China Aff Answers

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AFF ANSWERS CDI 2007

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This Evidence Was Produced by Erichttp://summerdebate.cord.edu

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CHINA AFF ANSWERS

UNIQUENESSRelations down in the SQ..1Cant predict future relations.2War inevitable: resources..3-4War inevitable: general..5U.S. health aid increasing.6Europe..7-8

No elite split.9Nationalism high now..10

LINKSThe way we talk about China is important..11China will not overreact....12 -13China Threat Kritik.14-17

IMPACTSNo war with China.18-19

COUNTERPLAN2AC...20-21Perm solves..22Soft Power DA: Link Extensions..23-24Soft Power DA: Asia Trade Impact...25Soft Power DA: North Korea Impact.26

Aff is a good form of nationalism..27


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UNIQUENESSRelations down in the SQ

(___) U.S.-China relations down due to many factorsInternational Security, 2005. (BYLINE: Aaron L. Friedberg is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University,HEADLINE: The Future of U.S.-China Relations; Is Conflict Inevitable?, Fall, l/n)

As President George W. Bush began his second term in office, however, there were signs of mounting friction between Washingtonand Beijing and increasing skepticism, on the U.S. side at least, that the relationship was as harmonious, and the interests (still less thevalues) of the two parties as compatible, as had often been claimed. Alarm over the possible lifting of the European arms embargohelped to draw renewed attention to the pace and scope of China's military buildup. Frustration with stalled negotiations over NorthKorea's nuclear weapons program caused some observers to question whether Beijing truly shared the U.S. commitment to haltingproliferation. Reports of a PRC diplomatic "charm offensive" in Southeast Asia stirred fears of waning U.S. influence and incipientChinese regional hegemony. Meanwhile, evidence that China was expanding its interactions with Europe, Latin America, Africa, andthe Middle East raised the specter of a new global rivalry for power and influence. To this combustible mix was added an official spat

over trade balances and currency values, as well as a flurry of sensational news stories about the impact of China's extraordinarydemand on world prices of energy and materials and the planned purchases of U.S. companies by their newly flush Chinese rivals. n2"The old China bet is off," announced one observer in mid-2005, while another (surveying the economic scene) proclaimed "the end ofthe China love affair." n3

(___) IPR violations and undervaluation of the yuan will hurt relationsHills and Blair, 2007. (Carla and Dennis, U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course, Independent Task Force Report59, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12985/uschina_relations.html, CDI 07; EJS)

In his stakeholder speech, then Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick correctly pointed out that U.S.-China relations are threatened byChinas failure to stop the theft of U.S. intellectual property and the undervaluation of Chinas currency , both of which contribute to theU.S. trade deficit with China. Indeed, concerns about these and other unfair trade practices have great potential to roil the U.S.-Chinarelationship, particularly given the strong reaction these issues generate in the U.S. Congress. The United States has been a primedriver of the process of economic globalization, but support for globalization is predicated on the notion that all nations will play by therules. The perception that China is breaking the rules, or at least exploiting ambiguities in the system in ways that disadvantage theUnited States, undermines support not only for cooperative U.S.-China relations specifically, but economic globalization moregenerally. (page 56-57)
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12985/uschina_relations.htmlhttp://www.cfr.org/publication/12985/uschina_relations.htmlhttp://www.cfr.org/publication/12985/uschina_relations.html


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UNIQUENESSCant predict future relations

(___) The future of US-China relations is unknown and unknowable

International Security, 2005. (BYLINE: Aaron L. Friedberg is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University,HEADLINE: The Future of U.S.-China Relations; Is Conflict Inevitable?, Fall, l/n)

As far-reaching as its impact may be, however, the future character of the U.S.-China relationship is also profoundly uncertain. Most experts haveopinions about this question but, if pressed, few [experts] would claim to be sure about what lies ahead. Such modesty is entirely appropriate. Notonly are the answers to the questions posed here unknown; they are also, at present, unknowable. Twenty years ago, few people foresaw that theconfrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union was about to undergo a radical transformation, and fewer still imagined that the lattermight soon cease to exist. As regards their ability to anticipate events, today's observers are no better equipped than their counterparts of the early1980s. At this point, scholars and analysts lack the kinds of powerful predictive tools that would allow them to say with any degree of assurance whatthe state of relations between the United States and China will be in five years time, to say nothing of ten or twenty. And although opinions varyabout what kinds of analytical advances are possible, there are good reasons to believe that such instruments are, in fact, unattainable. n4

While they differ in their degree of confidence, and in their willingness to make explicit predictions, most of those who think and write about the U.S.

China relationship nevertheless have beliefs and expectations about where it is headed and about the factors that will be most influential indetermining its course. Not all of the participants in this discussion are theorists of international relations, to be sure, and many would eschew thelabels and language of academic debate. To the extent that they have coherent and internally consistent views, however, most analysts deployarguments that derive from one or the other of the three main camps in contemporary international relations theorizing: liberalism, realism, andconstructivism. To make matters more interesting, and more complicated, those whose basic analytical premises place them in one of these threebroad schools of thought do not necessarily have similar views regarding the future of U.S.-China relations. On this issue, it is possible to identifyliberals who expect confrontation and conflict, realists who believe that the relationship will basically be stable and peaceful, and constructivists whothink that events could go either way. Each of the three theoretical schools, in sum, has two variants, one of which is essentially optimistic about thefuture of U.S.-China relations, the other distinctly pessimistic.

(___) Chinas future is unknowableHills and Blair, 2007. (Carla and Dennis, U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course, Independent Task Force Report59, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12985/uschina_relations.html, CDI 07; EJS)

Chinas future is uncertain. The United States can discern the landscapeChina requires peace and stability internationally andcooperation with the United States to continue to grow and deal with its pressing domestic problems. But even the Chinese peoplethemselves cannot know for sure which paths China will walk down. For the United States, the objective is clear: Further integratingChina into the global community offers the best hope of shaping Chinas interests and conduct in accordance with international normson security, trade and finance, and human rights, and encouraging collaboration to confront the challenges both countries face. TheUnited States needs to invest heavily to maximize the areas of cooperation with China and minimize the likelihood of conflict. Theultimate security of the United States lies in the deep foundations of U.S. national powermilitary, political, economic, and moralwhich the Task Force believes can be sustained, giving the United States ample time and means to evaluate and adjust policies towardChina in the event that proves necessary. The United States should approach China with an affirmative agenda from a positionof confidence. (page 97-98)
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12985/uschina_relations.htmlhttp://www.cfr.org/publication/12985/uschina_relations.htmlhttp://www.cfr.org/publication/12985/uschina_relations.html


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UNIQUENESSWar in Africa inevitableresources

(___) Relations are on the brink: Chinas need for energy is the source of friction that will push relations to thepoint of lasting political conflictThe National Interest, 2005. (BYLINE: Ian Bremmer, HEADLINE: The Dragon Wakes, 2005 SUMMER, l/n, CDI 07; EJS)

Yet, tensions between the United States and China are on the point of producing lasting political conflict. This fight is not simplyone of traditional balance-of-power politics. The real sources of friction between Washington and Beijing are found in the securityimplications for the United States of China's growing need for secure access to steady supplies of energy and raw materials. Energydemand is drawing China into deeper political involvement in politically volatile regions in which the United States has, since the end ofthe Cold War, enjoyed a near monopoly on international influence--in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. And Washington is nothappy about it.

