CivPro Additional Cases

8/12/2019 CivPro Additional Cases

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G.R. No. L-59731 January 11, 1990

ALFREDO CHING, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO ASEDILLO, respondents.

Joaquin E. Chipeco & Lorenzo D. Fuggan for petitioners.

Edgardo Salandanan for private respondent.

PARAS,J .:

This is a petition for review on certiorariwhich seeks to nullify the decision of respondent Court ofAppeals (penned by Hon. Rodolfo A. Nocon with the concurrence of Hon. Crisolito Pascual and JuanA. Sison) in CA-G.R. No. 12358-SP entitled Alfredo Ching v. Hon. M. V. Romillo, et al. which ineffect affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, now Regional Trial Court (penned

by Judge Manuel V. Romillo, Jr. then District Judge, Branch XXVII Pasay City) granting ex-partethecancellation of title registered in the name of Ching Leng in favor of Pedro Asedillo in Civil Case No.6888-P entitled Pedro Asedillo v. Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng.

The facts as culled from the records disclose that:

In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and DomingaLumandan in Land Registration Case No. N-2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and OriginalCertificate of Title No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizalcovering a parcel of land situated at Sitio of Kay-Biga Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality ofParanaque, Province of Rizal, with an area of 51,852 square meters (Exhibit "7", p. 80, CA, Rollo).

In August 1960, 5/6 portion of the property was reconveyed by said spouses to Francisco, Regina,Perfects, Constancio and Matilde all surnamed Nofuente and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 78633was issued on August 10, 1960 accordingly (Exhibit "8", pp. 81 and 82, Ibid.).

By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City, TransferCertificate of Title No. 91137 was issued on September 18, 1961 and T.C.T. No. 78633 was deemedcancelled. (Exhibit "5-2", pp. 76-77 and 83, Ibid.).

On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America. Hislegitimate son Alfredo Ching filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC) Branch III,Pasay City a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng docketed as Sp. Proc.No. 1956-P. Notice of hearing on the petition was duly published in the "Daily Mirror", a newspaper

of general circulation on November 23 and 30 and December 7, 1965. No oppositors appeared atthe hearing on December 16, 1965, consequently after presentation of evidence petitioner AlfredoChing was appointed administrator of Ching Leng's estate on December 28, 1965 and letters ofadministration issued on January 3, 1966 (pp. 51-53, Rollo). The land covered by T.C.T. No. 91137was among those included in the inventory submitted to the court (p. 75, Ibid.).

Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced on December 27,1978 by private respondent Pedro Asedillo with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC),Branch XXVII, Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 6888-P for reconveyance of the abovesaid


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property and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession (p. 33, Ibid.). ChingLeng's last known address is No.44Libertad Street, Pasay City which appears on the face of T.C.T.No. 91137 (not No.441Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in private respondent's complaint).(Order dated May 29, 1980, p. 55, Ibid.). An amended complaint was filed by private respondentagainst Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng on January 30, 1979 alleging "That on account ofthe fact that the defendant has been residing abroad up to the present, and it is not known

whetherthe defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estatemay be served by summons and otherprocesses only by publication;" (p. 38, Ibid.). Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or hisestate was directed by the trial court in its order dated February 7, 1979. The summons and thecomplaint were published in the "Economic Monitor", a newspaper of general circulation in theprovince of Rizal including Pasay City on March 5, 12 and 19, 1979. Despite the lapse of the sixty(60) day period within which to answer defendant failed to file a responsive pleading and on motionof counsel for the private respondent, the court a quoin its order dated May 25, 1979, allowed thepresentation of evidence ex-parte. A judgment by default was rendered on June 15, 1979, thedecretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding plaintiffs causes of action in the complaint to be dulysubstantiated by the evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffand against the defendant declaring the former (Pedro Asedillo) to be the true andabsolute owner of the property covered by T.C.T. No. 91137; ordering the defendantto reconvey the said property in favor of the plaintiff; sentencing the defendant ChingLeng and/or the administrator of his estate to surrender to the Register of Deeds ofthe Province of Rizal the owner's copy of T.C.T. No. 91137 so that the same may becancelled failing in which the said T.C.T. No. 91137 is hereby cancelled and theRegister of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is hereby ordered to issue, in lieu thereof,a new transfer certificate of title over the said property in the name of the plaintiffPedro Asedillo of legal age, and a resident of Estrella Street, Makati, Metro Manila,upon payment of the fees that may be required therefor, including the realty taxesdue the Government.

IT IS SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-44, Ibid.)

Said decision was likewise served by publication on July 2, 9 and 16, 1979 pursuant to Section 7 ofRule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court (CA Decision, pp. 83-84, Ibid.). The title over the property inthe name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in favor ofPedro Asedillo (p. 77, CA Rollo) who subsequently sold the property to Villa EsperanzaDevelopment, Inc. on September 3, 1979 (pp. 125-126, Ibid.).

On October 29, 1979 petitioner Alfredo Ching learned of the abovestated decision. He filed a verifiedpetition on November 10, 1979 to set it aside as null and void for lack of jurisdiction which wasgranted by the court on May 29, 1980 (penned by Hon. Florentino de la Pena, Vacation Judge, pp.54-59, Rollo).

On motion of counsel for private respondent the said order of May 29, 1980 was reconsidered andset aside, the decision dated June 15, 1979 aforequoted reinstated in the order dated September 2,1980. (pp. 60-63, Ibid.)

On October 30, 1980, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said latter order but thesame was denied by the trial court on April 12, 1981 (pp. 77-79, Ibid.)


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Petitioner filed an original petition for certiorariwith the Court of Appeals but the same wasdismissed on September 30, 1981. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on February10, 1982 (pp. 81-90, Ibid.)

