CHAPTER 4 ROAD ACCIDENTS - Amazon S3s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/nasp.dot.gov.za/... · CHAPTER...

CHAPTER 4 Road Accidents 57

CHAPTER 4

ROAD ACCIDENTSIntroduction.............................................................................................................. 58Incidence of Road Accidents................................................................................... 58Road Accident Fatalities.......................................................................................... 62Easter 1999............................................................................................................... 63Causes of Accidents................................................................................................. 65

Alcohol................................................................................................................ 65Vehicle Condition................................................................................................ 68Road Environment............................................................................................... 68Enforcement of Road Safety............................................................................... 68International Experience..................................................................................... 70

Public Concern......................................................................................................... 70The Importance of Road Safety to Road Accident Compensation......................... 71Initiatives to Address Road Safety.......................................................................... 72

Drive Alive.......................................................................................................... 72Arrive Alive Campaign....................................................................................... 72Financial Contribution by the RAF To The Arrive Alive Campaign................. 74Government Strategy........................................................................................... 75RAF Road Safety Initiatives............................................................................... 77Road Safety Initiatives in Other Jurisdictions.................................................... 78

Conclusions.............................................................................................................. 79Recommendations.................................................................................................... 80

There is a lawlessness almost amounting to anarchy on theSouth African roads. - Road Accident Victims Association(RAVA)

Policing our roads must address not only discipline and safedriving but the condition of the vehicles on our roads, theobject of this particular exercise being to reduce the volume ofaccidents. One has only to look closer at the vehicles on ourroads to come to the conclusion that very many of themsimply have no place on the public road. Headlights andtaillights do not work, tyres are bald and wheels wobblealarmingly. Vehicles can be seen swaying from side to side astheir drivers’ battle worn steering mechanisms and defectiveor absent shock absorbers in an attempt to point their vehiclesin the correct direction, particularly on curves and onundulating roads. When these things are added to roads withbad surfaces and, very often, non-existent markings,drunkenness, aggression, overloading and so forth, it is easyto understand why there is such carnage on our roads. – MrLouis Schoeman of Attorneys Liston, Schoeman & Co

The bulk of RAF funding should be spent on enforcement ofspeed and alcohol, supported by highly emotivecommunications … The enforcement Campaign should beconcentrated in areas of high crash occurrence, at times when

58 ROAD ACCIDENT FUND COMMISSION REPORT 2002 Volume 1

accident occurs, with sufficient equipment available for use(such as cameras, lasers, booze buses and evidential breathtesters). – Drive Alive

Introduction

4.1. South Africa has one of the highest road accident death tolls in the world. Thereasons are manifold – ranging from arrogance behind the wheel to ignorance about therules of the road; from fraudulent issuing of drivers’ licences to the absence ofinfrastructure to patrol and police the roads; from drunk driving to speeding. A numberof initiatives from both civil society and from the authorities have failed to stem therising tide of casualties.

4.2. In the previous chapter the importance of the promotion of road safety for asystem of road accident benefits was briefly alluded to within the context of themaintenance of the road transport infrastructure and the provision and regulation ofpublic transport. As the need for road accident benefits is inversely related to the levelof road safety, it is this latter issue that requires ongoing investigation, politicalcommitment and community involvement.

4.3. This chapter discusses the causes and extent of road accidents in South Africaand, against this background, considers road safety initiatives.

Incidence of Road Accidents

4.4. Since legislation to protect the victims of motor vehicle accidents was firstmooted in 1939 the number of motor vehicle accidents on South African roads hasincreased dramatically which increase is illustrated in the graph below:


Figure 4.1: Number of accidents: 1945 to 1998

Source: Department of Transport, Arrive Alive Campaign, 1999

1945

- 1

998

0

100000

200000

300000

400000

500000

600000

4547

4951

5355

5759

6163

6567

6971

7375

7779

8183

8587

8991

9395

97


4.5. The increase in road accidents is mainly related to an increase in the numberof vehicles on South Africa’s roads. As can be seen from the graphs below, the incidenceof road accidents per number of registered vehicles has actually declined. Similarly, thenumber of casualties and fatalities per number of vehicles on the road has noticeablydeclined over the past six decades.

Figure 4.2: Number of accidents per 10,000 vehicles: 1935 to 1998

Source: Department of Transport

Figure 4.3: Number of casualties per 10,000 vehicles: 1935 to 1998


0

200

400

600

800

1100

1200

1400

1600

65 68 70 73 75 78 80 83 85 88 90 93 95 9838 40 43 45 48 50 53 55 58 60 6335

Acc

iden

ts p

er 1

0,00

0 ve

hic

les

Year

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Year

Cas

ual

ties

per

10,

000

veh

icle

s

65 68 70 73 75 78 80 83 85 88 90 93 95 98383838 4040 43 45 48 50 53 55 58 60 6335


Figure 4.4: Number of road accident fatalities per 10,000 vehicles: 1935 to 1998


4.6. During 1998 some 866 536 motor vehicles were involved in accidents on theroad. Of these, 541 779 were motorcars (62.5%), 141 581 (16.3%) were light deliveryvehicles and 69 710 (8.0%) were minibus taxis1.

Figure 4.5: Type of vehicles involved in accidents: 1998

Source: Statistics South Africa, Road Traffic Collisions, 1998

4.7. The majority of accidents are recorded as taking place in urban areas. In 1998most of them, whether urban or rural, took place on straight roads and thereafter atstop/yield locations.

680

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Year

65 70 73 75 78 80 83 85 88 90 93 95 9838 40 43 45 48 50 53 55 58 60 6335

Fat

alit

ies

per

10,

000

veh

icle

s

Heavy5%

LDV16% Minibus

8%

Car63%

Other7%

Bus1%


Figure 4.6: Locations at which accidents occurred: 1998

Source: Department of Transport Arrive Alive Campaign 1999

Road Accident Fatalities

4.8. The Annual Traffic Safety Audit of 1998 prepared by the AutomobileAssociation compared South Africa’s road fatality rates with those of four developedcountries as follows:

Table 4.1: Comparison between other countries and South African road fatality rates

Source: The Automobile Association of South Africa

4.9. South Africa’s road safety statistics are better than those in comparabledeveloping countries, but the country "still endures a road safety record that is muchpoorer than in most developed countries"2. South Africa’s fatality rate of just under 10per 100 000 vehicle kilometres is half of that in Turkey but it is still almost nine timesthe level of that in the UK. This amounts to over 10 000 accident-fatalities per year.South Africa’s position is illustrated in the graph below. Of the countries included in thiscomparison only Korea, Egypt, Italy and Kenya have a higher number of fatalities thanSouth Africa per vehicle kilometres travelled.

