Civpro September 3

8/4/2019 Civpro September 3

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Mangila vs. CA/Loreta Guina

GRN 125027 August 12, 2002

Carpio, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Mangila hired the freight service of private respondent Guina for the importation ofseafoods to USA. Petitioner failed to pay the services rendered by Air Swift International abusiness operating under the sole proprietorship of Guina. The latter filed a case for collectionof money but summons were unsuccessfully served thus a writ of Preliminary Attachmentwas issued. Petitioner filed a motion to discharge without submitting herself to the jurisdictionof the court. The CA upheld the validity of the issuance of the writ attachment and sustainedthe filing of the case in Pasay as the proper venue, despite stipulation in the contract that incase of complaints, cases should be filed in Makati City. Pasay City is the office location ofAir Swift.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the venue of the swift was properly laid when it was filed in Pasay City wherethe sole proprietorship business of the respondent was located.

RULING:

A mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude the parties frombringing a case in other venues. The partiers must be able to show that the stipulation isexclusive. In the present case there are no qualifying or restrictive words in the invoice thatwould evince the intention of the parties that Makati is the only or exclusive venue where theaction would be instituted. Nevertheless, we hold that Pasay is not the proper venue.

In this case it was established that petitioner resides in Pampanga while respondent resides inParaaque. The case was filed in Pasay where the business is located.

A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from thepersonality of the owner of the enterprise The law does not vest a separate legal personalityon the sole proprietorship to empower it to file or defend an action in court. Thus, not being

vested with legal personality to file this case, the sole proprietorship is not the plaintiff butGuina herself.

Chuidian vs. Sandiganbayan, January 19, 2001

The rule contemplates that the defect must be in the very issuance of the

attachment writ. Supervening events which may or may not justify the

discharge of the writ are not within the purview of this particular rule.

When the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground. which is at the

same time the applicant's cause of action, the defendant is not allowed to

file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by

offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiff's

application and affidavits on which the writ was based, the reason being

that the hearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be

tantamount to a trial of the merits of the action. Thus, this Court has time

and again ruled that the merits of the action in which a writ of preliminary

attachment has been issued are not triable on a motion for dissolution of

the attachment, otherwise an applicant for the lifting of the writ could

force a trial of the merits of the case on a mere motion.

Moreover, we have held that when the writ of attachment is issued upon a

ground which is at the same time the applicant's cause of action, the only

other way the writ can be lifted or dissolved is by a counterbond, in

accordance with Section 12 of the same rule.

To reiterate, there are only two ways of quashing a writ of attachment: (a)by filing a counterbond immediately; or (b) by moving to quash on the

ground of improper and irregular issuance. These grounds for the

dissolution of an attachment are fixed in Rule 57 of the Rules of Court and


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the power of the Court to dissolve an attachment is circumscribed by the

grounds specified therein

CHUIDIAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN

349 SCRA 745 (Jan. 2001)

Facts: The government filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint against several

individuals, including D, for restitution of ill-gotten wealth. The government asked for

the issuance of a writ of attachment and this was granted. D assailed the propriety of

the issuance of the writ.

Issue: Whether the issuance of the writ was proper.

Held: Yes. In order to quash a writ of attachment, a party may file a counterbond

(Rule 57 12) or to quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or

improvidently issued (Rule 57 13). The grounds cited by D have nothing to do withthe issuance of the writ. His grounds were facts that took place after the writ had

already been implemented. Supervening events, which may or may not justify the

discharge of the writ, are not within the purview of Rule 57 13.

LUZ DU,petitioner, vs. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE CO., INC., respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN,J.:

Preference is given to a duly registered attachment over a subsequent notice oflis pendens,even if the beneficiary of the notice acquired the subject property before the registration of theattachment. Under the torrens system, the auction sale of an attached realty retroacts to thedate the levy was registered.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify theMarch 19, 2002 Decision and the December 5, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)in CA-GR CV No. 50884. The CA disposed as follows:

Parenthetically, when the decision in Civil Case No. 90-1848 became final and executory,levy on execution issued and the attached property sold at public auction, the latter retroactsto the date of the levy. Said the High Court:

In line with the same principle, it was held that where a preliminary attachment in favor ofA was recorded on November 11, 1932, and the private sale of the attached property infavor of B was executed on May 29, 1933, the attachment lien has priority over the privatesale, which means that the purchaser took the property subject to such attachment lien and toall of its consequences, one of which is the subsequent sale on execution (Tambao v. Suy, 52Phil. 237). The auction sale being a necessary sequel to the levy, it enjoys the samepreference as the attachment lien enjoys over the private sale. In other words, the auction saleretroacts to the date of the levy. [Were] the rule be otherwise, the preference enjoyed by thelevy of execution would be meaningless and illusory (Capistrano v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 101 Phil.1117). (Underscoring supplied)

By and large, We find no reversible error in the appealed decision.


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IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is ordered DISMISSED. Nopronouncement as to cost.

The questioned Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The CA narrated the facts as follows:

x x x Aurora Olarte de Leon was the registered owner of Lot No. 10-A (LRC Psd 336366)per Transfer Certificate of Title No. 582/T-3. Sometime in January 1989, De Leon sold theproperty to Luz Du under a Conditional Deed of Sale wherein said vendee paid a downpayment of P75,000.00 leaving a balance of P95,000.00.

Then again, on April 28, 1989, Aurora de Leon sold [the] same property to spouses Enriqueand Rosita Caliwag without prior notice to Luz Du. As a result, Transfer Certificate of TitleNo. 582/T-3 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2200 was issued in favor ofthe Caliwag spouses.

Meanwhile, Stronghold Insurance Corp., Inc. x x x commenced Civil Case No. 90-1848against spouses Rosita and Enrique Caliwag et al., for allegedly defrauding

Strongholdand

misappropriating the companys fund by falsifying and simulating purchases of documentarystamps. The action was accompanied by a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment dulyannotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2200 on August 7, 1990.

On her part, on December 21, 1990, Luz Du initiated Civil Case No. 60319 against Aurorade Leon and the spouses Caliwag for the annulment of the sale by De Leon in favor of theCaliwags, anchored on the earlier mentioned Deed of Conditional Sale.

On January 3, 1991, Luz Du caused the annotation of a Notice Of Lis Pendens at the back ofTransfer Certificate of Title No. 2200.

On February 11, 1991, the decision was handed down in Civil Case No. 90-1848 in favor ofStronghold , ordering the spouses Caliwag jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff

P

8,691,681.60, among others. When the decision became final and executory, on March 12,1991, a notice of levy on execution was annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2200and the attached property was sold in a public auction. On [August] 5, 1991, the certificate ofsale and the final Deed of Sale in favor of Stronghold were inscribed and annotated leading

to the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2200 and in lieu thereof, TransferCertificate of Title No. 6444 was issued in the name of Stronghold.

It came to pass that on August 5, 1992, Luz Du too was able to secure a favorable judgmentin Civil Case No. 60319 and which became final and executory sometime in 1993, as well.

Under the above historical backdrop, Luz Du commenced the present case (docketed as Civil

Case No. 64645) to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6444 in the name of Strongholdwith damages claiming priority rights over the property by virtue of her Notice Of LisPendens under Entry No. 13305 and inscribed on January 3, 1991, and the final and executorydecision in Civil Case No. 60319 she filed against spouses Enrique and Rosita Caliwag.According to Luz Du, despite her said notice of lis pendens annotated, Stronghold stillproceeded with the execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 90-1848 against the subject lotand ultimately the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6444 in its (Strongholds)name.

The trial court ruled that Stronghold had superior rights over the property because of the priorregistration of the latters notice of levy on attachment on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)No. 2200. For this reason, it found no basis to nullify TCT No. 6444, which was issued in thename of respondent after the latter had purchased the property in a public auction.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Sustaining the trial court in toto, the CA held that Strongholds notice of levy on attachmenthad been registered almost five (5) months before petitioners notice of lis pendens. Hence,respondent enjoyed priority in time. Such registration, the appellate court added, constitutedconstructive notice to petitioner and all third persons from the time of Strongholds entry, asprovided under the Land Registration Act -- now the Property Registration Decree.

The CA also held that respondent was a purchaser in good faith. The necessary sequels ofexecution and sale retroacted to the time when Stronghold registered its notice of levy onattachment, at a time when there was nothing on TCT No. 2200 that would show any defect inthe title or any adverse claim over the property.

Hence, this Petition.

Issues


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Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

I.

Whether a Notice of Levy on Attachment on the property is a superior lien over that of theunregistered right of a buyer of a property in possession pursuant to a Deed of ConditionalSale.

