China’s Policy of Good-Neighborliness · Web viewThe underlying reason is that the state-to-state...

Peace 2004 Serial No.72

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Peace

September 2004 Serial No. 72

Contents

FEATURE ARTICLESChina’s Policy of Good-Neighborliness and

China-ASEAN Relations………..……....….…...….…2

The Constraining Factors and the Choice of Modes in the

Northeast Asian Regional Economic Cooperation......13

East Asian Geo-strategic Environment and

China’s Maritime Security………………..…….…....21

Anatomy of Japan’s Missile Defense Plan.………....……..31

INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGESThe Challengse and

Opportunities Our World is Facing…………………36

Work Hard Togegher to Reduce Poverty……………...39

The 5th China Penglai “Ode to Peace” International

Youth Cultural and Artistic Festival Was Held

in Penglai China...……………………..…...…..…...42

An American Expert Visits China.……………………43

A UPC Delegation Visits China...…….…..…………...43

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(Cover Photo: Mme. He Luli, Vice Chairperson of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and President of the CPAPD meets with the

delegation of the Ukrainian Peace Council. )

NOTE: The academic papers published in the PEACE quarterly are mainly the authors’ observations, which do not necessarily reflect those of the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disar-mament.

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FEATURE ARTICLES

China’s Policy of Good-Neighborlinessand China-ASEAN Relations

Cao Yunhua, Xu Shanbao

Abstract: China used to have many bitter quarrels or even armed conflicts with its neighboring countries due to causes of history and the international environment. Since the inception of reform and opening-up in China, especially after the end of the Cold War, relations between China and its neighboring countries have improved rapidly, traversing a process from solving border disputes to establishing strategic partnership and strengthening regional cooperation. This result can best be attributed to China’s policy of good-neighborliness. Among those relations between China and its neighboring countries, China-ASEAN relationship is of great typical significance. Resent years have witnessed China-ASEAN relations developing on a fast track, and ASEAN has become China’s good neighbor, good partner and good friend. The development of China-ASEAN relationship has testified that China is a responsible big country.

In late 1990s, Chinese leadership pointed out that China-ASEAN relationship was at its best. After entering the 21st century, China-ASEAN relationship has been even better, and both sides have officially established strategic partnership. As the Joint Declaration of the People’s Republic of China and ASEAN State Leaders goes, “We, the heads of state/government of the PRC and ASEAN members, reviewed the development of bilateral relations in recent years. We agree that since the issuance of the Joint Statement of the Meeting of the State Leaders of the PRC and ASEAN in 1997, the relationship between China and ASEAN has seen rapid, all-round and in-depth growth and our two sides have become important partners of cooperation.” The development of China-ASEAN relationship shows that China’s policy of good-neighborliness has achieved remarkable success in Southeast Asia. Just like a foreign commentator once said, “China has weighed into the region with smiles and promises of open markets.”1

Important Developments in the Theory of Good-neighborlinessThe end of the Cold War provided China a favorable international environment and

good opportunities to improve its relations with its neighboring countries and to create a stable surrounding environment. Accordingly, China adjusted its foreign policy to take good-neighborliness as an important component of its foreign policy and to actively engage in improving relations with neighboring countries. Tremendous achievements have already been registered in developing relations with Southeast Asian countries. 1 “How China is Building an Empire” by Michael Vatikiotis and Murray Hiebert, Far East Economic Review, Nov. 20, 20034


Let’s compare the elaborations made by the three political Reports respectively to the three National Congresses of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (the 14th in 1992, the 15th in 1995, and the 16th in 2002) since early 1990s on the policy of China’s good-neighborliness, when they touched upon the question of “the International Situation and Our External Work”.

In the Political Report to the 14th National Congress of the CPC, it goes like this: “Our friendly and good neighborly relations with neighboring countries are in the best time since the founding of the PRC.” “China does not seek to enter into alliance with any country or group of countries, nor does China join any military bloc.”

In the Political Report to the 15th National Congress of the CPC, it says that “In a fairly long period to come, it will be possible to avert a new world war, and secure a favorable, peaceful international environment and maintain good relations with the surrounding countries.” The Report also emphasizes the need to adhere to Deng Xiaoping’ foreign policy that “we shall not enter into alliance with any power or group of countries; nor shall we establish any military bloc, join arms race, or seek military expansion.” “The good-neighborly policy should be upheld. This has always been our consistent stand and will never change. Keeping in mind the overall objective to maintain peace and stability, we should settle disputes between China and the surrounding countries through friendly consultations and negotiations. Should it fail to serve the purpose, we should put them aside for the time being, seeking common ground while reserving differences.” “In carrying out the socialist modernization program, we need a long-term of peaceful international environment, and above all, we need to maintain good relations with surrounding countries. China’s development will not pose a threat to any other country.”

The Report to the 16th National Congress of the CPC points out: “A new world war is unlikely in the foreseeable future. It is realistic to expect a fairly long period of peace in the world and a favorable climate in the areas around China.” “We will continue to cement our friendly ties with our neighbors and persist in building good-neighborly relationships and partnerships with them. We will step up regional cooperation and raise our exchanges and cooperation with our surrounding countries to a new height.”

Through the comparison, we can find that the three reports’ positions on China’s good-neighborliness after the Cold War are not only consistent with each other, but also in line with China’s foreign policy since the founding of the PRC. Meanwhile, it is not a simple continuity, but rather a kind of development and innovation built on the past. The 16th

National Congress of the CPC has two important innovations concerning China’s good-neighborly policy. First, the report to the 16th National Congress of the CPC does not mention “not enter into alliance” any more. Second, it puts forward the need to step up regional cooperation and bring our exchanges and cooperation with our surrounding countries to a new height. In this connection, China’s policy of good-neighborliness has been upgraded from simply maintaining friendship and good-neighborliness with neighboring countries to a new stage of relations featuring enhancement of relations through promoting regional cooperation and economic integration.

From early to mid 1990s, China was still steadily exploring ways just like “feeling one’s way forward to avoid hitting upon a rock in the water while crossing the river” on how to develop friendly and cooperative relations with Southeast Asian countries. In resent years, the CPC and government leadership further drew on the successful

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experience of China’s good-neighborly policy toward Southeast Asia from a more rational perspective after summarizing the development of Sino-Southeast Asian relations. H.E. Jiang Zemin once pointed out on an ASEAN-China informal leaders meeting on Dec. 12, 1997: “The time-honored traditional friendship, similar historical experience, and common desire for peace and economic development constitute an important basis both in history and at present for the enhancement of the good-neighborly relations of mutual trust and friendly cooperation between China and ASEAN countries.” “Facts have proved and will continue to prove that the friendly relations and cooperation between China and ASEAN are not only in the interests of our two sides but also benefit the Asia-Pacific region.” “China will forever be a good neighbor, a good partner and a good friend of ASEAN countries. Let’s join hands together to establish a partnership of good neighborliness and mutual trust oriented towards the 21st century.”2

After entering the 21st century, both Chinese and ASEAN leaders, realizing the importance of developing their bilateral relations, started to speed up the pace of cooperation between them. On Nov. 16th, 2001, Premier Zhu Rongji delivered an important speech titled “Working Together to Create a New Phase of China-ASEAN Cooperation” at the 5th China-ASEAN Summit. He said, “The Chinese Government firmly adheres to the policy of deepening the friendly and good-neighborly ties and cooperation with ASEAN countries.” “Under the new circumstances, we need to seize the opportunities brought about by economic globalization and the scientific and technological revolution, effectively deal with all kinds of risks and challenges and work together to create a new phase of China-ASEAN mutually beneficial cooperation.” 3He further put forward several proposals to promote bilateral cooperation. Firstly, to define priority fields of cooperation for the early period of the new century; secondly, to push forward the establishment of China-ASEAN Free Trade Area; thirdly, to strengthen mutual trust and support politically.

During his visit to Vietnam, H.E. Jiang Zemin made a speech at the Hanoi National University with the title “Working Together to Create a Bright Future for China-Vietnam Relations”. He described the exchange of visits between Chinese and Vietnamese top leaders as “visiting relatives”. Since “a close neighbor can be more helpful than a relative living far away”, China and Vietnam “should be good neighbors, good friends, good comrades and good partners forever, and exercise good-neighborliness and friendship to educate our two peoples and handle all problems between the two sides on the basis of mutual trust, mutual assistance, mutual accommodation and common development.” “Mutual trust is the foundation, long-term stability is the precondition, good-neighborliness is the guarantee, all-around cooperation is the linkage and common prosperity is the goal for the development of China-Vietnam relations.”

Premier Wen Jiabao further developed and enriched China’s policy of good-neighborliness. In his speech entitled “China’s Development and Asia’s Rejuvenation” at ASEAN Business and Investment Summit on Oct.7th, 2003, Premier Wen further elaborated on China’s consistent policy of good-neighborliness, and stated that China 2 “Establishing a partnership of good neighborliness and mutual trust oriented towards the 21st century” by Jiang Zemin, 16th, Dec., 19973 “Working Together to Create a New Phase of China-ASEAN Cooperation” by Zhu Rongji, 16th, Nov., 20016


pursues a policy of bringing harmony, security and prosperity to neighbors. He emphasized that this constitutes an important component of China’s own development strategy and is China’s established policy. Bringing harmony to neighbors means adhering to and carrying forward the Chinese philosophical thinking of sincerity, benevolence, good neighborliness and harmony. Guided by the principle of living amicably with its neighbors, China is ready to work together with its neighbors to foster stable and harmonious state-to-state relations in the region. Bringing security to neighbors is to actively maintain peace and stability in the region, to consistently enhance mutual trust through dialogue and cooperation, and to settle disputes through peaceful negotiations, thus creating a peaceful, tranquil and stable regional environment for Asia’s development. Bringing prosperity to neighbors is to step up mutually beneficial cooperation with the neighboring countries, deepen regional and sub-regional cooperation, and vigorously facilitate economic integration in the region, thus achieving common development with other Asian countries. 4 On Oct. 8th, Premier Wen made another keynote speech entitled “Promoting Peace and Prosperity by Deepening Cooperation in All-Round Way” at the 7th

China-ASEAN Summit. He said, over the past 6 years, China-ASEAN relations have formed an encouraging pattern of mutual respect politically, complementarity economically, and mutual trust in the area of security. He listed six aspects that the Chinese Government will focus on: first, consolidating and deepening mutually beneficial cooperation; second, strengthening political dialogue to enhance mutual trust; third, deepening economic and trade ties to accelerate common development; fourth, stepping up cooperation in security to keep the region stable; fifth, promoting scientific and technological exchanges to complement each other with respective advantages; sixth, enhancing coordination to bring about a stable environment. 5

China’s Foreign Policy towards Southeast Asia after the Cold WarChina’s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia after the Cold War is an important part

of China’s overall good-neighborly policy, whose core is to conduct active economic diplomacy to enhance mutual trust between China and its neighboring countries and regions. On the basis of that, parties concerned can carry out cooperation in political, security and other aspects.

I. Economic DiplomacyAs early as in 1970s, China gradually normalized its relations with most Southeast

Asian countries, especially ASEAN countries. However, mutual political and strategic needs were the basis on which such kind of relations were established and developed at that time, for both China and ASEAN were facing common threats—Soviet’s expansion in Southeast Asia and Vietnam’s regional hegemony. After the Cold War, that political basis disappeared, but China and Southeast countries soon found a new one for the development of bilateral relations—economic and trade cooperation. Like what I mentioned in my book Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia, “the China-ASEAN relations in the 1990s feature a new, pragmatic and economy-led type of relations, in which politics is 4 “China’s Development and Asia’s Rejuvenation” by Wen Jiabao, Oct. 7th, 20035 “Promoting Peace and Prosperity by Deepening Cooperation in All-round Way” by Premier Wen Jiabao, Bali, October 8, 2003

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subordinate to economy, differences in social ideology and political system are set aside and both sides have tried hard to seek common ground while shelving differences. The most prominent ‘consensus’ between the two sides is to strengthen economic cooperation, and elevate the standard and level of economic cooperation so as to accelerate their nations’ industrialization and modernization process.”6 Tailand expert Prof. Khien Theeravit also shares the views that since the1990s, China has been widely welcomed in Southeast Asia as an economic cooperative partner. He says that China has never been so popular in the past half century. The growth of trade interactions between China and Southeast Asian countries broadened their own markets respectively. Despite of worries by some Southeast Asian entrepreneurs that cheap Chinese goods will occupy their market share, most of the modern entrepreneurs still welcome free competition instead of rejecting rivals. There are also some people who fear that China may outperform them in attracting investors, and reaping in all capital. Nevertheless, in an integrated world today, virtually no entrepreneur sticks to convention and the concept of national border. In contrast, many countries have been encouraging their domestic entrepreneurs to invest abroad, rather than merely investing and creating jobs within the territory.

