Colonel Macgregor's GAO Presentation 12 December 2012

Burke‐Macgregor Group LLC

Organizing Army Forces for Future Joint Warfighting

A Presentation for the

Government Accountability Office12 December 2012

Douglas Macgregor, PhDColonel (ret) U.S. ArmyExecutive VP Burke‐Macgregor Group LLC+1 703 975 6954Doug.Macgregor@Burke‐Macgregor.com

Burke‐Macgregor Group LLCOutline for Discussion:

I. What you should take away from this presentation!

II. What should the Army do? III. Institutional Surgery: Reduce OverheadIV. Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) versus Combat

Groups V. Regional Alignment versus Joint Rotational

ReadinessVI. Modernization ParametersVII. The Light Reconnaissance‐Strike Group (LRSG)VIII. Questions worth askingIX. Summary of Key Points

“Don't fight the problem, decide it.” George C. Marshall, General of the Army


Goal: Within future budgets, cultivate new Army warfighting capabilities and create new strategic options for the national command authorities by extracting more capability from today’s assets and people;

Method: Organize Army Forces for Joint Warfighting operations within the ISR‐Strike‐Maneuver‐Sustainment framework and streamline long‐term investments in Army modernization;

End State: Achieve significant $ Savings while fielding a more capable, professional Army with relevance to Joint Operations in crisis or conflict, increased operational reach and broader strategic impact.

What you should take away from this presentation!

“The primary purpose of an army ‐ to be ready to fight effectively at all times ‐ seemed to have been forgotten….”

General Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, 1956


The ISR‐Strike‐Maneuver‐Sustainment Framework:

The Framework is not just about “things.” It’s about integrating existing and future capabilities within an agile operational framework guided by human understanding.

It’s an intellectual construct with technological infrastructure.

The Framework is the next logical step in the evolution of warfare beyond the ad hoc coordination of Federal Agencies or combined arms, air‐ground cooperation, air‐sea battle, amphibious and special operations.

Single‐service command structures are obsolete. U.S. capabilities must be integrated at the operational level to detect, deter, disrupt,

neutralize or destroy opposing forces decisively; Apply the ISR‐Strike‐Maneuver‐Sustainment Framework as a methodology for investment

planning and programming as constrained budgets compel force optimization.

Burke‐Macgregor Group LLCWhat must Army Forces do?

Army Forces must organize for operations that integrate functional capabilities –Maneuver, Strike, ISR, Sustainment – across service lines within an integrated Joint C2 operational framework;

Army must provide trained and ready forces organized and equipped to expand the nation’s range of strategic options and capable of conducting joint operations against a mix of opponents;

Army Forces must build powerful synergies with the technologies and concepts developed by U.S. Aerospace and Maritime Forces.


Institutional Surgery: Too much Army overhead!

“Failure in war is most often the absence of one directing mind and commanding will.” Sir Winston Churchill

Army Materiel Command

Training and Doctrine Command

Forces Command

• From March 1942 to April 1945 when there were 15 million men in the Army and Army Air Corps the U.S. had only 4 four star generals to command them: Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower and Arnold.

• Today, the U.S. employs 23 Four Stars to command a combined Army and Air Force of roughly 880,000 soldiers and airmen.


Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn said efficiency measures might mean "flatter organization, fewer headquarters, smaller staff, generally more efficiency" for the department… “You're not going to get savings like we're proposing here with simply the easier moves.“

Nathan Hodge, “Pentagon Looks To Save $100 Billion Over FiveYears,”Wall Street Journal.Com, 4 June 2010.

One Star Force Packages Exist Now!

Faster, Flatter C2 for the Post‐Industrial Era


The BCT versus the Combat Maneuver Group (CMG)

(CSA plans to restore the third maneuver battalion to Armored and Infantry BCTs increasing their strength to roughly 4,500 men.)

• The future Army must be survivable, effective and act as a Joint enabler across a range of alternative futures.

• The Combat Group is a self‐contained organization for combat; a specialized module of combat power organized around ISR, Strike, Maneuver and Sustainment.

• A combat group is designed to “Stand Alone ” inside a Lego‐like Joint Force Design.

• There are CGs for maneuver, strike, ISR and sustainment.

