EUGENIO BASBAS, TEOFILOARAS, RUFINO ARAS,GERVACIO BASBAS, ISMAELARAS, EUGENIO ARAS,SIMFRONIO ARAS,FELICIANO ARAS, ROSITAARAS, EUGENIO BASBAS, JR.and SPOUSES PABLITOBASARTE and MARCELINABASBAS BASARTE,

G.R. No. 172660

Present:

CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BRION, ⃰

DEL CASTILLO, andPetitioners, VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

- versus -

BEATA SAYSON andROBERTO SAYSON, JR.,

Promulgated:

Respondents. August 24, 2011

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 D E C I S I O N

 DEL CASTILLO, J.: Petitioners seek to prevent the revival of a judgment rendered in favor of the respondents more than two decades back.This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the February 17, 2004 Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 72385 which denied the appeal filed before it and affirmed in toto the May 21, 2001 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Branch 35. Also assailed is the April 19, 2006 Resolution[3] denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereto. 

Factual Antecedents On September 2, 1976, respondent Beata Sayson (Beata) and her husband Roberto Sayson, Sr. (Roberto Sr.) filed a Petition for Registration of an agricultural land located in Cagbatang, Balagtas, Matag-ob, Leyte docketed as Land Registration Case No. 0-177. The said application was opposed by the Republic of the Philippines and herein petitioners Eugenio Basbas (Eugenio Sr.), Teofilo Aras (Teofilo) and Rufino Aras (Rufino). On March 22, 1979, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Leyte, Branch V (Ormoc City) rendered a Decision adjudicating to the spouses Sayson said agricultural land and approving its registration under their names.[4]

 The oppositors filed their appeal to the CA docketed as

CA-G.R. No. 66541. In a Decision[5] dated July 24, 1985, the appellate court affirmed in toto the Decision of the CFI. This CA Decision became final and executory on August 21, 1985[6] and, accordingly, a Writ of Possession was issued on November 21, 1985, which was never implemented.

 The following year or on September 17, 1986, Original

Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2496[7] was issued to the spouses Sayson pursuant to the March 22, 1979 CFI Decision. An Alias Writ of Possession was issued on April 6, 1989 but this could also not be implemented in view of the refusal of Eugenio Sr. and his son Eugenio Basbas, Jr. (Eugenio Jr.). Claiming that the land they occupied is not the same land subject of the CFI Decision,[8] they demanded that a relocation survey be conducted. Hence, a relocation survey was conducted by order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Ormoc City.[9]

 

In an Order[10] dated September 13, 1989, the RTC approved the Commissioners Report[11] on the relocation survey and ordered the original oppositors, petitioners Eugenio Sr., Teofilo and Rufino, as well as their co-petitioners herein Gervacio Basbas (Gervacio), Ismael Aras (Ismael), Eugenio Aras (Eugenio), Simfronio Aras (Simfronio), Feliciano Aras (Feliciano), Rosita Aras (Rosita) and Eugenio Jr. to vacate the subject property, viz: 

[R]espondents are directed to vacate the portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-08-000235 covered by OCT No. 2496 and subject of the final decree of registration which, [up to the] present, said respondents are still possessing pursuant to the final and executory judgment of the Court of Appeals and as particularly defined in the Commissioners report submitted on August 3, 1989 x x x. Respondents are reminded that under Rule 71 of the New Rules of Court, failure on their part to so obey this order may make them liable for contempt of this Court. SO ORDERED.[12]

  Gervacio, Ismael, Eugenio, Simfronio, Feliciano, Rosita

and Eugenio Jr., although not oppositors in CA-G.R. No. 66541, were likewise ordered to vacate the property in view of the following pronouncement in the RTCs September 13, 1989 Order:

 It appearing from the records that

respondents Eugenio Basbas, Teofilo Aras, Gervacio

Basbas, Rufino Aras, Ismael Aras, Eugenio Aras, Simfronio Aras, Feliciano Aras, Rosita Aras and Eugenio Basbas[,] Jr. are parties to the present case, they having been the principal oppositors to the petition filed by the applicants as shown in the records, pages 34, 35 and 36, Vol. 1 x x x[13] (Emphasis supplied.)  

This September 13, 1989 Order was, however, not implemented within the five-year period from the time it became final.[14] Hence, respondent Beata and her son Roberto Sayson, Jr. (Roberto Jr.), as successor-in-interest of the late Roberto Sr., filed on August 18, 1995 a Complaint for Revival of Judgment[15] before the RTC of Ormoc City, Branch 12,[16] docketed as Civil Case No. 3312-0. Impleaded as defendants were Eugenio Sr., Teofilo, Rufino, Gervacio, Ismael, Eugenio, Simfronio, Feliciano, Rosita, and Eugenio Jr. Petitioner-spouses Pablito Basarte and Marcelina Basbas-Sabarte[17] (spouses Basarte), who, although not identified in the September 13, 1989 Order as principal oppositors in the land registration case, were likewise impleaded as defendants since they also allegedly harvested, processed, and sold the coconuts found in the subject property. Upon receipt of summons, Gervacio, Rufino, Ismael, Eugenio, Feliciano, Rosita and Eugenio Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss[18] on the ground that the Complaint states no cause of action. This was, however, denied[19] so the same set of petitioners, except for Feliciano, filed an Answer with Counterclaim.[20]

 

In their Answer with counterclaim, said petitioners admitted the allegations in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of respondents Complaint which state that: 

x x x x 4. On March 22, 1979, the Honorable Judge Numeriano Estenzo rendered a decision in the above-mentioned Land Registration [c]ase in favor of the petitioners x x x and against the oppositors, the dispositive portion of said decision reads: 

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered x x x [and] the land described under Plan PSU-08-000235 dated September 10, 1973 of Geodetic Engineer Nestorio Encenzo already APPROVED by the Acting Regional Director on June 27, 1974 is hereby adjudicated and registered in the names of the Spouses ROBERTO SAYSON and BEATA O. SAYSON, of legal ages, Filipinos, spouses and residents of Campokpok, Tabango, Leyte, Philippines and as soon as this decision becomes final, let a decree of registration be issued by the Land Registration Commission.

SO ORDERED. (x x x) 

5. From the above decision the oppositors (defendants herein) appealed;

 6. On July 24, 1985, the Honorable Court of

Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion [of which] reads:

 WHEREFORE, PREMISES

CONSIDERED, finding no merit in this appeal the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.  

SO ORDERED. 

and the said decision has become final and executory on August 21, 1985 per Entry of Judgment issued by the Court of Appeals x x x.

 7. That consequently, on September 17, 1986

an Original Certificate of Title No. N-2496 was issued in the names of Roberto Sayson and Beata O. Sayson, pursuant to Decree No. N-191615, by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Leyte;

 8. That on motion, the Honorable Court, on

November 21, 1985, issued a Writ of Possession which for some reason or [another] was not satisfied, so that the Honorable Court, on April 7, 1989 acting on an ex-parte motion dated April 6, 1989 directed the issuance of an Alias Writ of Possession;

 9. That the Deputy Sheriff of this Court, Mr.

Placid[o] Cayco tendered the Alias Writ of Possession to the oppositors, particularly to Mr. Eugenio Basbas, Sr. and Eugenio Basbas, Jr. who, as the Deputy Sheriff stated in his Progress Report dated May 18, 1989 did not believe and obey the CFI Decision and the decision of the Court of Appeals and x x x [t]hey demanded a relocation survey to determine the exact location of applicants (complainant[s] herein) property described in the alias writ of possession. x x x;

 10. That on June 16, 1989, the Honorable

Court, acting on the Progress Report of Deputy Sheriff Placido Cayco, issued an Order on even date appointing Geodetic Engineer Jose A. Tahil as Court Commissioner specifically to relocate Lot No. 1, Plan Psu-08-000235, LRC No. 0-177, Land Reg. Record No.

