Civpro Case Digests(3)

8/10/2019 Civpro Case Digests(3)

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1. G.R. No. 155014 November 11, 2005 CRESCENT PETROLEUM, LTD.,Petitioner,

vs.

M/V "LOK MAHESHWARI," THE SHIPPING CORPORATION OF INDIA,and PORTSERV LIMITED and/or TRANSMAR SHIPPING,

INC.,Respondents.

FACTS:Respondent M/V "Lok Maheshwari" (Vessel) is an oceangoing vessel ofIndian registry that is owned by respondent Shipping Corporation of India

(SCI), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of India and

principally owned by the Government of India. It was time-chartered by

respondent SCI to Halla Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South Korean

company. Halla, in turn, sub-chartered the Vessel through a time charter to

Transmar Shipping, Inc. (Transmar). Transmar further sub-chartered the

Vessel to Portserv Limited (Portserv). Both Transmar and Portserv are

corporations organized and existing under the laws of Canada.

On or about November 1, 1995, Portserv requested petitioner Crescent

Petroleum, Ltd. (Crescent), a corporation organized and existing under thelaws of Canada that is engaged in the business of selling petroleum and oil

products for the use and operation of oceangoing vessels, to deliver marine

fuel oils (bunker fuels) to the Vessel. Petitioner Crescent granted and

confirmed the request through an advice via facsimile dated November 2,

1995. As security for the payment of the bunker fuels and related services,

petitioner Crescent received two (2) checks in the amounts of

US$100,000.00 and US$200,000.00. Thus, petitioner Crescent contracted

with its supplier, Marine Petrobulk Limited (Marine Petrobulk), another

Canadian corporation, for the physical delivery of the bunker fuels to the

Vessel.On or about November 4, 1995, Marine Petrobulk delivered the bunker fuels

amounting to US$103,544 inclusive of barging and demurrage charges to

the Vessel at the port of Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada. The Chief

Engineer Officer of the Vessel duly acknowledged and received the delivery

receipt.Marine Petrobulk issued an invoice to petitioner Crescent for theUS$101,400.00 worth of the bunker fuels. Petitioner Crescent issued a

check for the same amount in favor of Marine Petrobulk, which check was

duly encashed.

Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent issued a revised invoice

dated November 21, 1995 to "Portserv Limited, and/or the Master, and/or

Owners, and/or Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V Lok Maheshwari" in

the amount of US$103,544.00 with instruction to remit the amount on or

before December 1, 1995. The period lapsed and several demands were

made but no payment was received. Also, the checks issued to petitioner

Crescent as security for the payment of the bunker fuels were dishonored

for insufficiency of funds.As a consequence, petitioner Crescent incurredadditional expenses of US$8,572.61 for interest, tracking fees, and legal

fees.

On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the port of Cebu City,petitioner Crescent instituted before the RTC of Cebu City an action "for a

sum of money with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of

preliminary attachment" against respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv

and/or Transmar.

On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of attachment against the

Vessel with bond at P2,710,000.00. Petitioner Crescent withdrew its prayer

for a temporary restraining order and posted the required bond.

On May 18, 1996, summonses were served to respondents Vessel and SCI,

and Portserv and/or Transmar through the Master of the Vessel.On May 28,1996, respondents Vessel and SCI, through Pioneer Insurance and Surety

Corporation (Pioneer), filed an urgent ex-parte motion to approve Pioneersletter of undertaking, to consider it as counter-bond and to discharge the

attachment.On May 29, 1996, the trial court granted the motion; thus, theletter of undertaking was approved as counter-bond to discharge the

attachment.

ISSUE:Whether the Philippine court has or will exercise jurisdiction and entitled to

maritime lien under our laws on foreign vessel docked on Philippine port and

supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port?

RULING:In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien for supplies furnished to a

vessel in a foreign port, whether such lien exists, or whether the court has or

will exercise jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country where thesupplies were furnished, which must be pleaded and proved.The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy of cases, which replaced suchsingle-factor methodologies as the law of the place of supply. The multiple-contact testto determine, in the absence of a specific Congressionaldirective as to the statutes reach, which jurisdictions law should be applied.

The following factors were considered: (1) place of the wrongful act; (2)

law of the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4) allegiance


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of the defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract; (6) inaccessibility offoreign forum; and (7) law of the forum. This is applicable not only topersonal injury claims arising under the Jones Act but to all mattersarising under maritime law in generalThe Court cannot sustain petitioner Crescents insistence on the application

of P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 and hold that a

maritime lien exists.Out of the seven basic factors listed in the case

of Lauritzen, Philippine law only falls under one the law of the forum. Allother elements are foreignCanada is the place of the wrongful act, of theallegiance or domicile of the injured and the place of contract; India is the

law of the flag and the allegiance of the defendant shipowner. Applying P.D.

No. 1521,a maritime lien exists would not promote the public policy behind

the enactment of the law to develop the domestic shipping industry.

Opening up our courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a maritime lien

under our laws even if they are not entitled to a maritime lien under their

laws will encourage forum shopping. In light of the interests of the various

foreign elements involved, it is clear that Canada has the most significant

interest in this dispute. The injured party is a Canadian corporation, the sub-

charterer which placed the orders for the supplies is also Canadian, theentity which physically delivered the bunker fuels is in Canada, the place of

contracting and negotiation is in Canada, and the supplies were delivered in

Canada.

2. Raymundo v CA G.R. No. 97805, September 02, 1992NILO H. RAYMUNDO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,SIXTEENTH DIVISION, HON. JUDGE, RTC, BR. 133, MAKATI, METRO

MANILA AND GALERIA DE MAGALLANES ASSOCIATION, INC.,

RESPONDENTS.

D EC I S I O N NOCON, J.:

FACTS:on July 5, 1989, the administrator of the Galleria de MagallanesCondominium discovered that petitioner Nilo Raymundo, who was anowner/occupant of Unit AB-122 of said condominium, made an unauthorizedinstallation of glasses at the balcony of his unit in violation of Article IV,Section 3 paragraph (d) of the Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictionsof the Association, which states that:

d. Nothing shall be done or placed in any unit or in the common areaswhich is beyond or will impair the structural strength of the buildings or alter

the original architecture, appearance and specifications of the building,including the external facade thereof.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE ASSOCIATIONThereafter, the administrator of said condominium reported said violation tothe Board of Directors of the private respondent Galleria de Magallanes

Association, Inc. in a special meeting held on July 8,1989 and the formersent a letter dated July 12, 1989 to the petitioner demanding the latter to

remove the illegal and unauthorized installation of glasses at his unit.Petitioner refused, consequently, private respondent filed a complaint formandatory injunction against petitioner on February 21, 1990 with theRegional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133 in Civil Case No. 90-490.on March 23, 1990, instead of an Answer, petitioner filed a Motion toDismiss with the trial court on the ground that said court has no jurisdictionover the present case since a complaint for mandatory injunction is withinthe exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:*Regional Trial Court - Makati: denied the Motion to Dismiss on account oflack of jurisdiction, citing Section 21 of BP 129:

"Original jurisdiction in other cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exerciseoriginal jurisdiction:(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quowarranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any partof their respective regions; and(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers andconsuls."*RTC -Makati (Motion for reconsideration): denied.*Court of Appeals: dismissed petitioner's petition for certiorari andprohibitionThis is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with restraining order and

preliminary injunction to annul and set aside the decision of the Court ofAppeals dated March 11, 1991.