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

350,000

400,000

450,000

500,000

No.

of

Acc

iden

ts

Urban 71,843 100,739 10,418 993 3,915 252,821 20,098 460,827

Rural 646 5,002 762 88 486 36,381 7,413 50,778

RobotStop /

YieldPed-Xing Rail

Fway

Ramp

Straight

Rd

Curved

RdTotal

Country Per 100,000 Population Per 100,000 Vehicles

Australia 12.09 21.62Canada 13.81 21.51France 15.93 28.45USA 16.35 21.53RSA 31.78 181.83


Figure 4.7: International comparison

Source: The Automobile Association of SA: International Comparison, 1998

Easter 1999

4.10. Over the Easter long weekend, 1 – 5 April 1999, 134 road accidents werereported by the South African Police Services. In these accidents 321 people died, thehighest number being in the Western Cape (53 fatalities in 33 crashes) followed by theNorthern Province (34 fatalities in 16 crashes) and KwaZulu Natal (34 fatalities in 23crashes). The highest number of deaths was caused by vehicles overturning, the secondhighest in accidents involving pedestrians. 41% of fatal crashes involved motor vehiclesand 19% involved light delivery vehicles. These were followed by taxis (10%) andminibuses (7%).

4.11. The then Minister of Transport, Mr Mac Maharaj, commented that:

a) Eighty-one deaths had occurred as a result of vehicles overturning andsome 39 such incidents were recorded around the country. Twenty-fivepeople died in seven head-on collisions and there were seven fatal crashesinvolving bicycles.

b) There were 32 fatal accidents in built up areas and 102 outside city or townlimits. The routes on which the most fatalities occurred were on the N12,the N1 and the R27.

c) Of the 170 vehicles in the 134 fatal crashes, 42% were passenger cars.Minibus taxis accounted for 10.6% of the total vehicles involved in fatalcrashes. A total of 51 people, four of them pedestrians, were killed in taxicrashes. Seven people died in a minibus taxi in the Northern Cape that it is

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75

USA

United Kingdom

Sweden

Spain

South Africa

Netherlands

Korea

Kenya

Japan

Italy

Israel

Hong Kong

Germany

France

EgyptCountry

Fatalities / 100 Million Vehicle Kilometers


alleged was unroadworthy at the time. (Its entire wheel came off and thevehicle rolled across the road into the oncoming traffic.) A further fourpeople died in KwaZulu Natal in an overloaded minibus taxi containing 21persons after a tyre burst.

d) A total of 164 people died in vehicles, of whom, 45 were drivers and 119passengers. In all 57 pedestrians were killed.

e) Forty-four percent of the people killed were between the ages of 19 and 39years. Eleven children under the age of 12 were killed (two were cyclists,four were passengers and five pedestrians).

4.12. The Minister commented that the major contributory factors to fatal crasheswere speed, fatigue, alcohol and pedestrians jay-walking. Some form of human factorcontributed to 56.9% of fatal crashes while road and environmental factors played a rolein 24.8% with vehicle factors contributing 18.13%. In the provinces with the highestfatality rate the human element played the greater role – over 65%. Speed is acontributing factor in 75% of all fatal vehicle crashes. This is borne out by informationobtained from electronic speed measuring systems used over the Easter weekend thatindicated that, on average, 40% of all vehicles on national routes were exceeding thespeed limit.

a) Information obtained from trauma units indicated that alcohol was acontributing factor in 50% – 60% of all crashes.

b) Fatigue, which is difficult to prove, was claimed to be a direct cause in3.8% of fatal crashes. Overtaking when it was unsafe or unlawful so to doaccounted for 5.7% of fatal crashes.

c) Tyre bursts prior to crashes are said to have contributed to 15.1% of fatalcrashes. Overloading of cargo and/or passengers contributed to 2.8% whilefaulty lighting caused 2.8% of accidents.

d) Of the measured road and environmental factors that contributed towards24.8% of all fatal crashes during Easter 1999, poor visibility was said to bethe major contributing factor in 16% of the crashes. Poor street lightingwas blamed in 7.5% of cases followed by sharp bends and narrow roadsrespectively.

e) The time of day when serious crashes result in multiple fatalities is acritical factor. Over Easter 1999 a total of 37 people were killed in sixcrashes that occurred in the early morning or late at night. Four of theseinvolved passenger-carrying vehicles. The Minister referred to anexample: A bus crash near Van Rhynsdorp in the Western Cape on 5 April1999 claimed 11 lives at 03h45; 14 people were killed on 2 April 1999when two buses were involved in a six vehicle pile-up on the N1 at 04h00;a crash involving a bakkie and a minibus near Witbank at 22h45 on 2 April1999 left two dead. In total 60% of fatal crashes took place after dark3.


Causes of Accidents

4.13. Contributory causes of accidents differentiate between human, vehicle androad environment. The Road to Safety published by the Minister of Transport in August2001, allocated 80%-90% to human causes, 10%-30% to vehicle causes and 5%-15% toroad environment.

4.14. The key driver factors identified include speed, the influence of alcohol ordrugs, fatigue and basic driver competence. Vehicle fitness factors include under-inflated tyres, smooth or worn or the wrong type of tyres, vehicle overloading, poorbrakes, faulty steering, poor lights or vehicle visibility and poor general maintenance ofvehicle parts. Road environmental factors include poor maintenance of the road surfaceresulting in potholes and poor ride quality, poor maintenance of the road reserve and/orroad verges and inadequate signs and marking. The Road to Safety details the strategyof the Department of Transport for addressing each of these factors.

4.15. Information pertaining to contributory causes of accidents is not recorded onaccident report forms for various reasons. Information in this regard is collected by theDepartment of Transport only over the December and Easter holiday periods directlyfrom police stations immediately after the accidents occur. The reports are compiled bythe SAPS who do not have the skills to provide proper assessment of injuries and do notalways identify who died and when. Poor training of officials in accident investigationsand reconstruction procedures requires that information collected must be treated withgreat circumspection4.