(___) Resources are the focal point of the Chinese-African relationshipSouth China Morning Post, 2006. (BYLINE: Cary Huang in Beijing, HEADLINE: Hunger for black gold fuels shift of focus; Hu's missions to

Africa and the Middle East signal their rising strategic value, April 22, 2006 Saturday, l/n, CDI 07; EJS)

"China's increasing reliance on imports of oil and other raw materials from the Middle East and Africa suggests these regions' growingstrategic importance to the mainland's future development," said Zhang Xiaodong , a researcher with Chinese Academy of SocialSciences' Institute of Western Asian and African Studies.

In a briefing on Mr Hu's visits, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi said co-operation in energy and resources would toptheagenda of talks with Middle Eastern and African leaders.

Mr Zhang said all four nations had one thing in common: they are resource-rich and influential.

Mr Hu's trip points to China's effort to broaden the focus of its diplomacy - previously geared towards the big powers and theirneighbours. China's first Africa Policy Paper, unveiled on January 12, was evidence of that policy shift, Mr Zhang said.

The focal point of China-Africa relations is resources, the paper said. "The Chinese government will adopt more effective measures tofacilitate African commodities' access to the Chinese market," it said.

Gong Shaopeng , a Middle East and North African affairs expert with the College of Foreign Affairs, said energy co-operation would gettop billing when Mr Hu visited leading oil exporters Saudi Arabia and Nigeria.


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UNIQUENESSWar in Africa inevitableresources

(___) U.S.-China competition for oil in Africa will permanently hurt relationsShinn, 2006.(David H.,Africa and Chinas Global Activism, Ellio tt School of International AffairsThe George Washington University, Paper Presented at the National Defense University Pacific Symposium, Chinas Global Activism: Implicationsfor U.S. Security Interests, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, June 20, 2006,http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2006/shinnpaper.pdf, CDI 07; EJS)

Potential U.S.-China competition for African oil is one of the most hotly debated topics today. The U.S. currently obtains more thanfifteen percent of its imports from Africa and that figure may rise to one-quarter by 2015. China buys more than twenty-five percent ofits imports from Africa and has replaced Japan as the second largest importer of African oil after the U.S. India has also become amajor competitor for African oil, which is highly desired because of its low sulfur content. To the extent that all of these countriescontribute to the development of new oil sources in Africa, competition among them will be minimized. It is also in the interest of Chinaand the U.S. to help stabilize a country like Nigeria so that it can expand its hydrocarbon production. But eventually external oil

demand, assuming that it remains high, and static African production will likely result in sharp competition for African oil by these andother countries. This issue alone will impact significantly the long-term future of U.S.-China relations as it relates to Africa.

(___) Chinas search for resources is both an economic endeavor and focused on security dimensions Hills and Blair, 2007. (Carla and Dennis, U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course, Independent Task Force Report59, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12985/uschina_relations.html, CDI 07; EJS)

Chinas quest for energy influences many aspects of its foreign policy. After the end of the Cold War, China launched the ShanghaFive (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) to expand its influence in Central Asia. China hoped not only to open upcross border trade and investment but also to ensure that the nations of Central Asia would not provide any encouragement orsanctuary to Uighur separatists. The Shanghai Five, expanded in 2001 by the addition of Uzbekistan and renamed the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization (SCO), still works to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism in Central Asia. But China also nowlooks to the SCO to help it secure oil and gas contracts and pipeline routes through SCO countries.Chinas search for raw materials, especially energy, now extends far beyond its borders. Chinas outreach to Africa is motivated by

the prospect of access to crude oil, copper, tin, timber, and other critical commodities, and it is multifaceted, with both economic andsecurity dimensions. Chinas recent foray evokes the spirit of the great Chinese navigator Zheng He, who led voyages of commerceand exploration to the Indian Ocean and the east coast of Africa during the Ming Dynasty almost six hundred years ago. Two-way tradequadrupled from 20002005, reaching $40 billion, making China Africas third largest trading partner after the European Union (EU)and the United States. In 2006,Angola edged out Saudi Arabia as Chinas largest foreign supplier of oil. More than eighty thousandChinese expatriates live in Africa. A steady stream of high-level delegations from Beijing toured Africa in 2006, checkbooks in hand.President Hu has visited Africa three times since becoming Chinas top leader.
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2006/shinnpaper.pdfhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2006/shinnpaper.pdfhttp://www.cfr.org/publication/12985/uschina_relations.htmlhttp://www.cfr.org/publication/12985/uschina_relations.htmlhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2006/shinnpaper.pdf


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UNIQUENESSWar in Africa inevitablegeneral

(___) Other developments in Africa will sustain the risk of a U.S.-China warGill, 2007. (Bates, Chinas Expanding Role in Africa: Implications for the United States, A Report of the CSIS Delegation to China on China-Africa-U.S. Relations, January, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/chinainafrica.pdf, CDI 07; EJS)

Integral to any such approach, however, will be the expectation thatowing to the weak state institutions, high incidence of conflict,and [the] relative economic fragility of most African countriesdevelopments in Africa, independent of U.S.-China relations, willrepeatedly test U.S. and Chinese approaches and their resolve to work collaboratively. It will be no less important to anticipate thatenduring philosophical, ideological, and programmatic differences, mutual suspicions and misunderstandings, and competitive tensionswill sustain the risk of a clash of U.S.-China interests in Africa. Hence the special need to anticipate flash points in approaches to Africaand manage them preemptively: most important, at this point, are crisis cases such as Darfur, sensitive assistance issues such as debtand harmonization of donor approaches, and access to energy resources.

(___) The U.S.-China relationship is already adversarial: Chinas overriding strategic goals of economic growth andwill exacerbate the frictions making a war the likely outcome in the status quoBrown and Waldron, 2007.(Harold and Arthur, Edited by Carla Hills and Dennis Blair, U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, AResponsible Course, Independent Task Force Report 59, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12985/uschina_relations.html,CDI 07; EJS)

I agree with the analysis, the findings, and the recommendations of the report. At the same time, my sense is that its tone is somewhattoo sanguine; China and the United States will find it difficult to manage the relationship during the next few decades in a way thatavoids an adversarial outcome. The overriding goals of Chinas leadership appear to be: First, to maintain its partys domesticmonopoly of political power; second (and related), to preserve Chinas internal stability and peaceful economic growth; third, totranslate that growth over time into a position of global power, redressing what it rightly sees as a 150- year chronicle of weakness and

of oppression by outsiders. The history of relations between the established power and the rising one is not encouraging. In the casethat is the focus of this report, there are already important elements in each country that regard the other as dedicated to repressing itsrise, in one case, or undermining or supplanting it, in the other. The close and intensifying economic ties are as likely to be theoccasion of dispute as a reason to cooperate politically. Though there are common interests (e.g., opposing WMD proliferation), thereare also conflicting ones (e.g., relative influence in Northeast Asia). And the vast difference in political systems both exacerbates theother frictions and makes it more difficult to deal with particular disputes. None of this makes an adversarial outcome inevitable. But itdoes suggest a need to display considerably more understanding of the issues and skill in handling them than has been the case forrecent administrations if the admittedly limited effect that the United States can have on the evolution and development of Chinesepolicy is to be a positive one. Chinese internal developments, whose future path is, as the final paragraph of the report states, unknowneven to the Chinese people, will be the most important factor in determining whether the rise will indeed be peaceful. (page 99-100)
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/chinainafrica.pdfhttp://www.cfr.org/publication/12985/uschina_relations.htmlhttp://www.cfr.org/publication/12985/uschina_relations.htmlhttp://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/chinainafrica.pdf


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UNIQUENESSEurope is the new hegemon

(___) EuropeThe Irish Times, 2005. (HEADLINE: Europe: the new superpower, February 18, 2005, l/n, CDI 07; EJS)

The world that emerges in this century will not be centred on the US or the UN, but will comprise a community of regional clubs led bythe Europeans, writes Mark Leonard in London

In the middle of Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington DC, a middle-aged woman with a weather-beaten face and a brown wig sits on a milk crate. Concepcion Picciotto has beendemonstrating against US foreign policy, outside the White House, for 21 years. She sleeps in a sitting position, for just three hours a night, so as to avoid breaking the stringent localvagrancy laws.

