41
Journal of International Cooperation Studies, Vol.26, No.1(2018.7)
Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption
NISHITANI Makiko*
Abstract
With an increasing number of regime complexes experienced in thepast decade,
a seriousquestionhasarisenas tohowtocreateconsistencyandharmonyoutofpotential
discordance among diverse goals, interests, and norms in a congested regime complex.
Internationalorganizations’orchestrationmayprovideananswer to thisquestion.Theglobal
anti-corruptiongovernance isa transnationalpolycentricregimecomplex,withregulationsand
frameworkscreatedandpromotedbymultipleactorsatmultiplelevels,inmulti-sectoralsettings
andovermultipleissues.TheUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC)isoneofthe
majororchestrators forcounteringcorruptionandhasmanypartnershipswithpublic,private
andcivil sectors.Thispaperdiscussessomeproblemsof theorchestration theorydeveloped
byKennethW.Abbott,DuncanSnidal andothers, andproposesaconceptof “collaborative
orchestration”asapromisingmodelforpolycentricgovernance.Thenitexaminesconditionsfor
UNODC’sorchestrationandacaseofcollaborativeorchestrationinenhancingtheeffectivenessof
theUnitedNationsConventionagainstCorruption(UNCAC).
* AssociateProfessor,GraduateSchoolofInternationalCooperationStudies,KobeUniversity. Earlierversionswerepresentedat the InternationalStudiesAssociationAnnualConvention,Atlanta,March 16–19, 2016 and at theworkshop “Orchestration inPolycentricGovernance: Possibilities andChallenges,”Kobe,June23–24,2017.MydeepappreciationgoestoKennethW.Abbott,PeterM.Haas,DuncanSnidal,YaacovVertzberger,andAtsushiYamadafortheirhelpfulcomments.Thispaperislargelybasedonthechapter“OrchestrationinPolycentricGovernance:InternationalOrganization’sRoleinImplementationofAnti-CorruptionNorms,”inMakikoNishitanied.,How are International Norms Realized: Dynamic Process of Complex Global Governance,MinervaShobo,2017(inJapanese),butthetheoreticalpartwassubstantiallyrevisedandoneof thecasestudiesweredeleted,basedonthe feedbackat theworkshop.ThisworkwassupportedbyJSPSKAKENHI(B)(GrantNo.15H03321).
42 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
Keywords:GlobalGovernance;Orchestration;Polycentricity;RegimeComplex;FightagainstCorruption;
UnitedNationsConventionagainstCorruption(UNCAC);UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsand
Crime(UNODC);UNCACCoalition
1.�Introduction:�How�can�governance�actors�create� synergy� in�decentralized�
global�governance?
Since themid-1990s,we have seen an increasing number of global polycentric
governance systemscharacterizedbydecentralized structures inwhich therearemultiple
centersof authorityoperatingatmultiple scales1withadiversityof stakeholders, including
civil societyorganizations(CSOs),private sectororganizations, internationalgovernmental
organizations(IGOs),and states.Thesegovernance systemsare oftenobserved in regime
complexes,definedas“anarrayofpartiallyoverlappingandnonhierarchicalinstitutionsgoverning
aparticular issue-area,”2 situatedonacontinuumbetweenhighly integratedandhierarchical
regulationsatoneextremeand fragmented,decentralized institutionswith feworno linkages
amongthemontheother.3
Manyscholarsof theregimecomplextheoryarguethatdecentralizedor fragmented
structurescould result in inefficienciesdue to inconsistencies,duplications, andgapsamong
diverseinstitutionsandineffectivenessduetobehaviorslikeforum-shoppingandregime-shifting.4
Scholarsworkingon institutional interplayhavepointedout,morepositively, thatsynergistic
institutional interactionsareratherprevalent inglobalenvironmentalgovernance.5Stillothers
havearguedinamorenuancedwaythattheflexibilityandadaptabilityofregimecomplexesare
preferred,undercertainconditions,fortheirpoliticalfeasibility.6
Whilewehavenodefinitiveansweras tohow to solve theproblemof inefficiency
and ineffectiveness,especially inacongestedregimecomplex,7KennethW.Abbottemphasizes
benefitsofdecentralizedandfragmentedregimecomplexes,includingcomplementaryregulations,
multifacetedapproachesandsolutionstoproblems,andabroaderrangeofchoicesforactors.He
arguesthatthesebenefitsarelikelytobeenhancedwhilethecostsoffragmentationareminimized,
if localactivitiesarecoordinatedbypublicauthorities inamannerthatmaintainsthecoherence
andconsistencyofapolycentricgovernancesystem.8Thisspecificmodeofgovernance iscalled
“orchestration,”whichheseesaskeyforeffectivemanagementofadecentralizedregimecomplex.
43Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption
Furthermore,wehavetocopewitha legitimacyproblemintermsof input legitimacy
(democraticprocedures)andoutput legitimacy(efficientmanagementandeffectiveproblem-
solving) inglobalgovernance.9AsMichaelZürnargues, the traditionalmodeof international
governance ledby theUSand international financial institutions,whichhe terms “executive
multilateralism,”hasbeenseriouslychallengedby transnationalprotestsagainst their lackof
legitimacyandaccountability,asdecision-makersofIGOsandWesternpowershavenotbeenheld
accountableforwrongdecisionstheyhavemadeattheinternationallevel.10Ontheotherhand,
theUNsystemasawholehas facedproblemsof legitimacy,causedbya lackof transparency
andfrequentoccurrencesofseriouscorruption.However,therecouldbeatradeoffbetweeninput
andoutput legitimacies,asaplethoraof incompetentparticipantsandcumbersomeprocedures
could lowerperformance.11Therefore,wehave to find away to enhance input legitimacy
withoutdamagingoutputlegitimacy.Orchestrationmightmitigatetheselegitimacyproblemsby
facilitatingparticipationbydiverseactors.
Orchestrationhasbeenobserved invarious fields, fromenvironmentalmanagement,
development, commerce,health, andhumanrights to security.12 Itmayalsobeseen inanti-
corruptionefforts, asglobalgovernance in the fight against corruption is characterizedby
ahighly fragmented regime complex consisting ofmulti-level andmulti-sectornormsand
initiativescreatedbydiverseactors, includingstates,governmentalagencies, IGOs,CSOs,and
businessorganizations.Wearguethatgovernanceactorsprefertoengage inaspecifictypeof
orchestrationtopromotetheimplementationofanti-corruptionnormsbypromotingcoordination
andsynergyamongdiverseactors.
Thepaperproceedsasfollows.Itfirstreviewstheconceptandtheoryoforchestration,
andcriticizes someof thehypotheses thathavebeenadvanced.Subsequently, itproposesa
specific typeof orchestration that is assumed tobeprevalentandpreferred inpolycentric
governance: “collaborativeorchestration”. ItalsodiscussesconditionsunderwhichIGOsprefer
collaborativeorchestrationandexaminestheminthecaseoftheUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugs
andCrime(UNODC),ananti-corruptionorchestrator.
2.Orchestration:�A�soft�and�indirect�governance�mode
(1)O-I-T Model The concept of orchestrationwas recently introduced in the field of international
44 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
relations byKennethW.Abbott andDuncan Snidal as an essential component ofNew
Governance,which ischaracterizedbyparticipationof “decentralized”actors,betheypublicor
private;aregulator’srelianceontheirregulatoryexpertise;andtheregulator’spreferenceforthe
usageoforchestrationandsoftlaw.13Anorchestratorsetsagovernancegoal,convenes,supports
andsteersrelevantstakeholderstowardachievingthegoal.14
Thisdefinitionhasgraduallychanged; inaneditedvolume,International Organizations
as Orchestrators (hereafter,“AGSZ”),orchestrationgenerallyreferstotheorchestrator’sworking
throughintermediariestoindirectlygoverntargets(theO-I-Tmodel),15emphasizinganindirect
andsoftaspect.Insomecases,O,I,andTaremutuallyoverlapping:theorchestratorcanserveas
asecretariatfortheintermediary,ortargetmemberscanserveasmembersoftheintermediary.
Thereareother formsof indirectgovernance, including trusteeship,delegation, and
cooptation,but theyaredifferent fromorchestration in termsof thegovernor’sauthoritative
control over intermediaries.16 In orchestration, intermediariesvoluntarily cooperatewithout
beingcontrolledbytheorchestratorwithhardmeasures.Thiskindofsoftgovernanceisusually
considered ineffectivecompared to thehierarchicalmodeofgovernance,andacademicsand
practitioners tendtodismiss its impact.However,orchestration is indeedobserved indiverse
issue-areasandcanenhancecapabilities, legitimacy, and the focalityof actors involved ina
dynamicprocesswhilestrengtheningaregimecomplexasasystem.17
(2)Conditions under which IGOs are likely to orchestrate Whilegovernments canwork throughdiverseactors indomesticgovernancewith
“directiveorchestration,”which involvesmandatoryrules,publicregulators(statesandIGOs)
in theglobal arena tend to rely on “facilitative orchestration,” or enlisting and supporting
diverseactorswithsoftinstrumentstoengageinregulatoryactivities.Facilitativeorchestration
is expected to reinforcecapabilities and legitimacyof orchestrators and intermediaries, and
simultaneouslyenhanceTransnationalNewGovernance(TNG)asasystembyreducinggaps
Source:KennethW.Abbott,PhilippGenschel,DuncanSnidal,andBernhardZangl, eds., International Organizations as Orchestrators,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2015,p.4.
Figure 1: Simple orchestration: O-I-T model
45Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption
andoverlapsamongmultipleregulations, resolvingcollectiveactionproblems,reducing forum-
shoppingandforum-shiftingbehaviors,andpromoting learningand innovation.18 IGOspreferto
use facilitativeorchestration,as theycanachieveregulatorygoalswithin theircapacitiesand
competenceoutsideofmemberstates’controloverIGOmandates.19
However, given that theTNGsuffers froman “orchestrationdeficit” compared to
domesticgovernance,20underwhat conditionsare IGOs likely toorchestrate?TheAGSZ is
dedicatedtopursuingthisquestion. Itarguesthatgovernanceactorsare likely toorchestrate
under the following conditions:First, if they lack certain capabilities, such as regulatory
competence, operational capacity, or legitimacy, they tend to orchestrate(orchestrator
capabilitieshypothesis).Whereasagovernanceactorwithnocapabilitiescouldnotorchestrate,
anactorwithextensivecapabilitieswouldnotneedorchestration.Second,orchestrationislikely
ifanactor is focal in the issue-area, inasenseofhaving“singleanduncontestedgovernance
leadership”(focality hypothesis).21Major sources of focality include authority, legitimacy,
operational competence, available resources, expertise, path-dependence, and charismatic
organizationalleaders.Third,iftheactorhasanentrepreneurialculturethatfavorscollaboration
withdiverseactorsandexperimentationwith innovativeapproaches, there isamotivation to
orchestrate(entrepreneurshiphypothesis).22Inaddition,orchestrationsarelikelywhenmultiple
intermediaries that share the orchestrator’s goal andhave complementary capabilities are
available(intermediaryavailabilityhypothesis).Whenthereisonlyonepotentialintermediary,a
governanceactorwouldberatherreluctanttoorchestrateit.However,thishypothesisisrather
weak,becauseanorchestratorcouldcatalyzeanewinstitutionquiteeasilyintheeventthatan
intermediaryisunavailable.
