8/13/2019 China CP Pre-Institute - Gonzaga 2013 http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/china-cp-pre-institute-gonzaga-2013 1/28 1NC Increasing investment in Venezuelan oil solves peaceful transition to multipolarity, international peace and spills over to the rest of the Latin American economies Giacolone & Ruiz 6/1 (Rita Giacalone, PhD in history from Indiana University. She is professor at the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences of the University of the Andes, Mérida, Venezuela, José Briceño Ruiz, PhD in Political Science at the Institute d'Etudes Politiques d'Aix-en-Provence, France. He is professor at the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences of the University of the Andes, Mérida, ―The Chinese –Venezuelan Oil Agreements: Material and Nonmaterial Goals,‖ Latin American Policy Volume 4, Issue 1, pages 76 – 92, June 2013, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lamp.12006/full) The promotion of national interest in a more-complex and diversified international system has led China and Venezuela to further energy cooperation. Ideational reasons have also played a role in this process, but it is difficult to deny that a realpolitik logic is behind the recent cooperation between Beijing and Caracas. In Venezuela, this cooperation must be understood in the context of the new foreign policy fostered by its government. One of its goals is the promotion of a multipolar world, in response to U.S. hegemony after the end of the Cold War. As Corrales (2010, p. 115) has pointed out, Chávez ―has elevated relations with China to almost national priority. He considers deepening ties with China as vital for constructing a more ‗multi -polar world,‘ lessening Venezuela's dependence on U.S. markets for oil.‖ In an official document of the Venezuela embassy in the United Kingdom, this objective is clearly established: Deepening diplomatic relations with China and other alliances with countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe is part of promoting a ―multi-polar‖ world order which counteracts US hegemony . Multi-polar cooperation is an alternative to conventional financing by the IMF and World Bank which often comes with the burden of high interest rates and the imposition of damaging economic policies. (Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the UK-Ireland, 201, p. 1) China shares this interest in the promotion of a multipolar world, even if the strategy that its government pursues is different from that of Caracas. For Beijing, a multipolar world is linked to the democratization of international relations, or as President Jintao asserted in 2010, a multipolar world should be based on ―a new type of relationship with each other: one in which countries of the world are politically respectful and trusting to each other and, economically, beneficial and reciprocal to each other.‖ Jintao also pointed out, ―We uphold that all countries co-exist in peace, adhere to a new view of security that is based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and collaboration, solve conflicts by peaceful means, and safeguard world peace and stability‖(―Chinese president calls for multi -polar world, democratization of international relations,‖ 2010). This view of a multipolar world has been recognized in the agreement that created the JIF/Heavy Fund I, because it states that it is based on equality, reciprocal consultation, and respect for sovereignty and mutual benefits (Convenio, 2008, art. 1). Notwithstanding these ideational premises, realpolitik also matters in bilateral oil cooperation . China needs to secure energy resources to maintain its process of economic growth, and considering the increasing political volatility of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, Venezuela seems to be a more secure oil provider. The Chinese – Venezuelan agreements are part of China's overall foreign economic policy and follow the lines of Chinese energy for credits agreements in Africa, Asia, and South America, where China has signed similar deals with Brazil and Ecuador. At the
1NCIncreasing investment in Venezuelan oil solves peaceful transition to multipolarity, international
peace and spills over to the rest of the Latin American economies
Giacolone & Ruiz 6/1 (Rita Giacalone, PhD in history from Indiana University. She is professor at theFaculty of Economic and Social Sciences of the University of the Andes, Mérida, Venezuela, JoséBriceño Ruiz, PhD in Political Science at the Institute d'Etudes Politiques d'Aix-en-Provence, France. Heis professor at the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences of the University of the Andes, Mérida, ―TheChinese –Venezuelan Oil Agreements: Material and Nonmaterial Goals,‖ Latin American Policy Volume4, Issue 1, pages 76 – 92, June 2013, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lamp.12006/full)
The promotion of national interest in a more-complex and diversified international system has led Chinaand Venezuela to further energy cooperation. Ideational reasons have also played a role in this process, but it is difficult to deny that a realpolitik logic is behind the recent cooperation between Beijing andCaracas.In Venezuela, this cooperation must be understood in the context of the new foreign policy fostered by its
government. One of its goals is the promotion of a multipolar world, in response to U.S.
hegemony after the end of the Cold War. As Corrales (2010, p. 115) has pointed out, Chávez ―has
elevated relations with China to almost national priority. He considers deepening ties with China as vitalfor constructing a more ‗multi-polar world,‘ lessening Venezuela's dependence on U.S. markets for oil.‖ In an official document of the Venezuela embassy in the United Kingdom, this objective is clearlyestablished:
Deepening diplomatic relations with China and other alliances with countries in Asia, Africa,
Latin America and Europe is part of promoting a ―multi-polar‖ world order which
counteracts US hegemony . Multi-polar cooperation is an alternative to conventional financing by the
IMF and World Bank which often comes with the burden of high interest rates and the imposition of
damaging economic policies. (Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the UK-Ireland, 201, p. 1)China shares this interest in the promotion of a multipolar world, even if the strategy that its government pursues is different from that of Caracas. For Beijing, a multipolar world is linked to the democratizationof international relations, or as President Jintao asserted in 2010, a multipolar world should be based on―a new type of relationship with each other: one in which countries of the world are politically respectfuland trusting to each other and, economically, beneficial and reciprocal to each other.‖ Jintao also pointed
out, ―We uphold that all countries co-exist in peace, adhere to a new view of security that is based onmutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and collaboration, solve conflicts by peaceful means, and safeguardworld peace and stability‖ (―Chinese president calls for multi-polar world, democratization ofinternational relations,‖ 2010). This view of a multipolar world has been recognized in the agreement thatcreated the JIF/Heavy Fund I, because it states that it is based on equality, reciprocal consultation, and
respect for sovereignty and mutual benefits (Convenio, 2008, art. 1). Notwithstanding these ideational premises, realpolitik also matters in bilateral oil cooperation . China
needs to secure energy resources to maintain its process of economic growth, and
considering the increasing political volatility of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf,
Venezuela seems to be a more secure oil provider. The Chinese – Venezuelan agreements are part
of China's overall foreign economic policy and follow the lines of Chinese energy for credits agreementsin Africa, Asia, and South America, where China has signed similar deals with Brazil and Ecuador. At the
same time, the loans associated with the agreements have helped Chinese firms to secure contracts ininfrastructure, housing, agricultural development, and military equipment (e.g., aircraft, arms, radars) inVenezuela, a trait also shared with agreements in the rest of the world. In South America, this may be an
important consideration because Chinese business does not have a strong foothold in the region .
Projects undertaken in Venezuela, if successful, may be expected to have a substantial
effect in high-value added sectors (cars, computers, cell phones, aircraft) for the rest of the
region (Ellis, 2010, p. 3).
