Warrior's Rage: Macgregor's Salon Presentation 10 March 2010

7/29/2019 Warrior's Rage: Macgregor's Salon Presentation 10 March 2010

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The True Storyof How the Soldiers

Won the Battle and theGenerals Lost Iraq in 1991

A Presentation by

Douglas Macgregor,

Colonel (ret) U.S. ArmyAuthor

10 March 2010Naval Institute Press, 2009

"The political object is a goal, war is themeans of reaching it, and means cannever be considered in isolation fromtheir purpose."

Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege


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Why are you stopping? asked the Republican Guard commander whowas now a prisoner of war in the hands of the 2nd Armored Cavalry

Regiment.

Why do you not go to Baghdad? You have the power. Your army rules theheavens and the earth In a voice filled with more anguish andfrustration than fear, my new Iraqi prisoner of war looked me straight in

the eye and said in heavily accented English, Major, you must go toBaghdad and end this. You must save Iraq . . .

. . . Along the 73 Eastingin the Iraqi desert 2200 hours, 26 February 1991


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28 February 1991

The gate's closed What isn't escaping is heavy tanks, what isn't

escaping is artillery pieces I'm talking about the gate that closed onthe war machine that is out there.

General Norman Schwarzkopf, CDR, U.S. Central Command,

25 March, 1991

According to the new estimates, which represent a consensus viewamong CIA, DIA and NSA, about 700 of Iraq's estimated 4,550 tanks insouthern Iraq and Kuwait escaped. About 1,430 of Iraq's 2,880 armoredpersonnel carriers are now believed to have escaped... Americangenerals say they have accomplished their mission and show nointerest in reopening hostilities.

Michael Gordon with Eric Schmitt, After the war; much more armor than USbelieved fled back to Iraq, The New York Times, 25 March, 1991.

27 March 1991

In addition, the general (Schwarzkopf) said in the interview, major

Republican Guard units had "bugged out" before the main attackby American forcesand crossed the Euphrates River When theshooting stopped, the general said, he was "suckered" by Iraqi militarycommanders who asked for and received permission to fly helicoptersover Iraq.

Patrick E. Tyler, After the War; Schwarzkopf Says Truce Enabled Iraqis to

Escape, The New York Times, 27 March 1991.

Desert Storm, asthe 1991 Gulf Waris known, waspublicized to theAmerican people

and to the world asa total victory anda triumph ofAmerican militarymight.

But the truth wasthere for anyoneinterested infinding it.


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The first Bush administration's decision to abandon the March uprising was amistake of historic proportions. With U.S. help, or even neutrality, the March

uprising could have succeeded, thus avoiding the need for a second costly warAn American may understand what happened in 1991 as carelessness inexcusable, but not malicious. An Iraqi Shiite saw a superpower that calledfor a rebellion and then ensured its failure.

Peter Galbraith, The Ghosts of 1991, 30 November 2006.


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1 March April 1991. Postwar IraqiUprising crushed by loyalist forces spearheaded bythe Iraqi Republican Guard.

27 August 1992 Operation Southern Watchestablished.

7 October 1994. 80,000 Iraqi troops including two veteran Republican Guarddivisionsmove South toward Kuwaiti Border. Madeleine K. Albright tells the UNSecurity Council Iraq might soon have some 60,000 troops and 1,000 tanks poised toattack Kuwait. U.S. responds putting 36,000 troops on planes and setting another 160,000in motion. (SH plays yo-yo with US)

1 January 1997 Operation Northern Watchestablished.

31 October 1998 President Clinton signs the Iraqi Liberation Act into law. December1998. Iraq accepts U.N.-sponsored oil-for-foodprogram.

16 December 1998.Operation Desert Fox:a four-day bombing campaign against Iraq.Stated goal: Disrupt Saddam's grip on power. Air strikes by US and UK forces continueweekly into 2001. (7-14 tons per month on average)

June 2002 March 2003. Operation Southern Focus. (54.6 tons dropped on Iraq inSeptember 2002)

16 October 2002. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution enacted.

20 March 2003. Operation Iraqi FreedomBegins.

Just as

World War IIbegan whereWorld War I

left off,OperationIraqiFreedombegan where

Desert Stormended in1991.