In the surging tide of regional economic integration and globalization, China and ASEAN have followed a wise policy of strengthening cooperation and promoting common prosperity in trade and economic field. Mr. Termsak Chalermpalanupap, Special Assistant to the Secretary General of ASEAN, calls such kind of policy as “mutual integration policy”. He pointed out that ASEAN-China relations officially established in 1991 have been developing rapidly, and registered tremendous achievements that were unthinkable for neither ASEAN nor China 10 years before. Such achievements can be best attributed to the constructive policies proposed by both sides for mutual trust, mutual benefits, mutual integration and cooperation. Both sides have always been implementing such mutual integration policy as they enjoy converging interests. ASEAN-China cooperation has created a win-win situation and result for both sides. 7

II. Rules and Institutional ArrangementChina and ASEAN have not only become more interdependent as a result of trade and

economic cooperation, but also registered tremendous progress in developing rules and institutional arrangements for bilateral relations.

By institutional arrangements, it means that all relations and cooperation between both sides are based on certain rules and systems. The establishment and development of such kind of institutional arrangements, which are brought about by ever deepening interdependence between the two sides, will in return further strengthen such dependence. The institutional arrangement for China-ASEAN cooperation was initiated in early 1990s. After more than 10 years of efforts, the bilateral relations have basically achieved regularization and institutionalization, thus offering institutional guarantee for the bilateral cooperation in all fields. There are four levels in the institutional arrangement for China-ASEAN relations.

6 Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia by Cao Yunhua, Publishing House of South China University of Technology, 19957 “ASEAN and China in the 21st Century: Partnership of Good-neighborliness and

Mutual Trust”, speech by Mr. Termsak Chalermpalanupap8


(1) Informal SummitThe ASEAN informal summit is convened on an annual basis, followed by the “10+3”

(heads of state and government of 10 ASEAN countries +China, Japan and the ROK) and “10+1” (heads of state of 10 ASEAN countries and China) summit meetings. President Jiang Zemin attended the 1st China-ASEAN Informal Summit in Hanoi in 1997, and the then Vice President Hu Jintao attended the 2nd China-ASEAN Informal Summit in Hanoi in 1998. Premier Zhu Rongji participated in the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th China-ASEAN Informal Summit from 1999 to 2002, while Premier Wen Jiabao took part in the 7 th Summit meeting in Bali, Indonesia in 2003. China-ASEAN Informal Summit is the highest decision-making organ of China-ASEAN cooperation, responsible for making decisions on issues that have great bearings on the bilateral relations. For example, at the Summit of 2001, both sides decided to establish China-ASEAN Free Trade Area; at the Summit of 2002, both sides signed the Framework Agreement on China-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea; at the Summit of 2003, China officially signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and both sides also signed Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of The People's Republic of China and the Member States of ASEAN, declaring the establishment of “Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity”.

(2) Ministerial MeetingASEAN holds Ministerial Meeting of Foreign Ministers in July or August every year,

followed by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and then the Post Ministerial Conference attended by foreign ministers from both the ASEAN countries and ARF countries. The Foreign Minister Meeting is the second important meeting next to the Summit Meeting. Chinese Foreign Minister began to attend this meeting every year after China officially became a dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1996. In addition, China and ASEAN also hold other kinds of ministerial meetings each year, such as ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting, ASEAN Transport Ministers Meeting, ASEAN Environment Ministers Meeting and so on.

(3) Five Working Parallel Mechanismsa. China-ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) Since 1995, China-ASEAN SOM Consultation is held on an annual basis, the main

content of which is to carry out consultations on major issues that have important bearings on the bilateral relations. For example, several rounds of consultations were held at China-ASEAN SOMs over disputes in the South China Sea, and resulted in a decision at the 4 th

SOM in Malaysia in 2000 of setting up a joint working group to draft a code of conduct in the South China Sea.

b. China-ASEAN Joint Committee on Trade and Economic CooperationEstablished in 1994, its main task is to review the growth of China-ASEAN trade and

economic cooperation, introduce ways to further such cooperation, and discuss regional or international issues of common concern. The operation of China-ASEAN Free Trade Area negotiations has also been under the supervision of this committee since 2003.

c. China-ASEAN Joint Committee on Scientific and Technological CooperationSet up in 1994, it is co-chaired by the president of the ASEAN Committee on Science

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and Technology and the Vice-Chairman of the State Science and Technology Commission of China (SSTC). Its main task is to review the development of bilateral scientific and technological cooperation, and discuss regional and international issues of common concern in fields of science and technology.

d. China-ASEAN Joint Cooperation Committee Established in 1997, it mainly works on the governmental official level. Secretary

General of ASEAN and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister co-chair the committee. One of its main functions is to set up a China-ASEAN cooperation fund, formulate schedules for the usage of the fund, and approve and supervise the implementation of every cooperation project between China and ASEAN. The priorities of cooperation cover 5 sectors namely agriculture, two-way investment, information and communication technology, human resources development and Mekong Basin cooperation.

e. ASEAN Beijing CommitteeSet up in 1996, it is composed of 10 ASEAN countries’ ambassadors to China, with its

main task of promoting dialogue between ASEAN and China, and presenting various advices to ASEAN on how to facilitate its cooperation with China.

(4) Bilateral and Multi-lateral Treaties, Agreements, and Joint StatementChina and ASEAN or its member counties signed a series of agreements, treaties and

joint statements in resent years, thus laying the legal foundation and providing the legal and institutional guarantees for the healthy and rapid development of bilateral relations. On Dec. 16 of 1997, both sides signed the Joint Statement of the Meeting of the President of the People's Republic of China and the Heads of State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN. On Nov. 4 of 2002, both sides signed the Framework Agreement on China-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, the Joint Declaration of China and ASEAN on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues, and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. On Oct. 8 of 2003, both sides signed Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the People's Republic of China and the Member States of ASEAN and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.

III. Political CommitmentChina and some ASEAN countries used to have some bitter quarrels over border and

territorial land or waters, or disputes in economic cooperation. Therefore, both sides need to make political arrangements and commitments so as to pave ways for cooperation in economic and other fields. China, as a regional major power, took initiative in this aspect by signing twice the China-ASEAN Joint Declaration in 1997 and 2003, in which a strategic partnership between the two was established. China also became a signatory party to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 2003 at the request of ASEAN, thus becoming the first major power outside ASEAN who has signed the treaty. With these actions, China has made solemn commitments to ASEAN and the world that, China, as a rising and developing power, is and will always be a trustworthy and cooperative good neighbor, good friend and good partner of ASEAN and other neighboring countries.

First, China commits itself to its neighbors and the world not to seek hegemony. With China’s rising and its ever-increasing strength, “the China threat argument”

began to emerge in resent years. Different from westerners’ preaching of “China threat”, 10


ASEAN’s version comes more out of geopolitical and geo-economic reasons. As most of ASEAN countries are small neighbors of China, they feel uneasy and have some worries about China’s rise. Therefore, China, by joining the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia can mitigate or eliminate such kind of worries of ASEAN countries, and help them walk out of security dilemma, get rid of any burdens, and develop cooperation boldly with China in all fields to promote regional stability and prosperity.

Second, by what it does, China has demonstrated to the international community that it stands ready to adjust state-to-state relations through international treaties or other international laws.

China’s formal accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia constitutes a foundation of international law for the healthy development of China-ASEAN relations. Consequently, bilateral relations will be surely more stable and consistent. They will not be adversely affected by a change of leadership in a certain country, nor will the long-term bilateral cooperation be affected by any sudden events. International treaty is an important legal form for state-to-state interactions, and also a contractual agreement established between two or more states or international organizations, binding them with certain rights and obligations. Parties to the treaty must abide by the treaty. This is an old, but most basic principle of international law. According to Oppenheim’s International Law, treaty is legally binding according to one customary rule of the international law—treaty is binding. In the final analysis, the restriction of this rule is based on the basic assumption that the international law is binding.

In the contemporary international community, the importance of adjusting state-to-state relations through various forms of international law has become more and more prominent. Just as the preface to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties adopted in 1969 goes, “the importance of the treaties as a source of international law and as a means of developing peaceful cooperation among nations whatever their constitutional and social systems is ever-increasing.” Actively implementing the treaty and fully honoring the commitments by the signatory parties have not only been an important instrument for safeguarding and promoting state-to-state relations, but also a fundamental condition for the normal development of international relations. If signatory parties do not respect treaties or do not honor their commitments in a down-to-earth manner, the state-to-state cooperation will be affected and the international relations jeopardized. Both the modern and contemporary history of international relations can well prove this point.

Third, by what it does, China has demonstrated to the international community that it is actively participating in the current international institutions, performing its due obligations while enjoying its rights accordingly.

After the end of the Cold War, the role of international institutions in facilitating international cooperation, and safeguarding world peace and stability has become more and more important. The Western countries and China’s neighboring countries have long had the worry that China, with its ever-increasing strength, would rise to challenge the current international institutions. If China had played such a role, the worry expressed in international community would be understandable. But China has never made such kind of strategic choice, because it is not in China’s interests to totally break up the current international institutions. China’s best strategic choice is to actively participate in the current international institutions, and make them reform properly to become increasingly

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rational and democratic. The strategic choice of totally breaking up the existing international institutions is harmful and not feasible.

Forth, by what it does, China has demonstrated to the international community that it has been exemplarily implementing the basic norms governing international relations.

China has always been upholding that all countries, big or small are equal, and small and weak countries also have the right to take part in international affairs. Almost all parties to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia are small or weak countries in Southeast Asia. Therefore, China’s entry into it means that as a regional power, China must also throw off airs, and cooperate with those small and weak countries on an equal footing.

Fifth, China is determined to play a more active role in international affairs, and make more contributions to peace, stability and prosperity of the region and the world at large.

As a mature political power, China should not be content with managing its own affairs well. It should also care about the whole world, on which it depends for subsistence and development. In a globalization age, when a country becomes more dependent on its neighbors and the world, it will get no where in its development if it closes the door. Hence by being a responsible big power, China will not only handle its own internal affairs well, but also pay attention to the well-being of the world and the entire humanity. For that purpose, China should assume more international obligations and responsibilities, and work together with the rest of the world to promote world peace, stability and prosperity.

Sixth, by what it does, China has demonstrated to the international community that it is sincere in pushing regional cooperation ahead, and promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.

Following China, India also signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Mr. Hassan Wirajuda, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister once said at the Bali Summit that he hopes Japan and the ROK will also sign a similar treaty with ASEAN so that “ more than 3 billion people will join together under one common treaty of Amity. That will definitely contribute to peace and stability, and bring the region prosperity and development.” If his wish comes true, the closer cooperation of a larger scope in East Asia covering economy, politics and other fields will no longer be a remote dream. Therefore, it is fair to say that by taking lead in signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia as the first non-ASEAN big power, China sets a good example for other Asian countries. Such kind of practice will surely boost East Asian regional cooperation and integration tremendously.

ConclusionThe school of realism in international relations holds that although states may

cooperate with each other for certain common interest, such cooperation would be difficult, and could not last long. The underlying reason is that the state-to-state cooperation can produce “absolute gains” and “relative gains”. Generally, all states are only concerned with the latter. Prof. Kenneth N. Waltz, representative of neo-realism, once said that when faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gains, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. This led them to consider ‘Who will gain more?’ rather than ‘Will both of us gain?’ If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, the state with more gain may use its gain to implement a policy 12


intended to damage or destroy the other. So long as both sides worry about the possibility that one side may use its increased ability to take some policy against the other side, they can hardly carry out cooperation even if they have a good prospect of absolute gains.8

Such kind of view not only reflects the over-concern of realism with relative gains, but also its over-exaggeration of the international anarchy. That is why realism always holds a pessimistic position on the role of international cooperation and international institutions.

Different from realism, neo-liberalism is of the view that, states can have cooperation, because cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others through a process of policy coordination. States can negotiate with each other about cooperation through explicit or tacit bargains. So cooperation can be a result of the interrelations between a strong and a weak actor.9 Such international cooperation can be conducted not only under the leadership of one hegemonic power, but also within a relatively equal international mechanism. According to neo-liberalism, many factors can promote international cooperation including common interests, international institutions and interdependency. Therefore, cooperation can be pursued even by purely rational and narrowly self-interested governments.

Then, what is China-ASEAN cooperation based on? The author thinks the most important foundation for China-ASEAN cooperation is their common interests created by their ever-deepening interdependency. It is just the aspirations for those common interests that have driven China and ASEAN to sit together, seeking common ground while shelving differences, and developing cooperation in various fields. In the future, even for a quite long period to come, China and ASEAN will pay more attention to their absolute gains. However, as most of ASEAN countries are small sized or weak, sometimes they have to take into account their relative gains when cooperating with China. In this connection, when cooperating with them, China, as a large-sized and strong regional power, must take care of their feelings and assure them that they can make more relative gains out of the cooperation.