WhentheorchestratorisanIGOasanagentsubjecttocontrolbyprincipals(member
states), the divergence of goals amongmember states or between the IGOandmember
states andweak institutional oversightbymember states arehypothesized to increase the
possibilityofIGOorchestrations(thegoaldivergencehypothesisandstateoversighthypothesis,
respectively).23
Thesehypotheseshavebeenexaminedandbroadlycorroboratedwithsomerevisionsin
casestudiesoftheEuropeanUnion(EU),theWorldTradeOrganization(WTO),theGroupof
Twenty(G20),theGlobalEnvironmentFacility(GEF),theWorldHealthOrganization(WHO),
theUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme(UNEP), the InternationalLaborOrganization
(ILO),andotherorganizations.
46 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
(3)Challenges of orchestration theory While thiscollaborativestudyprovides insightfulhypothesesaboutconditions forIGO
orchestration,therearesometheoreticalandempiricalshortcomings,assomecase-studychapters
pointout.First,focalityco-varieswithcapabilities,makingtheimpactofrespectiveindependent
variablesaswellasthevalueofthedependentvariableindeterminate.IfanIGOhasextensive
capabilities, itsperformanceand focalitywill improve,but its likelihoodoforchestrationwill
decreaseaccordingtothecapabilitieshypothesis.Ontheotherhand,anIGO’sshortageofcertain
capabilities(capabilitydeficit)mayloweritsfocalitybutincreasethelikelihoodoforchestration.
Thispresumptioncontradictswiththe focalityhypothesis thatargues focalitywill increasethe
likelihoodoforchestration.Thus,thevalueofdependentvariable(likelihoodoforchestration)can
beindeterminateduetothecontradictorypredictions.
Second,thedivergenceofgoalsco-varieswiththetightnessofstateoversight,especially
whenissuesalienceishigh;thisalsomakesthevalueofthedependentvariableindeterminate,as
thereisapossibilitythattheeffectofonevariable(goaldivergence)couldbecounterbalanced
by theeffectofanothervariable(stateoversight).Divergenceofgoalsmay lead to tighter
oversightthatnegativelyaffectsIGOorchestration,eventhoughthehypothesisassumesthatgoal
divergencemotivatesIGOstoorchestrate.Theinteractioneffectsbetweengoaldivergenceand
stateoversight isdiscussedintheconcludingchapteraswellas inthecaseoftheWTO,24and
chaptersonUNEPandtheILOpointoutthatissuesaliencecanincreasestateoversightwhen
goalsaredivergent.25
Although the covariation of state oversight and goal divergence is rather an
empiricalquestion, itcouldbesaid that the indeterminaciesdiscussedabove isderived from
inappropriatelydefiningthedependentvariable.Therefore,wearguethatdependentvariables
shouldbedifferentiatedaccordingto independentvariables.As isdiscussed inacasestudyon
EUregulation,goaldivergenceseems to illuminatevariationsoforchestrationordesignsof
intermediaries(loose/closenetworks)ratherthanexplainthelikelihoodoforchestration,whereas
thecapabilitieshypothesisexplainswhyactorsorchestrate.26Weputitinanotherway:whereas
capabilitydeficitexplainswhy, focalityandgoaldivergencecombinedwithstateoversightare
more likelytodeterminehowactorsorchestrate,morespecifically,how deep theyengagewith
theintermediary.Whenfocalityishigh,orchestratorsareabletodeeplyengageinorchestration.
IfIGO’sgoalisdivergentfromthatofmemberstatesoveracontroversialissue,itwillbedifficult
fortheIGOtoorchestratedeeplyagainstthewillofthestates.
47Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption
Lastbutnot least, there isanotherempiricalproblem:thefocalitydefinedashavinga
single,uncontestedleadershipisnotcommonintoday’sregimecomplexes.Asaregimecomplex
comprisesmultiple issue-areasand institutions,eachofwhich involvesagoverningbodyasa
centerofauthority,weoftenseemulti-centersystems.Forinstance,severalIGOstogetherplay
a leadingrole ineachareaof theMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDGs): theWorldBank,
UNICEF, andUNESCO inprimaryeducation; theUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme
(UNDP),theWorldBank,theUNWomen,UNESCOintheempowermentofwomen;andsoon.27
EspeciallyinregimecomplexescrowdedwithpowerfulIGOs,states(orstateagencies),andnon-
stateactors,diffusedfocalityisnotanexception;itprevails.Apotentialorchestratorcanbefocal
inaspecific,differentiatedarea,but itusuallycooperateswithotherpotentialorchestratorsto
copewithcomplexissues.Therefore,itisrealistictothinkthatmultipleorchestratorsthatshare
focalitycoexist,compete,orcollaboratewitheachotherinacongestedregimecomplex.
Takingtheabovepoints intoaccount, inthefollowingsection,wediscussvariationsof
orchestrationthatpromotecoordinationandsynergyinfragmentedpolycentricgovernance.
3.Orchestration�models�in�a�polycentric�governance�system
(1)Orchestration under diffused focality: Collaborative orchestration Inacongestedregimecomplex,focalitytendstobediffusedamongmultiplegovernors,
andcoordinationproblemsaccompaniedbyhighuncertaintyeasily come to the surface.As
the low focalitywill lower thedepthoforchestration,potentialorchestratorsare tempted to
cooperatewitheachother to complement respective lackof focality andcapabilities.Even
UNEP,oftenreferredtoasatypicalorchestratorthathaspioneeredtheTNG,28co-orchestrates
withanothergovernanceactorwhen focality is low, suchas in the fieldofCorporateSocial
Responsibility(CSR).Asdiscussed inthecaseofUNEP’sco-orchestrationwiththeUNGlobal
Compact(UNGC)ofthePrinciples forResponsibleInvestment(PRI),“…orchestrationmaybe
more likely incrowded issueareas…where focality is lessobvious,where issue-linkage is the
normandwheretherealitiesofcomplexinterdependencemayverywellrequireco-orchestration
bytwoormoreIGOs.”29LowfocalitymotivatesanIGOtoorchestratewithanotherorchestrator
instead of orchestrating alone.While the originalO-I-Tmodel focuses onvertical synergy
betweenorchestratorand intermediary, thecollaborativeorchestrationmodelshedsmore light
onhorizontalcollaborationbetweenorchestrators.
48 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
Co-orchestration and multi-orchestration
TheAGSZconceptualizesthatO, I,andTcaneachbeasetofactorsrespectively.30
When two ormore actorswork as an orchestrator jointly as a set,we call this type of
collaborationbetweenorchestrators “co-orchestration.” In theabovePRIcase,UNEPandthe
UNGCjointlyorchestratedfromthesameorchestratingpositionduringthesameperiodoftime;
theyjointlyengagedinconvening,assisting,endorsing,andcoordinatingthroughoutthecourseof
preparing,launching,andexpandingthePRI.
Ontheotherhand,wesuggestanotherformofcollaborationbymultipleorchestrators:
multi-orchestration. Contrary to co-orchestration,multiple orchestrators orchestrate the
intermediary fromdifferentorchestratingpositionsbyusingdifferentorchestration techniques.
The simplest formofmulti-orchestration isdual-orchestration: for instance,OrchestratorA
(CSO)convenesandcoordinatesacivilsocietynetworkasanumbrellanetworkorganization,
Figure 2: Collaborative orchestration
49Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption
whereasOrchestratorB(IGO)givesofficialendorsementandmaterialsupporttotheumbrella
organization toapplypressure tomemberstates.Amorecomplicatedcase is thatof triple-
orchestration, as in the casewhereOrchestratorA(abusiness association)organizes a
privateregulatorystandardschemethat isendorsedbyOrchestratorB(CSO)andfundedby
OrchestratorC(IGO).
Thefirstfeatureofmulti-orchestrationisthatorchestratorscollaboratethroughaclear
divisionof laborwithoutahigh levelofcoordinationbetweendifferentsectors, inwhichcivil
societyactorscoordinate thecivil societynetwork, IGOscoordinateamong internationaland
statebodies,nationalgovernmentscoordinatedomesticnetworks,andbusinessactorscoordinate
private sector regulation. In thisway, orchestrators can facilitate efficient coordinationand
networkingamongdifferentsectorswhilemaximizingtheautonomyofeachsector.Themulti-
orchestrationmodelillustratesthemechanismofpolycentricgovernancewherediverseactors,be
theypublicorprivate,workasorchestratorssimultaneously.
The second feature is different degrees of engagements by orchestrators. In the
abovecaseofdual-orchestration,OrchestratorA isdeeplycommittedtoorchestratingthecivil
societynetwork,whereasOrchestratorBorchestrates thatnetworkonlyshallowly fromthe
outside.Here,deeporchestrationrequiressubstantial,continuous,anddirectmanagementofan
intermediarythroughmobilizing,initiating,coordinating/steering,andgivingcostlyendorsement,
whereasshalloworchestration involvesonlysupplementaryandexternalsupport, includingthe
provisionofopportunities foradvocacy,materialassistance,and low-costendorsement. Inother
words,deeporchestrationrequiresamorecostlycommitmentthandoesshalloworchestration.
Weshouldnote,however,depthoforchestration isarelativeconcept,andcannotbe
measured inabsoluteterms.Exactlywhichtechniquesshouldbeperceivedasshallowordeep
isdependentondegreesofrelevantactors’andpublicawarenessonthesalienceof the issue,
privateorcivilsector’sinfluence,institutionalcongestion,availablefinancialresources,etc.,allof
whichaffectorchestrators’focalityandcapabilities.31
Difference between co- and multi- orchestrations
Themulti-orchestration can be differentiated from co-orchestration in terms of
orchestrators’orchestratingpositionsandtheirengagementwithajointproject;moreprecisely,
withregardstoasenseofownershipandadegreeofcoordination.Whengovernanceactorsco-
orchestrate, theysharenotonlya jointgoalbutalsoownershipof theproject fromthesame
50 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
orchestratingposition.Theyhavetobeinvolvedinhighdegreeofcoordinationamongconflicting
interests andof integratedpolicyandagreeon such termsof contract asmemorandumof
understandingoverthejointproject.
