Civpro 1

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGEST

DOLORES RUSTIA, plaintiff-appellant,vs.MAXIMIANO FRANCO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. 15149

FACTS: The plaintiff, Dolores Rustia, brought this action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga to secure an injunction to restrain the defendants from cutting bamboo from certain land alleged to belong to the plaintiff and to recover damages for the plants already cut. Some of the defendants answered, denying participation in the alleged trespasses and disclaiming all interest in the land from which the bamboo in question had been cut, while three, to wit, Cecilio Franco, Benito Laren, and Mariano Manalili, admitted that bamboo had been cut by them from the land described in the complaint or in that vicinity but asserted that said land belonged to Benito Laren, Mariano Man-alili, and Gregoria Dizon, wife of the defendant Cecilio Franco.

It appears in evidence, and was found by the trial judge, that the defendants have at various times, not only in 1917 but in several previous years, cut bamboo from a cañaveral lying on both sides of the estero Macabucod, but the proof does not show with any certainty how many bamboo had been cut by them on either side of the estero. The plaintiff claims that the land of which she is the owner com-prises an area of nearly 24 hectares, lying on the north side of the estero Macabucod, which said es-tero forms the southern boundary of part of the property. We consider the title of the plaintiff to the parcel in question to be fully proved by the documents introduced in evidence as well as by oral evi-dence. In this connection it appears that the plaintiff is a grand daughter of Doña Eulalia Bartolome, who died testate on August 12, 1899, at the age of 84. The aforesaid Doña Eulalia is said to have ac-quired the property from Potenciano Eugenio y Camacho, a resident of Malabon, who had obtained a composition title thereto in the year 1888. The document accrediting the ownership of Potenciano Eugenio y Camacho was presented in evidence by the plaintiff as Exhibit A. The introduction of said document was objected to by the attorney for the defendants, but this objection was overruled. In December of the year 1904, the descendants of Eulalia Bartolome entered into a partition agreement by which the property of their said ancestor was divided, upon which occasion the low in question was assigned to the plaintiff. No document was introduced to show how the title to said parcel had passed from Potenciano Eugenio to Eulalia Bartolome; but in view of the long continued possession of Dolores Rustia, as heir and successor of Eulalia Bartolome, it is unnecessary to trace the title further back than to Eulalia Bartolome. The Exhibit B, which is the deed by which the heirs of Eulalia Bar-tolome partitioned her property among themselves, must be considered properly before the court in relation with, and as explanatory of the testimony of the plaintiff, Dolores Rustia. Upon the state-ments made by her, corroborated by the testimony of witnesses introduced in her behalf, it is clear that she has maintained actual possession from the date of the partition, subject only to the occa-sional wrongful intrusion thereon of the defendants. The result is that the defendants in cutting bam-boo under claim of ownership on the north side of the estero Macabucod have unjustifiably invaded the plaintiff's rights, and the question now is, whether the defendants can be permanently enjoined from the repetition of these acts.

ISSUES: Whether or not it should be court of law

HELD: Yes. The courts of law and equity were entirely separate; and it so hap-pened that originally, while the courts of law had jurisdiction to adjudicate ques-tions of title, only the courts of equity could administer injunctive relief. The result

1 | P a g e


was that the latter courts in the beginning showed great diffidence in interfering by the remedy of injunction whenever there appeared to be a bona fide dispute over the ownership, which ought to be determined in a court of law. It therefore came to be accepted in common-law States that an injunction to prevent interfer-ence with rights in real property should not be granted until the plaintiff has fully established his title or right by a proper action brought, for that purpose. This meant, of course, that the plaintiff, in a State where separate courts of law and equity existed, must, first, resort to an independent action in the court of law. It seems to have resulted, furthermore, that the rule was accepted in some of these States that if, in an action for injunction in a court of equity, the defendant claimed ownership in himself, the preliminary injunction would be dissolved and the plaintiff would be required to go into the court of law.

The ownership of the property from which the bamboo was cut was in issue, and it would have been proper for the trial judge, upon the proof before him to have de-clared that the plaintiff is the owner of the land in question and in consequence to have enjoined the defendants from molesting the plaintiff by cutting bamboo therefrom in the future.

Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986)

FACTS: An investigating committee was created to determine the facts on the case involving the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. It appears that majority and minority reports showed that they are unconvinced on the participation of Galman as the assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded him instead as the fall guy as opposed to the military reports. Majority reports recommended the 26 military respondents as indictable for the premeditated killing of Aquino and Galman which the Sandi-ganbayan did not give due consideration.

The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a resolution charging the 26 military accused as principal to the crime against Aquino but was recalled upon the intervention of President Marcos who insist on the innocence of the accused. Marcos however recommended the filing of murder charge and to implement the acquittal as planned so that double jeopardy may be invoked later on.

The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of justice against the Sandigan-bayan and gross violation of constitutional rights of the petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in allowing the prosecution to present vital documentary evi-dence and prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal.

ISSUE: WON the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as mandatory required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses committed by military men is valid

HELD: No. "jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the Ex-ecutive, which could be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases.

2 | P a g e


The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and sup-press the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the in-tegrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vi-cious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved par-ties plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the century-and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio

Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney- General

GR. No. 6287, December 1, 1911 20 Phil 523

Facts:The plaintiff, a railroad company, began an action in the Court of First In-stance of the province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain real estate in said complaint to be located in the Province of Tarlac. After the filling of the complaint, the plaintiff took possession of the lands described therein, building its line, sta-tions and terminals and put the same in operation. Commissioners were ap-pointed to appraise the value of the lands so taken. They held several sessions, took a considerable amount of evidence, and finally made their report. After the said report had been made and fled with the court, the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants that on a certain date it would make a motion to the court to dismiss action, upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, having been recently ascertained by the plaintiff that the lands sought to be con-demned were situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija instead of the Province of Tarlac as alleged in the complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of one province has the power and authority to take cognizance of an action by a railroad company for the con-demnation of real estate located in another province.

Held:The condemnation of a real estate by a railroad corporation is governed by the special acts relating thereto, and the provisions of Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure which have to do with the venue of an action in condemnation pro-ceedings generally are not applicable to the proceedings by a railroad company to condemn lands. Section 377 was intended to cover simply actions relating to the condemnation of real estate where the land involved is. It was not intended to meet a situation presented by an action to condemn lands extending contiguously form one end of the country to the other.

3 | P a g e


In an action taken by a railroad company to condemn lands, while, with the con-sent of defendants, express or implied, the venue may be laid and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff, it being one in which the lands sought to be condemned is located, nevertheless, the defendants who have lands lying in another province, or any one of such defendants, may by timely application to the court, require the venue as to their, if one, his lands to be changed to the prov-ince where their lands lie. In such case, the action as to all of the defendants not objecting would continue in the province where originally begun, but would be severed as to the objecting defendants and ordered continued before the court of the appropriate province or provinces. Wherefore, the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Tarlac with discretion to proceed with the action accord-ing to law.

G.R. No. L-25795 October 29, 1966

ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ, AURORA MEJIA VILLASOR, ROY P. VILLASOR, petitioners, vs.THE CITY JUDGE, CESAR L. PARAS, TRINIDAD T. LAZATIN, and TERRA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS: In the month of February 1964, petitioners Roy P. Villasor, as administra-tor of the intestate estate of the spouses Manuel M. Mejia and Gloria Lazatin , to-gether with his co-petitioners Angelina Mejia Lopez and Aurora Mejia Villasor and other heirs of said spouses, entered into a contract with respondent Trinidad T. Lazatin for the development and subdivision of three parcels of land belonging to said intestate estate.

Subsequently Lazatin transferred his rights under the contract to the Terra Devel-opment Corporation. Months later, petitioners and other co-heirs filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-8344) for the rescis-sion of said contract for alleged gross and willful violation of its terms.

Thereafter, Lazatin and the Terra Development Corporation, in turn, filed with the Fiscal's Office of the City of Angeles a complaint against petitioners for an alleged violation of falsification of documents upon the allegation that they made it ap-pear in the contract mentioned heretofore that Aurora M. Villasor was the "guardian" of the minor George L. Mejia and that Angelina M. Lopez was similarly the "guardian" of the minor Alexander L. Mejia, when in truth and in fact they knew that they were not the guardians of said minors on the date of the execution of the document (Criminal Case No. C-2268).

However, it was found out that the City Court of Angeles had no jurisdiction over the offense because the private document that contained the alleged false state-ment of fact was signed by them outside the territorial limits of said city.

4 | P a g e


ISSUES: whether or not the City Court of Angeles City has jurisdiction to try and decide Criminal Case No. C-2268 for alleged falsification of a private document by the parties named in the information.

HELD: No.

It is settled law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense was committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an essential ele-ment of jurisdiction (U.S. vs. Pagdayuman 5 Phil. 265). Thus, under the provisions of Section 86 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal courts have original jurisdic-tion only over criminal offenses committed within their respective territorial juris-diction.

if the private document subject of the information was falsified by the persons therein charged, the act of falsification — the signing of the document and the co-etaneous intent to cause damage — was committed and consummated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Angeles, and that whether the falsified pri-vate document was thereafter put or not put to the illegal use for which it was in-tended, or was signed by the other contracting party within the territorial jurisdic-tion of the City of Angeles is in no wise a material or essential element of the crime of falsification of the private document, nor could it in any way change the fact that the act of falsification charged was committed outside the territorial ju-risdiction of Angeles City. Thus, that the City Court of Angeles has, no jurisdiction over the offense charged is beyond question.

G.R. No. L-3223 October 10, 1950

JAMES MCI. HENDERSON, Philippine Alien Property Administrator, and THE NATIONAL RUBBER GOODS MANUFACTURING CO., INC., petitioners, vs.BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Rizal City Branch, and JOSEPH AR-CACHE, respondents.

FACTS: T he National Rubber Goods Manufacturing Company, Inc. is a Philippine corporation, wherein the Philippine Alien Property Administrator, as the official designated by the President of the United States to hold and administer enemy properties located in the in the Philippines.

On June 24, 1947, the herein respondent Joseph Arcache, claiming to be the mortgage creditor of the company in the sum of P70,000 by virtue of a deed of mortgage purporting to have been constituted on September 24, 1942, on 19 parcels of registered company land situated in Rizal City, instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the foreclosure of said mortgage.

Neither the Philippine Alien Property Administrator nor the company received personal notice of this action, but following summons by publication and the lapse of the reglementary period for filing an answer, the company was declared in default and on October 2, 1947, judgment was rendered against it and in favor of Joseph Arcache for the amount of the mortgage debt and interests and for the sale of the mortgaged property, but with the following proviso.

Though notified of the above judgment the Philippine Alien Property Administrator took no steps to question the same, the said officer not being then aware of any facts that could be set up as a defense against the mortgage, with the result that the judgment became final in due time.

5 | P a g e


Though notice of the hearing of Arcache's motion to lift the moratorium clause in the judgment was made by publication, the Philippine Alien Property Administration never had actual knowledge of said motion or hearing, nor of the order of May 9, 1949, and the sale of the mortgaged properties to Ar-cache, and only came to know of these matters on July 6, 1949, when one of his employees happened to go to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal City connection with some other business and there learned that Arcache had presented for registration in said office the sheriff's deed of sale cov-ering the mortgaged properties. Following this discovery the company and the Philippine Alien Prop-erty Administrator filed a petition to have the said order of May 9, 1949, and the sale of the mort-gaged properties declared void. But as the petition did not prosper, they came to this Court with a pe-tition for certiorari to have the order of May 9, 1949, and the proceedings taken thereunder declared null and void.

ISSUE: whether the court may by an interlocutory order change its judgment after the same has already become final.

HELD: No. As a general rule, unless control over it has been retained in some proper manner, or a statute otherwise provides, no judgement can be amended after it has become final, except as to clerical errors or misprisions. As stated by Freeman in his book on Judgments (5th ed., par. 141, p. 269); "The power of courts to correct clerical errors and misprisions and to make the record speak the truth by nunc pro tunc amendments after the term does not enable them to change their judgments in substance or in any material respect. . . . Consequently it is well settled that, in the absence of statute permitting it, the law does not autho-rize the correction of judicial errors, however flagrant and glaring they may be un-der the pretense of correcting clerical errors. To entitle a party to an order amending a judgment order or decree, ordinarily, he must establish that the entry as made does not conform to what the court ordered."

It follows that the lower court had no power to excise the moratorium clause from its judgment in the way it did after the judgment had become final. Such an act was in excess of its jurisdiction and could, therefore, be corrected by certiorari.

In view of the foregoing, the order of May 9, 1949 and the consequent proceed-ings had thereafter are hereby declared void, including the order confirming the deed of sale made in favor of respondent Arcache. With costs against the said re-spondent.

G.R. No. L-30666 February 25, 1983

ANDRES ABAN and DOLORES GALOPE, petitioners, vs.HONORABLE MANUEL L. ENAGE, as District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan, Branch II, HEIRS OF ELEUTERIO CUENCA, and ATTY. TIMOTEO D. NALDOZA, Attorney-in-Fact and Counsel, re-spondents.

FACTS : On August 21, 1964, a complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan for Dam-ages with Injunction (pp. 12- 17, rec.).

The complaint states that Celestino Udarbe and Andres Aban are sued as parties-defendants "since their consent to have them joined as parties- plaintiffs could not be secured. "

6 | P a g e


Andres Aban, as a defendant in the above-entitled case, through counsel, filed a motion dated Sep-tember 1, 1964 to drop him from the complaint as a misjoined party and, at the same time, moved for the dismissal of the complaint (pp. 57-58, rec.).