In the cooperation, China is also facing an unavoidable question of how to properly strike a balance between its own interests and other’s interests. This is a question that can be frequently met in international relations. Although states become more and more dependent on each other in today’s world, there are still contradictions between one’s national interests and others’ or the international community’s interests. Once in front of such contradiction, will a state be egoistic or altruistic? According to Robert O Keohane, when coping with relations between its own interests and others’, a country may have four options concerning the principles of egoism and altruism.

The first is absolute egoism that is totally indifferent towards other countries’ welfare. The second is to think of others’ interests only when their actions might affect one’s

own interests. The third is to care about both its own interests and others’. Such scenario as Keohane

explains, is not because of the selflessness of some countries, but rather the fact that our world is becoming more interdependent, and increased gains of other countries whatever actions they take, may be conducive to promoting one’s own interests, and vice versa.

The fourth is to care about other countries’ welfare purely for their interests, even if 8 “Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism: The Contemporary Debate”, Baldwin, David A9 “After Hegemony”, Robert O. Keohane

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such doing is absolutely no good for one’s own material interests and security. China used to adopt the fourth model in dealing with its own interests and other

countries’, when it was still practicing the close-door policy and proletarian internationalism. Under this model, China provided a large amount of assistance to other countries, but took nothing back at all for its own national interests, or even at the cost of its own interests. Practice has proven that this model could not properly handle relations between one’s own national interests and other countries’ interests, so it has no way out in the contemporary world.

Since the inception of reform and opening-up, China, as a matter of fact, has abandoned the fourth model and shifted to the third one that is to care about both its own interests and other countries’, and has stressed win-win situation or mutual benefit in international cooperation. China is fully aware that in a world of interdependency, no one can survive alone. In order to realize and maintain its own interests, one country needs to take into consideration of other countries’ interests too, or at least not build its own interests on the basis of sacrificing or harming others. Like what Keohane says, the closely interwoven trade and financial networks in today’s world reflect the growing economic interdependency, which can directly transmit the welfare effects，good or bad, from one society to another. Under such circumstances, no matter what actions egoistic actors take, their common interests would constitute a mutually dependent relationship based on the state of affairs.

(Continued from Page 35) in terms of long distant operational ability and digital upgrading, and will further develop relevant space early warning and reconnaissance ability, which will undoubtedly enable Japan to have regional strategic superiority. While developing missile defense technology, Japan will also promote its technology on missiles production, which will definitely disrupt the stable situation in the Asia Pacific region, and force other neighboring countries to compete in the development of more advanced missiles and missile defense systems, and even go nuclear. (This article was completed before January 31, 2004)

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The Constraining Factors and the Choice of Modesin the Northeast Asian Regional Economic Cooperation

Xu Poling and Chen Yue

At the end of the 1980s, the accelerated development of regional economic cooperation worldwide became the major content of the development of the international economic relations. According to the statistics of the Japanese Trade Union Confederation, there are 194 regional trade agreements in the world now, 107 have taken effect, among which one third was concluded between 1990 and 1994, and most countries have taken part in one or several regional economic cooperation organizations. In terms of the structure of regional economic resources and economic development in this region, the Northeast Asian region has great potential to carry out economic cooperation among all the potential and existing regional economic cooperation entities. But when compared with other economic cooperation organizations in the regional integration, the regional economic cooperation in Northeast Asia lags behind. Although some progress has been made in the recent decade, for instance, with the international cooperation development program on the Tumen River region participated by China, the DPRK, the ROK, Russia and Mongolia as the symbol, the mechanism on the Northeast Asian regional economic cooperation and coordination of interests was preliminarily established and put into operation at the beginning of the 1990s. China, Japan and the ROK signed Bilateral Currency Swap Agreements with one another successively in 2001-2002, and the Sino-Japan Economic and Trade Partnership Consultation Mechanism was formaly started in 2002, but the scale, level and degree of institutionalization of cooperation is still unsatisfactory.

I. The Constraining Factors of the RegionalEconomic Cooperation in Northeast Asia

Because the existing global multilateral trade system can not ensure all members enjoy the benefits brought about by economic globalization, many countries and regions turn to regionalism to make up for the shortcomings of the multilateral trade mechanism and promote the development of this mechanism through the liberalization of regional trade, the Northeast Asian countries are no exception. But when compared with other regional economic organizations such as the European Union and the North American Free Trade Area etc., the regional economic cooperation in the Northeast Asian region has demonstrated different characteristics. These characteristics are determined by the special factors influencing the regional economic cooperation in Northeast Asia. These factors fall

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into three major categories, namely, the internal factors, strategic interests and external factors.

1. The internal factors within the region.In terms of the internal factors within the region, the barriers to the regional

cooperation mainly include the social, political, and economic systems, cultures and religious beliefs, economic development levels, issues left over by history, and other factors in this region. These factors have a fundamental influence on the regional economic cooperation in Northeast Asia and have decided the modes and depth of economic cooperation in this region. These factors include:

Differences of social, political, and economic systems. The key of regional economic cooperation is that the economic cooperation participators in this region have a common belief and observe common rules of the game. The common rules for economic cooperation are not innate, but the internationalized extension of the countries’ domestic systems and rules. The similarity of the countries’ social, political, and economic systems has a positive relevant relationship with the development level of the regional economic cooperation organizations. In the Northeast Asian region, there are Japan and the ROK whose market economy is fairly mature, and China, Russia and Mongolia who are still in the transition process toward market economy, as well as the DPRK who still sticks to planned economy. Even if the countries have reached the consensus on opening their economy, they will meet the questions such as unfamiliarity with the systems when investing in and trading with each other, or the market economic and legal systems of some countries are imperfect by themselves.

When the US takes the differences of social political systems as an excuse for confrontation and “containment”, and Japan adds fuel to the flames, it’s very difficult for the Northeast Asian countries to completely put aside their differences of political systems and establish a certain kind of coalition.

(2) The background of national development history, cultures and religions. The direct reason for the integrated regional economic cooperation is the economic return that may be brought about by the optimized allocation of resources. But whether the effective cooperation can be realized, the in-depth cause is related to the systems and rules of the game with which all sides compete and cooperate in the economic cooperation. Regional economic cooperation is in essence the expansion of the scope and chain of economic exchanges and the increase of participators, and the minimum condition to realize this expansion is that the stable expectation of the traders on the economic return cannot be lowered. Otherwise, the exchanges will be inevitably restricted within the scope adaptable to the risks.

System is a device to lower the risk and ensure the stable expectation of traders. From this perspective, the regional economic cooperation needs to be guaranteed by system. The system here can be understood as “rules of the game” or “the common belief of the two sides participating in the game and the brief demonstration or concentrated information of the balance of the game”.

Although the natural resources and economic structures of the countries in the Northeast Asian region are very complementary, the development of their cooperation is very slow. The reason behind it is that the participators of the economic cooperation in this 16


region lack basic common belief for the game.The subjects of economic cooperation in this region—China, Japan and the ROK have

very similar national cultures, and they are all deeply influenced by the Buddhist and Confucius thoughts. China’s 5000 years of civilization has a far-reaching influence on the DPRK, the ROK, Japan and other surrounding countries. But the reality is that the national awareness and religious beliefs of the above-mentioned three countries are not the same, not to say Russia’s Orthodox-Slav civilization. This represents a big contrast with the single Christian culture of the European Union. It is such a cultural difference that increases the cost of regional economic cooperation in this region, and the uncertainty of the cooperation prospect. Just as Huntington said to the effect that without culture, geological adjacency would not yield commonality, on the contrary, it would bring about an opposite result. Although the governments of the Northeast Asian countries have tried to eliminate the differences of the external formal systems and rules (systems and rules on the paper) through establishing a consultative mechanism, the evolvement of the external systems is restricted by the internal systems (cultures, traditions, ethics and customs). The differences of cultural and religious backgrounds and uneven development of history of modernization undoubtedly constitute a great barrier to the regional economic cooperation in Northeast Asia.

(3) Great differences exist in terms of the economic development levels and economic scales in the countries in this region. Great gaps exist among China, Russia, Japan, the ROK, the DPRK and Mongolia in terms of economic scales. Take the GDP as an example, in 2002, China’s GDP was $1.2 trillion, Japan’s was $4 trillion, Russia’s was $0.3465 trillion, the ROK’s was $0.4767 trillion, and Mongolia’s was $1.03 billion. The maximum difference reached as much as 3883 times. While in the EU, the biggest gap like the one between Germany and Portugal was no more than 16.5 times, and the gap between the US and Mexico in the North American Free Trade Area was only 27.8 times. Of course, the gap between economic scales itself does not constitute a barrier to the development of regional economic cooperation, but once the gap between economic scales is combined with mutual non-confidence, it will seriously hinder the development of opening of economy between each other.

In terms of economic development stage, China, Mongolia and the DPRK are still developing countries, while Japan and the ROK are developed countries. At present Russia is still in a transition period and its prospect is not clear. The gap between economic development levels does not directly constitute a barrier to economic cooperation. If there is not an economic cooperation method or mode to reach a win-win situation, it will be difficult to push forward the economic cooperation .

(4) Questions left over by history. If the difference between cultural values and religious backgrounds constitute a potential barrier to the regional economic cooperation in Northeast Asia, the contradictions existing among the Northeast Asian countries are the direct factors hindering the cooperation process.

There are three major most conspicuous and influential questions left over by history in the Northeast Asian region: territorial disputes, the Korean Peninsula Nuclear Issue, and Japan’s attitude toward its aggression to other countries in WWII. The disputes between Japan and Russia on the ownership of the four northern islands, the disputes between Japan and the ROK on Tokdo (Japan refers to it as Takeshima), and the disputes between

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China and Japan on Diaoyu islands will all inevitably influence the future regional cooperation. The Korean Peninsula Nuclear Issue is both a security issue within the region and an international security issue, especially when it involves the DPRK-US relations. And how Japan correctly treats its crimes committed in the wars of aggression in the Asian countries, especially the East Asian countries in WWII has become a major barrier influencing the cooperation among China, Japan and the ROK.

2. The strategic interests of the major countries in the region.After the end of WWII, the Northeast Asian countries joined different camps, which

ruled out the possibility of economic cooperation among themselves from the beginning, and made them lose an excellent opportunity to carry out regional economic cooperation, while the EU took its early shape in this period.

After the end of the Cold War, Japan and the ROK have been with the strategic interests coalition dominated by the US, Russia has its traditional interests, and China’s strategic interests are, to some extent, different from those of the above-mentioned countries. The strategic interests of the major countries in this region are competitive to one another and not in a win-win relationship, which means if one side wins, the other side loses. After the end of WWII, to rejuvenate Europe and to counter America’s control over Europe, France and Germany, the two major powers in Europe rapidly reconciled with each other and jointly promoted the integration process of Europe. The situation in Northeast Asia is opposite. This made the economic cooperation among the Northeast Asian countries lack a strong reason or support. At present, the Japanese government is not active toward the establishment of the Sino-Japan-ROK Free Trade Area and promoting the development of the regional economic cooperation in Northeast Asia. There are two major reasons: the first one is that Japan is afraid that an economically developing China would replace Japan’s economic dominance in the East Asian region; the second reason is that the Japanese government thinks it would not benefit much from a free trade with China. Once the free trade area is established, the weakest agriculture and textile industry of Japan would suffer from the impact of the Chinese products. In addition, at the beginning of the 21st century, the Chinese and Japanese products have already become more and more competitive to each other in the international markets. The competition between the Chinese and the ROK’s products is also in the same situation. The frictions between China, Japan and the ROK on the export of agricultural products have never ceased. All these factors will affect the development of the regional economic cooperation.

3. The influence of external factors.The external factors here mainly refer to the influence of the United States. As the

only super power in the world today, while continuing to develop relations with traditional allies in West Europe, the US has shifted much of its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific region. The Northeast Asian region is one of the regions that the US pays much attention to. The US actually has made use of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue to obstruct the economic cooperation in the Northeast Asian region, with a view to strengthening it’s strategic influence and deterrence in this region and containing China’s development.

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II. Choice of Modes of Economic Cooperation in the Northeast Asian RegionThe suggestions and ideas raised on the routes of economic cooperation in the

Northeast Asian countries in recent years are no more than the following three kinds: First, to start with the countries in the region establishing a institutional cooperation mechanism like bilateral free trade areas etc., and then integrate these bilateral agreements to develop a cross-regional institutional economic cooperation. Second, countries with similar development levels establish a institutional economic cooperation area as the core of this region’s economic cooperation and with other countries as the periphery. When conditions are ripe, the core can gradually expand, so that the institutional economic cooperation can be expanded to the entire cooperation area. Third, on the basis of extensive mutual consultation, all countries in the region establish a close economic cooperation organization at one go. It should be said that the above-mentioned three cooperation routes have both the strong points and weaknesses, but the common point is that all of them demand the economic cooperation be institutional. However, it’s not realistic to expect the regional economic cooperation in Northeast Asia to transcend the functioning stage rapidly and arrive at the institutional economic cooperation. In light of the current situation, the regional economic cooperation in Northeast Asia will continue to develop along the following routes, which are also the best choices in face of so many obstacle factors in the economic cooperation.