Whengovernanceactorsare involved inmulti-orchestration, on theotherhand, they
don’tsharethesame levelofownershipandresponsibilities.Neitherdotheynecessarilyshare
thesamesetofgoals; respectiveorchestratorsusuallyhave theirownagendaaside fromthe
overallgoalof theproject.Theyorchestrate fromdifferentorchestratingpositionsatdifferent
distance from the intermediary; therefore, eachorchestratorwouldbe involved indifferent
depthoforchestration.Asonlyalittlecoordinationisrequired,multi-orchestrationcanbeeasily
performedandprovideawiderangeofoptionsfororchestrators.
In short,whereas co-orchestration takesplacewhenorchestrators are involved in
jointlyplannedanddesignedprojectasacollectivegovernororonthebasisofagreeddivisionof
labor,multi-orchestration ischaracterizedbythe lackof jointownershipanddifferentdepthof
engagements fromdifferentorchestratingpositions.However, therecanbecontinuitybetween
bothtypesofcollaborativeorchestration;multi-orchestrationcanchangeintoco-orchestrationand
viceversa,accordingtochangingrelationships,goals,anddegreeofcoordination.
(2)Conditions for collaborative orchestration Theantecedentcondition forcollaborativeorchestration is theavailabilityofmultiple
potential orchestratorswith complementary capabilities and awillingness to collaborate;
“orchestratoravailability,”sotospeak.Asthemultiplicityofcentersofauthorityischaracteristic
ofpolycentricgovernance,weposit that thereshouldbemultipleorchestrators inpolycentric
system,thoughthemultiplicityaswellasdiversityoforchestratorsisnotwelldiscussedinthe
AGSZ.Furthermore,powerfulactorsthathaveenoughcapabilitiestoserveasintermediariescan
turnintoanorchestratoroverthecourseoforchestration;orchestrationbyex-intermediariesis
oftenobserved,asthechapterontheWHOorchestrationdemonstrates.32
Theroleoforchestratorisnot limitedtoIGOsandstates.CSOs,businessentities,and
localgovernmentscanpotentiallyplaytheroleoforchestrator.Accordingtoastudyconducted
byGlobalSolutionNetworks,whereasalmosthalfoforchestratorsareIGOs,statesaccount for
one-third,andCSOsaccountforabout15percentofthetotalnumberoforchestrators.33Asnon-
stateactorstrytomakeupashortageoflegitimacyandcapabilities,theyareinclinedtorelyon
orchestrationonadailybasis.Thus,anincreasingnumberofIGOsencouragepowerfulCSOsto
51Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption
orchestratecivilsocietycoalitionsandfacilitatepublic-privatepartnershipsandmulti-stakeholder
initiatives.
Ingeneral,agovernanceactorwouldbemotivatedtoorchestratecollaborativelywith
otherorchestrators,ifitlackedcertaincapabilitiescombinedwithfocalitytosteerintermediaries
single-handedly.Furthermore,whenanorchestrator is an IGO, a combinationofhighgoal
divergenceandtightstateoversightwouldincreasethelikelihoodoftheIGOtoengageinshallow
orchestrationinamulti-orchestrationsetting,whereasacombinationofhighgoaldivergenceand
loosestateoversightwouldlikelyresultintheIGO’ssingle-orco-orchestration.34Forexample,an
IGOthataimstofacilitatecivilsocietyinvolvementundertightoversightbysomememberstates
attempting toexcludecivil societyactors fromdecision-makingprocesswouldbe tempted to
restrainfromdeeporchestrationofcivilsociety,soastoavertex-postsanctionsbythemember
states.Bykeepingdistance fromcivilsocietyandengaging inshalloworchestration, IGOscan
legitimately facilitatetheparticipationofcivilsocietyactorswithintheirowncompetence,and
at thesametime,mobilize suchcivil societyactorsefficiently, allowingcivil orchestrators to
engageindeeporchestrationofcivilsociety.Itcouldbesaidthatmulti-orchestrationisawayof
facilitatingmulti-sector involvementevenundergoaldivergencebetweentheIGOandmember
statesaccompaniedbytightstateoversight.
Theconceptofcollaborativeorchestrationquestionssomeofthehypothesesdiscussed
intheAGSZ,namely, thehypothesesconcerning focality,goaldivergence,andstateoversight.
First,contraryto thehypothesis that lowfocalitywouldnot induceorchestration, lowfocality
wouldencourageorchestratorstobeinvolvedincollaborativeorchestration.Second,despitethe
AGSZ’sfindingthathighgoaldivergencecombinedwithtightstateoversightwoulddecreasethe
likelihoodof IGOorchestration,35 thiscombinationcould increaseanIGO’spreference formulti-
orchestration,usingshalloworchestrationtechniques.Thesetwovariablesco-varywhentheissue
issalient,andgoaldivergencedeterminesthedepthoforchestrationratherthan likelihood,as
wasmentionedintheprevioussection.Consideringthecovariationunderissuesalience,itwould
bemoreaccuratetotreatstateoversightasaninterveningvariable.
52 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
4.Overview�of�the�global�anti-corruption�governance
(1)Decentralized regime complex for the fight against corruption Theglobalgovernanceforthefightagainstcorruptionischaracterizedbyapolycentric
systemwithdiversityofactors,multi-levelinstitutions,anddiverseregulationswithhardandsoft
instruments.Multi-levelpublicregimesoperatedbytheUN,regionalorganizations,international
clubssuchasG20,andnationalaswellassub-nationalgovernments,co-existwithprivateor
multi-stakeholderregimesinitiatedbytheInternationalChamberofCommerce(ICC),theUNGC,
andsoon.
Inaddition, institutions linkwitheachother in “embedded,” “nested,” “clustered,”and
“overlapping”relations inadenseregimecomplex,asshown inFigure3.36TheUnitedNations
ConventionagainstCorruption(UNCAC)is firmlyembedded in theprinciplesofsovereignty
andnon-interventionindomesticaffairs.Institutions insub-fieldsofUNCAC,suchastheStolen
AssetRecoveryinitiative(StAR),aspecialinstitutionforassistingtherecoveryofstolenasset,
arenested in theUNCACregime.Furthermore,ascorruptionproblemsrelate tomany issue-
areasincludingcrimes,development,environment,security,etc.,institutionsdealingwithdifferent
topicshavebeenclusteredandeasilyoverlapwithotherissue-areas.Thus,theregimecomplex
includesthematicschemessuchastheExtractiveIndustryTransparencyInitiative(EITI),and
multi-issueinstitutionsincludingtheFinancialActionTaskForce(FATF)40Recommendations,
aimingtoregulatemoneylaunderingandcorruption.
(2)Multi-level and diverse regulations Corrupt practices had come to the fore as a serious issueby the 1970s.TheUS
adopted in1977theForeignCorruptPracticesAct(FCPA),whichwouldbeextraterritorially
applied.AsUSbusinesses lobbied for internationalregulationto level theplayingfield, theUS
led international legalizationat theUnitedNationsEconomicandSocialCouncil(ECOSOC).
However, legalizationefforts at theUN faileddue todisagreementsbetween industrialized
countries,whichwereinpursuitofregulationsforalevelplayingfield,anddevelopingcountries,
whichwerewaryof interference in theirdomesticaffairsandprioritizedeconomicgrowthby
invitingforeigninvestmentwithlooseregulations.
In the1990s,scandals involvinggrandcorruptioncommittedbymajorpoliticiansand
corporationswerefrequentlyreportedonandattractedattentionworldwide.Majordevelopment
53Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption
Figure 3: Regime Complex for the Fight against Corruption (Major Elements)
Note:Ellipsesindicateissue-areasandboxesindicateinstitutionalelements(normsorschemes).Boxeswithdarkshadowsdenotehardlegalinstruments,andthosewithlightershadowsdenotesoftinstitutions.IGOsasagents,includingregimeorschemesecretariats,arenotincludedinthisfigure.
54 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
organizationsincludingtheWorldBankbegantodeclaretheirresolvetocombatcorruption.The
USpushed the issue forwardat theOrganizationofEconomicCooperationandDevelopment
(OECD)insteadof theUN,andunder its leadership, theOECDadopteda recommendation
against bribery(hereafter, theOECDRecommendation), followed by theConvention on
CombatingBriberyofForeignPublicOfficialsinInternationalBusinessTransactions(hereafter,
theOECDConvention)in1997.Sincethen, theOECDConventionregimehasbeenoneof the
core institutions intheanti-corruptionregimecomplex.Theperiodfromthe1990sthroughthe
earlytwenty-firstcenturysawtheproliferationofregional legal instrumentsagainstcorruption
inEurope,37 theAmericas,38Africa,39andtheMiddleEast.40 InAsia-Pacific, theAnti-Corruption
ActionPlanforAsiaandthePacific(hereafter,ADB-OECDActionPlan)jointlypromulgatedby
theAsianDevelopmentBank(ADB)andtheOECDhasservedasaregionallegalframework.
At theglobal level,corruptpracticescommittedbypublicofficialswerecriminalized
in theUnitedNationsConvention againstOrganizedCrime(UNTOC) in 2000.During the
negotiationofUNTOC,aninternationalconsensuswasbuiltonthenegotiationofacomprehensive
treatydirectlypertaining to corruption,41 and consequently,UNCACwas adopted in 2003.
UNCACistheonlyuniversalandcomprehensivetreatyagainstcorruption.Torecap,therewasa
geographicalexpansionofpublicregulationsfromnationaltoregionalandfromregionaltoglobal
legalization.
