Chapter 8- Legislative Department

8/13/2019 Chapter 8- Legislative Department

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Chapter 8: The Legislative Department

A. Organization and Membership;Composition/Apportionment

MACIAS VS COMELEC

GR. L-18684 (Sept. 14, 1961) (Constitutional Law Apportionment,

Proportional Representation)

FACTS:

Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of a law (Republic Act

3040) that apportions representative districts in this country on the ground

that it is unconstitutional and void because it apportioned districts without

regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces. Respondentsaver they were merely complying with their duties under the statute, which

they presume and allege to be constitutional.

ISSUE:Whether or not an apportionment law that is disproportion in

representation is unconstitutional.

HELD:

Yes, a law giving provinces with less number of inhabitants more

representative districts than those with bigger population is invalid because

it violates the principle of proportional representation prescribed by the

Constitution. Such law is arbitrary and capricious and against the vital

principle of equality.

MARIANO vs. COMELEC (242 SCRA 211)

FACTS:

1.Two petitions assailing certain provisions of RA No. 7854 (An Act

Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City) as

unconstitutional.2.GR No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and

declaratory relief, and assailing the statute as unconstitutional on thefollowing grounds: a.Section 2 did not properly identify the land area or

territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical

descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in

relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code .b.Section 51

attempts to alter or restart the three-consecutive term limit for local

elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and

Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.c. Section 52:i.Increased the

legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter)violates the

constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be

passed by Congress within three years following the return of every census ii.

The increase in legislative district was not expressed in the bill title iii.The

addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accordance with

Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitutionthe population of Makati is

450,0003.GR No. 118627 involves a petition which assails Section 52 as

unconstitutional on the same grounds as a fore stated.

ISSUE:Whether or not the questioned provisions are constitutional.

HELD:Yes. Petitions dismissed.

RATIO:

a.D: The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial

boundaries of a local government unit cannot be overemphasized. The

boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial

jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of

government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners

have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the

proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries.


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D: The existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an

insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with

reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit.

Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati.

b. D: The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality

of a law are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) thequestion of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the

constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;

and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the

determination of the case itself.

The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events (i.e.

Mayor Binay will run again, etc.)Petitioners merely posed a hypothetical

issues. Petitioners (residents of Taguig) are not also the proper parties to

raise this abstract issue.

c. D: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special

law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides

that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless

otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude

Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a

general reapportionment law.

This is exactly what the Congress did in enacting RA No. 7854 and providing

for an increase in Makatis legislative district.

D: The policy of the Court favors a liberal construction of the one title one

subject rule so as not to impede legislation. The Constitution does not

command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or

completely catalogue all its details. Hence, it should be sufficient

compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions

are germane to such general subject.

D: Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least

250,000 shall have at least one representative. Section 3 of the Ordinance

appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has

increased to more than 250,000 shall be entitled to at least one

congressional representative.

Although Makati has a population of 450,000, its legislative district may still

be increased since It has met the minimum population requirement of

250,000.

Tobias vs. Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783, Dec. 8, 1994

As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit

on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading

of the applicable provision, Art. VI, Sec. 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the

present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly

provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more

than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The inescapable

import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may

be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.

Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by RA

7675 is not unconstitutional.

As to the contention that Sec. 49 of RA 7675 in effect preempts the

right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument

borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was

Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed

law, including Sec. 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a

right which pertains to itself.

Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been

made to participate in the plebiscite on RA 7675 as the same involved a

change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the

principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of

Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district

representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan

were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do

with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.


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Similarly, petitioners additional argument that the subject law has

resulted in gerrymandering, which is the practice of creating legislative

districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence.

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep.

Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent

representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having

consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep.Zamoras constituency has in fact been diminished, which development

could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

Party-list System: Inviolable parameters to determine the winners;

Computation


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B. Election, term and contests-qualifications; residence

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

248 SCRA 300

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her

domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in

the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college

degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in

Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in

Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late

speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In

1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a

Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When

Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan,

Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won

presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San

Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and

Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of

Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo RoyMontejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and

also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellationand

Disqualification"with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner

did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner,

in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency,

which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her

Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and

that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or

residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that

she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to

be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election

purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners

claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her

own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following

reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became

Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father

brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or

change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former

residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond

with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,

domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile

because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same

thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos

in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new

home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage

and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres.

Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated

that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of

choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in

1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act,

which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She


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even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban,

celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the

necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of

Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned

Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby

SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial

Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected

Representative of the First District of Leyte.