Private respondent Pedro Asedillo died on June 7, 1981 at Makati, Metro Manila during thependency of the case with the Court of Appeals (p. 106, CA Rollo).

Hence, the instant petition.

Private respondent's comment was filed on June 1, 1982 (p. 117, Ibid.) in compliance with theresolution dated April 26, 1982 (p. 109, Ibid.) Petitioner filed a reply to comment on June 18, 1982(p. 159, Ibid), and the Court gave due course to the petition in the resolution of June 28, 1982 (p.191, Ibid.)

Petitioner raised the following:

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I

WHETHER OR NOT A DEAD MAN CHING LENG AND/OR HIS ESTATE MAY BEVALIDLY SERVED WITH SUMMONS AND DECISION BY PUBLICATION.

II

WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY ANDCANCELLATION OF TITLE IS INPERSONAM, AND IF SO, WOULD A DEAD MAN

AND/OR HIS ESTATE BE BOUND BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND DECISIONBY PUBLICATION.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDINGS FOR RECONVEYANCE ANDCANCELLATION OF TITLE CAN BE HELDEX-PARTE.

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THESUBJECT MATTER AND THE PARTIES.

V

WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF LACHES ININSTITUTING THE ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE AFTER THE LAPSE OF 19YEARS FROM THE TIME THE DECREE OF REGISTRATION WAS ISSUED.

Petitioner's appeal hinges on whether or not the Court of Appeals has decided a question ofsubstance in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the SupremeCourt.


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Petitioner avers that an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title is in personamand thecourt a quonever acquired jurisdiction over the deceased Ching Leng and/or his estate by means ofservice of summons by publication in accordance with the ruling laid down inAng Lamv. Rosillosaet al., 86 Phil. 448 [1950].

On the other hand, private respondent argues that an action for cancellation of title is quasi in rem,

for while the judgment that may be rendered therein is not strictly a judgment in in rem, it fixes andsettles the title to the property in controversy and to that extent partakes of the nature of the

judgment in rem, hence, service of summons by publication may be allowed unto Ching Leng whoon the face of the complaint was a non-resident of the Philippines in line with the doctrine enunciatedin Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186 [1939].

The petition is impressed with merit.

An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in remor anaction against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is anaction in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properlyimpleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personamand actions in

remdiffer in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments,while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgmentswith respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real actionbut it is an actionin personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right toa tangible thing (Ang Lam v. Rosillosa, supra).

Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, thejudgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceaseddefendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter's death.

As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc. (70 SCRA 475 [1976]) the decisionof the lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of jurisdiction over hisperson. He was not, and he could not have been validly served with summons. He had no more civilpersonality. His juridical personality, that is fitness to be subject of legal relations, was lost through

death (Arts. 37 and 42 Civil Code).

The same conclusion would still inevitably be reached notwithstanding joinder of Ching Leng's estateas co-defendant. it is a well-settled rule that an estate can sue or be sued through an executor oradministrator in his representative capacity (21 Am. Jr. 872). Contrary to private respondent's claims,deceased Ching Leng is a resident of 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City as shown in his death certificateand T. C. T. No. 91137and there is an on-going intestate proceedings in the same court, Branch IIIcommenced in 1965, and notice of hearing thereof duly published in the same year. Such misleadingand misstatement of facts demonstrate lack of candor on the part of private respondent and hiscounsel, which is censurable.

The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be filed in the original land

registration case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in accordance with Section112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) not in CFI Pasay City in connectionwith, or as a mere incident in Civil Case No. 6888-P (Estanislao v. Honrado, 114 SCRA 748 [1982]).

Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since Ching Leng was alreadyin the other world when the summons was published he could not have been notified at all and thetrial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The ex-parteproceedings for cancellation oftitle could not have been held (Estanislao v. Honrado, supra).


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The cited case of Perkins v. Dizon, suprais inapplicable to the case at bar since petitioner Perkinswas a non-resident defendant sued in Philippine courts and sought to be excluded from whateverinterest she has in 52,874 shares of stocks with Benguet Consolidated Mining Company. The actionbeing a quasi in rem summons by publication satisfied the constitutional requirement of due process.

The petition to set aside the judgment for lack of jurisdiction should have been granted and the

amended complaint of private respondent based on possession and filed only in 1978 dismissedoutrightly. Ching Leng is an innocent purchaser for value as shown by the evidence adduced in hisbehalf by petitioner herein, tracing back the roots of his title since 1960, from the time the decree ofregistration was issued.

The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered inanother's nameafter one year from the date of the decreeis not to set aside the decree, butrespecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action inthe ordinary court of justice for damages if the property has passed unto the hands of an innocentpurchaser for value (Sy, Sr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66742; Teoville DevelopmentCorporation v. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75011, June 16, 1988).

Failure to take steps to assert any rights over a disputed land for 19 years from the date ofregistration of title is fatal to the private respondent's cause of action on the ground of laches.Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercisingdue diligence could or should have been done, earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a rightwithin a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either hasabandoned it or declined to assert it (Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78178, April 15,1988; Villamor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41508, June 27, 1988).

The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as toits legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting inthe portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land(National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 388 [1988]).

A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein(Section 49, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and thatthey are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any "information possessoria" or title existingprior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the title (Salamat Vda. de Medina v. Cruz, G.R. No.39272, May 4, 1988).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the instant petition is hereby GRANTED; (2) the appealed decisionof the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; (3) the trial court's decision datedJune 15, 1979 and the Order dated September 2, 1980 reinstating the same are hereby declaredNULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction and (4) the complaint in Civil Case No. 6888-P is herebyDISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., took no part.


