CIVPRO Cases Batch 1.1.pdf

8/9/2019 CIVPRO Cases Batch 1.1.pdf

1/52

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 150286. October 17, 2003]

ELCEE FARMS, INC., and CORAZON SAGUEMULLER, peti t ioner,vs. PAMPILO SEMILLANO and ONE HUNDRED THIRTY OTHERSand THE NLRC, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of theRules of Court assailing the Decision,[1]dated February 23, 2001, rendered bythe Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 56492 which dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction the petition for annulment of a decision of the National LaborRelations Commission (NLRC), filed by Elcee Farms, Inc. (Elcee Farms forbrevity) and Corazon Saguemuller.

The following are the antecedent facts:

On December 26, 1990, a complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by 144employees before the NLRC (Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII, Bacolod

City) against (a) petitioners Elcee Farms and Saguemuller; and (b) HillaCorporation, Rey Hilado and Roberto Montao. Of the 144 namedcomplainants, only 28[2]submitted their affidavits and evidence ofemployment.

In a Decision[3]dated October 20, 1993, the Labor Arbiter ordered HillaCorporation to pay each of the 28 complainants the sum of P2,235.62 asseparation pay but dismissed all claims against Elcee Farms, Saguemuller,Hilado and Montao, for lack of merit.[4]

Not satisfied with the decision, private respondents and Hilla Corporation

appealed to the NLRC.

In a Decision[5]dated March 29, 1995, the NLRC modified the decision ofthe Labor Arbiter by holding all defendants liable for the payment ofseparation pay and adding the payment of P5,000.00 as moral damages toeach complainant for all the troubles and sufferings from the disturbance oftheir rights to labor.[6]All the parties moved for reconsideration.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn1


2/52

On May 29, 1996, the NLRC issued a Resolution[7]modifying its decisionby: (a) absolving Hilla Corporation from liability and held only petitioners ElceeFarms and Saguemuller liable for the separation pay, moral and exemplarydamages; and (b) increasing the number of awardees from 28 to 131 [8]basedon the list of remitted SSS contributions as of 1990. [9]

Aggrieved, petitioners filed two separate petitions for certiorari with thisCourt under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court through different counsels.

The first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 125714, was initiated on August 9,1996 via a motion for a 60-day extension of time to file a petitionfor certiorari.[10] Petitioners filed a second motion for extension oftime,[11]unaware that they were only granted by the Court a 30-day extensionand they failed to submit their petition within that period. Petitioners counselthereafter filed a motion for leave to withdraw the two motions for extension onthe ground that said motions were not authorized by petitioners.[12]In aResolution dated October 16, 1996, the Court through the Second Divisiondenied: (a) the second motion for extension of time for being filed beyond theextension period granted by the Court, and (b) the motion to withdraw sincethe two motions for extension were filed before the authority of counsel waswithdrawn by petitioners. [13] Subsequently, in a Resolution dated February 17,1997, the Court considered the judgment sought to be reviewed as final andexecutory for failure of petitioners to file the petition for certiorari within thegranted extension period.[14] On February 21, 1997, petitioners filed a Motionfor Leave to Admit Manifestation and/or Motion for Clarification of the October

16, 1996 Resolution.

[15]

On April 10, 1997, petitioners filed a Motion forReconsideration of the February 17, 1997 Resolution.[16] Both motions weredenied with finality by the Second Division in its Resolution dated June 23,1997.[17]

The second petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 126428, was filedon September 11, 1996, or a month after G.R. No. 125714 was filed with theCourt.[18]In a Resolution dated November 12, 1997, the First Division of thisCourt gave due course to the petition and required: (a) the petitioners to paythe deposit for costs; and, (b) both parties to submit their respectivememoranda.[19]However, the said Resolution was sent at 2

ndfloor, Jocson

Building, B.S. Aquino Drive, 6100, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental instead ofMario Building, P. Hernaez Street, 6100 Bacolod City, Negros Occidental, theaddress provided for in the petition for certiorari. Thus, petitioners failed tocomply. In a Resolution dated March 25, 1998, the Court dismissed thepetition for certiorari for non-compliance with the Resolution of November 12,1997 requiring said deposit for costs and memorandum.[20]Said Resolution wasalso sent to the wrong address.[21]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn7


3/52

With the dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the NLRC Resolution datedMay 29, 1996 became final and executory as of July 1, 1996. [22]

On December 20, 1999, petitioner Saguemuller filed before the NLRC aMotion to Stay Execution on the ground of absolute nullity of decision. But,

without awaiting the resolution of its pending motion with the NLRC, petitionerSaguemuller together with Elcee Farms filed on January 4, 2000, a petition forannulment of judgment[23]with the Court of Appeals on the following grounds:

a) The resolution awards damages in favor of persons or alleged claimants who neverpursued their complaints.

b) The Resolution considered evidence for the first time on appeal.

c) The Resolution considered alleged factual circumstances that were never presentedduring the hearing of the case.

d) The Resolution rendered judgment against a person who clearly was not anemployer nor even an employee of the employer corporation.

e) The Resolution awarded damages without basis in law or in fact.

f) The Resolution modified the Decision that was already final.

g) The Resolution ennobled a prescribed claim. [24]

The petitioners reiterated the foregoing grounds for annulment in theirMemorandum[25]dated July 31, 2000 filed with the Court of Appeals and for thefirst time, interjected that there was extrinsic fraud in the proceedings beforethe Supreme Court claiming that the Resolution dated November 12, 1997 ofthe First Division of this Court which required them to pay the cost and to

submit their Memorandum was sent at 2nd

floor, Jocson Building, B.S. AquinoDrive, 6100, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental instead of Mario Building, P.Hernaez Street, 6100 Bacolod City, Negros Occidental, the address providedfor in the petition for certiorari; as a result of which, they failed to receive theResolution and for non-compliance, the First Division dismissed the petition. [26]