ISSUE:Which court has jurisdiction over the case considering that privaterespondent's sole pecuniary claim of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees in CivilCase No. 90-490 is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of theMetropolitan Trial Court as provided for under Section 33 of B.P. 129?

RULING:1. The RTC has jurisdiction since Sec 19 and 21 of BP 129 applies:"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exerciseexclusive original jurisdiction:


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(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable ofpecuniary estimation;Sec. 21. Original Jurisdiction in other cases. - Regional Trial Courts shallexercise original jurisdiction:(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quowarranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any partof their respective regions;

Private respondent's complaint is an action to compel the petitioner toremove the illegal and unauthorized installation of glasses at Unit AB-122 ofthe condominium which is not capable of pecuniary estimation and fallsunder the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

2. ATTORNEY'S FEES IS ONLY INCIDENTAL TO THE PRINCIPALCAUSE OF ACTION -- removal of the illegal & unauthorized installation ofthe glasses made by the petitioner. the question for resolution is whether ornot the petitioner violated the provisions of the Master Deed and Declarationof Restriction of the corporation, and if so, to remove the illegal andunauthorized installation of glasses at Unit AB-122 of the Condominium.Clearly, the issue is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

In the instant case, the claim of attorney's fees by the private respondent inthe amount of P10,000.00 is only incidental to its principal cause of actionwhich is for the removal of the illegal and unauthorized installation of theglasses made by the petitioner and therefore, said amount is notdeterminative of the jurisdiction of the court.

3. THE COMPLAINT IS NOT MANDATORY INJUNCTION, IT IS MERELY APROVISIONAL REMEDY. Note should be taken, however, that the trialcourt had erroneously considered the complaint as one for mandatoryinjunction, misled perhaps by the caption of the complaint.

A writ for mandatory injunction is a provisional remedy. It is provisionalbecause it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendencyof the main action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and isdependent upon the result of the main action.

DISPOSITIVE:Petition for certiorari & prohibition dismissed.

NOTE:In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is notcapable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of firstascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it isprimarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is consideredcapable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal

courts [now municipal trial courts] or in the courts of first instance [now

regional trial courts] would depend on the amount of the claim.However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recovera sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or aconsequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered suchactions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated interms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance[now regional trial courts].

3.

Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738; GR No. 119347, March 17, 1999

Posted byPius Morados onNovember 28, 2011

(Civil Procedures Jurisdiction; Civil actions in which the subject of thelitigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation)

Facts: Petitioners discovered a public document, which is a declaration ofheirs and deed of confirmation of a previous oral agreement, of partition,affecting the land executed by and among the respondents wherebyrespondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion ofpetitioners who are entitled thereto as legal heirs also.Petitioners filed a complaint, denominated DECLARATION OF NULLITY

AND PARTITION against defendants with the RTC claiming that thedocument was false and perjurious as the private respondents were not theonly heirs and that no oral partition of the property whatsoever had beenmade between the heirs. The complaint prayed that the document bedeclared null and void and an order be issued to partition the land among allthe heirs.Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground oflack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value ofthe subject land is P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3) of BatasPambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, falls within theexclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the RTChas jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is incapable ofpecuniary estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P. 129,as amended.

Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the nature of the civil case.

Held: Yes. The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is oneincapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of saidcourt.InSingsong vs. Isabela Sawmill,the Supreme Court ruled that:In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is notcapable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of firstascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it isprimarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered

capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
http://piusmorados.wordpress.com/author/piusmorados/http://piusmorados.wordpress.com/2011/11/28/russel-vs-vestil-304-scra-738-gr-no-119347-march-17-1999/http://piusmorados.wordpress.com/2011/11/28/russel-vs-vestil-304-scra-738-gr-no-119347-march-17-1999/http://piusmorados.wordpress.com/author/piusmorados/


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courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of theclaim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right torecover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or aconsequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered suchactions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated interms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance(now Regional Trial Courts).The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and

void the document in question. While the complaint also prays for thepartition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is thedeclaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that

jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and isdetermined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the reliefsought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of theclaims asserted therein.

4.

Bardillon v. Brgy. Masili

Nature:Petition for review under Rule 45

Facts:- Brgy Masili in Calamba Laguna wanted a lot on which a multi-purpose hall

will be constructed, so it offered to buy Bardillon's 144 sq. m. lot for Php

200,000.

- No agreement was reached.

- Feb. 23, 1998: The first complaint for eminent domain was filed before the

Calamba MTC by Brgy. Masili against Bardillon.

- MTC dismissed for Bardillon and counsel's failure to appear at pre-trial.

MTC denied Masili's Motion for Reconsideration (MR).

- Oct 18, 1999: The second complaint for eminent domain was filed with the

Calamba RTC by Masili.

- Bardillon opposed the complaint thru Motion to Dismiss, alleging res

judicata.

- RTC denied motion to dismiss, saying that MTC had no jurisdiction over

the first complaint.

- July 10, 2000: Municipal Ordinance authorizing Masili to initiate exprop

proceedings was approved and submitted.

- Aug 16, 2000: RTC issued writ of possession.

- Bardillon appealed to the CA. CA affirned RTC.

- No res judicata. MTC had no jurisdiction over the first complaint.

Issue # 1:Whether MTC had jurisdiction over first exprop case:

Held: No. Exprop suit does not involve sum of money. It is incapable ofpecuniary estimation and should be filed with the RTC (Section 19 of BP

129 as amended by RA 7691).

- The primary consideration of exprop proceedings is whether the gov't

has complied with the requisites for the taking or property.- An exprop suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the

value of the land.

Issue # 2:Whether the dismissal of the first complaint in the MTC amounts to res

judicata?

Held:NO- Requisites for res judicata

1. Former judgment must be final.

2. Court which rendered judgment must have jurisdiction over the subjectmatter and the parties.

3. Judgment is on the merits.

4. Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action in both actions.

- Since MTC had no jurisdiction, there is no res judicata.

Issue # 3:Whether CA erred when it ignored the RTC's issuance of a writ of

possession despite the pending MR of the ruling dismissing the complaint.

Held:NO- Requisites of immediate entry:1. filing of a complaint for exprop sufficient in form and substance

2. deposit of amount equivalent to 15% of the property's fair market value

based on its current tax declaration.

- Masili complied with both requisites.

- The issue of necessity of the exprop is a matter that should be addressed

by the RTC. If petitioner objects to the necessity, her objection should be

included in her Answer to the complaint.

Issue # 4: Whether or not Masili is guilty of forum shopping?


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Held:NO

- Test for determining forum shopping: whether the elements of litis

pendentia are present in two or more cases, such that a final judgment in

one case will amount to res judicata in another.

- The earlier case in the MTC had already been dismissed when the second

complaint was filed in the RTC.- Even if the MTC case was still pending, it will make no d ifference, because

the MTC had no jurisdiction in the first place.

Dispo:

Petition denied. CA affirmed.

5.VILLENA vs. PAYOYO (April 27, 2007)

FACTS: Payoyo and Novaline, Inc., through its president, Villena, enteredinto a contract for the delivery and installation of kitchen cabinets in

Payoyo's residence. The cabinets were to be delivered within 90 days from

down payment of 50% of the purchase price. A down payment was paid.Another contract was entered into for the delivery of home appliances and

Villena also paid the downpayment. Villena faled to install the kitchen

cabinets and deliver the appliances.

