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NTIT NK W RF R
S MIN R
14 15
October
1976
ashington D.C.
T R A N S C R IP T
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P RT
NGLISH T XT
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P RT TR NSL TORS
M r P M Sp rey
i Tash
Capt
L 0
Rat ley I I I
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NOTES
TO
THE READER
This;docxament
is
d iv ided
i n t o two p a r t s . The first
is a t r a n s c r i p t o f th e q ue st io ns
asked Col . Rudel and
th e
a n sw e r s
a ^
translated
f r om the
German a n s w e r s . Th e
s e c
ond
pa r t o f
th e
work i s
a
t r an s c r i p t only
o f th e
mate r ia l
t h a t was a sked
and answered
i n th e
German o r i g i n a l .
The re
a re s l i gh t
d i f f e r ence s
in
P RT
the t r an s l a t i on s as
ren
de r ed at t h e
c o n f e r e n c e and
PART II wh ich was t r a n s l a t e d
l a t e r
from a r e co rd i ng o f
th e
en t i r e con f e r en ce . If
th e
r eade r
has
a
pa r t i c u l a r
i n t e r e s t
in
any
a rea covered in
P RT I , he she shou ld
a l so
r e f e r to
th e
t r a n s l a t e d
Ger
man o r i g i n a l
in P RT
II The s l i g h t d i f f e r ence s a re due
t o th e l o s s o f a
c e r t a i n
po r t i o n
a t
th e German o r i g i n a l
du ri ng s imu lt an eou s t r an s l a t i on s as opposed to
no t
hav
ing
any
t ime l im i t when working with re co rd ed mater ia l .
Due to th e poo r q ua li ty o f th e
t ape
r ecorde r used ,
some
o f th e ma te r i a l
is
un i n t e l l i g i b l e
and is
so
in d ic ate d in
the text
11
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V
BSTR CT
This document
is a transcript of a conference held
in Washington D.C.
on
14 15
October 1976 with various
representatives of
the
U.S. Armed
Services
and
Industry
and Colonel
Hans Ulrich
Rudel. Col. Rudel was the most
highly
decorated member
of
the
German Armed
Services
in
World
War Two.
Col. Rudel
was
a
JU 87
Stuka Lagtwai^e
pilot
and
his most notable achievement was the destruct
ion of
519
Soviet tanks with his JU 87 G Stuka
which
was fitted
with
two 37 mm
antitank cannons
The
U.S.
interest
in Col
Rudel
was
stimulated in
the
past
by
the situation confronting TO today of a
massive Warsaw Pact advantage in armored vehicles
especially tanks The information obtained
from Col.
Rudel at this conference
and
recent studies on air to
ground
antitank warfare tend to support the thesis
that a
tremendous
resevoir of information is available
from Laitiuaiie. antitank experience that is directly
applicable
to
the NATO/Warsaw Pact
situation in
Europe
t od y
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TAPE I
SIDE
I
INTRODUCTION
CHAIRMAN:
I would like
to
introduce Capt Lon Ratley who
will give
a
brief
rundown of
the
war on
the
Eastern
Front as fought through the
German
eyes Capt
Lon
Ratley
is
assigned
to FIT
unintelligible , but he is going to
Postgraduate
School in
Monterey,
California
with the
Navy His
thesis
subject was Close Air Support and he
is
trying to draw analogies i think quite successfully
between
the
war
of the
MOs
and
the possible
war
in
the
near future;
or in
the next 10 to 15 years. In
his
research he did go to Germany he speaks fluent Geannan
and he
did
examine the
Archives
and spoke to German
Generals.
He was
fortunate
enough to be
able
to find
Col Rudel and spend a delightful time interviewing him
for
his
research paper.
i t
was the outgrowth of
that
effort
that has
led to
where
we are today.
What d
l ike to
do
is
have Capt. Ratley give a
brief overview of the war on the Eastern Front give you
background on Col Rudel himself, and then
we
will go
into a seminar session. In order to make
i t reasonable,
we will try to res t r ic t
the
participants
to those
people tha t
are
s i t t ing a t the table .
Then,
we wil l
go into the
question
and answer
period.
will
le t
the
topics flow
as they may.
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T A P E I
S I D E
I
C o l .
R u d e l , I a s s u r e
you w i l l be
t r u e
t o h i s word.
H e l l
be c a n d i d
and
f r a n k w i t h
h i s answers and
when they
h u r t
a n d
a r e
n o t
q u i t e
wha t
we
w a n t
t o
h e a r ,
w e l l
be
f o r t u
n a t e enough
t o h e a r
th em anyway. Tha t
i s
t h e purpose
o f
t h i s m e e t i n g .
L e t me f o r my own e d i f i c a t i o n and f o r everybody
e l s e h e r e , g o a r o u n d t h e t a b l e a n d show C o l . R u d e l
w h o s
h e r e .
I
am
C o l . Bob
D i l g e r ;
I am t h e
D i r e c t o r o f A-10
Armament. To
my l e f t i s Gen. B r i l l . e i s t h e System
Program D i r e c t o r f o r t h e A-10 program . Next t o him
i s
Mr.
Wilson from
t h e O f f i c e o f
S t r a t e g i c
Research
CIA.
Close Air
Support
i s one o f t h e
prime
s u b j e c t s
they
are
l o o k i n g
at t h i s t i m e . Next t o
him is F r e d
F e e r who
h a s
w o r k e d w i t h
Peter in s o m e
related
a r e a s of c o n v e n t i o n a l
warfare M r . M ik e M e c c a is next He is
a
retired A i r
F o r c e
O f f i c e r , 105
d r i v e r
and now
v e r y
much i n v o l v e d i n
t h e A-10 program from a v i e w p o i n t o f
employment among
o t h e r
t h i n g s .
N e x t ,
Mr. F r e d F r e d e r i c k s o n . Mr. F r e d e r i c k -
son i s
formerly from I and Warfare o f
DDR E
e i s now
i n an
a n a l y s i s program
System P l a n n i n g Program. Next
t o
him is
Mr. Spirey- Mr
S p r a y
was f o r m e r l y i n t h e group
t h a t
i s
now
c a l l e d
ASI^A
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TAPE I SIDE I
He
is
the
head
of
ASD/PA E Tac Ai^. Next
to
him
IS Bernie Bock, Deputy
Director
of
the
DDR E
General Purpose
Forces . Then, Gen. Smith, DCS Air Headquarters
Marine Corps.
Tom Turner is next. Vice President of Fair
child Industries. He also
vforks
for
Gen.
Brill.
Gen. McMullen, who is next was formerly Director of
the A-10 program and is now director of all requirements
for
TAC.
This is a new job for
him
and
we
in the A-10
are delighted that he is here. Next to
him
is Maj. Tash
who
will
help with
the
interpretation.
He
speaks
fluent
German.
i would like to find a seat for Mr.
Meyers
up
here at the table. Mr. chuck
Meyers
is from ddR B
A.ir
Warfare .
This
is
an unusual position to have at a
meeting like this but
he
recently took
over
responsi
i l i ty fo r th
A 10
So,
with
this I
would
like to turn the
meeting
over to Capt. Lon Ratley. He will give us a brief over
view
of the
War on
the Eastern Front and a
background
on
Col. Rudel for those of you that have not read his
book. Then
we
will go into seminar session.
CAPTAIN LON RATLEY:
Good morning gentlemen. i am Capt. Ratley. Col.
Dilger already explained
what
we
are
going to go
through
basically; a recap of the
campaign
on the Eastern Front
and
a
few
words about the German anti tank aircraft
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T A P E I
S I D E
I
The code name for the German plan for the camptiign
against Russia was BARBAROSSA
Basical ly,
the plan
consisted
of
twelve
weeks;
three
weeks
for the
capture
o f
Smolensk,
three weeks
for resupply and r e s t
and
then
s ix weeks
t h e r e a f t e r would
be the
capture
of Moscow
There were 333 German tanks used i n t h i s campaign,
o p po si ng a p p ro x im a t e ly
22-24
th ou sa nd R u ss ia n t a n k s .
About 3 . 2
m i l l i o n German s o l d i e r s
and a b o u t 4 . 5
m i l l i o n
R u s s i a n t r o o p s l o c a te d i n Western USSR.