In its Decision[27]dated February 23, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissedthe petition for annulment of judgment on ground of lack of jurisdiction. It heldthat petitioners cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the said court pursuant toRule 47 of the Rules of Court because said rule refers to decisions of regional

trial courts and not to quasi-judicial bodies. The appellate court also notedthat petitioners had availed of the relief of certiorariunder Rule 65 before theSupreme Court but they were not diligent in pursuing the same, to theirprejudice.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [28]but the Court of Appealsdenied the same in a Resolution dated September 19, 2001. [29]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn22


4/52

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the ground thatthe Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it refused to assumejurisdiction and annul a patently unjust decision of the NLRC.

Per the Courts Resolution dated January 21, 2002, respondents filed their

Comment dated March 6, 2002.[30]

On June 14, 2002, petitioners filed a Replyto private respondents Comment.

On February 3, 2003, private respondents filed with the Court a motionpraying for the remand of the records and for the issuance of an orderdirecting the Labor Arbiter to issue a writ of execution. [31] In compliance withthe Courts Resolution dated March17, 2003, petitioners filed their Commenton June 4, 2003, arguing that to grant the motion would render moot thepresent petition for review.

Hence, the Court deems it proper to resolve the issues raised in the main

petition.The instant petition for review is devoid of merit. The Court finds no error

in the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals. As correctly held by theappellate court, it has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of afinal and executory judgment of the NLRC. Section 9 of BP 129,[32]asamended, only vests in the Court of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction overactions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts.[33]

Moreover, annulment of judgment is allowed only where the ordinaryremedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies

are no longer available through no fault of petitioners. [34] In this case,petitioners were well-aware that they had the available remedy of a petitionfor certiorarito this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In fact, theytwice sought recourse with this Court via petitions for certioraribut bothpetitions were dismissed.

The Court notes that petitioners have an incorrect view of the effect of thedismissal of their second petition for certiorari(G.R. No. 126428) for non-payment of costs and failure to file memorandum. They posit thatconsidering, however, that the dismissal of the petition was not on the merits,

petitioners elected not to further pursue the matter.

[35]

It is a settled rule thatminute resolutions of this Court denying due course to petitions or dismissingcases summarily for failure to comply with the formal or substantialrequirements laid down by law are actually dispositions on the merits. [36]

The two petitions earlier filed by the petitioners before this Court and thepetition for annulment of judgment filed before the Court of Appealsundoubtedly run smack of forum shopping. A party is guilty of forum shopping
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn34http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn34http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn34http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn34http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn30


5/52

when he repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts,simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the sametransactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raisingsubstantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely,by some other court.[37] Forum shopping has been characterized as an act of

malpractice that is prohibited and condemned as trifling with the courts andabusing their processes. It constitutes improper conduct which tends todegrade the administration of justice. It has also been aptly described asdeplorable because it adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened docketsof the courts.[38]

As a general rule, the client is bound by the negligence or mistake of hiscounsel. But this rule is not without exception. The Court inGovernmentService Insurance System vs. Bengson Commerical Buildings,Inc.,[39]elucidated, thus:

As a general rule, the negligence or mistake of counsel binds the client, forotherwise there would never be an end to a suit so long as a new counselcould be employed who could allege and show that the former counsel had

not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned.

If under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as anaid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors mustbe relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice.In other words, the Court has the power to except a particular case from the

operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it. What shouldguide judicial action is that a party is given the fullest opportunity to establishthe merits of his action or defense rather than for him to lose life, honor or

property on mere technicalities.[40]

In De Guzman vs. Sandiganbayan,[41]this Court, ever mindful of the supremacyof substantive rights over technicalities and invoking its power to suspend therules, relieved petitioner De Guzman from the costly importunings of hisprevious lawyers who filed a demurrer to evidence despite the trial courtsdenial of his motion for leave. The Court emphasized:

. . . Under the circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity demandthat petitioner be not penalized for the costly importunings of his previouslawyers based on the same principles why this Court had, on many occasionswhere it granted new trial, excused parties from the negligence or mistakes ofcounsel. To cling to the general rule in this case is only to condone
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/jan2002/137448.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/jan2002/137448.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/jan2002/137448.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/jan2002/137448.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn39http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn39http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn39http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn40http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn40http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn40http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn41http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn41http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn41http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn41http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn40http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn39http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/jan2002/137448.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/jan2002/137448.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/jan2002/137448.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn37


6/52

rather than rectify a serious injustice to petitioners whose only fault wasto repose his faith and entrust his innocence to his previous lawyers.

. . . . . . . . .

Let us not forget that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere toolsdesigned to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigidapplication, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate ratherthan promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Even the Rules ofCourt envision this liberality. This power to suspend or even disregard therules can be so pervasive and encompassing so as to alter even thatwhich this Court has already declared to be final. . .

. . . . . . . . .

The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines inthe dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispensesit, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules,shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering realjustice have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guidedby the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat againstsubstantive rights, and not the other way around. Truly then, technicalities, inthe appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, should give way to therealities of the situation.[42](Emphasis supplied)

It is worthwhile to add that our courts are not only courts of justice but alsoof equity. Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach anddo complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rulesand want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances ofcases, are incompetent so to do.[43] Equity regards the spirit and not the letter,the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as itis variously expressed by different courts.[44]

In this case, the erroneous move taken by petitioners counsel in institutingthe petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals instead of

zealously pursuing the petition in G.R. No. 126428 before the First Division ofthis Court should not bind petitioners because they appear to have legitimategrievances.