4.16. The causes of South Africa’s high road accident rate are manifold. Amongthose most frequently cited are drunk driving, unroadworthy vehicles, the poorcondition of the roads, and inadequate lighting, particularly in rural areas.

Alcohol

4.17. The Department of Transport, Section: Traffic Legislation advised theCommission that South Africa accepted the principle of breath alcohol testing inlegislation in 1993 which has been implemented since September 1997. The Directorsof Public Prosecution have agreed to accept the test results of the breathalyserequipment – particularly the Drager machine that is used by law enforcement in allprovinces - as evidence in a court of law. However, acceptance of such evidence issubject to the equipment complying with the South African Bureau of Standards(SABS) specifications for evidential breath testers.

4.18. Section 122 of the Road Traffic Act, 29 of 1989, contains provisions relatingto drinking and driving. Sub-section (1) describes the elements of the offence "drivingunder the influence of alcohol or another substance that has narcotic effect". Sub-section(2)(24) deals with the requirements for blood testing. The current limit is 0.08g ofalcohol per 100ml of blood. Sub-sections (5)(2)(8) deal with the provisions on breathalcohol. Sub-section (5) stipulates the limit for breath alcohol that is 0.38mg per 1000mlof breath. Although the units are different from those of blood tests, they both test forthe same alcohol level. Sub-section (6) institutes the same presumption for breathalcohol as for blood alcohol. A person’s blood sample must be taken within two hoursof the accident but no time limit is prescribed for breath sampling. Similar provisionsare also included in Section 65 of the National Road Traffic Act, Act No. 93 of 1996,


which came into operation on 1 August 2000. This Act reduces the blood alcohol limitto 0.05g per 100ml for private drivers and 0.02g per 100ml for professional drivers; inrespect of breath alcohol, 0.24mg per 1 000ml for private drivers and 0.10mg per 1000ml for professional drivers. Section 65(9) makes it an offence to refuse to give abreath or blood sample.

4.19. Both in the RSA and elsewhere, alcohol has been assessed as the single mostimportant factor in motor vehicle collisions, particularly fatal ones. Local studiesimplicate alcohol as the major contributing factor in 40% of all accidents and in 65% ofaccidents occurring between the hour of 18h00 and 06h00. Intoxicated road users arealarmingly present in the RSA.

4.20. Multicentric random after-hours sampling performed during 1981 by theCouncil for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) showed that 29.2% of drivers hadtaken alcohol and 6.7% of drivers had blood alcohol consumption (BAC) levels at or inexcess of 0.08g/100ml. In November 1986 similar surveys showed that 3.4% of driversand 14.0% of pedestrians had blood alcohol consumption levels above the legal limit.

4.21. In 1982, 60% of drivers certified dead on arrival at hospitals had BAC levelsabove the legal limit. In 1980 a similarly selected pedestrian fatality analysis showed55.6% of victims to have had BAC levels above the legal limit.

4.22. In August 1997, 11.7% and in October 1997 9.7% of drivers were found tohave a drinking rate exceeding the legal limit5. In August 1997, 19.03% and in October1997 10.4% of pedestrians tested had drunk more than the legal limit.

Figure 4.8: RSA drinking rates of drivers and pedestrians


0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

August 1997 - January 1999

Per

cen

tag

e E

xcee

din

g L

egal

Lim

it

Drivers 11.8 9.8 7.2 5.1 5.9 5.8 5.1 3.3 3.2

Pedestrians 19 12.8 10.3 12.8 11 12 13.8 11 7.6

Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Aug Oct Dec Jan


4.23. During the period 26 July 1986 to 1 November 1987, particulars were taken ofa sample of 289 drivers injured in motor vehicle collisions who attended the GrooteSchuur Hospital trauma unit for treatment. Their sobriety was clinically assessed andthey were required to consent to the drawing of a blood sample for alcohol (ethanol)analysis. The presence or absence of law enforcement activity at the scene (particularlyas regards screening for the consumption of alcohol) and in the trauma unit was noted.A total of 285 blood samples were obtained and analysed and showed that 29.1% of thedrivers had a blood alcohol content at or above 0.08g/100ml. Law enforcement withregard to alcohol screening was found to be inadequate in all cases. The clinic alcoholscreening methods also proved to be inaccurate when compared with blood alcohollevels6.

4.24. Dr Van Kralingen, who recorded the results of the Groote Schuur Hospitalsample, commented on the three separate investigative and judicial processes that canapply where the driver who has caused a motor vehicle collision is blatantly intoxicated.If there are no injuries, neither the SAPS nor the traffic police is involved; if the guiltydriver is injured he is removed by ambulance long before the SAPS arrives with a goodchance that over consumption of alcohol will not be detected; if the guilty party isuninjured and remains on the scene and other collision victims are injured (thusrequiring the presence of the SAPS) that guilty driver might be prosecuted for suspecteddrunken driving. This would depend on the investigating officer detecting the driver’scondition and having the time and inclination to implement what has been described asthe "tedious process of obtaining a willing medical practitioner to draw the bloodsample and process the blood sample further".

4.25. Investigators of collisions are faced with a dilemma: blood determinationshould be made within two hours of the collision which would require the investigatorto leave the scene of the collision to arrange for a sample of blood to be taken. Dr vanKralingen suggests that a rapid, reliable and objective screening test should be used topredict more accurately when BAC sampling is needed and to address the grossundercall for such samplings. He recommends breath testing as a sufficiently reliableand practical manner of testing whether BAC sampling is needed.

4.26. Dr van Kralingen also refers to the current reluctance of many members of themedical profession to take blood specimens. Some of the reasons for this reluctance areuncertainty about the precise procedure, the fear of possible litigation, the fear of beingsubpoenaed to appear in court, uncertainty as to whether the injured patient was a driveror had been arrested, the realisation that their efforts would in most cases be futile, thefear that knowledge that they might be tested at hospitals might prompt the injured toforego medical assistance or delay obtaining it. Dr van Kralingen suggests that allenforcement personnel and hospital staff should be trained in the formal protocolsnecessary to evaluate7.

4.27. During December 2000 the Arrive Alive campaign conducted certainmonitoring surveys at 25 roadblocks throughout the country with the intention to"calculate weighted driver drinking rates from the data collected at the roadblocks".However, it soon became evident that "there was no standardised way of conducting analcohol roadblock". The result was that no statistically representative driving rate couldbe derived from the survey.