1. Carrying out the China-Japan-ROK economic cooperation first, and then gradually taking in Russia, Mongolia and the DPRK to expand the cooperation.

The key restriction of the regional economic cooperation is similar economic conditions of the participating countries. From the perspective of collective action, there exists the rule that a big group lacks efficiency and a small group is more likely to succeed. Also from the perspective of collective action, the regional collective economic cooperation must step toward the establishment of a cooperation group. This process needs to pay a price, and the bigger the group, the higher the cost. During this process, the major powers play the most important role, because they can afford a higher cost and have less intention to take a “free ride”. Therefore, the major countries in the Northeast Asian region, namely, China, Japan and the ROK should take the lead in organizing a core cooperation organization, and then invite Russia, Mongolia and the DPRK to join it. This should be a feasible choice.

2. Carrying out trade cooperation first, from bilateral to multilateral, and setting the establishment of free trade areas as the preliminary object.

At present, the objective that can most probably be achieved in recent time in the Northeast Asian economic cooperation is the establishment of the Japan-ROK Free Trade Area. This shows that in the regional economic cooperation, when conditions for multilateralization and institutionalization do not permit, it’s not necessary and economic to pursue such an objective. This means that bilateral free trade will become the major content and basic form of the Northeast Asian economic integration. The characteristic of this bilateral free trade cooperation has determined its effectiveness in promoting the

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regional cooperation in Northeast Asia, and the manifestations of which are: First, it can involve many fields. From the bilateral free trade agreements newly signed recently, we can see that many of them have broken the framework of the traditional free trade agreements, not only eliminated the tax and non-tax barriers, but also included the cooperation relations in the political, social, cultural and many other fields. Second, it has become easy to reach agreements. Although the bilateral free trade agreements involve many fields, it’s easy to reach agreements, because the negotiators only come from the two countries concerned. For instance, the time spent on negotiating the US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement and the European Free Trade Area- Mexican Free Trade Agreement are all less than five months. Third, it can transcend the limitation of economic development level. According to the experiences of the North American Free Trade Area, the European Union and the Southeast Asian Free Trade Area, only countries with similar economic development levels can carry out free trade in the same region. However, bilateral free trade can transcend such a limitation. For example, the free trade agreements signed between the European Union on one hand and Mexico, Morocco, Egypt and other countries on the other, the free trade agreement between Chile and Canada, are all agreements signed between developed and developing countries. Fourth, it’s not easy to be opposed by other countries. The free trade areas composed of the countries in the region are mainly exclusive economic circles, which tend to arouse vigilance, opposition and dislike from countries outside the region. On the contrary, bilateral free trade is also a kind of economic integration, it’s rarely objected by other countries, because it does not target a specific third country, and its objective is not to establish a bilateral economic group.

At present, bilateral cooperation is a feasible choice, but not the best regional cooperation method, and it cannot even be counted as a regional economic cooperation method. However, promoting the regional multilateral cooperation on the basis of bilateral cooperation is the key to establish a regional economic cooperation framework in Northeast Asia. This can be realized through establishing a core free trade area, such as the East Asia Free Trade Area or the China-Japan-ROK Free Trade Area.

3. The key to promote regional cooperation in Northeast Asia at present is to establish a mutual trust system.

No matter what kind of mode Northeast Asia takes in the regional economic cooperation, the key is that in a globalized international environment, the major countries in this region like China, Japan, Russia and the ROK, especially China and Japan must establish mutual trust relations between them. This is because, in the process of regional economic cooperation, political factors and regional security factors become more and more involved in it, and this needs the governments to establish a mutual trust system. Because only when a true mutual trust mechanism is established between the countries, can they carry out cordial and equal consultation on the contradictions and frictions happened in the past and that may happen in the future. From the perspective of establishing an internal system, mutual trust is not only an important component of the internal system, but also the basis on which the internal system can be improved. The internal system is the basis of the institutionalization of the regional economic cooperation in Northeast Asia. To establish a mutual trust system at present, the following questions must be resolved. (1) The security issue on Japan’s returning to Asia from Europe. Since 20


the Meiji Restoration, Japan has been committed to catching up with the developed countries like the European countries and the US and succeeded finally, and Japan has become a generally acknowledged developed Western country. Once Japan joins the regional economic cooperation process in Northeast Asia, it means Japan will transfer its economic focus to Asia, and whether it can maintain its original economic status will be a key and decisive factor for it to leave Europe and return to Asia. (2) The issue of status in the regional cooperation, that is in reality who will lead the future regional economic cooperation. Both China and Japan have the strength to lead the future regional economic cooperation. And one of the reasons that why Japan is not very active on the issue of establishing a free trade area is that it’s afraid of losing its economic leading position in Asia. These two issues must be resolved through establishing a mutual trust system. Without a stable expectation and reasonable settlement mechanism, Japan would feel difficult to make much contribution to promoting the regional economic cooperation in Northeast Asia.

4. The regional economic cooperation in Northeast Asia needs to resolve the issue of institutional arrangements.

The regional cooperation in Northeast Asia first needs to resolve the issue of institutional arrangements, which means that no matter how the economic cooperation is carried out, whether it is through a loose economic community or a close one, it should be assured by a corresponding institutional arrangement. However, to establish a close economic community like the EU in the Northeast Asian region is not possible. Instead, it is possible to establish some open but loosely connected bodies involving some local areas or some boundary areas shared by several countries at sub-regional level.

After examining the development of the Golden Triangle of Tumen River of the UN Development Program, we can see that it is more practical to carry out development projects in a scattered, overlapping area or sub-region on a bilateral or multilateral basis.

In choosing specific steps on a close institutional economic cooperation among China, Japan and the ROK, the reality should be taken as the foundation, and full consideration given to the differences of their economic levels and industrial structures. The cooperation should be carried out in an incremental way.

First, to simplify the procedure of trade can be taken as the field that a breakthrough can be made. Because the regional trade volume among China, Japan and the ROK is already remarkable and there exist preliminary conditions to do so. Meanwhile, because in recent years frictions have kept cropping up in the export of agricultural products between China and Japan, and between China and the ROK respectively, the involved two sides can take this as a breakthrough to coordinate the three countries’ products criteria and health and quarantine criteria, to simplify the visa procedures for business people, and to establish a Customs management system compatible with the E-commerce and paperless trade.

Second, in choosing the cooperation industries, full consideration should be given to industries with ripe conditions for liberalization first, and then gradually expand to other industries. This should be done according to the following criteria: the industries must have a comparatively high degree of dependence, narrow technological gap and big radiating effect. In this connection, the viewpoint put forward by POSCO Chairman Sang-

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Boo Yoo of the ROK to establish a “ Northeast Asian Steel Community” is quite inspiring.

III. China’s Tactics on the Regional Economic Cooperation in Northeast AsiaStrategically, the Chinese government should take an active attitude toward the

establishment of a free trade area in the Northeast Asian region. A good Sino-Japan relationship is the basis on which economic cooperation can be promoted in this region, and such a good relationship is possible to be achieved. The Chinese government’s attitude on this issue was not clear in the past, and in the future China should take practical steps and measures to define its status and objective in the negotiations on the regional economic cooperation. In this way, China could obtain an easy-to-be-operated program or timetable in the regional economic cooperation process in Northeast Asia, at the same time the Chinese government can declare its attitude to the world and indirectly promote Japan to change its inactive position on this issue. In real steps at present, it’s essential to promote the establishment of the Asian Monetary Fund first. Because this has not only been long advocated by Japan, but also been an important content and one of the safeguards methods in carrying out the regional economic cooperation since the financial crisis.

At present, as China has taken the lead in proposing to establish the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, and in light of the experience that the ROK once temporarily shelved the Japan-ROK Free Trade Area and gave priority to developing free trade with Chile and Mexico, China should give priority to developing free trade with Russia, the DPRK and Mongolia before the establishment of the Sino-Japan and Sino-ROK Free Trade Areas. China, the ASEAN countries, the DPRK and Mongolia are all developing countries, Russia has developed an economically complementary relations with China after its economic transition, so China is in a comparatively advantageous status in the free trade with the above-mentioned countries and has the conditions to carry out free trade at an early time. Therefore, even if the Sino-Japan Free Trade Area couldn’t be established in the short term, the negotiations between China and the above-mentioned countries on the establishment of free trade areas can indirectly promote the establishment of the Sino-Japan Free Trade Area. However, no matter in what ways, the establishment of the Sino-Japan-ROK Free Trade Area is the core and key, because the close institutional cooperation entity developed among China, Japan and the ROK not only will promote and be a model of the development of the institutional economic cooperation in the entire Northeast Asian region, but also will be the “first group” in the institutional change in this region. Therefore, China should weigh the advantages and disadvantages, correctly compare and analyze the long-term and short-term interests, and actively promote the establishment of the Sino-Japan-ROK Free Trade Area.

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East Asian Geo-strategic Environmentand China’s Maritime Security

Duan Tingzhi and Zhang Xiaofeng

Since the 16th century, the transmutation of the geo-strategic environment in East Asia has both been consistent with the past and demonstrated new characteristics in different historical stages, and has exerted major influence on China’s maritime security environment. On the basis of examining the history of transmutation of the East Asian geo-strategic environment, this paper will focus on probing into the new trends of the East Asian geo-strategic environment since the 1990s, analyzing their possible influence on China’s maritime security environment and raising a few suggestions concerning countermeasures on maritime security.

Drastic Changes of the East Asian Geo-strategic Environmentand China’s Loss of Maritime Rights in Modern History

In 1511, relying on its powerful marine force, the Portuguese Fleet occupied the Strait of Malacca, a trade center. Since then, during the 329 years until 1840, the Southeast Asian regions outside the Chinese mainland gradually became maritime colonies of the imperialist European powers, and the tentacles of the Western aggressors even gradually reached the coastal areas of China. Therefore, there emerged two geo-strategic areas on the Southeast Asian and East Asian continent: one was the expanding maritime world dominated by the colonial forces at the archipelagos outside the continent, the other one was the inward continental world led by China--the traditional master of the East Asian Continent.

The geo-strategy of ancient China had long been restricted within the narrow definition of “the Asian Continent being the whole world”, which resulted in the formation of an isolated East Asian geological environment. In this environment, the interests cared about by the rulers mainly focused on the agriculturally developed inland areas. Although the coastal areas underwent some development in the Ming Dynasty, and for a certain period of time there even emerged a kind of economy described by historians as the embryonic capitalist economy. But it “was soon restrained due to the aggression into central China by the Manchus”. Therefore, the national security view of the successive dynasties had long been locked on the East Asian continent, focusing on coping with the separatist rebellions from within and the invasion of the northern nomadic nationalities, while the coastal seas were considered a formidable barrier against the foreign enemies. China began to suffer from Japanese aggressions starting from the Ming dynasty, and the famous anti-Japanese aggression commander of Ming dynasty Yu Dayou once pleaded for “allocating half of the budget of the land force to the waterborne force”, and asked to command “several hundreds of big ships and thousands of soldiers of Fujian and Canton

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Provinces to destroy the Japanese aggressors at sea with powerful warships and cannons”. But he was left out in the cold by the rulers.

In fact, under the circumstances that many foreign aggressors occupied the peripheral areas of the East Asian continent through formidable warships and powerful cannons, the coastal waters of China had become a convenient channel for the foreign aggressors and a most vulnerable “soft belly”, and by no means a barrier. However, the “barrier argument” that the coastal waters can safeguard national security had long been embedded in people’s mind. As a result, the rulers ignored the danger from another world, and missed many strategic preventive opportunities endowed by history, so when the cannon of the Opium War began to fire, the feudal dynasty was at a loss in face of “the change never happened in history”, which was brought about by the shock of colonialism from the sea.

The first Opium War revealed the flaw of China’s traditional narrow geological security concept, and gradually dragged China into a super geological difficulty featured in the coexistence of “internal disturbance”, “continental emergency” and “maritime danger”. The Qing government adhered to the principle of “guarding against the common folks is more important than guarding against invaders”, and always gave priority to “eliminating domestic rebels”. The limited military resources were mostly allocated to internal wars, and only a small part of them was given to the army and navy. According to incomplete reports and statistics, after the outbreak of Taiping Uprising, the war expenses of the Qing government to put down the uprisings of Taiping Army, Nian Army and other nationalities reached 420 million Tael of silver. Thus we can see that the energy and resources that can be truly used by the Qing government to defend against foreign invasions were very limited.