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G.R. No. L-49475 September 28, 1993

JORGE C. PADERANGA, petitioner,vs.Hon. DIMALANES B. BUISSAN, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Zamboanga delNorte, Branch III and ELUMBA INDUSTRIES COMPANY, represented by its General Manager,

JOSE J. ELUMBA, respondents.

A.E. Dacanay for petitioner.

Uldarico Mejorada & Associates for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

We are called upon in this case to determine the proper venue of an action to fix the period of acontract of lease which, in the main, also prays for damages.

Sometime in 1973, petitioner JORGE C. PADERANGA and private respondent ELUMBAINDUSTRIES COMPANY, a partnership represented by its General Manager JOSE J.ELUMBA, entered into an oral contract of lease for the use of a commercial space within abuilding owned by petition in Ozamiz City. 1The lease was for an indefinite period although therent of P150.00 per month was paid on a month-to-month basis. ELUMBA INDUSTRIESCOMPANY utilized the area under lease as the Sales Office of Allied Air Freight in Ozamiz City.

On 4 April 1977, PADERANGA subdivided the leased premises into two (2) by constructing apartition wall in between. He then took possession of the other half, which repossession wassaid to have been undertaken with the acquiescence of the local manager ofELUMBA,2although private respondent maintains that this is not the case. 3At any rate, thevalidity of the repossession is not here in issue.

On 18 July 1977, private respondent instituted an action for damages 4which, at the same time,prayed for the fixing of the period of lease at five (5) years, before the then court of FirstInstance of Zamboanga del Norte based in Dipolog City. 5Petitioner, a resident of Ozamiz City,moved for its dismissal contending that the action was a real action which should have beenfiled with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental stationed in Ozamiz City where theproperty in question was situated.

On 6 November 1978, respondent Judge Dimalanes B. Buissan denied the Motion to Dismissand held that Civil Case No. 2901 merely involved the enforcement of the contract of lease, andwhile affecting a portion of real property, there was no question of ownership raised. 6Hence,venue was properly laid.

Petitioner pleaded for reconsideration of the order denying his Motion to Dismiss. He contendedthat while the action did not involve a question of ownership, it was nevertheless seekingrecovery of possession; thus, it was a real action which, consequently, must be filed in OzamizCity.7


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On 4 December 1978, respondent judge denied reconsideration. 8While admitting that CivilCase No. 2901 did pray for recovery of possession, he nonetheless ruled that this matter wasnot the main issue at hand; neither was the question of ownership raised. Not satisfied,petitioner instituted the present recourse.

PADERANGA argues that inasmuch as ELUMBA seeks to recover possession of the portion

surrendered to him by the local manager of private respondent, as well as to fix the period of leaseat five (5) years, Dipolog City could not be the proper venue of the action. it being a real action,venue is laid in the court having jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies.

ELUMBA counters that the present action is chiefly for damages arising from an alleged breach inthe lease contract; hence, the issue of recovery of possession is merely incidental. ELUMBA furtherargues that the action is one in personamand not in rem. Therefore venue may be laid in the placewhere plaintiff or defendant resides at the option of plaintiff.

Private respondent appears to be confused over the difference between personal and realactions vis-a-visactions in personamand in rem. The former determines venue; the latter, thebinding effect of a decision the court may render over the party, whether impleaded or not.

In the case before us, it is indubitable that the action instituted by private respondent againstpetitioner affects the parties alone, not the whole world. Hence, it is an action in personam, i.e.,any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. 9However, this doesnot automatically mean that the action for damages and to fix the period of the lease contract isalso a personal action. For, a personal action may not at the same time be an action in rem.In Hernandez v.Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., 10we held thus

In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, theenforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages. In a real action, the plaintiffseeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4, a realaction is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession, or

for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on, real property.

An action in personamis an action against a person on the basis of his personalliability, while an action in remis an action against the thing itself, instead of againstthe person. Hence, a real action may at the same time be an action in personamandnot necessarily an action in rem.

Consequently, the distinction between an action in personamand an action in remfor purposesof determining venue is irrelevant. Instead, it is imperative to find out if the action filed is apersonal action or real action. After all, personal actions may be instituted in the Regional TrialCourt (then Court of First Instance) where the defendant or any of the defendants resides ormay be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the

plaintiff.11

On the other hand, real actions should be brought before the Regional Trial Courthaving jurisdiction over the territory in which the subject property or part thereof lies. 12

While the instant action is for damages arising from alleged breach of the lease contract, it likewiseprays for the fixing of the period of lease at five (5) years. If found meritorious, private respondentwill be entitled to remain not only as lessee for another five (5) years but also to the recovery of theportion earlier taken from him as well. This is because the leased premises under the originalcontract was the whole commercial space itself and not just the subdivided portion thereof.


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While it may be that the instant complaint does not explicitly pray for recovery of possession,such is the necessary consequence thereof. 13The instant action therefore does not operate toefface the fundamental and prime objective of the nature of the case which is to recover theone-half portion repossessed by the lessor, herein petitioner. 14Indeed, where the ultimatepurpose of an action involves title to or seeks recovery of possession, partition or condemnationof, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, 15such an action must be deemed a real action

and must perforce be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any partthereof lies.

Respondent judge, therefore, in denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss gravely abused his discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition is GRANTED. The Orders of 6 November 1978 and 4December 1978 of respondent Judge Dimalanes B. Buissan are SET ASIDE. The branch of theRegional Trial Court of Dipolog City where Civil Case No. 2901 may be presently assigned isDIRECTED to DISMISS the case for improper venue. This decision is immediately executory.

Costs against private respondent ELUMBA INDUSTRIES COMPANY.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Grio-Aquino, J., is on leave.


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G.R. No. L-17299 July 31, 1963

JOSEFINA POTESTAS CABRERA and CRESENCIA POTESTAS OMULON,plaintiffs-appellees,vs.MARIANO T. TIANO,defendant-appellant.