N51830 x x x This Order was dictated in open court in the presence of Mr. Eugenio Basbas, Sr. and Eugenio Basbas, Jr. who had both objected to the Writ of Possession, and their counsel Atty. Evargisto Escalon, and Attorney Demetrio D. Sarit, counsel for the applicants. x x x

 11. That pursuant to the [O]rder dated June

16, 1989 x x x the Court assigned Commissioner, Engr. Jose A. Tahil, submitted his report stating that the job assigned to the commissioner was already fully and peacefully accomplished; that his findings [show] that all points are existing and intact on the field except x x x corner 3 of said lot x x x which at present [is] already defined and indicated on the ground. The commissioner also attached a Sketch Plan of the land to his report. x x x

 12. That, finally, the Honorable Court, on

September 13, 1989 issued an Order approving the Commissioners Report and further stated:

 [R]espondents (defendants herein) are directed to vacate the portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-08-000235 covered by OCT No. 2496 and subject of final decree of registration which, until [the] present, said respondents are still possessing, pursuant to the final and executory judgment of the Court of Appeals and as particularly [defined] in the Commissioners Report submitted on August 3, 1989 x x x

 Respondents are reminded that

under Rule 71 of the New Rules of Court, failure on their part to so obey this Order may make them liable for contempt of this Court.[21]

  

However, petitioners admitted but denied in part: 1) paragraphs 2 and 3, insofar as they alleged that they

were all oppositors to the land registration case when only Eugenio Sr., Teofilo and Rufino were the oppositors therein; and

 2) paragraph 14, with respect to the allegation on the

retirement of the Deputy Sheriff and the heart condition of the Clerk of Court, for lack of sufficient knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief thereon.

 On the other hand, they specifically denied: 1) paragraph 13, on the ground that they have the right

of ownership and/or possession over the subject property; and 2) paragraph 15, on the ground that the property they

are cultivating is owned by them, hence, respondents cannot suffer losses and damages. Paragraphs 2, 3, 13, 14 and 15 alluded to in the foregoing are as follows:

 2. All the defendants named above are x x x of

legal age and are residents of Balagtas, Matag-ob, Leyte where they may be served summons and other court processes; while defendant-spouses Pablito Basarte and Marcelina Basbas Basarte were not named as among the oppositors in the land registration case whose decision is herein sought to be revived, said spouses are nonetheless participating in the harvest, processing and sale of the coconuts with the other defendants named above;

 

3. Plaintiffs Beata Sayson and her late husband, Roberto Sayson are petitioners in Land Registration Case No. 0-177 for the registration of a parcel of agricultural land situated in Barrio Balagtas, Matag-ob, Leyte, filed on September 2, 1976 with the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch V, Ormoc City. The above-named defendants, namely: Eugenio Basbas, Teofilo Aras, Gervacio Basbas, Rufino Aras, Ismael Aras, Eugenio Aras, Simfronio Aras, Feliciano Aras, Rosita Aras and Eugenio Basbas, Jr. were oppositors to the application;[22]

 x x x x 13. That despite this admonition in the

[September 13, 1989] [O]rder that they could be cited for contempt of Court, the respondents, defendants herein, had continuously defied the same and this notwithstanding the fact that it was upon their own demands and insistence that a relocation survey be made on the premises subject of this case before they would obey the alias writ of possession x x x and that the finding[s] of the Court[-]appointed Commissioner Engr. Jose A. Tahil show that the oppositors-respondents did [encroach] on the land of plaintiffs herein;

 14. That this [September 13, 1989] Order

however was not implemented thru a Writ of Execution within the five-year period from the time the Order became final because of the retirement of Deputy Sheriff Placido Cayco and by reason also of the fact that the then Clerk of Court, Atty. Constantino A. Trias, Jr. who was also the ex-officio Provincial Sheriff was not physically fit to hike thru the mountains and

hills of Brgy. Balagtas where the property and the defendants therein reside due to his heart condition;

 15. That despite their knowledge of the

Court[s] [September 13, 1989] Order, the same [having been] dictated in open court, the respondents had continued to occupy the land of the plaintiffs and for more than five (5) years since this Order for them to vacate the land in question was issued, they had harvested the coconuts growing thereon and such other produce of the land herein involved. And until the decision of the Court of Appeals is executed, plaintiff will continue to suffer losses and damages by reason of defendants unlawful occupation and possession and their continued harvesting of the produce of this land of the herein plaintiffs.[23]

  By way of special and affirmative defenses, said

petitioners contended that the Order sought to be revived is not the judgment contemplated under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, hence the action for revival of judgment is improper. Also, except for Rufino, petitioners averred that they cannot be made parties to the complaint for revival of judgment as they were not parties to the land registration case. They thus believed that the September 13, 1989 Order sought to be revived is not binding upon them and hence, the complaint states no cause of action with respect to them. As to the counterclaim, petitioners prayed that respondents pay them moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Pre-trial conference was thereafter set[24] but since not all petitioners were served with summons, this was reset and alias

summons was issued and served upon Simfronio and the spouses Basarte.[25] Upon receipt of summons, Simfronio adopted the Answer with Counterclaim of Gervacio, Rufino, Ismael, Eugenio, Feliciano, Rosita and Eugenio Jr.[26] while the spouses Basarte filed a Motion to Dismiss[27] on the ground of lack of cause of action. As said motion was also denied,[28] the spouses Basarte later filed a Manifestation[29] that they were also adopting the Answer with Counterclaim filed by Gervacio and the others. 

During the pre-trial conference on July 14, 1999, the RTC issued an Order[30] which provides in part, viz: 

In todays pre-trial conference, manifestations and counter-manifestations were exchanged. All the parties and their counsels are present. x x x [P]laintiffs counsel presented a Special Power of Attorney by Beata Sayson but the Court observed that same was not duly acknowledged before the Philippine Consulate or Embassy in Canada. However, this matter is not so important[.] [W]hen the Court tried to dig and discuss with the parties on their real positions, it turned out that the plaintiffs are seeking revival of the previous final judgment, the original parties of which were Eugenio Basbas, Teofilo Aras and Rufino Aras. Eugenio and Teofilo are all dead, leaving Rufino Aras alive. It is quite complicated considering that in this action, the plaintiffs relied on the Order of this Court penned by the previous judge dated September 13, 1989 which was made after or consequent to the final judgment aforementioned, wherein the names of the other defendants were mentioned in the body thereof. After considering the merits of the

various contentions, the Court is of the view that the complaint had to limit itself to the names of the original parties appearing in the original judgment now being sought for revival. The interest of the plaintiffs in seeking implementation or execution of the judgment sought to be revived which would involve the other defendants can be taken when the judgment shall have been revived.

 In this connection therefore and as part of the

matters to be made part in the pre-trial conference, in the exercise of the authority granted to it by law, this Court directs the plaintiffs to make the necessary amendment and/or to submit a manifestation first to this Court on the point above raised regarding amendment of the designation of the parties having in mind the objection of the defendants who manifested that should there be an amendment, this counter-claim shall be disregarded since they were brought in unnecessarily in this kind of action.

 Plaintiffs therefore are given a period of ten

(10) days from today within which to submit the requisite manifestation furnishing copy thereof to the defendant who upon receipt shall also be given a period of ten (10) days within which this Court will make the necessary resolution before allowing any amendment.

 Hold the pre-trial conference in abeyance. SO ORDERED. [31] (Emphasis supplied.)