On September 17, 1964, the CFI of Butuan City issued an order (p. 59, rec.) dropping Andres Aban as party- defendant and dismissing the complaint against him.

On May 26, 1965, an amended complaint was filed wherein the names of Severo Malvar as plaintiff and petitioner herein Andres Aban and Celestino Udarbe as defendants in Civil Case No. 1005 were dropped as parties therein.

Meanwhile, the heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca filed a petition for correction, etc. dated November 1, 1965 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1126, this time before the CFI of Agusan, Branch 1, presided by Judge Simeon Ferrer, praying, inter alia, for the cancellation of TCT No. RT- 1693 issued to herein petitioner Andre Aban. This case, however, was dismissed at the instance of the heirs in an order of the court dated June 4, 1968 (pp. 68-69, rec.).

On April 15, 1968, defendants-heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca in Civil Case No. 1005, through Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza, counsel and attorney-in-fact of the Cuenca heirs, filed a motion in the aforesaid case for the cancellation of TCT No. RT-1693 issued in the name of Andres Aban, as well as all the annotations at the back thereof, alleging that herein petitioner Aban's claim over a portion of Lot No. 427, particu-larly Lot No. 427-C-1 is "now abandoned, waived or relinquished" (pp. 12-17, rec.).

Subsequently, herein petitioner Andres Aban filed an opposition to the motion to cancel TCT No. RT-1693 filed by the heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca.

On July 29, 1968, respondent Judge Manuel L. Enage issued an order hereby quoted as follows:

ORDER

RESOLVING: On a pending motion filed by Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza, counsel for defendants-movants, dated April 15, 1968 (See: pp. 667-672, Records), the manifestation with motion of same counsel dated May 25, 1968 (See: pp. 710-71 1, Records), all praying that TCT-RT 1693 issued to respondent Andres Aban and all the annotations at the back of said title (See: pp. 687-689, Records), be cancelled based on the grounds therein stated;

CONSIDERING: That, except for respondent Andres Aban who filed an opposition to the foregoing thru his counsel, Atty. Jose L. Lachica, and plaintiff Domingo Mactino who. thru his counsel, Atty. Lydio J. Cataluna argued orally in behalf of his aforesaid client, none of the parties filed any formal opposi-tion to the defendants-movants' aforesaid motion despite due notice given them, including the City of Butuan thru the City Fiscal, and neither did anyone of them even cared to appear in Court when de-fendant movants' motion was heard for oral argument;

ISSUE:

HELD: It may be well to state at this point that jurisdiction of the court over the subject or nature of an action, is conferred by law. Jurisdiction over the persons of the parties may be acquired by the vol-untary appearance of the plaintiff, and, with respect to the defendant, by the service of summons upon him or by his voluntary appearance in court.

It may be recalled that when the motion to cancel dated April 15, 1968 was filed by the heirs of Eleu-terio Cuenca in the Court of First Instance of Agusan in Civil Case No. 1005, the court served summons to the petitioners herein who subsequently filed their opposition thereto (pp. 18- 19, rec.). When the

7 | P a g e


motion to cancel was set for hearing (pp. 149-167, rec.) on June 17, 1968, Atty. Jose L. Lachica, coun-sel of herein petitioners, appeared in court. During said hearing, the parties were given ample oppor-tunity to argue their respective stand, present evidence and exhibits, after which the court a quo re-quired the parties to submit their respective memoranda, which the parties did.

Against the foregoing backdrop, this Court is not inclined to sustain herein petitioners' contention that the lower court was without jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion when it ,acted on the motion to cancel filed by private respondents herein by issuing an order dated July 29,1968 cancelling TCT-RT-1693 in the name of Andres Aban, petitioner herein.

For even assuming that the motion to cancel filed by private respondents in the court below is a sepa-rate, distinct, and independent action by itself, as argued by the petitioners, nevertheless, by the ser-vice of summons upon herein petitioners, and by their act of filing an opposition to the motion as well as their voluntary appearance in court when the motion was set for hearing, together with the sub-mission of their memorandum (pp. 168-177, rec.), the petitioners are deemed to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, and, consequently, they are bound by the legal implica-tions of the order of the court a quo.

G.R. No. L-27365 January 30, 1970

FELIX L. LAZO, MERCEDES CASTRO DE LAZO, and JOSE ROBLES, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.REPUBLIC SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC. represented by ANTONIO M. KOH, General Manager and as Attorney-in-Fact of plaintiffs, FELIX and MERCEDES LAZO defendants-appellants.

FACTS: December 12, 1963, plaintiffs spouses Lazo filed a complaint against Republic Surety and Insur-ance co., and its general manager Antonio Koh, the sheriff of Manila and the Register of Deeds of Manila. The spouses Lazo alleged that they guaranteed a loan between Jose Robles and the Philippine Bank of Commerce amounting to P12, 000.00 executed on August 18, 1953. The loan is executed with a real estate mortgage which was foreclosed extra-judicially on July 1, 1958 and sold to the mort-gagee. Antonio Koh pursuant to the mortgage right, executed a deed of absolute sale of the fore-closed property. Because of which, the certificate of title of the spouses Lazo was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the company.

In a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, they raised two issues: (a) that the complaint did not state a cause of action and the claim or demand set forth therein had already prescribed; (b) under the rules of court, an accounting could be demanded only in cases where real property is sold on exe-cution by virtue of a final judgment. In the present case, the defendants maintained the redemption period had already expired when the action was commenced.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to the accounting sought by them; whether or not the right of redemption with respect to the foreclosed property was still available; whether the fore-closure is valid or not.

The RTC ruled that the transfer of the loan to the Republic Investment Co., Inc. constituted a novation of the obligation, and that the defendant company was released from its liability as co-debtor be-cause it does not appear to have signed the new promissory note executed by the plaintiffs. Conse-quently, the court concluded, the real estate mortgage in favor of said defendant was extinguished, and the foreclosure thereof was a nullity.

8 | P a g e


The actuation of the trial court was not legally permissible especially because the theory on which it proceeded involved factual considerations neither touched upon the pleadings nor made the subject of evidence at the trial. Rule 6, Section 1, is quite explicit in providing that "pleadings are the written allegations of the parties of their respective claims and defenses submitted to the court for trial and judgment."

Held:

The actuation of the trial court was not legally permissible especially because the theory on which it proceeded involved factual considerations neither touched upon the pleadings nor made the subject of evidence at the trial. Rule 6, Section 1, is quite explicit in providing that "pleadings are the written allegations of the parties of their respective claims and defenses submitted to the court for trial and judgment." This rule has been consistently applied and adhered to by the courts.

The subject matter of any given case is determined ... by the nature and character of the pleadings submitted by the parties to the court for trial and judgment. Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100, 103.

It is a fundamental principle that judgments must conform to both the pleadings and the proof, and must be in accordance with the theory of the action upon which the pleadings were framed and the case was tried; that a party can no more succeed upon a case proved. but not alleged, than upon one alleged but not proved." (Ramon v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 742)

It is a well-known principle in procedure that courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue." (Lim Toco vs. Go Pay, 80 Phil. 166)

A judgment going outside the issues and purporting to adjudicate something upon which the parties were not heard, is not merely irregular, but extrajudicial and invalid." (Salvante v. Cruz, 88 Phil. 236, 244.)

G.R. No. L-28518 January 29, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.LORENZO PADERNA Y GAMBOA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: The appellant Lorenzo Paderna y Gamboa was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Ne-gros Occidental for unlawful possession of four packs of untaxed imported cigarettes known locally as "blue seal" cigarettes. The information, filed on August 8, 1966 and denominated "for violation of Rep. Act No. 4097," charged;

That on July 25, 1966, in the evening, in La Carlota City, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines . . . the abovenamed accused, without justifiable cause or reason, intentionally, feloniously, criminally and illegally had in his possession four (4) packages of UNTAXED BLUE SEAL CIGARETTES the specific tax of which in the amount of P4,224 has not been paid, in violation of law.

After trial, the court found Paderna "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Republic Act 4097" and sentenced him to pay a fine of P200 and suffer imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day.

He then appealed to the Court of Appeals where he moved to quash the information on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to try the case. He contended that Republic Act 4097, which punished the unlawful possession of untaxed article with a "fine of not less than ten times the

9 | P a g e


amount of the specific tax due on the articles found but not less than two hundred pesos nor more than five thousand pesos and . . . imprisonment of from four months and one day to four years and two months, had been amended by Republic Act 4713, effective on June 18, 1966, and that the penalty for the same offense was reduced to a fine of not less than fifty pesos nor more than two hundred pesos and imprisonment of not less than five days nor more than thirty-days, if the ap-praised value . . . of the article does not exceed five hundred pesos." The result is that the case was now cognizable only by the city court of La Carlota City, this, according to the appellant, for the rea-son that criminal statutes should be given retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused.

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General contended that the CFI of Negros Occidental, having validly acquired jurisdiction under Republic Act 4097, could not thereafter be divested of it.

ISSUE: whether the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is to be deter-mined by the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime, or by that in force at the time of instituting the action.

HELD: As a general rule the jurisdiction of a court depends upon the state of the facts existing at the time it is invoked, and if the jurisdiction once attaches to the person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of events, although they are of character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attach-ing in the first instance will not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached." (16 C.J., sec. 246, p. 181) In the instant case, jurisdiction was invoked for the first time when the complaint was filed in the justice of the peace court on February 6, 1932. That was after the Revised Penal Code took effect. By reason of the penalty which might be imposed, jurisdiction to try the case was already vested in the jus-tice of the peace. Hence, the Court of First Instance acted beyond its jurisdiction in trying the case.

TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29)

FACTS:Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the defendant. De-fendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.

CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed origi-nal exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not ex-ceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the juris-diction of any inferior court is in issue.

ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for

10 | P a g e


the first time upon appeal.

HELD:YES, SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it has also been held that after vol-untarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesir-able practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing - Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial pro-ceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties - In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for considera-tion. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without fil-ing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.

The orders appealed from are affirmed.

*now MTC

Figueroa vs.People

Facts: Figueroa, convicted for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide in RTC Bu-lacan, questioned the trial court’s jurisdiction first time on appeal before the CA. CA affirmed conviction. It said that Figueroa actively participated in RTC trial, hence, he is already estopped by laches.

Issue: Whether or not Figueroa can no longer question jurisdiction of the RTC.

11 | P a g e

http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/02/figueroa-vspeople.html


Held: Yes. Jurisdiction may be questioned.

The general rule remains: a court's lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the answer.

Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC. At that time, no considerable pe-riod had yet elapsed for laches to attach. The principle in Sibonghanoy case does not apply.

We note that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely--only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circum-stances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor.

FABIAN V. DESIERTO, ET AL. GR. NO. 129742

Remedial Law – Civil Procedure – Appeal from Decisions of Quasi-Judicial Bodies

FACTS:

Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction busi-ness with a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila EngineeringDistrict (FMED).

Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and Agustin. Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and re-sisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intim-idation and threats. She eventually filed an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. But the case was later referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.

The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and execu-tory. Fabian appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that:

In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, di-rective or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.

HELD:

12 | P a g e


No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from de-cisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervail-ing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the consti-tutional prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to give the SC a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the SC.

Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states that the appellate jurisdiction of the SC contemplated therein is to be exercised over “final judg-ments and orders of lower courts,” that is, the courts composing the integrated ju-dicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies.

But what is the proper remedy?

Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now re-quired to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, un-der the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate proce-dure for quasi-judicial agencies.

ERNESTO V. YU and ELSIE O. YU, vs.BALTAZAR PACLEB,

NATURE OF THE CASE: This petition was filed to set aside the decision made by the Court of Appeals in ruling that the respondent has the better right over the subject property and is the true owner thereof.

FACTS: Respondent Baltazar Pacleb and his late first wife, Angelita Chan, are the owners of parcel of land in Langcaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite covered by a transfer certificate of title.

Sometime in September 1992, Ruperto Javier offered the said land to spouses Ernesto and Elsie Yu. Javier claimed that he purchased the property from Rebecca Del Rosario who bought it from spouses Baltazar Pacleb and Angelita Chan. De-spite the alleged sales being unregistered, the spouses Yu accepted the offer and made a down payment and entered into an Agreement for the sale of the prop-erty. After giving the amount, the spouses Yu discovered that a portion of the property was tenanted by Ramon Pacleb, one of the respondent's sons. The peti-tioners then demanded the cancellation of their agreement and the return of their initial payment.

Javier then made arrangements with Ramon to vacate the property and to pay Ra-mon for his disturbance compensation. With that, Javier and the spouses YU pro-ceeded to enter into a Contract to Sell. But, Javier failed to comply with his obliga-tions. So, on April 23, 1993, the petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for spe-cific performance and damages against Javier to compel Javier to deliver to them ownership and possession, and the title to the property.

13 | P a g e


However, Javier did not appear in the proceedings and was declared in de-fault, so, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. The deci-sion and its Certificate of Finality were annotated in the title of the property.

On March 10, 1995, the petitioners and Ramon and his wife entered into an agreement that the spouses will pay Ramon P500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his tenancy rights over the land.

On October 12, 1995, the respondent filed a Complaint for annulment of deed of sale and other documents arising from it claiming that the deed of sale supposedly executed between him and his late first wife and Del Rosario was spu-rious and the signatures were forged. He also moved for the summons to be served upon Del Rosario via publication since her address cannot be found, but was denied. So, respondent moved to dismiss the case which was granted by the trial court.

On November 23, 1995, the petitioners filed an action for forcible entry against the respondent with the MTC. They contend that they had prior physical possession over the property through their trustee Ramon Pacleb, until the re-spondent ousted them in September 1995. The MTC and the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, but the Court of Appeals set aside the decisions of the lower courts. The CA decided that it was the respondent who had prior physical posses-sion of the property which was shown by his payment of real estate taxes thereon.