II.

Whether the acquisition of the subject property by Respondent Stronghold was tainted withbad faith.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:Superiority of Rights

Petitioner submits that her unregistered right over the property by way of a priorconditionalsale in 1989 enjoys preference over the lien of Stronghold -- a lien that was created by theregistration of respondents levy on attachment in 1990. Maintaining that the ruling inCapistrano v. PNB was improperly applied by the Court of Appeals, petitioner avers thatunlike the circumstances in that case, the property herein had been sold to herbefore thelevy. We do not agree.

The preference given to a duly registered levy on attachment or execution over a priorunregistered sale is well-settled in our jurisdiction. As early as Gomez v. Levy Hermanos, thisCourt has held that an attachment that is duly annotated on a certificate of title is superior tothe right of a prior but unregistered buyer. In that case, the Court explained as follows:

x x x. It is true that she bought the lots with pacto de retro but the fact of her purchase wasnot noted on the certificates of title until long after the attachment and its inscription on the

certificates. In the registry, therefore, the attachment appeared in the nature of a real lienwhen Apolonia Gomez had her purchase recorded. The legal effect of the notation of saidlien was to subject and subordinate the right of Apolonia Gomez, as purchaser, to the lien.She acquired the ownership of the said parcels only from the date of the recording of her title

in the register, which took place on November 21, 1932 (sec. 51 of Act No. 496; Liong-Wong-Shih vs. Sunico and Peterson, 8 Phil. 91; Tabigue vs. Green, 11 Phil. 102; Buzon vs.Lucauco, 13 Phil. 354; and Worcestervs. Ocampo and Ocampo, 34 Phil. 646), and the right ofownership which she inscribed was not an absolute but a limited right, subject to a priorregistered lien, by virtue of which Levy Hermanos, Inc. was entitled to the execution of thejudgment credit over the lands in question, a right which is preferred and superior to that ofthe plaintiff (sec, 51, Act No. 496 and decisions cited above). x x x

Indeed, the subsequent sale of the property to the attaching creditor must, of necessity,retroact to the date of the levy. Otherwise, the preference created by the levy would bemeaningless and illusory, as reiterated inDefensor v. Brillo:

x x x. The doctrine is well-settled that a levy on execution duly registered takes preferenceover a prior unregistered sale; and that even if the prior sale is subsequently registered beforethe sale in execution but after the levy was duly made, the validity of the execution saleshould be maintained, because it retroacts to the date of the levy; otherwise, the preferencecreated by the levy would be meaningless and illusory.

Even assuming, therefore, that the entry of appellants sales in the books of the Register ofDeeds on November 5, 1949 operated to convey the lands to them even without thecorresponding entry in the owners duplicate titles, the levy on execution on the same lots in

Civil Case No. 1182 on August 3, 1949, and their subsequent sale to appellee Brillo (whichretroacts to the date of the levy) still takes precedence over and must be preferred toappellants deeds of sale which were registered only on November 5, 1949.

This result is a necessary consequence of the fact that the properties herein involved wereduly registered under Act No. 496, and of the fundamental principle that registration is theoperative act that conveys and binds lands covered by Torrens titles (sections 50, 51, Act496). Hence, if appellants became owners of the properties in question by virtue of therecording of the conveyances in their favor, their title arose already subject to the levy infavor of the appellee, which had been noted ahead in the records of the Register of Deeds.(Citations omitted, italics supplied)

The Court has steadfastly adhered to the governing principle set forth in Sections 51 and 52 ofPresidential Decree No. 1529:

SEC. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. - An owner of registeredland may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance withexisting laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary


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instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntaryinstrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as aconveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and asevidence of authority to the Registry of Deeds to make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as thirdpersons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in

the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or the city where the land lies.

SEC. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. - Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien,attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered,filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land towhich it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering,filing or entering.(Italics supplied)

As the property in this case was covered by the torrens system, the registration ofStrongholds attachment was the operative act that gave validity to the transfer and created alien upon the land in favor of respondent.

CapistranoRulingCorrectly Applied

The preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished even by the subsequentregistration of the prior sale. That was the import of Capistrano v. PNB, which held thatprecedence should be given to a levy on attachment or execution, whose registration wasbefore that of the prior sale.

In Capistrano, the sale of the land in question -- though made as far back as 1946 -- wasregistered only in 1953, after the property had already been subjected to a levy on executionby the Philippine National Bank. The present case is not much different. The stipulation offacts shows that Stronghold had already registered its levy on attachment before petitionerannotated her notice oflis pendens. As in Capistrano, she invokes the alleged superior rightof a prior unregistered buyer to overcome respondents lien.

If either the third-party claim or the subsequent registration of the prior sale was insufficientto defeat the previously registered attachment lien, as ruled by the Court in Capistrano, itfollows that a notice oflis pendens is likewise insufficient for the same purpose. Such noticedoes not establish a lien or an encumbrance on the property affected. As the name suggests, anotice oflis pendens with respect to a disputed property is intended merely to inform third

persons that any of their transactions in connection therewith -- if entered into subsequent tothe notation -- would be subject to the result of the suit.

In view of the foregoing, the CA correctly applied Capistrano, as follows:

x x x the rule now followed is that if the attachment or levy of execution, though posterior tothe sale, is registered before the sale is registered, it takes precedence over the latter.

The rule is not altered by the fact that at the time of the execution sale the PhilippineNational Bank had information that the land levied upon had already been deeded by thejudgment debtor and his wife to Capistrano. The auction sale being a necessary sequel to thelevy, for this was effected precisely to carry out the sale, the purchase made by the bank atsaid auction should enjoy the same legal priority that the levy had over the sale in favor ofplaintiff. In other words, the auction sale retroacts to the date of the levy. Were the ruleotherwise, the preference enjoyed by the levy of execution in a case like the present would bemeaningless and illusory. (Citations omitted, italics supplied)

Second Issue:Taking in Bad Faith

We now tackle the next question of petitioner: whether Stronghold was a purchaser in good

faith. Suffice it to say that when Stronghold registered its notice of attachment, it did notknow that the land being attached had been sold to petitioner. It had no such knowledgeprecisely because the sale, unlike the attachment, had not been registered. It is settled that aperson dealing with registered property may rely on the title and be charged with notice ofonly such burdens and claims as are annotated thereon. This principle applies with more forceto this case, absent any allegation or proof that Stronghold had actual knowledge of the sale topetitioner before the registration of its attachment.

Thus, the annotation of respondents notice of attachment was a registration in good faith, thekind that made its prior right enforceable.

Moreover, it is only after the notice of lis pendens is inscribed in the Office of the Register ofDeeds that purchasers of the property become bound by the judgment in the case. AsStronghold is deemed to have acquired the property -- not at the time of actual purchase but atthe time of the attachment -- it was an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith.


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WHEREFORE, the Petition isDENIED,and the assailed Decision and ResolutionAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154106 June 29, 2004

D.M. WENCESLAO and ASSOCIATES, INC., and/or DOMINADOR S. DAYRIT,

petitioners,vs.READYCON TRADING AND CONSTRUCTION CORP., respondent.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING,J.:

This petition for review assails the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated January 30, 2002,as well as its resolution2 dated June 20, 2002 in CA-GR CV No. 49101, denying petitionersmotion for reconsideration. The appellate court affirmed the decision3 of the Regional TrialCourt of Pasig City, Branch 165, in Civil Case No. 61159, ordering petitioners to pay the sumof P1,014,110.45 with interest rate of 12% per annum (compounded annually) from August 9,1991, the date of filing of the complaint, until fully paid to Readycon Trading andConstruction Corp., plus damages.

Petitioner D.M. Wenceslao and Associates, Inc. (WENCESLAO, for brevity) is a domesticcorporation, organized under and existing pursuant to Philippine laws, engaged in theconstruction business, primarily infrastructure, foundation works, and subdivisiondevelopment. Its co-petitioner, Dominador Dayrit, is the vice-president of said company.4

Respondent Readycon Trading and Construction Corporation (READYCON, for brevity) islikewise a corporate entity organized in accordance with Philippine laws. Its primary businessis the manufacture and sale of asphalt materials.5

The facts of this case are not in dispute.