As a continental and coastal state, China’s “coastal defense” was greatly restricted by its need for “land defense”. In the 1870s, the debate on “frontier fortress defense” and “coastal defense” among the top Qing officials was actually a conspicuous reflection of China’s geological security dilemma. It was too extreme for Li Hongzhang to advocate in his 1874 Memorial to the Throne on the Discussion of Coastal Defense that Xinjiang should be given up, but compared with the depth and width of the danger to China’s security from foreign aggressors from the land and sea, the argument that “weak coastal defense” was a fundamental threat to China’s overall security hit hard at the ills of the time. The historical significance of this debate lies in the fact that China’s understanding of maritime security was raised to a strategic level. At that time Xinjiang was in the dire suffering of foreign invaders, but the Qing government did not adopt all of Li Hongzhang’s suggestions, including the one of abandoning Xinjiang. Instead it attached equal importance to land and coastal defense, which was a quite appropriate principle. But the top Qing officials were still quite narrow-minded in their understanding of coastal defense, for instance, most of their arguments were focused on China’s practical and recent threats, and their starting points were all about how to defend against the invaders from the sea. By comparison, beginning from the Meiji Restoration, Japan put forward the idea “explore thousands of Li of the sea, and spread national prestige all over the world”, and adopted an offensive strategy on the sea. Japan attempted to invade Taiwan and forcibly annex Ryukyu as early as in 1874. The above-mentioned practices of Japan greatly stimulated the Qing government, and became the direct reason for the initiation of the “discussion on coastal defense”, but according to available historical materials, the 24


debaters mainly cared about the potential threat from Japan toward China’s mainland, and almost nobody talked about the impact of the loss of Ryukyu on the whole China. However, history tells us that the loss of Ryukyu had an extremely far-reaching adverse impact on China’s maritime geological security environment, because China unconsciously became confined to its coastal seas.

With limited national defense resources, the reasonable practice should have been to establish a priority between land and coastal defenses, and focus part of the resources on solving the problem. But due to subjective and objective causes, the Qing government for a long time did not consider coastal defense as the focal point of its national security. In fact, the land defense entered a critical period, because when suppression on the uprisings of Taiping and Nian Army was under way. The Battle to Recover Xinjiang that lasted five years consumed at least 8 million Tael of silver each year, and the foreign debt borrowed on three occasions reached 13 million Tael of silver. What’s more, the Qing government indulged in luxurious life, the special fund earmarked for the naval build up was often diverted to other purposes. For instance, the special naval fund diverted by Dowager Cixi to build the Summer Palace was no less than 20 million Tael of silver, while the annual budget for coastal defense during this period was no more than 4 million Tael of silver. From the subjective point of view, the Qing rulers only demanded that the coastal defense could protect its land territory. Therefore, before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Chinese navy adhered to a purely defensive doctrine, it did not have the strategic intention to control the surrounding seas and fight with the Japanese army at sea, and was restricted by the resources available for development. As a result, its strength became weaker and weaker.

China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 signaled that the debate on China’s land and coastal defenses was concluded by the collapse of China’s coastal defense, and China completely lost the strength of becoming a qualified player at sea. The successive warlord governments still pursued the reactionary principle that priority should be given to “eliminating internal rebels”, most of the national defense resources were used on internal wars, and the plan of building up the navy was only on paper. This made it possible for Japan to concentrate on invading China’s mainland after it completely controlled China’s coastal seas.

At the beginning of the 20th century, with Japan’s expansionist drive on the continent becoming stronger, the East Asian geopolitical contradictions began to have new changes. After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, relying on its advantage as the largest fleet in the Far East and through its cooperation with Britain, Japan gradually established its dominant status in the West Pacific region. But the then America followed Mahan’s “doctrine”, and began to seek expansion both in the Pacific and Atlantic regions. With the US-Spanish War as the symbol, the US formally included the West Pacific into its geological expansion view, and considered Japan who was in control of the West Pacific as the major geological competitor. After the Washington Conference, the maritime geopolitical contradictions between Japan and the US rose rapidly and began to intensify 10 years later. The continental China and the maritime US gradually reached a consensus on containing Japan’s geological expansion, developed strategically converging attacks on Japan, and constantly revealed the flaws of Japan’s continental policy. In the West Pacific, “the America that reached the west coast of North America through conquering the Indians

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met with the Japanese navy on its forward march in the Pacific. The tide of going westward led to fierce conflicts between the US and Japan--the Pacific War. The Japanese navy that had controlled the peripheral areas of the continent was therefore destroyed, and the Monroe Doctrine spread to all of America’s allies that were located at the periphery of Asia, including China.

After the Pacific War, China broke away from the geological crisis, and restored the qualification as a regional geological competitor. But the US also replaced Japan as the dominator of the East Asia’s maritime geopolitics, and revealed its intention to further expand into the continent. All these foreshadowed a long-term conflict between China and the US at the peripheral areas of the continent after 1949.

The Evolvement of East Asia’s Geo-strategicSituation and the Improvement of China’s Maritime

Security Environment in the Cold War PeriodAfter the end of World War II, Japan not only lost its dominant status in East Asia, but

also was temperately stripped off the qualification to participate in the geopolitical game. The geological influence of the old European colonialists at the West Pacific was seriously weakened, their colonial rule in Southeast Asia was like a candle guttering in the wind, and they were no longer able to launch large-scale invasion into China from the sea. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the domestic political situation has taken a new look and enjoyed sound stability, and the internal disturbance—the most important factor that had long restricted the allocation of land and coastal defense resources was basically resolved. The normalization of the Sino-Russian relations and the independence movement of the surrounding countries greatly improved the land defense situation that had long plagued China’s security in modern and contemporary history. However, marked by the Sino-Russian alliance and the Japan-US security alliance, the East Asian geo-strategic relations broke into two major plates, one land, the other maritime along the edge of the continent, and the frictions between the two plates made the coastal areas of China once again face new threats.

As early as in 1944, the US geopolitics scientist Spakman published a book entitled Peaceful Geopolitics. He pointed out that the world is not a simple opposition between land rights and maritime rights, the surrounding areas around the center of the continent is the basis of geopolitics, the peripheral areas located between the heart of the Eurasian Continent and the peripheral seas “is a middle area that plays a buffer-zone role in the conflicts between maritime and land forces”. To prevent the danger coming from the heart area of the Eurasian Continent, the US must control the peripheral areas especially West Europe and East Asia, while Japan and Britain who are located at the edges of the Continent flank East Asia and West Europe respectively, which makes them carry important political and military significance. Spakman’s argument provided the US with important theoretical support for its geological expansion. Since then, the US has consciously or unconsciously practiced the theory of “peripheral areas” in the West Pacific. But the victory of China’s revolution dashed the America’s hope of establishing a strategic foothold at the East Asia continent through controlling China, just as it did in West Europe. The US had to resort to a second approach, it changed its policy toward Japan in 1947, propped up South Korea in 1948, tried to control the peripheral areas of the 26


East Asian continent, and waited for an opportunity to press onward to the depth of the continent.

From early 1950s to the end of 1960s, relying on its powerful marine and land forces, the US on one hand maintained pressure on China at the southeastern coastal areas, on the other hand constantly launched armed invasions against the inward crescent area from the outward crescent area of the East Asian continent along two directions ie. the Korean Peninsula and the Central South Peninsula. As a result, the threat from land became the root cause influencing China’s overall security situation. The outbreak of the Korean War pressed China to cut down on its navy construction, and temporarily put aside the issue of unification of the outside islands. In the Indo-China War and the following Vietnam War, China provided about $20 billion of assistance to Vietnam alone. When it entered the 1960s, the Sino-Russian relations broke up, and the pressure from the north once again emerged. Restrained by this, for a long period of time the military expenditure that China could use on coastal defense only amounted to that of a military area in China, and the operational capacity of the navy was restricted within the coastal seas. The geological contest line between China and the US was kept along China’s coastal seas, the security of the coastal areas could not be effectively safeguarded, not to mention the capacity to recover the outside islands like Xisha islands, etc.. To avoid the attacks from the sea and air by the US and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, the industrial layout had to be moved into China’s interior areas where the transportation was comparatively inconvenient, while the coastal areas where the industrial and technological basis was good and marine transportation was convenient could not go all out to carry out construction. All these seriously restricted the national development.

Since the 1970s, to contain the Soviet Union’s expansion in the West Pacific, the US gradually began to develop strategic cooperation with China, and the relations between the two countries began to thaw and normalize, therefore China’s maritime security environment saw some improvement. In the mid 1970s and late 1980s, there emerged twice the geological control “vacuum” on China’s surrounding seas, which offered a strategic opportunity for China to resolve the security issue on the coastal seas. In the mid 1970s, the US withdrew its troops from Vietnam, the marine forces of the Soviet Union had not come to the South on a large scale, so the Chinese navy took the opportunity to recover the Xisha islands. But soon Vietnam became hostile to China, in 1978 the Soviet Union navy stationed its troops in Cam Ranh Bay, so the geological “window of opportunity” which once opened closed again. In mid to late 1980s, the Soviet Union gave up the Cold War policy and actively sought to improve relations with China, therefore the Chinese navy took the opportunity to recover part of the occupied Nansha islands. But several years later the Soviet Union disintegrated, the US adjusted its strategy toward China, which once again increased the pressure from the sea on China. It should be said that in face of the above-mentioned opportunities, the Chinese navy took action in time, and improved China’s maritime security environment consequently. But because of the threats on land and domestic political and economic reasons, the development of the navy had long been restricted, and its operational capacity at the coastal seas was seriously underdeveloped, therefore it was unable to make full use of the above-mentioned geo-strategic opportunities. Of course, the comprehensive development of the Sino-US relations in the 1980s and the relaxation of the Sino-Russian relations to a great extent

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improved China’s maritime security environment, thus providing favorable conditions for the reform and opening-up led by the coastal areas. The economic rise of the coastal areas made China attach more importance to the maritime security issue at a strategic level, and the defense for the coastal seas thus became a strategic objective of the Chinese navy.

The Trend of Transmutation for the Geo-strategicEnvironment in East Asia after the Cold War

After the end of the Cold War, the transmutation of the geo-strategic environment in East Asia had two basic trends:

1.The trend featuring the development from geopolitics to geo-economy. Since the 1990s, economic globalization has accelerated its pace, the global and regional economic cooperation has developed vigorously, the economic relations between countries are closer and closer, and the economic factor has become more influential on each country’s political security. Against this background, the traditional geopolitics characterized by “zero sum” began to develop into a geo-economy stressing cooperation and non-confrontation, and the world has entered the times of geo-economy. In this way, the vast West Pacific is not only the countries’ geopolitical “wrestling ring”, but also has provided very favorable geological conditions for all countries in the region to carry out geo-economic cooperation and competition.

The development of geo-economy propelled the East Asian countries to change traditional military security concept, and establish a comprehensive security concept including economic security. Because the opponents or enemies defined according to traditional geopolitics standards may also be trade partners to each other in the geo-economic era, so it’s very difficult for a country to prevail over its geopolitical opponent through comprehensive confrontation in military, political and economic fields. Hence the geo-strategic objectives of the countries have a dual nature: they both need to prevail over the geological competitor and strengthen the status of their own countries in the regional geopolitics, and need to maintain close geo-economic relations with countries in the region, so as to promote their own countries’ economic and social development. The approaches and practices to realize geopolitical objectives are also more comprehensive and flexible. Here it should be stressed that the current geopolitics is only advancing toward geo-economy, and will not be replaced by the later. But at the same time there are still many countries sticking to traditional geo-strategic mentality, and engrossed in resolving geopolitical contradictions through military means.

2. The trend of constant alignment of geopolitical units in East Asia. The traditional geopolitical relations are generally based on national states, and the geological relations between countries are the basis for people to analyze geopolitical environment. But with the end of the Cold War, the question of regionalization of the entire geopolitics once again emerged. In Europe, the European Union composed of national states has become a new geopolitical entity taking part in the geological wrestling. In Asia, ASEAN is becoming increasingly strong in terms of internal cohesion and is taking part in regional geo-economic relations as an independent entity, and tries to play its role in geopolitical relations. In the long term, there will be more countries including China, Japan and other major powers joining the alignment process. The alignment of geopolitics has been able to prevent the countries from only limiting their views on national states when they consider 28


and formulate their own geo-strategies. Instead, they must include relevant state blocs into their strategic vision. What’s more, because the alignment of geopolitics is usually premised by the alignment of geo-economy (regional grouping), the countries in the region usually rely on the ocean to intensify their economic relations and develop common economic interests, therefore, the public nature of maritime security is more and more conspicuous. In this way, the monopolistic control of the ocean by some individual countries not only has violated the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, but also will not be tolerated by the countries in the region. At present, the East Asian countries have already begun to actively carry out multilateral security dialogue, and have put forward various conceptions on the regional security mechanism. In the long run, preventing some individual country’s monopolistic control of the ocean, establishing a regional maritime security mechanism that various countries can commonly participate in and ensuring public maritime security are the basic trends of the development of maritime geopolitics.