The Court entertains serious apprehensions on the validity of the serviceof the Resolution dated November 12, 1997 of the First Division of this Courtin G.R. No. 136428 which required petitioners to deposit for costs and tosubmit their memorandum, non-compliance of which inevitably caused the
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn42http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn42http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn42http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn43http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn43http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn43http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn44http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn44http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn44http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn44http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn43http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn42


7/52

dismissal of their petition for certiorari. Petitioners claim that the Resolutiondated November 12, 1997 was not sent to the address of his counsel asexpressly stated in the petition itself but to counsels former address when thecase was still with the NLRC. The possibility that such a procedural errormight have been caused by a mistake committed by this Courts personnel is

not far-fetched and it should not militate against petitioners right to dueprocess. Practical considerations and the realities of the situation dictate thatthe service at the old address of petitioners counsel and not at the address ofpetitioners counsel as specified in the petition cannot be considered a validservice. To consider the service of the resolution at counsels old address,when he did not give it to the court as his address for the particular case inwhich he entered his appearance, would be to sanction the service of courtprocesses and orders on counsel wherever he may have an office.[45]

The Court is even more concerned with the Resolution of the NLRC

dated May 29, 1996 increasing the number of awardees from 28 to 131which was apparently based only on the list of remitted SSScontributions as of 1990 when it is an undisputed fact that only 28employees submitted their affidavits and evidence of employmentbefore the Labor Arbiter.

Be that as it may, such concerns cannot be raised and resolved in apetition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals or in theinstant petition for review. They are proper questions for resolution in thepetition for certioraribefore the First Division of this Court (G.R. No. 126428)

should it decide to reinstate the petition, upon proper showing that the subjectResolution was indeed sent to an incorrect address without the fault ofpetitioners but which unduly deprived petitioners of opportunity to present theircase.

Consequently, it is likewise not within the jurisdiction of this Court in thepresent petition to act on private respondents motion for remand of therecords and for the issuance of an order directing the Labor Arbiter to issue awrit of execution.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of

merit but without prejudice to a more appropriate remedy, if any.SO ORDERED.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn45http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn45http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn45http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150286.htm#_ftn45


8/52

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 134895. June 19, 2001]

STA. LUCIA REALTY and DEVELOPMENT, INC., NEW NORTH

FAIRVIEW DEVELOPMENT CORP., DBH DEVELOPMENT CORP.

and ACL DEVELOPMENT CORP., petitioners, vs. LETICIA

CABRIGAS and MIGUEL CABRIGAS, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review is the 31 July 1998 Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47601, affirming the 22 September 1997 and 24 February1998 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 221, in Civil Case

No. Q94-19651.

The main point of contention in the instant case is whether or not a judgmentrendered by a trial court in an action for reconstitution may serve to bar an action for

quieting of title pending before another court based upon the principle of res judicata.

The factual antecedents of this controversy, as culled from the pleadings of theparties and the assailed decision of the appellate court, are as follows:

On 5 February 1993, private respondents Leticia and Miguel Cabrigas filed a

petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for the judicialreconstitution of the originals of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 259042 and

259043 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, which were destroyed by the fire

that gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988. These certificates of title allegedly

covered Lots 781 and 787 of the Tala Estate. The petition was docketed as LCR Case

No. Q-60161(93) and raffled to Branch 94, presided by Judge Romeo Zamora. In

support of their petition, private respondents presented a photocopy of their owners

duplicate of the transfer certificates of title, together with tax declarations in the nameof private respondent Leticia Cabrigas corresponding to the land in dispute. It was

alleged by private respondent Leticia Cabrigas that she bought the two parcels of land

from her father, Ludovico Cajilig, who held such properties under TCT Nos. 180458and 180459.


9/52

The Republic of the Philippines and petitioners opposed the petition for

reconstitution primarily on the ground that TCT Nos. 259042 and 259043 werespurious and fabricated, offering an extensive amount of evidence on this point. In

addition, an existing transfer certificate of title covering the disputed parcels of land

(TCT No. 233694) was presented by petitioners, which they traced to TCT No.

200519 issued on 19 July 1974 to B.C. Regalado and Co., Inc., predecessor-in-interestof petitioners, covering over four million square meters. When the land was

subdivided, TCT No. 200519 was cancelled and thousands of new certificates of titlewere issued, including TCT No. 233694. According to the oppositors, TCT No.

233694 covers 166 road lots, thirteen of which fall within the area formerly

encompassed by Lots 781 and 787 of the Tala Estate under TCT No. 200159.[1]

On 7 March 1994, during the pendency of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93), privaterespondents filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for quieting of title

against petitioners and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, which was docketed as

Civil Case No. Q94-19651 and assigned to Branch 221, presided by Judge Noel J.Tijam.