VS


CGs (Maneuver Echelon)

LRSGs 4 20,600 TroopsCMGs 12 66,000 TroopsICGs 7 35,000 TroopsAAGs 3 15,000 TroopsTotal CGs 26

136,600 Troops

Combat Group Types in Maneuver Echelon:LRSG: Light Reconnaissance Strike Group (5,150)CMG: Combat Maneuver Group –(Armored) (5,500)ICG: Infantry Combat Group ‐(Motorized) (5,000)AAG: Airborne‐Air Assault Group (5,000)

A Snapshot of Combat Groups (CG) versus BCTs

VS

BCTs (Projected)

Infantry BCT 13 Armor BCTs 12Stryker BCTs 7Total BCTs 32

144,000 Troops (Assumes roughly 4,500 men per BCT)

The BCTs are the reinforced brigades inside divisions with minor modifications at the battalion level or roughly 4,500 men.

The BCTs are realigned with division and corps headquarters to restore the ten division force structure, a smaller version of the Cold War Army that emerged in 1992 after Desert Storm.


“The progressive readiness model is his (Odierno’s) solution. Units and brigades will be aligned to a combatant commander who can use them as he sees fit. An active brigade will do about three months of reset, nine to 10 months of training and be available 10 or 11 months.”

Lance Bacon, “Straight Talk From The Top,” Army Times, 3 December 2012

Army’s Current Regional Alignment Plan


Joint rotational readiness achieves several important goals:1. Forces organized around Strike, ISR,

Maneuver, Sustainment habitually train as a Joint Team;

2. Deployments become predictable improving the quality of life for service members;

3. The National Command Authorities (NCA) know what forces are ready to fight;

4. Funding for O&M is managed more efficiently;

5. How many and what types of force packages/modules is a matter for decision by the NCA.

Joint Rotational Readiness: The Path to Unity of Effort and $ Savings!


Rapid prototyping applies to operational forces and the technologies they employ.

When tied to a new force design, rapid prototyping explores/develops new capabilities quickly with smaller inventories of new equipment in soldiers’ hands before larger investments are made;

Using a proven platform mitigates risk and speeds up delivery (German/IDF approach). The Puma AFV

What works now should triumph over “unobtainium.”

Don’t bind Army efforts through massive programs intended to stamp out 20,000 ideal designs over two decades of production runs (FCS);

A capable, cunning, fast moving enemy will find ways to avoid our strengths and bring the direct firefight to any attacking ground force.

New equipment must be tied to a new force design with a larger joint purpose in mind.

How can the Army modernize in a period of fiscal austerity?


The Central Idea: “Cross‐domain synergy. The complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others…”

JOINT OPERATIONAL ACCESS CONCEPT (JOAC) VERSION 1.0 17 January 2012

The Light Reconnaissance‐Strike Group (LRSG)

Army Force that punches above its weight, mobilizing fighting power disproportionate to its size (“High lethality, low density”);

Provides the Joint Force CDR with the capability to close with the enemy, take hits, sustain losses, keep fighting and strike back decisively. (Mobile, Armored Firepower!)

Burke‐Macgregor Group LLCQuestions worth asking:

What capabilities will the Army bring to the Joint Force that the Joint Force needs?

How will the Army organize these capabilities for integration across Service lines within the Joint Force?

What are the Army’s alternatives to deploying division or corps HQ as part of the Army’s “unit of issue” for deployment?

Where does the GCV fit into the Joint Warfighting picture? How many Cold War era trucks, tanks, brads and self‐propelled

artillery can the Army shed to extract savings (Hill problem)? Why is the Army investing scarce funds in a new rotor‐driven aircraft?

Why not reduce helicopter inventories? OH‐58Ds (Helos in general) are far more susceptible and

vulnerable to ground fire, air defense, have far less speed, endurance, and range than theater/tactical RPAs such as Predator/Sky Warrior or even the MQ‐7 Shadow.

Medevac Helos also put a lot more personnel at risk than using tracked armored vehicles as ambulances. (Merkavamodel)

What threat does the JLTV counter that the HMMWV does not?

Burke‐Macgregor Group LLCSummary of Key Points:

The Army must provide an efficient and effective organization of land combat power in Joint operations for the optimum utilization of increasingly constrained resources.

Like the Navy, Air Force and Marines, the U.S. Army exists to raise, train, and equip modular/mission focused capability packages with C2 elements designed for commitment to the COCOMs where they can plug into Joint Force Headquarters which have the authority and the responsibility to fight and win the nation's conflicts.

Without organizational change, combat power will be sacrificed to preserve unneeded overhead and new Army capabilities essential to Joint Warfighting will not emerge.