For Venezuela, oil cooperation with China fulfills several objectives. The agreements benefit theVenezuelan government by providing short-term funds, helping to extract oil, diversifying exportmarkets, generating ―symbolic projects for domestic consumption,‖ serving as a supplier of ―second-tier‖military and other goods (Ellis, 2010), and obtaining external resources to finance social and economic plans without the conditions imposed by the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank.
In tracking the behaviour of each country‘s citizens, the US-Chinese relationship looks large, lively andfundamentally healthy. Economic ties continue to grow quickly. Two-way trade has risen from $375 billion in recessionary 2009 to nearly $600 billion last year, and Chinese investment in the US doubledduring the last three years.People-to-people ties, though less frequently studied, are rising even faster than the trade figures. Just fiveyears ago, 67,000 Chinese students were enrolled in American colleges and universities. Since then thetotal has nearly tripled, hitting 194,000 in 2012. Mandarin language classes are spreading throughAmerican elementary schools and high schools. Chinese tourist and business arrivals are growing at anastonishing pace, up from 400,000 in 2008 to 1.5 million and likely to reach 4 million — or 10,000arrivals a day — by 2017.
Every day, the relationship is endorsed with thousands of individual votes of confidence from intelligentand well-connected young people, tourists and business managers. By this calculation, the future of theUS-Chinese relationship is good, its problems manageable, and while the two governments may havelittle reason to love one another, they have even less to fight.
US oil investment in Venezuela underlies relations with ChinaTania 12 (Maxime, MsC in Political Science, ―China‘s energy security strategy towards Venezuela,‖6/1/12, http://epa.iias.asia/files/Maxime%20Tania%20-%20Chinas%20energy%20security%20strategy%20towards%20Venezuela%20-%20Transnationalization%20and%20the%20geopolitical%20impact%20of%20the%20Sino-Venezuelan%20relationship.pdf)
In furtherance to what is discussed above, it is interesting to illustrate whether the constraints toexpanding the Sino-Venezuelan relations stems from the fact that, both for China and Venezuela, the U.S.is a more attractive option. With regard to the U.S.-Venezuelan relations, the advantages of geographical proximity and processing Venezuelan oil in the U.S. has previously been discussed and concludes that,despiteVenezuela´s political friction, doing oil business is quite lucrative. But why is China likely to benefit
more from a benign U.S. than a strategic partnership with Venezuela? The Sino-U.S. relations are
the final factor requiring discussion in order to assess the geopolitical impact that the
relationship between China and
Venezuela have on the world.
Some would assess China‘s oil diplomacy and its quest for overseas energy resources as a negativecomponent to its relations with various countries. As China is strengthening its relations with oil- producing and exporting countries, constituting a great competitor for other countries that rely on oilimports, China is likely to undermine their oil security and contravene their policies towards oil- producing countries
(Hongyi, 2007: 530). In scrambling for energy resources, both China and the U.S. as the
world’s major powers want to project their influence on the world’s geopolitical regions .
Although Latin America may be the backyard of the U.S., for both China and the U.S. Latin America is
turning into another geopolitical region. China‘s relations with Latin American countries in general andVenezuela in particular, have primarily emphasized on their economic relations in terms of trade andinvestments. Along these lines,China could be reducing U.S.‘ opportunity to have trade relations and make investments in the regioninstead. The fact that China‘s military relations with countries would affect the U.S., could be construedas an upcoming threat to U.S. national security. Although China‘s power projection on the world can
generally be characterized as ‗soft power‘, China is also growing securit y relations with its international partners. China claims that its militarization in these countries is a natural consequence of the need it hasto protect its interests from potential rivals. It is hard to tell whether or not the U.S. should be keeping a
close eye on this, still, minor threat to preserve its national security. Also, the consolidation of
China’s political relations with U.S. opposing parties, fuels tensions between the U.S. and
China whether this is justified or not.
Sino-US relations solve the global economyCohen & Greenberg 9 (William, US China Smart Power Commission, Maurice, US China Smart PowerCommission, ―Smart Power in US China Relations,‖http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf)
In short, the global good comprises those things that all people and governments want but havetraditionally not been able to attain in the absence of U.S. leadership. Despite historical, cultural, and political differences between the United States and China, Beijing‘s newfound ability, owing to its recenteconomic successes, to contribute to the global good is a matter for common ground between the twocountries. Today there is increasing recognition that no major global challenge can be addressed
effectively, much less resolved, without the active engagement of — and cooperation between — the
United States and China . The United States and China —the world‘s first- and third-largest
economies — are inextricably linked, a fact made ever more evident in the midst of the current globalfinancial crisis. Weak demand in both the United States and China, previously the twin engines of globalgrowth, has contributed to the global economic downturn and threatens to ignite simmering trade tensions
between the two countries. Nowhere is the interconnectedness of the United States and China more clearthan in international finance. China has $2 trillion worth of largely U.S. dollar – denominated foreignexchange reserves and is the world‘s largest holder— by far — of U.S. government debt. Former treasurysecretary Henry M. Paulson and others have suggested that the structural imbalances created by thisdynamic fueled the current economic crisis. Yet, China will almost certainly be called on to purchase the
lion‘s share of new U.S. debt instruments issued in connection with the U.S. stimulus and recovery package. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton‘s February 23, 2009, reassurance to Be ijing that U.S.markets remain safe and her call for continued Chinese investment in the U.S. bond market as a means tohelp both countries, and the world, emerge from global recession underscored the shared interest — and
central role — that both countries have in turning around the global economy quickly.
Although China‘s considerable holdings of U.S. debt have been seen as a troubling problem, they are now
being perceived as a necessary part of a global solution.
2NC Net Benefit — WarmingUS-Sino Relations solve warming — multiple warrantsCohen & Greenberg 9 (William, US China Smart Power Commission, Maurice, US China Smart Power
Commission, ―Smart Power in US China Relations,‖http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf)
The Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society and the and Pew Center on Global ClimateChange launched their Initiative for U.S.-China Cooperation on Energy and Climate to consider howChina and the United States could contribute to managing global climate change. The BrookingsInstitution, the Council on Foreign Relations, the National Committee on U.S.China Relations, and theEnvironmental Defense Fund also participated. The project specifically seeks to promote U.S.-Chinacooperation to minimize greenhouse gas emissions by changing how the two countries produce and useenergy, especially by reducing the heavy dependence on coal in both states. This report is the first to arisefrom the initiative. It draws on the insights of many experts, policymakers, and industry and civil societyexperts in both China and the United States. The report stresses the dangerous implications of global
climate change and the urgency for joint action by China and the United States to counter it. Bothcountries rely heavily on environmentally and climate-unfriendly coal as a major energy source.Combined, China and the United States contribute to nearly half of the world‘s greenhouse gas emissions.Unless they jointly adopt cleaner energy practices and become coleaders in transitioning the world tomore climate-friendly policies, international progress in curbing global climate change could proveimpossible.