On May 29, 1996, respondent filed an instant case for removal of cloud from title with damages alleging that the deed of sale between him and his late first wife could not have been executed on the date appearing thereon. He claimed that he was residing in the US at that time and that his late first wife died 20 years ago.

On May 28, 1997, while the case was still pending, the respondent died, hence, he was substituted by his surviving spouse and some of his children.

On December 27, 2002, the respondent's case was dismissed and the peti-tioners were held to be purchasers in good faith. The trial court also held that the petitioners' action for specific performance against Javier was already final, and the trial court also ordered the respondents' heirs and all other persons claiming under them to surrender the possession of the property to the petitioners. Upon appeal by the respondent, the CA reversed the trial court's decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the action for specific performance filed by the petitioners against Javier is not merely an action in personam, but an action in rem, and is thus, con-clusive and binding upon respondent even if he was not a party thereto since it in-volves a question of possession and ownership of real property.

14 | P a g e


HELD: The action for specific performance and damages filed by petitioners against Javier to compel him to perform his obligations under their Contract to Sell is an action in personam.

The purpose of the action is to compel Javier to accept the full payment of the purchase price, and to execute a deed of absolute sale over the property in favor of the petitioners. The obligations of Javier mentioned attach to Javier alone and do not burden the property. Thus, the complaint filed by the petitioners is an ac-tion in personam and is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. So, the action cannot bind the respondent since he was not a party therein and considering the fact that his signature and that of his late first wife were forged in the deed of sale. Hence, the petition is denied and the Court affirms the ruling of the CA finding the respon-dent having a better right over the property as the true owner thereof.

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO AR-ICAYOS,

G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, REGALADO, J.:

FACTS:

Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of peti-tioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no con-tract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name in-cluded in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00. Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St.Martin’s Funeral Home and in January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter took over the manage-ment of the business.

Amelita made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. The labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of peti-tioner declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between the par-ties and therefore his office had no jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: WON the decision of the NLRC are appealable to the Court of Appeals.

RULING:

The Court is of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the SC were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil ac-tion for certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word appeal in relation thereto and in the in-stances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by cer-tiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review ad-dressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, how-

15 | P a g e


ever, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action for certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the SC are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the inten-tion of the Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P No. 129 to supposed ap-peals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule65. Consequently, all such pe-titions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict obser-vance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

REPUBLIC VS CA (1978)

Petition: Petition for Review

Ponencia: Santos, J.

DOCTRINE:

Rules on perfection of appeals may and should be relaxed where compelling rea-sons so warrant.

FACTS:

1. Both Republic and respondents Alfredo V. de Ocampo and Oscar Anglo claim ownership over the same lots located in Negros Occidental.

2. According to RP, said lots were bequeathed to the Bureau of Education (now Bureau of Public Schools) on September 21, 1926 by the late Esteban Jalandoni through his will. Said land was already registered under the Torrens System with the proper titles on the land to prove it (OCT- of original owner, Meerkamp and Company who then sold the land to Jalandoni evidenced with a TCT).

3. In 1958, the Bureau of Public Schools, represented by the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Occidental initiated a forcible entry and detainer case against de Ocampo over lands in question. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the complaint and issued title to de Ocampo.

4. Republic did not file any appeal after receiving said decision on August 13, 1965. However, Republic later filed with the trial court on December 28, 1965, a petition to restrain Ocampo from enforcing the decision and to grant the Republic to file for a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal within the period granted.

5. On September 28, 1966, Republic filed an "Amended Petition claiming that Ocampo employed fraudulent means in acquiring the lands. However, trial court did not find merit in this accusation (misrepresentation as to the lands).

ISSUES:

Whether or not dismissal of Republic’s appeal by CA was proper

16 | P a g e


- whether or not within the period prescribed by the rules of court

PROVISION:

Section 6, Rule 41, of the Rules of Court (Record on Appeal; Form and Contents)

RULING + RATIO:

1. NO, dismissal was not proper.

SC held that there was lack of jurisdiction on the part of trial court (when they is-sued a decree of the land in the name of de Ocampo) when they decided on the case since the lands were registered in favor of Meerkamp and Company before 1919.

SC also held that there are strong and substantial allegations of fraudulent mis-representations and machinations employed by de Ocampo in securing his title.

Thus, although Republic filed its appeal 6 days late from the period provided by the court,

1. Republic received copy of decision – September 14, 1965

Republic can appeal until October 14, 1965 (30 days)

Republic can appeal until November 3, 1965 (20 day extension approved by lower court)

2. Republic filed appeal on November 9, 1965 (6 days late)

AND that the court has repeatedly construed Section 6, Rule 41, of the Rules of Court (Record on Appeal; Form and Contents) as mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, non-compliance with which justifies the dismissal of the appeal,

affirming this appeal on the said ground would be an injustice.

The rigid adherence to the rules on perfection of appeals may and should be re-laxed where compelling reasons so warrant. The grounds invoked in this case — not only lack of jurisdiction but gross injustice itself — more than justify the excep-tion — considering further that the delay in the perfection of the appeal involved six (6) days only.

THEREFORE, although the appeal was filed beyond the period allowed by the Rules of Court, SC decided that there were enough compelling reasons to relax this rule in order to prevent injustice.

MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOP-MENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP

G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987

149 SCRA 562 – Remedial Law – Civil Procedure – Payment of Docket Fees – Claimed Damages must be Stated in the BODY and PRAYER of pleadings

A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development Cor-poration against City Land Development Corporation to compel the latter to exe-cute a deed of sale in favor Manchester. Manchester also alleged that City Land forfeited the former’s tender of payment for a certain transaction thereby causing

17 | P a g e


damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. This amount was alleged in the BODY of their Complaint but it was not reiterated in the PRAYER of same complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only. Said docket fee is premised on the allegation of Manchester that their action is primarily for specific performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The court ruled that there is an under assessment of docket fees hence it ordered Manchester to amend its complaint. Manchester complied but what it did was to lower the amount of claim for damages to P10M. Said amount was however again not stated in the PRAYER.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment complaint should be admitted.

HELD: No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original com-plaint. A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the appropriate docket fee re-gardless of the actual date of filing in court. Here, since the proper docket fee was not paid for the original complaint, it’s as if there is no complaint to speak of. As a consequence, there is no original complaint duly filed which can be amended. So the any subsequent proceeding taken in consideration of the amended complaint is void.

Manchester’s defense that this case is primarily an action for specific performance is not merited. The Supreme Court ruled that based on the allegations and the prayer of the complaint, this case is an action for damages and for specific perfor-mance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary estimation.

Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already provided in the body of the complaint. Its omission in the PRAYER clearly constitutes an at-tempt to evade the payment of the proper filing fees. To stop the happenstance of similar irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court ruled that from this case on, all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the fil-ing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

NG SOON, vs. HON. ALOYSIUS ALDAY, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY, BILLIE GAN AND CHINA BANKING CORPORATION,

G.R. No. 85879 September 29, 1989

FACTS:

A savings account was allegedly maintained with the China Banking Corporation (CBC) by Gan Bun Yaw, both of whom are respondents herein. Petitioner, Ng Soon, claims to be the latter's widow. For the filing of the Complaint, petitioner paid the sum of P3,600.00 as docket fees. Respondent Billie Gan and the Bank, re-spectively, moved for the dismissal of the Complaint. Subsequently, respondent Gan, joined by the Bank, moved to expunge the said Complaint from the record for alleged non-payment of the required docket fees. During the pendency of this case, respondent Gan filed a Manifestation alleging, among others, that petitioner is an impostor and not the real Ng Soon, wife of Gan Bun Yaw, since the real Mrs.

18 | P a g e


Gan Bun Yaw (Ng Soon) died. This allegation was, however, denied by petitioner. The respondent Judge issued the questioned Order granting the "Motion to Ex-punge Complaint

Petitioner's Motion for the reconsideration of the said Order having been denied, she asks for its review, more properly for a Writ of Certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the doctrine laid down in the Manchester case was incorrectly applied by respondent Judge;

2. Whether or not the Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the Complaint expunged from the record although petitioner had paid the necessary filing fees.

HELD:

It is true that Manchester laid down the rule that all Complaints should specify the amount of damages prayed for not only in the body of the complaint but also in the prayer; that said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case; and that any pleading that fails to comply with such requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall, otherwise, be expunged from the record. The pattern in Manchester to defraud the Government of the docket fee due, the intent not to pay the same having been obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint, is patently absent in this case. Petitioner demonstrated her willingness to abide by the Rules by paying the assessed docket fee of P 3,600.00. She had also asked the lower Court to inform her of the deficiency, if any, but said Court did not heed her plea.

A final determination is still to be made by the Court, and the fees ultimately found to be payable will either be additionally paid by the party concerned or re-funded to him, as the case may be.The respondent Judge, hereby directed to rein-state Civil Case No. Q-52489 for determination and proper disposition of the re-spective claims and rights of the parties, including the controversy as to the real identity of petitioner.

CARMEN C. VIUDA DE ORDOVEZA, vs. HONORIA RAYMUNDO

G.R. No. L-45155 July 31, 1936

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Petitioner is the appellee and respondent the appellant in a case now pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, entitled Domingo Ordoveza vs. Honoria Raymundo, and numbered 44763 in the records of the court. The period for the filing of the appellant's brief in that case expired on March 20, 1936. On March 31, 1936 the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for failure of the appellant to file her brief within the time prescribed by the rules of the court, and ordered that after fifteen days the record of the case be remanded to the court below. On April 6, 1936 the appellant filed a petition for reconsideration of the order dismissing the appeal, which petition was denied on April 8, 1936. A second petition for reconsideration

19 | P a g e

iPad, 09/14/15,


was filed by the appellant, and in view thereof the Court of Appeals on April 14, 1936, passed the following resolution:

Upon consideration of the second petition of the attorneys for the appellant in case G. R. 44763, Domingo Ordoveza vs. Honoria Raymundo, etc. praying that the resolution of this court of March 31, 1936, dismissing the appeal for failure to file their brief be reconsidered; in view of the reasons given in said petition and the special circumstances of the case, said resolution is hereby set aside and the ap-peal reinstated; provided, however, that the attorneys for the appellant shall file their printed brief within five days from notice hereof.

On April 17,1936 the appellee filed a motion praying that the resolution above quoted be reconsidered and set aside, which motion was denied.

Upon the foregoing state of facts, the appellee filed this petition for a writ of cer-tiorari with a view to having declared null and void the order of the Court of Ap-peals restating the appeal.

Petitioner now contends (1) that the Court of Appeals had no power to reinstate the appeal because it lost jurisdiction of the case on April 5, 1936, in that fifteen days had already elapsed from March 20, 1936, the date when the period fixed for the filing of the appellant's brief expired; and (2) that granting that the Court of Appeals retained jurisdiction of the case, it had no authority to grant the appellant an additional period of five days within which to file her brief.

By section 145-P of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Common-wealth Act No. 3, and in virtue of the resolution adopted by the Court of Appeals on February 8, 1936, the rules of the Supreme Court governing the filing of briefs and the dismissal of appeals are applicable to cases cognizable by the Court of Appeals.

Rules 23 and 24 of the Supreme Court are pertinent to the consideration of the present petition. The rules read as follows:

23. Motions for extension of time for the filing of briefs must be presented before the expiration of the time mentioned in Rules 21 and 22, or within a time fixed by special order of the court. No more than one extension of time for the filing of briefs shall be allowed, and then only for good and sufficient cause shown, to be demonstrated by affidavit.

24. If the appellant, in any civil case, fails to serve his brief within the time pre-scribed by these rules the court may, on motion of the appellee and notice to the appellant, or on its own motion, dismiss the bill of exceptions or the appeal.

1. The first contention of the petitioner rests on the theory developed in his argu-ment that upon the failure of the appellant to file her brief within the time pre-scribed by the rules of the court, her appeal became, ipso facto, dismissed. Conse-quently, he argues that at the expiration of the period of fifteen days from March 20, 1936, the Court of Appeals lost jurisdiction of the case, and had, therefore, no power to reinstate the appeal. This view finds no support in the rules of this court. Rule 24 above transcribed clearly indicates the contrary view when it says that upon failure of the appellant to file his brief within the period prescribed by the

20 | P a g e

iPad, 09/14/15,

iPad, 09/14/15,


rules, the court "may", on motion of the appellee and notice to the appellant, or its own motion, dismiss the bill of exceptions or the appeal. The use of the word "may" implies that the matter of dismissing the appeal or not rests within the sound discretion of the court, and that failure of the appellant to file his brief within the time prescribed by the rules does not have the effect of dismissing the appeal automatically. Viewed in this light, the period of fifteen days must be counted in the case under consideration not from March 20, 1936, but from March 31, 1936. Having been entered on April 14, 1936, the order reinstating the appeal came within such fifteen-day period.

2. Granted that the Court of Appeals still had jurisdiction of the case when it rein-stated the appeal, it seem reasonable to conclude that it also had authority to grant the appellant an additional period of five days within which to file her brief. Rule 23 provides in specific terms that the court may by special order fix a time within which motions for extension of time for the filing of briefs must be pre-sented. It would seem to be within the spirit of this rule to hold that the court may grant either the appellant or appellee an additional time for the filing of his brief even without any previous application therefor. Moreover, as the Supreme Court of the United States has aptly observed, "it is always in the power of the court to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it." (U. S.vs. Breitling, 20 How., 252; 15 Law. ed., 900, 902.)