Ontheotherhand,asthedefinitionofcorruptionandthescopeofcriminalizedpractices
significantlyvary fromcountry tocountry, there isalsoademand forsoft regulations,which
areexpectedtoreducesovereigntycosts,buildanormativeconsensus,andlaythegroundwork
forhard institutions.42 Inparallelwith thegeographicalexpansionofpublic legislation,private
andmulti-stakeholderregulationstofightagainstcorruptionwerealsoexpandedandenhanced
in the2000s.CombatingExtortionandBribery: ICCRulesofConductandRecommendations,
issuedby the ICC in1977(hereafter, the ICCRules),was substantiallyupdated.Theanti-
corruptionprinciplewas incorporated inthe10thPrincipleoftheUNGC,acentral institution in
thetransnationalregimeontheCorporateSocialResponsibility(CSR).Inaddition,theBusiness
PrinciplesforCounteringBribery(hereafter,BusinessPrinciples)werecreatedin2013througha
multi-stakeholderprocessorchestratedbyTransparencyInternational(TI).43
Theprivate regulationsdescribed aboveweredesigned togenerate a synergistic
effect.The first ICCRuleswerecreated for thepurposeof complementing theprospective
UNConvention,whichwasnot adopted at that time. Subsequently, theywereupdated in
55Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption
1996and1999tocorrespondwiththeOECDConvention, followedbyacoupleofamendments
correspondingtokeylegalinstrumentsincludingUNCAC,in2005and2011.44AstheICChasa
longhistoryofadvocacyrelationswiththeOECD,UN,andCoE,theICCRuleswerepurposefully
designedtocomplementpubliclegislationbypromotingself-regulationbybusiness.45TheUNGC
10thPrinciplewasalso intentionally introduced inorder tocorrespondwithUNCAC.These
privateregulationsareexpectedtoimprovetheeffectivenessofhardlaw.
(3)Diverse actors and diffused focality Due to a decentralized governance structure, focality is diffused amongmajor
organizations.TheprimaryIGOsworkingagainstcorruptionincludetheUNODC,theUNDP,the
WorldBankGroupanditsinstitutes,theUNGC,theOECD,theEuropeanCommission(EC),CoE,
andsoon.SinceUNCACwasadopted,theUNODChasledglobalanti-corruptionactivitiesasthe
SecretariatforUNCACandUNTOC.Inadditiontopromotingtheratificationandimplementation
of these twoconventions, itworksasacoordinatorofglobalcampaigns,an informationhub
oncorruption,andanorganizerofconferencesandglobaleventssuchas InternationalAnti-
CorruptionDay.TheUNDPhastackledcorruptionsincetheearly1990sfromtheperspectiveof
humanandsustainabledevelopment.AsoneofmajorpartnersoftheUNODC,ithasco-organized
globalcampaignsagainstcorruptionsince2004.Inthefieldofdevelopment,theWorldBankalso
hasbeenaneminentleaderforthefightagainstcorruption,havingplacedtheissueofcorruption
atthetopofitsagendainthemid-1990s.46TheOECDalsohasledinternationalanti-corruption
activities,sinceitadoptedtheOECDConventionandrelevantrecommendations.
In addition to IGOs, anumberof influentialCSOshaveworkedonanti-corruption
measures;amongsuchCSOs,TI,theBaselInstituteonGovernance,theICC,TransparentAgents
andContractingEntities International(TRACE),andtheControlRisksGrouparerecognized
asthemostinfluential.WhereasTIisaleadingNGOintheanti-corruptionmovement,theICC,
TRACE,andControlRisksareallbusinessorganizationsworkingmainlyfortheprivatesector.
There are also large-scale, activemulti-stakeholder and non-state initiatives and
networks,includingtheEITI,themostpromisingpublic-privateinitiativeforincreasingrevenue
transparencyinextractiveindustries;theWorldEconomicForumPartneringagainstCorruption
Initiative(WEF-PACI),across-industryplatform foranti-corruptionand transparency in the
private sector; theGlobalOrganizationofParliamentariansAgainstCorruption(GOPAC),a
globalnetworkofparliamentarians;theUNICORNInternationalNetworkLimited(UNICORN),
56 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
aglobalmulti-sectornetworkof tradeunions;PublishWhatYouPay(PWYP),acivil society
networkaimingatenhancingrevenue transparency inextractive industries; and theUNCAC
Coalition,acivilsocietynetworkforpromotingUNCACimplementation,whichwillbedetailed
laterinthispaper.
Theabovementionedorganizationsandinitiativesallfunctionasindependentauthorities
and network hubs, though their actions have beenmoderately coordinated by forming
transnationalpolycentricnetworks.47Itcouldbesaidthatfocalityinanti-corruptiongovernanceis
highlydiffusedunderadecentralizedandcongestedregimecomplex.
(4)Challenges in coordination of the regime complex Although international legal instrumentswork in a relativelyharmoniousmanner,
domesticlawaswellaslawininternationalorganizationshasnotyetbeensufficientlyharmonized
withinternational law.UNCAC,asthesoleuniversalandcomprehensivehardlaw,mayappear
tositon the topof the legalhierarchyandalignother legal instruments. Inreality,however,
therearedifficultiesinthedomesticimplementationofUNCAC,asUNCACisembeddedinthe
principlesofsovereignequality,territorialintegrity,andnon-interventionindomesticaffairs.
ManyprovisionsofUNCACarenon-mandatory,vague,orqualified, asa resultofa
compromisebetweentheprinciplesofnon-interventionandanti-corruption. In fact,more than
half of criminalizationprovisionsarenon-mandatoryandmostprovisionsonpreventionand
internationalcooperationarequalifiedwithwordingssuchas “asappropriate,” “asnecessary,”
and“subjecttothebasicconceptsofitslegalsystem.”Thus,statespartiesareallowedtoreferto
theirreconcilabilityofdomesticlegalsystemswithsomecontroversialprovisions,suchas“public
reporting”(Article10), “participationofsociety”(Article13)andthecriminalizationof “illicit
enrichment,”“tradingininfluence,”and“abuseoffunction”(Articles17to19)asjustificationsfor
non-implementation.48Theycomplywithprovisionswhilenotactuallyimplementingthem.49Even
theprovisionsonmutual legalassistanceand lawenforcementcooperationnecessary forasset
recovery,whicharethebiggestcharacteristicsofUNCAC,allowmemberstatesnottocooperate
whentheseprovisionsareirreconcilablewithdomesticlaw.Oneofthereasonswhymorethan
180countriesratifiedtheConventionmightbethesesoftprovisions.
In addition, the international reviewmechanism(IRM)has remainweak since its
inceptionsixyearsafterUNCACwassigned,comparedwithreviewmechanismsofotheranti-
corruptionregimessuchastheOECDConventionandCoEConventions:countryvisitsbyreview
57Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption
teams,cooperationwithsocietyinthepreparationofandduringthereviewprocess,andmaking
fullcountryreportspublicareallnon-mandatory.50
SincetheConventionreflectscompromisesduringtoughnegotiationsand isregarded
asanendproductintheformofacomprehensiveandbindingtreaty,thereisnopoliticalwillto
makeweakprovisionsmandatoryor tonegotiateanew,stronger treaty.Theevolutionof the
Conventioncanbesaidtobealready“frozen.”51Inthissense,itcouldbesaidthatdisagreements
overthebalancebetweenanti-corruptionandnon-interventionprinciples,andovercontroversial
issues,arealreadyinstitutionalizedinUNCAC.
Furthermore, in the field of technical assistance, aplethora of programsoperated
bymore than50major organizationswithout coordination caused terrible congestion, and
thenecessityofaidcoordinationandharmonizationtoreduceduplicationsandgapshasbeen
repeatedlypointedoutsincetheearlytwenty-firstcentury.52Moreover,asstatesareregulatedby
multipleregimes,theyareoverburdenedbythemonitoringrequirementsofeveryreviewregime,
causingaproblemcalled“monitoringfatigue.”53Therewerealsomountingcriticismsagainstthe
overallanti-corruptionindustryforitsmushroomingbudget.54Thus,therehasbeenanincreasing
demandforcoordinationtoreduceinefficienciesamonganti-corruptionprogramsandamongthe
implementationmechanismsofdifferentregimes;theUNODCwasdesignatedtocopewiththese
difficulttasks.
5.Conditions�for�orchestration�by�the�UNODC
TheUNODCisperceivedasoneofthecentersofglobalauthorityforthefightagainst
corruptionas theSecretariat forUNCACandUNTOC. Itsprimaryanti-corruptionmandate
is topromotetheratificationand implementationofUNCACandUNTOC; it is theCorruption
andEconomicCrimeBranchthat ispredominantlytaskedwiththis job.Toachievethisgoal,
theOfficemanagestheConferenceofStatesParties(CoSP)anditssubsidiarybodies,including
theImplementationReviewGroup(IRG)andworkinggroups;providestechnicalassistanceto
memberstates;andcreatesandmanagesanti-corruptionknowledge. Itsmandatesalso include
the facilitationofcoordinationamongdiverse institutionsandcollaborationwithprivatesector
andcivil society,whichencouragetheOffice toengage incollaborativeorchestration. In this
section,weanalyzetheconditionsthatenabletheUNODC’sorchestration.
58 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
(1)Focality TheUNODC’s focality in theanti-corruptionregimecomplexwasnotvery strong,
partlydueto its institutionaloriginandmandates.TheUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugControl
andCrimePrevention(UNODCCP),thepredecessoroftheUNODC,wasestablishedbymerging
theUnitedNationsDrugControlProgrammeandtheCenterforInternationalCrimePrevention
(CICP)oftheUnitedNationsCrimePreventionandCriminalJusticeProgrammein1997.The
governingbody is theCommissiononCrimePreventionandCriminalJusticeunderECOSOC,
whichwascreatedin1992.
TheCICP launched threeGlobalProgrammes against criminal activities in 1999,
including theGlobalProgrammeagainstCorruption(GPAC),whichprovidedand facilitated
technical assistance, researchandpolicy formulation, interagencycoordination, and judicial
integrity.55Asmajoranti-corruptionprogramshadcomeintobeingbytheendofthe1990s,the
launchofGPACwasratherlateandtheCICPwasforcedtocompetewithpowerfulorganizations
like theWorldBank, theUnitedStatesAgency for InternationalDevelopment(USAID), the
OECD, theUNDP, andTI, all ofwhichalreadyhadamuch strongerpresence in theanti-
corruptionindustrypriortotheCICP’sinvolvement.
Furthermore, theUNODCCP,whichwas taskedwith theprogramsrelated todrug
andcrime,was initiallyplaced inadisadvantageousposition in the fightagainstcorruption,
ascorruptionhadbeenaddressedmainly in thecontextofdevelopment.Majordevelopment
organizationshadalreadysubstantially incorporatedanti-corruptionpolicies in theirprograms
throughoutthe1990s.TheOfficehadonlyweak focalityandoperationalcapabilitiesoveranti-
corruption issuesexcept forthoserelatedtocrimepreventionandcriminal justice. Ithad less
experienceondevelopmentissuesthandiddevelopmentagencies.Infact,theCICPhadtocarve
outanicheintheanti-corruptionindustryinordertogetanadvantagefromitsexpertise,which
resultedinthecreationofprogramsspecializinginjudicialintegrity.56
However, theUNODC’s focality has been strengthened since the early twenty-
firstcentury,as the focusofanti-corruption industrygraduallyshiftedaway fromawareness-
raisingandcapacity-andinstitution-buildingledbymajordevelopmentagenciesandTItoward
internationalcooperationamonglawenforcementandjudicialagencies.57Thistrendboostedthe
focalityoftheOffice,whichalreadyhadsufficientexpertiseandconnectionswithlawenforcement
and judicialagenciesaround theworld toworkasanauthoritativehubofnetworksofboth
governmentalandnon-governmentalexpertsand institutes.CoSPandsubsidiarybodiesalso
59Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption
provideopportunitiesfornetworkingamongofficialsandhavereinforcedtheUNODC’sroleasa
hubofexpertnetworks.Inaddition,theOfficefrequentlyorganizessymposiaandworkshopsfor
networking,informationsharing,andmutuallearning,whichalsostrengthenitsfocality.