2NC Link — China BacklashUS Oil investment causes China backlashLevi & Clayton 12 [Michael, David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment and
Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change at the Council on Foreign Relations,Blake, Fellow for Energy and National Security at the CFR, ―The Surprising Sources of Oil‘s Influence,‖Survival, Vol. 54, No. 6)What about fights over investment? There is no question that cross-border investment in oil production isoften politically charged. In many ways, though, this does not make oil special. China, for example,discriminates between domestic and foreign firms, and among foreign companies too, in determiningwhen to allow investment in a host of industrial sectors, from telecommunications to banking. That said,in some cases, oil investment is particularly touchy. In Latin America, for example, oil is typically seen as
a country‘s patrimony, and selling it to foreigners is something that triggers deep emotional reactions.6
Oil investment decisions can thus take on a special cast .¶ 3¶ It is important, though, not to push
this too far. In some cases where one would expect international politics to play a major role in shapingoil investment, it does not. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq, for example, all appear to select foreign firmsfor inward oil investment more on the basis of contract terms and technological potential than on the
bilateral relationship with those firms‘ home countries.7 ¶ Chinese oil companies, meanwhile, appear toselect their targets for outward investment primarily based on assessments of commercial attractiveness,
with foreign policy objectives taking a decisive back seat. But that does not mean that politics has
not have not affected where these companies have deployed their capital . Chinese
national oil companies have opportunistically taken advantage of investment opportunities
in places like Sudan and Burma, where Western sanctions have kept Western oil majors at
2NC Link — AT Relations ResilientRelations aren’t resilient—they can fall apart
Hao & Wang 11 [Yufan, Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities of the University of Macau,
Senior Visiting Fellow, Keio University, Global Security Research Institute, Tokyo, Japan (2006 - 2007)Luce Fellow, East Asian Institute, Seoul, South Korea (2005 - 2006), Residential research Fellow at the
Institute of International Research, Johns Hopkins University Nanjing University Center for Sino-
American Studies, Nanjing, China (fall 2005) and Jianwei, Research Fellow Department of Geological
Sciences University of Michigan, “Macau and Us-China Relations,”)
But China and America still have different interests and values, have not yet established high levels of
mutual trust or mutual understanding, and may well be experiencing a significant shift in their relative
power. They hold different views on many international issues, even where they share common
interests. They are competing for advantage, bilaterally, globally, and regionally. Their relationship should
not be assumed to be completely invulnerable to a very serious shock, nor should such a
shock - such as a crisis in the Taiwan Strait or on the Korean Peninsula- be completely ruled out. Even a series of
smaller events could exacerbate the mistrust and suspicion that already exists, thereby
increasing the vulnerability of the relationship.
More evidence—there could still be problems
Shobert ’11 [Benjamin A Shobert is the managing director of Teleos Inc, consulting firm dedicated to
helping Asian businesses bring innovative technologies into the North American market, “Beijing fails
the American test,” 2011, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MJ20Ad02.html)
Even outside the recent frustrations over China's indigenous innovation are long-standing unresolved issues related to China's state-owned
enterprises (SOEs). Specifically, the report makes note, "Industrial policies limit market access for non-Chinese companies and in some casesviolate the core WTO [World Trade Organization] principle of national treatment." Is this enough to finally upset the apple cart of US-China
relations? Probably not; but what continues to be obvious is that American attitudes from both sides of the aisle, and
from both labor and business is changing towards China, and not for the better. While the 2011 CECC
report makes note of some positive trends in the US-China relationship, it is also a reminder that all
is not well between the two countries and that much distrust and unease could still
threaten a policy of engagement that has been a pillar of the world for several decades.
However, as our story on Mr Xi‘s visit to Latin America points out, he may have had other reasons for
picking the destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obama‘s ―pivot‖ to Asia
by showing that China is developing its own sphere of influence in America’s backyard .
China‘s business relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but interms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexico‘s NationalAutonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipientof Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, KevinGallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than theWorld Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Ricamay also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with LatinAmerica. Up until now, China has hoovered up the region‘s commodities, importing soya, copper, iron,oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region withits manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have beenfrosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten
times as much to Mexico as it imports. ¶ But as wages in China have increased and high energy
prices have raised the cost of shipping goods from China to America, Beijing may be
looking for bases such as Mexico and Costa Rica where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit
from free-trade agreements with the United States. This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an immediate threat to Venezuela and Cuba? Probably not: China will continue to need their staunchideological support over issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it does suggest that China‘s economic
interest in the region is broadening, especially along the Pacific coast. If that proves to be the case, Cubaand Venezuela, deprived of the charismatic Chávez to court Beijing on their behalf, will have to workhard to stay relevant.
Say Yes — Venezuela Now is key — CP solves Venezuelan economy and Venezuela says yesArsenault 13 (Chris, Al Jazeera web producer, ―Venezuela looks to China for economic boost,‖
Caracas, Venezuela - As China‘s economic and political footprint grows across Latin America and Africa,worrying some and enriching others, Alvaro Ruiz Sanchez has his eyes on the prize. ¶ President ofOrOctrading, a consulting firm, Sanchez - sporting thick cufflinks with the red Chinese flag and a dark blazer - has been teaching Venezuelan companies about doing business with the world‘s second -largesteconomy. ¶ ―Usually, manufactured goods from China are coming into Latin America and raw materialsare going out,‖ Sanchez told Al Jazeera. ―Venezuela has posted a positive trade balance with China, because of oil exports, but without those we would have a major deficit.‖ ¶ Trade between Venezuela,holder of the world‘s largest oil reserves, and China grew to $18bn in 2011, a 24-fold increase from 2003,reported China Daily, a government-backed newspaper. ¶ Venezuela exports more than 500,000 barrels ofoil to the Asian giant daily, according to government figures, and plans to increase that to one million by
2015. The two countries had signed 300 bilateral agreements, including 80 major projects, according to aUniversity of Miami study in 2010. ¶ Looking east ¶ Alvaro Ruiz Sanchez believes trade with China is
the way of the future for Venezuela [Chris Arsenault/Al Jazeera] ¶ As relations between Venezuela
and the US soured in recent years, Venezuela looked away from its traditional trading partner towards the
east. China could soon surpass the US as Venezuela’s largest trading partner.¶ Venezuela's
interim President Nicolas Maduro, who took the job following the death of President Hugo Chavez onMarch 5, held talks with Chinese officials over the weekend. ¶ "The best tribute that we could give to ourcomandante Chavez is to deepen our strategic relationship with our beloved China," said Maduro, whoonce served as Venezuela‘s foreign minister. ¶ In a televised meeting with Maduro, Zhang Ping, chairmanof China‘s National Development and Reform Commission, said ―deepening relations between China and
Venezuela‖ are ―the only way to comfort the soul of President Hugo Chavez‖. ¶ If elected president on
April 14, Maduro has said his first trip abroad will be to China. ¶ Henrique Capriles, leader of Venezuela‘sopposition, criticises most government policies but generally supports expanding trade with China. ¶ Thecountries have launched two satellites together in recent years, and China is negotiating a free trade dealwith Mercosur, a South American trading zone. ¶
Now is key to broaden the relationship — counterplan solves uncertainty
Reuters 5/15 (Reuters International News agency, ―Venezuela's post-Chavez oil policy to focus onChina, Russia,‖ 5/15/13, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/15/venezuela-election-oil-idUSL1N0C69N220130315)
CARACAS, March 15 (Reuters) - Venezuela's post-Chavez oil policy will increasingly focus on dealswith China and Russia if acting President Nicolas Maduro wins an April 14 election to continue his late boss's socialist programs.During his 14 years in power, Hugo Chavez nationalized most of the OPEC nation's oil industry with theaim of putting its crude reserves - the biggest in the world - at the service of his power base, Venezuela's poor majority.Turning away from the United States, the traditional top buyer of Venezuelan oil, Chavez also sharplyincreased fuel sales to China and turned Beijing into his government's biggest source of foreign funding.