It doesn't take long for most Americans to realise that she is European. It is not just that she is naive, weak and anti-American. They recognise her because she lives on Americanhandouts of money and food, enjoys the protection of the Washington Police Department without contributing a cent to pay for its upkeep, and still has the gall to sit at the gates of theWhite House complaining about the way in which her providers and protectors run their foreign policy.

But maybe the time has come for Concepcion to rise from her crate. It is not as if President George Bush is listening to her anyway. And her obsession with the US is b linding her toEurope's growing power.

For all the talk of the American Empire, the past two years have been more about the limits of American power. Its economic lead overEurope is disappearing (in 1950 its GDP per capita was twice that of Western Europe, while today it is almost the same size), while thepolitical price for saying no to the superpower has never been lower (as Germany, France, Mexico, Turkey and Chile found over Iraq).In fact, the US leads the world in only two ways: it has the biggest army in the world, and the most popular "popular culture". But thecombined might of the US military could do nothing to stop 9/11 or halt terrorism in Iraq, and the more America's presence around theworld becomes militarised, the less attractive the American way of life becomes.

Meanwhile, across the pond, Europeans - often by accident - have been developing a new kind of power that cannot be measured interms of military budgets or smart-missile technology. It works in the long term, and is about reshaping the world rather than winningshort-term tussles. And when we stop looking at the world through American eyes, we can see that each element of European

"weakness" is in fact a facet of its extraordinary transformative power.

(___)The Irish Times, 2005. (HEADLINE: Europe: the new superpower, February 18, 2005, l/n, CDI 07; EJS)

Europe's power is easy to miss. Europe doesn't flaunt its strength or talk about a "single sustainable model of progress" as Americadoes. Instead, like an "invisible hand", it operates through the shell of traditional political structures. The Dail, Irish law courts, and Irishcivil servants are still here, but they have all become agents of the European Union, implementing European law. This is no accident.

By creating standards that are implemented through national institutions, Europe can take over the world without becoming a target forhostility. The same is true of European troops abroad who often serve under UN or NATO flags rather than the European one.


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UNIQUENESSEurope is the new hegemon


Many people have focused on the rise of great powers such as China and India and the implications they will have on world order.There is no doubt they will challenge the "unipolar world" shaped by the preferences of Americans and Europeans, who between themmake up less than 15 per cent of the world's population.

But an even bigger threat to the "unipolar moment" comes from the fact that there is another tier of countries around the world - fromBrazil and Mexico to South Africa and Nigeria, Japan and South Korea - that have looked at the way the EU has given tiny countries anability to shape their destiny on the world stage out of all proportion to their wealth, military might or population size. They have seenthat regional clubs can help to overcome historical rivalries and tensions, foster democracy, speed up the integration of countries intothe world economy and help to develop common solutions to problems that cut across borders - from organised crime to pollution. And

as each region develops its own arrangements, they will cumulatively have an impact on world order.


In the second half of the 20th century, Europeans started to reinvent this model. As Europe develops ever greater global clout andspreads to take over a continent, other countries have been faced with an equally stark choice: join the EU, or develop your own unionbased on the same principles of international law, interfering in each other's affairs, and peace as an ideology. By the end of the 21stcentury, in the new regional world, you will need to be part of a club to have a seat at the table. The world that emerges will be centred

on neither the US nor the UN, but will be a community of interdependent regional clubs.

As the momentum for regional organisation picks up, great powers such as the US will inevitably be sucked into the process ofintegration. They might be able to slow the process, but they won't be able to stop it. As this process continues, we will see theemergence of a "New European Century". Not because Europe will run the world as an empire, but because the European way ofdoing things will have become the world's.


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UNIQUENESSNationalism high now

(___) Nationalism already high in ChinaKurlantzick, 2005. (Joshua, China: Economic Power, Political Enigma, The Washington Quarterly, Summer, p 59-67, CDI 2007; EJS)

The popularity of videos glorifying the World Trade Center bombing, as well as the anti-Uighur crackdown, which enjoys support amongHan Chinese, testifies to a development within Chinese society that many policymakers would rather ignore: as China opens andgrows, it is experiencing a period of heightened nationalism. Although continued economic integration with the world and greaterpolitical freedom within China will help temper this nationalism eventually, for now Chinese nationalism is a fact that Washington mustaddress. Renewed U.S. alliances with neighboring Asian countries, a series of unfortunate Sino-U.S. incidents including the bombing othe Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the decline of communism as a unifying identity, and the nationalist curricula taught in many schoolshave all combined to make many young Chinese more nationalistic.


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LINKSChina will not overreact

(___) China will not overreact to US pressure. They believe that the policy will inevitably revert back to moderation

Pollack 2003- Chair of the Strategic Research Department @ Naval War College [Jonathan, Directs the Naval War Colleges Asia-PacificStudies Group., China and the United States Post-9/11, Orbis, Volume 47, Issue 4 , Autumn 2003, Pages 617-627]

Based on the cumulative lessons absorbed from three decades of interaction with the United States, China has undertaken a markedpolicy reorientation. Since the initial breakthroughs in U.S.-China relations under President Nixon in the early 1970s, Chinas leadershiphas acquired a much fuller appreciation for the vicissitudes of U.S. electoral politics. Though temperamentally more disposed toincumbent candidates and parties, the Chinese realize they cannot influence American political outcomes with efficacy or subtlety.Political power in the United States has passed from one party to the other four times since 1972, and in three of these presidentialelections (1980, 1992, and 2000) the successful candidate (Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush) entered office with thedeclared intention to significantly alter U.S.-China policy. In 1980 and again in 1992, the actions of incoming administrations andChinese reactions to them entailed serious costs to Chinese interests that officials in Beijing were determined to avoid in 2000. Leadersin Beijing have also sensed that all U.S. presidential administrations ultimately revert toward a moderate center, regardless of their

initial stated priorities toward China. 3 With George W. Bush, China has apparently concluded that it is far wiser not to repeat previouscycles of public hostility directed at Washington, given the turbulence and uncertainty such tensions were certain to engender.