Nevertheless,whileactorsandinstitutionshavecontinuedtoexpandanddiversify,the
UNODChasonlyamoderateinfluenceintheprivatesectorandcivilsocietyintheareaofanti-
corruption.Therefore, itcouldbe fair tosaythat theUNODC’s focality ishigh in theareaof
crimepreventionandcriminaljustice,whereasitsfocalityincivilsociety,theprivatesector,and
developmentissuesisrelativelylow.
(2)Capabilities TheUNODC’sexpertiseishighlyevaluatedbybothpublicsectorandcivilsociety.With
thishighlevelofexpertise,theOfficeinitiatesmanyprojectsforstandardsettingandpromotion,
technicalassistance,andknowledgemanagementandcreation. It facilitatesthe implementation
of theConventionsbyproducingspecialized tools, including legislativeandpracticalguides,
guidelinesandguidingprinciples,model lawsandprovisions, thematicreports,computer-based
self-assessmentandwritingtools.
Nevertheless,theUNODChasconstantlysufferedfromalackoffunding.TheOfficeisa
middle-sizedagencywithabout1,500personnelandanannualbudgetofapproximatelyUS$300
milliononaveragesince2012.58Thesizeofitsbudgetisrelativelysmallcomparedtothatofthe
UNDP,whichwasearmarkedmorethanUS$5billionforfiscalyear2015.59Thenumberofstaff
isinsufficientformeetingeverydemandfrommemberstatesfortechnicalassistance.
Inaddition,over thepastdecade, therehasbeenasteadydecline ingeneralpurpose
funds thatcouldbeused for thecoreactivitiesofexecutivemanagementandbasicresearch.
AlthoughtheOfficehasmadeeffortstostreamline,expanditsdonorbase,anddiversifyfinancial
sources, “UNODCeffectiveness is underminedbyanunsustainable fundingmodel.”60Tight
budgetaryconstraintscoupledwitha shortageofhumanresourceshaveapparently induced
theorganization to relyoncollaborations includingco- andmulti-orchestrationwithpartner
organizationstomakeupforshortagesoffocalityandcapabilities.
(3)Entrepreneurship TheUNODC’spreferenceforpartnershipisattributednotonlytoitsmoderatefocality
and fiscal constraintsbut also to an entrepreneurial culture that stressespartnershipand
60 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
intellectualendeavors.TheDrugsProgrammeandtheCrimePreventionandCriminalJustice
Programmebothhaveemphasizedpartnershipsincetheirinception,andhaveactivelyengagedin
inter-branchcollaborationsaswellasclosecooperationbetweentheheadquartersandfieldoffices.
Staffmembershavealsoregularlyattendedmeetingsasobserversofmajorpartnerorganizations,
including theOECDWorkingGrouponBribery(WGB), theUNGCAnti-CorruptionWorking
Group,theTaskForceonImprovingTransparencyandAnti-CorruptionoftheBusiness20.
Ithasactivelycollaboratedwithcivil societyaswell, includingwithNGOs,experts,
academics,grassrootsmovements, tradeunions, andcommunitygroups, as their abilities to
investigate,advise,raiseawareness,empower,andeducatearehighlyvaluedinthefightagainst
drugsandorganizedcrime.Inparticular,theDrugsProgrammehasbeeneagertoengagewith
civil society; theCrimePreventionandCriminalJusticeProgrammehas followedsuit.61Thus,
civilsocietyactorsareofficiallyinvolvedintheimplementationreviewmechanismofUNTOCby
participatinginthereviewprocessaswellasattendingCoSPsubsidiarybodiesasobservers.
Furthermore, itdevelopedonlineplatforms fordisseminationofknowledge:TRACK
(Tools andResources forAnti-CorruptionKnowledge) for anti-corruption andSHERLOC
(SharingElectronicResourcesandLawsonCrime)forcrimeprevention.Bothoftheseplatforms
provide information on convention implementation, comprehensivedatabases of legislation
(legal libraries), analyticalmaterials and tools, bibliographies, anddirectories of competent
nationalauthorities. Inadditiontoprovidingthis information, theTRACKportal is intendedto
be“acommunityofpractice forpartner institutionsandpractitioners,”62andcontainstoolsand
resourcesco-developedwithpartnerinstitutionsincludingtheUNDP,theOECD,theUNGC,the
StolenAssetRecoveryinitiative(StAR),andtheGroupofStatesagainstCorruption(GRECO).
TRACKwasthuscreatedthroughacombinationofpartnershipandknowledgecreation.
It couldbe said that orchestrationmethods that promotepartnership, knowledge
buildingand innovationhavebeendeeplyembedded in theOffice’sbasicstrategyandaction
repertoires.Suchastrongpropensity forentrepreneurshipmightoffset thenegative impactof
tightstateoversightonorchestration.
(4)Goal divergence and tight state oversight Asmentionedabove, theUNODChasbeenconstrainedby its tightbudged,mostof
whicharecontributedbymajordonorcountries forspecialpurposes.Nearly90percentof the
UNODCbudgetcomes fromvoluntarycontributions,and90percentof this isearmarked for
61Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption
specialpurposes,leavinglittleroomfortheOfficetoeffectivelyundertaketaskssuchasresearch
andanalysis,advocacy,humanresourcemanagement,independentevaluation,andauditing.63This
meansthattheuseandamountoffundsislargelycontrolledbythewillofmajormemberstate
donors,includingColombia,theEU,theUS,theNetherlands,Sweden,theUK,Japan,Brazil,and
Mexico.64Therefore,ingeneral,thereremainslittleroomfortheOfficetoexpanditsactivitiesat
itsdiscretionbeyondmemberstates’expectations.
ThedivergenceofgoalsamongmemberstatesandbetweentheUNODCandmember
statesover specific issuesalsoaffects theOffice’s inclination fororchestration.Asstated in
theprevioussection,disagreementsamongStatesPartiesconcerningthepriorityof theanti-
corruptionprincipleoverthenon-interventionprinciple inadditiontoothercontroversial issues
are legitimatelyallowed in thecurrentUNCACregime. Inotherwords,goaldivergenceover
salient issuesamongmemberstates is institutionalized in theUNCACregime,makingstate
oversight tightoverspecific issues. Inparticular, if the issue isdirectlyrelatedtothestability
ofpoliticalregimeandcultureofthecountry—forexample,theissuerelatedtoparticipationof
society(Article13)or theprincipleof transparencyandaccountability(Article10onpublic
reporting)—acountrycanstronglyresistanyattempts to facilitate intervention indomestic
affairs.TheUNODC,therefore, isassumedtoprefershalloworchestrationincollaborationwith
socialactorsonthesesensitiveissues.
(5)Intermediary and orchestrator availability Anumberofcompetentandcooperativeactorsworkingascentersofauthorityseemto
enablecollaborativeorchestrationinthefightagainstcorruption.Therearemanycollaborations
betweencivil societyandthepublicsector,asexemplifiedbytheprocessofdrafting theAU
ConventioninwhichtheAfricanUnion(AU)invitedcivilsocietytoactivelyparticipate.65Multi-
stakeholder initiatives like theEITIandtheUNGCalso illuminate thevalueofpublic-private
partnerships.Certainpowerfulprivateactorsserveaseither intermediariesororchestrators,
dependingon their focality, capabilities, andavailabilityof intermediaries/orchestrators.They
can sometimesplay a role of intermediary and orchestrator simultaneously in a chain of
orchestrations.AcaseinpointisTI.
TIhasbeenworkingasahubofdiverseanti-corruptionnetworksandhaspositioned
itselfasanexpertactivistorganizationoperating inpartnershipwithbothpublicandprivate
organizations aswell as individual experts andacademics.66TI servesasanetworkhubof
62 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
expertsondevelopmenteconomics,internationalcommerce,criminallaw,humanrights,business
management,etc.,andlaunchedtheAnti-corruptionSolutionsandKnowledge(ASK)network,a
poolofrecognizedexpertsandpractitionersaroundtheworld.67Inaddition,moststaffmembers
ofTIhaveenoughexpertiseandnetworks in theareasmentionedabovetobeaffiliatedwith
multipleinstitutions.
TI’sfunctionasamulti-networkhubisillustratedbyitsroleastheSecretariatforthe
InternationalAnti-CorruptionConference(IACC),aglobalmulti-stakeholderconference that
bringstogetherCSOs,privatesector,publicagencies,andindividualsfightingagainstcorruption
allovertheworld.TheIACCservesas“thepremierglobalforumforthenetworkingandcross-
fertilisation”68andasaniconicconferencethatsymbolizesthesolidarityoftheglobalcommunity
against corruption.69 In addition,TI co-orchestrated amulti-stakeholderprocess involving
businesses,tradeunions,civilsociety,andacademicstocreatetheBusinessPrinciples,together
withtheSocialAccountabilityInternational(SAI).
Highly focal and capable organizations likeTI can be orchestrators aswell as
intermediaries, but cannot dominate the focality in a congested system.Furthermore, the
credibilityofmajororganizations like theWorldBank, the IMF,USAID, andTIcame into
questionfortheirprincipallyneoliberalpolicies.Thus,theseorchestratorshavefoundacommon
interest incollaborativeorchestrationtomutuallycomplementtheirpartial lackof focalityand
capabilities.
6.Collaborative�orchestration�by�the�UNODC
(1)Inclination for collaborative orchestration TheUNODChas orchestrated a number of intermediaries for various functions,
includingsettingandpromotingnormsandstandards;providingtechnicalassistance for legal
support,policydevelopment,and institution-andcapacity-building;andcreatingandmanaging
knowledge,asshowninthetablebelow.
While theUNODC single-handedly orchestrates networks and groups related to
crimepreventionandcriminal justice, includingtheUNCrimePreventionandCriminalJustice
ProgrammeNetworkofInstitutes(PNI)andtheJudicialIntegrityGroup(JIG),italsofrequently
engages incollaborativeorchestration inareaswith low focality, including theStolenAsset
Recovery initiative(StAR), theRegionalWorkingGrouponBusiness Integrity inASEAN
63Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption
(WGBI),theAnti-CorruptionAcademicInitiative(ACAD),andtheInternationalAnti-Corruption
Academy(IACA).