QUESTION:
By G e n e r a l
Brill
Were these
a l l
TlQtK67
Referring to
the German
t a n k s . )
A N S W E R :
No
s i r , there were
no a t t h a t time. They
were Panze^i I I I 6 and I l / 4 . L a t e r
i n
t h e war t h e Germans
used the PanthzA which was i n the 4 ton
class and
the
TIqzh. i n t h e 60 t o n c l a s s )
CAPTAIN
LON
RATLEY;
The
German execution of the campaign went
according
t o
p l a n ,
u n t i l
t h e c a p t u r e o f
Smolensk
which f e l l on 16
J u l y ,
1941, t h a t
i s
where
t h e i r d i f f i c u l t y s t a r t e d .
There
was
some
ques t ion
about
the
s t r a t e g i c
o b j e c t i v e s
o f
t h e
campaign . H i t l e r
d e c i d e d
t h a t ,
i n l i e u o f
dlmmediately g o i n g
f o r
t h e
rail
and communicat ion
c e n t e r
i n Moscow, he would a t t a c k
i n s t e a d
t o t h e South and
^
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TAPE
I S I D E I
capture
large numbers
of diso rgan ized Soviet troops
in the Ukraine. This was quite a
successful
operation.
However when
they
shifted
the
weight
of
the
campaign
back t o
t h e
North t o Moscow, t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t
s t r e n g t h left t o
p e r m i t
t h e Germans t o
e f f e c t t h e
c a p t u r e
Moscow
p r i o r
t o
t h e o n s e t o f w i n t e r w e a t h e r
Through December
41,
these
figures you see here
are rough, but approximately
3
million Russian
POW s
17,500
Russian
tanks
destroyed, 2000 Russian a i r c r a f t
were destroyed t h e f i r s t day. I might add t h a t t h a t
figure i s
somewhat
suspect. The reported
1800
a i r c r a f t were destroyed.
Back
in headquarters
M a r s h a l l Goer ing a t t h e t ime
d i d n t
b e l i e v e them and
he
s e n t h i s own
s p e c i a l
p e o p l e o u t
t o
t h e f i e l d t o i n v e s t i
g a t e
Subsequent ly he d i s c o v e r e d
it
w a s n t 1800,
i t
was
in
fact
over
2000.
Basically
the winter
campaign
deter iorated to s t a t i c warfare. German
losses during
the
winter
were primari ly due to
t h e i r unpreparedness
fo r
winter;
as opposed to any offensive
act ion
by th e Sov ie ts .
There
were
excess ive command changes
on
the
German
side
because of
the f a i l u r e to
take
Moscow. Primari ly
udzfilo Vi
and Hotk
who
were
the
two pri me
architects
of
the
BlitzkJLlQ g
and armored
t a c t i c s
All t h r e e army group
commanders,
iVon l/on Bock, and l/ow Run6te.dt were
a ls o r e lie ve d
The summer o f f e n s i v e of
19 42 had
two primary o b j e c t i v e s ;
Stalingrad and the
o i l
f i e l d s a t
Baku on the
Caspian Sea.
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T PE I
S IDE
I
The e x e c u t i o n
m isc a rrie d with
th e
fa i lure
to
hold
Stalingrad. Ninety percent of the city was captured by
the
Germans
but ten p ercent
was
not.
Subsequently
the Russians
moved in
and
were
successful
in
surrounding
Stalingrad
and caputring
the Sixth
Army. At
the
same
time
a
s p e c i a l rmy
Group
i t is d iff ic ult
to
see
from
this map but
Stalingrad is
here on
the
Volga rmy
Group A p e n e tr a te d down
here
by the C acus us M ou nt ai ns
a nd a dv an ce d patrols-even reached the C as pi an S ea . You
don t
see
this much
in History books but they did in
fac t
reach th e C as pian S ea .
I t i s
down in th is a r e a .
As
yo u
can s e e this extended
r ight
wing o f th e German
Army p u t them in an extremely precarious p o s i t i o n
because
t h e y
were n o t
a b l e
to
h o l d
S t a l i n g r a d .
At
this p o in t entered
Marshall
Von
Manstein.
He
wa s
s u c c e s s f u l
in
a
se r i es
o f
d e f e n s i v e
ba t t l e s
on
i t s
l e f t
wing
an d t h er ef o r e enabled
the
Germans to withdraw
Army Group A
back
to i t s
jumping
off
p o s i t i o n .
In
March
of
19 4
3 he successful ly c o u n t e r a t t a c k e d th e
Russians
in
Kharkov and
they
suffered a
severe
d e f e a t
there and
th e
in i t i a t ive
passed back
i nt o
German
hands.
This
le d to th e
German Summer
offensive
in
1943
a t
th e
battle
of Kursk. This was a Russian salient
that
pro
truded into
the German
l in es
around
the
city
of
Kursk.
I t was the Germans plan to
pinch off
th is sa lien t by
concentric attacks from the North and South.
The
planning
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TAPE I SI I
for the campaign
was
c ha ra cte riz ed by a lot of deception
delays and differences of opinion. Von ansteinhad opted
for an i mmed ia te attack at Kursk before the onset of the
rainy
season
immediately
after the battle
of Kharkov
in
March. One thing led to another
and
the actual
offensive did
not start
until
July
1943. The allies
as
you know landed in Sicily on
the
12th
of
July and
Hitler called off the
offensive
a t Kursk
in
order to with
draw
the
Second SS Panzer Corps into Italy to counter
allied
landings. I t
is
generally
agreed
that
after
the
batt le of Kursk
any
possibil i t ies
for a
total
German
victory
on
the
Eastern Front disappeared. That is not
to imply that they
lost
the war there only that the war
could not
be
t o t a l l y won.
The
final
campaigns from 1943 to 45
basically
consisted of
a war
of
attrition
with
the
initiative
swing
ing to the Soviets
and
a gradual German defeat.
There
were no
spe c t a cu l a r
ba t t l e s a f t e r th e
ba t t l e o f
Kursk.
Field
commanders because
of
mistrust between major field
commanders and W
Headquarters
were
not given
enough
authori ty in the f ield to f ully exp lo it a l l of the
si tuat ions
that presented themselves.
For
example the defens ive
l ine
because
they
taught
them not one
step backwards
could
not be straightened so as to preclude
the
number
of
miles of front
tha t
any
given
division would have to defend.
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TAPE I S^IDE I
There was
a l s o
a marked d et er io ra ti on i n
mobile warfare
because of
worn-out
equipment,
lack of fuel and
logistics
s u p p o r t .
A
little
b i t about
a n t i t a n k a i r c r a f t :
Two
were
primari ly used, the HS-129 and Stuka G Model
t h a t
Col.
Rudel
f lew. The HS-129
c a r r i e d
a 30
cannon
on a
center
l ine mount. The JU87 G
carried
two pod
mounted 37 cannons mounted o u t b o a r d from t h e main
landing gear . This i s a shot o f the HS-129. Of t h i s
particular
version
here, there
were
only
6
or
9
buil t ,
I m
not sure exact ly
which. This i s n t the
37,
t h i s i s the
75
cannon t h a t was used. This
p a r t i c u l a r
a i r c r a f t was
considered ponderous and
was
only used
fo r individual
tanks
t h a t
had broken through th e f r o n t and were a t h r e a t
t o th e
major a r e a s
t o t h e r e a r
of
t h e
German
d i v i s i o n s .
Today
we
a r e
p r i m a r i l y
concerned
with
t h e
Stuka,
You
can s e e a s t a n d a r d D Model h er e w i t h ou t t h e cannons .
It
i s
impor tant
t o note t h a t t h e Stuka was considered
in
1939
by
the
Germans t o
be an
a i r c r a f t
t h a t was
not
t o
modern s t a n d a r d s . It was
n o t
c o n s i d e r e d
a
modern
front l i n e
a i r c r a f t
by
the
Germans in 1939. Yet, i t
was used up
u n t i l
t h e
v e r y
end
o f
t h e war .
This i s
a
p i c t u r e of the G Model Staka with the individual cannons
mounted
here , each weighing about 1000 pounds and
each
carrying
(you can see
it
here) a
magazine o f.
s i x 37
r
s h e l l s e a c h . Col . Rudel had 2500 c e r t i f i e d s o r t i e s .
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t p I SI E I
Twenty one
hundred
of
which were
with
the
and 4
Of
which
were
in the
FW-190.
A l i t t le background on Col.
Rduel:
he was
born
in
1916 in Silesia his father was an Evangelist Minister.
He
joined
the
Luitwaiiz
in 1936
going
into pilot training
subsequently posted to the Staka squadron
and
from there
he was tranferred to a reconaissance
squadron
and then back
to a Staka squadron. From there his first actual
bomb
dropping combat did
not
start until the Russian campaign
of
June
1941.
Thereafter
he
was
promoted
very
rapidly
ending the war as a Gzickuiad l commander which would be
roughtly equivalent to an augmented AF Wing today.