(___) Your uniqueness overwhelms the link: Chinas increasing global role is the reason China refuses tojeopardize its relationship with the U.S.Pollack 2003- Chair of the Strategic Research Department @ Naval War College [Jonathan, Directs the Naval War Colleges Asia-PacificStudies Group., China and the United States Post-9/11, Orbis, Volume 47, Issue 4 , Autumn 2003, Pages 617-627]

Senior leaders in Beijing have evidently decided to pursue an Arbatov strategy with Chinese characteristics. When visiting Washingtonin the late 1980s, long-time Soviet policy advisor Georgiy Arbatov reputedly stated, "We are going to do something terrible toyou. We are going to deprive you of an enemy." Senior Chinese leaders understand that to hector or threaten Washington would

validate those forces within both the United States and China seeking to thwart a more mature, productive bilateral relationship. TheUnited States looms far too large in Chinese policy calculations (especially in the context of Chinas own political succession and thehopes for unimpeded economic growth) to place this relationship at risk. The corollaries of this accommodation include Chinas fullerinvolvement in international institutions and increased support for international norms, ranging from global trade to export control tononproliferation and arms control; and a much deeper set of political, institutional, and economic interactions with all neighboringstates. China has decided to become a stakeholder in the international system. Its increasing centrality in global and regionalcommerce provides additional ballast to pursue these goals. Chinas reemergence as a world power, leaders in Beijing haveconcluded, must place it inside, not outside, the international tent.


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CHINA THREAT K

No choice but an escalatory violent arms race with China as long as china threat thought remains institutionalized.

Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University,Canberra, 2004 (Chengxin, The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,

Alternatives 29, 305-331, CDI 2007; EJS)

I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursiveconstruction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within theseframeworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-ledevolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold Warworld can still be legitimated.Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it

leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, andhard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect,Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it didduring the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the SovietUnion, but this may not work in the case of China."^^ For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile defence shield to"guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense ofvulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. Inconsequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms racethat would eventually make war more likely.Neither the United States nor China is likely to be keen on fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated, the "China threat"argument, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, tends to make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for both sides. At

this juncture, worthy of note is an interesting comment made by Charlie Neuhauser, a leading CIA China specialist. on the VietnamWar, a war fought by the United States to contain the then-Communist "other." Neuhauser says, "Nobody wants it. We don't want it, HoChi Minh doesn't want it; it's simply a question of annoying the other side."94 And, as we know, in an unwanted war some fifty-eightthousand young people from the United States and an estimated two million Vietnamese men, women, and children lost their lives.

Reject the Negs China Threat rhetoric. This doesnt mean we cant talk about China, it just opens the door to a more objec tive and lessdangerous debate over Chinese policy.

Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University, Canberra,2004 (Chengxin, The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics, Alternatives 29, 305-331, CDI 2007; EJS)

Therefore, to call for a halt to the vicious circle of theory as practice associated with the "China threat" literature, tinkering with thecurrent positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on China is no longer adequate. Rather, what is needed is to question this un-self-reflective scholarship itself, particularly its connections with the dominant way in which the United States and the West in generalrepresent themselves and others via their positivist epistemology, so that alternative, more nuanced, and less dangerous ways ofinterpreting and debating China might become possible.


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CHINA THREAT K

The Negs conception of the necessity of the US to stop various wars abroad creates a particular sel f-imaginationin which the goal of all nations in politics is to be more like America. The ways we see China, and the ways authors

write about it, are guided by this self imagination. Thus, the Negs impacts are more a result of the way we viewourselves than of any actual realities.Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University,Canberra, 2004 (Chengxin, The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,


At first glance, as the "China threat" literature has told us, China seems to fall perfectly into the "threat" category, particularly given its growing powerHowever, China's power as such does not speak for itself in terms of an emerging threat. By any reasonable measure, China remains a largely poorcountry edged with only a sliver of affiuence along its coastal areas. Nor is China's sheer size a self-evident confirmation of the "China threat" thesis,as other countries like India, Brazil, and Australia are almost as big as China. Instead, China as a "threat" has much to do with the particular mode ofU.S. self-imagination. As Steve Chan notes: China is an object of attention not only because of its huge size, ancient legacy, or current or projectedrelative national power. . . . The importance of China has to do with perceptions, especially those regarding the potential that Beijing will become anexample, source, or model that contradicts Western liberalism as the reigning paradigm. In an era of supposed universalizing cosmopolitanism,China demonstrates the potency and persistence of nationalism, and embodies an alternative to Western and especially U.S. conceptions ofdemocracy and capitalism.Certainly, I do not deny China's potential for strategic misbehavior in the global context, nor do I claim the "essential peacefulness" of Chineseculture."fO Having said that, my main point here is that there is no such thing as "Chinese reality" that can automatically speak for itself, for example,as a "threat." Rather, the "China threat" is essentially a specifically social meaning given to China by its U.S. observers, a meaning that cannot bedisconnected from the dominant U.S. self-construction. Thus, to fully understand the U.S. "China threat" argument, it is essential to recognize itsautobiographical nature.Indeed, the construction of other is not only a product of U.S. self-imagination, but often a necessary foil to it. For example, by taking this particularrepresentation of China as Chinese reality per se, those scholars are able to assert their self-identity as "mature," "rational" realists capable ofknowing the "hard facts" of international politics, in distinction from those "idealists" whose views are said to be grounded more in "an article of faith"than in "historical experience."41 On the other hand, given that history is apparently not "progressively" linear, the invocation of a certain other notonly helps explain away such historical uncertainties or "anomalies" and maintain the credibility of the allegedly universal path trodden by the UnitedStates, but also serves to highlight U.S. "indispensability." As Samuel Huntington puts it, "If being an American means being committed to the

principles of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if there is no evil empire out there threatening those principles, what indeeddoes it mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national interests?"^2 In this way, i t seems that the constructions of the particularU.S. self and its other are always intertwined and mutually reinforcing.Some may suggest that there is nothing particularly wrong with this since psychologists generally agree that "individuals and groups define theiridentity by differentiating themselves from and placing themselves in opposition to others."^3 This is perhaps true. As the Swiss linguist Ferdinand deSaussure tells us, meaning itself depends on difference and differentiation.'i'* Yet, to understand the U.S. dichotomized constructions of self/other inthis light is to normalize them and render them unproblematic, because it is also apparent that not all identity-defining practices necessarily perceiveothers in terms of either universal sameness or absolute otherness and that difference need not equate to threat.


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CHINA THREAT K

Its a self-fulfilling prophecy: your so-called value neutral assumptions about Chinese action come to beunderstood by policymakers as social reality

Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University,Canberra, 2004 (Chengxin, The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,


More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S.policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, forexample). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but arebetter understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helpstransform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is alwayspartof the "China threat"problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions andof theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literaturethemes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by thosecommon positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been

identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, politicalscience, and international relations.* Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particularhave shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and theirenormous practical implications for international politics.^ It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution.


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CHINA THREAT K

The DA is an exercise in an overly ordered and detached reading of China---society is reduced to an objectamenable to precise US manipulation---this legitimizes the worst forms of power politics

Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University,Canberra, 2004 (Chengxin, The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Polit ics,


China and its relationship with the United States has long been a fascinating subject of study in the mainstream U.S. internationalrelations community. This is reflected, for example, in the current heated debates over whether China is primarily a strategic threat to oa market bonanza for the United States and whether containment or engagement is the best way to deal with it.* While U.S. Chinascholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially interms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought tobe, empirically revealed by scientific means.For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, formerpresident of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today,

where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world."2 Like many other China scholars,Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment."^Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers"and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality.