Payoyo filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money and

damages against Villena. Petitioner posits that the RTC has no jurisdiction

over the complaint since it is mainly for recovery of a sum of money in the

amount of P184,821.50 which is below the jurisdictional amount set for

RTCs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case

RULING: YES, RTC has jurisdiction. In determining the jurisdiction of anaction whose subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the

principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily

for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of

pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends on the

amount of the claim. But, where the primary issue is something other than

the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely

incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, such are

actions whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence

cognizable by the RTCs.

Verily, what determines the nature of the action and which court has

jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of

the relief sought.

The complaint, albeit entitled as one for collection of a sum ofmoney with damages, is one incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus,one within the RTC's jurisdiction. The allegations therein show that itis actually for breach of contract. A case for breach of contract is a

cause of action either for specific performance or rescission of contracts.An action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an action for specific

performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore falls under

the jurisdiction of the RTC. The averments in the complaint show that

Payoyo sought the cancellation of the contracts and refund of the down

payments since Villena failed to comply with the obligation to deliver the

appliances and install the kitchen cabinets subject of the contracts. While

the respondent prayed for the refund, this is just incidental to the main

action, which is the rescission or cancellation of the contracts.

Petition DENIED.

6. Lu vs. Lu Ym, Sr.,et al

7.

De Ungria et al. vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 165777 | July 25, 2011

FACTS:This is a petition for review on certiorari for ownership, possession and

damages, and alternative causes of action either to declare two documents

as patent nullities, and/or for recovery of Rosario's conjugal share with

damages or redemption of the subject land against petitioner Ceferina de

Ungria et al.Respondent Rosario is the surviving wife of the late FernandoCastor, while the rest of the respondents are their legitimate children. The

documents they (respondents) sought to annul are (1) the Deed of

Transfer of Rights and Interest including Improvements thereon allegedly

executed by Fernando in favor of Eugenio de Ungria, petitioner's father; and

(2) the Affidavit of Relinquishment executed by Eugenio in favor of

petitioner. Petitioner also filed an Addendum to the Motion to Dismiss

raising, among others that the court has no jurisdiction over the case for

failure of plaintiffs to pay the filing fee in full. Pending resolution

of the motion, respondents filed a Motion to Allow them to continue

prosecuting this case as indigent litigants. Petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration and clarification on whether plaintiffs should be allowed to


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continue prosecuting the case as indigent litigants. Said motion was

denied. The same was filed to the RTC and to the CA; both were denied.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the

following assignment of error: that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding

that respondent RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying

petitioners Motion to Dismiss despite respondents non-payment of

the correct docket fees.

ISSUE:Was jurisdiction vested to the RTC in this civil case despite the failure of the

plaintiff to file the necessary docket fees?

RULING:YES. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that when an action is filed in

court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite

docket and filing fees. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or

appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee,

that vests atrial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the

action.Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides:SEC. 7.Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. - (a) For filing an action or a permissive

counter-claim or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or

for filing with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party,etc. complaint, or a

complaint-in-intervention, and for all clerical services in the same, if the

total-sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the property in

litigation, is:x x x x(b) For filing:1. Actions where the value of the subject

matter cannot be estimated ........ P400.00

2. x x xIn a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is

none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shallbe the basis in computing the fees.

Since we find that the case involved the annulment of contract which is not

susceptible of pecuniary estimation, thus, falling within the jurisdiction of the

RTC, the docket fees should not be based on the assessed value of the

subject land as claimed by petitioner in their memorandum, but should be

based on Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141. A perusal of the entries in the Legal

Fees Form attached to the records would reflect that the amount of P400.00

was paid to the Clerk of Court, together with the other fees, as assessed by

the Clerk of Court. Thus, upon respondents' proof of payment of the

assessed fees, the RTC has properly acquired jurisdiction over the

complaint. Jurisdiction once acquired is never lost, it continues until the case

is terminated

8.HILARIO vs. SALVADORG.R. No. 160384 . April 29, 2005, CALLEJO, SR. , J .

FACTS: Petitioners herein are co-owners of a parcel of land located

in Romblon. In 1996, they filed a complaint with the RTC of Romblonagainst herein, respondent, alleging that as co-owners, they are entitled to

possession of the lot, and that respondent constructed his house thereon

without their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite

demands to do so. They prayed for the private respondent to vacate the

property and restore possession thereof to them. The complaint, however,

failed to allege the assessed value of the land. Nevertheless, petitioners

were able to present during the trial the most recent tax declaration, which

shows that the assessed value of the property was Php 5,950.00.

The respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction because of the failure to allege the value of the land. The motion

was denied.Respondent then filed an Answer, traversing the material allegations of the

complaint, contending that petitioners had no cause of action against him

since the property in dispute was the conjugal property of his grandparents,

the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-Salvador.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed the

decision, holding that the action was one for the recovery of ownership and

possession of real property, and that absent any allegation in the complaint

of the assessed value of the property, the MTC had exclusive jurisdiction

over the action (citing Sec. 33 of R.A. No. 7691). The CA then ordered the

refiling of the case in the proper court.

ISSUES: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action

HELD:NO. Petitioner argues that the RTC has jurisdiction since their actionis an accion reivindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive

jurisdiction falls within the said court. This argument is without merit.

The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of

land is now determined by the assessed value of the said property and not

the market value thereof. [] In the case at bar, the complaint does not


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contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property subject of

the complaint. The court cannot take judicial

notice of the assessed or market value of land. The Court noted that during

the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence at ax de c l a r a t ion,

showing that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was Php5,950.00.

The petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the tax

declaration containing the assessed value of the property when they filed

their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the assessed value of theproperty in 1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC

had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, since the case involved

title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less than

Php20,000.00. As the Court of Appeals had held:

The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria [sic] is,

as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of the property in question.

For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed

value exceeds Php20,000.00, and the MTC, if the value is Php20,000.00 or

below. An assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the

municipality where the property is located, and is contained in the tax

declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax declaration securedand presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark

made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mention

that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the

fact that there is an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration

that should be consulted and no other kind of value, and as appearing in

Exhibit B, this is Php5,950.00. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive

original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which has

jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the court

a quo. 24

In an obiter, the Court discussed the nature of an accion publiciana, thus:

The action of the petitioners was an accion publiciana, or one for the

recovery of possession of the real property subject matter thereof. It does

not involve a claim of ownership over the property. An accion

reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery of possession

over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and

possession based on the said ownership. On the other hand, an accion

publiciana is one for the recovery of pos session of the right to possess. It is

also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year

after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding

of possession of the realty. []

The Supreme Court finally held that all proceedings before the RTC,

including the RTC decision, are null and void, since the RTC had no

jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners.

Criticism of the ponencia: The discussion about the distinction between an

accion reivindicatoria and an accion publiciana is inappropriate. The issue to

be resolved by the court is: which court has jurisdiction, the MTC or the

RTC? It is immaterial whether the case is one for accion reivindicatoria oraccion publiciana; only one court will have exclusive jurisdiction. I submit

that what should have been discussed in the obiter is that if the claim of co-

ownership by the defendant is true, may a plaintiff co-owner then file an

action in ejectment against another co-owner?