He
was primarily responsible for introducing the Stuka. with
the 37 cannons into operational use in Russia. His
tally on tanks was 519 that he personally destroyed. The
figure is
somewhat
misleading
because the
Germans
required
that the tank burn
and
also explode before
i t was
con
sidered a kill So roughly you
can
multiply that by a
factor of
two
or three to get a more realistic picture
of how many tanks Col.
Rudel
personally destroyed.
He
was decorated personally by Hitler with the
Knights
Cross
Golden Oak
Leaf
Swords
Diamonds
only
one of which was awarded to Col. Rudel. He is the
highest decorated
German
soldier
in
the 2nd World
War.
T ha t c on clu de s my por t ion
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TAPE I
S IDE
I
CHAIRMAN:
Let
me
jus t add
a few comments to i t and
then
we
wil l
go
to the
seminar. I t
was
the Stuka
which was an important part
of the
concept tha t
was
to provide
mobile
f i re
power
to
the rap id advancing
forces
Even
though
the
Germans
were
out
numbered
for
exapmle in Russia
by a large magnitude
by lightning
tac t ics they were able
to
get
on the
edge of
s
cow in
a
mat ter o f
6
weeks or thereabouts
That
was
a 1200
mile
advance against overwhelming numerical superiority on
the o the r
s ide
The
th ing
t h a t Lon
d id
no t
mention
was t h a t
Colonel
Rudel
also
sunk
the larges t ship of the war by ai r
The
ba t t l e sh i p
MuKat He a l so sank a
c ru i s e r
The 2500 so r
t i e s as it turns ou t in the l a t t e r
part
of
the war when the
German
Luitujaiiz was enormously
outnumbered
in
the
a i r The
Soviets actually had a i r supremeacy for a l l pract ical
purposes.
The
tank ki l l s
that he had again did not
occur dur ing
the
early part of
the war
a t
a l l
His
tank
ki l ls occurred pri
marily
a f t e r th e in tr oduc tio n of the gun
on
the Stuka. And
i t was
over the l ively
debate
that
took place
within
the Luf
forces as to whether
tha t
one could even do
t h i s
so
Rudel was much
impressed
with the
accuracy of
a gun system
and
did the
basic
R
and
D
f lying .
He brought
it out to oper
a t iona l
l ines
and
introduced it
through a combination
o f
tac
t i c s He
came enormously success fu l in
h is
venture t he r e
So most o f the
k i l l s occurred
in the
l a t e r
pa r t o f the
war
almost a l l with the gun
system.
And they occurred under a
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TAPE I
S I D E
I
situation that would be difficul t to comprehend from a view
point
of
numerical
superiority on
the opposite side
A
tank
kil l also
had to be verified by
another
person The tank had
to burn i t had to explode and another person had to
verify
i t .
Then you
had
a
tank
k i l l and not before
Two
or three
to me
i s
a conservat ive est imate
of
what really occurred
Now u n f o r t u n a t e l y I was o u t r a n k e d . So I c a n n o t be a
p a r t i c i p a n t
i n t h e seminar A l l I can
be
i s the
Chairman
I d l ike to throw i t open to questions and we will in terpret
to make
sure
Col
Rudel understands
the q uestio ns a s well
and
we wil l in terpret back
We
wil l go slowly
QUESTION:
Bob
1 6
l ike to ask
the
Colonel t h i s . Colonel in
add
i t ion to the tanks that
you
shot a t did
you
keep
a
record
of the trucks or
a r t i l l e r y
pieces
or dxther
vehicles
accompany
ing
the tanks o r did
you
not
even bother
to shoot a t them?
ANSWER :
Yes
he did both a t t a c k
and
keep some numeration
o f
t h e
things he shot a t . Unfortunately t h e s e records were
s t o l e n
from him
so they are
unavailable
to
anybody
r ight now He
c a n t account for a l l
of
them
but
d i d in f a c t
account
fo r
over
300
vehic les and
80
a r t t i - a i r c r a f t p o s i t i o n s t h a t
he
had
d e s t r o y e d .
QUESTION:
Almost
a l l
the k i l l s I
guess
were
in the Stuka
Now you
s a i d 37 ram 6 rounds p e r
magazine?
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TAPE
I
S I D E
I
ANSWER:
Y e s sir
QUESTION:
So t h o s e were r e a l l y s i n g l e s h o t ?
ANSWER;
Yes
sir
I v e
a lr e a d y t a lk e d w i t h him a b o u t t h i s so I
c a n answer y o u r q u e s t i o n . U s u a l l y what he would do is
a t t a c k
f r o n s l a n t r a n g e o f
a b o u t
300 m e t e r s .
QUESTION:
U n i n t e l l i g i b l e )
ANSWER:
No he d f i r e two
simultaneously
e would
at tempt
to
f i r e
two
a t
the same t ime;
one
from
each gun
QUESTION:
Your
s l a n t r a n g e
was 200
m e t e r s ? L e t
h im
a n s w e r t h a t .
A N S W E R :
The
g u n s w e r e
h a r m o n i z e d
t o
s h o o t t 400 m e t e r s b u t C o l .
R u d e l
f o u n d it was difficult f o r h i m t o b e a s e x a c t a s he
wanted t o
be
i n o r d e r t o e f f e c t a k i l l
by
shoot ing a t those
r a n g e s . He
would
u s u a l l y go down t o
200
somet imes 100 o r 1 5 0 .
He
had t o b e v e r y
e x a c t
i n h i s
d e l i v e r i e s a n d h e h a d t o hit
t h e
tank
i n
a
v u l n e r a b l e
a r e a
where
t h e t un g st en - ca rb i d e c e nt e r
would p e n e t r a t e t h e f u e l o r ammunition s t o r a g e a r e a i n o r d e r
t o e f f e c t
a k i l l . e
c o u l d n t do t h i s a t f u r t h e r s l a n t range
b e c a u s e
o f t h e
a c c u r a c y .
Q U E S T I O N :
- 1 ^ -
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TAPE I
3 IDE
I
ow given
you had a very short open
fire unintelligible)
what sort
of
ground a ir threat was
involved?
Was there org
anized arms
act ivi ty or, because of the dynamics of
the
s i t
ua t i o n ,
was
it nonex i s t en t ?
ANSWER:
When the Russian
tanks
would b re ak th ro ug h the
f ron t ,
as
with
any a t tack ,
the i r
l og i s t i c s
t ra in
would
become
somewhat
s t r a i n ed .
VtakpanzzA., the
guns
t h a t
a re
mounted on
a
tank
chass i s would f a l l behind the t anks .
Therefore ,
the problem
would
presen t
i t s e l f :
Tanks t ha t
had
broken,
through
the
f ron t
had t u r n e d
o u t was much
more difficult
o f
c o u r s e . . . a n d
h is a tta ck in g wi th h is
a i r c r a f t
would be c oo rd in at ed w it h o the r
a ir cr af t th a t
would at tack
the Vtak
pos i t ions
on the ground.
Also,
he would make multiple
passes a t the tank
unintelligible )
Gene ra lly s pe ak in g, the re
would
on ly be
one
i n i n t e l l i g i b l e
QUESTION:
What
so r t
o f a i r c r a f t
provided Zak
suppress ion?
ANSWER ;
There were two an t i - t ank squadrons in h is w ing. Pardon
me,
t h e r e
was
on ly one an t i - t ank f l i g h t o f a i r c r a f t , it was
ca l l ed a i r c r a f t un in te l l i g ib l e
a
very s t rong squadron o f
a i r c r a f t . What he would
do
i n an a t t a ck , the re would
be
o the r
Stuka
in
h is
wing
t h a t
normal
Stuka^
without
the
cannons
on,
would
bomb,
would a t t ack the
fZak
pos i t i ons through coordina ted
effort
QUESTION;
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TAPE
I IDE I
Were these
bombs
(unintelligible)
ANSWER;
The Stuka.
would carry a
om
that
could
unintelligible)
and the
bombs
had a fuse
in
them
that was
set
at 50 cm at that
time, which would allow them to
explode above
the ground un
intelligible) , They
would
carry about a 4 pound om inside,
similar
to our Rockeye ,
QUESTION:
How long
un in te l l ig ib le
ANSWER:
Abou t 50
s e cond s .
QUESTION:
Would you ask him to give us a review of the attack pro
file, dive angle, air speed altitude, when he d generally try
to ro l l in ,
tha t
type of
thing?