We conclude that the Court of Appeals had authority to reinstate the appeal in the aforesaid case numbered 44763 in its records, and to grant the appellant an addi-tional period of file days within which to file her brief.

The petition for a writ of certiorari must be denied. So ordered.

UNITED PULP AND PAPER CO., INC., vs. UNITED PULP AND PAPER CHAPTER-FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS,

[G.R. No. 141117. March 25, 2004]

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Resolutions dated October 12, 1999[1] and December 10, 1999[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55245, entitled United Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. vs. United Pulp and Paper Chapter-Federation of Free Workers.

The antecedent facts giving rise to the controversy at bar are as follows:

Sometime in July 1991, United Pulp and Paper Co., Inc., petitioner, implemented a Promotions Policy[3] that recognizes the excellent and meritorious work perfor-mance of deserving employees during the last twelve (12) months. The Promo-tions Policy sets forth the following guidelines:

VI. ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDELINES

21 | P a g e

iPad, 09/14/15,

iPad, 09/14/15,


1. Except in abnormal situations (subject to approval by the General Manager), promotions shall be made only if a vacancy in the next higher position occurs and Management has decided to fill-up such vacancy through approval of the Person-nel Requisition form.

x x x

9. In case of union employees, the promotional increase shall be 5% compounded for every pay class jump. However, the resulting effect of 5% promotional in-crease shall not cause the promoted employees salary to exceed that of the low-est paid incumbent within first, the section, second, department, and third, divi-sion. If this constraint will result to a promotional increase of lower than 3% over his previous salary, the employee will receive an increase of 3%.

x x x.[4]

On April 1, 1998, Teodorico Simbulan was promoted from Welder I to Welder II with the corresponding pay class (PC) movement from PC V to PC VIII.

For and in behalf of Simbulan, United Pulp and Paper Chapter-Federation of Free Workers, respondent, questioned the regularity or correctness of the salary in-crease granted by petitioner. Invoking Section 1, Article XVII of the collective bar-gaining agreement (CBA),[5] respondent maintains that Simbulan is entitled to a 5% salary increase (for every pay class movement) because such salary increase does not exceed the salary rates of other incumbents. Respondent also contends that petitioner is guilty of discrimination against Simbulan since other employees, like Enrique Cruz and Joselito de Castro who were previously promoted, enjoy the 5% salary increase for their pay class movements.

The controversy was submitted to the grievance machinery, but the parties failed to reach an acceptable settlement.

Thus, the matter was elevated to a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), Regional Branch No. III at San Fernando, Pampanga, docketed as NCMB-AC-583-RB3-10-024-98.

On July 1, 1999, the Voluntary Arbitrators rendered a Decision[6] partly repro-duced as follows:

In light of all the foregoing, this Panel holds that the promotional increase in the case of union employees is 5% compounded for every pay class jump unless the effect of such increase will be such as to cause the promoted employees salary to exceed that of the lowest paid incumbent in the same position as that to which the employee is being promoted, in which case the promotional increase shall be limited to not less than 3%.

Consequently, in the case of the subject employee, Teodorico Simbulan, since there is no showing that, for the second and third jumps in his promotion on 1 April 1998, his salary would have exceeded that of the lowest paid incumbent in the pertinent position if granted a 5% promotional increase, he is entitled to a salary increase of 5%+5%+5%, compounded for each pay class, effective as of the said date.

22 | P a g e


WHEREFORE, respondent United Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. is hereby ordered to pay Teodorico Simbulan the difference between the promotional increase of 5%+5%+5%, compounded for each pay class, and the salary increase be actually re-ceived as a result of his promotion, effective as of 1 April 1998.

The respondent is also directed to continue implementing the promotions policy, in appropriate cases, in the manner stated in this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Voluntary Arbi-trators in a Resolution[7] dated September 3, 1999.

On October 6, 1999, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the De-cision and Resolution of the Voluntary Arbitrators.

In a Resolution dated October 12, 1999, the Appellate Court dismissed the petition outright for being insufficient in form, thus:

"1. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel for the petitioner corporation, rather than by a duly-authorized officer thereof;

2. The affidavit of service is inadequate, as the registry receipts evidencing mail-ing of copies of the petition to the respondent were not attached;

3. Absence of the mandatory written explanation required under Sec. 11, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to explain why personal service upon the respon-dents of copies of the petition was not resorted to.

The foregoing defects warrant an outright dismissal of the instant petition.

IN VIEW THEREOF, the Petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

On October 29, 1999, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court in a Resolution dated December 10, 1999.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the Court of Appeals seri-ously erred in dismissing its petition for review on mere technicalities.

We agree with the Court of Appeals. Section 5, Rule 7 of the same Rules[8] pro-vides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading that he has not commenced any action in-volving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency.

Here, only petitioners counsel signed the certification against forum-shop-ping. There is no showing that he was authorized by the petitioner company to represent the latter and to sign the certification.

In Sy Chin vs. Court of Appeals,[9] we held that the petition is flawed as the certifi-cate of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party. The

23 | P a g e

iPad, 09/14/15,

iPad, 09/14/15,

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/nov2000/136233.htm


rule requires that it should be the plaintiff or principal party who should sign the certification, otherwise, this requirement would easily be circumvented by the sig-nature of every counsel representing corporate parties.[10]

Moreover, petitioners failure to attach with the petition a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally violates Section 11, Rule 13 of the same Rules.[11] We have ruled that where no explanation is offered to justify the service of pleadings by other modes, the discretionary power of the court to ex-punge the pleading becomes mandatory. [12] Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly considered the petition as not having been filed, in view of petitioners failure to present a written explanation why it failed to effect personal service of its petition for review.

In Kowloon House/Willy Ng vs. Hon. Court of Appeals,[13] we held that (r)ules of procedure exist for a purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be dis-dained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party.Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation. But they help provide for a vital sys-tem of justice where suitors may be heard in the correct form and manner, at the prescribed time in a peaceful though adversarial confrontation before a judge whose authority litigants acknowledge. Public order and our system of justice are well served by a conscientious observance of the rules of procedure, particularly by government officials and agencies.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Bayang v. CA, 148 SCRA 91 (’87)

FACTS: Bayang sued Biong for Quieting of Title w/ damages in 1969, w/c resulted in a ruling in his favor in 1978. In 1978, Bayang sued Biong again but this time for the income earned fr. the land while it was still in the latter’s possession fr. 1970 to 1978.

HELD: The subject matter in the 2 cases are essentially the same as the income is only a consequence or accessory of the disputed property. The claim for income fr. the land is incidental to, & should have been raised by Bayang in his earlier claim for ownership of the land. As the filing of the 2 cases constitute splitting of the cause of action, the 2nd case is barred by the 1st. Also, for about 7 years, the petitioner made no move at all to amend his complaint to include a claim for the income supposedly received by private resp. during that period. He did not make the proper claim at the proper time & in the proper proceeding. Whatever right he might have had is now deemed waived bec. of his negligence.

24 | P a g e

iPad, 09/14/15,

iPad, 09/14/15,

iPad, 09/14/15,


BLOSSOM & CO. V. MANILA GAS CORPORATIONS

Facts

• Blossom & Co. (plaintiff) and Manila Gas Corporations (defendant) entered into a contract. The contract provided for the delivery to the plaintiff from month to month of specified amounts of water gas tar. 1 ton of gas was priced at Php65. It was agreed that the price would prevail only so long as the raw materials (coal and crude oil) used by the defendants in the manufacture of gas should cost the same price as that prevailing at the time of the contract. In the event of an in-crease or decrease in the cost of raw materials, there would be a corresponding increase or decrease in the price of tar.

• The contract was later amended to extend the period for ten years. In considera-tion of the modification, the plaintiff agreed to purchase from the defendant a cer-tain piece of land lying adjacent to its plant. The defendant sold and conveyed the land to the plaintiff which in turn executed a mortgage to secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price.

• Around 4 years from the execution of the contract, plaintiff filed an action against the defendant to obtain specific performance and recovery of damages. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached the contract by ceasing to deliver any coal and water gas tar solely because of the increase in price of tar products and its desire to secure better prices than what the plaintiff paid.

• CFI Manila ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The court granted the recovery for dam-ages but refused to order the defendants to resume delivery but left it with its remedy for damages against the defendants for any subsequent breach of con-tract.

• Later, plaintiff filed another action for damages on the ground that the defen-dant breached the contract once more after refusal to perform its obligation under the same contract.

Issue

Whether or not the plaintiff is barred from filing the second action for damages

Ruling

Yes, the plaintiff is barred from filing the second action for damages.

Doctrine

• Divisible contracts (as a general rule)

- A contract to do several things at several times is divisible. A judgement for a single breach of a continuing contract is not a bar to a suit for a subsequent breach.

• Entire contract (case at bar)

- When the contract is indivisible and the breach is total, there can only be one ac-tion in which the plaintiff must recover all damages. The recovery of a judgement

25 | P a g e


for damages by reason of a breach is a bar to another action on the same con-tract and on account of the continuous breach.

- The contract between the parties is an entire contract.

- In the case at bar, the defendant terminated the continuing contract by absolute refusal. The claim for damages is an indivisible demand. Where a former final judgement was rendered, it is a bar to any damages which plaintiff may thereafter sustain.

Enriquez vs. Ramos

7 SCRA 265

Facts: Rodrigo Enriquez and the spouses Urbano Dizon and Aurea Soriano de Di-zon sold to Socorro A. Ramos, by a notarial deed of even date, 11 parcels of land situated in Bago Bantay, Quezon City, and covered by their corresponding certifi-cates of title, for the stipulated price of P101,000.00. The vendee paid P5,000.00 down, P2,500.00 in cash, and P2,500.00 by a check drawn against the PNB, and agreed to satisfy the balance of P96,000.00 within 90 days. To secure the said balance, the vendee, in the same deed of sale, mortgaged the eleven parcels in favor of the vendors. By way of additional security, Socorro A. Ramos, as attorney-in-fact of her children, Enrique, Antonio, Milagros, and Lourdes, and as judicial guardian of her minor child Angelita Ramos, executed another mortgage on Lot No. 409 of the Malinta Estate.

Because of the vendee-mortgagor's failure to comply with some conditions of the mortgage, this action for foreclosure of the mortgage was filed by the vendors-mortgagees in the court below, on 29 April 1959. Defendant Socorro Ramos moved to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiffs previously had filed action against her in the CFI of Manila on 24 Feb. 1959 for the recovery of P2,500.00 paid by check as part of the down payment on the price of the mortgaged lands; that at the time this first suit was filed, the mortgage debt was already accrued and de-mandable; that plaintiffs were, therefore, guilty of splitting a single cause of ac-tion, and under section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, the filing of the first action for P2,500.00 was a defense that could be pleaded in abatement of the second suit. Upon opposition by the plaintiffs, the CFI of Quezon City denied the motion to dismiss; but defendant Ramos repleaded the averments as a special de-fense in her answer. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City rendered judgment against defendant Ramos; ordered her to pay P96,000.00, with 12% in-terest from 24 Feb. 1959 until payment, 10% of the amount due as attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit; and further decreed the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties in case of non-payment within 90 days. Socorro Ramos ap-pealed directly to this Court

Issue: Should the action be dismissed on account of the alleged splitting of ap-pellee’s cause of action?Ruling: The court find no merit of the case. An examination of the first complaint

26 | P a g e

iPad, 09/14/15,

iPad, 09/14/15,


filed against appellant in the Court of First Instance of Manila shows that it was based on appellants' having unlawfully stopped payment of the check for P2,500.00 she had issued in favor of appellees; while the complaint in the present action was for non-payment of the balance of P96,000.00 guaranteed by the mort-gage. The claim for P2,500.00 was, therefore, a distinct debt not covered by the security; and since the mortgage was constituted on lands situated in Quezon City, the appellees could not ask for its foreclosure in the Manila courts. The two causes of action being different, section 4 of Rule 2 does not apply.

Union Glass Corp vs SEC

FACTS:

Private respondent Carolina Hofileña, complainant in SEC Case No. 2035, is a stockholder of Pioneer Glass Manufacturing Corporation, Pioneer Glass for short, a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of silica mines and the manufac-ture of glass and glassware. Since 1967, Pioneer Glass had obtained various loan accommodations from the Development Bank of the Philippines [DBP].

As security for said loan accommodations, Pioneer Glass mortgaged and assigned its assets, to the DBP, in addition to the mortgages executed by some of its cor-porate officers over their personal assets. The proceeds of said financial exposure of the DBP were used in the construction of a glass plant in Rosario, Cavite, and the operation of seven silica mining claims owned by the corporation.

It appears that through the conversion into equity of the accumulated unpaid in-terests on the various loans amounting to P5.4 million as of January 1975, and subsequently increased by another P2.2 million in 1976, the DBP was able to gain control of the outstanding shares of common stocks of Pioneer Glass, and to get two, later three, regular seats in the corporation's board of directors.

March, 1978, when Pioneer Glass suffered serious liquidity problems such that it could no longer meet its financial obligations with DBP, it entered into a dacion en pago agreement with the latter, whereby all its assets mortgaged to DBP were ceded to the latter in full satisfaction of the corporation's obligations in the total amount of P59,000,000.00. Part of the assets transferred to the DBP was the glass plant in Rosario, Cavite, which DBP leased and subsequently sold to herein peti-tioner Union Glass and Container Corporation, hereinafter referred to as Union Glass.