And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of"what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismissaltogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "whereChina is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension ofthe China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IRcommunity in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate;namely, the "China threat" literature.


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IMPACTSNo war with China

(___) China will not overtake the U.S.its too dependent on the U.S. for exports for economic growthThe National Interest, 2006. (BYLINE: Harry Harding et al., HEADLINE: China Goes Global: Implications for the United States, Fall 2006, l/n,CDI 07; EJS)

Everyone seems to be convinced that a new superpower is on the verge of overtaking the United States. History, of course, neverplays out in purely linear fashion. We've seen this before. In the 1990s it was the small economies of East Asia, the "Asian tigers",which were the wave of the future. Recall that in the 1950s, based on linear projections, Burma and the Philippines were supposed tobecome the most developed countries of the region. And in the early 1980s the CIA was projecting that the Soviet economy was nearlyas large as that of the United States.

Linear projections are not the entire story; they do not encompass the quality of growth or social benefits. It takes a lot more thanuninterrupted growth rates to match or even surpass the United States. We don't focus on the very real challenges China faces in

making it to the next level of development. I wonder how, in five years time, we are going to evaluate some of these overblownexpectations about China.

It is popular to underestimate how well the U.S. economy is doing, and to be worried about the Chinese juggernaut. China is still verydependent on exports to the United States to sustain its economic growth. Domestic demand in China is flat. For a long time to come,China is going to need a healthy, strong and prosperous United States to ensure its own prosperity and development.

(___) No war with China: tensions wont spillover to warNewsweek, 2005.(BYLINE: By Fareed Zakaria; With Melinda Liu in Beijing, Christian Caryl in Tokyo, Karen Lowry Miller in Brussels, RukhminiPunoose in New York and John Barry in Washington, D.C.; Graphic by Alexandra A. Seno and Andrew Romano, HEADLINE: Does the Future

Belong to China?, May 9, 2005, l/n, CDI 07; EJS)

A world war is highly unlikely. Nuclear deterrence, economic interdependence, globalization all mitigate against it. But beneath thiscalm, there is probably going to be a soft war, a quiet competition for power and influence across the globe. America and China will befriends one day, rivals another, cooperate in one area, compete in another. Welcome to the 21st century.

(___) China will not challenge the U.S.Shirk, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for relations with China, 2007. (Susan, China: FragileSuperpower, Oxford University Press, page 243-244, CDI 07; EJS)

According to a policy advisor who was helping prepare President Hu for his visit to the United States in September 2005 (becauseof hurricane Katrina, the trip was limited to a meeting with President Bush in New York City), Hu intended to articulate a new seof "three nos" to reassure the American president: China will not challenge the United States globally, China will not seek toexclude the United States from Asia, and China will not confront the United States on bilateral issues like trade. In short, the new ruleswere "no challenge, no exclusion, no confrontation.


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IMPACTSNo war with China

(___) China will act to prevent disputes from disrupting relationsShirk, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for relations with China, 2007. (Susan, China: FragileSuperpower, Oxford University Press, page 242-243, CDI 07; EJS)

Since 1999, Chinese foreign policymakers have bent over backward to avoid public fights with Washington that would angerthe Chinese public as well as the Americans. The goal is not only to convince Americans that China is not a threat, but also toprevent anti-American sentiments in China from disrupting relations with the United States or from turning against the CCPregime. In recent years, the Chinese government has found it safer to quietly accommodate U.S. policies than to get into a high-profile battle. It would rather hide its conflicts with Washington from the public than highlight them. This may be why the Chineseside declined the American request for a live televised press conference like the Clinton-Jiang one when President Bush visitedBeijing in 2005.

(___) Anti-U.S. public rhetoric does not mean the government will act against the U.S.Shirk, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for relations with China, 2007. (Susan, China: FragileSuperpower, Oxford University Press, page 222, CDI 07; EJS)

When I traveled to China during 1997 through 2000 to negotiate with my Chinese counterparts I noticed the disjunction betweenChina's harsh media rhetoric and its flexible diplomacy. After a long day in the bowels of the Foreign Ministry either over-airconditioned or overheated depending on the seasonand a long evening in the equally uncomfortable U.S. Embassy writing reportingcables to Washington. I returned to the haven of my hotel room and turned on the television. I was struck by the contrast between thetelevision news commentary, which sharply criticized American actions in various parts of the world, and the businesslike tone of the

negotiations I had just been part of. The public rhetoric toward the United States and the official interactions with the United States thawere hidden from public view were completely at odds. The media, guided by the Communist Party Propaganda Department, criticizedthe United States to arouse popular support for the Party, while at the same time Chinese diplomats were making compromises withthe U.S. government.


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CHINACOUNTERPLAN 2AC

1. Perm: Do Both [you will want to write out the specifics here]

2. CP is theoretically illegitimate

Counter-Interpretation: You could have run your DA without running the CP, which solves all of your offensive reasons forneeding to run a CP. In order to win the theory debate, you have to win a reason why the CP specifically is good, not Chinagenerally.

3. CP does not solve the Aff advantages. The U.S. is key to act because ______________________________.

4. The permutation induces cooperation with China: public health is a cooperation issue

Shinn, 2006.(David H.,Africa and Chinas Global Activism, Ellio tt School of International AffairsThe George Washington University, Paper Presented at the National Defense University Pacific Symposium, Chinas Global Activism: Implications

for U.S. Security Interests, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, June 20, 2006,http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2006/shinnpaper.pdf, CDI 07; EJS)

Although there are important African issues where the U.S. and China disagree, the next several years offer the greatest opportunityfor collaboration and cooperation. As competition for scarce energy resources in Africa increases in the years ahead, it will be moredifficult to cooperate in areas where there is no inherent conflict. Issues that lend themselves now to cooperation include counteringterrorism, organized crime, and drug cartels and addressing global public health crises. Improved health services are desperatelyneeded in Africa. This is an area where Chinese experience on the continent and western capital could work to the advantage ofeveryone. As China appreciates the increasing environmental dangers caused by its rapid economic expansion, the time may also beripe for working cooperatively towards better environmental practices in Africa. If there is U.S.-Chinese agreement on some of theseeasier challenges, it could lead to discussions aimed at convincing China to change its policy on the provision of arms to Africa.
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2006/shinnpaper.pdfhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2006/shinnpaper.pdfhttp://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2006/shinnpaper.pdf


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CHINACOUNTERPLAN 2AC

5. Coordination DA to the CP:Your evidence overestimates Chinas potential: the more China invests in Africa increasestensions amongst the government strategy and the agents carrying out the policy. This tension will hamstring Chinas overall

soft-power strategy and hurt effective coordination of the plan.Gill and Reilly, the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS and the East Asia representative for the American Friends ServiceCommittee, based in Dalian, China, 2007.(Bates and James, The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa, The Washington Quarterly, Summer,30:3, p37-52, CDI 2007, EJS)

Since 2000, this impressive policy push has rapidly advanced Chinas core strategic, economic, and diplomatic objectives in Africa. Chinesecorporations have secured long-term access to key strategic resources. Economic policymakers have leveraged ties to the continent to build a moreglobalized networkof large transnational corporations. The prospects for economic growth and investment have encouraged African leaders to support Chinas broaderdiplomatic effort to portray itself as a peacefully rising power interested in win-win solutions and have helped lure African capitals to drop official tieswith Taipei in favor of diplomatic relations with Beijing.Most analysts, however, tend to exaggerate the prospects of Chinas corporate engagement in Africa. As it deepens, the Chinese government willmore likely find itself hamstrung by what theorists call a powerful principal-agent dilemma: an increasing set of tensions and contradictions between

the interests and aims of government principalsthe bureaucracies based in Beijing tasked with advancing Chinas overall national interestsandthe aims and interests of ostensible agentsthe companies and businesspersons operating on the ground in Africa.