4.28. Arrive Alive commented in the survey that, "linking alcohol surveys aimed atestablishing a national driver alcohol drinking rate, with law enforcement actions, didnot produce the desired results". Difficulties included the fact that drivers were notselected randomly for testing but were screened by "sniffing" their breath; traffic orpolice roadblocks were moved and few alcohol tests were done. Among reasons for thiswas that officers claimed they had no mouthpieces available and therefore could not dothe testing. In one instance the same mouthpiece was used over and over again to savecosts. In others no attempts were made to do alcohol testing. Other problems were thata number of officers did not use the alcohol-screening equipment correctly; someoffenders were well known to officers who were reluctant to prosecute them; someroadblocks or testing sites were situated close to bars or restaurants while others werefar away from any popular drinking spots, some officers demanded to be paid for theirassistance.

4.29. Although no statistically representative drinking rate could be derived thesurvey showed that nearly 23% of the drivers who were tested had been drinking andsome 12% of those showed consumption higher than the legal limit. However, thesurvey cautions that no particular significance should be attached to the high level ofsome of these percentages because they are mostly an indication of the ability of theofficer to detect alcohol within a vehicle by "sniffing" or some other method.

Vehicle Condition

4.30. Moving South Africa argues that one of the most salient contributing factors tothe accident rate in South Africa is the low level of vehicle reinvestment, reflected inthe average vehicle age. The current vehicle "fleet" is operating at 82% of its usefuleconomic life. This vehicle ageing, particularly amongst buses and combis, contributesto affordability for operators but creates increasing risk for passengers and road users.It also necessitates additional vehicle maintenance requirements, if safety is to bemaintained.

4.31. According to the Institute of Motor Accident Investigators "many vehicles arenot roadworthy and cause more accidents than does negligence in driving". The Instituterecommends stricter enforcement on the lines of that in the United Kingdom whereroadworthiness tests have to be done every year before a vehicle can be licensed. Trafficofficers with some mechanical training should carry out inspections on the road.

Road Environment

4.32. The Institute informed the Commission that, particularly in rural accidents,topography plays a role. Generally, South African roads are deteriorating and manyroads are in an extremely poor condition. The Institute also pointed out that in urbanareas many accidents happen in taxi ranks where drivers speed and disobey signs andthere is poor lighting.

Enforcement of Road Safety

4.33. Another cause of the problem lies in enforcement of the system. This is aparticular problem in regard to truck overloading, with some hauliers able to reducecosts by overloading their vehicles, secure in the knowledge that enforcement will be


sporadic at best. While the hauliers profit, they create an additional cost in roadmaintenance and repair. Truck overloading is one of the principal sources of roaddamage in the country; the 30%-40% of trucks that are overloaded cause 60% of thedamage to the road network. KwaZulu-Natal has demonstrated the best record inenforcement, stopping six times as many vehicles as the next most aggressive province.As a result, the province has the lowest recorded number of overloading incidents (35%of all vehicles checked). Even with the best record in the country, KZN officials reportthat they would need an additional 218 officers or 57% of existing staffing to properlyenforce the load limits.

4.34. Not only are enforcement agencies under-staffed, more importantly they arehighly fragmented. Currently, more than 465 local traffic authorities and 83 provincialstations have some responsibility for traffic enforcement. In addition, non-transportentities with a host of competing priorities, like the courts, are an integral part of thesystem. Speed limits vary widely among jurisdictions, and if drivers are caught theirprobability of their bearing the cost is limited. Moving South Africa estimated that,adjusting for the probability of apprehension and then the probability of being served awarrant, the weighted average value of a R80 speeding ticket on the N2 in the WesternCape was R0.8 per fine.

4.35. This estimate signals a larger issue within the South African road systempertaining to the misalignment of risk. In general, the risk caused by South African roadoperators is not factored into their operating costs. So, for example, users pay into theRAF through the fuel tax, regardless of their safety record. In fact, until recently somefunding for the RAF originated from users – farmers or maritime operators, for instance- who never use the roads. General private insurance is not yet universal and not alwayspriced to an operator’s risk. As a result, the true risk – adjusted cost of operating on theroads - is rarely fully borne by the operator and the cost is pushed elsewhere into society,external to the transport system.

4.36. Superintendent Askew of the Crime Prevention Division (Accident CombatingSub-Section) informed the Commission that in 1999 there were approximately 550traffic departments. Only 15 of these provide a 24-hour service so there are frequentlyno traffic officers on duty when the majority of accidents occur. No one is available attraffic departments to take calls between 18h00 and 06h00 and during this periodemergency calls come through to the SAPS.

4.37. Superintendent Askew commented on the lack of continuity at provinciallevels within the SAPS and remarked that the attitude of senior police officers is thatroad safety is not a SAPS function. It is the view of the Superintendent that road safetyhas both law enforcement and accident investigation functions. He viewed "the demiseof the Uniform Investigation Branch as unfortunate".

4.38. Another problem he referred to was a lack of resources. Traffic officers, hesaid, are frequently aggressive with the public because they are forced to work overtimetoo often because of staff shortages. Insufficient petrol means that frequently as manyas seven or eight vehicles at a time cannot be used either by the SAPS or by trafficofficers. The Superintendent was concerned that local authorities are cutting back onfunding for road safety and rely instead on Arrive Alive funds and staff andrecommended a one-to-one contribution from local authorities and Arrive Alive.


4.39. He pointed out that there is no course in accident crime investigation in SouthAfrica and as a result personnel are not trained. However, some traffic departments –Stellenbosch, Tygerberg and Kempton Park among them - are becoming involved inaccident investigation. The Superintendent recommended the restoration of a UniformInvestigation Branch in the SAPS, a formal relationship with traffic departments andon-site crime investigation.

4.40. Superintendent Askew pointed out that of approximately 110 000 accidents onthe road per annum there are prosecutions in only 10% of cases and between 1% and5% result in convictions.

International Experience

4.41. A recent article in Time magazine (19 August 2002) commented on the 8 079road accident fatalities in France in the year 2000 which topped the European Unionrankings of road accident fatalities – well ahead of 7 503 fatalities in Germany duringthe same year. Fatalities per million road users in 2001 were 57.6 in Britain, 84.9 inGermany and 137.7 in France.