"We are not going to change one iota of the fundamental themes of President Chavez's policies," EnergyMinister Rafael Ramirez said in a recent interview with a local TV station."We have a very important strategic relationship with China, which we're going to continue deepeningand cultivating. It's the same with our cooperation with Russia ... Chavez's policies are more alive thanever, and we will push ahead with them."Maduro, the late president's preferred successor, faces Henrique Capriles, governor of Miranda state, inthe forthcoming election. The vote was called after Chavez's death last week following a two-year battlewith cancer.If Maduro wins, he can be expected to increase oil sales to political allies at the expense of the UnitedStates, while taking on more debt from those partners.Venezuela is sending China about 430,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude and products, up from just a fewthousand bpd in 2005, in repayment of loans totaling $36 billion.
The biggest Chinese energy company, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), is a key part ofVenezuela's efforts to tap its enormous Orinoco extra heavy crude belt, one of the planet's largesthydrocarbon reserves.CNPC has joined with state oil company PDVSA in a joint venture in the Orinoco called Petrourica thatis expected to begin producing within weeks. A PDVSA project with a Russian consortium,Petromiranda, began pumping there last year.KREMLIN SUPPORTRussia has given high-level support to its energy companies' efforts in Venezuela. During a visit in 2010,then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin handed Chavez a $600 million check as part of a signing fee forRussian companies' participation in the Orinoco.And Igor Sechin, deputy prime minister and chief executive of Rosneft, Russia's top crude producer, has been a regular visitor to discuss oil deals and arms sales.
Just weeks before the late Venezuelan president won re-election last October, Sechin donned a Chavez T-shirt to pose with workers as Petromiranda pumped its first barrels. Not put off by the nationalizations of recent years in Venezuela, U.S. major Chevron and and Spain'sRepsol are also working with PDVSA in the Orinoco. They will be watching April's presidential electionvery closely.Maduro, a former bus driver and union leader, has pitched his candidacy as the continuation of Chavez's"revolution." Two recent opinion polls gave him a strong lead over Capriles.
The opposition leader says that if he were to triumph on April 14, he would immediately end politicallymotivated oil deals signed during the Chavez years, including shipments to Cuba and an eight-year-oldregional program called Petrocaribe that supplies more than a dozen smaller countries.He would also try to streamline PDVSA, which is widely seen as bloated and inefficient, and review allits joint ventures. But both would be time-consuming challenges, and Capriles would be under enormous pressure not to disrupt the industry's operations.
Whoever wins, Venezuela is likely to import more processed fuels because of recurrent problems in itsrefinery network that were starkly illustrated by the Amuay disaster in August - one of the globalindustry's most deadly accidents in decades.'CATCH 22'The Orinoco projects have been suffering from lack of infrastructure and delays in PDVSA's payments toservice companies. Nonetheless, the government hopes they will eventually add a combined 2 million bpdof new output.It says Venezuela is currently producing about 3 million bpd. But it stopped publishing certified data in2011, and industry experts estimate that the figure is lower than that.The International Energy Agency (IEA) said this week that the sector could deteriorate more if Madurowins the election, and that Venezuela's next leader faced a "Catch 22" situation.Current policies of diverting of oil revenue to costly social programs could not continue, it said in a
report, without putting the industry and the whole economy at considerable risk."But neither can they be reversed without the risk of social unrest and political chaos," it added.Asked about the report, Ramirez dismissed the IEA as a "bitter enemy of the fatherland" that had beencreated purely to oppose political decisions taken by OPEC."We have a completely normal oil industry, without any problems, in an expansion plan with strategicgoals to boost production to 4 million bpd by 2014. We invested $22 billion last year and plan to invest$25 billion this year."The Chavez-era preferential deals with foreign allies meant PDVSA was not paid directly for almost halfthe crude it pumped in 2011. Meanwhile, the company has continued pressuring its joint venturecollaborators to find funds to spur output.As long as the political situation remains uncertain, Barclays Capital said, PDVSA's partners have seemedunwilling to shell out for new areas to be developed, mainly in the Orinoco.
"Most are maintaining their long-term plans in the country, given the great reserves, but are in wait-and-see mode."
2NC Say Yes — VenezuelaVenezuela will say yes — multiple warrantsBlas 13 (Javier, Commodities Editor for Financial Times, ―Venezuela fills void left by Iranian oil export
All is fair in love and war. And for Venezuela and Iran, it seems the adage applies to oil too.Caracas, a close ally of Tehran, is quietly taking advantage of the impact of US and European oilsanctions on Iran to capture some of the market the Middle Eastern country is losing in the boomingAsian region, particularly in China and India.―It is ironic,‖ says Robert McNally, a former White House oil official. ―But as sanctions drive Iranian oiloff the market, it would be unreasonable to expect even Tehran‘s friends like Venezuela to forgoopportunities to replace those barrels.‖ Over the past two years, Venezuela has nearly doubled its oil exports to China – the world‘s second-largest oil consumer – and to India – the fourth largest – to a combined total of almost 1m barrels a day.
Over the same period, Iranian oil exports to both countries have halved to roughly 500,000 b/d.Venezuela has this year become the third-largest oil supplier to China and India, up from seventh positionin 2011. Iran, which two years ago was the third top supplier to both Beijing and New Delhi, has fallen tosixth and 11th, respectively.The loss of export markets in Asia has driven Iranian oil production to a 25-year low, triggering a sharpdrop in the value of the national currency, the rial, against the dollar. Tehran relies on oil revenues tocover roughly half of its spending.The fight for oil market share between the two countries contrasts with the close political relationship between Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, the Iranian president, and Nicolas Maduro, the new Venezuelan president. Caracas continues to offer political and economic support to Tehran. Last month, the USTreasury slapped sanctions on the Iranian Venezuelan Bi-National Bank, a financial company originallyestablished as a bilateral joint venture.