On April 1, 1981, Carolina Hofileña filed a complaint before the respondent Securi-ties and Exchange Commission against the DBP, Union Glass and Pioneer Glass, docketed as SEC Case No. 2035. Of the five causes of action pleaded therein, only the first cause of action concerned petitioner Union Glass as transferee and pos-sessor of the glass plant. Said first cause of action was based on the alleged ille-gality of the aforesaid dacion en pago resulting from: [1] the supposed unilateral and unsupported undervaluation of the assets of Pioneer Glass covered by the agreement; [2] the self-dealing indulged in by DBP, having acted both as stock-holder/director and secured creditor of Pioneer Glass; and [3] the wrongful inclu-sion by DBP in its statement of account of P26M as due from Pioneer Glass when the same had already been converted into equity.

27 | P a g e

iPad, 09/14/15,


ISSUE:

WON the Joinder of Causes of action is valid

HELD:

Union Glass is involved only in the first cause of action of Hofileñas complaint in SEC Case No, 2035. While the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily to pro-ceedings before the SEC, allows the joinder of causes of action in one complaint, such procedure however is subject to the rules regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. 9 Since petitioner has no intra-corporate relationship with the complainant, it cannot be joined as party-defendant in said case as to do so would violate the rule or jurisdiction. Hofileñas complaint against petitioner for cancella-tion of the sale of the glass plant should therefore be brought separately before the regular court But such action, if instituted, shall be suspended to await the fi-nal outcome of SEC Case No. 2035, for the issue of the validity of the dacion en pago posed in the last mentioned case is a prejudicial question, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the action against petitioner Union Glass. Thus, Hofileñas complaint against the latter can only prosper if final judgment is rendered in SEC Case No. 2035, annulling the dacion en pago exe-cuted in favor of the DBP.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted, and the questioned Orders of respondent SEC, dated September 25, 1981, March 25, 1982 and May 28, 1982, are hereby set aside. Respondent Commission is ordered to drop petitioner Union Glass from SEC Case No. 2035, without prejudice to the filing of a separate suit before the regular court of justice. No pronouncement as to costs.

DILWEG V. PHILLIPS (1964)

[ G.R. No. L-19596, October 30, 1964 ]

FACTS:

On 7 February 1958 plaintiff Lavern R. Dilweg, a nonresident American citizen, through counsel, instituted the complaint at bar consisting of six causes of action against defendants Robert O. Phillips, Inocentes G. Dineros, and Isaac S. Eceta, claiming civil damages arising out of alleged libelous and defamatory statements uttered and published in the Philippines by the latter. On 24 February 1958 the first two named defendants presented a motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff interposed an opposition thereto on 7 March 1958.

On 11 May 1961 the trial court issued an order, which is the subject of the present appeal, the pertinent portion of which is as follows:

"This action is one for damages by reason of alleged libelous statements ut-tered in the Philippines by the defendants against the plaintiff. In other words, it is an action bared on a tort or act, which under the law of the Philippines, is defined as a criminal offense. At the time the said libelous statements were uttered, the plaintiff was in Washington, D.C. where, he was and has always been a resident.

28 | P a g e


There is no allegation in the complaint that plaintiff has ever been in the Philip-pines or has resided at anytime therein.

"The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff by the filing of his complaint. It was contended that as the plaintiff therein has never been a resident of the Philippines, the courts of this country have not acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of his action bared on a contract which was executed in the State of New York,USA.

The Court has come to conclusion that in order that it may validly try this case, it must have jurisdiction not only over the persons of the parties and over the subject matter and the plaintiff must be a resident within the territorial of this Court in order that jurisdiction over his person can be acquired, otherwise the Court will not be able to render a valid judgment against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not our Philippine courts can rightfully refuse to assume jurisdic-tion over a personal action instituted by a nonresident alien who is not within the territorial jurisdiction of our courts?

RULING:

It is thus evident that, contrary to the conclusion reached by the court below, it is not indispensable for a foreigner to establish a residence, nor need he be physically present in a state of which he is not a resident or citizen in order that he may initiate or maintain a personal action against a resident or citizen of that ether state for rights of action arising in, or for violations of laws committed within, the territorial jurisdiction of that other state. In this jurisdiction, no general law has come to our knowledge or notice which restricts the right of nonresident aliens to sue in our courts. It is not disputed that plaintiff's causes of action arose in, and that the defendants are within, our territorial jurisdiction. It is conceded by both parties that the law under which the instant case falls is silent on the matter of the right of an Alien to sue in our courts. On the other hand the particular law evidently availed of by the plaintiff in filing his complaint is Article 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:

"In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the in-jured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecu-tion and shall require only preponderance of evidence."

The above-quoted provision of law does not make any distinction as to whether the "injured party." who may maintain an action for damages based on defamation, is a Filipino citizen or resident or an alien.

“Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside, and the case is ordered re-manded to the court below for further proceeding consonant with this opinion”.

Marcelo v. De Leon, G.R. No. L-12902, 105 Phil. 1175, 56 Off. Gaz. [No. 37] 5738

FACTS:

29 | P a g e


The record disclose that on February 4, 1957, Ceferino Marcelo, filed in the justice of the peace court of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, a complaint to recover possession of a lot of 2,000 square meters belonging to Severino P. Marcelo (who had given him a full power-of-attorney) which was held by defendant "on the understanding that one-half of all the products raised in the occupied area, would be given" to the landowner. The complaint alleged that after plaintiff had assumed the admin-istration of Severino Marcelo's properties, defendant delivered the products corre-sponding to the owner; but when in September 1956, plaintiff notified defendant that in addition to giving half of the produce, he would have to pay a rental of two pesos per month, the latter refused, and continued refusing to pay such additional charges. Wherefore, complainant prayed for judgment ordering defendant to leave the premises and to pay damages and costs. The defendants allege that the plaintiff is a mere apoderado of the owner, Severino P. Marcelo that The rule is that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest,

ISSUE:

WON the contention of the defendant is correct

HELD:

plaintiff quotes that part of sec. 1 of Rule 72, permitting "the legal representative" of any landlord to bring an action of ejectment, and insists in his right now to liti-gate. Supposing that "legal representative" as used in sec. 1, includes attorneys-in-fact, we find that plaintiff's power attached to the complaint, authorizes him to sue for and in the name of Severino Marcelo, to "pursue any and all kinds of suits and actions for me and in my name in the courts of the land". This action is not in the name of plaintiff's principal.

Sulo ng Bayan vs. Araneta

[GR L-31061, 17 August 1976]

Facts: On 26 April 1966, Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. filed an accion de revindicacion with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Valenzuela, Bulacan, against Gregorio Araneta Inc. (GAI), Paradise Farms Inc., National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), Hacienda Caretas Inc., and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to recover the ownership and possession of a large tract of land in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, containing an area of 27,982,250 sq. ms., more or less, registered under the Torrens System in the name of GAI, et. al.'s predecessors-in-interest (who are members of the corporation). On 2 September 1966, GAI filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the grounds that (1) the complaint states no cause of action; and (2) the cause of action, if any, is barred by prescrip-tion and laches. Paradise Farms, Inc. and Hacienda Caretas, Inc. filed motions to dismiss based on the same grounds. NAWASA did not file any motion to dismiss. However, it pleaded in its answer as special and affirmative defenses lack of cause of action by Sulo ng Bayan Inc. and the barring of such action by prescrip-tion and laches. On 24 January 1967, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the (amended) complaint. On 14 February 1967, Sulo ng Bayan filed a motion to

30 | P a g e


reconsider the Order of dismissal, arguing among others that the complaint states a sufficient cause of action because the subject matter of the controversy in one of common interest to the members of the corporation who are so numerous that the present complaint should be treated as a class suit. The motion was denied by the trial court in its Order dated 22 February 1967.

Sulo ng Bayan appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 3 September 1969, the Court of Appeals, upon finding that no question of fact was involved in the appeal but only questions of law and jurisdiction, certified the case to the Supreme Court for resolution of the legal issues involved in the controversy.

Issue:

Whether the corporation (non-stock) may institute an action in behalf of its indi-vidual members for the recovery of certain parcels of land allegedly owned by said members, among others.

Whether the complaint filed by the corporation in behalf of its members may be treated as a class suit

Held:

1. It is a doctrine well-established and obtains both at law and in equity that a corporation is a distinct legal entity to be considered as separate and apart from the individual stockholders or members who compose it, and is not affected by the personal rights, obligations and transactions of its stockholders or members. The property of the corporation is its property and not that of the stockholders, as owners, although they have equities in it. Properties registered in the name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate and distinct from its members. Conversely, a corporation ordinarily has no interest in the individual property of its stockholders unless transferred to the corporation, "even in the case of a one-man corporation." The mere fact that one is president of a corporation does not render the property which he owns or possesses the property of the corporation, since the president, as individual, and the corporation are separate similarities. Similarly, stockholders in a corporation engaged in buying and dealing in real es-tate whose certificates of stock entitled the holder thereof to an allotment in the distribution of the land of the corporation upon surrender of their stock certifi-cates were considered not to have such legal or equitable title or interest in the land, as would support a suit for title, especially against parties other than the corporation. It must be noted, however, that the juridical personality of the corpo-ration, as separate and distinct from the persons composing it, is but a legal fic-tion introduced for the purpose of convenience and to subserve the ends of jus-tice. This separate personality of the corporation may be disregarded, or the veil of corporate fiction pierced, in cases where it is used as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, or to work -an injustice, or where necessary to achieve equity. It has not been claimed that the members have assigned or transferred whatever rights they may have on the land in question to the corporation. Absent any showing of interest, therefore, a corporation, has no personality to bring an action for and in behalf of its stockholders or members for the purpose of recovering property which belongs to said stockholders or members in their personal capacities.

31 | P a g e


2. In order that a class suit may prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1) that the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general inter-est to many persons; and (2) that the parties are so numerous that it is impracti-cable to bring them all before the court. Here, there is only one party plaintiff, and the corporation does not even have an interest in the subject matter of the con-troversy, and cannot, therefore, represent its members or stockholders who claim to own in their individual capacities ownership of the said property. Moreover, a class suit does not lie in actions for the recovery of property where several per-sons claim partnership of their respective portions of the property, as each one could alleged and prove his respective right in a different way for each portion of the land, so that they cannot all be held to have identical title through acquisition/prescription.

G.R. No. L-7020ALICIA GO, ET AL vs. ALBERTO GO, ET AL.,

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

FACTS:

plaintiffs brought an action in the Municipal Court of Manila to recover from defen-dants the possession of a house situated at 921 Dagupan St., Manila, and the sum of P2,000 as damages and P200.00 as attorney's fees.

Defendants in their answer set up several special defenses and a counterclaim. The counterclaim was divided into three causes of action as follows: the first is for P2,000 representing the value of certain furniture and equipment belonging to de-fendants and which are claimed to have been taken away by plaintiffs from the house in litigation the second is for P1,000 representing expenses incurred by de-fendants arising from the falsity of the facts alleged in the complaint; and the third is for P500 as attorneys fees arising from the institution of the present ac-tion.

The court found for the plaintiffs, after due hearing, ordering defendants to vacate the house in litigation and to pay costs, but denied the claim for damages both of plaintiffs and defendants on the ground that their amounts are beyond its jurisdic-tion. The defendants, in due time, perfected their appeal to the Court of First In-stance, and after the latter had filed their answer as required by the rules, plain-tiffs filed an amended complaint wherein they reiterated their original allegations with some slight modifications. To his amended complaint, defendants filed an amended answer reiterating the counterclaim they had alleged in their original answer which, as previously stated, has been divided into three causes of action involving an aggregate amount of P3,500.

Claiming that the amount involved in the counterclaim is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court and, therefore, the Court of First Instance cannot act on it in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss un-der Rule 8, section 1 (a), of the Rules of Court. This motion was resisted by defen-

32 | P a g e


dants, but the court, in its order issued on March 30, 1953, overruled the opposi-tion and granted the motion to dismiss. Hence, this appeal.

Appellants, in their brief, present the question for determination in this appeal in the following wise:

ISSUE:

whether the jurisdiction is determined by the amount of each cause of action, or by the aggregate amount of the several causes of action

HELD:

A case which may be considered on all fours with the present case is that of Vil-laseñor vs. Erlanger and Galinger, 19 Phil., 574, wherein this Court, in discussing the test to be considered in determining the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, laid down the following rule: "When a separate debt is due, it is demandable in a separate action. Therefore, neither a debtor nor a third party may plead lack of ju-risdiction because the sum of two separate debts exceeds the amount for which action may be brought in a court of a justice of the peace. On the other hand, if a debt is single a creditor may not divide it for the purpose of bringing the case within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace." This case is authority for the statement that if a claim is composed of several accounts each distinct from the other or arising from different transactions they may be joined in a single action even if the total exceeds the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace. Each account furnishes the test. But if the claim is composed of several accounts which arise out of the same transaction and cannot be divided, the same should be stated in one cause of action and cannot be divided for the purpose of bringing the case within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace.

The same rule obtains in the American jurisdiction. Thus, it has been generally held that "In order that two or more claims may be united to make the jurisdic-tional amount, they must belong to a class that under the statute will permit them to be properly joined in one suit, and not such as should be made the subject of independence suits; and where two or more causes of action are improperly united in one suit the amounts involved in the different causes cannot be added together so as to make an amount in controversy sufficient to confer ... . But "in so far as causes of action which may be properly joined are concerned, and which concern all the parties litigants, there is, however, a lack of harmony on the ques-tion of whether or not their various amounts should be aggregated in order to de-termine the amount in controversy for jurisdictional purposes. (21 C. J., pp. 76-78.)