4.42. The high road accident rate is attributed by Mr Jacques Robin, Vice Presidentof The League Against Road Violence, to a "veritable culture of irresponsibility andegotism". Many argue that it is necessary to teach French drivers a "healthy fear of thelaw". Approximately 50% of road deaths are attributed to speeding and 31% involvealcohol but it is thought that French judges are indulgent to offenders since punishmentfor violations is usually fines or suspended sentences:

The judge was more inclined to put himself into the driver’sshoes than mine, even though I’m the one who’s handicappedfor life. – Marcelle Verthoud (61) (who has spent three yearsin hospitals and in rehabilitation centres since a drunk driverhit her car head on; the driver receiving a three monthsuspended gaol sentence).

4.43. It is argued by many including Mr Jacques Robin that "it takes politicalcourage and will to police and punish dangerous drivers. It happens elsewhere, yet noFrench government has risked angering drivers by making enforcement of laws onroads and in courts a priority".

Public Concern

4.44. Many of the individuals and organisations with which the Commission hasbeen in contact have expressed their concern (and distress) at the high incidence ofaccidents on South African roads.

4.45. The Actuarial Society of South Africa commented that, "it is high time that thetransportation and taxi industries and the South African motoring public in general, bejolted into action in improving the appalling state of driving habits and attitudes onSouth African roads".

4.46. RAVA drew a distinction between road accidents and road crime. RAVA


regards an incident as a road accident "when the vehicle owner has placed a vehicle inreasonable condition on the road and the driver has driven with reasonable skills in areasonable manner and with a reasonable attitude towards his duties, his passengers andother road users". RAVA accepts that, notwithstanding such reasonableness, roadaccidents cannot be totally avoided. However, road crime occurs "where the vehicle orthe conduct of a driver (or both) are such that an accident is not a departure from thenorm but is in fact the normal, if not inevitable, consequence of certain conduct" andthis is avoidable. The Association recommended that existing structures at the variouslevels must be engaged in road crime prevention and enforcement. Its view is that a "gettough" stance and a "zero tolerance" policy will meet with public approval at anymeaningful level.

4.47. Stressing the need for "greater emphasis on road safety enforcement", theSouth African Insurance Association (SAIA) made a number of suggestions rangingfrom annual compulsory roadworthy tests on all vehicles to improvement of thecondition of roads and enforcement of drivers’ licence requirements. SAIA pointed outthat insurance companies operate their own punitive measures against insureddrivers/vehicle owners involved in road accidents.

The Importance of Road Safety to Road Accident Compensation

4.48. The majority of submissions to the Commission agreed with the ActuarialSociety of South Africa that:

It cannot be over-emphasised that the primary cause of theposition in which the RAF finds itself is the extraordinaryhigh rate of accidents on South African roads.

4.49. The General Council of the Bar submitted that, "there can be no doubt as to theimportance of the reduction of road accidents vis-à-vis the RAF". Any reduction in theaccident rate would result in savings in both the short and long term and also inadministrative savings such as on Criminal Court cases. The GCB therefore concluded,"it seems fair and reasonable that the costs to be incurred in having the accident ratereduced must be borne by the parties who ultimately enjoy the benefits".

4.50. RAVA stressed that the Commission should "focus its recommendations on thehigh accident rate that creates a high compensation need. There is no effectivemechanism in place to enforce the rules of the road and the rules relating to roadworthyvehicles and at the end of the day it will be cheaper and more economically viable tocut down the accident rate than to simply pump more money into the RAF tocompensate victims".

4.51. Mrs R D Vaka, CEO of the Botswana MVA Fund, argues that "since it is notpossible to increase the revenue of the Fund as and when required the only way tocontrol its solvency is to somehow control the accident rate and reduce the severity ofaccidents so as to reduce the amounts payable on claims."


Initiatives to Address Road Safety

Drive Alive

4.52. Drive Alive is a movement formed in 1989 by concerned South Africancitizens determined to create a new environment in which the number of road deaths andcasualties will be reduced by raising resources for public education campaigns, keepingthe public aware and informed about road safety and lobbying for stricter legislationagainst reckless and drunken driving.

4.53. Drive Alive subjects local and provincial work (and initiatives) to carefulscrutiny. One of their observations is that "there is little co-operation betweengovernment departments". They point out that the Johannesburg Hospital is not allowedto take blood unless permission is given by the Traffic Department; that the Departmentof Justice has a new Road Traffic Act but the Department of Transport is withoutsufficient funds to implement it and that the Department of Education has introducedlife skills into its Curriculum 2005 but road safety is not included therein.

4.54. Drive Alive sees the prime objective of the RAF investment in road safety tobe "an immediate and significant reduction in road deaths and the consequent reductionin serious injuries that follow from this strategic focus".

Arrive Alive Campaign

4.55. The main goal of the Arrive Alive Campaign, which was introduced in 1997was to:

Promote road traffic safety in general throughout the countryin order to effect a decrease in road accidents, fatalities,injuries and contributing road traffic offences by means of amulti-disciplinary approach. – National Business Plan for theArrive Alive Campaign, October 2001

4.56. The secondary goals of the Arrive Alive Campaign are to reduce certain criticalroad traffic offences through targeted law enforcement (speed, moving offences, driverfitness such as driving under the influence of alcohol and without a valid drivinglicence, non-wearing of seatbelts, overloading, intersection offences and vehicle fitnessaspects); to promote the effective adjudication of road traffic offenders; to engage thegeneral public, commuters and communities in participative road safety promotionprogrammes; to engage government departments and other role players; to ensurecompliance with minimum requirements and standards by driving licence testingcentres and vehicle testing stations; to identify and improve hazardous locations on theroad and street network; to establish monitoring, reporting and information systems andto establish financial management systems.

4.57. As indicated above the RAF contributed a total of R183.25 million to theArrive Alive Campaign between October 1997 and April 2002. Notwithstanding severalrequests, the Department of Transport was unable to advise of the portion of the costsof the Arrive Alive Campaign subsidised by the RAF. The March 2001 "Arrive AliveImpact Evaluation and Reporting" report authored by the CSIR summarises the ArriveAlive expenditure by reference to expenditure in each province of "RAF and own


funds" and fails to disclose which portion of RAF funds were allocated to whichprovince, what other contributions were made and from what other sources and in whatamount.

4.58. The only information made available to the Commission indicates that R106million was spent on the Arrive Alive Campaign between October 1997 and April 1999of which the RAF contributed 78% (R83 million) with the Department of Transport(R21 million) and the insurance company Glenrand MIB (R2 million) making furthercontributions. Local authorities also indirectly bore some of the costs.