  

In their Manifestation with Prayer,[32] respondents informed the RTC about the death of Eugenio Sr. and Teofilo who were oppositors in the land registration case and the substitution by their heirs, namely, Gervacio, Marcelina Basbas Basarte,[33] and Eugenio Jr. for Eugenio Sr. and Ismael, Vicente, Ligaya Aras (Ligaya), Rosendo Aras (Rosendo) and Daina Aras (Daina) for Teofilo. Respondents prayed that their manifestation be considered for the purpose of determining the proper parties to the case. Despite petitioners Counter-Manifestation,[34] the RTC issued the following Order[35] on May 15, 1999:

 The Manifestation of plaintiffs and the

Counter-Manifestation of defendants having already been submitted and duly noted, the Court hereby directs that henceforth in the denomination of this case, the names of the original parties, Eugenio Basbas and Teofilo Aras (in Land Registration Case No. 0-177) shall still remain to be so stated as defendants for purposes of the present case but with additional names of their respective heirs to be included and stated immediately after each name as heirs in substitution, namely: for Eugenio Basbas 1) Gervacio Basbas, 2) Marcelina Basbas Basarte, and 3) Eugenio Basbas, Jr.; and for Teofilo Aras 1) Ismael Aras, 2) Vicente Aras, 3) Ligaya Aras, 4) Rosendo Aras, and 5) Daina Aras.

 Since from the records, only Gervacio Basbas,

Eugenio Basbas, Jr. and Ismael Aras were duly served with summons, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to serve summons on the other heirs, namely: Marcelina Basbas Basarte, Vicente Aras, Ligaya Aras, Rosendo Aras, and Daina Aras.

x x x x[36]

  

After summons were served, Vicente, Rosendo, Ligaya and Daina were, however, declared in default for not filing any responsive pleading.[37] On February 2, 2001, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order[38] where the controverted stipulations and issues to be tried, among others, were enumerated as follows: 

Controverted Stipulations:  

1.                    That defendants are not enjoying the produce of the land because there are period[s] wherein the fruits were subject of theft and the same is now pending at the Municipal Trial Court of Matag-ob;

 2.                    That [even] before the start of the original

case, the original defendants referring to the late Eugenio Basbas, Sr. and Teofilo Aras, [and] Rufino Aras were occupying the property and they were succeeded by the respective heirs of the deceased Eugenio Basbas, Sr. and Teofilo Aras [sic];

 3.                    That plaintiff Teofilo Aras, Sr. has a daughter

named Fedeliza Aras; 

Issues  

1.              Whether x x x the plaintiffs are entitled to revival of judgment in the earlier [land registration] case;

 

2.              Whether x x x the defendants except for defendant Rufino Aras are the proper parties in the present action;

 3.              Whether x x x the complaint states a cause of

action; 4.              Whether x x x defendants are entitled to their

counterclaim, and; 5.              Whether judgment on the pleadings is allowed

or is tenable.[39]

  

Respondents subsequently filed an Omnibus Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment.[40] They contended that since petitioners Answer failed to tender an issue, they having expressly admitted the material allegations in the complaint, particularly paragraphs 4 to 12, a judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment is proper.

 Petitioners filed an Opposition Re: Omnibus Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment and Memorandum Re: Failure of Plaintiff Beata Sayson to Appear in the Pre-trial Conference.[41] They argued that the case cannot be decided based on the pleadings nor through summary judgment considering that the controverted stipulations and issues defined in the Pre-Trial Order must be proven by evidence. In addition, they questioned the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Beata in Canada empowering her son Roberto Jr. to appear on her behalf in the pre-trial conference. They argued that since said SPA has not been authenticated by a Philippine Consulate official, it is not sufficient authorization and hence, Beata cannot be considered to have attended the pre-trial

conference. The case must, therefore, be dismissed insofar as she is concerned.

 Ruling of the Regional Trial Court 

In resolving respondents Omnibus Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment, the RTC found that petitioners Answer does not essentially tender an issue since the material allegations of the Complaint were admitted. Hence, said court issued an Order[42] dated May 21, 2001, the dispositive portion of which reads:

 Wherefore, finding merit in the motion, judgment is hereby rendered for and in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants ordering the revival of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 24, 1985 affirming the decree of registration of this Court in the decision of the Land Registration Case No. 0-177 dated March 22, 1979, and of the final Order of this Court dated September 13, 1989 and upon finality of this Order, ordering the issuance of Writ of Possession for the lot made subject of the decision.Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.[43]

  Petitioners thus filed a Notice of Appeal[44] which was approved in an Order dated June 06, 2001.[45]

 Ruling of the Court of Appeals Finding no merit in the appeal, the CA denied the same in a Decision[46] dated February 17, 2004. It noted that petitioners

Answer admitted almost all of the allegations in respondents complaint. Hence, the RTC committed no reversible error when it granted respondents Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment. The appellate court likewise found untenable the issue as regards the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. To the appellate court, petitioners refusal to vacate the subject property despite the final and executory Decision of the CA in the land registration case and the September 13, 1989 Order of the RTC for them to vacate the same, clearly support respondents cause of action against them. Also contrary to petitioners posture, the September 13, 1989 Order is a final order as it finally disposed of the controversy between the parties in the land registration case. The CA likewise found the SPA executed by Beata in favor of Roberto Jr. as valid, hence, she was duly represented during the pre-trial conference. The dispositive portion of said CA Decision reads: 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is DENIED. The May 21, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Branch 35 is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.[47]

 Their Motion for Reconsideration[48] having been denied

in a Resolution[49] dated April 19, 2006, petitioners are now before this Court through the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. 

Issues 

Petitioners impute upon the CA the following errors: 

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals clearly committed serious errors of law in its decision and Resolution dated February 17, 2004 and April 19, 2006 when it affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated May 21, 2001 and declared that no reversible error was committed by the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City in granting respondents motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment; 2. The Honorable Court of Appeals clearly committed serious errors of law in its Decision and Resolution dated February 17, 2004 and April 19, 2006 when it affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City dated May 21, 2001 and declared that petitioners argument that respondents complaint failed to state a cause of action has no merit. 3. The Honorable Court of Appeals clearly committed serious errors of law when it affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City which ordered the revival of the Judgment of this Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 66541 entitled Beata Sayson and Roberto Sayson vs. Eugenio Basbas, et al., despite the fact that this was not the judgment sought to be revived in Civil Case No. 3312-0; 4. The Honorable Court of Appeals clearly committed serious errors of law in ruling that the duly notarized Special Power of Attorney in favor of Roberto Sayson[,] Jr. is valid and the latter is authorized to represent his mother, Beata Sayson[,] which is contrary to the ruling in the case of ANGELITA LOPEZ, represented by PRISCILLA L. TY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY x x x (G.R. No. 77008, December 29, 1987).[50]

 The Parties Arguments

 Petitioners insist that a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgmentis not proper in this case since the controverted stipulations and the first three issues enumerated in the pre-trial order involve facts which must be threshed out during trial. They also claim that the Complaint for Revival of Judgment states no cause of action because the September 13, 1989 Order which it sought to revive is not the judgment contemplated under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, cannot be the subject of such an action. Moreover, they argue that the CA Decision in the land registration case should not have been revived as same was not prayed for in the Complaint for Revival of Judgment. Lastly, petitioners assail the SPA which authorized Roberto Jr. to represent his mother, Beata, during the pre-trial conference, it not having been authenticated by a Philippine consulate officer in Canada where it was executed. Citing Lopez v. Court of Appeals,[51] they contend that said document cannot be admitted in evidence and hence, Beata was not duly represented during said pre-trial conference. The case, therefore, should have been dismissed insofar as she is concerned. For their part, respondents point out that the RTCs basis in granting the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment was petitioners admission of practically all the material allegations in the complaint. They aver that Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that where an answer fails to tender an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on

motion of that party, direct judgment on the pleadings. Also, the test for a motion for summary judgment is whether the pleadings, affidavits or exhibits in support of the motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and to justify a finding as a matter of law that there is no defense to the action or the claim is clearly meritorious. And since, as found by the CA, petitioners Answer did not tender an issue and that there is no defense to the action, the grant of the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment was appropriate. Respondents likewise contend that if their prayer in the Complaint is taken in its proper context, it can be deduced that what they were really seeking is the implementation of the CA Decision dated July 24, 1985 and the orders ancillary thereto. With respect to the SPA, they submit that the law does not require that a power of attorney be notarized. Moreover, Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court simply requires that a representative appear fully authorized in writing. It does not specify a particular form of authority. 