AQUINO VS. COMELEC

(248 SCRA 400)

FACTS:

Agapito A. Aquino files his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of

Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati. (Note: he

stated his residency period as 0 years and 10months)

Move Makati and Mateo Bedon (LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP) files petition to

disqualify Aquino for lacking residence qualification.

COMELEC dismissed petition to disqualify

Move Makati and Mateo files a motion for reconsideration.

On the election Aquino wins with 38,547 votes over his opponent, Agusto

Syjuco, with 35,910votes.

COMELEC grants motion for reconsideration declaring Aquino as ineligible

and thus disqualified as a candidate and determine the winner from the

remaining legible candidates.

ISSUE: WON Aquino is legible to run for the said position WON Declaring thewinner from the remaining legible candidates is constitutional

HELD:

NO to both issues.

RATIO :

Sec 6 Art VIof the Constitution provides that a candidate must be aresident of the district he is representing for at least one year before the

elections. Aquino has always been a resident of Conception, Tarlac prior to

the elections. Although he leased a condominium unit within the district he

will be representing, mere leasing instead of buying the unit is not evident

of a strong intention to establish a domicile. Declaring the person who

garnered the second highest number of votes as the winner because the

choice of the majority is disqualified is against the sovereign will of the

people


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C. Compensation and privileges-freedom from arrest;privilege of speech and debate

PHILCONSA v. GimenezG.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994

Regala, J.

Facts:

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the

validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and

commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives,

and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on

retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on

increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office,

contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The

same provision constitutes selfish class legislation because it allows

members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of serviceand gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years

of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of

the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can

retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity

which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which,

in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick

leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of

Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further

increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of

retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers

objected to by the petitioner does not constitute forbidden compensation

within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution.

The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of

commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely

in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring

member and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.

Issue:

whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the

Constitution which reads as follows:

The senators and the Members of the House of

Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an

annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each,including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and

exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective

districts in the case of Members of the House of Representative and

to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when

attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said

compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full

term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of

Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided

by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of

Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of

sixteen thousand pesos.

Held:

Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the

compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was

only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as

follows: No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the

expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly

elected subsequent to approval of such increase. In other words, under the

original constitutional provision regarding the power of the NationalAssembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take

effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the

Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.

The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14,

Article VI, includes in the term compensation other emoluments. This is

the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement

benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the

term other emoluments.


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Emolumentis defined as the profit arising from office oremployment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is

annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.

It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of

emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one

possessing any office.

Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of

Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon

the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits

were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of

the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of

Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs

counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA

3836 is therefore unconstitutional.

OSMENA V. PENDATUN (109 PHIL. 863)

FACTS:

In a privilege speech entitled: A message to Garcia, Osmena made

allegations of bribery against the Garcia administration. House Resolution

no. 59 followed the creation of a special committee to investigate the

allegedly groundless charges made by Osmena against the Garcia

administration. House Resolution no. 175 found Osmena guilty of serious

disorderly behavior and thereby suspending him for 15months.

ISSUES:WON his suspension was constitutional

HELD:Court has no Jurisdiction. Dismissed

RATIO:

Osmena contends that the Constitution gave him complete

parliamentary immunity in his privilege speech. Although the purpose of

parliamentary immunity is to guarantee the legislator complete freedom of

expression without being made responsible in criminal or civil actions, it

does NOT protect him from responsibility before the legislative body

whenever his words or conducts are disorderly or unbecoming of a member

thereof. The question of whether Osmenas speech constitutes disorderly

conduct is for the House to judge. The matter depends mainly on factual

circumstances of which the house knows best. On the question of

jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed for being moot or academic.Because n opreliminary injunction was issued, the special committee

performed its task, reported to the house and the latter approved the

suspension order.

JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG (17 SCRA 87)

The speech and utterances must constitute legislative action- that is

actions that are done in relation with the duties of a Member of the

Congress.

FACTS:

Respondent was a member of the House who wrote an open letter

to the President of the Philippines, and caused this to be published in

several newspapers of general circulation. The contents of the letter were

mainly to inform the president of the so-called three operational plans

under serious study of some officers of the AFP and aided by some civilians.

It also describes these plans as an insidious plan or a massive political build-

up of then Secretary of Defense Vargas. It also details the various means

that has already been mopped out to ensure the success of these

operational plans. The letter also suggested that the planners already have

in their control several officers of the AFP, included are the petitioners. It

was mentioned however in the letter that those mentioned above as

already in control of the planners may be unwillingly be only tools of the

plan which they may have absolutely no knowledge. An ordinary civil action

for damages was instituted by petitioners against respondent for the

publication of an allegedly libelous letter. The trial court dismissed this

complaint.


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ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the letter was privileged communication?

2.)Whether or not the letter could be considered libelous?