Pablito C. Pielago for plaintiffs-appellees.Prud. V. Villafuerte for defendant-appellant.

PAREDES, J.:

Ciriaco Potestas and Gregoria Blanco, were parents of five children, Isabelo, Lourdes,Clemente, Josefina, and Cresencia. Gregoria died before the second world war, together withClemente, single. During their lifetime, the spouses acquired properties, among which was aparcel of agricultural land, of about seven (7) hectares, located at barrio Manga, municipality ofTangub, Misamis Occidental, planted to coconuts and fruit-bearing trees. On July 2, 1947,Ciriaco, the surviving husband and three (3) children (Isabelo, Lourdes and Cresencia),purportedly sold the above mentioned parcel to herein defendant Mariano T. Tiano, forP3,500.00. At the time of the sale, Cresencia was a minor, and the other child, Josefina, did notsign the deed of sale, and did not know about the transaction.

Under date of June 20, 1957, in action for "Partition and Recovery of Real Estate, withDamages" was filed by Josefina and Cresencia against Tiano. In the complaint, it was allegedthat they were entitled to a portion of the land, since Josefina did not sign the sale andCrescencia was a minor; that defendant Tiano had usurped the portions belonging to them, totheir damage and prejudice in the amount of P7,000.00, which consisted of their share in theproduce of the property, during the period of defendant's possession.

In answer, defendant claimed that the plaintiffs herein knew of the sale and that he was notaware of any defect in the title of his vendors. As a Special Defense, defendant alleged that hewas the absolute owner of the land by acquisitive prescription of ten (10) years, from the date ofpurchase. Before the trial, the parties agreed to a stipulation of facts, parts of which recite

x x x x x x x x x

3. That at the time of the sale, appearing in Doc. No. 54, Page 81, Book No. 7, S. 1947, inthe book of Notary Public Basilio Binaoro of Tangub, Mis. Occ., Cresencia was a minor beingonly 16 years old, while Josefina who was long married and of legal age did not know aboutthe sale and/or did not give her consent to the same;

4. That the plaintiffs commenced this case against the defendant on June 20, 1957 and thejudicial summons was issued by the Clerk of Court on June 21, 1957, but defendant receivedthe same on July 2, 1957.

After the hearing, the court a quo rendered the following judgment

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby renders judgment declaring that theplaintiffs are entitled each to 1/8 of the property in question and therefore Judgment ishereby ordered declaring them entitled to partition the property in question in proportion of


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1/8 each of them, plus damages for both of them in the amount of P1,000.00 and attorney'sfees in the amount of P200.00.

The trial court in the same decision, commissioned the Deputy Provincial Sheriff, to partition theproperty in question and render a report within 30 days. Defendant moved for a reconsiderationof the decision, contending that prescription had already set in, and his (defendant's) title, had

become irrevocable, and that the award of damages had no factual and legal basis. The motionfor reconsideration was denied on March 5, 1960. The Commissioner's report, partitioning theproperty was submitted on April 11, 1960. Defendant perfected his appeal on May 9, 1960, andon May 14, 1960, the same was given due course and elevated to this Court.

In claiming that prescription had taken place, appellant insists that the period should be countedfrom the date the summons was served on him, which was on July 2, 1957. It was agreed,however, that the complaint for the recovery of the land in question was presented on June 20,1957, and the summons was sent out the following day. The Civil Code, provides that

The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is awritten extra-judicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written

acknowledgment of the debt of the debtor. (Art. 1155)

Since the sale of the property took place on July 2, 1947, the ten (10) year period within whichto file the action had not yet elapsed on June 20, 1957, when the complaint was presented.While it is true that the sale in question had taken place before the effectivity of the new CivilCode and the law then on matter of prescription was Act No. 190, said law, however, containedno specific provision on the interruption of the prescriptive period; and the established rule then,as it is the rule now, is that the commencement of the suit prior to the expiration of theapplicable limitation period, interrupts the running of the statute, as to all parties to the action(34 Am. Jur., Sec. 247, pp. 202-203; Peralta, et al. v. Alipio, G. R. No. L-8273, Oct. 24, 1955).The fact that summons was only served on defendant on July 2, 1957, which incidentally and/orcoincidentally was the end of the ten (10) year period, is of no moment, since civil actions are

deemed commenced from date of the filing and docketing of the complaint with the Clerk ofCourt, without taking into account the issuance and service of summons (Sotelo v. Dizon, et al.,67 Phil. 573). The contention that the period was not interrupted, until after defendant receivedthe summons is, therefore, without legal basis.

Defendant-appellant claims that he had already acquired full ownership of the property inquestion because the judicial summons, which could civilly interrupt his possession (Art. 1123,N.C.C.), was received by him only on July 2, 1957. Conceding, for the purposes of argument,that the article cited is applicable, still appellant cannot avail himself of acquisitive prescription,for the simple reason that no finding was made by the trial court that his possession from thetime of the sale (July 2, 1947), was with just title, in good faith, in the concept of an owner,public, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted (Arts. 1117 & 1118, N.C.C.). Good faith is a

question of fact which must be proved (Art. 1127, N.C.C.). For the purposes of acquisitiveprescription, just title must also be proved, it is never presumed (Art. 1131, N.C.C.). The factualrequisite of adverse possession do not appear in the stipulation of facts and the trial court didnot make findings to this effect. These circumstances could and/or should have been ventilated,had the appeal been taken to the Court of Appeals. Defendant, however, having chosen toappeal the decision directly to this Court, he is deemed to have waived questions of fact andraised only questions of law. There being no factual finding by the lower court of the presence ofthe requisites of acquisitive prescription this Court has to reject, as did the trial court, said


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defense. Moreover, on July 2, 1957, when the summons was received, the ten (10) yearsnecessary for acquisitive prescription had not yet elapsed. In fact, said period terminated on thatvery day. 1wph1.t

As to the award of damages, We find Ourselves devoid of ample authority to review the same,since it involves appreciation of facts. It cannot be denied, as found by the lower court, that

plaintiffs herein are entitled to a share in the land. Verily, they should also share in the produce,which, admittedly, was enjoyed by the defendant-appellant herein.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed. Costs againstappellant in both instances.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal,JJ., concur.