Meanwhile, a decision was rendered by Judge Zamora in LCR Case No. Q-

60161(93) on 30 September 1996, dismissing the petition for reconstitution. The trialcourt held that it did not acquire jurisdiction to hear and decide the case due to

petitioners failure to comply with certain mandatory and jurisdictional requirements

under Republic Act No. 26 (RA 26). Aside from this, the trial court found that, based

upon the evidence presented by the oppositors, the titles presented by private

respondents were not authentic and that the disputed property is covered by subsisting

titles in the names of other persons which should first be annulled before the courtcould proceed with the reconstitution proceedings. The decision, which became final

and executory, provided that

Anent the issued [sic] of jurisdiction, Republic Act No. 26 (1946), entitled An ActProviding a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of Title

Lost or Destroyed, which was the basis of the petitioners for the constitution [sic],

confers jurisdiction or authority on the Regional Trial Court to hear and decide

petitions for judicial reconstitution. It provides that [a] petition for reconstitutionmust allege certain specific jurisdictional facts before the Court can acquire

jurisdiction. The requirements and procedures under RA 26 are mandatory andjurisdictional, (Ortigas vs Company Limited Partnership vs Judge Tirso Velasco, Et.,

Al. (234 SCRA 455)). If these requirements are not strictly complied with, theproceedings will be utterly void (Director of Lands vs. CA, 102 SCRA 370). The law

provides the following requirements:

Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26 provide:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn1


10/52

SEC. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in Sections 2 (c), 2

(d), 2 (e), 2 (f), 3 (c), 3 (d), 3 (e), and or 3 (f) of this Act, shall be filed with the properCourt of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns or any person having an

interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among others, the

following: (a) that the owners duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or

destroyed; (b) that no co-owners, mortgagees or lessees duplicate had been issued,or if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location area

and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the building orimprovement, if any, which do not belong to the owners of such buildings or

improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession

of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may

have any interest in the property; [(f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if

any, affecting the property;] and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments

affecting the property have been presented for registration, or [if] there be [any, the

registration thereof has not been] accomplished, as yet. All the documents, orauthenticated copies thereof, to x x x [sic] [be] introduced in evidence in support x x

x [sic] [of] the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the

same; Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively fromsources enumerated in Section 2 (f) or 3 (f) of this Act, the petition shall be further

accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by

the Chief of the General Land Registration Office (now Commission of LandRegistration) or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate

covering the sameproperty.

Sec. 13. The Court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding

section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues ofthe Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the municipality or city

in which the land is situated, at the provincial building and of the municipal building

at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The Court shall likewise cause a copyof the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the

petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days

prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of

the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the registered owner,

the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the

adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundariesof the property, and the date on which, all persons having any interest therein mustappear and filed [sic] their claim or objection[s] to the petition. The petitioner shall at

the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as

directed by the Court.


11/52

Petitioner did not allege the following: (a) the nature and description of the buildings

or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the lot like the roads,sewer lines, drainage, club house, and other subdivision amenities introduced by

intervenors; (b) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of

the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties, and of all persons who may

have interest in the property, particularly the buyers of the different subdivision lots;and (c) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been

registered. There was no approved plan and technical description with a certifiedcopy with the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same

property. Although the plan submitted by the petitioners was signed by the private

surveyor, there was no seal of approval from any government agency. These

omissions delve into the acquisition of jurisdiction by the Court, furthermore, Sec. 5,

RA No. 26 (as amended) provides:

The petition shall be accompanied with the necessary sources for reconstitution and

with an affidavit of the registered owner stating, among other things:

(1) That no deed or other instrument affecting the property had been presented for

registration, of if there be any, the nature thereof, the date of its presentation, as wellas the names of the parties, and whether the registration of such deed or instrument is

still pending accomplishment;

(2) That the owners duplicate certificate or co-owners duplicate is in due form

without any apparent intention[al] alternation[s] or erasures;

(3) That the certificate of title is not the subject of litigation or investigation,administrative or judicial, regarding its genuineness or due execution or issuance;

(4) That the certificate of title was in full force and effect at the time it was lost or

destroyed;

(5) That the certificate of title is covered by a tax declaration regularly issued by the

Assessors Office and;

(6) That real estate taxes have been fully paid up to at least two (2) years prior to the

filing of the petition for reconstitution.

such that even assuming arguendo that the titles are valid and authentic the petition

would still be inadequate. The petition is not accompanied by the affidavit required in

this provision. The verification of the petition made by Leticia Cabrigas would notsuffice because it does not contain the following: (a) that no deed or other instrument

affecting the property had been presented for registration; (b) that the owners


12/52

duplicate certificate is in due form without any apparent intentional alternations or

erasures; (c) that the certificate of title is not the subject of litigation or investigation,administrative or judicial, regarding its genuineness or due execution or issuance and

(d) that the real estate taxes have been fully paid up to the last two years prior to the

filing or the petition for reconstitution.

There is also the fact that there was a defect in the notice of hearing and posting. Sec.13 of RA No. 26 requires notice to be sent to the individual title holders and the

Supreme Court has also ruled that actual notice of the petition must be sent to the

registered owners of the property affected as notice by publication is not enough(Manila Railroad & Co., Inc. vs Moya, 14 SCRA 358, 363, 364). The petitioners did

not comply with these jurisdictional facts which is mandatory (Ortigas vs. Judge

Velasco, supra). As to the posting of the notice of hearing, Sec. 3 (e); 3 (f) and 13 of

the law require that it be posted in the entrance of the city or municipal hall. TheCertificate of Posting dated March 15, 1993 was posted only on the courts bulletin

board, the sheriffs wall, and at the Barangay Hall as can be read from the very

wording of the Certificate. The aforementioned case of Tahanan vs CA, (118 SCRA

273) teaches us that such defect is fatal to the acquisition of jurisdiction by the court.

Lastly, another important point which is relevant to the determination of whether or

not the petition should be granted is the fact that the disputed property is covered by

subsisting titles in the names of other persons. As was mentioned earlier in the factsof the case, intervenors and the lot buyers of Neopolitan Subdivision hold torrens

titles to lands which petitioners titles purport to cover this being the case, the Court

could not proceed with the reconstitution proceedings without the titles of these

buyers having [sic] first annulled.