At present, there are four trends worth noticing in the East Asian geo-strategic situation:

1. The US intends to acquire monopolistic control over the West Pacific through military means. The US has not given up traditional geo-strategic mentality, and tried hard to strengthen military control over the West Pacific. Since the 1990s, the US government has publicly stressed that it would maintain military advantage in East Asia and other strategic areas, so as to contain the challenge from potential opponents. The US navy has clearly put forward the strategy of “from the ocean to the continent”, and tried to enhance geological expansion on the East Asian continent through its marine advantages. Although the US tried to prove through multilateral marine maneuvers and promoting regional security dialogue that its control over the oceans were “for the public welfare”, but it still could not hide its monopolistic nature—the intention to threaten and reject some countries in the region in terms of their efforts to make peaceful use of the oceans, so as to coerce and contain these countries.

2. Japan began to actively take part in the maritime geopolitical wrestling in East Asia. In recent years, the discussion on geo-strategy within Japan turned active. One of the conspicuous manifestations is the popularity of “the maritime Japan argument”. This argument advocates that Japan should overcome its “nature” as an isolated island country, strengthen its “openness” and “progressiveness” that a maritime country should possess, realize its transition from an “island” country to a “maritime” country, ally with the US and some other maritime countries in the “South Pacific”, and “safeguard free navigation at sea”. At present, the above-mentioned mentality has penetrated the decision-making level of the state. In the past years, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force has become a development focus of the Japanese military, and the use of its troops has spread to Persian Gulf since the outbreak of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. This demonstrates that Japan has changed its prudent posture in the Cold War, and has become an active player in the geopolitical game in the West Pacific. The transition of Japan’s geo-strategy will be the biggest variable affecting the stability of this region’s geological environment.

3. The geopolitical pressure on China from Russia and India has been comparatively reduced. As China’s largest and second largest continental neighbors, Russia’s and India’s geo-strategies have always been the major factor affecting China’s land security, and the two countries had once been the source of the trouble from the land to China in the Cold

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War period. But with the end of the Cold War, Russia’s national strength went downhill, its geo-strategy demonstrates a nature of inwardness, and just like China, it also faces the geological pressure from the US and Japan from the West Pacific. As a result, at present and for a period of time in the future, China and Russia will not have fundamental conflict in choosing geo-strategy, on the contrary, there will be a fairly large space for cooperation. In the 1990s, India once advertised the “China threat argument”, but due to the restriction of the Indian-Pakistan contradiction, it’s difficult for India to focus its forces to impose pressure on China from the land. However, in recent years, the Indian navy has made rapid development, and is trying to expand its activities at the South China Sea.

4. China is more dependent on the maritime geo-economy. First, because the contradiction between the growth of economy and population on one hand and the limitation of resources and space on the other is increasingly prominent, the exploration of the ocean has greater and greater significance for the country’s sustainable development, therefore safeguarding maritime security has a bearing on China’s overall prosperity and stability. Second, with the economic and social development mode changing from isolation to openness, China is much more sensitive on maritime transportation security. At present China’s foreign trade volume is 50% more than the GDP, and most of the trade relies on maritime transportation. Although as a continental and maritime country China can open trade channels on land and even by air, according to the calculation of experts, the cost of land transportation is 5 times that of marine transportation, and air transportation is 50 times that of it. Land and air transportation is difficult to meet the need of China’s economic development—the outward marine navigation line will increasingly become China’s “life line” in making use of overseas resources and markets. Second, China’s geo-economic interests are mainly located at the Pacific Rim, and are increasingly closer with this region’s geo-economies. How to handle relations with the East Asian geopolitical and economic behaviors has a bearing on the overall situation of economic security. In a word, China is more and more dependent on the maritime geological relations, unprecedentedly more sensitive to the change of East Asian maritime geological environment, and the maritime security is becoming the focus of China’s security interests.

New Opportunities, Challenges andNew Maritime Security Strategy Concept

In reflecting the geopolitical conflicts in China’s modern history, one of the major lessons that we can draw is that the rulers stubbornly observed the traditional continental geo-strategic concept of isolation, they could not detect the historical changes of the surrounding marine situation from the overall situation of East Asia and could not meet the challenges from the sea with an active posture. As a result, they failed in the coastal defense and the troublesome from the land came one after another. At the beginning of this century, we should learn from the history, be fully sensitive to the change of the East Asian geo-strategic environment, and safeguard our maritime security with new perspective, ideas and strategy.

The geo-economic cooperation and development and geopolitical alignment in East Asia have provided the possibility and favorable conditions for China to safeguard maritime security. The increasingly deepening Asia-Pacific economic cooperation has 30


developed a benign relationship of interdependence and common development between China and the countries in this region. Influenced by this, the countries will be inclined more and more not to use force to seek geopolitical advantage and resolve maritime conflicts. This has provided the possibility for China to peacefully resolve the maritime conflicts with the method of “putting aside differences and seeking common development”, etc.. The alignment of the East Asian geopolitical entities and the birth and development of the concept of maritime “public security” have also provided favorable conditions for China to contain any maritime hegemony and play positive role in the regional geo-strategic competition. China’s close geo-economic relations with the US and Japan will constantly constrain the two countries in their use of military strategies against China. The close economic relations will continuously enlarge the inherent contradiction of the two countries’ geo-strategies toward China—on one hand they both wish to contain China’s rise in the West Pacific from geopolitical perspective, on the other hand, they worry military confrontations will impair their economic interests in China.

The US and Japan appear to be co-hegemony in the West Pacific, which has increased the maritime security pressure on China. In 1997, Japan and the US signed the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation on the excuse of having to cope with the “surrounding situation”. And Japan has been vague on whether the word “surrounding” includes the Taiwan region, which obviously reflected the two countries’ strategic intention to jointly control the West Pacific and contain China. In recent years, the two countries have been enhancing their military cooperation with the West and South Pacific countries, especially China’s maritime neighbors. They even proposed to establish a “mini-NATO”. Propelled by Japan and the US, the East Asian geopolitical competition with strong military and maritime color is warming up. This will increase the maritime security pressure on China. Especially, the Taiwan question has become a leverage through which the US and Japan can impose geological pressure on China, and the smooth settlement of this question has a bearing on the overall situation of China’s maritime geopolitical struggle, as well as on the overall situation of the maritime security. Nevertheless, it should be noted that China’s comprehensive national strength is building up rapidly, it has been enjoying domestic political stability and harmony among the people. In the international community, China has established the Strategic and Coordination Partnership with Russia. The Sino-Indian relationship has become stable, the factors such as domestic trouble and threat from land that long plagued China’s coastal defense have reduced unprecedentedly, therefore, China’s coastal defense development is facing a strategic opportunity that it never had before.

In face of the opportunities and challenges brought about by the change of the East Asian geopolitical environment, China should put forward new geo-strategic perspective and new maritime security concept.

1. It should focus on safeguarding maritime security and adjust the national defense layout. If the entire East Asia is taken as a geopolitical chessboard, we can see that the key area in which the countries contend geologically have moved from one side of the chessboard—the continent, to another side—the oceans. The key of the game is no longer the gaining or losing of the space on land, but the command of the ocean. If China is to avoid the recurrence of the tragedy of “collapse of land and coastal defenses” in modern and contemporary history, it must grasp the opportunity to eliminate the “strong

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inclination toward the continent” in the geological thinking, face the oceans in time and adjust the strategic layout of the national defense.

2. It should put forward a maritime public security concept conforming to its own national interests, and strive for the initiative in the regional security cooperation. This concept should stress that the prerequisite of maritime public security is to favor the security interests of all countries in the region. The concept should oppose seeking the “one-way security” that only benefits certain individual country. It should stress that all countries in the region have the rights and obligations to safeguard maritime security and stability, oppose the exclusion of some countries from this maritime security arrangement out of certain motive. It should put stress on building a maritime security cooperation mechanism on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, and oppose some individual country to coerce the weak ones relying on its political and military advantages. It should stress that the aim and principle of the United Nations Charter and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea should be upheld and the maritime conflicts resolved peacefully, and intervention in other countries’ domestic affairs on the excuse of safeguarding public security should be opposed.

3. It should establish a comprehensive maritime security safeguards system, and safeguard the national security with various means. The current maritime competition has become part of the competition of the comprehensive national strength. Japan and the US put forward the “maritime national strength” concept long ago. Mr. Hirama Youichi, professor of the Japanese Bouei University believes that the maritime national strength is the force organically composed of one country’s ocean-related political force, technological strength and military strength, it is part of the national strength, and can be used to acquire national interests, reach national objectives and implement national policy through implementing necessary utilization of and control over the ocean. He also stresses to the effect that in recent years, the chase for maritime resources by the countries is quite fierce, and the political diplomatic strength relevant to ensuring maritime resources and factors such as the technology and capital in developing oceans are more conspicuous. The change of the maritime geo-strategic environment, the coming into effect of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the improvement of China’s international status have all provided the possibility for China to safeguard the maritime security through the comprehensive use of diplomatic, military, economic and legal means. Therefore, when making active use of the navy, China should overcome the simple political military perception, and establish a comprehensive maritime security safeguards system.

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Anatomy of Japan’s Missile Defense PlanBy Yu Ting

I The history of the missile defense developmentAs early as 1987, 4 years after the US President Reagan proposed the “Star War”

program in 1983, Japan signed the agreement upon participating in the research of strategic defense initiative with the US. In 1988, Japan formally joined the research on ballistic missile defense in West Pacific, doing joint research upon relevant topics about missile defense through exchanging data with countries like the US and the Republic of Korea. In September 1993, Japan and the US decided to establish a regime to consult with each other upon the specific contents of missile defense –the working group upon the Japan-US theater missile defense which is subordinate to the high level consultation conference upon security defense, and the two countries also held consultation conferences upon cooperation on theater missile defense technology for many times. Starting from 1994, the two sides conducted expert level research on ballistic missile defense. In September 1998, Japan decided to do joint research with the United States in the following 4 aspects, i.e. the 4 components of the “SM-3” intercept missile, infrared sensor, kinetic intercepting warhead, light weight exo-atmospheric projectile, and 2-stage rocket motor. On December 26, 1998, the US and Japan formally declared that they would jointly develop theatre missile defense system on the excuse of the missile threats from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Japan allocated 960 million Japanese yen for this project in the fiscal year of 1999. In August 1999, the US and Japan signed the agreement on the 5-year development plan on theatre missile defense. In November 1999, the two sides reached an understanding on jointly developing the ballistic missile defense technology. In June 2003, Japan started research upon importing the production technology of the “PAC –3” missile and the independent production will be carried out by its own military complex, the Mitsubishi Heavy Industry. On August 29, 2003, the Japanese government declared the import of the missile defense system produced by the US on the pretext of missile threats from the DPRK. In December 19, at the meeting of Security Council and the Cabinet, the Japanese government formally decided that Japan would begin to introduce the missile defense system produced by the US from the year 2004, and budgeting 100 billion Japanese yen for this project in the fiscal year. It has also been decided that 500 billion yen will be spent for the deployment of this missile defense system from year 2004 to year 2007, and deployment of the whole system will be accomplished before the year 2011.

Looking through the history of Japanese missile defense plan, we may realize that Japan has always been closely following the steps of the US on the research of missile defense system. Lots of work had been done before the formal decision upon deployment

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was made. First of all, it had conducted feasibility study, and fixed the basic steps to establish missile defense system. The first step was to set up the research division upon ballistic missile defense within the Defense Agency, doing research on missile threats faced by Japan, the necessity of establishing a missile defense, the technical feasibility and cost. The second step was to receive intelligence about ballistic missiles of relevant countries provided by the US, and began simulated tests on missile defense, after having reached a conclusion that advantages would outweigh disadvantages politically and militarily if Japan was to build missile defense. Secondly, the priority was identified. There are all kinds of missile defense systems available to intercept incoming missiles at different phases, namely, the boost-phase system of the sea-based Navy Theater Wide Defense(NTWD), the midcourse NTWD system and the midcourse land-based Theater High-Altitude Area Defense(THAAD), the terminal phase of the THAAD and the land-based Lower Tier Defense. After some research, the Japanese Defense Agency concluded that based on the geographic features of Japan, the midcourse system of the sea-based NTWD and the terminal phase of the land-based Lower Tier Defense system were of realistic significance to Japan. Therefore, Japan’ s research was focused on the NTWD which was also the key project of the joint research on technology by Japan and the US. Thirdly, relevant technology and equipments were developed in planned steps. For many years, Japan has accumulated abundant technological abilities through introducing licenses from the US to produce missiles like the “Sidewinder”, “Hawk”, “Sparrow”, and “Patriot”, and independently developing the “Maltra” missile. Japan’s missile and missile defense technology ranks top of the world. One of the important reasons for the US to vigorously demand Japan join its missile defense plan was because of the missile technology of Japan. Meanwhile, Japan has gradually accumulated the technology and equipment to build missile defense systems through introducing the Aegis destroyer, the large-scale commanding early warning Boeing 767, the satellite image intelligence processing system, independently developing new radars, and launching military surveillance satellites. Japan had got ready in terms of both technology and equipments when it declared its decision to build missile defense.