Dr. Tolentino is of the opinion that a co-owner may bring such an action

against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession of and asset

ownership in himself alone. The effect of the action will be to obtain

recognition of the co-ownership.

The defendant co-owner, however, cannot be excluded from possessionbecause as co-owner, he also has the right to possess.

9.San Pedro vs. Asdala

10. Maslag vs. Monzon et al

11. Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs. Cyborg

Leasing Corp.

Facts:Cyborg Leasing Corp filed before the MTC of Manila a case captioned

"Damages with prayer for a writ Replevin" against Conpac and Movers.

It was alleged that pursuant toa lease agreement, Cyborg had delivered

one forklift to Conpac. The lease agreement stipulated a monthly rental

of P11,000.00 for the use of the equipment. Conpac failed and refused

to pay the stipulated rentals. Petitioner took control of the operations of

Conpac and seized all the cargoes and equipment in ludi g the subject

porklift. Petitioner ignored Cyborg's demand for the return to it of the

equipment and the formal disclaimer of ownership made by Conpac. A

Writ of Replevin was issued. Petitioner was served with a copy of thesummons and the latter filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground


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of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the of MTC since the complaint had

asked for the actual market value of the equipment, actual

damage,,exemplary damages and atty's fees. MTC dismissed the

complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Cyborg filed a petition for certiorari and

prohibition with preliminary injuction against MTC Judge, COnpac and

Movers before the RTC f Manila. RTC granted Cyborg's application for

preliminary injunction. Petitioner assails the decision of RTC. Hence this

petition.

Issue:WON, MTC has jurisdiction over the complaint?

Held:NO!

MTC's jurisdiction over the action filed by Cyborg is the concern of the

case.

The jurisdiction of the court and the nature of the action must be determi

ned by theaverments in the complaints and the character of the relief

sought. The complaint filed by Cyborg with the MTC prayed for the

return of the Nissan Forklift to it as the owner or in the alternative for thepayment of 150T plus damages, amount of unpaid lease and atty's fees.

It would be incorrect to argue that the actual damages in the form of

unpaid rentals were just in incident of the action for the return of the

forklift considering that private respondent specifically sought in the

complaint not only seizure of the forklift from petitioner Movers but also

payment of unpaid and outstanding rentals. MTC's dismissing the

complaint was properly decreed, Petition for review is granted.

12.Mangaliag v. Pastoral

Facts: Respondent Serquina filed a complaint for damages with the

RTC against petitioners Mangaliag and Solano. This complaint alleges

that the Serquina and his co-passengers sustained serious injuries and

permanent deformities from the collision of their tricycle with the

petitioners dump truck and the gross negligence, carelessness and

imprudence of the petitioners in driving the dump truck. Respondents

seek damages in the form of medical expenses amounting to

P71,392.00. Respondents also claim P500,000.00 by way of moral

damages, as a further result of his hospitalization, lost income of

P25,000.00 or the nominal damages, and attorneys fees.

Petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim. After pre-trial

conference, trial on the merits ensued. After the respondent rested his

case, petitioners testified in their defense. Subsequently, petitioners filed

a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject

matter. They alleged that since the principal amount prayed for, in the

amount of P71,392.00, falls within the jurisdiction of MTC. Petitioners

maintain that the courts jurisdiction should be based exclusively on the

amount of actual damages, excluding therefrom the amounts claimed asmoral, exemplary, nominal damages and attorneys fee,etc.

The respondent opposed the motion saying that since the claim for

damages is the main action, the totality of the damages sought to be

recovered should be considered in determining jurisdiction. He relied on

Administrative Circular No. 09-94 which provides that in cases where

the claim for damages is the main cause of action. . . the amount of

such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the

court Also, the petitioners defense of lack of jurisdiction has already

been barred by estoppel and laches. He contends that after activelytaking part in the trial proceedings and presenting a witness to seek

exoneration, it would be unfair and legally improper for petitioners to

seek the dismissal of the case.

RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioners filed an MR which was

denied. Subsequently, they filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.

Issues:(1) Whether petitioners are barred from raising the defense of

the RTCs lack of jurisdiction? NO

(2) Whether it is the amount of P71,392.00 as medical expenses,excluding moral, nominal damages and attorneys fees, which

determines jurisdiction, hence it is MTC which has jurisdiction? NO

Ruling:

(1) On the matter of estoppel and laches:In the present case, no

judgment has yet been rendered by the RTC. As a matter of

fact, as soon as the petitioners discovered the alleged

jurisdictional defect, they did not fail or neglect to file the

appropriate motion to dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal

element of laches to be absent, the Sibonghanoy doctrine doesnot control the present controversy. What happened in the


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Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only

after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had

already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional

case because of the presence of laches. But in this case, there is

no laches. Thus, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction

of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings must

apply. Petitioners are not estopped from questioning the

jurisdiction of the RTC.

(2) On the issue which of the amounts is determinative of

jurisdiction: The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction

of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by

the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective

of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of

the claims or reliefs sought therein. In the present case, the

allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondent

seeks to recover not only his medical expenses, lost income but

also damages for physical suffering and mental anguish due topermanent facial deformity from injuries sustained in the

vehicular accident. Viewed as an action for quasi-delict, the

present case falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219 (2),

which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of

quasi-delict causing physical injuries.

Private respondents claim for moral damages of P500,000.00cannot be

considered as merely incidental to or a consequence of the claim for

actual damages. It is a separate and distinct cause of action or an

independent actionable tort. It springs from the right of a person to thephysical integrity of his or her body, and if that integrity is violated,

damages are due and assessable. Hence, the demand for moral

damages must be considered as a separate cause of action,

independent of the claim for actual damages and must be included in

determining the jurisdictional amount.

If the rule were otherwise, i.e., the courts jurisdiction in a case of quasi -

delict causing physical injuries would only be based on the claim for

actual damages and the complaint is filed in the MTC, it can only award

moral damages in an amount within its jurisdictional limitations, asituation not intended by the framers of the law.

(3) (Not really an issue raised by the respondent himself, but

was nonetheless discussed by the SC) On the issue whether

a direct recourse by petition for certiorari to the SC from the

order of RTC:Generally a direct recourse to this Court is highly

improper, for it violates the established policy of strict

observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. Although this

Court, the RTCs and the CA have concurrent jurisdiction to issuewrits of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas

corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the

petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This

Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to

satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the

Constitution and immemorial tradition.

Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the

redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and

exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of nationalinterest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the

extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its

primary jurisdiction.

Be that as it may, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad

rule. It generally applies to cases involving warring factual

allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial

courts at the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of these

contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the

parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot bebrought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of

facts. Therefore, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is

not necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do

not involve factual but legal questions.

In the present case, petitioners submit a pure question of law involving

the interpretation and application of paragraph 2 of Administrative

Circular No. 09-94. This legal question and in order to avoid further

delay are compelling enough reasons to allow petitioners invocation of

this Courts jurisdiction in the first instance.


10/26

(Maybe it is important to note that the petition for certiorari was filed from

the denial of the RTC of the petitioners motion to dismiss. There is no

final adjudication yet as to the complaint for damages.)