The impact of the sanctions on Iranian oil exports is not the only factor driving Venezuela into Asia,however. According to the US department of energy, ―Venezuela has attempted to diversify its oil exportdestinations away from the US‖ as a matter of national policy over the past few years. Venezuela has attempted to diversify its oil export destinations away from the US- US department of energyBut oil traders and analysts say that without the retreat of Iran due to the sanctions it would have beenimpossible for Caracas to win Asian market share so quickly. Amrita Sen, chief oil analyst at consultantsEnergy Aspects, said that the Iranian sanctions are helping Venezuela‘s diversification strategy,―especially for countries like India and to an extent China, who are replacing Iranian crude with others‖. Rafael Ramírez, Venezuela‘s oil minister, said during the recent meeting of the Opec oil cartel in Viennathat the growth of oil exports into Asia was the result of a successful oil market ―diversification strategy‖away from the US.
Over the last decade, Venezuelan oil exports to the US have fallen 25 per cent to an average of 900,000 b/d in 2012. The drop in exports has accelerated this year, with sales falling to a 25-year low of 579,000 b/d in February.The construction of new and complex refineries in Asia has also paved the way for the arrival of thenotoriously difficult-to-refine Venezuelan crude in China and India.The repayment of several oil-for-loans programmes with China is also playing a big role in the surge inVenezuelan oil exports into Asia. Caracas is handing about 400,000 b/d to Beijing to repay $40bn worthof loans signed between Petróleos de Venezuela, the state-owned oil company, with the ChinaDevelopment Bank in 2008-2011. In the past, CDB resold some of the oil into the market to raise cash,
but as Iranian oil exports fall, the bank is shipping the oil into China. As a result, China has become thefastest growing destination for Venezuelan oil, growing from virtually nothing in 2005 to 10 per cent ofChinese total oil imports.The growing ties between Venezuela and India and China go deeper than oil exports. Caracas has alsowelcomed investments by Chinese and Indian oil companies in its hydrocarbons industry, at a time whenTehran struggles to retain foreign investors, even from allies like Beijing, due to western sanctions.
In Venezuela, a consortium formed by ONGC, Indian Oil Corporation and Oil India controls an 18 percent stake in the Carabobo-1 project to produce 400,000 b/d from the Orinoco Belt region. China NationalPetroleum Corporation, the state-owned company, controls a 40 per cent stake in the 400,000 b/d Junin-4 project.
2NC RollbackOnly the CP solves — private companies means the aff gets rolled backNieh 6 (Daniel, Ph.D Student at University of Pennsylvania, ―The People's Republic of China's
Development of Strategic Petroleum Stockpiles,‖ 2006,http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=curej)
The unusual relationship between China‘s government and its major oil companies could play to China‘sadvantage in developing oil stockpiles. The US and IEA oppose private strategic reserves because theyfear that, in an emergency scenario, profit-maximizing companies may not share their government‘sinterest in protecting the domestic economy. In the words of one US
DOE official, major US oil companies, if asked to maintain strategic stockpiles, ― would tell us to
drop dead.‖28
Chinese oil companies are different. The state-owned Chinese oil majors answer toBeijing, an allegiance trumping any conflict of interest in a supply disruption scenario. China could take
advantage of these companies‘ existing commercial storage capacity by requiring them to hold 40 days offorward cover in a mix of crude oil and refined products, thereby achieving the goal of the IEA-mandated90 days. These reserves, already in the hands of distributors, would serve as China‘s first line of defense.The Strategic Oil Stockpiles Office could exercise flexibility in managing the ―private‖ stocks, imitatingKNOC by permitting companies to swap oil and take advantage of seasonal price fluctuations.Other creative stockpiling strategies could complement China‘s reserves. The KoreanJoint Oil Stockpiling program is one example. Two American experts recently put forth an alternativestrategy they call ―forward commercial storage,‖ urging OPEC producers to store spare-capacity oil inconsuming regions (e.g. East Asia) for release in tight supply scenarios.29During his visit to Saudi Arabia in April, Chinese President Hu Jintao discussed the development of thiskind of forward storage arrangement with King Abdullah.30 China has established several direct producer-consumer relationships; the foundation for special stockpiling measures has already been laid.
It’s the BEST way to test the agent on this topic— economic engagement with Latin America is an
international issue, making their research inevitable — limiting this discussion is aff conditionalityas it artificially obviates a critical question of the plan. That outweighs — makes being negative
impossible because it eliminates link ground and makes the aff a moving target
Key to education — their interpretation forecloses discussion of other agents beyond the question of
reactions to US policy —that’s ethnocentric and an unrealistic model of decision-making —
education outweighs fairness — rules are in place to facilitate education
Disads don’t check— doesn’t reflect the opportunity cost to the organization— US action also
doesn’t propose an opp-cost to the CP
Default to theoretical reasonability —don’t have to win our advocacy is best, just that it does not
destroy debate — uniquely justified by the structural issues on the topic
Permutation solves — cooperation solves Chinese modeling and Chinese economy
Nieh 6 (Daniel, Ph.D Student at University of Pennsylvania, ―The People's Republic of China'sDevelopment of Strategic Petroleum Stockpiles,‖ 2006,http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=curej)
3.3 The Geopolitical Challenges of China‘s Oil Stockpiling Plan How China decides to build strategic oil stockpiles will not only carry significanteconomic repercussions for the PRC but also affect the world oil market and China‘s role on the
world stage. The opportunity to cooperate with other states in developing and maintaining
energy
security policies could permit China to improve its reputation as a positive player in
international
politics. Alternatively, a rigid and unilateral stockpiling regime in the spirit of ―equity oil‖
would
decrease the fluidity of the oil market and hamper China’s charm offensive on the West.