4.59. Reports on the success of the Arrive Alive Campaign differ. On the one hand, theMinistry of Transport has claimed success in reducing the number of accidents on SouthAfrican roads. On the other hand, the Department of Transport itself has identifiedserious problems:

a) The Campaign has run into difficulties for a number of reasons. One ofthem is difficulty in obtaining co-operation from the different provinces –provinces failed to submit business plans and only 15% of local authoritiesresponded to questionnaires. Provinces were asked to ascertain where,when, how and by whom equipment has been used but none replied.

b) Another problem is the lack of co-ordination amongst different localauthorities – the journey from Pretoria to Johannesburg, for instance, takesthe driver through six different law enforcement jurisdictions (Pretoria,Centurion, Midrand, Sandton, Germiston, Johannesburg).

c) Mr Gerrie Botha of the Department of Transport and the Arrive AliveCampaign commented on the difficulties in obtaining co-operation fromthe different provinces. The result was that it was decided to focus on a lessambitious strategy. In Phase 1 the Campaign promoted law enforcement ona local and provincial basis while Phase 2 focused on overtime lawenforcement, the purchase of law enforcement equipment andcommunication.

d) The Campaign learnt not to spread its resources too thinly. There was theneed for concentration of personnel along the more hazardous routes butthis learning curve took time and compilation of data.

e) Provinces and local authorities themselves decide who will work overtimeand when and where this will take place. Arrive Alive has not been givendetailed reports and there is no co-ordination. Concern is expressed thatArrive Alive Campaign money could have been spent on basic salaries andnot on additional and overtime law enforcement.

4.60. This Campaign has been strongly criticised in a number of submissions to theCommission. Drive Alive has commented that the Arrive Alive Campaign has "trafficofficers who are thinly spread, who are underpaid, not part of a team and badly co-ordinated". The link between the Arrive Alive Campaign and any reduction in deaths isdoubted and the question has been raised as to whether, in the absence of sufficientstatistics testifying to the direct benefit achieved by the financial contributions made bythe RAF, the value of the Campaign can be assessed.


4.61. In evaluating the Arrive Alive initiative and assessing its relevance andbenefits, it is necessary to adopt more than merely a bottom line statistical analysis. Onemust be mindful of the returns of any promotion and advertising initiatives. In thepresent instance, it can be expected that the Arrive Alive campaign has attractedattention and aroused curiosity, conveyed the message of the necessity for safe driving,encouraged drivers by convincing them that it is in their own interests that they drivesafely. Not only should one be alert to the medium and long-term yields in the reductionof statistics but also to the short-term advantages of awareness of road safetycampaigns.

Financial Contribution by the RAF To The Arrive Alive Campaign

4.62. During the financial years 1997 to 2002, the RAF contributed substantially tothe costs of the Arrive Alive Campaign, introduced by and operating under the aegis ofthe Department of Transport. The contributions of the RAF are set out below:

Table 4.2: RAF contributions to the Arrive Alive Campaign: 1997 to 2002


4.63. The Commission raised doubts about the statutory authority for the RAF tocontribute towards funding the Arrive Alive Campaign. The new Board of the RAFobtained legal opinion in this regard during July 2000 and was advised that the Boardof the RAF was "acting ultra vires its powers under the Act in making use of the fundsto promote the Arrive Alive campaign". The necessary legislative amendment "toauthorise the Fund to make financial contributions to road safety projects andprogrammes approved by the Minister" was enacted during April 20018.

4.64. The unlawful expenditure by the Board of the RAF of fuel levy income on theArrive Alive campaign is dealt with in detail in chapter 37 of this Report. Suffice it tosay that this expenditure confirms firstly, the need for an independent and strong mindedRAF Board and, secondly, that the fact that it is appropriate to relocate the RAF fromthe aegis of the Ministry of Transport to the Ministry of Social Welfare andDevelopment.

4.65. It is the view of the Department of Transport that the contribution made by theRAF towards the Arrive Alive Campaign is "an investment that brings down the risk ofthe RAF".

4.66. There has been much criticism of the Arrive Alive Campaign and theinvolvement of the RAF therewith. The Department of Transport has noted that the RAFhas given no direction as to how fuel levy income should be spent. The Law Society ofSouth Africa commented that the "anticipated return on the investment in the Arrive

Phase Time Period Amount (R Millions)

1 April 1997 - March 1998 37.52 April 1998 - March 1999 45.753 April 1999 - May 2000 20.04 April 2000 - March 2001 30.05 April 2001 - March 2002 50.0

Total 183.25


Alive Campaign is not encouraging" and pointed out that there is no effective system tomonitor fuel levy investment in the Arrive Alive campaign. The General Council of theBar has been critical about the lack of control over expenditure on the Arrive AliveCampaign and an apparent absence of strategic thinking. In fact, a former member ofthe senior management of the RAF, Mr Duif de Waal commented publicly several timesthat he had serious doubts about the efficacy or value of the RAF contribution towardsthe Arrive Alive Campaign.

Government Strategy

4.67. The mission statement of the Department of Transport was defined in the 1996White Paper on Transport Policy as "to ensure an acceptable level of quality in roadtraffic, with the emphasis on road safety, on the South African urban and rural roadnetwork". The objective set by the Department of Transport was to reduce crashes,deaths and injuries on the roads of South Africa by 5% year-on-year until the year 2004and thereafter by 10% year-on-year until the year 2009. These targets were set in stagesto take realistic account of the constraints facing the Department of Transport in thefundamental restructuring of road traffic safety management.

4.68. Strategy 2000 (a discussion document issued by the Ministry of Transport on3 May 2000) has identified four key focal areas around which detailed actions have beenand are being designed: enforcement and law compliance; operator, vehicle and driverfitness; management systems and capacity building; public education and participation.