HELD:

No. It is not privileged communication. Although the Constitution

provides for any member of Congress not to be questioned for any speech

or debate therein, in the halls of Congress or elsewhere, this publication

doesnt fall into this category. The said expression refers to utterances made

by legislators in the performance of their functions, while Congress is in

session. In the case a quo, the letter was made while Congress was

presumably not in session. Furthermore, he caused the letter to be

published in newspapers of general circulation, thus ipso facto he wasnt

performing his official duty either as a member of Congress or any officer of

any committee. No. The fact that the letter suggested that the plaintiffs may

be unwilling tools of the plan without having knowledge thereof already in a

way exculpate the responsibility of the plaintiffs in the said plans if ever they

have any part in the same. This is not derogatory to the petitioners to

entitle them to damages, especially that the planners of the operational

plans were already clearly suggested.

PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS (324 SCRA 689)

FACTS:

The accused was a member of the lower House when he was

convicted of rape. He was confined in the

National Penitentiary while his appeal was pending. He was re-

elected. He argued that he should be allowed to attend legislative sessions

and committee hearings; because his confinement was depriving the

electorate of his district of their voice in Congress and that he has a duty to

attend the sessions in Congress.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner should be allowed to attend sessions inCongress?

HELD:

No. Election to high government offices doesnt free the accused

from the common restraints of general law. The constitution provides that a

member of the House of Representative is privileged from arrest only if theoffense is punishable by not more than 6 years of imprisonment. The

accused has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the

operation of this provision. Section 11, Article 6 of the Constitution states

that a the members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend

sessions especially if the reason if a legitimate one. Confinement of a

congressman charged with a crime punishable by more than 6 years of

imprisonment has constitutional foundations. Allowing the accused to

attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually make

him a free man. When the voters of his district reelected him, they had full

awareness of the limitation of his freedom of action. The accused is only

one of the members of the House of Representatives. Congress continues to

function despite the absence of one or a few of its members. The issue in

this case boils down to the question of equal protection. Election to the

position isnt reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.

Instant motion is denied.


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D.Disqualifications and Disabilities- Incompatible vsForbidden Offices; duty to disclose in conflicts ofinterests; sec 12 and 13 Art VI, sec 14 Art VI

PUYAT V. DE GUZMAN (113 SCRA 31)

FACTS:

On May 14, 1979, an election for the Directors of the

International Pipe Industries Corporation was held. Petitioner Puyat

was among those elected. On May 25, 1979, the other group of

directors, led by Acero, instituted a proceeding questioning the said

election on the ground that the votes were not properly counted.

Thereafter, Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of Interim

Batasang Pambansa,entered his appearance as counsel for Acero to

which Puyat objected due to Constitutional Gorunds which provides

that:

SEC 11. ART VIII No Member of the Batasang Pambansa

shall appear as counsel . or before any administrative body.

Neither shall he, directly, or indirectly be interested

financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special

privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or

instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or

controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not acceptemployment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be

called on account of his office.

Assemblyman Esatnislao Fernandez did not continue his

appearance as counsel but instead filed a Motion for Intervention.

SEC granted the motion on account that Fernandez had 10 shares

on the corporation. Thereafter, the Court en banc issued a

temporary restraining order enjoining SEC from allowing the

participation as intervener of Assemblyman Fernandez. Solicitor

General supported the allowing of the intervention. Hence thispetition.

ISSUE:Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, may intervene inthe SEC Case without violating the Constitution.

HELD:The Order granting Fernandez to intervene in SEC Case isreversed and set aside.

RATIO:

Fernandez acquired a mere 10 shares out of 262, 843 shares.

He acquired said shares after the institution of the contested

election, after the suit has been filed and a day before he filed a

motion to intervene. Realizing that the objection of petitioner Puyat

as valid, Fernadez decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of

legal interest in the matter under litigation. Under those facts and

circumstances, the Court found that there has been an indirect

appearance as counsel before and administrative body and it is a

circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The intervention

was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the

proceedings in some other capacity. A ruling upholding the

intervention would make the Constitutional provision ineffective. All

an Assemblyman need to do, if he wants to influence an

administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the

interest of the client and then intervene in the proceedings. That

which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done in

indirection which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically

or impliedly prohibited. In brief, the Court held that the intervention

of Assemblyman in SEC case falls within the ambit of the prohibition

contained in Section 11.Art. VIII of the Constitution.