As China‘s import requirements continue to rise, stockpiling oil poses two challenges;first, keeping up with growing import dependency; and second, avoiding demand inflationcaused by the import of oil for stockpiling. China‘s growing demand for oil fuels anxiety about
China‘s economic and military rise in the US and elsewhere; while few dispute the desirability of
aChinese oil reserve, filling China’s tanks will unquestionably increase the strain on the
world
oil market . Senior Chinese policy makers are very conscious of China‘s image abroad and
therefore reluctant to augment the PRC‘s already undesirable oil import demand growth. FillingChina‘s petroleum reserves could add up to 100,000 b/d to Chinese import demand for years tocome. ―China‘s strategic reserve has met some difficulty,‖ said Han Wenke, deputy director ofthe Energy Research Institute, a Beijing-based government think-tank. ―You don‘t want to havetoo much of a market impact when prices are this high.‖25 This reluctance to inflate demand,along with the costs associated with purchasing oil for the reserve at today‘s record crude oil prices, is preventing the Chinese government from filling the already completed tanks at Zhenhai.In many ways, these choices are paradigmatic of the conundrum of China‘s rise. WillChina evolve into a powerful but benign stakeholder in a multilateral world order? Or will theworld‘s most populous nation become a strategic and economic competitor with the United
States and its allies? Ultimately, the decision between economic liberalism and economicnationalism will factor heavily into the outcome of China‘s global emergence. How China
chooses to stockpile oil will be a telling sign of China‘s direction. It should be noted that a conservative approach to the development of stockpiles wouldnot constitute preparation for military competition with the United States. In the event of militaryconfrontation, the American military could handily destroy China‘s stockpiling facilities at theirvulnerable locations on the Eastern seaboard. A conservative stockpiling model would indicateChinese anticipation of Cold War-like tension, not military conflict, with the United States
Nieh 6 (Daniel, Ph.D Student at University of Pennsylvania, ―The People's Republic of China'sDevelopment of Strategic Petroleum Stockpiles,‖ 2006,http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=curej)
The opportunity to cooperate with other states in developing reserves and drawdown policies is an avenue through which China can improve its standing as a regional leader by
pursuing a multilateral approach. Proposals for regional joint stockpiling programs have receivedsome attention at ASEAN, ASEAN + 3 and APEC meetings. In January, India‘s energy ministerexpressed support for the creation of an Asian counterpart to the IEA which could ―coordinatethe long-term energy import policies of major oil importers in the region.‖31 And although Chinais not a member of the OECD, US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick has recently expressed theUnited States‘ interest in link ing the Chinese reserve system to the 4.1 billion barrels of petroleum reserves coordinated by the IEA.32Innovative, cooperative measures that could save costs for the PRC abound, butultimately, the future of China‘s strategic stockpiling system depends on the mindset of the
relevant PRC decision makers. Conservative, security-based thinking will lead to greater costs
for the government, more stress on the world oil market, and negative consequences for
the
PRC’s image abroad . A more open-minded approach will facilitate the efficient and
comparatively inexpensive completion of the reserves . If Beijing is willing, the potential exists
for the development of a strong, flexible and affordable strategic oil stockpiling system.
2AC AT CP — Dutch DiseaseCounterplan causes Dutch Disease — tanks Venezuelan economyArsenault 13 (Chris, Al Jazeera web producer, ―Venezuela looks to China for economic boost,‖
Debt trap? ¶ While China‘s business deals with South America are welcomed by many, including
politicians and young businessmen like Sanchez, some experts worry the manufacturing
powerhouse is repeating old problems faced by Latin America, allowing countries to boost
their economies purely through primary commodity exports.¶ Loans to Venezuela backed by
the Chinese state and its development banks are being repaid in oil, directly from the spigot, rather than
cash or government bonds. ¶ Current oil deals are creating a ―fundamentally unsustainable
cycle of indebtedness and dependency‖, according to the University of Miami study. ¶ Since 2008,
state-backed China Development Bank has agreed to lend Venezuela $46.5bn, according to a report from
Tufts University. More than 90 percent of this debt is backed by sales contracts for crude. And the
government is running up debt despite high oil prices . ¶ With international lenders demanding high
interest rates on Venezuelan government debt, and the Chavez government criticising the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for their demands of privitisation and austerity, turning to Chinamakes sense, according to some observers. ¶ ―Venezuela has a policy goal of trying to limit its exposure tothe international debt market,‖ Mark Jones, Latin America expert at the Baker Institute for Public Policy,a think-tank specialising in the energy industry, told Al Jazeera. ―For China, ideology has very little to dowith it; they are investing for strategic reasons - to acquire natural resources.‖ Ideology, for Venezuela, iscrucial. ¶ Carlos Andres Perez, a former Venezuelan president, once slammed the IMF for ― practicing
economic totalitarianism which kills not with bullets but with famines‖. But it‘s unclear whether dealsfrom totalitarian China, especially if they are backed with black gold, will be any better for Venezuela‘s
long-term prospects. ¶
―My children and grandchildren will have to pay that debt,‖ Sanchez said,wondering if the billions in loans-for-oil deals could be ―a double-edged sword‖. ¶ Dependency ¶ "I have aclient who used to manufacture school uniforms here. It has become so difficult to produce in Venezuela,now he is just trying to import them from China." ¶ - Alvaro Ruiz Sanchez ¶ In recent decades, Venezuelahas been dependent on crude exports, and this dependence has deepened since 1998 when Chavez wasfirst elected. ¶ High oil prices, coupled with the government‘s desire to increase social spending at homeand rigid currency controls, have made life even more difficult for Venezuelan businesses. ¶ Petroleumexports tend to raise the value of a country‘s currency, making other exports less compe titive - a
phenomenon economists call the ―Dutch disease‖.¶ ― I don’t think it’s feasible to create
alternative exports in the next two years,‖ Venezuelan economist David Pinto told Al Jazeera.
―The government that is elected in April will just have to focus on managing the oil exports it gets. The
Dutch disease factor is just too high.‖ ¶ Sanchez has seen the troubles faced by Venezuelanexporters first-hand. ―I have a client who used to manufacture school uniforms here,‖ he said. ―It has become so difficult to produce in Venezuela, now he is just trying to import them from China." ¶ Whileeconomics drives the China relationship, demographics is playing an increasingly important role. ¶Migration ¶ More than 200,000 Chinese nationals are currently living in Venezuela, Federico Chang, editorof Panda, a newspaper for Chinese people in Venezuela, told Al Jazeera. ¶ Many work on large-scale oiland infrastructure projects, he said, but others run small grocery stores or restaurants. ¶ Caracas‘Chinatown, a series of restaurants and small outdoor markets selling vegetables, knick-knacks and
bootlegged DVDs, was busy on Sunday. Many of the Chinese vendors didn‘t speak much Spanish, andnone were interested in speaking to the media. ¶ Privately, some Venezuelans worry that Chineseimmigrants are not assimilating to the local culture and learning the language. But there are also ethnicChinese who have been in Venezuela for the past 100 years, Chang said, who are thoroughlyVenezuelan. ¶ Chang doesn‘t believe Latin American countries should be worried about a flood of cheapChinese imports displacing local products. ¶ ―China has opened its large internal market to Latin American
countries,‖ he said. ―Venezuelan coffee, chocolate and other products are being sold through China a nd inother Asian countries where China has a certain degree of influence.‖ ¶ Big plans ¶ Some Chinese firms,including the appliance maker Haier and the communications company Huawei, have established production operations in Venezuela. But products from these factories often have a guaranteed market inVenezuelan government companies. It‘s common to see Venezuelan pro-government activists talking onHuawei cellphones, which are heavily subsidised by the state. ¶ Supporters of these projects say China is bringing new technologies and investment to Venezuela. Critics believe the Chinese, like the Americans before them, are looking for guaranteed markets for their value-added manufactured goods and easyaccess to resources, trapping countries like Venezuela in a cycle of debt and dependency. ¶ While he takesan interest in debates on Venezuela‘s new embrace of China, Sanchez has more pressing concerns. One ofhis clients wants to import spare car parts from China, while others are interested in textiles and buildingmaterials. He is planning another trip to Beijing next week and brushing up on his Mandarin, like other
young entrepreneurs across South America. ¶ ―In Latin America and Africa, the Chinese are directly buying natural resources,‖ he said, finishing his coffee. ―They are taking control of the US and Europethrough buying companies and bonds."