[G.R. Nos. 79937-38. February 13, 1989]

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS AND D.J.WARBY, pet i t ioners, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION,Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional TrialCourt, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUAUY PO TIONG, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

GANCAYCO, J.:

Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a courtacquires jurisdiction aver a case when the correct and proper docket fee hasnot been paid.

On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL forbrevity) filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manilafor the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with aprayer for the judicial declaration of its NULlity against private respondent

Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent was declared in default for failure tofile the required answer within the reglementary period.

On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed acomplaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund ofpremiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which wasdocketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against petitioner SIOL, andthereafter including E.B. Philips and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The


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complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral,exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation andcosts of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify theamount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of thecomplaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).

Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket feewhich prompted petitioners counsel to raise his objection. Said objection wasdisregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presidingover said case.

Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together with twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches of the Regional Trial Courtof Quezon City which were under investigation for under-assessment ofdocket fees were transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned thesaid records to the trial court with the directive that they be re-raffled to theother judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge Castro. Civil Case No.Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant.

On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution inAdministrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in said cases toreassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order itspayment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificatesof re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specifyin their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.

On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala CivilCase No. Q-41177 was temporarily assigned, issued an order to the Clerk ofCourt instructing him to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket feepaid by private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the same insaid certificate.

On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filedby petitioners. On August 30, 1984, an amended complaint was filed byprivate respondent including the two additional defendants aforestated.

Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q-41177 was

thereafter assigned, after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986,issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment onthe Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with theResolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed byprivate respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered.On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-

Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00


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as actual and compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the saidsecond amended complaint however, private respondent alleges actual andcompensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of aboutP44,601,623.70.

On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting thesecond amended complaint and stating therein that the same constitutedproper compliance with the Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereofshould be furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docketfees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private respondent'sclaim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages"amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by privaterespondent.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorariwith the Court of Appealsquestioning the said order of Judge Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.

On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaintalleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as damages so the total claimamounts to about P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986, or some sevenmonths after filing the supplemental complaint, the private respondent paidthe additional docket fee of P80,396.00.[1]

On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling,among others, as follows:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 09715 insofar as it seeks

anNULment of the order

(a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended, and

(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due course to the portion

thereof questioning the reassessment of the docketing fee, and requiring the

Honorable respondent Court to reassess the docketing fee to be paid by private

respondent on the basis of the amount of P25,401,707.00."[2]

Hence, the instant petition.

During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the saidjudgment of respondent court, private respondent paid the additional docketfee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988.[3]
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The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in notfinding that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the ground of non-payment of the correct and proper docket fee.Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private respondent had paidthe amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related, and

considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended andsupplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70, the docket fee that should be paidby private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid thesame, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and allincidents arising therefrom should be anNULled. In support of their theory,petitioners cite the latest ruling of the Courtin Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA,[4]as follows:

"The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the

prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not

thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based

on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case in so

far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed."

On the other hand, private respondent claims that the rulingin Manchester cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-41177 for at thetime said civil case was filed in court there was no suchManchester ruling asyet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is the ruling ofthis Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete,[5]wherein this Court held that the trial courtacquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient.

The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case isuntenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed asapplicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.[6]

In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres,[7]this Court held that the payment ofthe full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection ofan appeal. In a forcible entry and detainercase before the justice of the peacecourt of Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a judgment dismissing thecase, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but he deposited onlyP8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as required, withinthe reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after receiving notice of

judgment. Plaintiff deposited the additional P8.00 to complete the amount ofthe docket fee only fourteen (14) days later. On the basis of these facts, thisCourt held that the Court of First Instance did not acquire jurisdiction to hearand determine the appeal as the appeal was not thereby perfected.
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In Lee vs. Republic,[8]the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intentionto become a Filipino citizen by sending it through registered mail to the Officeof the Solicitor General in 1953 but the required filing fee was paid only in1956, barely 5-1/2 months prior to the filing of the petition for citizenship. ThisCourt ruled that the declaration was not filed in accordance with the legal

requirement that such declaration should be filed at least one year before thefiling of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded thatthe filing of petitioner's declaration of intention on October 23, 1953 producedno legal effect until the required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956.

In Malimit vs. Degamo,[9]the same principles enunciatedin Lazaro and Lee were applied. It was an original petitionfor quo warranto contesting the right to office of proclaimed candidates whichwas mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First Instance, within theone-week period after the proclamation as provided therefor by

law.[10]However, the required docket fees were paid only after the expiration ofsaid period. Consequently, this Court held that the date of such payment mustbe deemed to be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the datewhen it was mailed.

Again, in Garcia vs. Vasquez,[11]this Court reiterated the rule that thedocket fee must be paid before a court will act on a petition orcomplaint. However, We also held that said rule is not applicable whenpetitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the same decedent as he is notrequired to file a separate action for each will but instead he may have the

other wills probated in the same special proceeding then pending before thesame court.