WENCESLAO had a contract with the Public Estates Authority (PEA) for the improvement

of the main expressway in the R-1 Toll Project along the Coastal Road in Paraaque City. Tofulfill its obligations to the PEA, WENCESLAO entered into a contract with READYCON onApril 16, 1991. READYCON agreed to sell to WENCESLAO asphalt materials valued atP1,178,308.75. The contract bore the signature of co-petitioner Dominador Dayrit, assignatory officer for WENCESLAO in this agreement. Under the contract, WENCESLAOwas bound to pay respondent a twenty percent (20%) downpayment, or P235,661.75, upondelivery of the materials contracted for. The balance of the contract price, amounting toP942,647, was to be paid within fifteen (15) days thereof. It was further stipulated by theparties that respondent was to furnish, deliver, lay, roll the asphalt, and if necessary, make theneeded corrections on a prepared base at the jobsite.6

On April 22, 1991, READYCON delivered the assorted asphalt materials worthP1,150,531.75. Accordingly, WENCESLAO paid the downpayment of P235,661.75 toREADYCON. Thereafter, READYCON performed its obligation to lay and roll the asphalt

materials on the jobsite.7

Fifteen (15) days after performance of said work, READYCON demanded thatWENCESLAO pay the balance of the contract price. WENCESLAO, however, ignored saiddemand.

On May 30, 1991, the counsel for READYCON wrote a demand letter to WENCESLAOasking that it make good on the balance it owed. Again, WENCESLAO failed to heed thedemand. It did not even bother to reply to the demand letter. 8

In view of this development, on July 19, 1991, READYCON filed a complaint with theRegional Trial Court of Pasig City for collection of a sum of money and damages, with prayerfor writ of preliminary attachment against D.M. Wenceslao and/or Dominador Dayrit,docketed as Civil Case No. 61159. READYCON demanded payment of P1,014,110.45 from

petitioners herein with P914,870.75 as the balance of contract price, as well as payment ofP99,239.70, representing another unpaid account.9


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As READYCON timely posted the required bond of P1,150,000, its application for the writ ofpreliminary attachment was granted.

On September 5, 1991, the RTC Sheriff attached certain assets of WENCESLAO,particularly, the following heavy equipments: One (1) asphalt paver, one (1) bulldozer, one(1) dozer and one (1) grader.10

On September 16, 1991, WENCESLAO moved for the release of the attached equipments andposted its counter-bond. The trial court granted the motion and directed the RTC Sheriff toreturn the attached equipments.

On September 25, 1991, the Sheriff released the attached heavy machineries toWENCESLAO.11

In the proceedings below, WENCESLAO admitted that it owed READYCON P1,014,110.45indeed. However, it alleged that their contract was not merely one of sale but also of service,namely, that respondent shall lay the asphalt in accordance with the specifications andstandards imposed by and acceptable to the government. WENCESLAO also alleged thatsince the contract did not indicate this condition with respect to the period within which thebalance must be paid, the contract failed to reflect the true intention of the parties.12 It allegedREADYCON agreed that the balance in the payments would be settled only after the

government had accepted READYCONs work as to its quality in laying the asphalt. By wayof counterclaim, WENCESLAO prayed for the payment of damages caused by the filing ofREADYCONs complaint and the issuance of the writ of attachment despite lack of cause. 13

On December 26, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment in this wise:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant D.M.Wenceslao & Associates, Inc. to pay plaintiff as follows:

1. The amount of P1,014,110.45 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum(compounded annually) from August 9, 1991, date of filing of thecomplaint, until fully paid.

2. The amount of P35,000.00 as and for attorneys fees and expenses oflitigation.

3. Costs of suit.

The counterclaim of the defendants is dismissed for lack of merit. 14

Dissatisfied with the decision, the petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellatecourt, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. 15

In denying the appeal, the appellate court found that contrary to WENCESLAOs assertion,malice and bad faith in obtaining a writ of attachment must be proved before a claim for

damages on account of wrongful attachment will prosper, citingPhilippine CommercialInternational Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 196 SCRA 29 (1991). The CA stressedthat the trial court found neither malice nor bad faith relative to the filing of the complaint andthe obtaining of the writ of attachment. Also, according to the CA, petitioners did not adduceevidence to show that the attachment caused damage to the cited pieces of heavy equipment.16

The appellate court also found that the trial court correctly interpreted the period for paymentof the balance. It held that the text of the stipulation that the balance shall be paid withinfifteen days is clear and unmistakable. Granting that the sales contract was not merely forsupply and delivery but also for service, the balance was already due and demandable whendemand was made on May 30, 1991, which was a month after READYCON performed itsobligation.17

Hence, the instant petition, wherein petitioners raise the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT QUESTIONS OF FACTS ARE RAISED IN THE APPEALBY CERTIORARI;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED INNOT HOLDING RESPONDENT LIABLE FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGESFOR THE WRONGFUL ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARYATTACHMENT;

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED INNOT HOLDING THE OBLIGATION [AS] NOT YET DUE ANDDEMANDABLE.18

We find proper for resolution two issues: (1) Is respondent READYCON liable to petitionerWENCESLAO for damages caused by the issuance and enforcement of the writ ofpreliminary attachment? (2) Was the obligation of WENCESLAO to pay READYCONalready due and demandable as of May 30, 1991?


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On the first issue, petitioners rely mainly on Lazatin v. Twano and Castro, 112 Phil. 733(1961), reiterated in MC Engineering v. Court of Appeals, 380 SCRA 116 (2002). InLazatin,we held that actual or compensatory damages may be recovered for wrongful, though notmalicious, attachment.Lazatin also held that attorneys fees may be recovered under Article2208 of the Civil Code.19 Petitioners contend thatLazatin applies in the instant case becausethe wrongful attachment of WENCESLAOs equipment resulted in a paralysis of itsoperations, causing it to sustain a loss of P100,000 per day in terms of accomplishment ofwork. Since the attachment lasted 19 days it suffered a total loss of P1.9 million. Aside from

that, it had to spend P50,000 on the pullout of the equipment and another P100,000 to repairand restore them to their former working condition.20

Respondent counters that inasmuch as a preliminary attachment is an available ancillaryremedy under the rules, a penalty cannot be meted out for the enforcement of a right, such asin this case when it sought such relief. It stresses that the writ was legally issued by the RTC,upon a finding that READYCON sought the relief without malice or bad faith. Furthermore,WENCESLAO failed to show concrete and credible proof of the damages it suffered. Theissuance of a writ and its enforcement entail a rigorous process where the court found that itwas not attended by malice or bad faith. It cites Mindanao Savings and Loan Association v.Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 480 (1989), to the effect where a counter-bond is filed, the rightto question the irregularity and propriety of the writ of attachment must be deemed waivedsince the ground for the issuance of the writ forms the core of the complaint. 21

We find for the respondent on this issue. However, its reliance upon Mindanao Savings andLoan Association is misplaced.

It is to be stressed that the posting of a counter-bond is not tantamount to a waiver of the rightto damages arising from a wrongful attachment. This we have made clear in previous cases,e.g., Calderon v. Intermediate Appellate Court,22 where we ruled that:

Whether the attachment was discharged by either of the two (2) ways indicated in thelaw, i.e., by filing a counterbond or by showing that the order of attachment wasimproperly or irregularly issued, the liability of the surety on the attachment bondsubsists because the final reckoning is when "the Court shall finally adjudge that theattaching creditor was not entitled" to the issuance of the attachment writ in the firstplace. The attachment debtor cannot be deemed to have waived any defect in the

issuance of the attachment writ by simply availing himself of one way of dischargingthe attachment writ, instead of the other. Moreover, the filing of a counterbond is aspeedier way of discharging the attachment writ maliciously sought out by theattaching party creditor instead of the other way, which in most instances like in the

present case, would require presentation of evidence in a fullblown trial on the meritsand cannot easily be settled in a pending incident of the case.23

The point in Mindanao Savings, alluded to by respondent, pertained to the propriety ofquestioning the writ of attachment by filing a motion to quash said writ, after a counter-bondhad been posted by the movant. But nowhere in Mindanao Savings did we rule that filing acounter-bond is tantamount to a waiver of the right to seek damages on account of theimpropriety or illegality of the writ.

We note that the appellate court, citingPhilippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, 196 SCRA29 (1991), stressed that bad faith or malice must first be proven as a condition sine qua non tothe award of damages. The appellate court appears to have misread our ruling, for pertinentlywhat this Court stated was as follows:

The silence of the decision in GR No. 55381 on whether there was bad faith ormalice on the part of the petitioner in securing the writ of attachment does not meanthe absence thereof. Only the legality of the issuance of the writ of attachment wasbrought in issue in that case. Hence, this Court ruled on that issue without apronouncement that procurement of the writ was attended by bad faith. Proof of badfaith or malice in obtaining a writ of attachment need be proved only in the claim fordamages on account of the issuance of the writ. We affirm the finding of the

respondent appellate court that malice and bad faith attended the application byPCIB of a writ of attachment.24

Plainly, we laid no hard and fast rule that bad faith or malice must be proved to recover anyform of damages. InPhilippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, we found bad faith andmalice to be present, thereby warranting the award of moral and exemplary damages. But wedenied the award of actual damages for want of evidence to show said damages. For the mereexistence of malice and bad faith would notper se warrant the award of actual orcompensatory damages. To grant such damages, sufficient proof thereon is required.