4.69. Enforcement and law compliance includes road traffic law enforcement andinstitutional monitoring and control. The goals of road traffic law enforcement are:

a) To implement a much tougher approach to vehicle and fitness issues inaddition to zero tolerance of critical traffic contraventions such asdangerous overtaking and speeding, with a particularly stringent focus onheavy trucks, buses and minibus taxis.

b) To implement the sections of the National Road Traffic Act that governtransport of dangerous goods and the setting of new, lower, breath andalcohol limits.

c) To substantially increase the number of regular roadblocks to undertakeinspections of driver and vehicle fitness on a daily, year round basis, onboth national and provincial through routes and urban roads and streetnetworks.

d) To intensify speed law-enforcement through the deployment of state of theart equipment and procedures and the implementation of streamlinedmethods of the processing of notices through the Road TrafficInfringement Agency.

e) To encourage provincial and local traffic authorities to enter into contractswith the private sector for static camera monitoring of speed and trafficlight violations.

f) To establish urgently fines and demerit point norms to be applied to


commercial transport operators to key offences such as overloading andunroadworthiness.

g) To investigate the introduction of a weighted system of licensed demeritpoints for younger drivers and professional freight and public passengerdrivers.

h) To appoint additional administrative staff to service traffic authoritiesthereby relieving qualified traffic officers of the administrative duties andgetting them out onto the road 24 hours of the day to concentrate on law-enforcement actions.

i) To give urgent priority to filling vacant traffic officer posts and makingsubstantial additional funds available for traffic law enforcement purposes.

j) To implement more 24-hour-seven-days-a-week Traffic Control Centreswith weighbridges at carefully targeted locations in the road networks tofocus on freight and public passenger driver and vehicle fitness with aparticular emphasis on overloading.

k) To investigate the creation of an elite "roving" national traffic law-enforcement team to undertake special actions around the country atlocations where they will have the biggest impact.

4.70. Institutional monitoring and control includes the rooting out of fraud andcorruption at Driving Licence Testing Centres and Vehicle Testing Stations. This canbe achieved by taking immediate steps to increase the powers and staffing levels of theinspectorates. In addition a computerised standard national system should be developedfor testing learner drivers and driving school instructors and certain testing centresshould be commercialised or privatised.

4.71. Key issues relating to operator, vehicle and driver fitness are the effectivecontrol of entry into the public passenger transport market, the widening of monitoringpowers and evidential capacity for assessment under legislation and customer/publicempowerment to act as agents of safety promotions. In order to ensure operator fitness,regulations would have to be amended to compel all owners of vehicles for which aprofessional driving permit is required to be registered as operators as well as drivers,strengthening basic entry on safety performance requirements related to possession ofan Operator Card. Driver fitness requires review of the regulations governing the issueand renewal of professional driving permits and also amendment of legislation toprescribe conditions of employment, monitoring equipment, testing of professionaldrivers and development of road safety education courses. Vehicle fitness involvesresearch into the installation of speed limiting devices and multi-functional "black box"devices in freight and public passenger transport vehicles; the safety and loadingfeatures on certain vehicles, updating safety specifications by the SABS and phasing-incompulsory roadworthy tests for all vehicles, initially every five years, reducing toevery three years and finally to an annual test to every vehicle over three years old.

4.72. Infrastructure systems involve road safety audits, a programme of cost-effective remedial engineering measures and the creation of a specialist national teamto identify high-risk locations and to investigate the introduction of appropriate


remedial engineering measures. Management information systems require thedeployment and effective implementation by traffic authorities of the managementinformation systems, effective implementation of the Road Accident Fund and theregular analysis and dissemination of useful road traffic safety information.

4.73. Education and training of all road users whether they are scholars, students incommunities or traffic officials is envisaged. There should be public participation andempowerment. It is commented that, "the passengers who sit in buses and taxis everyday are potentially very powerful agents of change and compliance. The same appliesto other road users and the general public. [The document suggests that such passengerscould encourage] correct behaviour as it is happening; and they could, in organisedformation, support safety enforcement compliance and promotion activities."

4.74. The Department of Transport informed the Commission that Government islooking at optimal modes of transport. Its policy is to formulate a programme,implement regulation and control and then provide economic assistances.

4.75. The Department of Transport informed the Commission that it believed"fragmentation" was a key issue with regard to the lack of success in achieving roadsafety on South African roads. However, since March 2000 the sum of R140 million hadbeen allocated to traffic control. Approximately 1 000 people were to be recruited andwould receive six months’ training at Traffic Training Colleges to become qualifiedtraffic officials.

RAF Road Safety Initiatives

4.76. During April 2002 the RAF reported to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committeeon Transport that it had budgeted a sum of R25 million in respect of its "road safety"campaign. The RAF subsequently advised the Commission that it planned to initiate anRAF-driven programme managed by a dedicated Road Safety Desk.

4.77. Amongst the responsibilities which would be carried out by such Road SafetyDesk include:

Complement Arrive Alive Initiatives [and] Road to SafetyStrategy Initiatives; liaise with the Arrive Alive and the Roadto Safety Strategic teams on behalf of the RAF; address gapsin the Arrive Alive and Road to Safety Strategy Initiatives;develop a road safety education strategy to limit the kinds ofaccidents which expose the Fund to huge [million rand plus]claims; create a database of and liaise with relevant roadsafety organisations in the country; identify and supportpractical and relevant road safety initiatives by communitiesand civil society structures; conduct road safety education andworkshops in schools and relevant institutions; commissionresearch into inadequately addressed aspects of road safety;conduct studies into road safety awareness and designappropriate corrective programmes; translate road safetyresearch findings into practical programmes of action; exploreand enter into strategic partnerships with road safetystakeholders; promote road safety consciousness amongpublic transportation providers, particularly freight, truck, bus


and taxi operators; promote the gradual introduction of roadsafety technology, e.g. ABS brakes and airbags, in vehiclessold in the country; run campaigns to centre road safety in theconsciousness of the South African public.

4.78. The Commission had requested the RAF to advise, inter alia, by whom theRAF anticipated such road safety campaign would be run, what control the RAF wouldexercise thereover and generally indicate what was to be achieved and in what mannerand over what period of time. It is noted that the RAF has failed to give any indicationof the personnel who would staff this Road Safety Desk and how the budgeted sum ofR25 million would be expended in the current financial year that ends 31 March 2003.

Road Safety Initiatives in Other Jurisdictions

4.79. In many countries the regulatory authority or administrator of road accidentcompensation or benefits is actively engaged in initiatives intended to reduce thenumber and severity of accidents on roads. Such initiatives are usually linked toprogrammes intended to improve the management of injuries resulting from roadaccidents. This also involves research and service development in the fields of traumacare, rehabilitation and life care. Essential to any such initiatives is the collection,analysis and dissemination of data for purposes of research, policy development andmonitoring the effectiveness of any programmes.