ANSWER:
If
they
had
a cloud deck
of 200
meters and they
had
to
fly underneath that and then with a very relatively
flat
at
tack angle. They didn't take into account the height of the
clouds...When they were not paying attention
to, their
cloud
decks, then they would normally start between 800 and 1500
meters. They would circle around until they found the tank
itself. The problem
was
not actually shooting or killing
the tank, but i t was finding
the
tank. Being able to vis
ually
acquire their target, that
is
where
they spent
most of
their time. e added too
that
speed
was
poison f or finding
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TA PE
I
S I D E
I
ta r^ .
Normally they
would
fly at 25
kilometers
but
when
they were
at
an angle of 2 to 3 degrees they would dive
I t would
be
about.. 320.
They had aerodynamic problems with
the aircraft. If you got
at
32 kilometers you d ge t ossi-
lations
Q U E S T I O N :
T his
was
o n l y the
cannon
a i rc ra f t ?
A N S W E R :
Yes
th i s was
f o r t h e
cannon. Th e
cannon
would
n o t f i re
accurately i f you went over
350.
The regular ai rcraf t would
g o
4 5 0
i n
a
d i v e .
Q U E S T I O N ;
Kilometers
per hour hou re talking
about?
A N S W E R ;
E ve r ything
i s in k ilo m ete rs p er h o u r.
The
cannon
i t s e l f was th e
c o n t r o l l i n g
fac tor . I t
wa s
def ina te ly th e
aerodynamics
of th e
c ann on w hic h
l i m i t e d t h e
airspeed. Normally thei r landing speed
was 180
an d
thei r
crusing was 250
Because
the cannon was the most important
thing they would
le t the
cannon control
a ll of the
speed.
was
th e th in g t h a t
act u al l y
k i l l e d
th e tank
so
every
t h i n g
e l s e
fell
to
th e
s i d e .
Q U E S T I O N ;
180 k i l o m e t e r s fo r
th i s l andi ng
w ith
the
a i r c ra f t . . .
with th e cannon un in te l l ig ib le
A N S W E R ;
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TAPE I
S I D E
I
A b o u t 1 4 0
Q U E S T I O N :
Pierre
mentioned something about speed
is
poison?
A N S W E R :
Yes
there is ju st
a
l i t t l e phrase a t the
end
of
what he
was saying about that the essence is to find tanks nce you
find
them you can shoot them
with
a
reasonable
candor and
the phrase
he
used was that in finding tanks speed is poison
Q U E S T I O N :
C o u l d I q u o t e t h a t ?
A N S W E R :
Ask him it i s not my statement. L e t s not take i t out of
context
e
says
that
really speed is
absolutely catastrophic
and i t is a poison when you are
trying
to k i l l a tank because
yo u can
g e t
too f a s t You w i l l ov er shoot
th e
tank and then
y o u v e
w a s t e d y o u r
m i s s i o n .
Q U E S T I O N :
Before
Tom comes in
l e t s finish developing our
point.
General Smith
said
don t
quote
i t out
of
context.
advocate
low speeds for descrimination General Smith your point is
g o i n g t o b e
w h a t ?
A N S W E R :
You ve g ot to
take
the
whole warfare into context. In
other words i f you can t survive what surrounds you you are
not going
to survive the shoot.
Speed
is catastrophic
when
you a re t r y i n g to find something
an d
a
tank
i s n o t too much
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TAPE I SIDE I
different
from
a truck.
If
you are in foliage the slower
you can go
certainly
improves your eyeball action capability
and then you ve got to keep in sight everything that is going
around
you
too.
ou
know
the equation balances out very
quickly;
what
is coming
at
you determines your speed
and if
y o u r e going
to
survive
th e
k i l l .
Q U E S T I O N ;
This is the
question that
I was going to ask. We ve
mentioned that they did try
Vlak
suppression but
we haven t
mentioned what other kinds of air defense flying
you
were
under
while
you
were
circling looking for tanks.
While
you
were flying 25 kilometers at a couple of hundred meters.
What about rifle
firing,
what about machine
gun firing,
what
about
a ll of th e other things that
you would encounter. ow
d id
y ou
avo id t he se?
A N S W E R ;
They
had
to deal
with everything
from
pistols
on up and
they had
soldiers
that had fallen on
their
backs
who
would
just
shoot
up into
the a ir and
when you had
100
soldiers in
front of the tanks or with the tanks
and you
just
had
to pass
through
i t
and you encountered
unintelligible).
e says
that he
often
had
3
or 4
hits
in the airplane
and
as long
as none
of
those
hi t s ,
a ll
calib ers,
as
long
as
none
of
those
hits were in the radiator, i t really wasn t a big problem.
U n in te l l i g ib l e ,
EN D TA P E I
S I D E
I
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T A P E
I
S I D E
II
ANSWER CON T:
. . . u n t i l such time as
he
has through h is experience and
seat of the pants f eel i n g and he could see- the
s lant
range to
the
tank, he would r o l l out just for a second, stabilize his
platform and
fire
and then immediately
start
jinking again.
That 3 a very
important
point,
le t me
emphasize
that,
I went
over t h a t with Colonel Rudel,
He
says th a t h is
l ine
up time
from
wings level
until firing
with
the
cannon
was
between 1
and 1
1/2
seconds, and I believe t h a t s accurate because he
quotes for
bombing
3 to 4 seconds line up time for experienced
pilots.
He said,
however,
there
was no
way
you could
get
a
pilot out of ordinary training to be able to
hit
a tank with
only one second line up time. the other hand, he said i t
was absolutely
essential for
survival to hold i t down
to
that.
And of course, in an
airplane, that would
be
less
limited by
i ts cannons, you know that one second for cannons versus three
or four seconds for bombing^ in and of i t s e l f would be a
tr e
mendous
survival advantage.
Younger
p i l o t s , to continue
aug
menting what
Mr
Sprey said, had a lo t of difficulty because
they c ou ld n t, q uite
frankly, they couldn t
see
the same
slant
ranges
that
Col. Rudel could.
They
simply
didn t
have
the
experience and
hadn t
had enough practice
to
be
able to
roll
out
ju s t
momentarily and
le t
two rounds go and
st a rt
jinking again.
The
majority of the losses
that
they
had
with
the
antitank aircraft
were in a phase where
the pilot
would
roll out, track
th e target and then
fire.
I might add
that
just based
on
a conversation with Col.
Rudel
yesterday,
that
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T A P E
I S IDE
you had
to
be very canny
in
working with
the
Russians
said o f t e n
he
would come i n t o
the
area^ a wooded a r e a an d
finally after making several
orbits
he would spot a
tank
and
then
he
said
something would just
not
look rig h t to
him i t would look
fishy
and so he would m y e wait ten
more minutes an d then he might spot a fZdk b a tte r y o r they
would
f i n a l l y
j u s t g et disgusted with waiting and they would
open up on him They would expend a ll of
their
munitions
tha t they
ha d a t th e
time
and
then
he could go in and at t ack
the
tank
a f t e r
the
enemy had expended
a ll
of
t h e i r
flak
a t
him.
I t i s very
i n d i v i d u a l
th e way
t h a t
a pi lo t i s
going
to
a t tack
t anks
He
r a t es
tha t
a s
a
v ery im p or ta nt f ac to r
in
surv iva l
in a d d i t i o n to th e t ac t i c s t ha t he
i s
ta lk ing
a b o u t .
T ha t se n se
fo r a t ac t i ca l s i tua t ion f o r t e l l i ng
when
t h e r e wa s
a fZak
t rap
se t up
and
when
t h e r e
w a s n t .
He
r e fe rs to
it
a s
j u s t i n tu i t ion
and
a lso
cons t an t
e x p o s u r e
to
get that sixth sense
i t
is
absolutely
essential to
be flying
every single day.
A few weeks away from
the front
you
lose
c o n t a c t
wi t h th e
si tuat ion
yo u l o s e
c o n t a c t w ith th e l a tes t
tac t ics o f th e enemy He
says
it i s very dangerous when yo u
come back af ter you ve been o u t o f
c o n t a c t
fo r a few weeks.
Q U E S T I O N :
He s a id he
t y p i cal l y operated
from 1500
meters
from th e
front?
A N S W E R :
No 1500 meters i n
c r u i s e al t i tude
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TAPE
I
S I D E II
Q U E S T I O N :
Okay t h e n ho w t y p i c a l l y
ANSWER;
Your
q ue stio n a s
to
how
fa r
de pen de d o n
th e
par t icu la r
time o f
th e
war and where th e
ai r f ie ld
happened to be. I t
could be anywhere from 17 to 1 kilometers.
I t
i s impossible
to
say.