Our Ruling There is no merit in the petition. 

I. The instant case is proper for the rendition of a summary judgment.

 Petitioners principally assail the CAs affirmance of the

RTCs Order granting respondents Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment.

 In Tan v. De la Vega,[52] citing Narra Integrated

Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[53] the court distinguished summary judgment from judgment on the pleadings, viz:

 The existence or appearance of ostensible

issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending partys answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist i.e. facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions. x x x.Simply stated, what distinguishes a judgment on the

pleadings from a summary judgment is the presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender any issue, that is, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse partys pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate.[54] On the other hand, when the Answer specifically denies the material averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a summary judgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine. A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial.[55]

 

a) Judgment on the pleadings is not proper because petitioners Answer tendered issues.

  In this case, we note that while petitioners Answer to

respondents Complaint practically admitted all the material allegations therein, it nevertheless asserts the affirmative defenses that the action for revival of judgment is not the proper action and that petitioners are not the proper parties. As issues obviously arise from these affirmative defenses, a judgment on the pleadings is clearly improper in this case.

 However, before we consider this case appropriate for

the rendition of summary judgment, an examination of the issues raised, that is, whether they are genuine issues or not, should first be made.

 b) The issues raised

are not genuine issues, hence rendition of summary judgment is proper.

To resolve the issues of whether a revival of judgment is the proper action and whether respondents are the proper parties thereto, the RTC merely needed to examine the following: 1) the RTC Order dated September 13, 1989, to

determine whether same is a judgment or final order contemplated under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court; and, 2) the pleadings of the parties and pertinent portions of the records[56] showing, among others, who among the respondents were oppositors to the land registration case, the heirs of such oppositors and the present occupants of the property. Plainly, these issues could be readily resolved based on the facts established by the pleadings. A full-blown trial on these issues will only entail waste of time and resources as they are clearly not genuine issues requiring presentation of evidence.

 Petitioners aver that the RTC should not have granted

respondents Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment because of the controverted stipulations and the first three issues enumerated in the Pre-trial Order, which, according to them, require the presentation of evidence. These stipulations and issues, however, when examined, basically boil down to questions relating to the propriety of the action resorted to by respondents, which is revival of judgment, and to the proper parties thereto the same questions which we have earlier declared as not constituting genuine issues.

 In sum, this Court holds that the instant case is proper

for the rendition of a summary judgment, hence, the CA committed no error in affirming the May 21, 2001 Order of the RTC granting respondents Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment. II. The Complaint states a cause of action. 

Petitioners contend that the complaint states no cause of action since the

September 13, 1989 Order sought to be revived is not the judgment contemplated under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. They also aver that the RTC erred when it ordered the revival not only of the September 13, 1989 Order but also of the July 24, 1985 CA Decision, when what was prayed for in the complaint was only the revival of the former.

 This Court, however, agrees with respondents that these

matters have already been sufficiently addressed by the RTC in its Order of May 9, 1997[57] and we quote with approval, viz:

 The body of the Complaint as well as the prayer mentioned about the executory decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 24, 1985 that had to be finally implemented. So it appears to this Court that the Complaint does not alone invoke or use as subject thereof the Order of this Court which would implement the decision or judgment regarding the land in question. The Rules of Court referring to the execution of judgment, particularly Rule 39, Sec. 6, provides a mechanism by which the judgment that had not been enforced within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date the said judgment has become final and executory could be enforced. In fact, the rule states: judgment may be enforced by action.

 So in this Complaint, what is sought is the

enforcement of a judgment and the Order of this Court dated September 13, 1989 is part of the process to enforce that judgment. To the mind of the Court, therefore, the Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action.[58]

  

III. Any perceived defect in the SPA would not serve to bar the case from proceeding.

  Anent the SPA, we find that given the particular circumstances in the case at bar, an SPA is not even necessary such that its efficacy or the lack of it would not in any way preclude the case from proceeding. This is because upon Roberto Sr.s death, Roberto Jr., in succession of his father, became a co-owner of the subject property together with his mother, Beata. As a co-owner, he may, by himself alone, bring an action for the recovery of the co-owned property pursuant to the well-settled principle that in a co-ownership, co-owners may bring actions for the recovery of co-owned property without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his co-owners.[59]

 While we note that the present action for revival of judgment is not an action for recovery, the September 13, 1989 Order sought to be revived herein ordered the petitioners, among others, to vacate the subject property pursuant to the final and executory judgment of the CA affirming the CFIs adjudication of the same in favor of respondents. This Order was issued after the failure to enforce the writ of execution and alias writ of execution due to petitioners refusal to vacate the property. To this Courts mind, respondents purpose in instituting the present action is not only to have the CA Decision in the land registration case finally implemented but ultimately, to recover possession thereof from petitioners. This action is therefore one which Roberto Jr., as co-owner, can bring and prosecute alone, on his own behalf and on behalf of his co-owner, Beata. Hence, a dismissal of the case with respect to Beata pursuant to Sec. 5,[60] Rule 18 of the Rules of Court will be futile as the case could

nevertheless be continued by Roberto Jr. in behalf of the two of them.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 17, 2004 and Resolution dated April 19, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 72385 are AFFIRMED.

PHILIPPINE BUSINESS BANK,Petitioner, - versus - FELIPE CHUA,Respondent.G.R. No. 178899 Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,BRION,BERSAMIN,VILLARAMA, JR., andSERENO, JJ. Promulgated:November 15, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x D E C I S I O N BRION, J.: We resolve the petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by Philippine Business Bank (PBB) challenging the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 94883 dated February 8, 2007,[2] insofar as it overturned the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) order dated December 16, 2005 declaring the finality of its Partial Summary Judgment and granting the issuance of a writ of execution against respondent Felipe Chua (respondent Chua). PBB also seeks to overturn the resolution of the CA dated July 18, 2007, which denied its motion for reconsideration. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTSFrom the records, the following facts are not in dispute.On March 22, 2002, Tomas Tan (Tan), a stockholder and director/Treasurer of CST Enterprises, Inc. (CST), filed a derivative suit for the Declaration of Unenforceability of Promissory Notes and Mortgage, Nullity of Secretarys Certificate, Injunction, Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against PBB, Francis Lee, Alfredo Yao, Rodulfo Besinga, Stephen Taala, Rose Robles, Henry Ramos, Yu Heng, Mabuhay Sugar Central, Inc., Nancy Chan, Henry Chan, John Dennis Chua, Jaime Soriano, Voltaire Uychutin, Peter Salud, Edgar Lo, respondent Felipe Chua, and John Does before the Makati City Regional Trial Court.[3] In Tans amended complaint dated January 9, 2003, he alleged that sometime in February 2001, before he went abroad for medical treatment, he turned over to respondent Chua, a director and the President of CST, the original copies of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124275 and 157581, titles to lands

owned by, and registered in the name of, CST. In January 2002, the respondent informed him that CSTs properties had been fraudulently used as collateral for loans allegedly taken out in CSTs name, but without proper authority from CST stockholders and/or the Board of Directors.[4] From his investigation, Tan discovered that a certain Atty. Jaime Soriano had issued a Secretarys certificate, which stated that John Dennis Chua was authorized during a duly constituted CST board meeting to open a bank account and obtain credit facilities under the name of CST with PBB. This Secretarys Certificate also authorized John Dennis Chua to use CSTs properties as security for these loans.[5] Using this Secretarys Certificate, John Dennis Chua took out loans with PBB in the total amount of Ninety-One Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P91,100,000.00),[6] and used CST properties as collateral.[7] Respondent Chua signed as co-maker with John Dennis Chua, who signed both as the representative of CST, as well as in his personal capacity, on six promissory notes to PBB to evidence parts of this loan.[8] When PBB threatened to foreclose the mortgage on these properties after CST defaulted,[9] Tan filed the present complaint, essentially arguing that the loans/promissory notes and mortgage made out in CSTs name are unenforceable against it, since they were entered into by persons who were unauthorized to bind the company.[10] In its Amended Answer,[11] PBB claimed that the loans to CST, as well as the corresponding mortgage over CST properties, were all valid and binding since the loan applications and documents accomplished by John Dennis Chua were supported by the duly accomplished secretarys certificate, which authorized him to obtain credit facilities in behalf of CST. In addition, the original copies of the titles to the properties were offered to PBB as collaterals.