13. Samson vs. DawayG.R. No. 160054-55 | July 21, 2004 | Ynares-Santiago,J.

Petitioner:Manolo P. SamsonRespondents:Hon. Reynaldo Daway (RTC Quezon City), People of the Philippines, and

Caterpillar, Inc.

Summary:Samson is the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. He was charged with a

criminal complaint for unfair competition with the Quezon City RTC because

he sells imitations of Caterpillar products, to the damage and prejudice of

respondent Caterpillar Inc. He filed a motion to suspend arraignment

because of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved in

another civil case. This was denied by the trial court. Next, he also filed amotion to quash information alleging that the RTC has no jurisdiction over

him. The Supreme Court ruled against him. In criminal/civil cases involving

infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of

origin and false description or representation, is lodged with the RTC, as

provided under RA 166 or the Old Trademark Law. Note that at this time,

the IPC was already enacted. However, the IPC did not repeal the

provisions involving jurisdiction, hence, RA 166 as regards jurisdiction is still

good law. Further, there can be no prejudicial question involved in this case.

It is important to note that under unfair competition,

fraudis the common element. Also, an independent civil action may be filedunder Art. 33 of the Civil Code for fraud. Being an independent civil action,

there can be no prejudicial question.

Facts:Samson is the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. He was charged with two

informations for unfair competition under the Intellectual Property Code

(IPC). The following are the pertinent portions of the informations:

Samson is the owner of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufacturing

Corporation.

It is located at Robinsons Galleria, EDSA cor. Ortigas Avenue, QC.

Sometime in November 1999, Samson unlawfully distributed/sold Caterpillar

products(footwear, garments, clothing, bags, accessories) which are closely

identical/colorable imitations of the authentic Caterpillar products and

likewise using trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would cause

confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the buying public to the

damage and prejudice of CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter, userand owner of the following internationally: CATERPILLAR,CAT,CATERPILLAR & DESIGN, CAT AND DESIGN, WALKING

MACHINES and TRACKTYPE TRACTOR & DESIGN.

Samson filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings

because of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved in

another case (Civ Case No. Q-00-41446) involving unfair competition

pending in the same RTC branch, as well as a petition for review with the

Sec. of Justice assailing the Chief State Prosecutors resolution.

RTC denied this.

He then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the trial

court has no jurisdiction over the offense.

He contended that since under Section 170 of the IPC, the penalty of

imprisonment forunfair competition does not exceed six years, the offense is

cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial Court,

per R.A. No. 7691.

RTC also denied this.

Hence, this petition.

Issues/Held:(IMPT) Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation

of intellectual property rights?

RTC. Samson is wrong.

Was there a prejudicial question involved in this case as claimed by the

accused?


11/26

NO. Judge correctly dismissed the motion to suspend arraignment.

Whether the pendency of the petition for review with the SOJ on the finding

of probable cause for unfair competition shall suspend the proceedings

NO.

RatioJurisdiction Issue

Under Section 170 of the IPC, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the

criminal penalty for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition,

false designation of origin and false description or representation, is

imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty Thousand

Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos,

Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions (including

criminal and civil) under Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169

shall be brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction

under existing laws.

The existing law referred to here is Sec. 27 of RA 166 (The OLDTrademark Law)It provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks,

unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or

representation, is lodged with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial

Court)

Now, Samson is claiming that RA 166 is already repealed by the IPC.

However, this is not so, because:

The repealing clause of the IPC reads that all acts and parts of Acts

inconsistent herewith,more particularly RA 166 (and goes on to cite otherlaws), are hereby repealed).

The use of the phrases parts of Acts and inconsistent herewith only

means that the repeal pertains only to provisions which are repugnant or not

susceptible of harmonization with the IPC.

Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is consistent and in harmony with

Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293.

O

Had R.A. No. 8293 intended to vest jurisdiction over violations of intellectual

property rights with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have expressly

stated so under Section163 thereof.

Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict

between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail.

In this case, the IPC and RA 166 are special laws conferring jurisdiction

over violationsof intellectual property rights to the RTC.

It should prevail over RA No 7691 (as cited by Samson) which is a general

law.

Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair competition is

properlylodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor is

imprisonment of lessthan 6 years, or from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging

from P50,000.00 to P200,000.00.

In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving

violations of intellectual property rights under the IPC, the Court issued A.M.

No. 02-1-11-SC dated February 19, 2002designating certain Regional Trial

Courts as Intellectual Property Courts.

On June 17, 2003, the Court further issued a Resolution consolidating

jurisdiction to hearand decide Intellectual Property Code and Securities andExchange Commission cases inspecific Regional Trial Courts designated as

Special Commercial Courts.

Petitioner also cites the case of Mirpuriin arguing that RA 166 was already

repealed totally by the IPC. However, such argument has no merit because

there is no categorical ruling that violation of IP rights is lodged with the

MTC. Also, the mere passing remark in that case was merely

a backgrounderto the enactment of the IPC and cannot

be construed as a pronouncement in cases for violation of intellectual

property rights.

Prejudicial Question Issue

Samson failed to substantiate his allegations of prejudicial question.

In any case, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal

action can, according tolaw, proceed independently of each other.

In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfaircompetition under Section168 of the IPC is fraud

Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of defamation,


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fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate anddistinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.

Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which as admitted by private

respondent also relate to unfair competition, is an independent civil action

under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial

question that will justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar.

Petition for Review Issue

According to the Rules, while the pendency of a petition for review is a

ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the

deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60days reckoned from the filing

of the petition with the reviewing office.

Hence, after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign

the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.

In this case, Samson failed to substantiate his allegations/failed to discharge

the burden of proving that he was entitled to a suspension of hisarraignment.

His pleadings and annexes do not show the date of filing of the petition of

review with the SOJ.

14. In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas

Corpus

15.MADRIAN vs. MADRIAN

GR No. 159374July 12, 2007

FACTS:Petitioner Felipe N. Madrian and respondent Francisca R. Madrian were

married on July 7, 1993.Their union was blessed with three sons and a

daughter. After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their

conjugal abode and took their three sons with him to Albay and

subsequently to Laguna.

Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch

things up between her and petitioner but failed. She then brought the matter

to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their Barangay, but this too proved futile.

Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of the three sons in the

Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioners act of leaving the conjugal

dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of

their children and deprived them of their mothers care. She prayed that

petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their sons before the court and

to explain why they should not be returned to her custody.

On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum alleging that

respondent was unfit to take custody of their three sons because she was

habitually drunk, frequently went home late at night or in the wee hours of

the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected her

duties as a mother. He claimed that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002,

it was respondent who left, taking their daughter with her. It was only then

that he went to Laguna where he worked as a tricycle driver. He also

questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under

Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the Family Courts Act of

1997) family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide

the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.

For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May

18, 2002 but was driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it was petitionerwho was an alcoholic, gambler and drug addict. Petitioners alcoholism and

drug addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing him to commit acts of

violence against her and their children. The situation was aggravated by the

fact that their home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently

meddled in their personal problems.

On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its

authority to take cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213

of the Family Code, respondent was entitled to the custody of the two

younger sons who were at that time aged six and four, respectively, subject

to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to eldest son who was then

eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the

proper family court in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule

99 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court

of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE:Whether or not the CA had jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeascorpus as jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the Family Courts under

R.A. 8369.