Asdiscussed in theprevious section, acombinationofhighexpertise, a shortageof
resources, a relative lackof focality, strongentrepreneurship, andorchestrator/intermediary
availabilityisassumedtohaveencouragedtheOfficetoengageincollaborativeorchestration.In
addition,highgoaldivergenceoversensitive issues isassumedtohavemotivatedtheOfficeto
engageinmulti-orchestrationwithshalloworchestrationtechniques.
However, it isnotgood forapublicagencytocollaboratewithaprivateorganization
whosecredibility is somewhat indoubt.Throughcooperationwithanumbrellaorganization
consistingofmultipleorganizations,thiscriticismcanbeavoided.Therehadbeenalreadymany
umbrellanetworksofnon-stateorganizations in thefieldofanti-corruption, includingGOPAC,
UNICORN,thePWYP,andtheUNCACCoalition.Therefore,theUNODCpreferstoworkclosely
withumbrellaorganizations, including theViennaNon-GovernmentalOrganizationCommittee
(VNGOC), theNGOAlliance onCrimePrevention andCriminal Justice, and theUNCAC
Coalition.80 Itspartnershipswithumbrellaorganizationshave laid thegroundwork formulti-
orchestration.
(2)Multi-orchestration: The UNCAC Coalition TheUNODCintendedtoorchestrateanintermediarytoensureinputfromcivilsociety
in thedeliberationsofCoSPsubsidiarybodies,but itwashardlyable to initiateorcoordinate
Table 1: UNODC’s orchestration for the fight against corruption (intermediaries)
functionscale
Standardsettingandpromotion
Technicalassistance Knowledgemanagement
Macro(Regimecomplex;Globallevel)
IGAC70
RoLCRG71IGACPNI72
IACAACAD73
IGACPNIIACAACAD
Meso(Thematicinstitutions;Regionallevel)
UNCACCoalitionICCWC74
JIG75
WGBI76
UNCACCoalitionStAR77
ARAC78
IAACA79
StARJIGARAC
Micro(Programs/projects;Locallevel)
Programs/projectsfortechnicalandfinancialassistance
64 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
civilsocietyintermediariesduetoalackoffocalityincivilsociety;theOffice’spartnershipwith
civilsocietyintheareaofanti-corruptionwasnotstrongcomparedtoitspartnershipoverdrug
issues.
Furthermore, itwas under tight oversight by someStatesParties.Civil society
actorsarenotallowed toparticipate in themeetingsof the IRGandworkinggroups, even
though theOfficeofLegalAffairsof theUNSecretariat recommended IRGto takepositive
stepsonthis issue81andtheUNSpecialRapporteuronFreedomofAssemblyandAssociation
publiclycriticized theexclusionofcivil society fromthe IRG.82The issueof thecivil society’s
observer status in theCoSPsubsidiarybodieshasbeenhighlycontroversial andhasnot to
datebeensettled.SomecivilsocietyactorscriticizedtheUNODCforitsbarringofcivilsociety
representatives fromthemeetingsof subsidiarybodies,havingyielded topressure fromthe
StatesParties,“withoutputtingthequestiontothemembersofthosebodiesasrequiredbythe
rulesofprocedure.”83ThisillustratesthefactthattightstateoversightconstrainedtheOfficeso
muchthatitwasunabletosteercivilsocietytopressureStatesPartiesfortheparticipationof
CSOsinthesubsidiarybodies.
TI,ontheotherhand,hasbroad influenceovercivilsociety,andwith itshighfocality
andcapabilities, itwasabletomobilizeandconvenecivilsocietyactorsto initiatetheUNCAC
Coalition.Itwaslaunchedin2006byGillianDellofTIandKirstineDrewofUNICORN,primarily
for thepurposeof coordinating inputs fromcivil society toStatesParties’deliberations.To
betterpursueadvocacyactivities,theCoalitionwasregisteredasanindependentNPOinVienna,
Austria, inOctober2016.TIhasbeendeeply involved in theorchestrationof theCoalition,
andhas servedas theSecretariatand thepermanentmemberof theCoalitionCoordination
Figure 4: Multi-orchestration through UNCAC Coalition
65Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption
Committee(CCC)sincetheCoalition’sinception.
Approximately120members(asofJanuary2018)participateinthecoalition,including
majorCSOsandumbrellaorganizationsthathavealongcooperativepartnershipwithTIsuchas
ChristianAid,GlobalWitness,theBaselInstituteonGovernance,andtheTaxJusticeNetwork,
aswell asparliamentariansandacademics.Themembersof theCoalitionare fromdiverse
fields, includinggovernance,development,humanrights, laborrights,environment,andpeace
andsecurity.Themembers’countriesoforiginarealsodiverse:about20%arefromSub-Sahara
Africa,about35%fromEurope,about10%fromSouthAsia,6%fromAsia-Pacific,8%fromthe
Americas,6%fromtheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,andabout10%actonaglobalbasis.
Despitediversebackgrounds,membersare fairlyunifiedforthepurposeofpromoting
theratificationandimplementationofUNCAC.84CoalitionpolicyiscoordinatedbytheCCC,which
consistsofeightregionalseats, two internationalseats,one individualseat,andtheSecretariat,
whichisservedbyTI.85Throughgeographicallyequalrepresentation, itcanadjustforregional
differencesand facilitateglobal solidaritybeyondregions.TheCCCsetsgoalsandorganizes
collectiveactivities, includingadvocacyactivitiesatCoSPandparticipation insideeventsand
trainings.WhiletheCCCinvitesmemberstojoinsuchactivities,doingsoisvoluntary.
For theUNODC, theCoalitionwasa convenientpartner in termsof legitimacy; it
appearsneutralasanumbrellaorganizationofawiderangeofcivilsocietyactors,andtheplan
to launch theCoalitionwasendorsedatameetingof theUN inter-agencycoordinationbody
foranti-corruptionprograms.86TheCivilSocietyTeamof theUNODChasengaged inshallow
orchestrationoftheCoalitionduetoitslackoffocalityincivilsocietyandtightstateoversight.
First, itgives legitimacytotheCoalitionasacivilsocietyrepresentativebyendorsing itasan
officialpartner.Second, itgrantsfinancialsupport totheCoalition,whichhasnostable funding
source.
Third, as theSecretariat forCoSP, theOfficehosts side events on themargins of
CoSPmeetingsandbriefingsessionson themarginsof IRG. Inboth, theCoalition isallowed
topresentviewsandexchangeopinionswithdelegates.Sideeventson themarginsofCoSP
meetingsconsistofpanelsessionsorganizedbystates, IGOs,branchesofUNODC,CSOs,and
multi-stakeholdergroups.Thenumberofsessionshas increasedwitheachmeeting,with5-10
sessionsheldperday,totaling33sessionsduringCoSP6in2015.Somesessions,includingthose
onSustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs),wereheldaspartofhigh-levelmeetings,providing
some input into the formaldecision-makingprocess.Briefingsessionson themarginsof IRG
66 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
provideanopportunityfortheCoalitiontoorganizepanelsessionsaccompaniedbyQ&Asessions
withdelegates.At the first IRGbriefing in2012,almost40civil societyrepresentativesand
100delegatesattendedandactivelytookthefloor.WhereassomedelegatescriticizedCSOsby
questioning theirqualifications, including theirprofessional capabilitiesandneutrality, others
considereditanopportunitytohaveaconstructivedialogue.Somecivilsocietyrepresentatives
have felt trustbeingbuiltbetweengovernmentsandcivil societyasaresultof thesebriefing
sessions.87
Fourth, theOfficeandtheCoalitionhave jointlyorganizedtrainings forCSOstobuild
professional capabilities toparticipate in thepreparationof andduring theUNCACreview
process.88Nearly150CSOs in totalwere trained inAustria,SouthAfrica, andSenegal from
2012 to 2013.89These trainingswerehighlyevaluatedby the IndependentEvaluationUnit,
andso, a three-yearextension for theprojectwasapproved.90The trainingswereorganized
throughadivisionoflabor:theOfficeconvenedthetrainingsessionsandprovidedfinancialand
administrativesupportwhile theCoalitionwassubstantively taskedwith training.91Fifth, the
CoalitionandtheUNODCco-organizedmulti-stakeholderworkshopsonUNCACanditsreview
mechanism forgovernments, civil society,and theprivatesector from2014 to2016.92These
workshopswerehighlypraisedasservingasaplatformfortrustbuildingandmutuallearning.93
Thus, theUNODChasbeenmakingefforts tobridge thegapbetweengovernment
andcivil societyandto facilitate theparticipationofcivil societybyusingmulti-orchestration
techniquesundertightstateoversightandalackoffocality.Thecapabilitiesandfocalityofboth
organizationshavebeenstrengthened throughmulti-orchestration.For instance, someCSOs
participatinginthetrainingslaterjoinedtheCoalitionasactivemembers,suchasIWATCH,a
TunisianNGO,whichbecameanewCCCmemberin2015.94TheUNODC’sconnectionsincivil
societyandtheprivatesectorhavebeensignificantly increasedcomparedtothoseintheearly
twenty-firstcentury.95
7.Conclusion
Theultimatequestionthispaperseekstoanswer ishowto improvecoordinationand
synergyinadecentralizedandcongestedregimecomplex,inwhichthefocalityofgovernanceis
diffusedamongmultipleactors,aplethoraofprogramsorschemesoperateinanuncoordinated
fashion, and issue-linkages frequently occur.This paper attempts to answer thequestion
67Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption
byproposing the collaborative orchestrationmodel, including co-orchestration andmulti-
orchestration,whichcouldenhance the focality, capability,and legitimacyoforchestratorsas
wellas intermediariesunderdiffused focality.Evenunderhighgoaldivergencecoupledwith
tight state oversight,multi-orchestration, inwhichmultiple orchestrators engagewith the
same intermediaries fromdifferentorchestratingpositions,may improve input legitimacyby
promotingtheparticipationofdiversestakeholderswithoutinvolvingtoomuchcost.Itmayalso
promoteproblemsolvingbyfacilitatingthespontaneousandefficientdevelopmentofnetworksin
respectivesectors,yieldinganincreaseinmultifacetedapproachesandawiderrangeofoptions
forgovernance actors.This analysisdemonstratedwhyandhow theUNODCstrategically
orchestratedintermediariestocreatesynergyamongmajorgovernanceactorswhilefacilitating
theparticipationofabroadrangeofstakeholdersthroughmulti-orchestration.