II Structure and the application in battles1. Structure. Japan’s missile defense will be composed of the sea-based SM–3

missiles and the land-based PAC-3 missiles and the relevant early warning, command & control, communications, intelligence and battle management systems including the Aegis destroyer. The maximum range for the SM-3 missile is 425 kilometers, and it can intercept ballistic missiles at an apogee of 120 meters. It is composed of three phases, the third of which is the light weight exo-atmospheric projectile which can destroy the target directly. It is 5.2 meters long, 15.5 centimeters in diameter, and with a weight of 312.4 kilo grams and the maximum range of 20 kilometers. It can intercept incoming missiles at an apogee of 2-15 kilometers. The PAC-3 is particularly for the interception at the lower tier within the atmosphere, can attack the incoming missiles directly, and destroy the target with kinetic energy. The SM-3 will be firstly deployed at one of the 4 Aegis destroyers deployed for the Marine-time Self-Defense Force (The Navy currently has 4 Aegis destroyers altogether, and 2-4 more will be built).The PAC-3 will be firstly deployed at the first high artillery groups of the Air Self-Defense Force defending the area of Tokyo. Four high artillery groups of the Air Force will be equipped according to the plan.34


2. Application in battles. The objectives of the Japanese missile defense are: to establish a comprehensive missile defense system which can provide deep defense; to defend the whole territory of Japan, especially protecting political and economic centers such as big cities and areas with densely distributed industries from ballistic missile threats; to intercept incoming missiles in the outer space.

Japan’s tentative plan of missile defense for war-fighting is to detect and identify a incoming missile through military reconnaissance satellites, early warning satellites and sea & air-based early warning systems, and then transfer various parameters & data of the incoming missile to the command & control center for comprehensive processing. After that, the command & control center will send instructions to the SM –3 loaded at the Aegis destroyer to intercept the missile in midcourse at the upper tier of the atmosphere. If the interception fails, the PAC-3 will be used to intercept the incoming missile at the terminal course near the earth. The core theory is: (1) Any operation platform of a troop can detect and track a incoming missile, and the platform with interception capability can intercept the missile according to the instruction from the command & control system. (2) Other operation platforms can automatically start up its system to intercept a missile which has penetrated the former defense. (3) The commander of the troop in charge of missile defense should be able to make timely adjustments to missile defense resources according to the situation of the war.

The major models for Japan’s missile defense for war-fighting are offshore mobile defense and inland point defense. The offshore mobile defense largely relies on SM-3 system. In the offshore of Japan, mobile defense forces, mainly Aegis destroyers, will be deployed to monitor possible incoming missiles and intercept them in the midcourse or even boost phase. Theoretically speaking, 4-6 Aegis destroyers are enough to provide early warning and intercept incoming missiles from any direction targeted at the whole island of Japan. This system can not only intercept short and medium range missiles, but also has great potentials to intercept long range missiles. The inland point defense is mainly composed of PAC-3 system to defense important areas like Tokyo. The two models of defense constitute the complete system of Japan’s missile defense.

In addition to interception, the early warning and war management system of Japan’s missile defense will be made up of the commanding & control center (or post) and the command communications chains to connect all the platforms of the missile defense systems. The major tasks of the command & control center are as follows: promulgating rules of the operation of the missile defense troops; commanding, monitoring the operation of the missile defense troops at the time of war; managing the space surveillance and tracking system (mainly covering the Western Pacific area);issuing alarms for missile defense; working out the launching and landing points of incoming missiles through space early warning satellites and air-based sensors; publicizing the arrangements and data of space targets and exercise unitary monitoring and tracing; readjusting the recourses of missile defense systems and etc..

In the process of missile defense deployment, close cooperation between Japan and the United States is absolutely necessary. On the one hand, due to the actual conditions in terms of technology and funding, the basic principle of war operation of Japan’s missile defense is to “early detect and early interception”. The reasons are as follows: 1. The earlier to detect and intercept to an incoming missile, the more effective the interception

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will be. The success rate will reach the maximum if the interception was in the boost phase. 2. If there is absolute superiority in terms of numbers of the incoming missiles, the first layer of defense can hardly intercept all of them. This requires the accurate identification of the trajectories and landing points of the incoming missiles in the early warning period, to ensure successful interception of the second layer of defense. 3. If the incoming missile penetrates the first layer of defense and split into a number of warheads at the terminal phase, the PAC-3 missiles must be applied to intercept each warheads, which is more difficult and costly.

The condition for “early detecting and early interception” is the availability of credible early warning data, which is a necessity for the missile defense command & control system. Even though the early warning airplane, the Aegis system and high-powered ground-based radar may raise the efficiency of the Japanese missile defense, however, only through analyzing the detecting, tracking data accumulated at the early stage, can the landing point of the incoming missile can be accurately figured out. Based on this, the air, sea and land based early warning, reconnaissance systems can be applied to trace and destroy the incoming missiles. As long as Japan does not has its own early warning satellites, its missile defense has to rely on the satellites of the US. The two military reconnaissance satellites launched by Japan in 2003 was low orbit imaging satellite, which can hardly be compared with the early warning military satellites. While the US does not consider transferring the technology of production and management of the early warning satellites, Japan has to overcome the technical impediments and the possibility of generating arms race if it independently develops its early warning satellites. Japan can ask the US to establish the “most ideal” institution for joint command &control by Japan and the US, however, in such a joint command institution, Japan will still be in the subordinate position. Therefore, the launching preparation and launching confirmation of the Japanese missile defense has to rely on the intelligence from the US early warning satellites and electronic reconnaissance airplane. Japan can not independently carry out missile defense operation. Thus, the Japanese missile defense operation is in fact a joint operation between Japan and the US. To ensure the maximum operation efficiency of missile defense systems, it is of utmost importance to establish a unilateral commanding relationship for either Japan or the US.

III. Major problems and their implications1.Major problems. First, the legal problem. The Japanese Constitution only allows

self-defense, and does not allow collective defense. Japan claims that its missile defense is purely defensive, and it does not mean Japan has the obligation to defend a third country. Therefore, Japan does not violate the Constitution when deploying missile defense. But the Defense Agency does not give an appropriate explanation on how to distinguish a missile flying over Japan and a missile actually targeting at Japan. Before this, some Japanese media reported a new explanation to this problem, i.e. the Japanese missile defense not only intercepts missiles targeting at Japan, but also intercepts all hostile missiles flying over or near Japan to the US. This will be typical collective defense.

Second, the technical problems. First of all, the SM-3 missile has only been tested for 5 times for interception. The tests conducted on December 11, 2003 was successful, but the one on June 18, 2003 was a failure. In addition, currently there is no mature technology to intercept the Nodong missile of the DPRK which flies at the speed of 4000 36


per second. Therefore, in terms of technology, it is still unknown whether the Japanese missile defense system can effectively intercept missiles coming from the DPRK. Secondly, the range of PAC-3 missile is short, which will also bring uneasiness to Japan’s missile defense. The effective range of PAC-3 is only 15 kilometers, which means its area of defense is very limited. It is exactly because of this, the PAC-3 of Japan can only provide point defense for major areas. The missile defense of Japan can provide two-layer defense to its capital, while it can only provide one layer of defense by the SM-3 to other areas.

Third, the problem of funding. One of the reasons for the US to vigorously ask Japan to join its missile defense is the huge cost of research & development. In fact, even the US does not know how much it will cost to develop the missile defense systems. In the 20 years since President Reagan initiated the Star War Program, the US has already spent 75 billion US dollars on R & D of all kinds of missile defense systems. The current son of the Star War may need 80 to 300 billion US dollars. In addition, if the period of R&D is too long, it is quite possible that upon deployment, the technology of the missile defense system will lag behind that of the offensive missiles. Thus it is a necessity to put large amount of fund in a short period of time. The budget for missile defense in the fiscal year 2004 is 100 billion Japanese yen, which is only the fund for the first phase. If the expenses for deploying PAC-3 and upgrading the radars and commanding & control systems are included, the cost will be no less than 500 billion Japanese yen. If the scale of the missile defense is enlarged “according to demands”, then the total cost may surpass 1000 billion yen. The Japanese government needs to face the difficult problem of heavy financial burden in the coming years.

2. Implications First, the Japanese missile defense will consolidate and enhance the Japanese-US military alliance. As mentioned before, the missile defense system can not operate without the support of the US. To be more specific, through the missile defense system, the security of Japan will be further incorporated into the US global security strategy, and their bilateral military alliance will naturally be consolidated and enhanced. The Japanese missile defense has in fact become an important part of the US missile defenses in the Asian Pacific region, another form of extension of the US military forces in this region. This extension is dominated by the US and with the Japanese-US military alliance as the axis. It can be estimated that Japan will speed up its pace to dispatch troops overseas in the name of peace keeping and supporting the US, and backed by the military alliance, will take harder positions in the disputes with other countries.

Secondly, the revival of militarism inside Japan will go even further. It can be estimated that Japan will take the missile defense, “the sole means of protecting the lives of our country’s people and their property”, as a good opportunity to further amend its relevant laws, or even amend the Article 9 of its Constitution, and make major amendments to a series of defense policies based on the Peace Constitution, such as the “Defense Guidelines”, “the Three Principles on Arms Export of Japan”, and “the Three Non-nuclear Principles”.

Thirdly, it will upset the military balance in the Asia Pacific region and generate regional arms race. In order to establish missile defense systems, Japan will eventually promote the buildup of its air and marine-time self-defense forces (Continued to Page 12)

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INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGES

The Challenges and Opportunities Our World is Facing

--the key-note speech by Huan Guoying, Vice-President, Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament at the 16th IPPNW Congress held in Beijing, September 16-18, 2004

(excerpt)

Ladies and gentlemen,Friends,

We long for peace, but the gun-fire of invasion and endless bombings in Iraq keep warning us that the world is far from tranquil. We wish to promote development, but what we see is that with the accelerated globalization, the gap between the South and the North is widening, and mankind is not enjoying common prosperity. We wish to participate in the world affairs as equal partners, and resolve the problems we are facing through multilateral cooperation, but to our much dismay, the unilateral actions by the superpower have brought about more problems to the world. World peace indeed is still confronted with many threats and challenges.

First of all, mankind has not been free from the haunting of traditional security threats. Local conflicts arising from ethnic and religious clashes, and border or territorial disputes keep cropping up one after another. The world cannot enjoy peace when one supper power wantonly invades other countries and resort to military force at will. In addition, groups of displaced people in Darfur of Sudan are telling the world the shocking misery that innocent people may suffer in the time of conflict.

Secondly, non-traditional security issues are becoming more and more salient, posing threats to the development of mankind. At the present world, we are faced with such non-traditional security factors as outrageous terrorism, rampant transnational crimes, widespread diseases, huge gaps between the rich and the poor, and serious environmental pollution. All these are in fact deceases tormenting our world and threatening peace and development of all countries.

Thirdly, the unjust international political and economic order still exists. We have witnessed there still exists the mentality of seeking absolute security through military means, and the dream of pursuing world hegemony by the super power. Some unilateral actions have already challenged the basic norms of international law, and have impeded the process of democratization of international relations. The economic globalization has not brought universal benefit to all countries, but instead, has made quite a few developing countries marginalized. According to the World Bank, at present, nearly half of the world population live on less than 2 US dollars per day per person, among whom 1.2 billion live on less than 1 US dollar per day per person.38


It is obvious that our world is plagued by various diseases. Then, what are effective prescriptions to treat and cure these diseases? We come from different countries representing different cultures. In my view, each country has its own way of being great, each culture contains its own unique wisdom. Let’s pool together all these wisdoms, to work jointly to build a better world of peace and security. This is the opportunity our world is facing. In this connection, please allow me to make some personal observations.

First, promote democracy in the international relations. The international community should not go back to the days when big powers divided spheres of influence, neither should we allow the repeat of history that big powers contended with each other all over the world. A new type of international relations should be established, in which countries, big or small, rich or poor, strong or weak are all equal. No country is entitled to impose its own will on others. We always say that the world is a big family, then the affairs of the family should be handled through consultations by all its members. The United Nations is the core of the international collective security regime, and the best venue to exercise multilateralism. Therefore, the United Nations should play an important role in the international affairs. We should advocate and promote multilateralism, and oppose unilateralism. It has been proved that unilateralism is a great challenge to world peace and security, and the pre-emptive military strategy can only generate more problems.

Second, safeguard the authority of international law, and honor the UN Charter and the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. The UN Charter is the guide for international relations. Under the current situation, its purposes and principles are still valid and authoritative, and should be observed. Fifty years ago, together with other Asian leaders like the late Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the Chinese leaders initiated the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, i.e. mutual respect for sovereignty and territory integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference of each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. As a great treasure of human society, these shining principles have stood the test of the times and become the basic norms in handling state to state relations.