HELD:RA 8369 did not divest the CA and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction

over habeas corpus cases involving custody of minors. The provisions of RA


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8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the CA and the

SC to issue said writ. Said law should be read in harmony with the

provisions of RA 7092 (expanding the jurisdiction of the CA) and BP 129

(the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) that family courts have

concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and the SC in petitions for habeas corpus

where the custody of minors is at issue. This is in fact affirmed by

Administrative Circular 03-03-04-SC, dated April 22, 2004.

In this case, after petitioner moved out of their residence on May 18, 2002,

he twice transferred his sons to provinces covered by different judicial

regions. By giving the family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas

corpus cases will result in an iniquitous situation leaving individuals like the

respondent without legal recourse in obtaining custody of her children.

Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for

would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose

writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. This lack

of recourse could not have been the intention of RA 8369.

Moreover, under, RA 8369, the family courts are vested with original

exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of

habeas corpus which may be issued exclusively by the family courts undersaid law pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction

with the petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

16. TUCP vs. Coscolluela17. Primero vs. IAC

18.PEPSI COLA DISTRIBUTOR PHILS.vs. GALANG, September24,1991

Facts:The private respondents were employees of the petitioner who weresuspected of complicity in the irregular disposition of empty Pepsi Cola

bottles. On July 16, 1987, the petitioners filed a criminal complaint for theft

against them but this was later withdrawn and substituted with a criminal

complaint for falsification of private documents. After a preliminary

investigation conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan, Leyte, the

complaint was dismissed.

Allegedly after an administrative investigation, the private respondents were

dismissed by the petitioner company on November 23, 1987. As a result,

they lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional Arbitration

Branch of the NLRC in Tacloban City and decisions mandateed

reinstatement with damages. In addition, they instituted in the Regional Trial

Court of Leyte, a separate civil complaint against the petitioners for

damages arising from what they claimed to be their malicious prosecution.

The petitioners moved to dismiss the civil complaint on the ground that the

trial court had no jurisdiction over the case because it involved employee-

employer relations that were exclusively cognizable by the labor arbiter. The

motion was granted .On July 6, 1989, however, the respondent judge, acting

on the motion for reconsideration, reinstated the complaint, saying it was

distinct from the labor case for damages now pending before the labor

courts. The petitioners then came to this Court for relief.

Issue: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the claim for damagesarising from the malicious prosecution of the petitioner company.

Held:It must be stressed that not every controversy involving workers andtheir employers can be resolved only by the labor arbiters. This will be so

only if there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted

and employee-employer relations to put the case under the provisions of

Article 217. Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the

regular courts of justice in the exercise of their civil and criminal jurisdiction.In Medina v. Castro-Bartolome, 3 two employees filed in the Court of First

Instance of Rizal a civil complaint for damages against their employer for

slanderous remarks made against them by the company president. On the

order dismissing the case because it came under the jurisdiction of the labor

arbiters, Justice Vicente Abad Santos said for the Court:

It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair

labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortious acts

allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being the case, the governing

statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code. It results that the orders

under review are based on a wrong premise.

The case now before the Court involves a complaint for damages for

malicious prosecution which was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Leyte

by the employees of the defendant company. It does not appear that there is

a reasonable causal connection between the complaint and the relations of

the parties as employer and employees. The complaint did not arise from

such relations and in fact could have arisen independently of an

employment relationship between the parties. No such relationship or any

unfair labor practice is asserted. What the employees are alleging is that the

petitioners acted with bad faith when they filed the criminal complaint which

the Municipal Trial Court said was intended to harass the poor employees

and the dismissal of which was affirmed by the Provincial Prose cutor for


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lack of evidence to establish even a slightest probability that all the

respondents

herein have committed the crime imputed against them. This is a matter

which the labor arbiter has no competence to resolve as the applicable law

is not the Labor Code but the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, the order dated July 6, 1989, is AFFIRMED and the petition

DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

19. Tipait vs Reyes

20. Manliguez vs. CA

21. Nova vs. Judge Sancho Dames II (2001)

Facts:

Complainant Greogorio S. Nova filed with the NLRC complaint for

illegal dismissal against R.A. BroadcastingCorporation represented by it

s Vice President forOperations Vilma J. Barcelona and Station Manager

DeoTrinidad. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of Nova and

ordered R.A. Broadcasting to pay his separationpay and full backwages.

NLRC affirmed such decision anddenied the MFR filed by R.A.

Construction on the groundthat it was filed out of time. The NLRC issued

an alias

writ of execution

and the property of Sps. Barcelona wasscheduled in an auction sale.

The said spouses filed withthe RTC Camarines Norte action for

damages with

prayerof TRO to restrain the NLRC from conducting thescheduled public

auction. The RTC granted the TRO. Novaargued that under the Labor

Code, issuance of the TRO orpreliminary injunction in a case arising

from labor disputeis prohibited.

Issue:

Whether the RTC cannot issue injunction against NLRC?

Held:YES

Regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear

and decidequestions which arise and are incidental to theenforcement of

decisions, orders or awards rendered inlabor cases by appropriate

officers and tribunals of theDOLE. Corollarily, any controversy in the

execution of the judgment shall be referred to the tribunal which issued

thewrit of execution since it has the inherent power to controlits own

processes in order to enforce its judgments andorders.True, an action

for damages lies within the jurisdiction of aregional trial court. However,

the RTC has no jurisdiction toissue a TRO in labor cases. The SC finds

respondent Judgeguilty of gross ignorance of the law.

22. Tolosa vs NLRC (2008)

G.R. 149578

Facts:

Petitioner was the widow of Capt. Virgilio Tolosa who was hired by

Qwana-Kaiun, through its manning agent, Asia Bulk, to be the master of

the Vessel named M/V Lady Dona. His contract officially began on

November 1, 1992, as supported by his contract of employment when he

assumed command of the vessel in Yokohama, Japan. The vessel

departed for Long Beach California, passing by Hawaii in the middle of

the voyage. At the time of embarkation, CAPT. TOLOSA was allegedly

shown to be in good health.

During 'channeling activities' upon the vessel's departure from

Yokohama sometime on November 6, 1992, CAPT. TOLOSA was

drenched with rainwater. The following day, November 7, 1992, he had a

slight fever and in the succeeding twelve (12) days, his health rapidly

deteriorated resulting in his death on November 18, 1992.

When petitioner filed a complaint with the POEA, transferred to the

DOLE, NLRC, the Labor Arbiter ruled in her favor. The NLRC, affirmed

by the Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the labor commission had

no jurisdiction over the subject matter filed by petitioner.

Hence, this appeal.

Summary of Ruling: The Court affirmed the appealed decision.

Petitioner's action was recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict or

tort, not adjudication of a labor dispute to which jurisdiction of labor

tribunals is limited. Petitioner is actually suing shipmates Garate and

Asis for gross negligence, and the said shipmates have no employer-

employee relations with Capt. Tolosa. While labor arbiters and the NLRC

have jurisdiction to award not only relief provided by labor laws, but also

damages under the Civil Code, these relief must still be based on an

action that has reasonable causal connection with matters.


15/26

Issues and Rulings:

1. Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case (whether the

labor arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over petitioner's action).