But he d e fi na te ly s tr es se s experience. I t was a very
important thing. That i s why i t was impossible for young people
to
survive
the
way he did because
they
did not have the exper
i e n c e
Q U E S T I O N :
One
other
ques t ion
a l o n g t ha t same
l i n e
when he arr ived
in
target
area
I assume t hat he had no problem finding a
target
a re a w a s th ere any c o n t r o l
at
all o v e r th e A ir F o r c e l i k e to
da y with a i r b o r n e
a ir
cont rol lers
and
so for th o r
d id
he have
to be
b r o u g h t
in
by ex te rna l means?
A N S W E R ;
He
s tr e ss e s p a r ti cu l a rl y experience. With
th e young
pi lo t
the ai rcraf t
f l y s
the
pi lo t With the very
expereinced pi lot
i t is the p i l o t t h a t is flying
the
machine.
says t h a t he
pract ical ly
s lept in his machine.
He d
be going from
3
i n th e
morning
unt i l ei g h t o r
nine
in
the
evening.
He was
constantly
with
the
m a c h i n e
i t s e l f
an d
it was
th e
f a c t
t h a t
he had
t o t a l
cont ro l o v e r
h is a i r c r a f t
t ha t
made
the b ig di f fe rence
C H A I R M A N :
Excuse me fo r j u s t a m i n u t e . We ve been g o i n g for o ne
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TAPE I SIDE
II
hour now Suppose we take a 15 minute break. We ve
only
scratched the surface of
Mr. Christie s
question. I don t
know
the size of the flights I
don t
know the
tactics
en
volved. I
don t
know
the coordination of the captain.
We
will open up session with those kind of questions. Did he
rendezvous how was
i t
controlled
how
did they get there
how d id they ge t back?
I N TERM I S S I O N
CHAIRMAN:
I
appreciate
the p atien ce
of
everybody
a t
this
time.
have
made a few changes. One is that Ive
asked
here
because he speaks fluent Geirman
Mr
Sprey to sit up here
so that
we
get
the full
impact
of
what
is
being
translated.
I t
is
easy
to
lose some
of
what
is
being translated. Sec
ondly there
was a suggestion made and I concur t h a t what
we Qught to do i s set up a random shotgun b la st in g r at he r
than
questions
t h a t
bounce l l
around to ll
kinds of is
sues
th t we ta k e phases o f
th e
problem and we res t r i t
questions
to
you
know
l i ke command
and
control
o r
whatever
one
t a
time
and
st a y with it unt i l
we have
exhausted it
to
our
satisfaction
then
press
on to the
next topic
area.
There
was
one other
thing
they have to have the tape
re
corder
down
here
to get
a
better
pick up and
they
have
asked
me
to ask everybody to speak up when they ask
the
questions so
th t it i s picked up
an d
i f
not
fo r me to
repeat the questions to make sure th at i t is
picked
up
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T A P E
I S I D E II
o n t h e r e c o r d e r
Q U E S T I O N :
What a r e
you going t o do w i t h t h e t a p e ?
Q U E S T I O N :
Who s d o i n g th e ta p in g ?
B i l l
McLaurin
A N S W E R ;
Yes i f
I may
B i l l McLaurin
i s a
p r o f e s s i o n a l
jour
n a l i s t .
th o u g h t
it
m i g h t be v e r y good
i f he
wro t e a
pie c e
on how he
se e s
th e
discussion then pa ss
it around to
the
p e o p l e wh o
w e r e h e r e t o
make
s u r e
it was a t r u t h f u l r e f l e c t i o n
o f
Col.
Rude l s
comments.
That was th e
i d e a
to
g e t
a profes
sional jo u rn alist
so to
speak to give
an interpretation.
C H A I R M A N :
L e t
me
make
an o b s e r v a t i o n it i s a v e i w p o i n t o f
mine
an d
I
d o n t
know i f
it
i s held by
anybody e l s e ,
bu t
Col. Rudel
h a s
had
enormous
e x p e r i e n c e , b u t
i n
a
d i f f e r e n t
e r a
u n d e r
d i f
f e r e n t
c o n d i t i o n s an d
d i f f e r e n t t i m e s and I t h i n k it i s incum
b e n t
u p o n u s
wh o
h a v e
some i n f l u e n c e
o n t h i s e r a o n t h i s t i m e
t h a t we l i s t e n t o
t h e
h i s t o r y a s it w ere and we a r e
e a c h
r e s
ponsible for how
well
t ha t t ra n sl at es
into
t o d a y s world.
I t
may
n o t t r a n s l a t e
a t a l l o r
it
m i g h t
be
a lm o st
100 p e r c e n t
t r a n s l a t e a b l e with each o f
u s .
a r e not
he re
to
q u a r r e l
with
what
happened 3 years
ago
we a re
here
to
find
out what
happened
30 y e a r s a g o .
With
t h a t ,
I d
l i k e t o
p i c k up
w i t h where Mr C h r i s t i e s
q u e s t i o n dropped o f f . T h a t i s , we a r e
t r y i n g
to b u i l d th e
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scenario that took place more or less typically
and
I guess
when you really get
down
to it, there is no such thing as a
typical mission Questions like
how many
people flew in the
flight?
as
i t
a flight of one a
flight
of two or
was i t
squadron
size.
Did he meet up with cover, was
that
standard?
ow did he support his organization?
as
i t controlled
by
ground controllers? Those kind of questions Neil can you
go ahead
and
start that off there and
that
will open i t up
ANSWER:
e
would
usually
go out
alone.
e
would
start
early.
ed be the f irst one out to reconnoite r the area. When the
report
was that there would only be ten tanks, that they
were looking for ten to 15 then he
would
be followed up
with a very small
flight
of usually about 12 sometimes only
six or seven of those
aircraft.
e added that
he would
fly
with a squadron
size
unintelligible ,
a normal squadron
was
12 to 16
aircraft,
but
because of
the
maintainance difficulties
and so
forth,
they could only
put six or
seven up
in the
air.
If
there
was a stronger enemy formation
of
artillery and
tanks and so
forth,
instead of
flying
a squadron
level,
they
would fly at a group level. Theoretically 27 aircraft , in
reality, 15 aircraft. gain they
would
fly in a unintelligible
QUESTION:
What sort of did they have with
the
top cover?
The
fighter
ircr f t
were
there
prior rendezvous
arrangements or
was
the cover against
the
Soviet opposi ti on?
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ANSWER:
1 11 answer his
question,
bu t just
to
clear up any con--
f u s i o n , I ll
run
through t h e .
Q U E S T I O N :
I
w a n t
to
know
why y ou l aughed
A N S W E R :
Because he
said
t h a t
t h e i r
coiranunications,
normally
were
te le phonic
l a n d l i n e s tha t functioned par t o f th e time and
fun
ctioned part of
the
time not. So, that was one of
their pr o
blems.
The
levels
a t which
they
would work, would be
unint
elligible)
squadrons; smaller than our squadrons,
maybe
12 -
16
air cr af t .
From there, you would go
to
a G tappe which was
three
squadrons plus a
staff flight. rom
there you would go
to
a which was
three
G/iapen.
rom there,
you would
go
to
a LaitdZxjl^lon o r a Lu{tKoA.p^, which
would
be an a i^
division
or
Air
Corps, From
there,
to
a
Luitilottz
which would
be an a ir
f lee t i t
would be
j u s t the
level of command .
In
Col. Rudel*s c a s e , h i s
wing would
be
subordinated
to an
A ir
C o rp s , t h r o u g h
l a n d l i ne s
would
coordina te w i t h
c lose
a i r
support units l i ke
Col.Rudel s and with
fighter
uni t s. They
would
s e t
a
rendezcous point
and they would
supposedly meet
th eir
a ir
cover prior to going into
attacking
their
targets.
In
pract i ce,
Gol.Rudel s
support a i rc ra ft would arrive only
about one-half o f the time. There
would
be d i f f e r e n t excuses;
they would say they were
attacked
in route, they were engaged
e l s e w h e r e , the we a the r wa s
to o bad
and
so for th .
In R u s s i a
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TAPE
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S I D E
II
German l ine a t
one
poin t and the Germans in to
the
Russians
l ine
at
another
point. I t was an extremely diff icul t
problem
for
him
to
discern
which
were
friendly
and
which were enemy
and,
of
course, that was
the big thing that occupied his
time. I t was very diff icul t especially when
they
were
re
ceiving
Vlak,
because the
posit ions
on the ground
were
so
close
and the tendency would be t o i f
they^re flying
a-
round up
there
and
they s t a r t
get t ing shot
a t
they d say,
Well, we re get t ing shot a t
so
obv ious ly t hose
are
not
Ger
mans. In real i ty
it
wasn t the case because the
troops
were
so in te rmixed
so in terwoven
with one another on th e
ground.
said
that
he
had to sometimes
make
as
many
as
five or six
passes for
identification
alone (unintelligible).