In the last analysis, therefore, the question to be determined is whether the three causes of action into which the counterclaim of the defendants has been divided refer to transactions which should be stated separately, or transactions which have a common origin and should be joined in one cause of action for jurisdic-tional purposes. An analysis of the facts reveals that the three causes of action of the counterclaim are different one from the other, or at least the first is com-pletely different arises from a set of facts different from those which gave rise to the other two. The first refers to the recovery of the amount of P2,000 arising from the alleged unlawful taking by the plaintiffs of certain furniture and equip-

33 | P a g e

http://philippinelaw.info/jurisprudence/gr5789-villasenor-v-erlanger-galinger-et-al.html




ment belonging to the defendants; while the second and third causes of action arose, not from the illegal taking of property, but from the alleged unlawful insti-tution by the plaintiffs of the action of ejectment in the Municipal Court. From this it can be seen that the first cause of action cannot be joined with the other two in one single claim because they arise from different sets of facts.

Another consideration that should be borne in mind is whether the counterclaim is compulsory or not. If it is, such as if it arises from, or is necessarily connected with, the facts alleged in the complaint, then that counterclaim should be set up regardless of its amount. Failure to do so would render it barred under the rules. In this particular case, while the first cause of action cannot be considered com-pulsory because it refers to a transaction completely unrelated with the main claim, the second and the third belong to this class because they necessarily arise from the institution of the main action. Viewed in this light, it can be said that the counterclaim of the defendants should be deemed as coming within the jurisdic-tion of the municipal court, because the respective amounts, considered sepa-rately, do not exceed its jurisdiction. From all angles we view the order appealed from it would appear that it is unwarranted and has no legal basis.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.

Borlasa vs Polistico

FACTS:

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna on July 25, 1917, by Victoriano Borlasa and others against Vicente Polistico and others, chiefly for the purpose of securing the dissolution of a voluntary association named Turuhan Polistico & Co., and to compel the defendants to account for and surrender the money and property of the association in order that its affairs may be liquidated and its assets applied according to law. The trial judge having sustained a demur-rer for defect of parties and the plaintiffs electing not to amend, the cause was dismissed, and from this order an appeal was taken by the plaintiffs to this court.

the court made an order requiring the plaintiffs to amend their complaint within a stated period so as to include all of the members of the Turnuhan Polistico & Co. either as plaintiffs or defendants. The plaintiffs excepted to this order, but acqui-esced to the extent of amending their complaint by adding as additional parties plaintiff some hundreds of persons, residents of Lilio, said to be members of the association and desirous of being joined as plaintiffs. Some of these new plaintiffs had not been named in the list submitted by the defendants with their amended answer; and on the other hand many names in said list were here omitted, it be-ing claimed by the plaintiffs that the persons omitted were not residents of Lilio but residents of other places and that their relation to the society, so far as the plaintiffs could discover, was fictitious.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the case

HELD:

34 | P a g e


The trial judge appears to have supposed that all the members of the Turnuhan Polistico & Co. should be brought in either plaintiffs or defendants. This notion is entirely mistaken. The situation involved is precisely the one contemplated in sec-tion 118 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where one or more may sue for the bene-fit of all. It is evident from the showing made in the complaint, and from the pro-ceedings in the court below, that it would be impossible to make all of the persons in interest parties to the cases and to require all of the members of the associa-tion to be joined as parties would be tantamount to a denial of justice.

The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties wherever possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, the presence of those lat-ter being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power. The class suit contem-plates an exceptional situation where there are numerous persons all in the same plight and all together constituting a constituency whose presence in the litigation is absolutely indispensable to the administration of justice. Here the strict applica-tion of the rule as to indispensable parties would require that each and every indi-vidual in the class should be present. But at this point the practice is so far re-laxed as to permit the suit to proceed, when the class is sufficient represented to enable the court to deal properly and justly with that interest and with all other in-terest involved in the suit. In the class suit, then, representation of a class interest which will be affected by the judgment is indispensable; but it is not indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party.

Rivera vs Luciano

FACTS:

On May 16, 1962 Angelita F. Rivera instituted Civil Case No. 50408 against Loreto Luciano in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the collection of the sum of P5,862.60. However, on June 9, 1962, upon motion of defendant, the case was dismissed on the ground that her husband was not joined as defendant. Plaintiff did not appeal from the order of dismissal.

On August 14, 1962 Angelita F. Rivera filed another action against the same de-fendant Loreto Luciano, in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of the sum of P5,897.60. The case in as docketed as Civil Case No. 51262. It involved the same subject matter, the same cause of action and the same parties as in Civil Case No. 50408. Again, Loreto Luciano's husband was not joined as defen-dant, but the complaint alleged as reason for this that defendant was engaged in business. Before filing an answer defendant moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the same was barred by the dismissal of the previous Civil Case No. 50408. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case.

ISSUE:

The only issue is whether or not the dismissal of Civil Case No. 50408 for non-join-der of a party was an adjudication on the merits which would bar the institution of Civil Case No. 51262.

HELD:

Section 4 of Rule 30 of the old Rules of Court, applicable herein, states:

35 | P a g e

http://philippinelaw.info/statutes/act190.html


SEC. 4. Effect of dismissal on other grounds. — Unless otherwise ordered by the court, any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.

Accordingly, the dismissal of an action in the Court of First Instance on grounds not provided for in Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Rule 30 is, unless otherwise ordered, an adjudication on the merits, except, of course, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction which is always without prejudice. 1

In the instant case the dismissal of Civil Case No. 50408 was not in pursuance of Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Rule 30. Neither was it for lack of jurisdiction. And, inas-much as the court did not order the dismissal to be without prejudice, it follows that it was an adjudication on the merits. Having become final it bars the filing of another action on the same cause of action.

Gonzales vs. Hechanova, et. al.

FACTS:

Respondent Executive Secretary Rufino G. Hechanova authorized an impor-tation of tons foreign rice. Such act is being questioned by petitioner Ramon Gon-zales, a rice planter and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Associa-tion, for being violative of a particular statute which proscribes importation of rice and corn by government agencies.

Respondents aver that petitioner as a rice planter does not give him suffi-cient interest to file herein petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is a real party in interest.

HELD:

Yes. “ x x x, [S] ince the purchase of said commodity will have to be effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice producer and landowner, petitioner must necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has suffi-cient personality and interest to seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds.

36 | P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGEST MORALES, GENIE C.

Ibanez vs Roman Catholic Church

FACTS:”

The Complaint is as follows : United States of America, Philippine Islands, in the Court of First Instance of Cavite. — No. ——. —Nicomedes Ibañes, Bernardo Ramos, Pedro Zapanta, Pelagio Ninon, Andres Ninon, Victoriano Ramos, Hermenegildo Dinglay, Damaso Hernandez, Ciriaco Ramos, Cenon Zapanta, Baldomero Dionis, Rafael Ramos, Raymundo Salcedo, for themselves and in the name of the other inhabitants of the town of Tenate, plaintiffs, vs. the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church and its representative, the parish priest of Naic, Valentin Velasco, defen-dants, for the proprietorship of an image of the Holy Child.

The plaintiffs as express above, as inhabitants of the town of Ternate, for them-selves and in the name of all the other inhabitants of said town, appear before the court and bring complaints against the defendant, alleging as a cause of action that:

xxx xxx xxx

The claim of the plaintiffs is that the persons who were at the time of the presen-tation of the complaint the inhabitants of Ternate were the owners in common of the image considered as a piece of personal property. There is no evidence to show that the present plaintiffs, or any one of the present inhabitants of Ternate, were the heirs or in any way related to any of the two hundred Mardicas who came to the Philippines nearly two hundred and fifty years ago. The claim of the plaintiffs is apparently not rested upon the proposition that they are entitled to re-lief because they are such heirs, but because they live in the pueblo. Their view seems to be that the heirs of the Mardicas living in other pueblos have no interest in the image.lawphil.net

Nor is there any evidence in the case to show how many, if any, of the plaintiffs or of the present inhabitants of Ternate, who are some 2,460 people, belong to the Roman Catholic Church. It will have been observed that, when the Mardicas came here, there came with them a priest of the Roman Catholic Church; that the im-age has always been used in connection with the worship of the religion professed by that church; that the cofradia was an organization of that church, and by terms of the decree of November 30, 1803, necessarily had to have as its rector a priest of that religion; that the disposition of the image has always been at the charge of the church's officers, and that a recourse has always been had to them to deter-mine any rights relating thereto.

Passing the question as to whether the Roman Catholic Church is not the owner of the image, the question may be asked, whether under these circumstances it can be said that any one has a proprietary right in this image who is not a Roman Catholic? If among the Mardicas who first came here there had been on who did not profess that religion, would he have any participation therein? Are the Chinese who now live in Ternate part owners of the image? These are questions which we do not feel called upon to decide, for the case must be resolved upon the point made by the defendant at the very commencement of the action, to wit, that the thirteen persons named as plaintiffs have no right to maintain it.

37


The plaintiffs rely upon article 118 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is as fol-lows:

When the subject-matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons, and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all. But in such case any party in interest shall have a right to intervene in protection of his individual interests, and the court shall make sure that the parties actually before it are sufficiently numerous and representative so that all interests con-cerned are fully protected.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there can be a class suit

HELD:

No case has been called to our attention in which this section or rule which it enunciates has been applied where the ownership of personal property is involved and where it is claimed to belong to persons who at a particular time reside in a particular place, or where the ownership changes as persons move in or out of such locality.

In the case of Macon and Birmingham Railroad vs. Gibson (85 Ga., 1; s. c. 21 Am. St., 135), it appeared that the railroad, in accordance with the terms of its charter, if it built its railroad within 5 miles of the town of Thomaston, had to build it within the corporate limits, or within 1 mile of the court-house. It was there held that two citizens of the town had a right to maintain a suit in behalf of themselves and of their fellow citizens, to prevent the railroad from violating its charter. The court said that the object and of the provision in the charter was to prevent the decline and decay of the town in consequence of having a railroad in the vicinity but not near enough to prevent some rival town from springing up, and that the citizens of Thomaston had a peculiar and vital interest therein. It will be seen that in this case the ownership of personal property was not involved.lawphil.net

The case of Wheelock vs. First Presbyterian Church (119 Cal., 477), did involve the ownership of certain property and two persons were allowed to bring the ac-tion in behalf of others, but it there appeared that the persons who belonged to the Central Presbyterian Church, and whom the two plaintiffs represented, num-bered 369 and were well known. In other words, that they were the members of a well-defined unincorporated society. The case of Smith vs. Swormstedt (16 How., 288), involved the division of the Methodist Church of the United States into two bodies, Methodist Church North and Methodist Church South. The matter in con-troversy was a property known as The Book Concern. The only persons interested in this property were the preachers belonging to the two churches, of whom there were about 1,500 in the Church South and about 3,800 in the Church North. These persons were well known and could be identified, and six of the preachers belong-ing to the Church South were allowed to maintain the action for themselves and for all their fellow-preachers in that body. It will be seen that no one of these three cases is like the present one, wherein no one of the inhabitants of Ternate has vested interest in the property in question which would survive his removal from

38


the town and in which another person, by moving into the town, acquired an inter-est.

But even if this section were applicable to such a case as the present, the action could not be maintained. In the case of Smith vs. Swormstedt, above cited, the court said, at page 303:

In all cases where exception to the general rule are allowed, and a few are permit-ted to sue and defend on behalf of the many, by representation, care must be taken that persons are brought on the record fairly representing the interest or right involved, so that it may be fully and honestly tried.

In Macon and Birmingham Railroad vs. Gibson, above cited, the court said:

It is true that as only two of the citizens have become parties, it is rather a small representation of the whole community; but considering the publicity of the case and of the interest involved in it, and the fact that the suit is located in Upson County and will be tried (if tried at all) at the county town, which is the town whose citizens are interested, there can be no cause to apprehend that the two plaintiffs on the face of the petition will be disposed, or if so disposed, allowed to misrepresent the community in whose behalf they have brought this suit. No doubt it is somewhat discretionary with a court of equity as to how many repre-sentatives of a class will, or ought to be, regarded as a fair representation of the whole class in the given instance.

It is sufficiently appears from the record in this case that it is a controversy be-tween the Roman Catholic Church on one side and the Independent Filipino Church on the other. That it is the purpose of the plaintiffs, if they secure posses-sion of the image, to place it in the chapel of the Independent Church is also very clear. What number of the inhabitants of the town (2,460 according to the census) are members of the Roman Catholic Church and what part are members of the In-dependent Filipino Church does not appear. But it is very apparent that many of the inhabitants are opposed to the transfer of the image from the Roman Catholic Church. Under the circumstances, the thirteen plaintiffs do not fairly represent all of the inhabitants of the town. Their interest and the interests of some of the oth-ers are diametrically opposed. For this reason this action can not be main-tained.itc-alf

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the defendants are acquitted of the complaint, with the costs of the first instance against the plaintiffs. No costs will be allowed to either party in this court. So ordered.

SANTIAGO VS FAR EAST BROADCASTING CO.

This is an original petition for mandamus. The petitioner prays this court to issue the writ "directed to the respondent, Far Eastern Broadcasting, commanding it that the petitioner be allowed to broadcast any speech or address without previ-ous censorship." The allegations of the petitioner are as follows:

39


1. That the petitioner is of legal age, resident of the City of Manila and cam-paign manager of the political party Popular Front Sumulong; the respondent is a public utility corporation engaged in radio broadcasting service, and organized and existing in and under the laws of the Philippines, having its principal office in the insular Life Building, Manila.

2. That, sometime In September, 1942, the petitioner, as campaign manager of the Popular Front Sumulong, asked the respondent, through its manager, for the purchase of air time for the broadcast of the Popular Front political speeches at the Opera House on September 23, 1941. But the said respondent refused and still refuses to allow to broadcast except on condition that complete manuscript of contemplated speeches should be submitted in advance.