In such a case, this Court is without jurisdiction to grant the petition. As was held in

the case of Alabang Development Co. vs Valenzuela (116 SCRA 261), The courts

simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution ofallegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued

subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners. (see also Ortigas vs

Judge Velasco, Et. Al., supra)

The court is mindful of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of

Director of Lands vs CA (93 SCRA 238) which states that:

This Tribunal can take judicial notice of innumerable litigations and [legal]

controversies spawned by overlapping and encroaching boundaries, each party relying

on certificates of titles issued under the Torrens [S]ystem or the Spanish registration

laws or other deeds and documents which prima facie show their lawful interests orownership therein. To the ordinary land purchaser not fully acquainted with the


13/52


14/52


15/52

There are four (4) essential requisites which must concur in order for res judicata as a

bar by former judgment to attach, viz:

1. The former judgment must be final;

2. It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subjectmatter and the parties;

3. It must be a judgment or order on the merits; and

4. There must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of

subject matter and identity of causes of action. (p. 499-500, Underscoring Supplied)

The trial court in the first reconstitution case acknowledged that it did not acquire

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition (p. 10 of Decision in LRC CASE

No. Q-60161 (93). Its disquisition on the spuriousness of the owners duplicate ofTransfer Certificate of Titles Nos. 259042 and 259043 is at best an obiter dictum

which petitioners cannot invoke as a bar to the quieting of title case.

Obiter dictum simply means words of a prior opinion entirely unnecessary for the

decision of the case (Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 1222, citing the case of Noel v.Olds, 78 U.S. App. D.C. 155) or an incidental and collateral opinion uttered by a

judge and therefore not material to his decision or judgment and not binding

(Websters Third New International Dictionary, p. 1555).

Moreover, since the first reconstitution case and quieting of title case are entirelydifferent cause of action, the decision in the former case will not bar the latter.

Anent the issue of whether or not private respondents were forum shopping when they

filed the three separate cases, viz, the first reconstitution case that was dismissed for

want of jurisdiction, the quieting of title case and the second reconstitution case, the

Court finds that the quieting of title case can exist separately from the reconstitution

case because each has different legal consequences. In the quieting of title case,

private respondents ownership over Lots 781 and 787 of the Tala Estate can beaffirmed and they can ask for the cancellation of petitioners title thereon. In the

reconstitution case, private respondents can only ask for the reconstitution ofdocuments that were already lost or destroyed, viz, the original copies of TransferCertificates of Title Nos. 259042 and 259043, but the trial court cannot confirm nor

adjudicate ownership over the property they cover (Serra Serra vs Court of Appeals,

195 SCRA 482, 490).


16/52


17/52

some mandatory provisions of RA 26, it still retained the jurisdiction to declare as

fabricated the titles of private respondents, citing Ortigas & Co. Ltd. v.Velasco,[9]Director of Lands v. Sta. Maria,[10]Alabang Development Corp. v.

Valenzuela,[11]and Tahanan Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[12]wherein the

Court declared as fake the titles sought to be reconstituted, despite the fact that the

lower courts were pronounced to be without jurisdiction to grant the petition forfailure of the petitioners therein to observe the jurisdictional requirements of RA 26.

Petitioners argue that private respondents are liable for forum-shopping when

they instituted the action for quieting of title during the pendency of LCR Case No. Q-

60161(93), and when they filed yet another petition for reconstitution [LCR Case No.

8734(96)], involving the very same titles, during the pendency of the action for

quieting of title.[13]

On the other hand, private respondents insist that petitioners motion for a

preliminary hearing on their affirmative defense of res judicatafiled in Civil Case No.

Q94-19651 should have been denied by Judge Tijam for being filed out of time sincetrial was already on-going at the time it was filed. Also, it is contended that the special

civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioners with the Court of Appeals

assailing the 22 September 1997 and 24 February 1998 orders of Branch 221 waserroneously resorted to as there was no showing that Judge Tijam had acted without or

with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying

petitioners motions. Private respondents would also have the Court dismiss the

instant petition for the failure of petitioners to file a motion for reconsideration from

the 31 July 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47601.

As to the issue of res judicata, private respondents assert that the judgmentrendered in LCR Case No. Q-60161(93) will not bar Civil Case No. Q94-19651 since

certain elements of res judicata are absent. First of all, Branch 94 had no jurisdiction

over the subject matter of the case. Secondly, there is no identity of subject matter asthe petitioners title is fictitious and hence, could not refer to the properties covered by

private respondents titles. Finally, the two cases have different causes of action.[14]

After considering the arguments of both parties and assiduously studying therecords of this case, it is the Courts opinion that the present petition is not imbued

with merit.

Simply stated, the main issue in this case is whether the 30 September 1996decision of the trial court in LCR Case No. Q-60161(93) will bar by res judicatathe

action for quieting of title initiated by private respondents. The doctrine of res

judicatacomprehends two distinct concepts - (1) bar by former judgment and (2)

conclusiveness of judgment. For res judicatato serve as an absolute bar to asubsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment or

order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn9


18/52

been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and

(4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subjectmatter, and of causes of action.[15]When there is no identity of causes of action, but

only an identity of issues, there exists res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of

judgment.[16]Although it does not have the same effect as res judicatain the form of

bar by former judgment which prohibits the prosecution of a second action upon thesame claim, demand, or cause of action, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment bars

the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the sameparties on a different claim or cause of action.[17]

Petitioners would have this Court rule that, based on the principle on

conclusiveness of judgment, the declarations made by the trial court in LCR Case No.