Petitioners citeLazatin and MC Engineeringinsofar as proof of bad faith and malice asprerequisite to the claim of actual damages is dispensed with. Otherwise stated, in the presentcase, proof of malice and bad faith are unnecessary because, just like inLazatin and MCEngineering, what is involved here is the issue of actual and compensatory damages.

Nonetheless, we find that petitioner is not entitled to an award of actual or compensatorydamages. UnlikeLazatin and MC Engineering, wherein the respective complaints weredismissed for being unmeritorious, the writs of attachment were found to be wrongfullyissued, in the present case, both the trial and the appellate courts held that the complaint had


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merit. Stated differently, the two courts found READYCON entitled to a writ of preliminaryattachment as a provisional remedy by which the property of the defendant is taken intocustody of the law as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment which the plaintiff mayrecover.25

Rule 57, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that:

SEC. 4. Condition of applicants bond. - The party applying for the order mustthereafter give a bond executed to the adverse party in the amount fixed by the courtin its order granting the issuance of the writ, conditioned that the latter will pay allthe costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he maysustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that theapplicant was not entitled thereto (italics for emphasis).

In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found no reason to rule thatREADYCON was not entitled to issuance of the writ. Neither do we find now that the writ isimproper or illegal. If WENCESLAO suffered damages as a result, it is merely because it didnot heed the demand letter of the respondent in the first place. WENCESLAO could haveaverted such damage if it immediately filed a counter-bond or a deposit in order to lift the writat once. It did not, and must bear its own loss, if any, on that account.

On the second issue, WENCESLAO admits that it indeed owed READYCON the amountbeing claimed by the latter. However, it contends that while the contract provided that thebalance was payable within fifteen (15) days, said agreement did not specify when the periodbegins to run. Therefore, according to petitioner, the appellate court erred when it held thecontract clear enough to be understood on its face. WENCESLAO insists that the balance ofthe purchase price was payable only "upon acceptance of the work by the government." Inother words, the real intent of the parties was that it shall be due and demandable only fifteendays after acceptance by the government of the work. This is common practice, according topetitioner.

Respondent argues that the stipulation in the sales contract is very clear that it should be paidwithin fifteen (15) days without any qualifications and conditions. When the terms of acontract are clear and readily understandable, there is no room for construction. Even so, thecontention was mooted and rendered academic when, a few days after institution of the

complaint, the government accepted the work but WENCESLAO still failed to payrespondent.

Under Article 1582 of the Civil Code, the buyer is obliged to pay the price of the thing sold atthe time stipulated in the contract. Both the RTC and the appellate court found that theparties contract stated that the buyer shall pay the manufacturer the amount of P1,178,308.75in the following manner:

20% downpayment - P235,661.75

Balance payable within fifteen (15) days P942,647.00

Following the rule on interpretation of contracts, no other evidence shall be admissible otherthan the original document itself,26except when a party puts in issue in his pleading the failureof the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties.27This was what thepetitioners wanted done.

However, to rule on whether the written agreement failed to express the true intent of theparties would entail having this Court reexamine the facts. The findings of the trial court asaffirmed by the appellate court on this issue, however, bind us now. For in a petition forcertiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court may not review thefindings of fact all over again. Suffice it to say, however, that the findings by the RTC, thenaffirmed by the CA, that the extra condition being insisted upon by the petitioners is not foundin the sales contract between the parties. Hence it cannot be used to qualify the reckoning of

the period for payment. Besides, telling against petitioner WENCESLAO is its failure still topay the unpaid account, despite the fact of the works acceptance by the government already.

With submissions of the parties carefully considered, we find no reason to warrant a reversalof the decisions of the lower courts. But since Dominador Dayrit merely acted asrepresentative of D.M. Wenceslao and Associates, Inc., in signing the contract, he could notbe made personally liable for the corporations failure to comply with its obligationthereunder. Petitioner WENCESLAO is properly held liable to pay respondent the sum ofP1,014,110.45 with interest rate of 12% per annum (compounded annually) from August 9,1991, the date of filing of the complaint, until fully paid, plus damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.The assailed decision and resolution of the Courtof Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49101, affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court ofPasig City, Branch 165, in Civil Case No. 61159, are AFFIRMED.No pronouncement as to

costs.

SO ORDERED.


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TERESITA V. IDOLOR, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. GUMERSINDODE GUZMAN and ILUMINADA DE GUZMAN and HON. PRUDENCIO CASTILLO, JR.,Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 220, QuezonCity, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

GONZAGA-REYES,J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresita Idolor which seeks to setaside the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which reversed the Orderof theRegional Trial Court of Quezon Citygranting Idolors prayer for the issuance of a writ ofpreliminary injunction and the resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

On March 21, 1994, to secure a loan of P520,000.00, petitioner Teresita Idolor executed infavor of private respondent Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage withright of extra-judicial foreclosure upon failure to redeem the mortgage on or before September20, 1994. The object of said mortgage is a 200-square meter property with improvementslocated at 66 Ilocos Sur Street, Barangay Ramon Magsaysay, Quezon City covered by TCTNo. 25659.

On September 21, 1996, private respondent Iluminada de Guzman, wife of Gumersindo deGuzman, filed a complaint against petitioner Idolor before the Office of the Barangay Captainof Barangay Ramon Magsaysay, Quezon City, which resulted in a Kasunduang Pag-aayoswhich agreement is quoted in full:

Kami, ang (mga) may sumbong at (mga) ipinagsusumbong sa usaping binabanggit sa itaas,ay nagkakasundo sa pamamagitan nito na ayusin ang aming alitan gaya ng sumusunod:

Na ako si Teresita V. Idolor of legal age ay nakahiram ng halagang P520,000.00 noongSeptember 20, 1994.

Na ang nasabing halaga ay may nakasanlang titulo ng lupa (TCT No. 25659) under Registryreceipt 3420 dated July 15, 1996.

Na ako si Teresita V. Idolor ay humihingi ng 90 days palugit (grace period) to settle the saidamount.

Failure to settle the above account on or before December 21, 1996, I agree to execute a deedof sale with the agreement to repurchase without interest within one year.

Total amount of P1,233,288.23 inclusive of interest earned.

At nangangako kami na tutupad na tunay at matapat sa mga katakdaan ng pag-aayos nainilahad sa itaas.


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Petitioner failed to comply with her undertaking; thus private respondent Gumersindo filed amotion for execution before the Office of the Barangay captain who subsequently issued acertification to file action.

On March 21, 1997, respondent Gumersindo De Guzman filed an extra judicial foreclosure ofthe real estate mortgage pursuant to the parties agreement set forth in the real estate mortgagedated March 21, 1994.

On May 23, 1997, the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to respondentGumersindo, as the highest bidder and consequently, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale wasregistered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997.

On June 25, 1998, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220,a complaint for annulment of Sheriffs Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of atemporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction against privaterespondents, Deputy Sheriffs Marino Cachero and Rodolfo Lescano and the Registry ofDeeds of Quezon City alleging among others alleged irregularity and lack of notice in theextra-judicial foreclosure proceedings subject of the real estate mortgage. In the meantime, atemporary restraining order was issued by the trial court.

On July 28, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining private

respondents, the Deputy Sheriffs and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City from causing theissuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject property in favorof the De Guzman spouses. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by thede Guzman spouses.

Spouses de Guzman filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorariseeking annulment of the trial courts order dated July 28, 1998 which granted the issuance ofa preliminary injunction.

On September 28, 1999, the respondent court granted the petition and annulled the assailedwrit of preliminary injunction. Teresita Idolor filed her motion for reconsideration which wasdenied in a resolution dated February 4, 2000.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresita V. Idolor. The issues

raised by petitioner are: whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling (I) thatpetitioner has no more proprietary right to the issuance of the writ of injunction, (2) that theKasunduang Pag-aayos did not ipso facto result in novation of the real estate mortgage, (3)that the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is merely a promissory note of petitioner to private

respondent spouses; and (4) that the questioned writ of preliminary injunction was issued withgrave abuse of discretion.