Counterplan doesn‘t solve—can‘t stimulate the Venezuelan economy
Giacolone & Ruiz 6/1 (Rita Giacalone, PhD in history from Indiana University. She is professor at theFaculty of Economic and Social Sciences of the University of the Andes, Mérida, Venezuela, JoséBriceño Ruiz, PhD in Political Science at the Institute d'Etudes Politiques d'Aix-en-Provence, France. Heis professor at the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences of the University of the Andes, Mérida, ―TheChinese –Venezuelan Oil Agreements: Material and Nonmaterial Goals,‖ Latin American Policy Volume4, Issue 1, pages 76 – 92, June 2013, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lamp.12006/full)
In Venezuela, a nation in which oil constitutes the bulk of exports, the People's Republic of China (PRC,subsequently China) has recently entered the field of oil exploration and production in association withthe government. Venezuela has hailed this decision as opening the possibility of obtaining independencefrom U.S. companies that had traditionally dominated this field, but the deal has been criticized because
Chinese investments in the exploitation of natural resources belonging to the state could
deepen Venezuelan dependence on oil exports revenues , increase the already large role of the
state in the economy, and curtail future oil sales to guarantee debt repayment of a Chinese
2AC AT CP — Aff is keyAff is key — CP risks war with ChinaDumbaugh & Sullivan 5 (Kerry, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Mark, Specialist in Latin American Affairs,
―China‘s Growing Interest in Latin America,‖ 2005, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi- bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA462467)
On April 6, 2005, the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee held hearings on China‘s growing Latin American involvement. Witnesses reflected the range of debate on the implications of China‘s regional contacts.12
Some observers believe increased Chinese interest and economic linkages with LatinAmerica constitute a significant future threat to U.S. influence and interests in Latin
America. They maintain that China ―is using Latin America to challenge United States
supremacy in the western hemisphere and to build a third world coalition of nations with
interests that may well be at variance or even inimical to American interests and values.‖13
According to this view, the assertive Chinese commercial interest demonstrated at the November 2004 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum meeting in Chile
should serve as a wake-up call to U.S. policymakers to focus more attention on China‘s growing role in the region.14 China‘s regional presence, they say, ultimately could havesignificant strategic implications for the United States when China begins to take actionto protect its interests in the region.15 Some observers who are wary of PRC initiatives in the Western Hemisphere contend that the Chinese government is attempting to exploitweaknesses left by U.S. inattentiveness to the region. According to this view, the UnitedStates should adopt a new strategy in Latin America — including ―expanding its own free trade network, helping friendly nations develop strong market economies, fostering closer,more cooperative security relationships‖ — in order to deflect the China challenge.16
Blumenthal 11 (Dan, Resident fellow at AEI, Current commissioner and former vice chairman of the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, where he directs efforts to monitor, investigate, and provide
recommendations on the national security implications of the economic relationship between the two countries.
Previously, he was senior director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia in the Secretary of Defense's Office of
International Security Affairs and practiced law in New York prior to his government service. At AEI, in addition to
his work on the national security implications of U.S.-Sino relations, he coordinates the Tocqueville on China
project, which examines the underlying civic culture of post-Mao China. Mr. Blumenthal also contributes to AEI's
Asian Outlook series and is a research associate with the National Asia Research Program. 10/3/2011, “The top ten
unicorns of China policy”, http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/asia/the-top-ten-
unicorns-of-china-policy/)
9) We need China's help to solve global problems. This is further down on my list because it is not really a fantastical unicorn. It
is true. What is a fantasy is that China will be helpful. We do need China to disarm North Korea. They do not want to,and North Korea is now a nuclear power. The same may soon be true with Iran. The best we can get in our diplomacy with
China is to stop Beijing from being less helpful. It is a fact that the global problems would be easier to manage with
Chinese help. However, China actually contributing to global order is a unicorn.
Broader strategic cooperation outweighs
Jeffrey A. Bader 11, visiting scholar at the China Center at Brookings, “U.S.-China Senior Dialogue: Maintaining
the Balance”, May 6, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0506_strategic_economic_dialogue_bader.aspx
The S&ED comes at a time when U.S.-China relations are in fundamentally sound condition. President Hu
Jintao’s visit to the United States was generally assessed as setting a realistic tone and achieving successes in a
relationship that will always be marked by frictions. President Obama, who will be involved in the S&ED, has put
a high priority on U.S.-China relations, and the two sides have cooperated, within limits, on major security issues,including Iran, Korea, Sudan, Libya, and nuclear security. From the U.S. perspective, it will certainly not hurt that
the meeting comes only a week after the successful raid that eliminated Osama bin Laden, which sends a message
of U.S. strength and credibility in a relationship where those qualities are always the subject of Chinese scrutiny.
The United States and China have developed reasonable expectations about both the possibilities and limits of
cooperation, which will reduce the chances of future miscalculation. All of these subjects, plus broader
developments in the Middle East, will be on the agenda of the S&ED.
Relations are resilient, but the cooperation that their impacts assume is impossible
Harry Harding 11, founding dean of the School of Leadership and Public Policy at the University of Virginia, “Are
China and the U.S. on a collision course?”, June 14, http://thinkingaboutasia.blogspot.com/2011/06/are-china-
and-us-on-collision-course.html
In my judgment, it is highly unlikely for the relationship between the US and China to be primarily cooperative,
at least in the short to medium term. The differences in values, political systems, interests, levels of
development, and perceptions of the existing international order are simply too great for the two countries to
find common ground on all issues, or even to find a mutually agreeable allocation of costs and benefits when
they try to pursue common interests. Only a common interest that was massively compelling – say a widespread
pandemic, another financial crisis, a global outbreak of terrorist activity targeted at both countries, or increasingly
severe consequences of climate change – might produce a predominantly cooperative relationship. Fortunately,
an essentially confrontational relationship is also unlikely, especially if one is primarily concerned with the risks
Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees between now and the end of the century even if every
country cuts greenhouse gas emissions as proposed, according to a United Nations update. Scientists looked at
emission plans from 192 nations and calculated what would happen to global warming. The projections take into
account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things. The U.S.
figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate,
where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil
fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The
world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. Much of projected rise intemperature is because of developing nations, which aren't talking much about cutting their emissions,
scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. China alone adds nearly 2 degrees to the
projections. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s
environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed
papers on climate over the last three years. Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and
the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050, as some experts propose, the world is still facing a 3-
degree increase by the end of the century, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped
oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in
Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the
century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees.