PBBs Amended Answer also included a cross-claim against respondent Chua, demanding payment of the promissory notes he signed as co-maker with John Dennis Chua.[12] In respondent Chuas Answer to the Cross-Claim of PBB,[13] he claimed that he never applied for a loan with the PBB. He further denied authorizing John Dennis Chua to apply for any loans in CSTs name, or to use CST properties as security for any loans.[14] Nevertheless, he admitted that he signed, as co-maker, six promissory notes covering the loans obtained by John Dennis Chua with PBB. According to respondent Chua, he executed these promissory notes after the loans had already been consummated, in a sincere effort to persuade John Dennis Chua to pay off the unauthorized loan and retrieve from cross-claimant PBB the CST titles.[15] PBB subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules), claiming that since respondent Chua already admitted the execution of the promissory notes in favor of PBB amounting to Seventy Five Million Pesos (P75,000,000.00),[16] insofar as its cross-claim against him was concerned, there was no genuine issue on any material fact on the issue of his liability to PBB. PBB argued that although respondent Chua claimed that he signed the promissory notes merely to persuade John Dennis Chua to pay off his loan to PBB, he was still liable as an accommodation party under Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.[17] THE RTCS PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTActing on PBBs motion, the RTC issued a partial summary judgment on PBBs cross-claim on July 27, 2005, finding respondent Chua liable as a signatory to the promissory notes amounting to Seventy-Five Million Pesos (P75,000,000.00). The RTC reasoned that by signing as a co-maker, he obligated himself

to pay the amount indicated in the promissory notes, even if he received no consideration in return. Thus, the RTC ordered him to pay PBB the amount of P75,000,000.00, plus interests and costs.[18] In its order dated December 16, 2005, the RTC resolved respondent Chuas Notice of Appeal, as well as PBBs Motion to Disallow Appeal and to Issue Execution. Citing Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules, the RTC ruled that respondent Chua could not file a notice of appeal. Instead, he should have filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. However, since the period for filing a certiorari petition had already lapsed without respondent filing any petition, the partial summary judgment had become final and executory. Thus, it ordered the issuance of a writ of execution for the satisfaction of the partial summary judgment in favor of PBB.[19] On December 21, 2005, the RTC issued an order appointing Renato Flora as the special sheriff to implement the writ of execution. In line with this order, Renato Flora, on December 23, 2005, issued a Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution of Personal Properties, addressed to respondent Chua. He proceeded with the execution sale, and on December 28, 2005, he issued a certificate of sale over respondent Chuas 900 shares of stock in CST in favor of PBB. He also posted a notice of sheriffs sale on January 10, 2006 over respondent Chuas five parcels of land located in Las Pinas, Pasay City, and Muntinlupa.[20] THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION Respondent Chua filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the CA to challenge: (a) the December 16, 2005 order, granting PBBs motion to disallow his appeal; (b) the December 21, 2005 order, granting PBBs motion to appoint Renato Flora as special sheriff to implement the writ of execution; and (c) the February 16, 2006 order denying his motion for reconsideration

and to suspend execution. In essence, respondent Chua alleged that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in disallowing his appeal of the partial summary judgment, and in issuing a writ of execution. Significantly, respondent Chua did not question the propriety of the partial summary judgment. On February 8, 2007, the CA issued the assailed decision, partly affirming the RTC order dated December 16, 2005 on the matter of the disallowance of respondent Chuas appeal. The CA held that respondent Chua could not appeal the partial summary judgment while the main case remained pending, in keeping with Section 1(g), Rule 41 of the Rules. However, the CA held that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the writ of execution against respondent Chua. As found by the CA, the RTC grievously erred when it held that the partial judgment had become final and executory when respondent Chua failed to avail of the proper remedy of certiorari within the 60 day reglementary period under Rule 65. Since a partial summary judgment does not finally dispose of the action, it is merely an interlocutory, not a final, order. Thus, it could not attain finality. The CA further noted that certiorari is an independent action and not part of the appeal proceedings, and failure to file a certiorari petition would not result in the finality of the judgment or final order. The RTC, thus, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it granted the issuance of a writ of execution, and the corresponding writ of execution issued by the court a quo, as well as the subsequent implementing proceedings, were void. THE PETITION PBB submits two issues for our resolution:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN APPLYING JURISPRUDENCE NOT ON ALL FOURS [WITH] THE FACTUAL BACKDROP OF THE CASE. II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN RECALLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE WRIT OF EXECUTION AND ALL THE PROCEEDINGS TAKEN FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION ON THE WRONG NOTION THAT THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAS NOT BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. THE RULING We DENY the petition for being unmeritorious. Nature of Partial Summary Judgment PBBs motion for partial summary judgment against respondent Chua was based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules, which provides:Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear

undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, or for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.[21] When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.[22] The rendition by the court of a summary judgment does not always result in the full adjudication of all the issues raised in a case. For these instances, Section 4, Rule 35 of the Rules provides: Section 4. Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this Rule, judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel shall ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. The facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted on the controverted facts accordingly. This is what is referred to as a partial summary judgment. A careful reading of this section reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a final judgment, as it does not [put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for.[23] The Rules provide for a partial summary judgment as a means to simplify the trial process by allowing the

court to focus the trial only on the assailed facts, considering as established those facts which are not in dispute. After this sifting process, the court is instructed to issue an order, the partial summary judgment, which specifies the disputed facts that have to be settled in the course of trial. In this way, the partial summary judgment is more akin to a record of pre-trial,[24] an interlocutory order, rather than a final judgment. The differences between a final judgment and an interlocutory order are well-established. We said in Denso (Phils.) Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court[25] that: [A] final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties' next move . . . and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes final or, to use the established and more distinctive term, final and executory. x x x x Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory, e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules x x x

Unlike a 'final judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an 'interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.[26] Bearing in mind these differences, there can be no doubt that the partial summary judgment envisioned by the Rules is an interlocutory order that was never meant to be treated separately from the main case. As we explained in Guevarra v. Court of Appeals:[27] It will be noted that the judgment in question is a partial summary judgment. It was rendered only with respect to the private respondents first and second causes of action alleged in their complaint. It was not intended to cover the other prayers in the said complaint, nor the supplementary counterclaim filed by the petitioners against the private respondents, nor the third-party complaint filed by the petitioners against the Security Bank and Trust Company. A partial summary judgment is not a final or appealable judgment. (Moran, Vol. 2, 1970 Edition, p. 189, citing several cases.) It is merely a pre-trial adjudication that said issues in the case shall be deemed established for the trial of the case. (Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 429.) x x x x The partial summary judgment rendered by the trial court being merely interlocutory and not a final judgment, it is puerile to discuss whether the same became final and executory due to the alleged failure to appeal said judgment within the supposed period of appeal. What the rules contemplate is that the appeal from the partial summary judgment shall be taken together with the judgment that may be rendered in the entire case after a trial is conducted on the material facts on which a substantial controversy exists. This is on the assumption that the partial

summary judgment was validly rendered, which, as shown above, is not true in the case at bar.[28] We reiterated this ruling in the cases of Province of Pangasinan v. Court of Appeals[29] and Government Service Insurance System v. Philippine Village Hotel, Inc.[30] Applicability of Guevarra PBB asserts that our pronouncement in the cases of Guevarra, Province of Pangasinan, and Government Service Insurance System cannot be applied to the present case because these cases involve factual circumstances that are completely different from the facts before us. While the partial summary judgments in the cited cases decided only some of the causes of action presented, leaving other issues unresolved, PBB insists that as far as its cross-claim against respondent Chua is concerned, the court a quos partial summary judgment is a full and complete adjudication because the award is for the whole claim.[31] According to PBB, whatever the court decides as regards the main case, this will not affect the liability of respondent Chua as a solidary debtor in the promissory notes, since the creditor can proceed against any of the solidary debtors. In other words, no substantial controversy exists between PBB and respondent Chua, and there is nothing more to be done on this particular issue. We do not agree with PBBs submission.In the Guevarra case, the Court held that the summary judgment rendered by the lower court was in truth a partial summary judgment because it failed to resolve the other causes of action in the complaint, as well as the counterclaim and the third party complaint raised by the defendants.