The core issue in this petition is whether or not the respondent Court erred in finding that thetrial court committed grave abuse of discretion in enjoining the private and public respondentsfrom causing the issuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the subjectparcel of land in favor of private respondents.

Petitioner claims that her proprietary right over the subject parcel of land was not yet lostsince her right to redeem the subject land for a period of one year had neither lapsed nor runas the sheriffs certificate of sale was null and void; that petitioner and the general public havenot been validly notified of the auction sale conducted by respondent sheriffs; that thenewspaper utilized in the publication of the notice of sale was not a newspaper of generalcirculation.

We do not agree.

Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests.Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1)there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act againstwhich the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. Hence the existence of a

right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed toprotect contingent or future rights. Failure to establish either the existence of a clear andpositive right which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction or that thedefendant has committed or has attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tendsto endanger the existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction. Thecontrolling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court maythereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties beforetheir claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted toonly when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot beremedied under any standard of compensation.

In the instant case, we agree with the respondent Court that petitioner has no moreproprietary right to speak of over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of awrit of injunction. It appears that the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to

private respondent Gumersindo on May 23, 1997 and the sheriffs certificate of sale wasregistered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997. Petitioner had oneyear from the registration of the sheriffs sale to redeem the property but she failed to exerciseher right on or before June 23, 1998, thus spouses de Guzman are now entitled to a


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conveyance and possession of the foreclosed property. When petitioner filed her complaintfor annulment of sheriffs sale against private respondents with prayer for the issuance of awrit of preliminary injunction on June 25, 1998, she failed to show sufficient interest or titlein the property sought to be protected as her right of redemption had already expired on June23, 1998, i.e. two (2) days before the filing of the complaint. It is always a ground fordenying injunction that the party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and noclaim to the ultimate relief sought - in other words, that she shows no equity. The possibilityof irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.

Petitioners allegation regarding the invalidity of the sheriffs sale dwells on the merits of thecase; We cannot rule on the same considering that the matter should be resolved during thetrial on the merits.

Petitioner next contends that the execution of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos dated September21, 1996 between her and spouses de Guzman before the Office of the Lupon Tagapamayapashowed the express and unequivocal intention of the parties to novate or modify the real estatemortgage; that a comparison of the real estate mortgage dated March 21, 1994 and theKasunduang Pag-aayos dated September 21, 1996 revealed the irreconciliableincompatibility between them, i.e., that under the first agreement, the amount due was fivehundred twenty thousand (P520,000) pesos only payable by petitioner within six (6) months,after which it shall earn interest at the legal rate per annum and non-payment of which withinthe stipulated period, private respondents have the right to extra-judicially foreclose the realestate mortgage while under the second agreement, the amount due was one million twohundred thirty three thousand two hundred eighty eight and 23/100 (P1,233,288.23) inclusiveof interest, payable within 90 days and in case of non payment of the same on or beforeDecember 21, 1996, petitioner should execute a deed of sale with right to repurchase withinone year without interest; that the second agreement Kasunduang Pag-aayos was a validnew contract as it was duly executed by the parties and it changed the principal conditions ofpetitioners original obligations. Petitioner insists that the Kasunduang Pag-aayos was not amere promissory note contrary to respondent courts conclusion since it was entered by theparties before the Lupon Tagapamayapa which has the effect of a final judgment.

We are not persuaded.

Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation

by a subsequent one which terminates it, either by changing its objects or principal conditions,or by substituting a new debtor in place of the old one, or by subrogating a third person to therights of the creditor. Under the law, novation is never presumed. The parties to a contractmust expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one.

Accordingly, it was held that no novation of a contract had occurred when the new agreemententered into between the parties was intended to give life to the old one.

A review of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos which is quoted earlier does not supportpetitioners contention that it novated the real estate mortgage since the will to novate did notappear by express agreement of the parties nor the old and the new contracts wereincompatible in all points. In fact, petitioner expressly recognized in the Kasunduan theexistence and the validity of the old obligation where she acknowledged her long overdueaccount since September 20, 1994 which was secured by a real estate mortgage and asked fora ninety (90) days grace period to settle her obligation on or before December 21, 1996 andthat upon failure to do so, she will execute a deed of sale with a right to repurchase withoutinterest within one year in favor of private respondents. Where the parties to the newobligation expressly recognize the continuing existence and validity of the old one, where, inother words, the parties expressly negated the lapsing of the old obligation, there can be nonovation. We find no cogent reason to disagree with the respondent courts pronouncement asfollows:

In the present case, there exists no such express abrogation of the original undertaking. Theagreement adverted to (Annex 2 of Comment, p.75 Rollo) executed by the parties onSeptember 21, 1996 merely gave life to the March 21, 1994 mortgage contract which wasthen more than two years overdue. Respondent acknowledged therein her total indebtednessin the sum of P1,233,288.23 including the interests due on the unpaid mortgage loan whichamount she promised to liquidate within ninety (90) days or until December 21, 1996, failingwhich she also agreed to execute in favor of the mortgagee a deed of sale of the mortgagedproperty for the same amount without interest. Evidently, it was executed to facilitate easycompliance by respondent mortgagor with her mortgage obligation. It (the September 21,1996 agreement) is not incompatible and can stand together with the mortgage contract ofMarch 21, 1994.

A compromise agreement clarifying the total sum owned by a buyer with the view that hewould find it easier to comply with his obligations under the Contract to Sell does not novatesaid Contract to Sell (Rillo v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 461 [1997]).

Respondent correctly argues that the compromise agreement has the force and effect of a finaljudgment. That precisely is the reason why petitioner resorted to the foreclosure of the

mortgage on March 27, 1997, after her failure to comply with her obligation which expired onDecember 21, 1996.


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Reliance by private respondent upon Section 417 of the New Local Government Code of1991, which requires the lapse of six (6) months before the amicable settlement may beenforced, is misplaced. The instant case deals with extra judicial foreclosure governed byACT No. 3135 as amended.

Notably, the provision in the Kasunduang Pag-aayos regarding the execution of a deed ofsale with right to repurchase within one year would have the same effect as the extra-judicialforeclosure of the real estate mortgage wherein petitioner was given one year from theregistration of the sheriffs sale in the Registry of property to redeem the property, i.e., failureto exercise the right of redemption would entitle the purchaser to possession of the property.It is not proper to consider an obligation novated by unimportant modifications which do notalter its essence. It bears stress that the period to pay the total amount of petitionersindebtedness inclusive of interest amounted to P1,233,288.23 expired on December 21, 1996and petitioner failed to execute a deed of sale with right to repurchase on the said date up tothe time private respondents filed their petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estatemortgage. The failure of petitioner to comply with her undertaking in the kasunduan tosettle her obligation effectively delayed private respondents right to extra-judicially foreclosethe real estate mortgage which right accrued as far back as 1994. Thus, petitioner has notshown that she is entitled to the equitable relief of injunction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appealsdated September 28, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

RIMEO S. GUSTILO, complainant, vs. HON. RICARDO S. REAL, SR., Presiding Judge,2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Victorias- Manapla, Negros Occidental, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

In a verified complaint dated June 15, 1997, Rimeo S. Gustilo charged respondent JudgeRicardo S. Real, Sr., of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Victorias-Manapla, NegrosOccidental with gross misconduct, gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, andviolation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act relative to Civil Case No. 703-Mentitled Weddy C. Libo-on v. Rimeo S. Gustilo, et al. for recounting of ballots of PrecinctNos. 27 and 27-A, Barangay Punta Mesa, Manapla, Negros Occidental.

Complainant avers that he was a candidate forpunong barangay of Barangay Punta Mesa,Manapla, Negros Occidental in the May 12, 1997 elections. His lone opponent was Weddy C.Libo-on, then the incumbentpunong barangay and the representative of the Association ofBarangay Captains (ABC) to the Sangguniang Bayan of Manapla and the SangguniangPanlalawigan of Negros Occidental. Both complainant and Libo-on garnered eight hundred

nineteen (819) votes during the elections, resulting in a tie. The breaking of the tie by theBoard of Canvassers was in complainants favor and he was proclaimed duly elected punongbarangay of Punta Mesa, Manapla.


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On May 20, 1997, his opponent filed an election protest case, docketed as Civil Case No. 703-M, before the MCTC of Victorias-Manapla, Negros Occidental. Libo-on sought therecounting of ballots in two precincts, preliminary prohibitory injunction, and damages.

On May 21, 1997, respondent ordered the issuance of summons to the parties and set thehearing on June 6, 1997.