Theoretical implications
Thispapergivesanewinsightintothetheoreticalhypothesesconcerningfocality,goal
divergence,andstateoversight.First,contrarytothefocalityhypothesis,orchestrationtechniques
are likely tobe chosenunder low focality,which is often the case in a congested regime
complex,inacollaborativeformoforchestration.Ingeneral,governanceactorsaremotivatedto
orchestratecollaborativelywhenanorchestrator lacksacombinationofcertaincapabilitiesand
the focalitytoorchestratean intermediarythatcouldbeorchestratedbyanotherorchestrator.
Inaddition,wesuggest“orchestratoravailability,”i.e.,availabilityofmultipleorchestrators,asan
antecedentconditionforcollaborativeorchestration.
Second,itisthecombinationofgoaldivergenceandstateoversightthatdeterminesthe
depthoforchestration,ratherthanlikelihood.ContrarytotheAGSZ’sfindings,thepaperargues
IGOsprefershalloworchestrationundertheconditionofhighgoaldivergenceaccompaniedby
tightstateoversightovercontroversial issues,as in thecaseof theUNODC’sengagement in
shalloworchestrationinamulti-orchestrationsettingwithTIasanotherorchestrator,concerning
theissueofcivilsocietyparticipationinCoSPsubsidiarybodies.
Effectiveness of orchestration
Thispapereschewsdiscussionof theeffectivenessoforchestration,whichshouldbe
investigatedinfutureresearch.Here,wetouchonthreethingstobeconsideredwhendiscussing
effectiveness:dynamicprocess, organizational interest, andpossiblecombinationswithother
68 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
modesofgovernance.
Considering the dynamic process of orchestration, an orchestrator’s focality and
capabilitieswouldbeunderminedovertimeifintermediariesandotherorchestratorsareableto
strengthentheirfocalityandcapabilitiesthroughcompetition,andchallengetheorchestrator.To
ensurethatorchestrationissustainable,effectivecoordinationamongcompetitiveintermediaries
andorchestrators is thought tobe indispensable.Thismightbeoneof thereasonswhy the
UNODCorchestrates theUNCACCoalition, as theCoalition iswell coordinatedbyTIasan
orchestratorofcivilsociety.Hence,itisessentialtoassessdynamiceffectivenessoverthecourse
oforchestrationinthelongrun.
Second,conflictbetweenpublicinterestsandorganizationalinterestsmustbeconsidered.
IGOs use orchestration to serve their own organizational interests, including expanding
resourceswhilereducingcosts,enhancingfocalityandlegitimacy,andenhancingautonomyfrom
memberstates’ control.Orchestration ishelpfulalso formissioncreep(expansion intoother
areas),because IGOscangainexperienceandexpertise throughorchestrationwithoutheavy
organizational investments.96Whenanorchestrator’sorganizational interestsare incompatible
withcertainpublicinterests,itsorchestrationmayloseitseffectiveness.
Finally,itwouldbeinappropriatetoassesstheeffectivenessoforchestrationseparately
fromother factors,especially ina “Prisoners’Dilemma”situation,which inducesopportunistic
behaviors.Consideringthepossibilityofgrowingconflictsofinterestsamongorganizations,itmay
bebettertocomplementthesoftmodeofgovernancewiththehardmodeofgovernanceinorder
toenhancetheeffectivenessofcoordination.Itisworthdiscussingwhichtypesoforchestration
andmodesofgovernanceshouldbecombinedforachievingspecificgoals.
Notes1 ElinorOstrom, “Polycentric Systems for CopingwithCollectiveAction andGlobal
EnvironmentalChange,”Global Environmental Change20,2010,pp.550-557.2 KalRaustialaandDavidG.Victor, “TheRegimeComplex forPlantGeneticResources,”
International Organization58(2),2004,p.279.3 RobertO.KeohaneandDavidVictor,“TheRegimeComplexforClimateChange,”Perspectives
on Politics9(1),2011,p.7,p.8.Theyuseamorerelaxeddefinition:“non-hierarchicalbut looselycoupled systemsof institutions”without an overall umbrella structure that controls theinstitutions.
4 RaustialaandVictor,op.cit,pp.277-309;LaurenceR.Helfer, “RegimeShifting:TheTRIPsAgreementandNewDynamicsofInternationalIntellectualPropertyLawmaking,”Yale Journal of International Law29,2004,pp.1-83;MarcL.Busch,“OverlappingInstitutions,ForumShoppingandDisputeSettlement in InternationalTrade,” International Organization 61(4),2007,pp.735-
69Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption
761;KarenJ.AlterandSophieMeunier, “ThePoliticsof InternationalRegimeComplexity,”Perspectives on Politics7(1),2009,pp.13-24.
5 ThomasGehringandSebastianOberthür,“ComparativeEmpiricalAnalysisandIdealTypesof Institutional Interaction,” inSebastianOberthürandThomasGehringeds., Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: Synergy and Conflict among International and EU Policies,Cambridge:MITPress,2006,p.318;SebastianOberthürandOlavSchramStokkeeds.,Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime Interplay and Global Environmental Change,Cambridge:MITPress,2011;ThomasGehringandBenjaminFaude,“TheDynamicsofRegimeComplexes:MicrofoundationsandSystemicEffects,”Global Governance19(1),2013,pp.119-130.
6 KeohaneandVictor,op.cit.,esp.,p.9,pp.13-16.7 Fortheinefficiencyproblemincongestedenvironmentalgovernance,seeEdithBrownWeiss,
“InternationalEnvironmentalLaw:ContemporaryIssuesandtheEmergenceofaNewWorldOrder,”Georgetown Law Journal81,1993,p.697.
8 KennethW.Abbott, “TransnationalRegimeComplex forClimateChange,”Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy30(4),2012,pp.571-590,esp.,p.582,pp.586-587;ElinorOstrom,“PolycentricSystems forCopingwithCollectiveActionandGlobalEnvironmentalChange,”Global Environmental Change20,2010,pp.550-557.
9 FritzW.Sharpf, “Introduction:TheProblem-SolvingCapacityofMulti-LevelGovernance,”Journal of European Public Policy4,1997,pp.520-538.
10 MichaelZürn,“GlobalGovernanceandLegitimacyProblems,”Government and Opposition,39(2),2004,pp.260-287.
11 TanjaA.BörzelandThomasRisse, “Public-PrivatePartnerships:EffectiveandLegitimateTools ofTransnationalGovernance?” inEdgarGrande andLouisW.Pauly eds.,Complex Sovereignty: Reconstituting Political Authority in the Twenty-first Century,Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress,2005,pp.195-216,esp.,pp.208-213.
12 KennethW.AbbottandThomasHale,“OrchestratingGlobalSolutionNetworks:AGuideforOrganizationalEntrepreneurs,”GlobalSolutionNetworks,2014,p.5;KennethA.Abbott,PhilippeGenschel,DuncanSnidal, andBernhardZangl, eds., International Organizations as Orchestrators, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2015,p.355.
13 KennethW.AbbottandDuncanSnidal, “Strengthening InternationalRegulation throughTransnationalGovernance:Overcoming theOrchestrationDeficit,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law42,2009,pp.501-578.
14 Ibid.,p.510.15 Abbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,p.4.16 Kenneth W. Abbott, Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal and Bernhard Zangl, “The
Governor’sDilemma:ManagingtheVarietiesofIndirectGovernance,”apaperpresentedattheInternationalStudiesAssociationannualmeeting,Atlanta,March19,2016.
17 KennethA.Abbott,PhilippeGenschel,DuncanSnidal,andBernhardZangl, “Orchestratingglobalgovernance: fromempirical findings to theoretical implications,” inAbbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,pp.349-379.
18 AbbottandSnidal,op.cit.,pp.558-559.19 Ibid.,p.564.20 Ibid.21 Abbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,p.24.22 Ibid.,p.2523 Thesehypothesesaresummarized inthe frameworkchapter:KennethW.Abbott,Philipp
Genschel,DuncanSnidal, andBernhardZangl, “Orchestration:Globalgovernance throughintermediaries,”inAbbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,pp.3-36.
24 ManfredElsig,“Orchestrationonatightleash:StateoversightofWTO,”inAbbott,Genschel,
70 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,pp.65-87.25 CornisvanderLugtandKlausDingwerth,“Governingwherefocalityislow:UNEPandthe
PrinciplesofResponsibleInvestment,”inAbbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,pp.237-261,esp.,p.259;LucioBaccaro,“Orchestrationforthe ‘socialpartners’only:InternalconstraintsontheILO,”inAbbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,p.281.
26 MichaelBlaubergerandBertholdRittberger, “Orchestratingpolicy implementation:EUgovernancethroughregulatorynetworks,”inAbbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,pp.39-64,esp.,p.64.
27 HelmutReisen, “TheMultilateralDonorNon-System:TowardsAccountabilityandEfficientRoleAssignment,”Economics:TheOpen-Access,Open-AssessmentE-Journal4(5),2010,pp.1-24.
28 KennethW.Abbott andDuncanSnidal, “International regulationwithout internationalgovernment: Improving IOperformance through orchestration,”Reviewof InternationalOrganization,5,2010,pp.315-344,esp.,p.334.
29 CornisvanderLugtandKlausDingwerth,“Governingwherefocalityislow:UNEPandthePrinciplesofResponsibleInvestment,”inAbbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,pp.237-261,esp.,p.258.
30 Abbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,p.4.31 Inparticular, theeffectofendorsementmaysignificantlydifferdependingon thedegree
ofcongestioncausedbyanumberofprivateauthorities.For instance, in the issue-areaofenvironmentalmanagement,crowdedwithprivateregulatoryschemes,anofficialendorsementbythepublicsector issupposedtohaveabig influence,whereas inothercaseswith fewerprivateauthorities,officialendorsementmaynotbesocrucial,thoughendorsementagainstthewillofmemberstateswouldbecostly.
32 Hanrieder,op.cit.,pp.191-213.33 AbbottandHale,op.cit.,pp.4-5.Amongothers,UNEP, theWorldBank, theWorldHealth
Organization,theUSgovernment,theUKgovernment,andtheWorldWildlifeFund(WWF)havebeenpredominantlyinvolvedintheorchestratedinitiativesidentifiedinthestudy.Ontheotherhand,approximatelyone-thirdof intermediariesarecorporations,andstatesandCSOsaccountfor20percenteach.
34 Forfindingsthatacombinationofhighgoaldivergenceand loosestateoversight inducesIGO-initiatedorchestration,whereas lowgoaldivergencecoupledwith tightstateoversighttendstoresultinstate-initiatedorchestration,seeAbbott,Genschel,Snidal,Zangl,op.cit.,p.372.
