Civil Society and the Governance of Education in the Context of SWAps:

Kenya & Tanzania

Malini SivasubramaniamMegan Haggerty

OISE/University of Toronto

October 2, 2006Africa-Canada Forum

Tanzania, Kenya and “Education for All” Equal access to education a key promise at

Independence – but different roots Tanzania: African socialism “Ujamaa”

– Education for self reliance– Swahili– Resources concentrated on primary and adult

literacy– Centralized system closed to public debate

(education and villagization). – “Narrow staircase” with broad base; Primary

100%, Secondary 5-10%, Tertiary <1%– Highly donor dependent

Kenya: One party state market economy– Harambee movement: communities drive rapid

expansion of secondary – Centralized and politicized policies but laissez-

faire approach to finance– Limited use of curriculum to produce national

identity– Wider staircase but growing regional and

socio-economic inequalities, decline in quality and employment opportunities.

Crisis, Adjustment, Change Economic crisis, globalization, and structural adjustment Political mismanagement/poor governance In education sector

– Demand outpaces resources and opportunity for formal employment

– Financing burden steadily shifted on to parents – cost sharing– From Universal Primary Education (UP) in 1971,1974 and 1978 (Kenya) and 1978

(Tanzania) to a deterioration in both Quality and Access. (Tanzania dropped to 70% enrollment by 1990; Kenya dropped to 86.9% by 1998)

From the late 1980s: – structural reform/economic liberalization - limited aid. – education sector reforms focus on privatization, cost-sharing, containment of

dissatisfaction through decentralization. In mid 1990s: political liberalization Late 1990s:

– New governments promise EFA; abolish user fees – New donor resources for EFA and transnational advocacy “rights”– Continuing dilemmas = equality, quality, demand, dependency.

Education SWAp: 2000 - PresentTANZANIA - PEDP (2002-2006) Sub-sector approach

Harmonization of donors; Basket funding

Heavily donor dependent - $63 Million/year (1999-2003)

BEDC chaired rotationally. Netherlands, CIDA, World Bank, AfDB, DfID, SIDA, NORAD, IRE, JICA, EC

Abolished primary school fees (2001); Enrolment 85.4% (‘01) to 109% (‘05)

Implementation focus on Access to Primary Education (not Quality)

KENYA – KESSP (2005-2010) Sector wide approach

Harmonization of donors; Basket funding

Less donor dependent - $23 Million/year (1999-2003)

EDCG co-chaired by UNICEF and Dfid. World Bank, Dfid, CIDA, UNICEF, JICA, USAID, SIDA, NORAD

Abolished primary school fees (2003). Enrolment 88.2% (‘02) to 104.8% (‘04).

Overcrowding in schools. I million out of school. Non-formal schools a new reality.

Nature of Civil Society engagement: Tanzania

TENMET (Tanzanian Education Network) Advocacy and Policy network; 161 members with regional and international connections

Complementary organizations: Private Schools Gov’t “owned” NGOs Innovations taken to scale by Gov’t (FAWE & AKF)

Tanzania Teachers Union; School Committees; Parents Association

Little Voice in policy: Grassroots NGOs, CBOs

Roles? TENMET members present @ all major policy meetings

Legitimate Representatives Voice of CSOs

Policy negotiation & monitoring; Advocacy; Capacity building; Budget tracking; Non-government schools; Innovations; Evidence-based Research

INGOs/National NGOs; Dar-es-Salaam based; Urban/Rural; Elite-leadership & Grassroots connections

Approaches to Gov’t: Complementary or Watchdog?

Communication Logistics – Internet Access? Reliable Post-box?

Tensions?

Who?

Nature of Civil Society engagement: Kenya

EYC (Elimu Yetu Coalition) 1999 Advocacy and Policy network; 110 members with regional and international connections (GCE, ANCEFA, CEF)

Kenya national union of Teachers (KNUT) limited involvement in advocacy issues in EFA. Parents associations, non-formal schools, service delivery, INGOs, advocacy networks. Competing

interests. Dense, extensive networks and cross-networks.

Post 2002 political landscape. Participatory democracy and pluralism problematic. KESSP: official recognition of CSO. Limited participation Participation in policy advocacy, capacity building, budget tracking. Limited capacity to offer evidence-based research.

Roles?

EYC network INGO driven. Government is accommodating to CSOs but CSOs fragmented, competing

interests. National umbrella organizations/coalitions weak and ineffective. : EYC and

NCNGOs Donor and resource driven. Lacking capacity to make real contribution NGO community not well known by donor community.

Tensions?

Who?

Equal Partners?

Government

Civil Society

TANZANIA KENYA

Government

Civil Society/ TENMET

Donors

Donors

Government

Civil Society

Donors

MODEL

de - CENTRAL - ization

TANZANIA KENYA

Ministry of Education Ministry of Education

District

And how does this affect CSOs?

How is SWAp affecting CSOs In Kenya? SWAps heightens and centralizes power of government. Govt and CSO

competing for funds (cordial/ineffective/divide and rule)?

All CSO activities should be harmonized with KESSP.

Do NGOs want their resources harmonized or pooled with the government? Larger NGOs see link to government (i.e., money represented as part of KESSP) as ensuring sustainability. Smaller NGOs more hesitant to have their money reflected/disclosed as part of KESSP.

SWAPS appear to be removing CSO leverage.

Competing interests among civil society. E.G. Churches advocating for government to return running and ownership of schools to FBOs. Harmonization and pooling among INGOs and NGOs difficult.

How is SWAp affecting CSOs?Tanzania

SWAPS appear to be increasing CSO leverage.– Opportunity to bring forward issues to the policy table / United front– Role of the Opposition?

Contentious Space / Government Resistance– Sees NGOs “proper” role as complementary– Attempt to limit public criticism and control input (Haki Elimu & ESR saga) – CSOs input not seen as important as donors

Select Donor support (morally and financially)– Concentrated into few NGOs, TENMET related– Primary Education concentration

Challenges– As speed of policy increases, CSO input decreases– Affect of Sub-sector to Sector support, OR Direct Budget Support

SUMMARY

IN KENYA SWAps heightens and centralizes power of government. Govt and CSO competing for funds (cordial/ineffective/divide and rule). IN TANZANIA, SWAps has created space for NGO/civil society participation even though government resistant.

TENMET a more cohesive network of CSOs. EYC fragmented and INGO driven. Why is Tanzania a strong network, not Kenya?

– Timing of UPE, user fees– Who do donors meet regularly? Donors get to know those represented at

meetings.– Coalesce against Gov’t vs. Pull the rug out

Decentralization takes very different forms in Kenya and Tanzania.

QUESTIONS Should donors pool, harmonize and channel all their

funds through government? Do CSOs/INGOs want their resources harmonized or

pooled with the government? What form of harmonization should there be between INGOs?

“Any donor organization that does not have a balanced portfolio will fail” (CSO33, Kenya) & “Don’t put your eggs all in one basket” (CSO14, Tanzania)

How does SWAPs change the way CSOs should operate in a sector? – Programming, Advocacy, Cooperation changes