Petitioner argues that her cause of action is not predicated on a quasi

delict or tort, but on the failure of private respondents as employers of

her husband (Captain Tolosa) to provide him with timely, adequate

and competent medical services under Article 161 of the Labor Code:

"ART 161. Assistance of employer. It shall be the duty of anyemployer to provide all the necessary assistance to ensure the adequate

and immediate medical and dental attendance and treatment to an

injured or sick employee in case of emergency."

Likewise, she contends that Article 217 (a) (4) of the Labor Code vests

labor arbiters and the NLRC with jurisdiction to award all kinds of

damages in cases arising from employer-employee relations.

Petitioner also alleges that the "reasonable causal connection" rule

should be applied in her favor. Citing San Miguel Corporation v.

Etcuban, she insists that a reasonable causal connection between the

claim asserted and the employer-employee relation confers jurisdictionupon labor tribunals. She adds that she has satisfied the required

conditions: 1) the dispute arose from an employer-employee relation,

considering that the claim was for damages based on the failure of

private respondents to comply with their obligation under Article 161 of

the Labor Code; and 2) the dispute can be resolved by reference to the

Labor Code, because the material issue is whether private respondents

complied with their legal obligation to provide timely, adequate and

competent medical services to guarantee Captain Tolosa's occupational

safety. We disagree.

We affirm the CA's ruling that the NLRC and the labor arbiter had nojurisdiction over petitioner's claim for damages, because that ruling was

based on a quasi delict or tort per Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION; LABOR

TRIBUNALS; ACTION BASED ON QUASI DELICT THAT DOES NOT

INVOLVE LABOR DISPUTE, NOT INCLUDED - Time and time again,

we have held that the allegations in the complaint determine the nature

of the action and, consequently, the jurisdiction of the courts. After

carefully examining the complaint/position paper of petitioner, we are

convinced that the allegations therein are in the nature of an action

based on a quasi delict or tort. It is evident that she sued Pedro Garateand Mario Asis for gross negligence.

Petitioner's complaint/position paper refers to and extensively discusses

the negligent acts of shipmates Garate and Asis, who had no employer-

employee relation with Captain Tolosa. The labor arbiter himself

classified petitioner's case as "a complaint for damages, blacklisting and

watchlisting (pending inquiry) for gross negligence resulting in the death

of complainant's husband, Capt. Virgilio Tolosa."

We stress that the case does not involve the adjudication of a labor

dispute, but the recovery of damages based on a quasi delict. Thejurisdiction of labor tribunals is limited to disputes arising from employer-

employee relations, as we ruled in Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v.

Isnani:

"Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters

that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their

adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters

and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes

arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be

resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their

collective bargaining agreement."The pivotal question is whether the Labor Code has any relevance to the

relief sought by petitioner. From her paper, it is evident that the primary

reliefs she seeks are as follows:

(a) loss of earning capacity denominated therein as "actual damages" or

"lost income" and

(b) blacklisting. The loss she claims does not refer to the actual earnings

of the deceased, but to his earning capacity based on a life expectancy

of 65 years. This amount is recoverable if the action is based on a quasi

delict as provided for in Article 2206 of the Civil Code, 18 but not in the

Labor Code.DAMAGES PROVIDED BY THE CIVIL CODE; AWARD PROPER IF

RELIEF SOUGHT HAS CAUSAL RELATIONS WITH LABOR MATTERS

- While it is true that labor arbiters and the NLRC have jurisdiction to

award not only reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages

governed by the Civil Code, these reliefs must still be based on an

action that has a reasonable causal connection with the Labor Code,

other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements.

The central issue is determined essentially from the relief sought in the

complaint. In San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, this Court held:"It is the

character of the principal relief sought that appears essential in thisconnection. Where such principal relief is to be granted under labor


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legislation or a collective bargaining agreement, the case should fall

within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, even though a

claim for damages might be asserted as an incident to such claim."

The labor arbiter found private respondents to be grossly negligent. He

ruled that Captain Tolosa, who died at age 58, could expect to live up to

65 years and to have an earning capacity of US$176,400.

LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY; NOT TO BE EQUATED WITH LABOR

BENEFITS COGNIZED IN LABOR DISPUTES - It must be noted that aworker's loss of earning capacity and blacklisting are not to be equated

with wages, overtime compensation or separation pay, and other labor

benefits that are generally cognized in labor disputes. The loss of

earning capacity is a relief or claim resulting from a quasi delict or a

similar cause within the realm of civil law.

Claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217 must have a

reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in the

article in order to be cognizable by the labor arbiter. Only if there is such

a connection with the other claims can the claim for damages be

considered as arising from employer-employee relations. In the presentcase, petitioner's claim for damages is not related to any other claim

under Article 217, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining

agreements.

Petitioner cannot anchor her claim for damages to Article 161 of the

Labor Code, which does not grant or specify a claim or relief. This

provision is only a safety and health standard under Book IV of the same

Code. The enforcement of this labor standard rests with the labor

secretary. Thus, claims for an employer's violation thereof are beyond

the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. In other words, petitioner cannot

enforce the labor standard provided for in Article 161 by suing fordamages before the labor arbiter.

REGULAR COURTS HAVE AUTHORITY OVER ACTION FOR

DAMAGES PREDICATED ON QUASI DELICT AND HAS NO

CONNECTION WITH LABOR-RELATED CLAIMS - It is not the NLRC

but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over actions for damages, in

which the employer-employee relation is merely incidental, and in which

the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation such

as a tort. Since petitioner's claim for damages is predicated on a quasi

delict or tort that has no reasonable causal connection with any of the

claims provided for in Article 217, other labor statutes, or collective

bargaining agreements, jurisdiction over the action lies with the regular

courts not with the NLRC or the labor arbiters.

2. Whether or not Evelyn is entitled to the monetary awards granted by

the labor arbiter (whether the monetary award granted by the labor

arbiter has already reached finality).

ISSUES NOT RAISED IN COURTS A QUO CANNOT BE RAISED FOR

THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL Petitioner contends that the labor

arbiter's monetary award has already reached finality, since privaterespondents were not able to file a timely appeal before the NLRC.

This argument cannot be passed upon in this appeal, because it was not

raised in the tribunals a quo. Well-settled is the rule that issues not

raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Thus, points

of law, theories, and arguments not brought to the attention of the Court

of Appeals need not and ordinarily will not be considered by this

Court. Petitioner's allegation cannot be accepted by this Court on its

face; to do so would be tantamount to a denial of respondents' right to

due process.

Furthermore, whether respondents were able to appeal on time is aquestion of fact that cannot be entertained in a petition for review under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In general, the jurisdiction of this Court in

cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to a review

of errors of law allegedly committed by the court a quo.

23. EVIOTA vs CA Case Digest

FACTS:

Sometime on January 26, 1998, the respondent Standard Chartered Bankand petitioner Eduardo G. Eviota executed a contract of employment under

which the petitioner was employed by the respondent bank as

Compensation and Benefits Manager, VP (M21). Petitioner came up with

many proposals which the bank approved and made preparations of. He

was also given privileges like car, renovation of the office, and even a trip to

Singapore at the companys expense. However, the petitioner abruptly

resigned from the respondent bank barely a month after his employment

and rejoined his former employer. On June 19, 1998, the respondent bank

filed a complaint against the petitioner with the RTC of Makati City for

damages brought about his abrupt resignation.