Then in Magaspi,[12]this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that acase is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of theactual date of its filing in court. Said case involved a complaint for recovery ofownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages filed in the Courtof First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the docket fee andP10.00 for the sheriff's fee, the complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-11882. The prayer of the complaint sought that the Transfer Certificate of Titleissued in the name of the defendant be declared as NULl and void. It was

also prayed that plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom the proper titleshould be issued, and that defendant be made to pay monthly rentals ofP3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property is delivered toplaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral damages, attorney's fees in the amount ofP250,000.00, the costs of the action and exemplary damages in the amount ofP500,000.00.
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The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correctamount of the docket fee to which an opposition was filed by the plaintiffalleging that the action was for the recovery of a parcel of land so the docketfee must be based on its assessed value and that the amount of P60.00 wasthe correct docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay P3,104.00

as filing fee.

The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to includethe Republic as the defendant. In the prayer of the amended complaint theexemplary damages earlier sought was eliminated. The amended prayermerely sought moral damages as the court may determine, attorney's fees ofP100,000.00 and the costs of the action. The defendant filed an opposition tothe amended complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the amendedcomplaint was admitted by the trial court. The trial court reiterated its order forthe payment of the additional docket fee which plaintiff assailed and then

challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid the total docket feein the amount of P60.00 and that if he has to pay the additional fee it must bebased on the amended complaint.

The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may beconsidered to have filed the case even if the docketing fee paid was notsufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule that the case was deemed filedonly upon the payment of the correct amount for the docket fee regardless ofthe actual date of the filing of the complaint; that there was an honestdifference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee in that

as the action appears to be one for the recovery of property the docket fee ofP60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also one for damages, Weupheld the assessment of the additional docket fee based on the damagesalleged in the amended complaint as against the assessment of the trial courtwhich was based on the damages alleged in the original complaint.

However, as aforecited, this Courtoverturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves an action for tortsand damages and specific performance with a prayer for the issuance of atemporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case is for the issuance ofa writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action

against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid bythe plaintiffs for the property in question, the attachment of such property ofdefendants that may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may berendered, and, after hearing, the issuance of an order requiring defendants toexecute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property and anNULdefendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It was also prayed thatthe defendants be made to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, actual,


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compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts asmay be proved during the trial for attorney's fees. The plaintiff also asked thetrial court to declare the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiffvalid and sufficient for purposes of payment, and to make the injunctionpermanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer

although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78Million allegedly suffered by plaintiff.

Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of onlyP410.00 for the docket fee based on the nature of the action for specificperformance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniaryestimation. However, it was obvious from the allegations of the complaint aswell as its designation that the action was one for damages and specificperformance. Thus, this Court held that plaintiff must be assessed the correctdocket fee computed against the amount of damages of about P78 Million,

although the same was not spelled out in the prayer of the complaint.

Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed anamended complaint on September 12, 1985 by the inclusion of another co-plaintiff and eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body ofthe complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained.

On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docketfee in the said case and other cases that were investigated. On November12, 1985, the trial court directed the plaintiff to rectify the amended complaintby stating the amounts which they were asking for. This plaintiff did as

instructed. In the body of the complaint the amount of damages alleged wasreduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of damages was specified inthe prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.

Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only uponpayment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court," thisCourt held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case bypayment of only P410.00 for the docket fee. Neither can the amendment ofthe complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposesthere was no such original complaint duly filed which could be

amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and allsubsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court were declaredNULl and void.[13]

The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases ofunder-assessment of docket fee which were investigated by this Courttogether with Manchester. The facts and circumstances of this case aresimilar to Manchester. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount
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of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amountof damages asked for was not stated. The action was for the refund ofpremium and the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with damages.The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. OnJanuary 23,1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it

is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual andexemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of hispecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaintwas admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additionaldocket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00in damages, which he paid.

On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaintalleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his totalclaim is approximately P64,601,620.70. OnOctober 16, 1986, private

respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After thepromulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31,1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additionaldocket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after thepromulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid anadditional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears tohave paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering thetotal amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental complaintamounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondentmust pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.

The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the presentcase. The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket feedue it is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in thefiling of the second amended complaint.

However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket feeuntil the case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus,in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court heldthat the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that theamended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original

complaint was NULl and void.

In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called forconsidering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated hiswillingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees asrequired. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had thatsobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket


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fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance bymanifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may beordered.

Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still

insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter whichthe clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk orclerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due,he must require the private respondent to pay the same.

Thus, the Court rules as follows:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatorypleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial courtwith jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where thefiling of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket

fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in nocase beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claimsand similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless thefiling fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment ofsaid fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicableprescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing ofthe appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,

subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or ifspecified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additionalfiling fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be theresponsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforcesaid lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

WHEREFORE,the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk ofCourt of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine theadditional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering thetotal amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the

supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and theprayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any,without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-

Aquino, Medialdea, andRegalado, JJ., concur.


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G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987

MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS,ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.

Tanjuatco, Oreta and Tanjuatco for petitioners.

Pecabar Law Offices for private respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

GANCAYCO, J .:

Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Second Division of January 28,1987and another motion to refer the case to and to be heard in oral argument by the Court En Bancfiledby petitioners, the motion to refer the case to the Court en bancis granted but the motion to set thecase for oral argument is denied.

Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of theamended complaint cite the case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. 1They contend that the Court of

Appeals erred in that the filing fee should be levied by considering the amount of damagessought in the original complaint.