As Chinas Africa strategy depends on an ever-increasing number of bureaucratic principals and corporate agents, contradictions between them willlikewise increase. There is already ample and growing evidence of Chinese corporations and entrepreneurs taking steps that are at odds withChinese government interests, creating problems for Beijings attempts to promote a positive and constructive image for Chinese engagement in

Africa. Looking ahead, Beijings ability to rely on its corporate agents to dependably advance its strategic, economic, and diplomatic interests inAfrica will further erode. This in turn will likely present new challenges to Chinas global influence and overall soft-power strategy.

Chinas image key to trade agreements which secure Chinas oil supply and economyChina Daily, 2005(Jan 21, China Playsa More Active Role, http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/118482.htm, CDI 2007; EJS)

Also, China included energy co-operation into its diplomatic work. Following the Iraq War, more and more Chinese have been conscious of theimportance of energy security and the international struggle for strategic material. China fully realized that its economic growth could slow and even

stop in the absence of sufficient energy supply. The country has thus begun to make a thorough review of its past petroleum security strategy in thewake of the Iraq War. And an all-dimensional energy diplomacy has gradually taken shape. Over the past two years, China has implemented adiversified energy supply strategy, setting up energy relations in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, actively carrying out energy co-operationwith Britain, Russia and others. More importantly, China is building energy diplomacy into a systematic project and global strategy. The country isnow straightforward when talking about its energy interests throughout the world. And its ties with a number of countries are warming up due to theirenergy co-operation. Following its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), China has seen an increasing number of trade disputes with othercountries while enjoying the benefits the membership has brought. This has driven home to China that passively acting as a bystander ofinternational rules does not help settle its economic disputes with others, and it should seek interests for itself by gaining a bigger say in internationalbodies and the making of new rules. To solve various kinds of economic rows from the roots, the Chinese Government has conducted bilateraldialogues with more countries to remove itself from the list of non-market economic states. It has also co-operated with some countries within theWTO framework to change and eliminate related articles detrimental to China's economic development and the interests of developing countries.Currently, China has not only accepted a number of established international systems and rules, but has also played as a more mature and adeptactor on the diplomatic stage.

Chinas economy key to the global economyThe Economist, 2004(Sep 30, 2004, Can the world economy sustain its stunning pace of growth? , l/n, CDI 2007; EJS)

The fourth risk is that China's soaring economy might suffer a hard landing as its investment boom turns to bust. A slump in China would badly hurtthe rest of Asia, and dent global confidence. China's GDP surged by almost 10% in the year to the second quarter, and fixed investment and banklending are still rising too fast. The government is reluctant to use the usual macroeconomic policy tools of a market economy, such as letting theexchange rate rise and raising interest rates; instead it has relied mainly on administrative controls to curb lending and investment. Negative realinterest rates are distorting market signals, and the bluntness of direct controls runs the risk that investment may mistakenly undershoot.


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COUNTERPLAN ANSWERSPerm solves the link to the DA

(___) The perm solves the link to the DA--There is a small window of opportunity for cooperation: the US and Chinamust work together to avoid a fight over AfricaGill, 2007. (Bates, Chinas Expanding Role in Africa: Implications for the United States, A Report of the CSIS Delegation to China on China-Africa-U.S. Relations, January, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/chinainafrica.pdf, CDI 07; EJS)

First, and most importantly, there is a need for a more strategic approach by the United States, if a costly U.S.-China clash in Africa isto be avoided and if opportunities for fruitful collaborations are to be pursued effectively. A strategic approach can build on the realitythat, broadly speaking, the United States and China share a range of common interests in seeking a more collaborative andconstructive bilateral relationship. The relationship between the two countries is in a period of relative stability and constructivedialogue, presenting a window of opportunity to make further gains in expanding their common ground. Most obviously, the two sideshave become deeply intertwined economically and share a joint interest in managing their political and security relationship in a waythat assures continued bilateral economic benefits. In addition, recent experience has affirmed that the two countries stand a far better

chance of dealing with the many security challenges they facefrom stemming the nuclear ambitions of Iran andNorth Korea to securing energy supplies to tackling the problem of global climate changethrough cooperation and healthycompetition rather than confrontation.

(___) Cooperation will be hard but not impossible: focusing on health issues will strengthen the U.S.-ChinapartnershipGill, 2007. (Bates, Chinas Expanding Role in Africa: Implications for the United States, A Report of the CSIS Delegation to China on China-Africa-U.S. Relations, January, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/chinainafrica.pdf, CDI 07; EJS)

For the United States, such a strategic and anticipatory approach to China-Africa relations will demand a greater openness to engage

China through multilateral channels, such as within the United Nations, within major international economic and financial institutions,and within Africa-based multilateral bodies such as the African Union. The slower pace and tough diplomatic work of consensusbuilding will prove frustrating, but can pay longer term dividends in providing greater awareness of Chinese policies and preferencesand fostering more constructive and cooperative responses from China. More specifically, a strategic approach can also bestrengthened through a deliberate focus on strong, mutual shared interests in Africa. In the sphere of public health and infectiousdiseases in Africa, the United States and China have each taken global leadership positionson HIV/AIDS, malaria, and avianinfluenzaand each aims as a matter of policy to address the weakness of infrastructural capacities and health workforce shortagesbetter.
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/chinainafrica.pdfhttp://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/chinainafrica.pdfhttp://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/chinainafrica.pdfhttp://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/chinainafrica.pdfhttp://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/chinainafrica.pdf


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COUNTERPLAN ANSWERSSoft Power DA to the CPThe Link

(___) China suffers from the principal-agent dilemma: further engagement in Africa will not be coordinated effectively, 3reasonsGill and Reilly, the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS and the East Asia representative for the American Friends Service

Committee, based in Dalian, China, 2007.(Bates and James, The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa, The Washington Quarterly, Summer,30:3, p37-52, CDI 2007, EJS)

As Chinas engagement in Africa deepens, Beijings strategy of relying on state-owned corporations to advance Chinas broad political and strategicinterests is becoming increasingly problematic. This problem is best understood as a classic principal-agent dilemma. Whenever a lead actor, orprincipal, designates another actor, an agent, to advance certain goals on their behalf, a number of conditions can impede effective coordination andoversight.21In the case of Chinas Africa policy, three such conditions stand out. First, China relies heavily on coordination among a complex array ofcorporations and government bureaucracies to achieve its policy objectives in Africa. These companies are ranked at city, province, and nationallevels and are responsible to different bureaucracies, impeding effective government oversight. Furthermore, given the limitations of bureaucratic

capacity, geographical distance, and companies incentives to hide information, government regulatory and implementing agencies are likely to havedifficulty in accessing timely information sufficient for oversight. Finally, the interests of Chinese corporations and their supporting bureaucraticagencies of the Chinese government may conflict with the interests of other Chinese government bureaucratic actors also engaged in Africa.The following chart illustrates the conflicting lines of bureaucratic authority and interests embedded in Chinas Africa strategy.22 Three powerfulbureaucratic agenciesthe MOC, provincial governments, and the SASAC, the actual owner of the enterpriseshave authority over Chinas SOEs.