Contrary to PBBs assertions, the same could be said for the case presently before us. The partial summary judgment in question resolved only the cross-claim made by PBB against its co-defendant, respondent Chua, based on the latters admission that he signed promissory notes as a co-maker in favor of PBB. This is obvious from the dispositive portion of the partial summary judgment, quoted below for convenient reference: WHEREFORE, a partial summary judgment is hereby rendered on the cross-claim of cross-defendant Philippine Business Bank against cross-defendant Felipe Chua, ordering the latter to pay the former as follows: 1. The amount of Ten Million (P10,000,000.00) Pesos, representing the value of the Promissory Note dated April 17, 2001, plus interest thereof at the rate of 16% from April 12, 2002, until fully paid;2. The amount of Twelve Million (P12,000,000.00) Pesos, representing the value of the Promissory Note dated April 5, 2001, plus interest thereon at the rate of 17% from April 1, 2002, until fully paid;3. The amount of Twenty Three Million (P23,000,000.00) Pesos, representing the value of the Promissory Note dated April 25, 2001, plus interest thereon at the rate of 16% from April 19, 2002, until fully paid;4. The amount of Eight Million (P8,000,000.00) Pesos, representing the value of the Promissory Note dated June 20, 2001, plus interest thereon at the rate of 17% from June 20, 2001, until fully paid;5. The amount of Seven Million (P7,000,000.00) Pesos, representing the value of the Promissory Note dated June 22, 2001, plus interest thereon at the rate of 17% from June 17, 2002, until fully paid;6. The amount of Fifteen Million (P15,000,000.00) Pesos, representing the value of the Promissory Note dated June 28,

2001, plus interest thereon at the rate of 17% from June 24, 2002, until fully paid;7. Plus cost of suit. SO ORDERED. [32] Clearly, this partial summary judgment did not dispose of the case as the main issues raised in plaintiff Tomas Tans complaint, i.e., the validity of the secretarys certificate which authorized John Dennis Chua to take out loans, and execute promissory notes and mortgages for and on behalf of CST, as well as the validity of the resultant promissory notes and mortgage executed for and on behalf of CST, remained unresolved. Chua shares common interest with co-defendant- debtors Still, PBB insists that the partial summary judgment is a final judgment as regards PBBs cross-claim against respondent Chua since respondent Chuas liability will not be affected by the resolution of the issues of the main case. On its face, the promissory notes were executed by John Dennis Chua in two capacities as the alleged representative of CST, and in his personal capacity. Thus, while there can be no question as to respondent Chuas liability to PBB (since he already admitted to executing these promissory notes as a co-maker), still, the court a quos findings on: (a) whether John Dennis Chua was properly authorized to sign these promissory notes on behalf of CST, and (b) whether John Dennis Chua actually signed these promissory notes in his personal capacity, would certainly have the effect of determining whether respondent Chua has the right to go after CST and/or John Dennis Chua for reimbursement on any payment he makes on these promissory notes, pursuant to Article 1217 of the Civil Code, which states:

Article 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two or more solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept. He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share which corresponds to each, with the interest for the payment already made. If the payment is made before the debt is due, no interest for the intervening period may be demanded. When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the debt of each. In other words, PBB has a common cause of action against respondent Chua with his alleged co-debtors, John Dennis Chua and CST, it would simply not be proper to treat respondent Chua separately from his co-debtors. Moreover, we cannot turn a blind eye to the clear intention of the trial court in rendering a partial summary judgment. Had the trial court truly intended to treat PBBs cross-claim against respondent Chua separately, it could easily have ordered a separate trial via Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules, which states: Section 2. Separate trials. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues. That the trial court did not do so belies PBBs contention.It has also not escaped our attention that PBB, in its Motion to Disallow Appeal and to Issue Execution Against Cross-Defendant Felipe Chua,[33] already admitted that the partial summary

judgment is not a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case. In its own words:x x x x 3. However, the remedy availed of by [respondent Chua] is patently erroneous because under Rule 41 Section 1 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken only from a judgment or final order that completely disposes the case; 4. The judgment rendered by [the RTC] dated July 27, 2005 is only a partial summary judgment against [respondent Chua], on the crossclaim of cross-claimant Philippine Business Bank. The main case which involves the claim of plaintiffs against the principal defendants is still pending and has not yet been adjudged by [the RTC].[34] Thus, PBB cannot now be allowed to deny the interlocutory nature of the partial summary judgment. Certiorari not the proper remedyPBB also maintains that the partial summary judgment attained finality when respondent Chua failed to file a certiorari petition, citing the last paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules as basis. We quote: Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal maybe taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from: x x x x (g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims

and third party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; x x x x In all the above instances where the judgment, or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Contrary to PBBs contention, however, certiorari was not the proper recourse for respondent Chua. The propriety of the summary judgment may be corrected only on appeal or other direct review, not a petition for certiorari,[35] since it imputes error on the lower courts judgment. It is well-settled that certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judges findings and conclusions of law and fact.[36] As we explained in Apostol v. Court of Appeals:[37]As a legal recourse, the special civil action of certiorari is a limited form of review. The jurisdiction of this Court is narrow in scope; it is restricted to resolving errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Indeed, as long as the courts below act within their jurisdiction, alleged errors committed in the exercise of their discretion will amount to mere errors of judgment correctable by an appeal or a petition for review.[38] In light of these findings, we affirm the CAs ruling that the partial summary judgment is an interlocutory order which could not become a final and executory judgment, notwithstanding respondent Chuas failure to file a certiorari petition to challenge the judgment. Accordingly, the RTC grievously erred when it issued the writ of execution against respondent Chua. In view of this conclusion, we find it unnecessary to resolve the issue raised by respondent Chua on the validity of the RTCs appointment of a special sheriff for the implementation of the execution writ.

Propriety of Summary Judgment Reserved for Appeal As a final point, we note that respondent Chua has raised with this Court the issue of the propriety of the partial summary judgment issued by the RTC. Notably, respondent Chua never raised this issue in his petition for certiorari before the CA. It is well settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below.[39] Basic considerations of due process impel the adoption of this rule.[40] Furthermore, this issue would be better resolved in the proper appeal, to be taken by the parties once the court a quo has completely resolved all the issues involved in the present case in a final judgment. If we were to resolve this issue now, we would be preempting the CA, which has primary jurisdiction over this issue. Lastly, taking jurisdiction over this issue now would only result in multiple appeals from a single case which concerns the same, or integrated, causes of action. As we said in Santos v. People:[41] Another recognized reason of the law in permitting appeal only from a final order or judgment, and not from an interlocutory or incidental one, is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which must necessarily suspend the hearing and decision on the merits of the case during the pendency of the appeal. If such appeal were allowed, the trial on the merits of the case would necessarily be delayed for a considerable length of time, and compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as incidental questions may be raised by him, and interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court.