35 Ibid.,pp.372-373.36 OranYoung, “InstitutionalLinkages in InternationalSociety:PolarPerspectives,” Global
Governance 2(1), 1996, pp.1-23.An institution can be “embedded” in basic principles ofinternational society such as the respect for sovereignty; “nested” in a superior andcomprehensivenormaccordingtoa legalhierarchy;“clustered”with institutionsdealingwithothertopics;and“overlapping”withdifferentissue-areas.
37 Forexample, theCouncil ofEurope(CoE)theCriminal andCivilLawConventionsonCorruption(hereafter,theCoEConventions)
38 For example, the Inter-American Convention against Corruption(hereafter, OASConvention).
39 Forexample,theAUConventiononPreventingandCombatingCorruption(hereafter,AUConvention).
40 Forexample,theArabConventionagainstCorruption(hereafter,ArabConvention)41 A/54/128“Actionagainstcorruption”;A/55/383“Reportof theAdHocCommitteeonthe
ElaborationofaConventionagainstTransnationalOrganizedCrimeontheWorkofItsFirsttoEleventhSessions.”
71Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption
42 KennethW.AbbottandDuncanSnidal,“HardandSoftLawinInternationalGovernance,”inInternational Organization54(3),pp.421-456.
43 Business Principles for Countering Bribery: A Multi-Stakeholder Initiative Led by Transparency International,Berlin:TransparencyInternational,2013.
44 InternationalChamberofCommerce,The ICC Rules on Combating Corruption,2011edition.45 FritzHeimanandFrançoisVincke,Fighting Corruption: International Corporate Integrity Handbook,
2008edition.,InternationalChamberofCommerce,2008,p.8.46 In1995, then-Presidentof theWorldBankJamesWolfensohnaddressed “thecancerof
corruption”at theannualmeetingsof theWorldBankandtheInternationalMonetaryFund;since then, the issueof corruptionhasbeenat the forefrontof internationaldevelopmentassistance.Voice for the World’s Poor: Selected Speeches and Writings of World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn, 1995-2005, Washington:WorldBank,p.50.
47 MakikoNishitani, “TheCoordinationof theGlobalAnti-CorruptionGovernanceviaHybridPolycentricNetworks,”inThe Study of Global Governance,2,2015,pp.48-67.
48 CecilyRose, International Anti-Corruption Norms: The Creation and Influence on Domestic Legal Systems,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2015,pp.97-132.
49 Ibid.,p.127.50 Only40percentofStatesPartieshavepublishedtheir fullreviewreportsonline,sincethe
implementationreviewmechanismwaslaunchedin2009.51 Rose,op.cit.,p.116.52 ODCCP,Report on the Second United Nations Interagency Anti-Corruption Co-ordination Meeting,
Vienna,July1-2,2002,p.4;UNODC,Report on the Fifth Meeting of the International Group on Anti-Corruption Coordination ( IGAC),Merida,December11,2003,p.5.
53 UNODCandAsianDevelopmentBank(ADB),Report on the Seventh Meeting of the International Group for Anti-Corruption Coordination ( IGAC),Bangkok,April21-22,2005,p.13.
54 According to theestimatesofBryaneMichaelsandDonaldBowser, thesizeof theanti-corruption industrywasapproximately$100million in2003andmushroomedtoalmost$5billionby2009.BryaneMichaelsandDonaldBowser, “Theevolutionof theanti-corruptionindustry in the thirdwaveofanti-corruptionwork,” inSebastianWolfandDianaSchmidt-Pfister, eds., International Anti-Corruption Regimes in Europe: Between Corruption, Integration, and Culture,Baden-Baden:Nomos,2010,p.161.
55 CICP,Value Added of Partnership in the Fight against Corruption,conferencepaper,Vienna,March2001,p.21.
56 UNODC, Report on the Fourth United Nations Interagency Anti-Corruption Coordination Meeting,Vienna,July24-25,2003,p.12.
57 MichaelsandBowser,op.cit.,pp.164-166.58 UNODC,Annual Report 2014, p.120; “Staff”http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/
employment.html?ref=menutop; “Fieldoffices”http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/field-offices.html?ref=menutop(accessedJune1,2017)
59 “Ourprojects,”http://open.undp.org/#2015(accessedJune1,2017)60 UNODC,Annual Report 2014,p.66.61 UNODC,Annual Report 2010,p.38.62 CorruptionandEconomicCrimeBranchofUNODC,Anti-Corruption Update,Issue1,February
2012,p.2.63 UNODC,Annual Report 2010,p.63.64 UNODC,Annual Report 2014,p.122.65 GillianDell, Anti-Corruption Conventions in Africa: What Civil Society Can Do to Make Them Work,
Berlin:TransparencyInternational,2006.66 TI has formal partnerships with 35 public or private organizations. “Institutional
72 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
Relationship,”https://www.transparency.org/whoweare/accountability/governance/0/(accessedJune1,2017)
67 “NetworkofExperts,”http://www.transparency.org/experts_network(accessedAugust30,2015)
68 http://iacconference.org/en/about/about_iacc(AccessedMarch1,2014)69 CommentsontheIACCgivenbyMs.GillianDell,whohasservedontheSecretariatfora
longtime.Author’sinterviewwithMs.GillianDell,July23,2012.70 InternationalGroupforAnti-CorruptionCoordination71 RuleofLawCoordinationandResourceGroup72 UNCrimePreventionandCriminalJusticeProgramNetworkofInstitutes73 Anti-CorruptionAcademicInitiative74 InternationalConsortiumonCombatingWildlifeCrime75 JudicialIntegrityGroup76 RegionalWorkingGrouponBusinessIntegrityinASEAN77 StolenAssetRecoveryInitiative78 AcademiaRegionalAnticorrupciónparaCentroaméricayelCaribe79 InternationalAssociationofAnti-CorruptionAuthorities80 Ms.MirellaDummar-Frahi, theCivilSocietyOfficer,and theLeaderof theCivilSociety
Teamof theCorruptionandEconomicCrimeBranch,emphasizedthat theOfficecooperateswithumbrellaorganizations fromtheperspectiveof legitimacy.Author’s interviewwithMs.FrahiinVienna,June24,2016.
In fact, at the first IRGbriefing, somedelegatesquestionedTI’sprofessionalcapability,neutrality,andotherqualifications.Matti Joutsen, “CivilSocietyOrganizationsandUNCAC:DoCSOsHaveaSeatat theTable?”presentationmaterialdistributedat theCivilSocietyOrganizationsFightingCorruption:TheoryandPracticeWorkshop,heldat theUniversityofSurrey,UK,July9-10,2012.
81 CAC/COSP/IRG/2010/9“LegalOpinionfromtheOfficeofLegalAffairs,”para16.82 A/69/365“Rightstofreedomofpeacefulassemblyandofassociation.”83 UNCAC Newsletter10,November2013,p.6.84 InterviewwithMs.Dell,July23,2012.Sheremarkedthattheyhadnothadmajorconflicts
withinthenetwork.Indeed,accordingtotheminutesofCCCmeetings,internalconflictswerenotontheagenda.
85 “CoalitionGovernance,” http://uncaccoalition.org/en_US/about-us/coalition-governance(accessedAugust 30, 2015). Its responsibilities includepolicycoordination, promoting theactivitiesof theCoalition,communicatingtotheexternalaudiences,approvingandexcludingmembers,andgivingassistancetomembersthatareunderattack.
86 UNODC,Report of the Ninth Meeting of the International Group for Anti-Corruption Coordination ( IGAC),DeadSea,Jordan,December15,2006,p.5.87 MattiJoutsen,“CivilSocietyOrganizationsandUNCAC:DoCSOsHaveaSeatattheTable?”,
presentationmaterial distributedat theCivil SocietyOrganizationsFightingCorruption:TheoryandPracticeWorkshop,heldat theUniversityofSurrey,UK,July9-10,2012.Also,author’sSkypeinterviewwithMs.Dell,August12,2016.
88 Thetrainingswereconductedaspartofacivilsocietyproject launched in2010: “LookingBeyond:TowardsaStrategicEngagementwithCivilSocietyonAnti-Corruption,andDrugsandCrimePrevention”(GLOU68).
89 “EmpoweringCSOstoBetterFightCorruption throughtheUNCAC,”http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/CSOs/CN9-Empowering-CSOs-to-better-fight-corruption-through-the-UNCAC.html(accessedAugust30,2015)
90 UNODCIndependentEvaluationUnit, Independent Project Evaluation of the “Strengthening the
73Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption
Capacity of Civil Society Organizations in Africa to Combat Corruption and Contribute to the UNCAC Review Process,”July2013.
91 Author’sinterviewwithMr.ManzoorHasan,ChairoftheUNCACCoalition,inPanamaCity,December3,2016.
92 “AfricanGovernmentsandCivilSocietyComeTogethertoWorkagainstCorruption,” http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/CSOs/CN18-African-Governments-and-civil-society-come-
together-to-work-against-corruption.html(accessedOctober10,2016) “AfricanCivilSocietyandGovernmentsWorkingTogetheronAnti-CorruptionIssues,” http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/CSOs/CN14-African-civil-society-and-governments-working-
together-on-anti-corruption-issues.html(accessedOctober10,2016) “BringingGovernmentsandCivilSocietyTogethertoBetterFightCorruptioninAsia,” http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/CSOs/CN13-Bringing-governments-and-civil-society-together-
to-better-fight-corruption-in-Asia.html(accessedOctober10,2016) “EmpoweringCSOstoBetterFightCorruptionthroughtheUNCAC,” http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/CSOs/CN9-Empowering-CSOs-to-better-fight-corruption-
through-the-UNCAC.html(accessedOctober10,2016) “TheFirstMulti-StakeholderWorkshopon theUNCACSecondCycleReviewCreated
SynergiesBetweenAfricaandSoutheastEurope,” http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/CSOs/cn22_african-and-see-gov-and-cso-learning-and-
cooperating-together-for-the-preparation-of-the-uncac-second-cycle-review.html(accessedOctober10,2016)
93 ThisobservationwasconfirmedbyMr.Hasan, intheauthor’semail inquiry,December23,2016.
Especially theregionalworkshopheld inMalaysia in2014washighlyevaluated,andasa result, thePresidentialUNCACInter-AgencyCommitteewasestablished inPhilippines.UNODC,Annual Report 2014,p.78.
94 UNCAC Newsletter13,July2015,p.10.95 AnobservationbyMs.FrahimadeduringaninterviewinVienna,June24,2016.96 Abbott,Genschel,Snidal,andZangl,op.cit.,p.356.