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Villegas vs Legaspi

Political Law Appearance in Court by a Congressman

FACTS:

On 27 Sept 1979, Villegas filed a complaint for annulment of bank

checks and damages against spouses Vera Cruz et al before the Court ofFirst Instance Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed their answer to the

complaint and they were represented by Valentino Legaspi, an

assemblyman and a member of the Batasang Pambansa. Villegas then

challenged the representation made by Legaspi as counsel for the spouses

on the ground that it is unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas no

member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court

without appellate jurisdiction. The presiding Judge however overruled

Villegas challenged and proceeded with the trial. Judge said that Courts of

First Instance have appellate jurisdiction. Villegas appealed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not CFIs are appellate courts resolving this is essential

in determining if Legaspi indeed violated a constitutional provision?

HELD:

CFIs have dual personalities. They can be courts of general original

jurisdiction (courts of origin) or appellate courts depending on the case thatthey took cognizance of. In the case at bar, CFI Cebu acted as a court of

general original jurisdiction since the case filed by Villegas was not elevated

from any lower court. It is then clearly resolved that this CFI in the case at

bar is a court without appellate jurisdiction. Legaspi then has violated a

constitutional provision and is hereby barred to appear as counsel before

the said court of first instance.

Adaza vs Pacana

Singularity of Office/Position

FACTS:

Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in

the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started

discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Pacana was

elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the

law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On

March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14,

1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the

ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates,

while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa

on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of saidoffice. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of

Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to perform the

duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of

the governors office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana

therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six

years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term

expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of

the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a

local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and

simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.

ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a

governor of the province simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor

who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original position and as such

can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.


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HELD:

Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:

Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan

Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or employment in the

government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,

including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his

tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .

The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza

cannot invoke common law practices abroad. He cannot complain of any

restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one

office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the

Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana,

as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left

vacant by petitioners election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul

against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on

May 14, 1984, Section 13*2+ of which specifically provides that gove rnors,

mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall,

upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of

absence from office. Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of

this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of

candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg.

337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code.


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E. Internal Government- officers; quorum; sessions;discipline of members; journal

ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA (277 SCRA 268)

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the

National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes (actually

specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes,

originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was

approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on

September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain

amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral

conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions

of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral conference

committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21,

1996. At11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the

Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship

speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmien to was first

to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for

lack of quorum. Rep.Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a

head count. After a roll call, the Chair (DeputySpeaker Raul Daza) declared

the presence of a quorum.

The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. In thecourse of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to

raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation

he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript

of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as

published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6,

1996:MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the

conference committee report.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion? MR.

ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There

being none, approved.(Gavel)MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr.

Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair

asked the distinguished sponsor. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There

was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of the report, and the

Chair called for the motion.MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted

to object. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended forone minute.(It was 3:01 p.m.)(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)THE

DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.MR. ALBANO. Mr.

Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next week. THE

DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock,

Wednesday, next week. On that same day, the bill was signed by the

Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate

and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as

having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the

Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by

President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996. Petitioners filed a petition

for certiorari and/or challenging the validity of RA 8240.

ISSUES:

Whether or not RA 8240 was passed in violation of rules of the House which

will therefore be a violation of the Constitution. Whether or not the

Supreme Court has the power to look into the internal proceeding of the

House.

HELD:

It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been

violated in the enactment of R.A. No.8240 are merely internal rules of

procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the

enactment of a law. Petitioners claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a

query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albanos motion approved.

But what happened is that, after Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor

of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the

approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair

called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There

being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, however,Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep.


13/45

Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo

subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the

conference committee report had by then already been declared by the

Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel. Verily, the fact that nobody

objects means a unanimous action of the House making the passage of the

bill to a law in accordance with the law. The Constitution does not require

that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to

vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readingsof the bill. Therefore, no violation of the Constitution was shown. In this

case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member

who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute

to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has no more power to look into

the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House as long as

no violation of the Constitutional violation is shown.

AVELINO VS. CUENCO (83. PHIL. 17)

FACTS:

Petition of quo warran to. Petitioner, Jose Avelino, asks the court to

declare him the rightful senate president and oust the respondent, Mariano

Jesus Cuenco.

Feb 18, 1949; the request of senator Lorenzo Tanada to speak on

the floor on Feb 21, 1949 was granted to formulate charges against the then

senate president Avelino. On the day that Tanada was supposed to speak on

the floor, Avelino delayed his appearance, did not immediately openthesession, and read slowly the resolution of senator Sanidad and Tanada.