On May 27, 1997, however, Libo-on filed a motion to advance the hearing to May 29 and 30,1997.

The next day, respondent granted Libo-ons motion. The hearing was advanced to May 29and 30, 1997 cancelling the hearing for June 6, 1997. Complainant avers that he was notfurnished a copy of this Order dated May 28, 1997.

On May 29, 1997, respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) and annulledthe proclamation of complainant as the duly electedpunong barangay of Punta Mesa,Manapla. Complainant declares that no copy of this Order dated May 29, 1997 was served onhim. That same day, however, he was able to secure copies of the orders of respondent datedMay 28 and May 29, 1997 from the COMELEC Registrar of Manapla, Negros Occidental andthe Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). Moreover, it was only in theafternoon of May 29, 1997 that complainant received a copy of Libo-ons petition in Civil

Case No. 703-M and respondents Order dated May 21, 1997.

On May 30, 1997, complainant took his oath of office as punong barangay. That same day, healso filed a petition forcertioraribefore the Regional Trial Court of Silay City, NegrosOccidental, Branch 69 docketed as Special Civil Action No. 1936-69.

On June 5, 1997, the RTC lifted the TRO issued by respondent and declared as null and voidthe order nullifying complainants proclamation as duly elected punong barangay.

Believing that respondent could not decide Civil Case No. 703-M impartially, complainantmoved for his inhibition.

On June 11, 1997, respondent denied complainants motion for inhibition and after hearingLibo-ons motion for permanent injunction, issued a second TRO to maintain the status quobetween the contending parties.

Complainant argues that by issuing the second TRO, respondent reversed the order of theRTC of Silay City dated June 5, 1997. He also claims that by preventing him from assumingoffice, he was excluded by the DILG from participating in the election of theLiga ng MgaBarangay on June 14, 1997.

In his Comment, respondent denied the allegations. He claimed that when Libo-on filed hismotion to advance the hearing of the prayer for injunction on May 27, 1997 in Civil Case No.703-M, complainant was served a copy by registered mail as shown by the registry receipts

attached to said motion. Considering the urgency of the matter and since there was substantialcompliance with due process, he issued the Order of May 28, 1997 which cancelled thehearing set for June 6, 1997 and advanced it to May 29 and 30, 1997.

Respondent claims that on May 29, 1997, Libo-on and his counsel appeared but complainantdid not, despite due notice. The hearing then proceeded, with Libo-on presenting his evidence.As a result, he issued the TRO prayed for and annulled complainants proclamation.Respondent admits that the Order of May 29, 1997, particularly the annulment ofcomplainants proclamation, was outside the jurisdiction of his court. But since theCOMELEC ignored Libo-ons petition for correction of erroneous tabulation and Libo-on hadno other remedy under the law, he was constrained to annul complainants proclamation,which from the very beginning was illegal. He justified his action by our rulings in Bince, Jr.v. COMELEC, 312 Phil. 316 (1995) and Tatlonghari v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA849 (1991),which held that a faulty tabulation cannot be the basis of a valid proclamation.

Respondent also faults the RTC of Silay City for issuing the Order dated June 5, 1997, whichlifted the TRO he issued and declared void his nullification of complainants proclamation.Respondent contends that complainant should first have exhausted all remedies in his courtbefore resorting to the special civil action forcertiorari with the RTC. The latter court, inturn, should have dismissed the action forcertiorari for failure to exhaust judicial remedies.

With respect to his Order of June 11, 1997, respondent explains that it was never meant toreverse the Order of the RTC of Silay City dated June 5, 1997. He points out that both partiesin Civil Case No. 703-M were present during the hearing after due notice. After receivingtheir evidence, he found that unless a TRO was issued, Libo-on would suffer a grave injusticeand irreparable injury. He submits that absent fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, his acts, evenif erroneous, are not the subject of disciplinary action.

In its evaluation and recommendation report dated November 29, 1999, the Office of theCourt Administrator (OCA) found that respondents errors were not honest mistakes in theperformance of his duties. Rather, his actions showed a bias in favor of Libo-on and evinced


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a pattern to prevent the complainant from assuming office as the duly electedpunongbarangay despite his having been proclaimed as such by the Board of Canvassers. The OCArecommends that respondent be fined P20,000.00 and warned that a repetition of similar actsin the future will be dealt with more severely.

Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides:

2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in asummary hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the records aretransmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The records shall be transmittedimmediately after raffle (Emphasis supplied).

x x x

4. With the exception of the provisions which necessarily involve multiple-sala stations,these rules shall apply to single-sala stations especially with regard to immediate noticeto all parties of all applications for TRO.

The foregoing clearly show that whenever an application for a TRO is filed, the court may acton the application only after all parties have been notified and heard in a summary hearing. Inother words, a summary hearing may not be dispensed with. In the instant case, respondent

admits that he issued the injunctive writ sought on May 29, 1997 after receiving theapplicants evidence ex parte. His failure to abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 inissuing the first TRO is grave abuse of authority, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to theproper administration of justice.

Worse, he compounded the infraction by annulling complainants proclamation as the dulyelectedpunong barangay of Punta Mesa, Manapla and prohibiting him from assuming office.Respondent admits that his court was not vested with the power or jurisdiction to annul theproclamation, but seeks to justify his action on the ground that the proclamation was void abinitio. In so doing, respondent wantonly usurped a power exclusively vested by law in theCOMELEC. A judge is expected to know the jurisdictional boundaries of courts and quasi-judicial bodies like the COMELEC as mapped out by the Constitution and statutes and to actonly within said limits. A judge who wantonly arrogates unto himself the authority and powervested in other agencies not only acts in oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due

process, but also creates chaos and contributes to confusion in the administration of justice.Respondent, in transgressing the jurisdictional demarcation lines between his court and theCOMELEC, clearly failed to realize the position that his court occupies in the interrelationand operation of the countrys justice system. He displayed a marked ignorance of basic laws

and principles. Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge shall befaithful to the law and maintain professional competence. By annulling complainantsproclamation as the duly electedpunong barangay, despite being aware of the fact that hiscourt had no power to do so, not only is respondent guilty of grave abuse of authority, he alsomanifests unfaithfulness to a basic legal rule as well as injudicious conduct.

Moreover, in willfully nullifying complainants proclamation despite his courts want ofauthority, respondent knowingly issued an unjust order.

Note that the RTC of Silay City corrected respondents errors by declaring null and void hisOrder dated May 29, 1997. Nonetheless, he compounded his previous errors of judgment byproceeding to hear Libo-ons motion for permanent injunction and issuing a second TRO onJune 11, 1997 on the ground that extreme urgency and grave injustice and irreparableinjury will arise if no injunctive remedy were granted. Respondent insists that his act did notreverse the Order of the RTC in Special Civil Action No. 1936-69, since the second TRO heissued satisfied the notice and hearing requirements of Circular No. 20-95.

Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present:(1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the actagainst which injunction to be directed is a violation of such right. The onus probandi is onmovant to show that there exists a right to be protected, which is directly threatened by the actsought to be enjoined. Further, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right ismaterial and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ toprevent a serious damage. In this case, complainant had been duly proclaimed as the winningcandidate forpunong barangay. He had taken his oath of office. Unless his election wasannulled, he was entitled to all the rights of said office. We do not see how the complainantsexercise of such rights would cause an irreparable injury or violate the right of the losingcandidate so as to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order to maintain thestatusquo. We see no reason to disagree with the finding of the OCA that the evident purpose ofthe second TRO was to prevent complainant from participating in the election of theLiga ngmga Barangay. Respondent must be held liable for violating Rule 3.02 of the Code of JudicialConduct which provides that, In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain thefacts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion, or fear ofcriticism.

In a similar case, a judge was fined P5,000.00 for failure to observe the requirements ofAdministrative Circular No. 20-95 when he issued a TRO enjoining a duly proclaimedbarangay captain from participating in the elections of officers of the ABC of Taft, EasternSamar. Note, however, that in the instant case, the respondents infractions are not limited to


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the mere issuance of a restraining order without conducting the summary conference requiredby Administrative Circular No. 20-95. He also annulled the proclamation of the complainantknowing very well that he had no such authority. When his first restraining order was setaside and nullification of complainants proclamation was declared null and void by the RTCof Silay City, a superior court, he again issued a TRO, which showed his partiality tocomplainants political rival. Respondent is thus guilty of violating Rules 3.01 and 3.02 of theCode of Judicial Conduct; knowingly rendering an unjust order; gross ignorance of the law orprocedure; as well as bias and partiality. All of the foregoing are serious charges under Rule

140, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. We agree with the sanction recommended by the OCA,finding it to be in accord with Rule 140, Section 10 (A) of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, this COURT finds respondent judge GUILTY of violating Rules 3.01 and3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, knowingly rendering an unjust order, gross ignorance ofthe law and procedure, and bias and partiality. Accordingly, a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos(P20,000.00) is hereby imposed upon respondent with a STERN WARNING that a repetitionof the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

ALEMARS SIBAL & SONS, INC.,petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, NLM-KATIPUNAN (representing the group of CHARITO

ALIMORONG), respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PARDO,J.:

The petition before the Court is forcertiorari to set aside the resolutions of the NationalLabor Relations Commission dismissing the appeal of petitioner and upholding the order ofthe Labor Arbiter to proceed with the execution of the decision rendered in favor of privaterespondent.