The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats
how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner
said. Global warming is speeding up, especially in the Arctic, and that means that some top-level science
projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic. Corell, who headed an assessment ofwarming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." BecauseGreenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought, it looks like the seas will risetwice as fast as projected just three years ago, Corell said. He said seas should rise about a foot every 20
to 25 years.
Data and models point to no solution or warming, even IPCC agrees
Lomborg 08 [Bjørn, author of The Skeptical Environmentalist, is director of the Copenhagen Consensus Center and adjunct professor at
the Copenhagen Business School, “Warming warnings get overheated”, response to their Tickell article, Aug 15,
These alarmist predictions are becoming quite bizarre, and could be dismissed as sociological oddities, if itweren't for the fact that they get such big play in the media. Oliver Tickell, for instance, writes that a
global warming causing a 4C temperature increase by the end of the century would be a "catastrophe" andthe beginning of the "extinction" of the human race. This is simply silly. His evidence? That 4C would
mean that all the ice on the planet would melt, bringing the long-term sea level rise to 70-80m, flooding everything we
hold dear, seeing billions of people die. Clearly, Tickell has maxed out the campaigners' scare potential (becausethere is no more ice to melt, this is the scariest he could ever conjure). But he is wrong. Let us just
remember that the UN climate panel, the IPCC, expects a temperature rise by the end of the century between 1.8and 6.0C. Within this range, the IPCC predicts that, by the end of the century, sea levels will rise 18-59centimetres – Tickell is simply exaggerating by a factor of up to 400. Tickell will undoubtedly claim thathe was talking about what could happen many, many millennia from now. But this is disingenuous. First, the
4C temperature rise is predicted on a century scale – this is what we talk about and can plan for. Second,although sea-level rise will continue for many centuries to come, the models unanimously show thatGreenland's ice shelf will be reduced, but Antarctic ice will increase even more (because of increased precipitation in Antarctica) for the next three centuries. What will happen beyond that clearly depends much more on emissions in future
centuries. Given that CO2 stays in the atmosphere about a century, what happens with the temperature, say, six centuries from now mainly
depends on emissions five centuries from now (where it seems unlikely non-carbon emitting technology such as solar panels will not have
become economically competitive). Third, Tickell tells us how the 80m sea-level rise would wipe out all the world'scoastal infrastructure and much of the world's farmland – "undoubtedly" causing billions to die. But to cause billions to die, itwould require the surge to occur within a single human lifespan. This sort of scare tactic is insidiouslywrong and misleading, mimicking a firebrand preacher who claims the earth is coming to an end and we
need to repent. While it is probably true that the sun will burn up the earth in 4-5bn years' time, it does give a slightly different perspective
on the need for immediate repenting. Tickell's claim that 4C will be the beginning of our extinction is again many times beyond wrong
and misleading, and, of course, made with no data to back it up. Let us just take a look at the realistic impact of such a 4C
temperature rise. For the Copenhagen Consensus, one of the lead economists of the IPCC, Professor Gary Yohe, did a survey of all the
problems and all the benefits accruing from a temperature rise over this century of about approximately 4C. And yes, there will, ofcourse, also be benefits: as temperatures rise, more people will die from heat, but fewer from cold;agricultural yields will decline in the tropics, but increase in the temperate zones, etc. The modelevaluates the impacts on agriculture, forestry, energy, water, unmanaged ecosystems, coastal zones, heat
and cold deaths and disease. The bottom line is that benefits from global warming right now outweigh thecosts (the benefit is about 0.25% of global GDP). Global warming will continue to be a net benefit until about 2070, when the
damages will begin to outweigh the benefits, reaching a total damage cost equivalent to about 3.5% of GDP by 2300. This is simply not the end
of humanity. If anything, global warming is a net benefit now; and even in three centuries, it will not be a challenge to our
civilisation. Further, the IPCC expects the average person on earth to be 1,700% richer by the end of this century. Tickell's hellfireand damnation sermon also misinforms us of the solutions to global warming: panicking is rarely the rightstate of mind for finding smart solutions. In essence, Tickell says that because the outlook is sofrightening, we need to cut much, much more than the Kyoto protocol called for. Now, all peer-reviewed, publishedeconomic models demonstrate that such an effort is a colossal waste of money – one of the leading models shows
that, for every pound spent, Tickell's solution would do about 13p-worth of good.
CIR solves — Venezuela RelationsCIR solves US-Venezuelan relationsSweig 13 (Julia, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for
Latin America Studies, ―Washington: Out of the Game in Caracas,‖ http://www.cfr.org/united-states/washington-out-game-caracas/p29823)
"Shuttle diplomacy" is a term usually associated with the Middle East, and with American statesmen andnow women flying around the clock to avert major crises and war. But it is hard to remember the last timeAmerican diplomats stood at the front lines of conflict prevention in Latin America. ¶ In the current crisis,Venezuela, it appears that the United States has taken a back seat to Havana, Brasilia and Buenos Aires.Reports, tweets, quotes, photographs and snippets of the back story suggest that other than Venezuelansthemselves, the effort to avert a major crisis in Caracas has been an entirely Latin American affair. To besure, the assistant secretary of state for Latin America, Roberta Jacobson, had had at least oneconversation with Nicolas Maduro, who likewise talks to other Americans out of, but close to U.S.government sources. And I am guessing that senior officials in Bogota and Brasilia are keeping
Washington at least somewhat in the loop. ¶ But the cold truth is that Washington is a marginal actorduring one of the most important political events in Latin America of the last two decades. ¶ The optics arestunning. Raul and Fidel receiving heads of state and other senior government officials in what looks likea collective strategy, albeit one led by Havana, to safeguard a stable transition in Venezuela that will lastthrough Chavez' illness, and endure in the aftermath. (Oh, and Havana is hosting peace talks betweenColombia and the FARC at the very same time.) Washington has no standing to undertake similarendeavors. ¶ Washington's isolation may be good news for the South American actors involved, and clear-eyed realists in the White House may well be thankful that they are, as a result, somehow freed to worryabout South Asia and the Middle East. Or, in an era of already low expectations, at least assume a roleconsistent with very limited foreign policy tools on hand for the region. I am the last person who wants tosee yesterday's imperial hubris return in a more palatable suit, or now dress. Better for others to enjoysome successes and make the inevitable mistakes. ¶ But, leaving aside the tempting schadenfreude of this
new normal from the Latin American perspective, and stipulating that in Venezuela the United Statesarguably has little to offer that will improve the chances for a stable, democratic outcome, by now theUnited States should have figured out how to find a place at Latin America's new diplomatic table. It may
well be that the way forward is through our own domestic policies: immigration reform and gun
control, two issues that have major and potentially positive consequences for Latin America, and are at
the top of Obama's second term agenda. Add a dash of common sense toward Cuba, and a path
back to the table begins to emerge. Will Washington seize the opportunity?