When the session finally started, Sanidad moved that the roll call be

dispensed with but senator Tirona, Avelinos follower, opposed the motion

because of the plan of Avelinos group to delay the session to prevent

Tanada from delivering his privilege speech. Suddenly, a disorderly conduct

broke out in the senate gallery. Senator Pablo David, Avelinos follower,

moved for adjournment of session perhaps consistent with their ploy to

prevent Tanadas privilege speech. Sanidad opposed the motion and moved

that it be submitted to a vote. Suddenly, Avelino banged the gavel,

abandonedthe chair, and walked out of the session hall followed by senatorFrancisco, Torres, Magalona,Clarin, David, and Tirona. Cuenco was

designated to chair the session. Tanada was finally able to deliver his

privilege speech. Sanidads resolution no. 68 was read and approved.

Tanada yielded the chair to senate president pro-tempore Arranz. Then,

Sanidad introduced resolution no. 67 entitled Resolution declaring vacant

the position of the president of the senate and designating the honorable

Mariano Jesus Cuenco acting president of the senate. Resolution no. 67

was approved.

ISSUES:Does the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter? If it has,were resolutions nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?

DECISION:Petition dismissed. Court has no jurisdiction over the subjectmatter.

RATIO:

The court does not have any jurisdiction in view of the separation of

powers and the constitutional grant to the senate of the power to elect its

own president. The selection of the presiding officer affects only the

senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers,

change, or reinstate them. The petition to put back the petitioner to preside

is only acceptable if the majority of the senators want to, such remedy lies

in the senate session hall and not in the supreme court.

Assuming that the court has jurisdiction, the session left by Avelino and

presided by Arranz was a continuation of the session. Thus, the departure of

the minority senators does not prevent the remaining majority senators

from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.


14/45

OSMENA V. PENDATUN (109 PHIL. 863)

FACTS:

In a privilege speech entitled: A message to Garcia, Osmena made

allegations of bribery against the Garcia administration. House Resolution

no. 59 followed the creation of a special committee to investigate the

allegedly groundless charges made by Osmena against the Garciaadministration. House Resolution no. 175 found Osmena guilty of serious

disorderly behavior and thereby suspending him for 15months.

ISSUES:WON his suspension was constitutional

HELD:Court has no Jurisdiction. Dismissed

RATIO:Osmena contends that the Constitution gave him completeparliamentary immunity in his privilege speech. Although the purpose of

parliamentary immunity is to guarantee the legislator complete freedom of

expression without being made responsible in criminal or civil actions, it

does NOT protect him from responsibility before the legislative body

whenever his words or conducts are disorderly or unbecoming of a member

thereof. The question of whether Osmenas speech constitutes disorderly

conduct is for the House to judge. The matter depends mainly on factual

circumstances of which the house knows best. On the question of

jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed for being moot or academic.

Because n opreliminary injunction was issued, the special committee

performed its task, reported to the house and the latter approved the

suspension order.

Mabanag vs Lopez Vito

Political Law Amendment to the Constitution

FACTS:

Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three

senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8

representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House

except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some

senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required

vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing

amendments to the Constitution)* which has been considered as an

**enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered

into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was

passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote.

Petitioners pray that the said resolution be prevented. Respondents argue

that the same can no longer be prevented as entered in the Journals. The

Journal of each house is conclusive to the courts.

*this is in contrast to Art 15 of the Constitution as well

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar.

HELD:If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal

which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps

complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective.

It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of

Article XV of the Philippine Constitution consists of (only) two distinct

parts: proposal and ratification. There is no logic in attaching political

character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to


15/45

amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the

Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by

the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of

any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency

scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest,

there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then

into that of ratification. On the other hand, as far as looking into the

Journals is concerned, even if both the journals and an authenticated copy

of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the

basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for,

as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of

the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This Court

found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and

did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if

one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of

conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled

copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy

out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each

other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two

documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that

if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals,

disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be

conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment

thereof.

**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both

houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and

filed by the secretary of state.

Philippine Judges Association Versus Prado

Direct Filing

Facts:

Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the

Judiciary. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by Philippine Postal Corporationthrough its Circular No.92-28. The franking privelege of the Supreme Court,

COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices were withdrawn

from them.

In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the

methods adopted prior it becoming a law.

Issues; WON RA 7354 is unconstitutional.

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress

shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in

the title thereof."

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall

become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and

printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to

its Members three days before its passage, except when the President

certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public

calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment

thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon

shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in theJournal.

- Violative of the Equal protection clause

Ruling:

The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1)

ruling further that it's adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying

that the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act,

or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure.


16/45

However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection

clause. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on

substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary

and the grantees of the franking privilege.

Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.


17/45

F. Electoral tribunals and the Commision onAppintments

[G.R. No. L-10520 | February 28, 1957]TAADA vs. CUENCO

FACTS:Senate chose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and

Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal.

Respondents allege that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of

jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the

members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause

of action, because "petitioner Taada has exhausted his right to nominate

after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2) more

Senators."