On January 30, 1984, private respondent NLM Katipunan, representing the group of CharitoAlimurong, filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a notice of strike, raisingcharges of unfair labor practice (ULP) and illegal dismissal against petitioner. Thereafter, thecharges were elevated to respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) forcompulsory arbitration.

On April 29, 1985, Labor Arbiter Emilio V. Pealosa rendered a decision ordering petitionerto pay private respondent separation pay equivalent to one-half () month pay for every yearof service.

On December 23, 1985, the Research and Information Unit of the NLRC submitted itscomputation of the separation pay due to private respondent, which amounted to a total ofP207,365.33.

On January 4, 1988, private respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a motion for execution ofthe decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner did not file any opposition thereto.


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At the hearing held on April 19, 1988, petitioner and private respondent agreed to thecomputation of the separation pay. The terms of settlement are as follows:

"As agreed upon by the parties, a downpayment of P20,736.53 will be paidin May 1988 which is equivalent to 10% of the total money judgment. InJune 1988, P41,473.06 will be paid by respondent and the rest covering theinitial forty four (44) will be paid July 1988. The balance of theP207,365.20 will be spread over a fifteen (15) months period."

"(Sgd) Counsel .....................(Sgd) Counselfor Complainant.....................for Respondent"

Thus, Labor Arbiter Jose de Vera directed petitioner to pay the agreed amount of P20,736.53representing 10% of the total amount of the separation pay due the complainants on May 16,1988.

On June 10, 1988, the Rehabilitation Receiver of petitioner submitted a Manifestation withMotion, alleging that petitioner was not yet in a position to comply with the directive of LaborArbiter de Vera for the reason that it was still under Rehabilitation Receivership by virtue ofthe order of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) dated August 1, 1984. Thus, itsought deferment of such payment until the SEC will issue an order formally approving the

rehabilitation of petitioner and allowing complainants to file their claims with theRehabilitation Receiver. Suprema

Due to the failure of petitioner to comply with its obligation to pay the first batch ofcomplainants their separation pay, the Labor Arbiter granted the motion for execution ofprivate respondent in an order dated July 18, 1988.

On August 5, 1988, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting themotion for execution, contesting the amount computed by the Research Information Unit ofthe National Labor Relations Commission.

On September 9, 1988, Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera denied the motion, stating as follows:

"respondent failed to manifest any objection or to submit its comment on

the computation made by the Research and Information Unit, this Branch.In fact, on March 17, 1988, it submitted a proposal as to how thecomplainants claim for separation pay would be satisfied. Further, when

the complainants agreed to accept payment of their separation pay onscheduled basis, the first payment of P20,736.53 scheduled in May 1988,which was agreed upon by the parties, said respondent failed to comply andinstead, it filed a Manifestation with Motion praying for the deferment ofexecution until the Securities and Exchange Commission issues an Orderformally approving the rehabilitation of the respondent.

Besides, the respondent Motion for Reconsideration is filed out of time

considering that as per bailiffs return, respondent received the questionedOrder on July 26, 1988 while its Motion was filed only on August 5, 1988,or more than ten (10) days from receipt of the Order."

On September 26, 1988, petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter a Motion to SuspendExecution, citing as reason therefor the order issued by the Securities and ExchangeCommission which states:

"All actions for claims against the corporation before any court, tribunal orbody are suspended accordingly."

On October 27, 1988, petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiters order for the issuance of a writof execution to the NLRC. In a decision dated October 13, 1993, the NLRC dismissed the

appeal. On February 2, 1994, the NLRC likewise denied the petitioners motion forreconsideration.

Hence, this petition. Juris

Petitioner contends that public respondent should have denied the order of the Labor Arbiterfor the immediate payment of separation pay in favor of private respondent. Petitioner insiststhat a stay of execution of monetary award is justified in this case because of the order of theSecurities and Exchange Commission suspending all claims against petitioner pending beforeany court, tribunal or body.

The Solicitor General, in his Manifestation, recommends that the petition be given due coursewithout prejudice to the subsequent receipt of separation pay by private respondent inaccordance with the preference and concurrence of credits under the Civil Code, the

Insolvency Law and Article 110 of the Labor Code.


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Respondent National Labor Relations Commission, on the other hand, contends that petitioneris bound by its agreement with private respondent as to the computation of separation pay tobe paid. The NLRC emphasizes that the order of execution made by the Labor Arbiter hadreached finality and stresses that petitioners succeeding motions had been filed out of time.

We note that at the time this petition had been filed on May 4, 1994, petitioner had beenplaced under rehabilitation receivership. Jurisprudence has established that a stay of executionmay be warranted by the fact that a petitioner corporation has been placed under rehabilitation

receivership. However, it is undisputed that on March 5, 1997, the Securities and ExchangeCommission issued an order approving the proposed rehabilitation plan of petitioner andplacing it under liquidation pursuant to Presidential Decree 902-A. Subject to the control ofthe SEC, the liquidator, Ledesma, Saludo & Associates, was ordered to "wind up the affairs ofthe corporation, continue to manage the corporation for purposes of liquidation in order toprotect the interest of its creditors and avoid dissipation, loss, wastage, or destruction of theremaining assets and other properties of the corporation and to ensure orderly payment ofclaims against such corporation in accordance with applicable laws." Scjuris

Thus, petitioner pointed out that the SECs order suspending all claims against it pendingbefore any other court, tribunal or body was pursuant to the rehabilitation receivershipproceedings. Such order was necessary to enable the rehabilitation receiver to effectivelyexercise its powers free from any judicial or extra-judicial interference that might undulyhinder the rescue of the distressed company. Since receivership proceedings have ceased and

petitioners rehabilitation receiver and liquidator, Ledesma Saludo & Associates, has beengiven the imprimatur to proceed with corporate liquidation, the cited order of the Securitiesand Exchange Commission has been rendered functus officio. Thus, there is no legalimpediment for the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter for the payment ofseparation pay.

Considering that petitioners monetary obligation to private respondent is long overdue andthat petitioner has signified its willingness to comply with such obligation by entering into anagreement with private respondent as to the amount and manner of payment, petitioner cannot delay satisfaction of private respondents claim. However, due to events subsequent to thefiling of this petition, private respondent must present its claim with the rehabilitation receiverand liquidator of petitioner, subject to the rules on preference of credits.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition and directs private respondent tofile its claim with the rehabilitation receiver/ liquidator of petitioner in SEC EB No. 81entitled "In the Matter of the Liquidation of Alemars Sibal & Sons" pending before theSecurities and Exchange Commission.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.


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MICHAEL J. LAGROSAS, PETITIONER, VS. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB (PHIL.),

INC./MEAD JOHNSON PHIL., RICHARD SMYTH AS GENERAL MANAGER AND

FERDIE SARFATI, AS MEDICAL SALES DIRECTOR, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. NO. 170684

BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB (PHIL.), INC./MEAD JOHNSON PHIL., PETITIONER,

VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MICHAEL J. LAGROSAS, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before this Court are two consolidated petitions. The first petition, docketed as G.R. No.168637, filed by Michael J. Lagrosas, assails the Decision [1] dated January 28, 2005 and theResolution [2] dated June 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83885. Thesecond petition, docketed as G.R. No. 170684, filed by Bristol-Myers Squibb (Phil.),Inc./Mead Johnson Phil., assails the Resolutions [3] dated August 12, 2005 and October 28,2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83885.

The facts are undisputed.