3. That the act of the respondent in refusing to allow the use of its station for broadcasting the speeches except upon prior submission of complete manuscript of the speeches to be broadcast is discriminatory and constitutes unlawful censor-ship and a violation of the freedom of speech guaranteed by our Constitution.

4. That the present the constitutional guarantees are not suspended, the state not being placed under martial law, and, consequently, the conduct of the respon-dent is unlawful.

5. That the respondent, in refusing to allow the petitioners to use its station ex-cept upon prior cencorship, unlawfully excludes and deprives the latter from en-joyment and exercise of the right and freedom of speech.

6. That the petitioner has no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy to en-force his right other than this action.

ISSUE:

Whether there is a corresponding duty devolved by law upon the respondent to permit the petitioner to do so.

HELD:

It seems clear from the laws and the regulations hereinbefore adverted to that the respondent had the right to require the petitioner to submit the manuscript of the speeches which he intended to broadcast. In his memorandum counsel for the re-spondent sustains, and cites numerous authorities in support of his contention, that Commonwealth Act No. 98 is valid as a proper exercise by the state of its po-lice power. However, we are not called upon here to inquire into the constitution-aly and validity of said Act, which directly governs this case, because the peti-tioner has not specifically raised that question and the general rule is that the constitutionality of a law will not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued. "The basic principle which under-lies the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is that by enactment of legislation, a constitutional measure is presumed to be created.

QUINTANILLA VS CA

FACTS:

40


The antecedents, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA), are as follows:

Defendant, x x x (respondent RCBC) is a commercial banking institution, orga-nized under existing laws, doing business through its duly accredited offices in the City of Cebu.

On 12 July 1983, plaintiff (petitioner) executed a Real Estate Mortgage on a parcel of land, situated in the City of Cebu, under TCT No. 39409, in favor of defendant, RCBC, to secure a credit line in the amount of P45,000.00. Plaintiff availed, from this collateralized credit line, the amount of P25,000.00 only, secured and evi-denced by promissory note no. 84/615 in the said sum of P25,000.00, with inter-est at the rate of 38% per annum, on 23 October 1984.

Plaintiff, Perfecta Quintanilla, who is engaged in business, under the name and style, Cebu Cane Products, exports rattan products abroad. In connection there-with, she established with defendant, RCBC, advance credit line, for her export bills against Letters of Credit from her customers abroad.

Also, on an even date, 23 October 1984, plaintiff secured from defendant, RCBC, a loan of P100,000.00, against her advance export credit line, secured by promis-sory note no. 84/614, on a maturing period, one month from thence.

Again on November 8, 1984, plaintiff secured another advance credit of P100,000.00 against her advance export credit line, which she again secured by another promissory note no. 84/632, of even date.

On 20 November 1984, plaintiff shipped stocks of her Cane Products to her buyer in Belgium, upon a Letter of Credit, under Export Bill No. 84/199, in the amount of US $10,638.15. Defendant, RCBC, received the proceeds of this export shipment, in the amount of P208,630.00, from Bank Brussels Lambert-New York.

The full amount of the proceeds, was therefore credited to plaintiffs Current Ac-count No. 218 with defendant bank. Defendant RCBC, then debited plaintiffs cur-rent account, in the amount of P125,000.00 as payment for the latters loan of P100,000.00 to promissory note no. 84/614 and P25,000.00 to promissory note no. 84/615. The latter amount was what plaintiff secured by the Real Estate Mort-gage, Exhibit A.

On November 27, 1984, plaintiff made another shipment from her Cebu Cane Products, under Export Bill No. 84-205 for US $10,083.00. Consequently, RCBC sent the export documents to the issuing bank for collection of this, latter export shipment.

However, on November 28, 1984, the issuing bank, Brussels Lambert-Belgium, re-fused payment on Export Bill No. 84-199, and demanded reimbursement from de-fendant, RCBC, the amount of US $20,721.70, invoking its right for immediate re-imbursement, under Art. 16 of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Pub-lication 400 through telex, to which plaintiff was so notified by defendant, RCBC. The latter, subsequently advised plaintiff to communicate and arrange matters with her buyers and customers in Belgium. After persistent demand for reimburse-ment, from Bank Brussels Lambert-Belgium, defendant, RCBC, returned and reim-bursed the total sum of US $20,721.70 to Bank Brussels Lambert-Belgium.

41


RCBC, then proceeded to revert the credit and debit entries on plaintiffs current account, which it supposedly paid to promissory note nos. 84/614 and 84/615 and demanded payments from the plaintiff, the whole amount, including the amount of P25,000.00, it collaterized by the real estate mortgage.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent RCBCs counterclaim is compulsory or permissive in nature.

HELD:

The amount stated in the mortgage contract between petitioner and RCBC does not limit the amount for which it may stand as security considering that under the terms of that contract, the intent to secure future indebtedness is apparent. It would have been different if the mortgage contract in the case at bar simply pro-vides that it was intended only to secure the payment of the same and those that may hereafter be obtained the principal of all of which is hereby fixed at P45,000.00. Yet the parties to the mortgage contract further stipulated: as well as those that the Mortgagee may extend to the Mortgagor. The latter phrase clearly means that the mortgage is not limited to just the fixed amount but also covers other credit accommodations in excess thereof. Thus, the general rule that mort-gage must be limited to the amount mentioned in the mortgage cannot be ap-plied herein. Rather by specific provision and agreement of the parties, the mort-gage contract was designed to secure even future advancements.

Having determined that the mortgage contract extends even to petitioners other advances in excess of the P25,000.00, RCBCs counterclaim for such other ad-vances cannot but be considered as compulsory in nature. Such counterclaim nec-essarily arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of petitioners claim which is to enjoin the foreclosure of the latters other credit ac-commodations in excess of P25,000.00. It thus satisfies the compelling test of compulsoriness which requires a logical relationship between the claim and coun-terclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court. Both claims are merely offshoots of the same basic controversy. More-over, RCBCs counterclaim does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties upon whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction and the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.

TIU PO VS BAUTISTA

FACTS:

Private respondent, Juan Pambuan, Jr., filed a Complainant for Reconveyance and Damages of approximately P400,000.00 against petitioners before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City (Civil Case No. 5023-P) for an alleged wrongful sale at public auction of a certain real property. Petitioners presented their An-swer with a counter-claim, on account of the 11 malicious and unfounded action,"

42


for moral damages in the amount of P600,000.00; actual and compensatory dam-ages of P100,000.00; exemplary damages of P50,000.00; attorney's fees of P30,000.00, plus P200.00 per appearance of counsel as representation and travel-ling expenses.

On the same day that they filed their Answer, petitioners filed an ex- parte Motion for exemption from payment of legal fees on their counterclaim alleging that it was compulsory in nature and that under section 5(a), Rule 141, only a permissive counterclaim is subject to payment of legal fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners' claim for moral, actual, compensatory and exemplary damages, together with attorney's fees and costs, constitutes a compulsory coun-terclaim.

HELD:

Under section 4, Rule 9, a counterclaim is compulsory in nature 1) if it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the sub-ject matter of the opposing party's claim; 2) if it does not require for its adjudica-tion the presence of third parties over whom the Court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and 3) if the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim A compulsory counter-claim is barred if not set up. Conversely, a counterclaim is permissive where it has no necessary connection with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim, or even where there is such connection, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim, or if it requires for its adjudication the presence of third persons over whom the Court acquire jurisdiction

Petitioners' counterclaim for damages fulfills the necessary requisites of a compul-sory counterclaim. They are damages claimed to have been suffered by petition-ers as a consequence of the action filed against them. They have to be pleaded in the same action, otherwise, petitioners would be precluded by the judgment from invoking the same in an independent action. The pronouncement in Papa vs. Ba-naag, 1 is in point:

Compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, allegedly suffered by the creditor in consequence of the debtor's action, are also compulsory counterclaim barred by the dismissal of the debtor's action. They cannot be claimed in a subsequent action by the creditor against the debtor.

FROILAN VS PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING CO.

FACTS:

Defendant Pan Oriental took possession of the vessel in question after it had been repossessed by the Shipping Administration and title thereto reacquired by the government, following the original purchaser, Fernando Froilan’s, default in his

43


payment of the unpaid balance and insurance premiums for the said vessel. Pan Oriental chartered said vessel and operated the same after it had repaired the vessel and paid the stipulated initial payment, thereby exercising its option to purchase, pursuant to a bareboat charter contract entered between said company and the Shipping Corporation. The Cabinet resolved to restore Froilan to his rights under the original contract of sale on condition that he shall pay a sum of money upon delivery of the vessel to him, that he shall continue paying the remaining in-stallments due, and that he shall assume the expenses incurred for the repair and by docking of the vessel. Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Froilan’s rights under the contract of sale, for the reason that when the vessel was deliv-ered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of said authority to the property, Froilan having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon. Froilan paid the required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an action for in the CFI of Manila to recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said prop-erty. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted there on may be foreclosed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the government’s motion to dismiss Pan Oriental counterclaims may prosper.

HELD:

Under the circumstances already voted to, Pan Oriental cannot be considered a possessor in bad faith until after the institution of the instant case. However, since it is not disputed that said appellant is entitled to the refund of such expenses with the right to retain the vessel until he has been reimbursed therefore. As it is by the corrected acts of defendant and intervenor Republic of the Philippines that the appellant ha a lien far his expenses, appellees Froilan, Compania Maratma, and the Republic of the Philippines are declared liable for the reimbursement to appellant of its legitimate expenses, as allowed by law, with legal interest from the time of disbursement.

PASCUAL VS BAUTISTA

FACTS:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being a full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual, who died intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children.. Adela Soldevilla Pascual the surviving spouse of the late Don Andes Pascual filed w/ the RTC Branch 162, a special pro-ceeding case no.7554 for administration of the intestate estate of her late hus-band. Olivia and Hermes are illegitimate children of Eligio Pascual (although they contend that the term “illegitimate children” as described in art 992 should be construed as “spurious children”).

ISSUE:

44


Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

HELD:

Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legiti-mate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992.

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.

Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in hold-ing that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the suc-cession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.

BALBASTRO ETAL VS CA

FACTS:

The facts are undisputed. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, on July 17, 1969, Chiu Keng Iong, Lim Bun Kong and Rajindar Singh, lessees of three doors of a

10-door apartment situated at E. Rodriguez St., Quezon City, filed a complaint for interpleader and consignation with the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IV, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-13297 against private respondent Francisco E. Fernandez and Angela M. Butte, each of whom was claiming ownership over the aforementioned 10-door apartment and of the right to collect the rents therefrom. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that they have no means of knowing definitely to whom they should pay rentals — whether to defendant Angela M. Butte or defendant Francisco E. Fernandez.

In answer to plaintiffs' complaint defendant Francisco E. Fernandez alleged among others that pending determination of the conflicting claims involved in the case he was granted an ad interim authority to collect and deposit with the court the rentals due on the subject property which authority was allegedly upheld by the Court of Appeals in its decision of July 17, 1970 in CA-G.R. No. 44341-R entitled Angela M. Butte vs. Francisco E. Fernandez. On the other hand, defendant Angela M. Butte claims that being the owner of the 10-door apartment in question, she has every right to collect the rents of the property.

On October 29, 1969, private respondent Francisco E. Fernandez filed a Third-Party Complaint against the third-party defendants (petitioners herein) who are the lessees of the remaining doors of the 10-door apartment because of their re-fusal to recognize the authority of private respondent Francisco E. Fernandez to collect the rents on the doors leased by them. The third-party defendants who are now the petitioners herein filed with the respondent court a "Motion To Strike Out

45


And/Or To Dismiss The Third-Party Complaint" filed by Francisco E. Fernandez on the ground that the filing of said

Third-Party Complaint against them is in violation of the express provisions of Sec-tion 12, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court and not in accord with established ju-risprudence on the matter and on the further ground that said Third-Party Com-plaint does not state any cause of action.

ISSUE:

whether or not the respondent Judge has committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing the inclusion of petitioners as parties in the aforecited interpleader case on the basis of a pleading designated as "third-party complaint" of respon-dent Francisco E. Fernandez.

HELD:

Apart from the requirement that the third-party complainant should assert a de-rivative or secondary claim for relief from the third-party defendant, there are other limitations on said party's ability to implead. The rule requires that the third-party defendant is "not a party to the action" for otherwise the proper procedure for asserting a claim against one who is already a party to the suit is by means of counterclaim or

cross-claim under sections 6 and 7 of Rule 6. In addition to the aforecited require-ment, the claim against the third-party defendant must be based upon plaintiff's claim against the original defendant (third-party claimant). 3 The crucial charac-teristic of a claim under section 12 of Rule 6, is that the original "defendant is at-tempting to transfer to the third-party defendant the liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff. 4

In Capayas v. Court of First Instance 5 this Court enunciated the same principle, when the court ruled: "... when the law says that a third-party complaint may be filed with leave of court, it refers to a complaint that alleges facts which prima fa-cie show that the defendant is entitled against the third-party defendant to contri-bution, etc., etc. Otherwise the court can not legally grant leave to a defendant to file it, because it would not be a third-party complaint... The test to determine whether the claim for indemnity in a third-party complaint, "in respect to plain-tiff's claim" is, whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the plain-tiff's claim is based, or the third-party's claim, although arising out of another or different contract or transaction, is connected with the plaintiff's claim."

The requirement that for a third-party complaint to be available the third-party defendant must be liable secondarily to the original defendant in the event that the latter is held liable to the plaintiff was reiterated in Commercial Bank & Trust Company of the Philippines v. Republic Armored Car Service Corp. 6 where this Court thru Justice Labrador ruled that "a third-party complaint is, under the Rules, available only if the defendant has a right to demand contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief from the supposed third-party defendants in re-spect to the plaintiff's claim."