17/26

Though petitioner reimbursed part of the amount demanded by Standard, he

was not able to pay it full.

Standard alleged that assuming arguendo that Eviota had the right to

terminate his employment with the Bank for no reason, the manner in and

circumstances under which he exercised the same are clearly abusive and

contrary to the rules governing human relations, governed by the Civil Code.

Further, Standard alleged that petitioner also violated the Labor Code when

he terminated his employment without one (1) notice in advance. This

stipulation was also provided in the employment contract of Eviota with

Standard, which would also constitute breach of contract.

The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the

action for damages of the respondent bank was within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under paragraph 4, Article 217 of the Labor

Code of the Philippines, as amended. The petitioner averred that the

respondent banks claim for damages arose out of or were in connection

with his employer-employee relationship with the respondent bank or some

aspect or incident of such relationship. The respondent bank opposed the

motion, claiming that its action for damages was within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the trial court. Although its claims for damages incidentallyinvolved an employer-employee relationship, the said claims are actually

predicated on the petitioners acts and omissions which are separately,

specifically and distinctly governed by the New Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:

The SC held that the RTC has jurisdiction. Case law has it that the nature of

an action and the subject matter thereof, as well as which court has

jurisdiction over the same, are determined by the material allegations of the

complaint and the reliefs prayed for in relation to the law involved. Not every

controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-

versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. A money claim

by a worker against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the labor arbiter only if there is a reasonable causal

connection between the claim asserted and employee-employer

relation. Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the regular

courts of justice.

Actions between employees and employer where the employer-employee

relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a

different source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular

court. The jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor

Code, as amended, is limited to disputes arising from an employer-

employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor

Code of the Philippines, other labor laws or their collective bargaining

agreements.

Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under

paragraph 4 of Article 217, to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must have

a reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in that

article. Only if there is such a connection with the other claims can the claim

for damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations.

In this case, the private respondents first cause of action for damages is

anchored on the petitioners employment of deceit and of making the private

respondent believe that he would fulfill his obligation under the employmentcontract with assiduousness and earnestness. The petitioner volte face

when, without the requisite thirty-day notice under the contract and the

Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, he abandoned his office and

rejoined his former employer; thus, forcing the private respondent to hire a

replacement. The private respondent was left in a lurch, and its corporate

plans and program in jeopardy and disarray. Moreover, the petitioner took

off with the private respondents computer diskette, papers and documents

containing confidential information on employee compensation and other

bank matters. On its second cause of action, the petitioner simply walked

away from his employment with the private respondent sans any written

notice, to the prejudice of the private respondent, its banking operations and

the conduct of its business. Anent its third cause of action, the petitioner

made false and derogatory statements that the private respondent reneged

on its obligations under their contract of employment; thus, depicting the

private respondent as unworthy of trust.

The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a

contractual obligation. The other items demanded are not labor benefits

demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of in labor disputes, such

as payment of wages, overtime compensation or separation pay. The items


18/26

claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an obligation,

intrinsically a civil dispute.

It is evident that the causes of action of the private respondent against the

petitioner do not involve the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines

and other labor laws but the New Civil Code. Thus, the said causes of

action are intrinsically civil. There is no causal relationship between the

causes of action of the private respondents causes of action against the

petitioner and their employer-employee relationship. The fact that the

private respondent was the erstwhile employer of the petitioner under an

existing employment contract before the latter abandoned his employment is

merely incidental.

Petition is denied.

24. Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. vs. Todaro G.R.No. 154830 June& 8, 2007AUSTRIA, MARTINEZ, J.:

The Case:A petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the

Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution denying petitioners

Motion for Reconsideration to dismiss the complaint on the grounds

that the complaint states no cause of action, that the RTC has no

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, as the same is

within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that the complaint should be

dismissed on the basis of the doctrine of forum+non+conveniens.

The Facts:

Antonio D. Todaro (resigned managing director of Betonval

Readyconcrete, Inc., a company engaged in pre5mixed concrete

and concrete aggregate production) was contacted by PIL and asked

him if he was available to join them in connection with

their intention to establish a ready mix concrete plant and other related

operations in the Philippines.

PIL and Todaro came to an agreement wherein PIL consented to

engage the services of Todaro as a consultant for two

to three months, after which, he would be employed as the manager of

PIL's ready mix concrete operations should the company

decide to invest in the Philippines.

PIL started its operations in the Philippines; however, it refused to

comply with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a permanent basis.

Todaro filed a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with

Preliminary Attachment against Pioneer International Limited (PIL),

Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. (PCPI), Pioneer Philippines Holdings,

Inc. (PPHI), John G. McDonald (McDonald) and Philip J. Klepzig (Klepzig).

o PIL& Mother company based in Australia, Cement Aggregate

Business

o PPHI 5 PILs operating company (on stocks) in the Philippines

o PCPI 5 Undertakes PILs business of ready mix concrete, concrete

aggregates and quarrying operations in the Philippines

o McDonald 5 Chief Executive of the Hongkong office of PIL

o Klepzig 5 President and Managing Director of PPHI and PCPI

Instead of filingan Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved

to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC has no

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, as the same is

within the jurisdiction of the NLRC.

Petitioners contend that since Todaros claims for actual, moral and

exemplary damages are solely premised on the alleged breach ofemployment contract, the present case should be considered as falling

within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC.

The&Issue: Question of jurisdiction.The&Ruling:The complaint was not based on a contract of employment for this was no

employer employee relationship existed between them; it was based on

petitioners' unwarranted breach of their contractual obligation to employ

Todaro. It has been consistently held that where no employer employee

relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which

may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes

or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court

that has jurisdiction.

25.

LOCSIN v NISSAN LEASE PHILS INC

FACTS: On January 1, 1992, Locsin was elected Executive Vice Presidentand Treasurer (EVP/Treasurer) of NCLPI. As EVP/Treasurer, his duties and

responsibilities included: (1) the management of the finances of the

company; (2) carrying out the directions of the President and/or the Board of

Directors regarding financial management; and (3) the preparation of


19/26

financial reports to advise the officers and directors of the financial condition

of NCLPI. Locsin held this position for 13 years, having been re-elected

every year since 1992, until January 21, 2005, when he was nominated and

elected Chairman of NCLPIs Boardof Directors.

On August 5, 2005, a little over seven (7) months after his election as

Chairman of the Board, the NCLPI Board held a special meeting at the

Manila Polo Club. One of the items of the agenda was the election of a new

set of officers. Unfortunately, Locsin was neither re-elected Chairman nor

reinstated to his previous position as EVP/Treasurer.

Aggrieved, on June 19, 2007, Locsin filed a complaint for illegal dismissal

with prayer for reinstatement, payment of backwages, damages and

attorneys fees before the Labor Arbiter against NCLPI and Banson, who

was then President of NCLPI.

On July 11, 2007, instead of filing their position paper, NCLPI and Banson

filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter did not have

jurisdiction over the case since the issue of Locsins removal asEVP/Treasurer involves an intra-corporate dispute.

On August 16, 2007, Locsin submitted his opposition to the motion to

dismiss, maintaining his position that he is an employee of NCLPI.

On March 10, 2008, Labor Arbiter Concepcion issued an Order denying the

Motion to Dismiss, holding that her office acqui

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