QUESTION;
Were there cases o f
complaints
o f
inexperienced Stuka
pilots
shooting
up
f i rendly, as
happened
to us,
was tha t a
c o n s t a n t
prob lem
or
ANSWER:
This,
of
course,
occurred, but one did not see i t very
of t en
It
happened to Col. Rudel on
one
occas ion . It was th e
regulation
in
his wing that none
of the
pilots in
his
wing
could
drop ord inance
any
closer
than he,
himself,
per sona lly d id
He also
said
tha t he control led when
they
bombed
a t a l l so
the l a s t
decis ion
before
bombing
was h i t
QUESTION:
I was thinking in par t icular i f the case of using
the
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SJtuka G with
the
37 mm whether there were cases where
inexperienced
pilots
actually
shot
up
individual
German
armored
fighting units?
Germans
because
of misidentification
stress wha t e v e r
A N S W E R :
I t happened to Col. Rudel
personally. F ortunately the
bomb
m issed
and th e gu y jumped o u t o f th e tank and waved
a t
him.
I t
was a
Tiger
tank and the guy,
very
shocked and
frightened po ppe d o pen the hatch an d waved a t him
Q U E S T I O N :
Let s pursue t h a t a l i t t le
further
then.. .did they ever
have any ground
control-or
ground a ssis ta nc e in ta rg et id en ti
f ica t ion and what marking d e v i c e s would be used?
A N S W E R ;
He said t h a t in the Panzer divisions which you have to
remember
were
e l i t e
divis ions
they
had
O f f i c e r s
who were on
the ground in
tanks
with radios.
They were in
very close communication. There is probably
a
b e t t e r
way
to
i n t r o d u c e
th i s s u b j e c t .
Th e 1 4 t h
Panzer Division
had
one
Panzer l e f t a t
the time
of t h i s
incident
and
the
commanding
general of th e u n i t
t o l d
Col. Rudel t h a t he
was
going to
use
t h a t
t a n k
as
a
r ad io t ank
P u t
in h is
Lia ison
off icer He
took th e cannons
o u t
in order to g e t th e
radios
i n . He said that the conversation the exchange was f a r
m o r e impo r t an t
to
h im th an w heth er t h a t o n e P an zer co uld
shoot o r not. The
St LLk cii
gave him the
p o ssib ili ty o f attacking
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targets
that
he
needed attacked
and obviously
with
vastly greater
f ire power
than
that
one
tank
could give
him That introduces the importance of t h i s l i a i s o n .
But
t h e
f a c t
t h a t
t h e r e were LuitmUe
Liaison
o f f i c e r s
mounted in
specia l
tanks had
radios
t h a t
were
on the a i r -
to ground frequency of
the
JU 87 and they were
in
constant
very close contact They announced what they needed done
what targets they needed
i f
they could pinpoint them they
would pinpoint them i f they only
kn w they
were taking
f i r e from a
certain
area they would ask them to
search
for
them. So
they were in
very
close tact ical contact
Col Rudel
says
t h a t if
they
had no t
had
t h a t
kind o f
arrangement t h e
war would have
been
over i n
1943
T h a t s
how
c r i t i c a l it
was
to
the overal l success of
t h i s
close
s u p p o r t
effort
QUESTIONS
own
to what level were these pat ro l
u n i t s ,
did he
tell
you? How
many?
ANSWER:
There
was one p e r
d i v i s i o n , so
t h a t would be
d i v i s i o n
level liaison
QUESTION:
U n i n t e l l i g i b l e ) Movement around the b a t t l e f i e ld i s
terr ibly confusing and diverse i t seems to
m
tha t they
obvious ly
c o u l d n t b e ev erywhere
a t once
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A N S W E R :
You ve
g o t t o
remember
t h a t th e s e were small
divisions. They were more like
our
brigades. Somewhere
between o u r
b r i g a d e
l e v e l and d i v i s i o n
l e v e l .
This was, o f
c o u r s e , up to th e
d i v i s i o n
commander
where
to
put the
aptim ^ Liaison Officer)
but he was
normally to
be found a l l the way up
front
with
the
spearhead
of th e armored di vi si on and t h a t was
j u s t
th e a s s i s t a n c e
t h e y
g a v e
t h e
d i v i s i o n
c o m m a n d e r s .
NE W V O I C E ;
You know through, P e te , Tom it seems
to
me t h a t
when you
have
friendly
versus
enemy you
g e t
into a
large
mass o f tank b a t t l e s the th in g t h a t u n i n t e l l i g i b l e )
i s
going to be very
murky
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e ) .
P e o p l e
is
t h e
w r o n g w o r d .
It i s going to be d i f f i c u l t
in
f a c t i f t h e r e
was
some
kind
o f marking c a p a b i l i t y to keep
tr a c k o f
w h a t s
out there
T h a t s
wh y it i s t o i m p o r t a n t t o
t r a i n
t h e f o r c e
b e f o r e
the bat tle s ta rt s
S o w h a t ?
So i m p o r t a n t to
t r a i n
th e f o r c e b e f o r e you
g e t in
t h a t
situation
Yeah
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ANSWER:
In
add it ion to the Panzer
div i s ions
t he re
were
l i a i son
of f i ce r s with 2 other e l i t e groups. The
unin
t e l l i g i b l e
were
no t o rgan ic to
th e d iv i s i on
because
the re
were not enough of them to go around. In fac t
they
were
only a ss ig ned to div is ions
tha t
were
r ig h t in the
th ick of
it
Any divis ion t ha t
was
off
the l i ne or
j u s t
holding
or
something
t h ey pu ll e d th e Lia i son
Of f i c e r and
ass igned him to
th e
rep lacement d iv i s i on .
QUESTION;
What was
th e l i n e
o f
au thor i ty? Did these
l i a i s on
o f f i c e r s
have th e au tho r i ty to d i r e c t a i r c r a f t ? What was
t h e i r
au tho r i t y ?
ANSWER:
w
jus t
one
minute
f i r s t
answer the
previous quest ion
Yes
we
have
a
p r ev i ou s ques t i on
t h a t
has
no t
been
translated
And
th e q ue stio n was about
whether
or not
you
used
p i l o t s as t he se
forward
con t ro l l e r s
o r l i a i s on
o f f i c e r s .
ANSWER:
No there
were
no pi lo t s t ha t were used. They were
Officers who had
speical
t ra in ing one
year
schooling
fo r th i s par t icular chore tha t
they
were
doing.
They were
mostly used
j us t as l ia ison of f i ce r s .
They
did not have
any
command a uth ority o r anything. They would
inform
the a i r
uni t s
how th e d iv is io n was deployed on the
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b a t t l e f i e l d
where t h e y
w e r e
where
t h e f r i e n d l y
t r o o p s
were and
where
t h ey s us pe ct e d t h e enemies
were . e
d i d n t
have
any
command
a u t h o r i t y .
The
o r g a n i z a t i o n
c h a r t
would
have t h e
F l i e g e r A i r
D i v i s i o n o r A i r Corps
a s Col .
Rudel s
commander and h e
was
t h e o r e t i c a l l y
r e sp o n si b le t o him.
However b e c a u s e o f h i s e x p e r i e n c e
i n n o v a t i o n
and
p r e v i o u s
employment
he i n e f f e c t had a f r e e hand w i t h
o p e r a t i o n s . . .
t h a t was g i v e n
t o
o t h e r e x p e r i e n c e d l e a d e r s a l s o b u t o n l y
v er y e xp e r i e n c ed o n e s.
They
would
be
s e n t from one a r e a t o
a n o t h e r a s t h e need
a r o s e and t h a t would come from
h i g h e r
a u t h o r i t y .
But a s
f a r a s employment w i t h i n h i s
a r e a
t h e a u t h o r i t y t o r e l e a s e
h i s bombs
was
left t o him b e c a u s e o f h i s e x p e r i e n c e
and
h i s
p r i o r
s u c c e s s .
e knew
more
t h a n h i s
commanders
knew and
t he y re co gn iz ed
it and
s a i d
i n e ff e c t you f a c t a
f r e e hand
i n
what
you
a r e
d o i n g .
S t a r t
o u t w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n .
What
was t h e q u e s t i o n ?