46


Absent therefore in the case at bar the nexus between petitioners as third-party defendants and Francisco E. Fernandez, the third-party plaintiff, showing the exis-tence of a secondary or derivative liability of the former in favor of the latter "in respect of his opponent's claim" the third-party action would not be proper.

On the issue therefore, as to whether or not section 12 of Rule 6 of the Rules au-thorizes a defendant to bring into the case any person not a party to the action, who is not secondarily liable to said defendant for contribution, indemnity, subro-gation or any other relief in respect to the claim of the plaintiff against the defen-dant, the answer appears plain. In the context of the aforecited rule and applica-ble jurisprudence the answer must be in the negative.

COMMISSION OF CUSTOMS VS CLORIBEL

FACTS:

Petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul and set aside several orders of re-spondent court all of which together in effect: (1) permitted ex-parte private re-spondents Jose and Susana Conchingyan to file a third-party complaint for man-damus against petitioners in a special civil. action for declaratory relief in which said Cochingyans were defendants and which was already tried and almost ready for decision; on the same day, (2) admitted said third-party complaint and (8) fur-ther issued immediately a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction likewise ex-parte; and which (4) were intended to enforce said writ of injunction.chanrob-lesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

There was pending before respondent court as Civil Case No. 52318, entitled Macario M. Ofilada vs. Reparations Commission, Jose Cochingyan and Susana Cochingyan, a special civil action for declaratory relief, wherein Ofilada, as the Second Receiver of the World War II Veterans Enterprises, Inc. (Warvets) in Civil Case No. 34998, likewise pending in another Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, sought a judicial declaration as to whether, under the allocation granted to said Warvets to purchase reparations goods, the conversion into pesos of the dollar prices of said goods should be at the rate of two pesos to one dollar or at the prevailing market rate at the time for payment, which would be much higher. Civil Case No. 34998 was a minority suit filed by certain stockholders of Warvets alleging irregularities in the management and disposition of the goods being pur-chased by the corporation by virtue of the aforementioned allocation, hence the need for receivers, of which there were two, the first being one Ramon E. Saura and the second, Ofilada. In the same Civil Case No. 34998, an order had been is-sued on October 9, 1962 ordering Ofilada to deliver to the Cochingyans the sec-ond shipment of goods under Warvets' allocation.

ISSUE:

whether or not respondent court gravely abused its discretion in allowing the fil-ing of and in admitting the third-party complaint of the Cochingyans

47


HELD:

As already stated, Civil Case No. 52318 was a special civil action for declaratory relief under Rule 66 of the Rules of 1940 which were in force when it was filed. The only purpose thereof was to secure from the court the proper interpretation or construction of the reparations contract between the Reparations Commission and Warvets in regard to the rate of conversion of the dollar to the peso of the purchase price Warvets had to pay No positive or affirmative, much less any ma-terial relief, was 'using sought therein. Indeed, it is in the very nature of a 'declaratory relief special civil action that "the Relief is confined to a case of ac-tual controversy within the Court's jurisdiction, without the need of injunction, ex-ecution or other relief beyond the adjudication of the legal rights which are the subject of controversy between the parties." ( 3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 146, 1970 ed.) In other words, the plaintiff Ofilada in said case did not, as he could not pray for anything to be award or granted to him. Now, as regards the nature and purpose of a third-party complaint, Section 1 of Rule 12 of the Rules of 1940 provided:

SECTION 1. Claim against one not a party to an action. - When a defendant claims to be entitled against a person not a party to the action, hereinafter called the third-party defendant, to contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other re-lief, in respect of the plaintiff' claim, he may file, with leave of court, against such person a pleading which shall state the nature of his claim and shall be called the third-party complaint.

It is obvious from this definition that a third-party complaint is inconceivable when the main case is one for nothing more' than a declaratory relief. In a third-party complaint, the defendant or third-party plaintiff is supposed to seek contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief from the third-party defendant is re-spect to the claim of the plaintiff against him. In the case at bar, what possible re-lief could the Cochingyans, as defendants in Civil Case No. 52318, for declaratory relief, have asked for by way of contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief from those they have named third-party defendants, the Collector of Cus-toms, Commissioner of Customs, Reparations Commission, their co-defendant and Macario Ofilada, the very plaintiff, in respect to the construction or interpretation that Ofilada was asking the court to make? At the risk of quoting again part thereof, the complete prayer in the third-party complaint in question reads thus:

1. Immediately upon the filing of the herein third-party complaint this Honor-able Court issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ex-parte, without no-tice to the other parties, ordering the third-party defendants Commissioner of Customs and Collector of Customs and Reparations Commission to release imme-diately the third-party plaintiffs the balance of the 202 packages of rayon clothing forming part of the shipment of consumer goods originally consigned to the Repa-rations Commission which arrived in Manila aboard the SS GUILLERMO on Septem-ber 10, 1962, and which to the present are still under the custody and possession of the collector of Customs and Commissioner of Customs upon the filing of a

48


bond by the third-party plaintiffs in such amount as may be fixed by this Honor-able Court to pay for any damages that the third-party defendants may suffer should this Honorable Court find that issuance of the preliminary mandatory in-junction is not proper.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

2. That after hearing on the merits this Honorable Court confirm and make final its order of mandatory preliminary injunction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrob-les virtual law library

The third-party plaintiffs further pray for such other relief as may be just and equi-table under the premises. (Pp. 87-88, Record.)chanrobles virtual law library

According to Moran:

Tests of Propriety.-The test to determine whether the claim for indemnity in a third-party complaint in respect to plaintiff's claim is proper, are (a) whether it arises out of the same transaction on which plaintiff's claim is based; or whether the third-party's claim, although arising out of another or different contract or transaction, is connected with plaintiff's claim; (U.S. Commercial Co. v. Guevara, et al., 48 O.G. 612.) (b) whether the third-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the origi-nal defendant, although the third- party defendant's liability arises out of another transaction; or (e) whether the third-party defendant may assert any defense which the third-party plaintiff has, or may have, against plaintiff's claim. (Capayas v. Court of First Instance, 77 Phil. 181.) Failing these tests, the complaint is im-proper. ... (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 281, 1970 ed.)

It is thus too evident to call for more elaborate discussion that respondent court s action in allowing the filing of Cochingyans' third-party complaint completely dis-regarded, due presumably to ignorance thereof, the basic concepts of the reme-dies of declaratory relief and third-party complaint.chanroblesvirtualawli-brarychanrobles virtual law library

RUBIO VS MARIANO

FACTS:

The Manufacturers Bank & Trust Company, on one hand, and Roberto O. Philips & Sons, Inc., Robert O. Philips, Magdalena Ysmael Philips and Hacienda Benito, Inc., on the other, have filed separate motions for reconsideration of the decisions of this Court promulgated on January 31, 1973. All these private respondents prays for the dismissal of the petition, which would be in effect an affirmance of the re-fusal by the court a quo to admit petitioner's amended and supplemental answer as well as his third-party complaint in Civil Case No. 8632; but the MBTC in partic-ular makes an alternative prayer.

ISSUE:

that the MBTC may not be impleaded as a third-party defendant because the third-party complaint introduces new and separate controversies into the action

HELD:

While We recognize the fact that these movants - the MBTC, the Phillips spouses, the Phillips corporation and the Hacienda Benito, Inc. - did raise in their respective

49


answers the issue as to the propriety of the instant petition for certiorari on the ground that the remedy should have been by appeal within the reglementary pe-riod, We considered such issue as a mere technicality which would have accom-plished nothing substantial except to deny to the petitioner the right to litigate the matters he raised in his amended and supplemental answer and in his third-party complaint in Civil Case No. 8632, leaving him, however, the right to do so in an entirely new action. The latter alternative, under the premises, appears to be unreasonably circuitous. As We observed in our decision:

We do not believe that it would serve the ends of justice or of a prompt dispatch of the controversies and issues involved to affirm the orders herein challenged and cause an entirely new action to be commenced. The main dispute below has been delayed long enough for reasons that can be attributed to the plaintiffs and the third-party defendants. The same policy considerations against multiplicity of suits which prompted this Court in Balbastro, et al. vs. Court of appeals, et al., L-33255, November 29, 1972, to affirm the admission of the third-party complaint therein involved despite a finding of its procedural infirmity, likewise obtain in this case.

Regarding the wisdom or propriety of the admission of the petitioner's new plead-ings below, We find nothing in the motions before Us to justify the prayer for re-consideration. The respondents' respective denials of the petitioner's claims in his amended and supplemental answer and third-party complaint can best be venti-lated in a full-blown trial on the merits

YU VS CA

FACTS:

Petitioners are respectively the Heirs of Yu Tiong and Yu Sun and are co-owners of the lot and the commercial building standing thereon covered by Transfer Certifi-cate of Title No. 58345 of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City. Private respondents, on the other hand, are occupying separate portions of the aforesaid property as lessees thereof, pursuant to a verbal contract of lease on a "month-to-month ba-sis" entered into by them with petitioners, and as such lessees, private respon-dents were paying one-half (½) of the agreed rentals to the heirs of Yu Tiong and the other one-half (½) to the heirs of Yu Sun.

On July 22, 1976, petitioners wrote private respondents informing them that they are increasing the rentals to take effect on January 1977. Private respondents re-fused to agree to the posed new rental rates. On September 30, 1976, petitioners wrote another letter to private respondents this time informing them that general repair and renovation of the building had to be undertaken starting March 1, 1977. Private respondents again refused to allow the repair and renovation. In view thereof, written demands were made upon the private respondents to vacate the premises respectively occupied by them.

Instead of vacating the premises, private respondents started to deny the title of petitioners as their lessors and filed a complaint in intervention in Civil Case No. R-14977 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IV. This case was dismissed sometime in March 1977 but was appealed by private respondents to the then Court of Appeals.

50


HELD:

The records show that the extended period granted to the private respondents within which to file their brief expired on May 15,1980. The period granted lapsed without counsel having filed the required appellants 'brief nor having explained his failure to do so. Consequently, the appeal was considered "dismissed" and "abandoned" in the resolution of respondent Court dated August 21, 1980. It was only on September 15, 1980 or after a period of four (4) months from the due date that private respondents through counsel, Atty. Benedicto H. Alo, (who was the same counsel of private respondent in the lower court) mailed their brief, after receiving on September 4, 1980, the resolution of respondent Court dismissing the appeal. The reason advanced by counsel for private respondents runs thus-

that the brief could not be filed earlier, as the case was referred back to Carlos Po (in his lifetime) by counsel, so that another counsel would appear and make the brief, but as it appears now, this never happened and the records were all kept in the files of the deceased, and which is the reason for the non-filing thereof.

The above explanation of counsel, Atty. Benedicto H. Alo, is far from being satis-factory. If there were really moves to replace him as counsel and that for this rea-son he was unable to file the briefs on time, it was his duty to inform respondent Court of Appeals of said fact.

When counsel did not file the brief for the accused because the latter's parents had considered retaining the services of another lawyer for that purpose, the least that was expected of counsel of record was that he should inform this tribunal of the developments set forth in his explanation and ask that he be allowed to with-draw as counsel. 11

An examination of the records of this case failed to reveal any withdrawal made and formally filed by Atty. Benedicto H. Alo as counsel for private respondents. Neither has there been a valid substitution of counsel which maybe allowed only upon compliance with the following requirements: (1) filing of a written applica-tion for substitution; (2) written consent of the client; (3) written consent of the lawyer to be substituted, if such consent can be obtained; and (4) in case such written consent cannot be procured, then application for substitution must be ac-companied with proof of the service of notice of such motion in the manner re-quired by the rules, on the attorney to be substituted. 12

There being no withdrawal nor substitution of counsel made, Atty. Benedicto H. Alo remains as counsel for private respondents and for his failure to file the re-quired briefs on time, his clients (herein private respondents) should suffer the consequences thereof. For, it is settled that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsels.

But what militates very heavily against the reinstatement of respondents' appeal is its utter lack of merit. We see no prospect of the Order sought to be appealed, being reversed or at least modified. From the assailed Order which is herein ear-lier quoted, it is clear that private respondents' action is one of "Interpleader, Spe-cific Performance, Fix Duration of Lease, Consignation with Prayer for Injunction." The trial court ruled, after hearing on the affirmative defenses and on the motion to dismiss, that the matters intended to be litigated are not contentious since pri-

51


vate respondents had, all the while been "paying the rentals to the heirs of Yu Tiong without objection from defendant-oppositors. With respect to the heirs of Yu Sun, there is actually an earlier interpleader case filed by the same parties." Be-sides, "consignation under Art. 1256 of the Civil Code is not the proper proceeding to determine the relationship between landlord and tenant." Moreover, it is not disputed that private respondents' stay on the leased premises, is on a "month-to-month" basis, and as such, the lessors (herein petitioners) may terminate the lease at the end of every month. 14 The records show that as early as September 1976, demands were made by petitioners upon private respondents as lessees, to vacate the leased premises. Instead of vacating the premises, private respon-dents filed several cases of Interpleader and consignation of rentals, aside from this instant case, before several branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. 15 No doubt, said cases were resorted to by private respondents in order to pro-long their stay in the leased premises to the prejudice of the owners, herein peti-tioners. To sustain, therefore, the reinstatement of private respondents' appeal and remand the case to respondent court for further proceeding will serve no pur-pose whatsoever. Rather, it will only impair the speedy administration of justice, private respondents' appeal from the order of the trial court dismissing their com-plaint, being manifestly frivolous and completely devoid of merit.

52

Date post:	11-Dec-2015
Category:	Documents
Upload:	ryan-castillo
View:	218 times
Download:	3 times

Civpro 1

Documents