Michael J. Lagrosas was employed by Bristol-Myers Squibb (Phil.), Inc./Mead Johnson Phil.from January 6, 1997 until March 23, 2000 as Territory Manager in its Medical Sales ForceDivision. [4]

On February 4, 2000, Ma. Dulcinea S. Lim, also a Territory Manager and Lagrosas' formergirlfriend, attended a district meeting of territory managers at McDonald's Alabang TownCenter. After the meeting, she dined out with her friends. She left her car at McDonald's androde with Cesar R. Menquito, Jr. When they returned to McDonald's, Lim saw Lagrosas' carparked beside her car. Lim told Menquito not to stop his car but Lagrosas followed them andslammed Menquito's car thrice. Menquito and Lim alighted from the car. Lagrosasapproached them and hit Menquito with a metal steering wheel lock. When Lim tried tointervene, Lagrosas accidentally hit her head.

Upon learning of the incident, Bristol-Myers required Lagrosas to explain in writing why heshould not be dismissed for assaulting a co-employee outside of business hours. While theoffense is not covered by the Code of Discipline for Territory Managers, the Code states that"other infractions not provided for herein shall be penalized in the most appropriate manner atthe discretion of management." [5] In his memo, Lagrosas admitted that he accidentally hit Lim

when she tried to intervene. He explained that he did not intend to hit her as shown by the factthat he never left the hospital until he was assured that she was all right. [6]

In the disciplinary hearing that followed, it was established that Lagrosas and Lim hadphysical confrontations prior to the incident. But Lagrosas denied saying that he might not beable to control himself and hurt Lim and her boyfriend if he sees them together.

On March 23, 2000, Bristol-Myers dismissed Lagrosas effective immediately. [7] Lagrosas

then filed a complaint[8]

for illegal dismissal, non-payment of vacation and sick leavebenefits, 13th month pay, attorney's fees, damages and fair market value of his Team ShareStock Option Grant.

On February 28, 2002, Labor Arbiter Renaldo O. Hernandez rendered a Decision [9] in NLRCNCR Case No. 00-03-02821-99, declaring the dismissal illegal. He noted that while Lagrosascommitted a misconduct, it was not connected with his work. The incident occurred outside ofcompany premises and office hours. He also observed that the misconduct was not directedagainst a co-employee who just happened to be accidentally hit in the process. Nevertheless,Labor Arbiter Hernandez imposed a penalty of three months suspension or forfeiture of pay toremind Lagrosas not to be carried away by the mindless dictates of his passion. Thus, theArbiter ruled:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby [rendered] finding that respondentcompany illegally dismissed complainant thus, ORDERING it:

1) [t]o reinstate him to his former position without loss of seniority rights, privileges andbenefits and to pay him full backwages reckoned from [the] date of his illegal dismissal on 23March 2000 including the monetary value of his vacation/sick leave of 16 days per yearreckoned from July 1, 2000 until actually reinstated, less three (3) months salary as penaltyfor his infraction;

2) to pay him the monetary equivalent of his accrued and unused combined sick/vacationleaves as of June 30, 2000 of 16 days x 3 years and 4 months - 10 days x P545.45 =P23,636.16 and the present fair market value of his Team Share stock option grant for eighthundred (800) BMS common shares of stock listed in the New York Stock Exchange whichvested in complainant as of 01 July 1997, provisionally computed as 90% (800 shares xUS$40.00 per share x P43.20/US$ = P1,244,160.00).

3) to pay him Attorney's fee of 10% on the entire computable amount.

All other claims of complainant are dismissed for lack of merit.


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SO ORDERED. [10]

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) set aside the Decision of LaborArbiter Hernandez in its Decision [11] dated September 24, 2002. It held that Lagrosas wasvalidly dismissed for serious misconduct in hitting his co-employee and another person with ametal steering wheel lock. The gravity and seriousness of his misconduct is clear from the factthat he deliberately waited for Lim and Menquito to return to McDonald's. The NLRC alsoruled that the misconduct was committed in connection with his duty as Territory Manager

since it occurred immediately after the district meeting of territory managers.

Lagrosas moved for reconsideration. On May 7, 2003, the NLRC issued a Resolution [12]

reversing its earlier ruling. It ratiocinated that the incident was not work-related since itoccurred only after the district meeting of territory managers. It emphasized that for a seriousmisconduct to merit dismissal, it must be connected with the employee's work. Thedispositive portion of the Resolution states:WHEREFORE, premises considered, We find this time no reason to alter the Labor Arbiter'sDecision of February 28, 2002 and hereby affirm the same in toto. We vacate our previousDecision of September 24, 2002.

SO ORDERED. [13]

Bristol-Myers filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC denied in an Order datedFebruary 4, 2004 in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-03-02821-99 (NLRC NCR CA No. 031646-

02).

[14]

Later, Labor Arbiter Hernandez issued a writ of execution.

[15]

Notices of garnishmentwere then served upon the Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. for the supersedeas bondposted by Bristol-Myers and the Bank of the Philippine Islands for the balance of thejudgment award. [16]

Bristol-Myers moved to quash the writ of execution contending that it timely filed a petitionfor certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court gave due course to Bristol-Myers'petition and issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) [17] enjoining the enforcement of thewrit of execution and notices of garnishment. Upon the expiration of the TRO, the appellatecourt issued a writ of preliminary injunction dated September 17, 2004. [18]

Bristol-Myers then moved to discharge and release the TRO cash bond. It argued that since ithas posted an injunction cash bond, the TRO cash bond should be legally discharged andreleased.

On January 28, 2005, the appellate court rendered the following Decision:WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of May 7, 2003 and the Order ofFebruary 4, 2004 in NLRC NCR Case No. [00-03-02821-99] (NLRC NCR CA No. [031646-

02]), are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The public respondent NLRC's Decision datedSeptember 24, 2002 which reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision and in effect sustained thelegality of the private respondent's termination and the dismissal of his claim for the fairmarket value of the [Team Share] stock option grant is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED,with MODIFICATION that the petitioner shall pay the private respondent the monetaryequivalent of his accrued and unused combined sick/vacation leave plus ten (10%) percentthereof, as attorney's fees. The injunction bond and the TRO bond previously posted by thepetitioner are DISCHARGED.

SO ORDERED. [19]

The appellate court considered the misconduct as having been committed in connection withLagrosas' duty as Territory Manager since it occurred immediately after the district meetingof territory managers. It also held that the gravity and seriousness of the misconduct cannot bedenied. Lagrosas employed such a degree of violence that caused damage not only toMenquito's car but also physical injuries to Lim and Menquito.

Lagrosas filed a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied.

In the meantime, Bristol-Myers moved to release the TRO cash bond and injunction cashbond in view of the Decision dated January 28, 2005. On August 12, 2005, the appellate courtdenied the motion as premature since the decision is not yet final and executory due toLagrosas' appeal to this Court. [20]

Bristol-Myers filed a motion for reconsideration. On October 28, 2005, the appellate courtresolved:

WHEREFORE, the petitioner's Motion [f]or Reconsideration dated September 6, 2005 isPARTIALLY GRANTED and the Resolution of August 12, 2005 is RECONSIDERED andSET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order cash bond in the amount of SIX HUNDREDTHOUSAND PESOS (P600,000.00) which was posted by the petitioners on July 19, 2004 isordered DISCHARGED and RELEASED to the petitioners.

SO ORDERED. [21]

The appellate court held that upon the expiration of the TRO, the cash bond intended for italso expired. Thus, the discharge and release of the cash bond for the expired TRO is proper.But the appellate court disallowed the discharge of the injunction cash bond since the writ ofpreliminary injunction was issuedpendentelite. Since there is a pending appeal with theSupreme Court, the Decision dated January 28, 2005 is not yet final and executory.


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Hence, the instant petitions.

In G.R. No. 168637, Lagrosas assigns the following errors:I.

...THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN DECLARING THAT THETERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT WAS LEGALHAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH

THE LABOR LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE AND DEPARTED FROM THEACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, AS TO CALL FORTHE EXERCISE OF THIS HONORABLE COURT'S POWER OF REVIEW AND/ORSUPERVISION.

II.

...THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY OFDISMISSAL, BEING A PENALTY TOO HARSH IN THIS CASE, DECIDED AQUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LABOR LAWSAND JURISPRUDENCE AND DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUALCOURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, AS TO CALL FOR THE EXERCISE OF THISHONORABLE COURT'S POWER OF REVIEW AND/OR SUPERVISION. [22]

In G.R. No. 170684, Bristol-Myers raises the following issue:

[WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTEDGRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OFJURISDICTION IN DISALLOWING THE RELEASE AND DISCHARGE OFPETITIONER'S INJUNCTION BOND. [23]

Simply put, the basic issues in the instant petitions are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err infinding the dismissal of Lagrosas legal? and (2) Did the Court of Appeals err in disallowingthe discharge and release of the injunction cash bond?

On thefirstissue, seriou

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