Q-60161(93) regarding the lack of authenticity of private respondents titles arebinding upon the parties and accordingly, that this particular issue may no longer be

litigated in the action for quieting of title. On the other hand, private respondents

maintain that there can be no res judicata since Branch 94 had no jurisdiction over thesubject matter due to the non-compliance with certain mandatory provisions of RA

26, and in addition, there was no identity of subject matter and cause of action

between the two cases. In its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals concurred withthe position taken by private respondents. It ruled that there was no res

judicata asthe trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter

of the case since sections 5, 12 and 13 of RA 26, all of which have been held to bemandatory and jurisdictional provisions by this Court, were not complied with in LCR

Case No. Q-60161(93). In its pleadings, petitioners argue that private respondents

should be considered estopped from denying that Branch 94 had jurisdiction over the

petition for reconstitution since it is due to private respondents own fault that the trialcourt failed to acquire jurisdiction, and also because private respondents actively

participated in the reconstitution proceedings and sought affirmative relief from thetrial court.

Republic Act No. 26,[18]entitled An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the

Reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title Lost or Destroyed, as amended, [19]is aspecial law which provides for a specific procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens

certificates of title lost or destroyed.[20]It confers jurisdiction upon trial courts to hear

and decide petitions for judicial reconstitution. However, before the court can

properly act, assume and acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grantthe reconstitution prayed for, petitioner must observe certain special requirements and

mode of procedure prescribed by the law. Some of these requirements, having to do

with the contents of the petition for reconstitution and notice, are as follows

Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2(c), 2(d),2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn15


19/52

First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in

the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a)that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that

no co-owner's mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been

issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of

the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any,which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the

owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of theoccupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining

properties and all persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed

description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement

that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for

registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as

yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence

in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with thesame: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources

enumerated in section 2(f) of 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further be

accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved bythe Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the

description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.

Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding

section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues ofthe Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building

and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated,

at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copyof the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the

petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days

prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number ofthe lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the registered owner,

the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the

adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries

of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must

appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the

hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directedby the court.

In numerous cases, the Supreme Court has held that compliance with theseprovisions are mandatory and jurisdictional.[21]The failure to comply therewith

deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the case, and

consequently, all its proceedings are rendered null and void.[22]The rationale
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn21


20/52

underlying this rule concerns the nature of the conferment in the trial court of the

authority to undertake reconstitution proceedings. In all cases where the authority toproceed is conferred by a statute and the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is

mandatory, the same must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly

void.[23]

In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996 decision

in LCR Case No. Q-60161(93) that private respondents failed to comply with both

sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the subject

matter of the case. However, private respondents never questioned the trial courts

jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout the duration of LCR Case

No. Q-60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents actively participated in the

reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence. Theyinvoked the trial courts jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief the

reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus foreclosed their right to

raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own actions.

The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be

assailed at any stage, a litigants participation in all stages of the case before the trial

court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, barssuch party from challenging the courts jurisdiction.[24]A party cannot invoke the

jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after

obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same

jurisdiction.[25]The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating

in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment,

only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

[26]

However, despite our foregoing ruling, the Court is still precluded from declaring

the existence of res judicata, in any of its two forms, since one essential requisite is

absent a judgment on the merits. CitingEscarte v. Office of the President,[27]theCourt defined judgment on the merits in the 1994 case ofAllied Banking

Corporation v. Court of Appeals[28]-

x x x As a technical legal term, merits has been defined in law dictionaries as a

matter of substance in law, as distinguished from matter of form, and as the real orsubstantial grounds of action or defense, in contradistinction to some technical or

collateral matter raised in the course of the suit. A judgment is upon the merits when itamounts to a declaration of the law to the respective rights and duties of the parties,

based upon the ultimate fact or state of facts disclosed by the pleadings and evidence,and upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal, technical or

dilatory objectives or contentions.

Meanwhile, inDiwa v. Donato,[29]we held that
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn23


21/52

A judgment on the merits is one rendered after argument and investigation, and whenthere is determination which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment renderedupon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point, or by default and without

trial. By no stretch of the imagination can our Resolution of September 20, 1989 be

considered a judgment on the merits. All it resolved is the issue of the proper action

that petitioners should file in light of the allegations of their Complaint. We ruled thatthey should file an action for specific performance and not an action for

interpleader. Only after the filing of the proper action can the substantive rights of theparties be adjudicated. Needless to state, we did not adjudicate the substantive rights

of the parties in our Resolution of September 20, 1989.

Thus, a judgment on the merits is one wherein there is an unequivocal

determination of the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the causes of

action and the subject matter of the case.[30]Clearly, a judgment dismissing an actionfor want of jurisdiction cannot operate as res judicataon the merits.[31]Coming to the

case at bar, it is apparent that the trial courts 30 September 1996 Decision in LCR

Case No. Q-60161(93) dismissing the petition for reconstitution was mainly premised

upon its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case due to the lack of

substantial compliance of private respondents with Sections 5, 12 and 13 of RA

26. In plain and simple language, the trial court explicitly declared that the provisionsof RA 26 are mandatory and jurisdictional, and that it had not acquired jurisdiction

over the case since private respondents failed to comply therewith. Proceeding from

such declarations, it must be presumed, therefore, that Judge Zamora, being cognizantof the well-entrenched doctrine that absent jurisdiction the court cannot pass upon the

merits of a case,[32]did not intend to adjudicate the substantive aspects of the petition.

For a court to declare that it has no jurisdiction and at the same time to pass upon themerits of the case contravenes all legal and practical reasoning. Thus, Judge

Zamoras discussions on the existence and authenticity of private respondents

certificates of titles were superfluous, a mere obiter dictum. Such statements do notchange the fact that the petition for reconstitution was dismissed upon a matter of

procedurethe courts lack of jurisdiction.