RULING:We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from

the foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs.

Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192)-relied upon by the

respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek to

compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to

perform their duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution

provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the

Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the

Senate.

Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive

power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral

Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the

authority shall be exercised. As the author of a very enlightening study on

judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:

"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain

powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand, to determine whether

the powers possessed have been validly exercised. In performing the

latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate

branch of the, government, since the determination of the validity of an

act is not the same, thing as the performance of the act. In the one case

we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the

particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine

whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or

attented by either an executive official or the legislative."

Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested

exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract fromthe power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of

Congress. And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the

legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by

the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of

said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be

determined in the proper actions.

In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation

cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act of

Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to

pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded

without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual

destruction.

As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the

question whether the issue before us is political or not.

In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what

it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words,

in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those

questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people intheir sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority

has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the

Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not

legality, of a particular measure.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present

case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators

Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral

Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman

of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of

its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said


18/45

members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon

nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the

Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The

Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of

members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon

is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in

nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to

pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.

Whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law

is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by

statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may

determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such

statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to

deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439;

emphasis supplied.).

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also,

the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties

herein.

Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as

members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and lawful?

Section 11 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, reads:

"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an

Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to

the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of

whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the

Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of

the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen

by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest

number of votes and three of the party having the second largest

number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal

shall be its Chairman."

Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators

Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista Party-as members of

the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made

without power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by said party,

and the election by the Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as

members of said Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be members

thereof, must necessarily be nominated by the party having the second

largest number of votes in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the

Citizens Party, to which Senator Taada belongs and which he represents.

Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the

effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9) members,"

six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of

Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that when-after the

nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party, and their election by

the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator Taada

nominated himself only, on behalf of the minority party, he thereby "waived

his right to no two more Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias nominated

Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the

Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias

and the Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the

fundamental law, relative to the number of members of the Senate

Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are

de jure members of said body, and the appointment of their co-respondents,

Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid

and lawful.

What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and

concomitant with, the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the

Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the

majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that thestructure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and

the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who

are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The

procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the

Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it

constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said

procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null

and void.

It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the

membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven (7),


19/45

instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present

composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our

Constitution.

Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the

solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan

considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3)

Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by themajority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the

party having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned.

Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents'

contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party has only one

member in the Upper House, Senator Taada felt he should nominate, for

the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party. The

same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said

Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Taada did not nominate other two Senators,

because, otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous position,

therein, of the Citizens Party.

Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators

Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party

would have five (5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as against one

(1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court.

With the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in said

Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The

equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed. What

is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court

would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wideopen for the predominance of political considerations in the determination

of election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what

the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as

members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not

been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that

the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate

not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the

party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the

exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as

members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor

any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one

having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its

representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no

standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of

Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said

respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void

ab initio.

As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel

Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared to hold, however, that their

appointments were null and void. Although recommended by Senators

Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the Senate Electoral

Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the

consent of the majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or, pursuant

to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant

(supra), the election of its personnel is an internal matter falling within the

jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe

that it will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4)respondents abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the

Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents

Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have not been

duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that they are not

entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are hereby, enjoined

from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal

and from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case

No. 4 thereof. With the qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed,as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio

and Placido Reyes.


20/45

Cunanan vs Tan

CARLOS CUNANAN vs. JORGE TAN, JR.

Facts:

Petitioner sought to nullify the ad interim appointment of Jorge Tan

Jr as acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration.Cunanan was formerly appointed in the same position but was later on

rejected by the Commision of Appointment prompting the President to

replace him with Jorge Tan Jr immediately without his consent.

Filing the quo warranto proceeding to the Supreme Court, Cunanan

questions the validity of the convened Commission of Appointments citing

irregularities as to the numbers of members comprising the same.

Issue: WON the appointment of Jorge Tan Jr is valid.

Ruling:

With the reorganization of the Commission of Appointment, it was

ruled that such is a power vested in the Congress as they deem it proper

taking into consideration the proportionate numbers of the members of the

Commission of Appointment members as to their political affiliations.

However, with their reorganization, this affected a third party's right which

they rejected as its result. To correct this, the Supreme Court declared the

reinstatement of the petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate and turnover the office in contention.

ABBAS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (166 SCRA 651)

FACTS:

Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution states that the Electoral

Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be

Justices of the Supreme Court...and the remaining six shall be Members of

the Senate or the HOR, as the case may be. On October 9, 1987, Petitioners

filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET

Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were

proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections. The

respondent tribunals was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the

Supreme Court and six (6)senators. On November 17, the petitioner filed

with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition ofthe Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of the

above case on the ground that all of them are interested parties, and

respondents. This mass disqualification, in effect, would leave only the three

Justices to serve as Members of the Electoral Tribunal. The Motion was

denied and hence, this petition for certiorari.