4.80. The Motor Accident Insurance Board (MAIB) of Tasmania has established theInjury Prevention and Management Foundation whose purpose includes fundingresearch, education and service of development programmes directed towards theprevention of injuries resulting from motor accidents. In addition, the MAIB commitsfunding each year to the Road Safety Task Force that is involved in enforcement andpublic education activities. The MAIB contribution has been made on condition "that areduction in serious injury claims is achieved". Targets for claim reductions have beenset following a major study into the factors which contribute to the incidence of seriousroad injuries, the sustainability of the impact of initiatives with regard to speeding,drink-driving and road laws, the effectiveness of advertising and enforcementcampaigns.

4.81. In New Zealand the Injury Prevention and Rehabilitation Act establishes injuryprevention as one of the primary functions of the Accident Compensation Corporation(ACC). It is stressed that well-managed injury prevention strategies "requirecomprehensive, consistent and accessible information across a number of differentagencies". The ACC published, as part of its Injury Prevention Programme, "DownWith Speed" which provides a substantial research base to consideration of speeding asa safety issue and the sort of strategies that can be employed to reduce speed. AmongstACC road safety programmes include the "Stop Bus Programme" which buildsawareness of the danger of drinking and driving; the "Down With Speed Programme";the "Community Seatbelt Programme" in which there are 36 projects encouraging roadusers to "belt up"; the "Motorcycles Programme" which aims to reduce high injury ratesamongst motorcycle riders and which focuses on speeding and visibility atintersections.

4.82. The Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC) has made a majorcommitment in funding, research and expertise to programmes that reduce crashes,


injuries and deaths. The ICBC Road Improvement Programme identifies high-crashlocations and collaborates in the development of engineering solutions such as newsignal lights and better marked cross-walks. ICBC works with communities andstakeholder groups to help them take responsibility for road safety challenges. ICBCpromotes safe driving through a series of public education efforts under the umbrellaname of "RoadSense". These include curriculum programmes offered in BritishColumbia high schools to provide youth with basic knowledge of the risks associatedwith being a driver or a passenger and ways to manage those risks. At the elementarylevel there is a programme offering a series of levels for young children on road safety.The "Way To Go" programme promotes the use of safe travel alternatives for schoolchildren. Publications include "Navigating the Teen Driving Years – A Resource Guidefor Parents", "Bike Smarts" which is a handbook for teachers, youth leaders and cyclinginstructors, "RoadSense Kids" which is a family fun activity book, "Road Sensibility"which is a programme available for programme leaders to enable them to develop aninstructive programme on road safety and driver preparedness. ICBC provides RoadSense Scholarships available at universities, colleges or other post-secondaryinstitutions intended to reward school students for their commitment to road safety.ICBC has sponsored the Rock Solid RoadSense Teen Police Camp to enable 150 highschool students to attend an eight-day mini police academy that focuses on road safetyissues such as excessive speed, auto crime and impaired driving.

4.83. The Motor Accidents Commission (MAC) of South Australia devotes asignificant percentage of funds to sponsor programmes that focus on road safety andcrash prevention. Projects range from road safety education for school students tosponsorship of New Years’ Eve bus services in regional areas. "MAC Night Moves" isa late night bus service run between midnight and 5am every Saturday night takingpeople home from popular city night-spots which is intended to reduce the numbers ofdrivers who take to the roads under the influence of alcohol, drugs or fatigue. The MAChas sponsored research on roadside hazards and the effectiveness of the erection ofroadside accident markets and interpretative signs. The Youth Driver TrainingProgrammes have reached more than 80 000 school students, youth groups and adultgroups throughout South Australia. MAC funded the production of the "CrashDummies" display set up at the National Motor Museum at which visitors can choosewhether or not to fit seat belts to dummies in a mock car which is then pulled up a trackand released into a wall with the visitors viewing the crash in slow motion to see theresults with and without seatbelts.

Conclusions

4.84. There is no doubt that accidents on South African roads remain at anunacceptably high level. It is the opinion of this Commission that the promotion of roadsafety and a scheme for the provision of road accident benefits are inseparable. Theactive involvement of the road accident benefits scheme in the promotion of road safetyis inevitable.

4.85. However, such involvement cannot continue to take the form of unmonitoredfinancial contributions of fuel levy income from the RAF to the Arrive Alive Campaign.Any contribution from a road accident benefits scheme should be directed specificallytowards the most effective interventions. This requires liaison with and evaluation andmonitoring of all road safety interventions.


Recommendations

4.86. The link between safety on the roads and claims for road accident benefits mustbe clearly articulated and publicised by the administrative authority of the road accidentbenefits scheme.

4.87. The administrative authority should also actively involve itself in the captureand analysis of data on the incidence and causes of road accidents, the nature and extentof injuries and disablement resulting therefrom, and the impact of such injuries anddisability on individual victims, their families and the broader South Africancommunity.

4.88. This information should be made available to Government; to institutions andbusinesses involved in the planning, design and building of roads; and to transportbodies and road user associations.

4.89. The administrative authority should be proactive in initiating, promoting andfunding initiatives, programmes and research to promote safety on South African roads,to limit the factors contributing to road accidents and to prevent and improve themanagement of injuries resulting from such accidents. Such involvement should notusurp the Ministry of Transport or relieve it of its own road safety responsibilities.

1 Statistics South Africa, "Road Traffic Collisions 1998".2 Moving South Africa.3 Press release from the Minister of Transport, Wednesday 7 April 1999 "Final Easter Traffic Update".4 Mr Gerrie Botha of the Department of Transport. "The Department of Transport is not responsible for the capture of data on

which statistics are based and bases its statistics merely on data captured by the relevant authorities. Accordingly the accuracyof statistics is therefore not guaranteed." Communication from the Department of Transport to the Road Accident FundCommission, 9 November 1999.

5 Arrive Alive Road Safety Campaign, Department of Transport during 1999.6 Van Kralingen and others. 1991. Alcohol in the Injured Driver. The Podder Project conducted at the Groote Schuur Trauma

Unit, February.7 Ibid.8 The Road Accident Fund Amendment Bill, 2001, Government Gazette No. 22251.

Date post:	21-Jan-2020
Category:	Documents
Upload:	others
View:	7 times
Download:	0 times

CHAPTER 4 ROAD ACCIDENTS - Amazon S3s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/nasp.dot.gov.za/... · CHAPTER...

Documents