The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that

1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel ofland with damages.2While the present case is an action for torts and damages and specificperformance with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc. 3

2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the annulment of title of thedefendant to the property, the declaration of ownership and delivery of possession thereof toplaintiffs but also asks for the payment of actual moral, exemplary damages and attorney's feesarising therefrom in the amounts specified therein. 4However, in the present case, the prayer isfor the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the actionagainst the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs forthe property in question, to attach such property of defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfyany judgment that maybe rendered, and after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contractof purchase and sale of the subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of themoney of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff actual, compensatoryand exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as maybe proved during the trial asattorney's fees and declaring the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid andproducing the effect of payment and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damagessought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total amountof over P78 Million as damages suffered by plaintiff. 5


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3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as to the nature ofthe action in the Magaspi case. The complaint was considered as primarily an action forrecovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The damages stated were treated asmerely to the main cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00 and P10.00 for thesheriff's fee were paid. 6

In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As maybe gleaned from theallegations of the complaint as well as the designation thereof, it is both an action for damages andspecific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only of P410.00 byconsidering the action to be merely one for specific performance where the amount involved is notcapable of pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damagessought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complainttotalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee.

4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the attention ofthis Court together with similar other cases an investigation was immediately ordered by theCourt. Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court filed an amendedcomplaint on September 12, 1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-

plaintiff and by emanating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint.The prayer in the original complaint was maintained. After this Court issued an order on October15, 1985 ordering the reassessment of the docket fee in the present case and other cases thatwere investigated, on November 12, 1985 the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amendedcomplaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffsspecified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the reduced amount ofP10,000,000.00. 7Still no amount of damages were specified in the prayer. Said amendedcomplaint was admitted.

On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amountof P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages alleged in the original complaint as it did notconsider the damages to be merely an or incidental to the action for recovery of ownership and

possession of real property.8

An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court toinclude the government of the Republic as defendant and reducing the amount of damages, andattorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was also admitted. 9

In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of ownership but alsofor damages, so that the filing fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment. Althoughthe payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it washeld that since the payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correctamount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired jurisdiction over the case and theproceedings thereafter had were proper and regular." 10Hence, as the amended complaintsuperseded the original complaint, the allegations of damages in the amended complaint shouldbe the basis of the computation of the filing fee. 11

In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the allegations of thecomplaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and specificperformance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages asalleged in the original complaint.

As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only uponpayment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court . 12 Thus, in the presentcase the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as


22/48

docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon theCourt. 13For an legal purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed whichcould be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and allsubsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void.

The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of the

docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in theamended complaint.

The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice ofcounsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount ofdamages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of thecomplaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correctfiling fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulentpractice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly andordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting allmention of the amount of damages being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when inobedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount of

damages be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages soughtin the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayerthereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious.

The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical practice.

To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similarpleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of thepleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filingfees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted noradmitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docketfee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in theCourt, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amendedpleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case 14in so far as it is inconsistent with thispronouncement is overturned and reversed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., took no part.


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[G.R. No. 85200. February 19, 1991]

ARTURO Q. SALIENTES, in his capacity as receiver of and

representing the Heirs of the Registered Co-Owners ofthe Maysilo Estate, pet i t ioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.PACITA CANIZARES-NYE, as Presiding Judge of the RegionalTrial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92; DESTILLERIA LIMTUACO& CO. and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALOOCANCITY, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PARAS, J .:

This is a petition for review on certiorariassailing the July 19, 1988 decision*of theCourt of Appeals, Thirteenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 14811 entitled ArturoQ. Salientes, petitioner v. Hon.Pacita C. Nye, et al., respondents, dismissing thepetition filed by petitioner before this Court and referred to the Court of Appeals fordisposition. The latter petition challenged the January 4, 1988decision as well as thesubsequent orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92**in Civil CaseNo. Q-52034, ArturoSalientes, et al., plaintiff v. Destilleria Limtuaco & Co., Inc.,defendants, likewise dismissing the complaint filed by herein petitioner forfailure to paythe proper docket fees.

On September 29, 1987, petitioner Arturo Q. Salientes, in his capacity as receiver ofand representing the heirs of the registered co-owners of Maysilo Estate, filed acomplaint before the Regional Trial Court, seeking to recover possession of a portion ofsaid estate allegedly occupied illegally by Destilleria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. to the extentof 6,885 square meters, more or less, valued at P500,000.00 and praying among othersfor an Order to said company to pay Salientes actual or compensatory damages in theamount of not less than P500,000.00 and such other exemplary damages as theHonorable Court may allow x x x.

Respondent company moved to dismiss or suspend the proceedings for failure topay proper fees which motion was opposedby Salientes. After Destilleria Limtuaco filed an answer ad cautelam, the Clerk of Courtof RTC Quezon City, Branch 92, filed a comment on the motion to dismiss. In her

Comment, the Clerk of Court stated that the filing fee was a ssessed and collectedbased on the value of the land (P500,000.00) and the damages (P500,000.00) in thetotal amount of P1,000,000.00 (p. 112, Rollo). Judge Pacita Nye of the same courtdismissed the complaint as follows:

Hence, the failure of the complaint to specify the amount of compensatory damages

in the prayer, the phrase in the amount of notless than P500,000.00 (par. 3, prayer)

not being a fixed amount for purposes of computing the payment of the prescribed
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24/48

docket fee, the assessment and payment of docket fee based on P500,000.00 was not

proper. Consequently, in line with the foregoing ruling in

the Manchester DevelopmentCorporation case (supra), this Court has not acquired

jurisdiction over the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above-entitled case is hereby orderedDISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.(Rollo, pp. 53-54).

Salientes motion and supplementary motion for reconsideration were both denied.

On March 25, 1988, Salientes then filed a petition with this Court which waseventually referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. The appellate courtdismissed the petition holding that:

The doctrine in theMagaspi case relied upon by petitioner is no longer

controlling. In the Manchester case, it was held that the ruling in the Magaspi case in

so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for

lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.(Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 102).

The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Salientes was likewise denied,hence, this petition. The sole issue in the case at bar is plain and simple, i.e., whetherthe court acquires jurisdiction over a case when there is an alleged failure to pay the

proper and correct docket fees.The petition is impressed with merit.