G.R. No. 170026 June 20, 2012

SHIMIZU PHILIPPINES CONTRACTORS, INC., Petitioner, vs.MRS. LETICIA B. MAGSALIN, doing business under the trade name "KAREN'S TRADING," FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, GODOFREDO GARCIA, CONCORDIA GARCIA, and REYNALDO BAETIONG, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc. (petitioner) to challenge the twin resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA)2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096 which dismissed the appeal of the petitioner on the ground of lack of jurisdiction3 and denied the petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration.4 The appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096 had sought to nullify the December 16, 2003 order5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissing the petitioner’s complaint for sum of money and damages on the ground of non prosequitur.

The Antecedents

The antecedent facts of the petition before us are not disputed.

An alleged breach of contract was the initial event that led to the present petition. The petitioner claims that one Leticia Magsalin, doing business as "Karen’s Trading," had breached their subcontract agreement for the supply, delivery, installation, and finishing of parquet tiles for certain floors in the petitioner’s Makati City condominium project called "The Regency at Salcedo." The breach triggered the agreement’s termination. When Magsalin also refused to return the petitioner’s

unliquidated advance payment and to account for other monetary liabilities despite demand, the petitioner sent a notice to respondent FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU Insurance) demanding damages pursuant to the surety and performance bonds the former had issued for the subcontract.

On April 30, 2002, the petitioner filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 02-488 against both Magsalin and FGU Insurance. It was raffled to Branch 61 of the RTC of Makati City. The complaint sought Two Million Three Hundred Twenty-Nine Thousand One Hundred Twenty Four Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P2,329,124.60) as actual damages for the breach of contract.

FGU Insurance was duly served with summons. With respect to Magsalin, however, the corresponding officer’s return declared that both she and "Karen’s Trading" could not be located at their given addresses, and that despite further efforts, their new addresses could not be determined.

In August 2002, FGU Insurance filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The petitioner filed its opposition to the motion. The motion to dismiss was denied as well as the ensuing motion for reconsideration, and FGU Insurance was obliged to file an answer.

In October 2002, in an effort to assist the RTC in acquiring jurisdiction over Magsalin, the petitioner filed a motion for leave to serve summons on respondent Magsalin by way of publication. In January 2003, the petitioner filed its reply to FGU Insurance’s answer.

In February 2003, FGU Insurance filed a motion for leave of court to file a third-party complaint. Attached to the motion was the subject complaint,6 with Reynaldo Baetiong, Godofredo Garcia and Concordia Garcia named as third-party defendants. FGU Insurance claims that the three had executed counter-guaranties

over the surety and performance bonds it executed for the subcontract with Magsalin and, hence, should be held jointly and severally liable in the event it is held liable in Civil Case No. 02-488.

The RTC admitted the third-party complaint and denied the motion to serve summons by publication on the ground that the action against respondent Magsalin was in personam.

In May 2003, the RTC issued a notice setting the case for hearing on June 20, 2003. FGU Insurance filed a motion to cancel the hearing on the ground that the third-party defendants had not yet filed their answer. The motion was granted.

In June 2003, Baetiong filed his answer to the third-party complaint. He denied any personal knowledge about the surety and performance bonds for the subcontract with Magsalin.7 Of the three (3) persons named as third-party defendants, only Baetiong filed an answer to the third-party complaint; the officer’s returns on the summons to the Garcias state that both could not be located at their given addresses. Incidentally, the petitioner claims, and Baetiong does not dispute, that it was not served with a copy of Baetiong’s answer. The petitioner now argues before us that FGU Insurance, which is the plaintiff in the third-party complaint, had failed to exert efforts to serve summons on the Garcias. It suggests that a motion to serve summons by publication should have been filed for this purpose. The petitioner also asserts that the RTC should have scheduled a hearing to determine the status of the summons to the third-party defendants.8

The Order Of Dismissal

With the above procedural events presented by both parties as the only backdrop, on December 16, 2003 the RTC issued a

tersely worded order9 dismissing Civil Case No. 02-488. For clarity, we quote the dismissal order in full:

O R D E R

For failure of [petitioner] to prosecute, the case is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

The RTC denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,10 prompting the latter to elevate its case to the CA via a Rule 41 petition for review.11

The Ruling of the Appellate Court

FGU Insurance moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It argued that the appeal raised a pure question of law as it did not dispute the proceedings before the issuance of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order.

The petitioner, on the other hand, insisted that it had raised questions of fact in the appeal.12 Thus -

While, the instant appeal does not involve the merits of the case, the same involves questions of fact based on the records of the case. It must be emphasized that the lower court’s dismissal of the case based on alleged failure to prosecute on the part of plaintiff-appellant was too sudden and precipitate. This being the case, the facts [sic] to be determined is whether based on the records of the case, was there a definite inaction on the part of plaintiff-appellant? A careful examination of all pleadings filed as well as the orders of the lower court vis-à-vis the rules should now be made in order to determine whether there was indeed a "failure to prosecute" on the part of plaintiff-appellant[.]13 (emphases supplied)

The CA agreed with FGU Insurance and dismissed the appeal, and denied as well the subsequent motion for reconsideration.14 The petitioner thus filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

The Present Petition

The petitioner pleads five (5) grounds to reverse the CA’s resolutions and to reinstate Civil Case No. 02-488. In an effort perhaps to make sense of the dismissal of the case (considering that the trial court had not stated the facts that justify it), the petitioner draws this Court’s attention to certain facts and issues that we find to be of little materiality to the disposition of this petition:

Grounds/ Statement of Matters Involved

I. The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to determine the merits of the Appeal as the matters therein involve both questions of law and fact.

II. The lower court erred in declaring that petitioner failed to prosecute the case despite the fact that petitioner never received a copy of the Answer of Third-party defendant-respondent Reynaldo Baetiong.

III. The lower court erred in declaring that petitioner failed to prosecute the case despite the fact that there is no joinder of indispensable parties and issues yet because defendant-respondent Leticia B. Magsalin as well as third-party defendant-respondents Godofredo and Concordia Garcia’s whereabouts were unknown, hence no service yet on them of the copy of the summons and complaint with annexes[.]

IV. The lower court erred in declaring that Petitioner failed to prosecute the case despite the fact that it was party respondent FGU which caused the cancellation of the hearing.

V. It is evident that the lower court’s dismissal of the case is a clear denial of due process.15

In our Resolution dated February 13, 2006,16 we required the respondents to comment. FGU Insurance’s comment17 alleges that the present petition is "fatally defective" for being unaccompanied by material portions of the record. It reiterates that the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096 was improperly filed under Rule 41 and should have been filed directly with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Baetiong, in his comment,18 asserts that the dismissal of the appeal was in accord with existing laws and applicable jurisprudence.

The Ruling Of The Court

Preliminarily, we resolve the claim that the petition violates Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on the attachment of material portions of the record. We note that FGU Insurance fails to discharge its burden of proving this claim by not specifying the material portions of the record the petitioner should have attached to the petition. At any rate, after a careful perusal of the petition and its attachments, the Court finds the petition to be sufficient. In other words, we can judiciously assess and resolve the present petition on the basis of its allegations and attachments.

After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition on the ground that the December 16, 2003 dismissal order is null and void for violation of due process. We are also convinced that the appeal to challenge the dismissal order was properly filed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. We further find that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 for failure to prosecute is not supported by facts, as shown by the records of the case.

The Dismissal Order is Void

The nullity of the dismissal order is patent on its face. It simply states its conclusion that the case should be dismissed for non prosequitur, a legal conclusion, but does not state the facts on which this conclusion is based.

Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A plain examination of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order shows that it is an unqualified order and, as such, is deemed to be a dismissal with prejudice. "Dismissals of actions (under Section 3) which do not expressly state whether they are with or without prejudice are held to be with prejudice[.]"19 As a prejudicial dismissal, the December 16, 2003 dismissal order is also deemed to be a judgment on the merits so that the petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No. 02-488 can no longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata. Procedurally, when a complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on the merits.20

As an adjudication on the merits, it is imperative that the dismissal order conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court on the writing of valid judgments and final orders. The rule states:

RULE 36Judgments, Final Orders and Entry Thereof

Section 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. — A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court.

The December 16, 2003 dismissal order clearly violates this rule for its failure to disclose how and why the petitioner failed to prosecute its complaint. Thus, neither the petitioner nor the reviewing court is able to know the particular facts that had prompted the prejudicial dismissal. Had the petitioner perhaps failed to appear at a scheduled trial date? Had it failed to take appropriate actions for the active prosecution of its complaint for an unreasonable length of time? Had it failed to comply with the rules or any order of the trial court? The December 16, 2003 dismissal order does not say.

We have in the past admonished trial courts against issuing dismissal orders similar to that appealed in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096. A trial court should always specify the reasons for a complaint’s dismissal so that on appeal, the reviewing court can readily determine the prima facie justification for the dismissal.21 A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark and is especially prejudicial to the losing party who is unable to point the assigned error in seeking a review by a higher tribunal.22

We thus agree with the petitioner that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 constituted a denial of due process. Elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be given information on how the case was decided, as well as an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.23 Where the reasons are absent, a decision (such as the December 16, 2003 dismissal order) has absolutely nothing to support it and is thus a nullity.24

For this same reason, we are not moved by respondent FGU Insurance’s statement that the disposition of the present petition must be limited to the issue of whether the CA had correctly dismissed the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096.25 This statement implies that we cannot properly look into the validity of the

December 16, 2003 dismissal order in this Rule 45 petition. A void decision, however, is open to collateral attack. While we note that the validity of the dismissal order with respect to Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court was never raised by the petitioner as an issue in the present petition, the Supreme Court is vested with ample authority to review an unassigned error if it finds that consideration and resolution are indispensable or necessary in arriving at a just decision in an appeal.26 In this case, the interests of substantial justice warrant the review of an obviously void dismissal order.

The appeal was properly filedunder Rule 41 of the Rules of Court

While the nullity of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order constitutes the ratio decidendi for this petition, we nevertheless rule on the contention that the appeal was erroneously filed.27

In dismissing the appeal, the CA relied on the premise that since the facts presented in the petitioner’s appeal were admitted and not disputed, the appeal must thereby raise a pure question of law proscribed in an ordinary appeal. This premise was effectively the legal principle articulated in the case of Joaquin v. Navarro,28 cited by the CA in its April 8, 2005 resolution. Respondent FGU Insurance thus contends that the proper remedy to assail the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 was an appeal filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The reliance on Joaquin is misplaced as it is based on the conclusion the appellate court made in its April 8, 2005 resolution — i.e., that the pleading of undisputed facts is equivalent to a prohibited appeal. The reliance is inattentive to both the averments of the subject appeal and to the text of the cited case. The operative legal principle in Joaquin is this: "[W]here a case is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the

correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which [is properly subject to the review of this Court.]"29 In this case, as already pointed out above, the facts supposedly supporting the trial court’s conclusion of non prosequitur were not stated in the judgment. This defeats the application of Joaquin.

At any rate, we believe that the filing of the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096 under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court was proper as it necessarily involved questions of fact.

An authority material to this case is the case of Olave v. Mistas.30 Directly addressed in Olave was the CA’s jurisdiction over an ordinary appeal supported by undisputed facts and seeking the review of a prejudicial order of dismissal. In this case, a complaint was filed before the RTC in Lipa City to nullify an instrument titled "Affidavit of Adjudication By The Heirs of the Estate of Deceased Persons With Sale." The RTC dismissed the complaint, with prejudice, after the plaintiffs had moved to set the case for pre-trial only after more than three (3) months had lapsed from the service and filing of the last pleading in the case. The plaintiffs thereafter went to the CA on a Rule 41 petition, contending, among others, that the trial court had erred and abused its discretion. As in the present case, the defendants moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the issues therein were legal; they pointed out that the circumstances on record were admitted.31 They argued that the proper remedy was a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The CA denied the motion and entertained the appeal. It rendered a decision reinstating the complaint on the ground that there was no evidence on record that the plaintiffs had deliberately failed to prosecute their complaint.

When the case was elevated to this court on a Rule 45 petition, we squarely addressed the propriety of the plaintiffs’ appeal. Though mindful that the circumstances pleaded in the appeal were all admitted, we categorically held in Olave that the appeal was correctly filed. We observed that despite undisputed records, the CA, in its review, still had to respond to factual questions such as the length of time between the plaintiffs’ receipt of the last pleading filed up to the time they moved to set the case for pre-trial, whether there had been any manifest intention on the plaintiffs’ part not to comply with the Rules of Court, and whether the plaintiffs’ counsel was negligent.

Significantly, in Olave, we agreed with the plaintiffs that among the critical factual questions was whether, based on the records, there had been factual basis for the dismissal of the subject complaint. This same question is particularly significant in the present case given that the order appealed from in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096 does not even indicate the factual basis for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488. Due to the absence of any stated factual basis, and despite the admissions of the parties, the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096, still had to delve into the records to check whether facts to justify the prejudicial dismissal even exist. Since the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 appears to have been rendered motu proprio (as the December 16, 2003 dismissal order does not state if it was issued upon the respondents’ or the trial court’s motion), the facts to be determined by the CA should include the grounds specified under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A court could only issue a motu proprio dismissal pursuant to the grounds mentioned in this rule and for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.32 These grounds are matters of facts. Thus, given that the dismissal order does not disclose its factual basis, we are thus persuaded that the petitioner had properly filed its appeal from the dismissal order under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

The Dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 is not Supported by the Facts of the Case

We also find that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 is not warranted. Based on available records and on the averments of the parties, the following events were chronologically proximate to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488: (a) on March 24, 2003, the court admitted FGU Insurance’s third-party complaint; (b) the trial court cancelled the June 20, 2003 hearing upon FGU Insurance’s motion; and (c) on June 16, 2003, Baetiong filed his Answer to the third-party complaint but did not serve it upon the petitioner.

None of these events square with the grounds specified by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court for the motu proprio dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute. These grounds are as follows:

(a) Failure of the plaintiff, without justifiable reasons, to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief;

(b) Failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time;

(c) Failure of the plaintiff to comply with the Rules of Court; or

(d) Failure of the plaintiff to obey any order of the court.

In our view, the developments in the present case do not satisfy the stringent standards set in law and jurisprudence for a non prosequitur.33 The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.34 There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute.35

In this case, the parties’ own narrations of facts demonstrate the petitioner’s willingness to prosecute its complaint.1âwphi1 Indeed, neither respondents FGU Insurance nor Baetiong was able to point to any specific act committed by the petitioner to justify the dismissal of their case.

While it is discretionary on the trial court to dismiss cases, dismissals of actions should be made with care. The repressive or restraining effect of the rule amounting to adjudication upon the merits may cut short a case even before it is fully litigated; a ruling of dismissal may forever bar a litigant from pursuing judicial relief under the same cause of action. Hence, sound discretion demands vigilance in duly recognizing the circumstances surrounding the case to the end that technicality shall not prevail over substantial justice.36

This court is thus of the opinion that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 is not warranted. Neither facts, law or jurisprudence supports the RTC’s finding of failure to prosecute on the part of the petitioner.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition is Granted. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated April 8, 2005 and October 4, 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order dated December 16, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati City, in Civil Case No. 02-488 is declared NULL and VOID, and the petitioner’s complaint therein is ordered REINSTATED for further proceedings. No costs.