All three agencies prioritize enterprise profit-making. To ensure that Chinese enterprises also advance Chinas overall strategic and diplomaticinterests in Africa, MOFA and regulatory agencies rely on low-ranking embassy staff in Africa in the ECC office. As figure 1 demonstrates, the ECCoffice does not have direct authority over SOEs in Africa, undermining its ability to compel compliance from powerful corporations in Africa.Peeling back these layers of bureaucratic complexity reveals that the China Inc. model may be far less monolithic or effici ent than outsideobservers often assume. Recent evidence from Africa suggests that the Chinese government is now struggling to address tensions arising fromthese internal contradictions.

(___) Conflicting concerns between government officials and key actors prevent coordination in AfricaGill and Reilly, the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS and the East Asia representative for the American Friends ServiceCommittee, based in Dalian, China, 2007.(Bates and James, The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa, The Washington Quarterly, Summer,30:3, p37-52, CDI 2007, EJS)

Second, Chinas foreign aid policy is constrained by conflicting priorities of key actors . MOFA and Chinas top leaders view Chinas aid program asprimarily a diplomatic tool designed to improve Chinas bilateral relationships, often to secure access to natural resources. The MOC prioritizes theeconomic benefits for China in implementing aid programs: jobs for Chinese workers and contracts for Chinese firms. Chinese firms prioritizecompleting projects as quickly and cheaply as possible, which can result in lax safety and labor policies. Such firms are usually affiliated withdifferent city or provincial governments in China, which encourage them to establish a foothold in Chinas foreign aid projects in Africa.The combination of multiple oversight bureaucracies, competing companies, and their conflicting interests suggests that Chinese firms are likely toact in ways that undermine the diplomatic objectives of the aid program. Indeed, in October 2006 the MOC formulated new regulations for Chinesefirms implementing aid projects abroad, indicating that this problem is already emerging. The regulations prohibit the practice of transferring aid

contracts to another firm and only permit subcontracting to a firm already approved by the MOC.The new MOC regulations also require the ECC office in the local Chinese embassy to report incidents of worker deaths to the MOC quickly. Anycorporation involved in a safety incident leading to the death of workers is barred from participating in a Chinese aid project for two to four years.29The MOC also recently required local ECC staff to certify the Chinese firms approved to use Chinese overseas labor, in an effort to enhance theMOCs monitoring capacity of Chinas booming labor-export industry. Although MOCs standards appear rigid and comprehensive, enforcement ofthese rules at the local level is likely to be spotty.


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COUNTERPLAN ANSWERSSoft Power DA to the CPThe Link

A2: but China has worked before

(___) Previous success doesnt matter: our link is based on future Chinese action in AfricaGill and Reilly, the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS and the East Asia representative for the American Friends ServiceCommittee, based in Dalian, China, 2007.(Bates and James, The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa, The Washington Quarterly, Summer,30:3, p37-52, CDI 2007, EJS)

Although Chinas corporate engagement in Africa has yielded an impressive slate of strategic, economic, and diplomatic succes ses inrecent years, a closer inspection suggests a fundamental underlying problem. Chinas primary oversight agencies do not enjoy directlines of authority over Chinese corporations overseas. Although the Chinese government is now busily passing regulations aimed atcontrolling Chinese corporations in Africa and elsewhere abroad, this bureaucratic muddle suggests that they are unlikely to berigorously enforced. This poses not only a risk for Chinas reputation but also raises a host of concerns in Africa and the internationalcommunity regarding worker and product safety, fraudulent goods, unfair trading and investment practices, and lax environmentalstandards.

Chinas implementing and regulatory agencies will need a stronger hand to oversee and enforce newly developed rules at the locallevel. The Chinese government should also do more to encourage Chinese embassy officials and firms to engage with local partners,including African and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), to implement best practices for worker safety andenvironmental protection.


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COUNTERPLAN ANSWERSSoft Power DA to the CPAsian Regional Trade

CHINESE SOFT POWER PROMOTES ASIAN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS CREATING A STABLE REGION THAT SOLVES

CONFLICTS DIPLOMATICALLY

Garrison, 2005 (Jean A., March 22, Asian Affairs: An American Review, China's prudent cultivation of "soft" power and implications for U.S. policyin East Asia, p. 456)

East Asian states and Taiwan recognize that economically, China has become the new game in town. Asian trade is flourishing due to China's hugemarket for industrial components, raw materials, food, and other consumer products. A close relationship has developed between China's import

growth and increasing exports to other Asian countries. In contrast, Japan is now recovering from a decade-long decline and its current recovery appears dependent on China. In 2003, growth of total exports ofChina's trading partners stemmed from exports to the People's Republic of China (PRC): almost a one-third increase for each of Japan and Korea's totals and a 68-percent increase for Taiwan, according to U.S. government reports. A largepercentage of the trade with Japan, Korea, and Taiwan is in the form of components destined for export to other markets as finished products--commonly, shipments to the United States. States in the East Asian region recognize the need to take

advantage of their closeness to China to become an active supplier of fuel or intermediate goods in China's export engine. This trend is reflected in the increasing two-way trade between ASEANcountries and China since 1990--which ASEAN reports to be an average increase of 20 percent annually, while ASEAN-Japan trade is on thedecline. In addition, China's willingness to tolerate trade deficits with regional states (such as the $ 14.8-billion trade deficit with Japan, $ 23 billiondeficit with Korea, $ 16.4 billion deficit with ASEAN states, and $ 40 billion deficit with Taiwan in 2003 according to Chinese Customs statistics) adds

to the interdependence, with China at the center. East Asian investment patterns further strengthen regional interdependence. First, East Asianstates invest heavily in China. China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) reports that 61 percent of China's FDI inflows in 2002 originated in Asia, with Hong Kong leading at 34 percent with the remainder of the figure attributed toJapan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Macau, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia. Second, China has also begun to encourage outward FDI into East Asia through its "Go Forth" policy. According to an United Nations Conference onTrade and Development (UNCTAD) report, China's overall investment in ASEAN countries grew from $ 400 million in the 1980s to $ 2.9 billion in 2002. The investment is heavily resource-based, with oil and gas in Australia, Indonesia, and Thailand,although Chinese manufacturing is poised to expand its investment. For example, Thailand seeks an opportunity for direct investment from China with the idea that Chinese companies may aim to escape regulatory barriers, overcapacity at home,

and even higher land and labor costs in China by relocating to Thailand. As regional fears have calmed, a sense of common purpose has emerged. Growing economicinterdependence with China provides new incentives for states in the East Asian region to promote a stable framework for bilateral relations tomaintain prosperity. Japan focuses on strengthening China's regional economic ties for development to prevent a pattern of power projection in theregion. For other countries, the more formal stake in China's future development, such as ASEAN's FTA negotiations with China and Japan, givesthem leverage in negotiations with both countries and "power of say" in the region's development. Even the Taiwan issue potentially reinforces thestatus quo. East Asian countries generally value stable economic ties over Taiwan's independence and register little enthusiasm over Taiwan's quesfor freedom.