The q u e s t i o n was d i d o t h e r commanders were
t h e y
h e l d
responsib le to the higher
echelon o f
the
command th e
Air
D i v i s i o n s a n d A i r C o r p s ?
ANSWER:
C o l . R u d e l s a i d t h a t t h e r e
w e r e
a f e w o f
c o u r s e
if
t h e commander o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l wing o r g r o u p was a new
commander
then
t h e c o n t r o l t h a t th e
Air
Divis ion commander
would e x e r c i s e
would
o f c o u r s e
be much
more
s t r i n g e n t
t h a n
h e would
w i t h someone l i k e C o l Rudel
However b e c a u s e
o f
t h e
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core of experienced people t h a t they had a v a il a bl e f o r
commanders by
the
end of the
war
there were very, very few
wing
commanders
t h a t
had
t o
be
subordinated
to
the A ir
C o r p s
commander , i n
t h a t m a n n e r .
For the inexperienced squadron leaders
unintelligible ,
the
Flieger Corps l e v e l
the
Air Corps l e v e l
t o l d
them
e x a c t l y where
to
bomb o r gave them exa ct c o or di na te s and
they
had to bomb
there.
They
had
no freedom
of
action,
f o r t he i nexper ienced
people, and
they
bombed
there even
i f there were f r iendly t roops r i g h t
a t
those coordinates .
Col.
Rudel
came
back from a mission
and
he s a i d
t h a t
they
had not
destroyed a l l of the Russian
tanks
or
troops
in a particular
area
and he wanted to
return to
that
parti
c u l a r t a rg e t t o
f i n i s h
up, if t h e r e
was
a c o n f l i c t between
what he thought
and what
the
Air Corps commander
thought
tha t
the Air
orps commander had a more
important
target ,
the,
of
course. Col. Rudel
was
ordered
to
the
more
important
target
QUESTION:
I d
l i k e t o ask him a two p a r t
ques t ion .
Could he
g i v e
us a b r i e f
d e s c r i p t i o n
o f how he r e a ct e d t o an a i r
request,
where
did
it
come
from
and
how
did
it
actually
get
t o him. I n r e ad in g h i s book, I s e e t h a t
some
o f h i s m i s s i o n s
were
almost
on
his
own
i n i t i a t i v e .
He
went
out s o r t
of hunting
a s
a g a i n s t r e a c ti n g t o a r e q u e s t a s we
would
t o o u r own
t a c t i c a l
a i r
c o n t r o l
s y s t e m . Aid t h e n i n
t h o s e a r e a s t h a t
were
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within the range of
friendly
units did he ever have
coordination with the
artillery
that helped him soften
up
the
area
so
to
speak
in
suppression?
Did he
ever
use the a r t i l l e ry
ANSWER:
t would be
the
f ront d iv is ion commanders tha t
woul
place their
requests
and
m ny
times the
rmy requests
would be to 3 at a
time
Of course this would far
exceed
the assets
tha t
they had
END
OP
TAPE I
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T A P E II
S I D E
The f i n a l d e c i s i o n on
who
would
r e c e i v e
t h e h e l p
was
made by t h e A i r C o r p s . It a p p a r e n t l y
was
n e i t h e r
j o i n t conference o f d i v i s i o n commanders nor
h ig he r th an
A ir Corps The l a s t
d e c i s i o n ,
a f t e r r e ce iv in g th e
r e
q u e s t s
and
t h e reasons from t h e
d i v i s i o n
commanders
was
made
at
t h e
A i r Co rp s l e v e l
on who
would a c t u a l l y
r e c e i v e t h e
h e l p .
QUESTION:
Yes you
s a i d
something
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e )
c o n v e r s a t i o n
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e ) .
You
s a i d t h a t even
though
t h e r e were
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e )
o f t h o s e who were i s s u i n g t h e o r d e r s
and e x e c u t i n g
t h a t m i s s i o n
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e ) t a c t i c a l
b a t t l e ,
w o u l d n t
t h e r e
b e
some
p r o c e s s
o f u p d at i n g
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e ) .
ANSWER:
It was c l e a r t h a t
German pilot g r o u p commander
squadron
commander
whatever w o u l d n t knowingly
a t t a c k
German
t r o o p s .
t h i n k
what
h e meant b e f o r e was t h a t
if t h e r e
was
some f r i e n d l i e s
you
c o u l d n t s e e
o n
t h e
ground t h e y
were o r d e r e d
t o
a t t a c k t h e r e and n a t u r a l l y
t h e y w o u l d .
T h e r e
w a s ,
t h e o r e t i c a l l y ,
s y s t e m o f u p d a t e ,
b u t
it
was so c o m p l i c a t e d
and
f l u i d t h e r e , t h a t it
se ldom
f u n c t i o n e d . It
was d e p e n d e n t
upon how f a r away
they
were
from th e c o n t r o l s ,
how f a r away
they
were
from
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T A P E
S IDE
t h e i r ow n
base s ,
from
th e Corps I f they were 300
k i lome te r s
from
th e A ir
Corps t h e i r
rad ios
could
no t
func t ion a t t h a t d i s t ance ,
so it
had to
be
s t r i c t l y
a t th e
knowledge
o f
th e f l i g h t commander
as to
whether
o r no t
t hey
would a t t a c k . He s a i d
t h a t
th e German s o l d i e r s
on th e ground . . . , it was seldom
t h a t they would
have
t roub le
d i s c e r n ing which were t h e i r
own
s o l d i e r s , in
t h a t s it u a ti o n ,
because
o f t h e
PZak
o t h e r t h an , a s
we
s a id
be fo r e , when t hey were mixing i n one w ith a no th er.
But normally
the f tak
was
so
in tense
t ha t
t h ey . . . , an
inexper ienced man would say
t h a t th a t i s th e
place t h a t
normal ly
they
(un in te l l i g ib l e ) t h a t t h e r e
was
no t
g r e a t
d i f f i cu l t y
t e l l i n g w hich w ere
th e
f r i e nd l i e s
and
no t .
The
German
f r i end ly so l d i e r s would have
f l a r e s i gna l
they would u s e , so t h a t t h ey cou ld i d en t i fy themse lves .
I f
the
Siuk a6 w ere
to f ly
over
and
t he re
was
no
s i gna l ,
they would c i r c l e aga in .
Knowing th e c i r c l e ,
t h e i r own
t r oops would
use
th e
f l a r e
s ig n a l to
say we re
Ge rman , a n d don t bomb us.
QUESTION;
I d l i k e t o go back
to h is
f l i g h t
c on t r o l .
He in
d i c a t ed
t h a t
th e
first
s h o t ou t o f th e b a r r e l in th e day
t ime was h i s . Look a t th e s i t u a t i o n and t h en qu i t e
o f t e n
it wound up wi th a dd it io na l a irp la ne s in
th e
f l i g h t s .
C ould you g e t
th e
command
and
c on t r o l
t h a t
he exe rc i s ed
ove r h i s suppor t ing a i r
t h a t was d i r e c t l y i n suppor t o f
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T A P E II S IDE I
h im on a mi s s i o n ?
A N S W E R :
Yes
s i r Could
I
j u s t
h o l d
on it o n e se co n d to
answer the previous question the ar t i l l e ry
about well t ha t a l s o I meant about th e ident i f ica t ion
of the ground troops. They would fly down
of course
and m ke these
I.D.
passes and
then
when the troops on
the
ground
realized
that
they
were
trying to
clarify
the
si t u at i o n
they would
use
f l a r e s f l a r e
p i s t o l s to
clarify their
position.
Then from above Col Rudel
could look
down
an d
he
could see
a l l
the
l i g h t s
and
maybe he c o u ld make o u t
e x a c t l y
where
th e f ron t
was.
They would use d i f f er en t colors for
d i f f e r e n t
purposes
and h e would
know
exact ly
al o n g what
l ine t h e
f r iend l ies
a n d
th e
e n em i e s
And
e v e n apparent ly
inexper ienced commanders would
n o r m a l l y b e w arned o f f if they w e r e
abou t
to bomb
on
some coord ina te s
t h a t
w e r e four
h o u r s
o ld a n d
th e
f r iendly
t r o o p s
had
advanced
t oo meanwhile. Even
an in
experienced
commander
normally
i f they were shooting o ff
fery
pis to ls would
see
tha t
he
w a s n t
supposed
to
bomb
there.
I f
he wasn t too r i g i d then apparently
they
would
l e t him move
h is coordina tes
fo rw a rd bomb fo rw a rd .