Burke‐Macgregor Group LLCBackup Slides


Joint Rotational ReadinessApplied to a Reorganized Army Force

Rotational Readiness System provides 30,000 to 50,000 + Army Troops ready to deploy at all times!


• Responds directly to Joint Force Commander

• Integrates Army, AF/Navy Strike Assets• Collects, Analyzes, Exploits Joint ISR• Absorbs or sheds battalions as needed• Capable of Independent Operations

inside Joint Force (Stand Alone)

Combat Group Staff Structure

Burke‐Macgregor Group LLCNew Army Career Path!


The fiscal crisis in defense spending creates the opportunity to both economize and expand the Nation’s range of strategic options.

Congress can reduce costs by building a 21st‐century scalable, “lego‐like” force design, a design structured and equipped for dispersed/distributed, mobile warfare inside an integrated ISR‐Strike‐Maneuver‐Sustainment Framework.

Strategic Implications for National Defense:


Maneuver Echelon Strike Echelon

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Echelon

Sustainment Echelon

C4I Group (C4IG)

Engineer Construction Group (ENGG)

TMD

Strike Group (STRG)STR

Infantry Combat Group ‐Motorized (ICG)

Combat Maneuver Group – Armored (CMG)

CW

Airborne Air Assault Group (AAG)

ENG

ICG

CMG

Light Recon Strike Group –Medium Tracked armor (GCV equipped LRSG)

Combat Sustainment Group (CSG)CSG

Theater Missile Defense Group (TMDG)

12 X

7 X

3 X

4 X

3 X

4 X

4 X

10 X4 X

Field Army Analysis based on force in Transformation under Fire (Praeger, 2003)

C4IG

Chemical Warfare Group (CWG)

AAG

1 X

Troops in the Field ArmyAssuming 450,000 Troops in the Active Force


• Simplified organizational structures that emphasize responsibility and accountability are the keys to success in 21st Century crisis or conflict.

• There won’t be time for a “pick‐up game” in a future crisis or conflict. By the time the U.S. gets its operational construct and “C2” act in order, China (or other future great powers) will defeat U.S. forces and achieve its own strategic aims.

• Today’s C2 structure is a legacy of WW II and Industrial Age service‐centric warfare. Joint Task Force Headquarters are single‐service headquarters with augmentation.

• 21st Century Warfare demands force packages organized around maneuver (ground), strike, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and sustainment capabilities for employment under Joint Force Headquarters.

What is to be done? Reduce Overhead!


Integrated “All Arms” Warfare: Warfighting Operations that integrate functional capabilities –Maneuver, Strike, IISR, Sustainment – across service lines inside an integrated Joint C2 operational framework.

“High lethality, low density”: Army Forces that punch above their weight, capable of operational reach in an environment of mobile, dispersed warfare.

Post Industrial Warfighting Paradigm

Burke‐Macgregor Group LLCHow does the Army get it’s LRSGs?

The Army needs to:

Implement DEPSECDEF’s “better buying power.” Prioritize non‐developmental military capabilities that can be quickly fielded.

Shed equipment sets its forces no longer need: Shedding old equipment drops maintenance costs;

Eliminate modernization programs it no longer needs: Upgrading Cold War equipment sets to extend their service life is expensive and unnecessary;

Reduce and eliminate command overhead it no longer needs: Reductions in overall numbers of soldiers must involve commensurate reductions in redundant overhead in the form of unneeded General Officer headquarters.


What should the Army’s senior leaders do?

In December 1905, three years after the Boer War ended, Richard Haldane became Secretary of State for War. Obstructed by a nation obsessed with the Royal Navy, and a political culture opposed to conscription, Haldane began preparing the British Army for a future conflict very different from colonial warfare.

Haldane set out to determine the form future war was likely to take, then, adopted the organization and weapons to fight it. In other words, software (thinking carefully about things, contemplating likely issues and problems) must come before hardware. Richard Burdon Haldane,

Secretary of State for War, 1905‐1912

What happened?•Haldane concentrated on reorganization, modernizationand training to maximize capability at cost; •In practice, Haldane built a ground force suited to a global Maritime Power, not a regional Continental Power;•The result was an elite force of 6 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division, designed for rapid deployment as a British Expedition Force (BEF), backed by a reserve of 14 Territorial divisions of volunteers;•In 1914, the BEF arrived in time to slow, then, cooperate with the French to halt the German advance.

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Colonel Macgregor's GAO Presentation 12 December 2012

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