Therefore, as there is no judgment on the merits, neither can there be a finding

of res judicataso as to bar the action for quieting of title. This being the case, there is

no more need to determine whether LCR Case No. Q-60161(93) and Civil Case No.

Q94-19651 share the same causes of action or issues.

As to the second petition for reconstitution of TCT Nos. 259042 and 259043[LCR Case No. Q-8734(96)] filed by private respondents during the pendency of the

action for quieting of title, the trial court, acting upon a motion filed by petitioners

North Fairview Development Corp. and DBH Development Corp., has alreadydismissed the same based on res judicata in its orders issued on 23 February 1998 and
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/134895.htm#_edn30


22/52

28 May 1998. Such orders are currently being reconsidered by the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. No. 59735. Considering these procedural antecedents, it would bepremature for the Court to determine whether or not LCR Case No. Q-8734(96)

should be dismissed. The better option would be to wait for the resolution of CA-G.R.

No. 59735 so as to avoid multiplicity of suits and the possibility of conflicting

decisions.

WHEREFORE,based the foregoing, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 148267. August 8, 2002]

ARMANDO C. CARPIO, peti t ioner, vs. SULU RESOURCESDEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent .

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Decisions and final orders of the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) areappealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.Although not expresslyincluded in the Rule, the MAB is unquestionably aquasi-judicial agency and stands in the same category as those enumeratedin its provisions.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rulesof Court, challenging the August 31, 2000 Decision[1]and May 3, 2001Resolution[2]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 46830. TheAssailed Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. [3]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn1


23/52

Reconsideration was denied in the assailed Resolution.

The Facts

In the challenged Decision, the CA summarized the facts of this case asfollows:

This case originated from a petition filed by respondent [Sulu ResourcesDevelopment Corporation] for Mines Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) No.MPSA-IV-131, covering certain areas in Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioner [Armando C.

Carpio] filed an opposition/adverse claim thereto, alleging, inter alia, that his

landholdings in Cupang and Antipolo, Rizal will be covered by respondents claim,

thus he enjoys a preferential right to explore and extract the quarry resources on his

properties.

After due proceedings were held, the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geo-

Sciences Bureau of the DENR rendered a Resolution dated September 26, 1996,

upholding petitioners opposition/adverse claim. This dispositive portion of said

Resolution reads:

x x x. WHEREFORE, the opposition/adverse claims of ARMANDO C. CARPIO is

hereby UPHELD. Accordingly, the properties of CARPIO are ordered excluded from

the area of PMPSA-IV-131 of SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, and the area not covered by the adverse claim as subject to mininglocations in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations.

SO ORDERED.

Respondent appealed the foregoing Resolution to the Mines Adjudication Board.

Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss appeal on the ground of respondentsfailure to comply with the requirements of the New Mining Acts Implementing Rules

and Regulations.

On June 20, 1997, the Mines Adjudication Board rendered the assailed Order

dismissing petitioners opposition/adverse claim. The dispositive portion of the

assailed Order provides:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, this Resolution of the Panel of

Arbitrators of Region IV dated September 26, 1996, is hereby SET ASIDE and the

adverse claim/opposition of CARPIO DISMISSED. Accordingly, the PMSPA of


24/52

SULU should be given due process and evaluated subject to the pertinent provisions

of RA 7942 and DAO 96-40.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order which was denied by theBoard per Order dated November 24, 1997, the decretal portion of which provides:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of

merit.[4]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Citing Section 79 of Chapter XIII of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA7942), the CA ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review the Decision ofthe Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). The adjudication of conflicting miningclaims is completely administrative in nature, as held in Pearson v.Intermediate Appellate Court. [5]Under RA 7942, the settlement of disputesinvolving rights to mining areas, mineral agreements, and surface owners,occupants and claimholders/concessionaires shall pertain exclusively to aPanel of Arbitrators in the regional office of the Department of Environmentand Natural Resources, whose decisions are appealable to the MinesAdjudication Board. Under Section 79 of RA 7942, the findings of fact by the

MAB as well as its decision or order shall be final and executory.Inasmuch as the issue raised by petitioner relates to whether an overlap or

a conflict between his properties and the area covered by the application ofrespondent has been proven, MABs finding thereon was binding andconclusive, and the Boards Decision was already final and executory.

Hence, this Petition.[6]

Issue

In his Memorandum, petitioner raises this sole issue for our consideration:

Whether or not appeals from the Decision or Final Orders of the MinesAdjudication Board should be made directly to the Supreme Court as contended bythe respondent and the Court of Appeals, or such appeals be first made to the Court of

Appeals as contended by herein petitioner.[7]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn4


25/52

This Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Sole Issue:Appel late Jur isdict ion o ver MAB Decis ions

Petitioner submits that appeals from the decisions of the MAB should befiled with the CA. First, the Supreme Court has authority, under Section 5(5) ofArticle VIII of the Philippine Constitution, to promulgate rules of procedure inall courts, including all quasi-judicial agencies such as theMAB. Second, Section 3 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedureauthorizes appeals to the CA from judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial

tribunals by means of petitions for review. Third, the MAB gravely abused itsdiscretion in deliberately, willfully and unlawfully disregarding petitionersrights to the land unduly included in the questioned application for a MinesProductive Sharing Agreement (MPSA).