Third, to establish a new concept of security based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation. Lasting and comprehensive security can only be built upon mutual trust and cooperation. Peoples from Asia and Europe should promote mutual trust through dialogue among various countries, resolve disputes through negotiations, and achieve development through cooperation.

Fourth, preserve the diversity of the world and promote dialogues among civilizations. There are 6 billion people in the current world comprising more than 200 countries and regions, with more than 2500 ethnic groups and over 5000 languages. We live in a colorful and diverse world. Among the world’s different civilizations, one might be longer than the other, but never more superior. All civilizations were created by human beings. All contributions to the world civilization by each nation should be respected. Among countries and nations, an attitude of openness should be adopted, accommodation and understanding should be adhered to, and peaceful coexistence promoted. They can complement each other through competition, and realize development by seeking common grounds while reserving differences. To conduct dialogues among civilizations will help advance human society, while to advocate “the clash of civilizations” will benefit no one.

As I understand, among you there are also many experts on arms control and 39


disarmament. Although confronted with various difficulties, we should continue our efforts to push forward the multilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation process, which are of great significance to world security. In recent years, some country’s unilateral actions have seriously affected the process of arms control and disarmament. Meanwhile, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the delivery systems, and the possibility that terrorist groups may acquire or use these weapons have posed more serious and real threats to international peace and security. The effective way to meet these challenges should be political and peaceful means and international cooperation. To build up missile defense systems is not a good solution at all to these problems. To bring weapons to the outer space will make things even worse. In addition, the lessons drawn from the Iraqi war tell us that the problem of terrorism and non-proliferation can not be resolved through war.As you may know, China has been marching on the road of reform and opening up to the outside world over the past 26 years, whose achievements have drawn world-wide attention. My colleagues and I are the witnesses and beneficiaries of this great cause and have been supporters all along. Now we are working hard to realize the goal of building a well-off society in an all round way. We need to continue our reform and opening up, and build our own country. This requires a peaceful and stable international and peripheral environment. China’s road of development is a road to peace. We will achieve development in the cause of safeguarding world peace, and will promote world peace through our own development. We should strive for peace, stability and development, and we should pursue equality, mutual benefit and the win-win results.

(Continued from Page 41) the western development mode. The investigation group of this conference to Southwest China believed that China had recorded tremendous and inspiring achievements in its poverty reduction projects in Southwest China. Ms Frannie Leautier, Vice President of the World Bank commented that the great achievements made by China in its poverty relief work can not be paralleled by other countries, and China’s many practices can be spread in other developing countries.

The opening of the Global Conference on Scaling up Poverty Reduction also showed us that global poverty relief still has a long way to go. To fight against poverty is a sacred responsibility of all countries and the international community.

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Work Hard Together to Reduce Poverty—The First Global Conference on Scaling up

Poverty Reduction was Held in China

From May 26 to 27, 2004, the first Global Conference on Scaling up Poverty Reduction (hereinafter referred to as the conference) initiated by the World Bank was solemnly held in Shanghai, China. Over 1200 representatives from more than 120 countries and regions participated in the conference to discuss the global poverty relief issue. This conference was a high-ranking and large-scale international conference on the global poverty relief, whose aim was to share experience on international poverty reduction, put forward new poverty reduction measures, and promote international development and financing as well as the development of global poverty relief undertakings.

The South African, Brazilian, Tanzanian and Ugandan Presidents and the Bangladesh Prime Minister attended the conference. Top officials from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations Development Programme and other international organizations also participated in this conference.

Besides the opening ceremony, plenaries and closing ceremony, the conference also had 22 parallel and round table meetings at ministerial level. During the conference, the domestic and foreign participants extensively exchanged experience on poverty relief, held discussions on how to utilize the economic, social and political factors contributive to achieving large scale and lasting poverty relief by the various countries, so as to promote poverty relief activities and widely spread experience on poverty relief to relevant countries. The participants held discussions focusing on more than 50 poverty relief cases, including a poverty reduction project carried out by Shanghai City and Yun Nan Province, one of the 8 successful cases in China.

The convening of the first Global Conference on Scaling up Poverty Reduction demonstrated that the international community has attached more attention to the impoverished people accounting for one sixth of the world total population. As the host of the conference, the Chinese government and people warmly greeted the guests from other countries, and extended sincere congratulations on the convening of the conference.

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao delivered a speech at the opening ceremony. He pointed out that the world is undergoing complicated and profound changes, but peace and development remained the themes of the times. Science and technology are developing rapidly, the world multi-polarization and economic globalization have created more opportunities for the development of the human society, but the gaps between the rich and poor and between the South and North are widening, and the poverty issue is still threatening peace and development of the mankind. At the UN Millennium Summit held in 2000, the leaders from different countries solemnly approved the “Millennium Development Goals”. In the past four years, the countries have taken active actions, but

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due to various reasons, the development of the global poverty relief undertakings did not meet our expectation. Starvation, illness and poverty problems are still plaguing many developing countries, and achieving the objective of global poverty relief and development remains an uphill journey.

Premier Wen Jiabao pointed out that the current global poverty issue was due to some countries’ social, historical, natural causes and closely related with the unjust and irrational international political and economic order. Reducing and even eliminating poverty is not only an economic issue, but also a political issue, it’s not only a pressing task of the relevant countries themselves, but also the common responsibility of the international community.

In the speech, Premier Wen put forward a five-point proposal of the Chinese Government: 1.Work hard to create a peaceful and stable international and domestic environment. 2. Establish just and rational international political and economic new order. 3. The developed countries have the obligation and responsibility to provide more aid to the developing countries. 4. The developing countries should rely on their own efforts in development. 5. The international organizations should play a bigger role in the global poverty relief undertakings.

When talking about China, Premier Wen pointed out that China is a big developing country with a large population, and an important practitioner in carrying out the global poverty relief undertakings. After the establishment of the New China, especially since the reform and opening up, the national economy has seen a sustainable and rapid development; and the people’s life has reached the well-off level in general. Since the 1980s, and with the development of the economy, the Chinese Government has implemented large-scale, lasting and fruitful poverty relief development programs and has solved the problems of food and clothing for more than 200 million impoverished rural people. This is a great historical achievement and a magnificent accomplishment in the history of the development of mankind.

Meanwhile, Premier Wen also pointed out that China has scored prominent achievements in its poverty relief undertakings. However, China at present is still a developing country whose per capita income is relatively low, and its uneven development problem is still quite acute. China still has a quite heavy task in eliminating poverty, and needs to make long-term arduous efforts. China will make its own contribution to maintaining world peace and promoting common development through its actions of reducing poverty constantly by itself, adhering to peace and development and going toward prosperity. He noted that the resolution of the poverty problem in China—a big country with a population of 1.3 billion is in itself a major contribution to the world poverty relief cause.

Premier Wen stressed that China’s poverty relief cause had been supported by the international community. For many years, many international organizations and NGOs, as well as many countries in the world have been actively supporting China’s poverty relief development. The Chinese people will not forget and are deeply grateful for their help. At the same time, China will make endeavor to promote the South-South cooperation, gradually increase aid to the development of the impoverished countries within its own capability, and expand trade and investment with the developing countries.

Finally, Premier Wen said that the Chinese government is willing to offer selfless aid 42


to the global poverty relief undertakings. On the basis of donating US $50 million to the African Development Fund, China also decided to donate US $30 million to the Asian Development Fund of the Asian Development Bank. He declared that the Chinese government had decided to donate an additional US $20 million to the Asian Development Bank, and establish the “China Special Fund for Poverty Reduction and Regional Cooperation” at the Asian Development Bank to support the poverty relief undertakings and regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

During the conference, the Chinese government and the UNDP also signed a memorandum of understanding on the establishment of the China International Poverty Reduction Center. Mr. Brown, Administrator of the UNDP said that this Center would play an active role in sharing, learning and spreading poverty relief experience between the countries in the world.

The conference issued the Shanghai Agenda on Poverty Reduction, which expressed welcome to China’s actions in actively participating in the international poverty relief cooperation.

This conference also realized the objective put forward by Mr. Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, initiator and co-chairperson of this conference that discussions in the conference should not be limited within some frameworks or the already-reached common understanding, but should offer full space for each country to air their opinions so that the poverty relief experience can be shared.

The Agenda pointed out that this conference for the first time gathered so many people working for development in various countries to discuss feasible measures on accelerating poverty relief actions and successful spreading of poverty relief projects.

Mr. Wolfensohn said that eliminating poverty is the common responsibility of the international community. Brazilian President Lula said even more frankly that the developed countries should increase official aid to the developing countries, further open their markets, jointly establish new financing and aid mechanism for international development so as to help the developing countries to eliminate poverty.

The Agenda also pointed out that since the Monterrey Conference, no sufficient progress had been made. To achieve the Millennium Development Goals, the developing countries, developed countries and international institutions should all work harder, adopt concrete measures to implement the already-reached policies and actions on accelerating growth and poverty relief.An old Chinese saying goes to the effect that when a gentleman is poor he can only look after himself, and when he is rich he can at the same time take care of others. The starting point of the development of poverty relief is that the developing countries should rely on their own efforts, respect and guarantee the freedom and rights of the entire people to pursue happiness, and give play to their wisdom and creativity. Meanwhile, the rich developed countries have the obligation and responsibility to give greater aid to the developing countries.

In addition, the leaders and senior governmental officials of each country and top officials of the international organizations participating in this conference all praised that China had achieved an unprecedented success in its poverty relief work, and considered that China has shown other countries a different way besides (Continued to Page 38)

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The 5th China Penglai “Ode to Peace” International YouthCultural and Artistic Festival Was Held in Penglai China

The 5th China Penglai “Ode to Peace” International Youth Cultural and Artistic Festival was held August 20-24 this year in Penglai Shan Dong Province China. Penglai, a coastal city highly praised as “Fairyland on Earth” was once again immersed in a sea of songs and flowers. The youngsters in different colors from many countries and regions joined together, hand in hand at the Penglai Pavilion and the seaside, they appealed and aspired for peace with their songs, dances and calligraphies. Many foreign guests and diplomats attended the activities of this grand ceremony.

Prior to this festival, similar activities were held in Washington, D.C. the US, and in Pusan, the ROK.

Since 2000, the festival has been successfully held for five consecutive years. It was praised by UNESCO as one of the biggest rallies of the human being appealing for peace up to now, and was included in the theme activities of International Decade of Development of Peace and Non-violence Culture by Children in the World.

The CPAPD has been one of the sponsors of this peace festival and Mme He Luli, Vice Chairperson of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and President of the CPAPD sent a message of congratulation, extending her cordial regards to the guests and to the warm and hospitable host Penglai people.

It is worth noting that a reproduction of the Indonesian “World Peace Gong”, a present of the Indonesian World Peace Committee to the CPAPD was formally installed on the Penglai city square at the opening ceremony of the festival.

This year’s festival was again a great success. We wish all peace-loving people unite and work hard together to realize lasting peace for the whole world.

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An American Expert Visits China

As guest of the CPAPD, Prof. Gary Bertsch, Director of Center for International Trade &Security, University of Georgia, visited China from March 21-27, 2004. In Beijing, Prof. Bertsch exchanged views with scholars from the CPAPD upon issues relating to non-proliferation and export control. He was also invited to give a lecture upon non-proliferation export control. More than 20 scholars from 11 research institutes and universities attended the lecture. Prof. Bertsch also called on Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce and some research institutes. In addition to Beijing, Prof. Bertsch visited Shanghai, and gave a lecture at Fudan University on export control issues.

A UPC Delegation Visits China

At the invitation of the CPAPD, a 5-member Ukrain Peace Committee (UPC) delegation headed by UPC Vice-president Volodynyr Novokhatsky paid a friendly visit to China from 20 to 27 May, 2004. During the visit of the delegation in Beijing, Madam He Luli, Vice-Chairperson of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and President of the CPAPD met the delegation and hosted a dinner in their honor. CPAPD Vice-president Huan Guoying chaired the discussion with the delegation. The delegation also met and exchanged views on international issues with Chinese scholars from the Research Center of Contemporary World. Besides Beijing, the delegation also visited Shanghai and Nanjing.

Expressing warm welcome, He Luli emphasized that UPC delegation’s China visit was significant after the contact between the two organizations had been suspended for 7 years. He Luli expressed the hope that the exchanges and cooperation between the peace organizations of China and Ukrain would continue to expand, and make due contributions to the mutual understanding and friendship between the peoples of the two countries and to the maintenance of regional and world peace. In the discussion, both sides briefed each other their respective work and exchanged views on the world and regional situation and the ways to promote the friendly and cooperative relations between the two organizations. The visit left the delegation a deep impression. They expressed their admiration and strong interest in China’s development and hoped China would achieve greater success in the modernization drive.

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