ASIAN REGIONAL CONFLICTS GO NUCLEAR

Beg, 1999 (Mirza Aslam, Nuclearization of South Asia: Rational Diffusion of Holocaust; May 20,http://www.friends.org.pk/Beg/nuclearization%20of%20south%20asia.htm, CDI 2007; EJS)

During the darkest days of the World War I, the Austrian poet, Karl Kraus wrote: If we still had imagination, we would no lo nger wage war. But human innovative proclivity towards destructive pursuits, it appears, often draws curtain overimagination. The creation of the doomsday machine - the atomic bomb - brings the most frightening prospect of what has been characterized as the nuclear winter. It is not a fantasized popular end -of-the-world-dread, but gives concrete substancto that image; using a just small portion of our nuclear stockpiles, we may so impair our habitat, the earth, that it no longer can sustain human and other forms of life.1Andrei Sakharov also reiterated: A very large nuclear war would be a calamity of

indescribable proportions and absolutely unpredictable consequences, with the uncertainties tending towards the worst.... all-out nuclear war would mean the destruction of contemporary civilization,throw man back centuries, cause the death of hundreds of millions or billions of people, and with a certain degree of probabi lity, would cause man to be destroyed as a biological species.2(continue) Deterrence worked in the case of two super powers during the Cold War as has been dramatically brought to light by Gorbachev. Pleading for one standard, Jaswant Singmaintains: Indias nuclear policy remains firmly committed to a basic tenet, that the countrys national security in a world of nuclear proliferation lies either in global disarmament or in exercise of the principle of equal and legitimate security for all.31He believes disarmament to be unrealistic politics, and discards the apprehensions with respect to India becoming nucleaIf the permanent fives possession of nuclear weapons increases security, he says, why would Indias possession of nuclear weapons be dangerous? 32To come at par with the five nuclear nations, is the driving motive. If the perma nent five continue to employ nuclear weapons, as an international currency of force and power, why should India voluntarily devalue its owstate power and national security? 33He therefore poses a fundamental question: If deterrence works in the West as it so obviously appears to, since western nations insist on continuing to possess nuclear weapons - by what reasoning will it not work for India. 34Dr. Bowen, questions the efficiency of seductive super power model, which in his view, is wrong. Such alogic, he said, would be persuasive if several things were always true; if leaders were always logical; and of perception of the situation in the real world were always reasonably accurate. After having gone through it, my take on the Cold War is that the super powers get through it with a consistent streak of luck as much as through the careful and wise decisions ofnational leaders. It was not western superiority that was decisive in preserving peace but prolonged luck. 35 The second argument is that US and USSR did not share common geography as the South Asian rivals do. The super powers shared a buffer -thousands of miles of Ocean between them - but this is not the case with South Asia. Even with the fastest ballisticmissiles, he said, the time from launch to impact was 30 minutes. A half-hour may not be much time, but it is generally enough to pause to assess a warning that something drastic is about to happen, to determine if the warning was a false one, or simply to give a chance for cooler heads t o prevail.36In the case of South Asia, it would be a tenth of the time the superpowers had - 30 minutes isnt much, but its a lot better than three minutes. It is on this basis that progress on weaponization, on ind ucting weapons into the armed forces, and deployment of these nuclear forces should stop. Each step up the ladder, each additional rung, places the region closer to the point where some accident or miscalculation could lead to nothing budisaster. The nuclear genie cannot be put back in the bottle - but the genie need not be allowed to dictate how weapons and missiles go from the drawing board to the battle field. 37One can thus see the futility of non-first-use of nuclear weapons proposition put forward by India, as the geography makes it utterly impossible to determine as to who was the trigger happy

within a span of three minutes. The conflict-ridden South Asia has become all the more vulnerable after its nuclearization as historical animosities, may escalate intonuclear confrontation with horrendous consequences. Nuclearization is very often a precursor of nuclear competition, which exerts a dynamics of itsown, where irrational fears, cloud rational thinking and misperceptions guide judgments. By altering the non-weaponised nuclear character of South

Asia, India has triggered a snow-ball impact on the continent of Asia, and even beyond. Iran, may feel threatened and may opt to become nuclear.The nuclear fear waves may touch the shores of South East Asian countries, who would legitimately be concerned about their security andmaintaining the pace of their economic development. Similarly, with the prospect of Indian nuclear submarine, freely playing in the Indian Ocean -reportedly in the making in collaboration with Russia - Australia and Japan would have reasons to worry about and choose options to meet thethreat.


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COUNTERPLAN ANSWERSSoft Power DA to the CPNorth Korea

A. Chinese diplomacy key to relations with South Korea which solve for North-South Korean conflict

Shambaugh, Director of the China Policy Program in the Elliott School of International Affairs and Professor of Political Science andInternational Affairs at The George Washington University, The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology, 2004.(David Shambaugh, International Security, China Engages Asia; Reshaping the Regional Order, CDI 2007; EJS)

China's strategy for building ties with South Korea has both an economic motive and a strategic dimension. In the early 1990s, Chinesestrategists concluded [End Page 79] that China would have little leverage in shaping the eventual outcome of the divided KoreanPeninsula if it did not enjoy strong ties with South Korea. Improved ties would also offset any potential threat to China from the U.S.-South Korean alliance and presence of U.S. forces on the peninsula. Further, a more robust Chinese-South Korean relationship wouldblunt any attempt by Japan to gain a stronger foothold on the peninsula. Beijing's strategy has been a net success for Chinese strategicinterests; the bourgeoning relationship has greatly benefited both countries, and it has become a central element in the evolving

balance of power in Northeast Asia. The strong state of bilateral ties has also been a key factor in forging the six-party talks (hosted byChina) concerning North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons. Beijing and Seoul have converging and closely coordinated positions inthe talks.

B. Korean War causes extinction

Chol, 2002. (Kim Myong, The Agreed Framework is Brain Dead, Policy Forum Online, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0212A_Chol.html, CDI2007; EJS)

The second choice is for the Americans to initiate military action to knock out the nuclear facilities in North Korea. Without preciseknowledge of the location of those target facilities, the American policy planners face the real risk of North Korea launching a full-scalewar against South Korea, Japan and the U.S. The North Korean retaliation will most likely leave South Korea and Japan totallydevastated with the Metropolitan U.S. being consumed in nuclear conflagration. Looking down on the demolished American homeland,

American policy planners aboard a special Boeing jets will have good cause to claim, "We are winners, although our homeland is inashes. We are safely alive on this jet." The third and last option is to agree to a shotgun wedding with the North Koreans. It meansentering into package solution negotiations with the North Koreans, offering to sign a peace treaty to terminate the relations of hostility,establish full diplomatic relations between the two enemy states, withdraw the American forces from South Korea, remove North Koreafrom the list of axis of evil states and terrorist-sponsoring states, and give North Korea most favored nation treatment. The first twooptions should be sobering nightmare scenarios for a wise Bush and his policy planners. If they should opt for either of the scenarios,that would be their decision, which the North Koreans are in no position to take issue with. The Americans would realize too late thatthe North Korean mean what they say. The North Koreans will use all their resources in their arsenal to fight a full-scale nuclearexchange with the Americans in the last war of mankind. A nuclear-armed North Korea would be most destabilizing in the region andthe rest of the world in the eyes of the Americans. They would end up finding themselves reduced to a second-class nuclear power.


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