ARGUMENTS:Petitioners argue that considerations of public policy andnorms of fair play and due process require the mass disqualification. Further,

necessity dictates that an amendment of the Tribunals Rules of procedure

permitting the contest to be decided by only three Members is a practicable

and unconstitutionally unobjectable solution.

ISSUE:Whether or not a Senate Electoral Tribunal composed of only three(3) Justices of the SC is a valid Electoral Tribunal under the Constitution

HELD:NO. The suggested device is unfeasible and repugnant to theConstitution.

REASONS:

Looking into the wording and intent of Section 17 of Article VI of the

Constitution, it is clear that in creating a Tribunal composed by Justices of

the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, both judicial and

legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of all

contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The

fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed

membership of the SET is 2 to 1 an unmistakable indication that the

legislative component cannot be totally excluded from participation in the

resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the


21/45

spirit and intent of the Constitution. The proposed mass disqualification, if

sanctioned and ordered, would leave the tribunal no alternative but to

abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it

cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire

membership of senators. The framers of the Constitution could not have

been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all

24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment

thereon. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such

unusual situations. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust

and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members

of the Tribunal. Refrain from participation must be distinguished from

complete absence. Indeed, an individual Member of the Tribunal may

recues himself from participating in the resolution of a case where he

sincerely feels that his biases would stand in the way of an objective and

impartial judgment. But a Tribunal cannot legally function as such absent its

entire membership of Senators or Justices.

LAZATIN VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (168 SCRA 391)

FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for

Representative of the first district of Pampanga in the May 11, 1987

elections. During the canvassing of the votes, respondent objected to the

inclusion of certain election returns and brought the case to the COMELEC.

On May 19, The COMELEC ordered the suspension of the proclamation of

the winning candidate, yet on May 27, petitioner was proclaimed thewinner. Respondent filed two petitions: a) to nullify the proclamation and b)

prevent petitioner from taking office. However, the COMELEC did not act on

the petitions. On June 30, petitioner assumed office. On September 15, the

COMELEC nullified the proclamation. The Supreme Court set aside the

revocation on January 25, 1988.On January 28, Respondent received a copy

of the Courts decision and consequently filed an election protest with the

HRET on February 8.

ARGUMENTS:In moving to dismiss private respondents protest on theground that it was filed late, petitioner cited Sec.250 of the Omnibus

Election Code: A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of

the Batasang Pambansa...shall be filed...within ten (10) days after the

proclamation of the results of the election

.

Using the above rule, Petitioner argued that respondent had only until

February 6 to file a protest. Since the protest was filed on February 8, the

HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over it. However, the HRET argued that

petitioner was able to file the protest on time, citing Sec. 9 of the HRET

rules: Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall

be filed... within fifteen (15)days from the effectivity of these rules on

November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made prior to the

effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same may be filed within fifteen

(15)days from the date of proclamation. Using the above rule, the HRET

argued that respondent has up February 11 to file a protest. Since it was

filed on February 8, the HRET ruled it was within the prescribed period and

thus, had jurisdiction over the matter.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the protest

2. Whether or not the Supreme Court may conduct a Judicial Review of

decisions/final resolutions of the HRET

HELD:

1. YES. The HRET has jurisdiction over the protest, as it was filed within the

period prescribed by Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules.

2. NO, except for cases requiring the exercise of the Courts extraordinary

jurisdiction.


22/45

REASONS: Inapplicability of Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code to thecase at bar:

Under the 1973Constitution, Section 250 of the Omnibus Election

Code applies to petitions filed before the COMELEC contesting the election

of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city

official. Under the 1987 Constitution, it has ceased to be effective. First, the

Batasang Pambansa ha salready been abolished and legislative power is nowvested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive

jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and

qualifications of the Members of the HOR and the Senate in their respective

Electoral Tribunals.

Exclusive character of the Electoral Tribunals Power:

The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to

the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of

Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters

within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before

it, is beyond dispute. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive

character of the jurisdiction conferred. It is intended to be as complete and

unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Its rule-making

power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the

Constitution. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power

is conferred is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary

for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred.

Following this principle, the HRET, in order to fully exercise its constitutional

function may implement its own rules concerning the filing of electoral

protests. A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, exceptunder the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge all contests relating to the

election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative branch

has been exclusively granted to the legislative body itself. In the 1935

Constitution, this power was lodged to an independent, impartial and non-

partisan body attached to the legislature and specially created for that

singular purpose. Under the 1973 Constitution, this delineation between the

power of the Executive and the Legislature was blurred when jurisdiction

over electoral contests was vested in the COMELEC, an agency with general

jurisdiction over the conduct of election for all elective national and local

officials. The 1987 constitution vested this jurisdiction back to the respectiveElectoral Tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives.