This Court has already laid this issue to rest in the recent case of Maximo Tacay, etal. v. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, et al., G.R. Nos. 88075-77, December 20, 1989,which held among others as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Circular No. 7 of this Court, dated March 24, 1988, cannot thus be invoked, as the

petitioner does, as authority for the dismissal of the actions at bar. That circular

avowedly inspired by the doctrine laid down inManchester Development Corporationv. Court of Appeals, has but limited application to said actions xxx. Moreover, the

rules therein laid down have since been clarified and amplified by the Courts

subsequent decision in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, et al., G.R.

Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989.

xxx xxx xxx


25/48

The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.

Asuncion, supra, read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well, thelegal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b)

the total amount of related damages sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the

action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment of the

requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of

the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court may

grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in in the meantime. But where -

as in the case at bar -

the fees prescribed action involving real property havebeen paid, but the amounts of c

ertain related damages (actual, moral and

nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may not be dismissed. The Courtundeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the realproperty, acquiring it up

on the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed fee.

And is not divested of that authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired

jurisdiction over theaccompanying claims for damages because of lack of specificatio

n thereof. What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to w

hich no amounts are stated, x x x or allow, on motion, a reasonabletime for the amend

ment of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount of each item

of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant presc

riptive period. (Underscoring supplied).

In the light of the foregoing, it is very clear that the courts below erred inperemptorily dismissing the complaint filed by Salientes.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the assaileddecision of the Court of Appeals and to REMAND Civil Case No. Q-52034 to theRegional Trial Court for further proceedings, so that among other things, the prayer inthe complaint can on motion be amended to make specific the amount of damagesprayed for, the assessed fee can then be completely paid within the period ofprescription, and the case can be fully tried on the merits.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Hererra, (Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento, andRegalado, JJ., concur.


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[G.R. No. 89747. July 20, 1990]

MAERSK-TABACALERA SHIPPING AGENCY (FILIPINAS),

INC., pet i t ioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MONET'SEXPORT AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATION AND/ORVICENTE TAGLE, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

GRINO-AQUINO, J.:

This is petition for review on certiorariof the decision dated July 12, 1989of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 18124 affirming that of theRegional Trial Court of Legaspi City in Civil Case No. 7480 which awarded

damages to the plaintiff, now private respondent, Monet's Export andManufacturing (Monet for short) against the petitioner Maersk-Tabacalera Shipping Agency (Filipinas), Inc., (Maersk for short) for breach ofa contract of carriage.

The facts are stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:

"On May 21, 1985, a complaint for damages was filed by plaintiff Monet's Export and

Manufacturing Corporation (Monet's) and/or Vicente Tagle against

defendants Maersk Tabacalera Shipping (Maersk) and the New Asia Enterprises (New

Asia) and/or Manuel Ranola, alleging, among other things, that plaintiff, likedefendant New Asia, is engaged in the export of locally-made handicrafts and

products, while defendant Maersk Line is engaged in furnishing containerized

services through which Monet's and New Asia normally ship their goods; that on

March 11, 1984, plaintiff, after complying with all the export and custom

requirements, loaded its goods in Maersk's container to be delivered on or before

March 15, 1984 to Manila for immediate transshipment to its port of destination; that

through fraud and malice, and without prior notice to Monet's, Maerskunloaded the

goods at New Asia's factory site at Tagas, Daraga, Albay to give way to the latter's

own export shipment; that Monet's shipment was later returned to its warehouse

at Banag, Daraga, Albay; and that because of this occurrence, Monet's had to secureanother shipper, thereby incurring unnecessary expenses as well as suffering mental

anguish, worry and sleepless nights thinking of the possibility of losing its trading

partners which would seriously doubt Monet's capacity as a respectable exporter.

Monet's likewise alleged having suffered actual, moral and exemplary damages (p. 1,

Record).


27/48

"Answering the complaint, Maersk contended that contrary to Monet's allegations, the

latter's shipment was loaded on March 10, 1984 in Maersk container subject to the

condition that the bill of lading would be issued upon Monet's compliance with all the

necessary export papers prior to the departure of the truck bearing said container for

Manila on March 11, 1984. Maersk further alleged that Monet's knew that the subject

goods would not be brought to Manila without submitting all the necessary exportpapers, as without them, Maersk would incur charges on the cargo when deposited at

the customs warehouse in Manila and would subsequently be not allowed to export

the goods by custom authorities (p. 16, Record).

"Defendant New Asia, for its part, denied any liability in favor of Monet's, alleging

that Monet's has no cause of action against it not being a party to the contract of

carriage between Monet and Maersk (p. 24, Record).

"Defendants during the hearing of February 17, 1986 were considered as in default for

their failure to attend the scheduled pre-trial conference despite proper notice.Subsequently, the order of default in regard to defendant Maersk was lifted and the

latter was allowed to cross-examine all the witnesses of Monet's. Defendant New

Asia did not move for the lifting of the order of default and accordingly remained as

in default." (p. 204, Record.)

On March 28, 1988, the appealed judgment was rendered:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant Maersk Shipping Line is found to be

liable to plaintiff for damages in the following amounts: For breach of contract of

carriage, P50,000.00; for moral damages brought about by the wanton bad faithemployed by defendant shipping line in the performance of its contractual obligation,

P50,000.00; and as exemplary damages, another P50,000.00 and for attorney's fees,

P20,000.00.

"Defendant New Asia Enterprises is exonerated of any liability, there being no valid

cause of action by plaintiff against it. New Asia Enterprises cannot be made

answerable for whatever action or violation of contracted obligation

defendant Maersk Line may have committed against plaintiff because they are 2

separate corporations and there is no proof of any collusion between

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