Apparently
tha t was
an
inform al arrangement s t r i c t ly
speaking
he
was
supposed to bomb th e c oo rd in at es . B ut
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T A P E II S I D E I
a pp are ntly th e system was f l e x i b l e
enough t o
allow
him
t o
shift h i s c o o r d i n a t e s
f o r w a r d .
The
remark
t h a t yo u made about
giving
away posi t i ons,
s i r , by th e l i g h t i n g and by f l a r e s ; he
c o l . Rudel)
said
t h a t the Germans were concerned
about
having
friendly
o s
dropped on them and they would constantly l i g h t
t h e i r own
p o s i t i o n s t o
a v o i d t h i s s i t u a t i o n .
There wa s
no such th in g as a s e c r e t as to where they were. The
G e r m a n s
a l w a y s
knew w h e r e t h e R u s s i a n s o l d i e r s w e r e a n d
t h e R u s s i a n s
always
knew
where
t h e German
s o l d i e r s were.
So, it
was
not
a
problem o f giving
away
t h e i r p o s i t i o n s . . .
it was already known I t wa s more
important
to them and
to t h e i r own s a f e t y t h a t the y i d e n t i f y them selves,
which they would do c o n s t a n t l y , with
th e
Stukoi > so t h a t
t h e y w o u l d n o t g e t t h e i r ow n b o m b s .
To
answer y o u r
q u e s t i o n
a b o u t
t h e
a r t i l l e r y :
Th e
a r t i l l e r y was used only f o r
s p o t t i n g . They d
drop a
s h e l l u n in t e ll ig ib l e ) .
They
w o u l d n t
b e u s e d t o s o f t e n
u p a n
a r e a o r t o
t r y
t o d e s t r o y
s o m e
o f t h e
R u s s i a n
u n i t s . .
s u p p r e s s i o n ?
T he
a r t i l l e r y
d i d n t
h a v e
enough
m u n i t i o n s t o w a s t e
them t h a t way. N ot
t h a t
t h e y d
b e
w a s t e d , b u t
t h e r e w e r e
o t h e r
t a r g e t s o f h ig h e r
p r i o r i t y t h a t
t h e y . . . ,
Yo u s e e , t h e y w e r e o p e r a t i n g on
a
c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t
t o n n a g e s c a l e t h a n t h e U . S .
d i v i s i o n s .
A U . S . d i v i s i o n
g o t such h i g h e r
a r t i l l e r y tonnages t h a t t h e y
could a f f o r d
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TAPE
II S IDE I
to
do
t h a t
type
o f
t h ing .
There
was
very
little
mass
a r t i l l e ry
anywhere
on
the
Russian f ron t , because they
were so
t i g h t
on
a r t i l l e r y .
Our idea
o f
a r t i l l e r y
pre
para t ion , by th e
Germans
was
r e l a t ive ly
r a r e .
CHAIRMAN:
I
t h ink we
can t ake a break
now.
I propose , i t * s
qu a r t e r
to
twe l ve r i g h t
now
t h a t
we
t a k e a f i f t e e n
minute b reak , r e t u rn
at
12 :00 , go fo r
ano t h e r
hou r
and
t hen a t 1:00 we l l
ad journ
fo r lunch-
This paper t h a t s hopeful ly
going
around; if you
would
I
would r ea l ly
l ike
you a l l to s ign up with
your
address and when
we h av e some th in g t h a t resembles minutes
ou t of t h i s ,
we l l
send them to
you
fo r your in format ion .
It s
s t a r t ed
ou t ,
it h a s n t
gone
too
f a r .
So
if each of
you would p lea se s ign we l l t r y to
t ake
c a re o f
t h a t
ad
ministrative detail
AFTER BREAK MR. TURNER
Can
I
make
a po i n t ? The
comment
t h a t I
made abou t
th e
j ou rna l i s t ; He
i s
a j ou rna l i s t
by
background bu t
t h i s
repo r t
i s s tr i c t l y
fo r
i n t e rna l
use
and
no t
fo r
the
pres s , fo r
anybody
who may be misled by
t h a t
comment.
QUESTION;
I n te rn a l to
what?
Exp la in i n t e r n a l
ANSWER;
To t h i s g roup .
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T A P E
S I D E
QUESTION
H e s maki ng t h i s t a p e s o t h a t t h i s g ro u p c a n h e a r
it?
A N S W E R :
N o s o t h a t we c a n p u t o n e r e p o r t t o g e t h e r
t h a t s
not biased.
Q U E S T I O N ;
T h a t s
a n
i n t e r n a l t a p e ?
A N S W E R :
Yes.
Q U E S T I O N :
C o n t r o l l e d b y y o u ?
A N S W E R :
Correct.
Q U E S T I O N ;
T h a t s
g o i n g
t o
b e
u s e d
t o
c r o s s
c h e c k
t h e
m i n u t e s .
A N S W E R ;
That s correct.
C H A I R M A N ;
S p e c i f i c a l l y
w
w a n t t o a v o i d an y k i n d o f a n
i m p l i
c a t i o n
t h a t s o u n d s
like ...
a n d
t h a t
w as
t h e
g r o u n d
r u l e s
t h a t Tom
a n d
h a d t a l k e d a b o u t .
W e r e
g o i n g t o l i v e b y
t h o s e a n d w e d l i k e yo u all t o
d o
t h e
s a m e .
Now w e r e h av in g l u n ch
at o n e
o c l o c k a n d we h a v e
r e s e r v e d s p a c e s
f o r
t w e n t y p e o p l e
it s
f l e x i b l e . F o r
t h o s e w h o w i s h
t o
sit
in
at l u n c h
t
will
b e
i n f o r m a l .
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TAPE II
S IDE I
or as
f igh ter p i l o t s , it i s n ot p os sib le to do t h i s
mission. To do close support , the pi lo t s
have
to
be,
in
h is
term,
in fan t ry
o f th e
a i r .
QUESTION:
ow
did Col. Rudel
manage
the
a ir tha t
was
support
ing him indicated that quite often the
f i r s t
f l ight
o f th e day
was
th e p erso na l reconna isance of the a rea
and t hen subsequen tly a i r power was
applied.
Did he
hold
them from
th e
f i e l d s ? Did
he
mar sh a l l
them
so f a r from
where he
was? ow
d id
he c a l l
it
in ? I s
he
a un in t e l li
g i b l e
ANSWER:
The f i r s t pa r t of t h a t ques t ion was t h a t he would
go
ou t f i r s t , then
r e turn to
th e
base ,
because th e
o the r
p i l o t s would s leep longer than he would. This was
a
before dawn
f l igh t .
I t was a reconnaisance f l i gh t before
dawn. e would re tu rn and the o ther pi lo t s would
then be
ready having
got ten
up l a t e r than
he did
and they would
t ake
of f , usual ly in
group s t r eng th ,
which was,
as
we
have said before ,
about
14 or 15 a i rp lanes . Then he
would t a k e them
back
t o t h e a r e a
that
he
had
s e l e c t e d
and
presumedDly
b r i e f
the Air
Corps
l eve l
what
was
to
a t t ack . That would s t a r t
o ff
the f igh t ing day. With h is
normal
a i r c r a f t s t rength
being
36,
he
would only
be
able
to
put
14-15 a i r c r a f t in th e a i r and ready fo r f l i gh t .
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T A P E S I D E I
QUESTION:
Was
t h e
r e a s o n f o r
t h i s b a t t l e damage
o r was t h i s
o n e o f t h e i r m a i n t e n a n c e p r o b l e m s ?
A N S W E R ;
T h e m a i n
r e a s o n
for that w a s m e c h a n i c a l . T h e i r
problems
were because an a i r c r a f t
i s
a
v e r y
t e c h n i c a l
machine a n d i n
o r d e r t o
m a i n t a i n t h a t a i r c r a f t p r o p e r l y
t h e y
could only
g e t a b o u t 1 / 3 o f
them
i n
t h e
a i r .
It
was
l e s s t h e
problem t h a t
t h e y
had been s h o t
a t .
Hal f
o f
t h e
a i r c r a f t were
s e v e r e l y
b a t t l e
damaged.
He h a s l o c a te d t h e m . .. I n t h e o r y h e h a d 36 a i r p l a n e s
a v a i l a b l e 27
on s t r e n g t h
and
r e s e r v e . The r e s e r v e s
were a lway s
intended t o be
i n maintenance .
I n
f a c t
he was a b l e t o o n l y p u t up 14 o r 1 5 n o r m a l l y .
Of
c o u r s e
t h e r e were days when h e d go a l o n e ; t h e r e
was
o n l y
one
a ir p l a n e a v a i l a b le .
e s a y s it was
n o t
s o
much
a
problem
o f