Scope of the Supreme Court over decisions made by the HRET:

So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole

judge of all contests related to the election, returns and qualifications of its

Members, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its

jurisdiction shall as a rule, not be reviewed by the Court. Its corrective

power extends only to decisions and resolutions constituting a grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the ElectoralTribunals.

Daza versus Singson

Tribunal and its Composition

FACTS:

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized

resulting to a political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its

representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the

seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member.

Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA

which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by

Singson. Daza questioned such replacement.

ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignmentvalidly changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments.

HELD:

As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on

Appointments consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the

House of Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of

proportional representation of the political parties therein, this necessarily

connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the

requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate

measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also

subsequently thereto NOT the court.


23/45

Coseteng Versus Mitra

Facts:

Congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in representatives

from diverse political parties Petitioner Anna Dominique Coseteng was the

only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA.

A year later, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino or LDP was

organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of

Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees,

including the House representation in the Commission on Appointments,

had to be reorganized. Petitioner Coseteng then wrote a letter to Speaker

Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed

as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House Electoral

Tribunal.

On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, revised the

House majority membership in the Commission on Appointments to

conform with the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP,

with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, however, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was

retained as the 12th member representing the House minority.

On February 1, 1989, Coseteng and her party, filed this Petition for

Extraordinary Legal Writs praying that the Supreme Court declare as null

and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco,

Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and

Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them

from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents fromrecognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the

theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional

mandate of proportional representation

Issue:

1. WON the question raised is political.

2. WON the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments

were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political

parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Holding/

Held:

1. No, it is not. The political question issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson,

where this Court ruled that the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner

of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitutionis justiciable, and, evenif the question were political in nature, it would still

come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction

conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which

includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion

amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any

branch or instrumentality of the government.

2. Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Section 18, Article VI of the

1987 Constitution reads: Sec. 18. There shall be aCommission on

Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex oficio

Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of

Representatives elected by each House on the basis of proportional

representation from the political parties and parties or organizations

registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of

the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall

act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the

Congress from their submission. The commission shall rule by a majority

vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.) The composition of the

House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on

proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are

160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the Housemembership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of

12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members,

which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The

remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-

Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL

(respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House.

There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the

Commission on Appointments was done on the basis of proportional

representation of the political parties therein. There is no merit in the

petitioners contention that the House members in the Commission on

Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their respective


24/45

political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by their

respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not

by their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The

validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments-eleven (11)

from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority-is unassailable.

Section 21&22

Teofisto Guingona vs Neptali Gonzales

HRETsComposition Rounding Off

FACTS:

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15

LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN

senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12

representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional

formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of

Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members

for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5

member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader,

nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and

that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the

CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentinowho proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight

LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a

member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that

the compromise is against proportional representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys

representation in the CoA.

HELD:

It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled

to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional

representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of

Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of

application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to

which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate

converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one

senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so

doing one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly

reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on

Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate.

This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliancewith its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the

proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator

Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the

representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the

NPC.A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-

members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party

which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In

order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to

come up with proportional representation especially since one party may

have affiliations with the other party.


25/45

BONDOC VS. PINEDA (201 SCRA 792)

FACTS:

Marciano Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and

Dr. Ermigidio Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party were rivals in the

congressional elections held on May 11, 1987. Pineda was the proclaimed

winner, but Bondoc filed a protest before the House of RepresentativesElectoral Tribunal(HRET). The said tribunal is composed of nine (9) members,

3 of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court, and the remaining six (6) are

members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of

proportional representation from political parties and party list. A decision

has been reached by the HRET where Bondoc won over by Pineda; thus the

LDP members in the tribunal insisted on a reappreciation of votes and

recount of ballots delaying the finalization of the decision at least four

months. Thereexamination resulted in increase of Bondocs lead over

Pineda from 23 to 107 votes. It shall be noted that Congressman Camasura,

a member LDP, voted with the Supreme Court Justices to proclaim Bondoc

the winner of the contest; hence, HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation No.

25 declaring Bondoc as the winner. Subsequently, Congressman Cojuanco

informed Camasura and Bautista that the LDP expelled them from the party

on the ground of betrayal to the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP.

Thereafter, Cojuanco informed the House Speaker Mitra of the ouster of the

said Congressmen and their decision to withdra

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Chapter 8- Legislative Department

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