En contrario, the CA ruled and respondent agrees that the settlement ofdisputes involving rights to mining areas and overlapping or conflicting claim isa purely administrative matter, over which the MAB has appellate jurisdiction.The latters factual findings, decisions and final orders on such matters arefinal and executory as provided in Section 79 of Chapter XIII of the Philippine

Mining Act of 1995 and as held in Pearson v. IAC. Since the appeal ofpetitioner pertains to the factual matter of whether he was able to prove theexistence of the overlap or conflict between his claimed area and that coveredby respondents application, then the findings of the MAB should be deemedfinal and executory.

The CA refused to take jurisdiction over the case because, under Section79 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, petitions for review of MAB decisionsare to be brought directly to the Supreme Court. The provision reads in part:

xxx xxx xxx

A petition for review bycertiorari and question of law may be filed by the aggrievedparty with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or

decision of the Board.

We hold that respondents reliance onPearson is misplaced. The claimanttherein sued in the then Court of First Instance (CFI) to prevent the execution


26/52

of a Decision rendered by the panel of investigators of the Bureau of Minesand the Office of the President. Despite a Motion to Dismiss filed by themining companies, the CFI ordered the creation of a committee to determinethe correct tie-point of their claims. So, the mining companies went to the thenIntermediate Appellate Court (IAC) via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

The claimants averred that the appellate court had no jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, petitioner went to the CA through a Petition for Reviewon Certiorari under Rule 43, seeking a reversal of the MAB Decision. Giventhe difference in the reason for and the mode of appeal, it is obviousthat Pearson is not applicable here.

Still, we can draw one lesson. Far from dismissing the case on the groundof lack of jurisdiction, Pearson expressly held that the CA had jurisdiction overthe petition for certiorari, because Section 9 of BP Blg. 129 (The JudiciaryReorganization Act of 1980), now incorporated in Section 4, Rule 65 of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, vested the then IAC with original jurisdiction toissue writs of certiorari and prohibition, among other auxillary writs x x x.However, even though the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with theCA and the Regional Trial Courts to issue a writ of mandamus, prohibition orcertiorari, litigants are well advised against taking a direct recourse to thisCourt without initially seeking proper relief from the lower courts, inaccordance with the hierarchy of courts.[8]

In Pearson, what was under review was the ruling of the CFI to takecognizance of the case which had been earlier decided by the MAB, not the

MAB Decision itself which was promulgated by the CA under Rule 43. Thepresent petitioner seeks a review of the latter.

Pearson held that the nature of the primary powers granted by law to thethen secretary of agriculture and natural resources as well as to the director ofmines were executive or administrative, such as granting of license, permits,lease and contracts[;] or approving, rejecting, reinstating or cancelingapplications[;] or deciding conflicting applications. These powers should bedistinguished from litigants disagreements or controversies that are civil orcontractual in nature, which may be adjudicated only by the courts of justice.

The findings of fact of the MAB, which exercises appellate jurisdiction overdecisions or orders of the panel of arbitrators, are conclusive and binding onthe parties; its decisions or orders on these are final and executory. Butpetitions for certiorari may be filed with the appropriate courts. [9]In short, theCourt held that the appellate jurisdiction of the IAC (now the CA)inPearson fell under Rule 65 -- not 43 -- because what was being impugnedwas grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CFI.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn8


27/52

Pearson, however, should be understood in the light of other equallyrelevant jurisprudence. In Fabian v. Desierto,[10]the Court clarified that appealsfrom judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required tobe brought to the CA, under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule43. This Rule was adopted precisely to provide a uniform rule of appellate

procedure from quasi-judicial agencies.[11]

Section 27 of RA 6770[12]which is similarly worded as Section 79 of thePhilippine Mining Act, was struck down by Fabian as unconstitutional,because it had broadened the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Courtwithout its consent, in violation of Section 30 of Article VI of theConstitution.[13]In short, Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides thatalladministrative decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealedto the Supreme Court, was unconstitutional.

In another case, held invalid in the light of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules ofCourt was Section 3(2) of Executive Order No. 561, which had declared thatdecisions of the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP)were appealable exclusively to the Supreme Court.[14]There is no convincingreason why appeals from the COSLAP should be treated differently fromthose arising from other quasi-judicial bodies, the decisions of which aredirectly appealable to the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules.

Finally,Metro Construction, Inc. v. Chat ham Properties, Inc.[15]held thatSection 19 of Executive Order No. 1008 -- which had deemed arbitral awardsof the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) to be appealable

to the Supreme Court on questions of law -- was modified by Circular No. 1-91, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by RA 7902, RevisedAdministrative Circular 1-95, and Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.Reiterating Fabian, the Court ruled that appeals were procedural and remedialin nature; hence, constitutionally subject to this Courts rule-making power.

In the present case, it is claimed that a petition for review is improperbecause petitioners challenge is purely factual, bearing only on the MABruling that there was no overlap or conflict between the litigants claims.

We clarify. Factual controversies are usually involved in administrative

actions; and the CA is prepared to handle such issues because, unlike thisCourt, it is mandated to rule on questions of fact. [16]In Metro Construction, weobserved that not only did the CA have appellate jurisdiction over CIACdecisions and orders, but the review of such decisions included questions offact and law.[17]At the very least when factual findings of the MAB arechallenged or alleged to have been made in grave abuse of discretion as in
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/sep2001/141897.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/sep2001/141897.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/sep2001/141897.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/sep2001/141897.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/sep2001/141897.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/sep2001/141897.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/148267.htm#_edn10


28/52

the present case, the CA may review them, consistent with the constitutionalduty[18]of the judiciary.

To summarize, there are sufficient legal footings authorizing a review ofthe MAB Decision under Rule 43 of th

Date post:	01-Jun-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	karla-espinosa
View:	227 times
Download:	0 times

CIVPRO Cases Batch 1.1.pdf

Documents