By 2000, Arab leaders realized Saddam was more popular with their subjects than theyDiplomatically, the U.S. was more in a box than Iraq.

Angelo Codevilla, Advice to War Presidents, (Basic Books, 2009), page 107.


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What people said before 17 January 1991:

Third U.S. Army Personnel Command estimates VII Corps will take 20,000 casualties in thefirst five days of fighting the Iraqi Army.

Richard Swain, Lucky War. Third Army in Desert Storm, page 205

Nobody wanted another Vietnam.General Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesnt Take a Hero, page427

The White House had been accustomed over the years to the military coming in with verylarge force requirements for contingency plans. This was clearly partly out of caution, but therewas also the perception at times it was to dissuade the President from action.

Robert M. Gates, Deputy National Security Advisor, 1990, The Generals War, page 154.

If Saddam withdraws with most of his forces intact, we havent really won.Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor, 1991 from A World Transformed, page473.

Franks (LTG, VII Corps CDR) couldnt make a decision to pee if his pants were on fire.Unnamed officer quoted by Rick Atkinson in Crusade: The Untold Story of the GulfWar, page 255.

Iraqi tank crews can fire every 8 to 10 seconds from a static defensive position, but are unableto hit targets beyond 500 meters and nothing that moves.

Lieutenant Colonel (ret), Israeli Defense Force, quoted in Armor Magazine, 1990.


7/18

Attack Iraqi political-military leadership and command and control;gain and maintain air superiority; sever Iraqi supply lines, destroychemical, biological and nuclear capability; destroy RepublicanGuard forces in the Kuwaiti Theater; liberate Kuwait.

U.S. Central Command Operations Order 91-001, 17 January 1991

Pin (the Iraqi Republican Guard) with their backs against the sea, then, go inand wipe them out Once theyre gone be prepared to continue the attack to

Baghdad.

General Norman Schwarzkopf, November 1990.


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U.S. and Iraqi LandForces January

February 1991:

Iraqi ground forces in the Kuwait Theater ofOperations (South of the Euphrates River) included

540,000 troops organized into 12 armored and 30other divisions including 4550 tanks plus 2,880armored fighting vehicles (most with 1960s-vintageSoviet and Chinese equipment). 80,000 man IraqiRepublican Guard Corps equipped with 1970 eraSoviet tanks, BMPs and artillery.

By 21 February 1991 when U.S. and allied groundforces attack into Iraq, Iraqi forces South of theEuphrates were reduced through air attack anddesertion to 280,000 troops.

On 21 February 1991, Coalition forces numbered840,000 men and nearly 8,000 tanks. U.S. groundforces consisted of 116,000 soldiers in the XVIIIAirborne Corps, 110,000 soldiers in the VII Corpsand 107,000 Marines.

The VII Corps, under LTG Frederick Franks Jr., wasdeployed to the right of XVIII Airborne Corps andconsisted of the 1st Infantry Division (mechanized),1st and 3rd Armored divisions, the British 1stArmored. Div., the U.S. 2nd Armored Cavalry

Regiment and the U.S. 11th Aviation Brigade.


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Limit of Advance on 24Feb. 1991 at 1700 hours

Limit of Advance on 24 Feb.

1991 at 1000 hours

Limit of Advance on 23 Feb.1991 at 1500 hours

PL MILLER

PL LONESTAR

PL LITE

PL CORONA

PL COORS

PL COLT

PL BUSCH

PL BUD

PL HARPS

PL BECKS

PL DIXIE

OBJ

GATES

OBJ

MAYOBJ

MERREL

OBJ

FEUCHTRedfox ForwardReconnaissance

Element

Cougar Battlegroup(Main Body)

2nd Cavalry in theVII Corps Attack Across

Southern Iraq

23-24 February 1991

Republican

Guard

Limit of Advance on 25Feb. 1991 at 1000 hours.

PL Blacktop

Kuwait

Saudi Arabia

Basrah

Kuwait City


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X X

X X

X XUK

PLTANGERINE

2

3

1

11

XX

XX

II

II

(3rd Armored Division)

(1st British Armored Division)

(Cougar)

(1st Infantry Division(mechanized))

PL LIME; Planned limit of

Advance for the 2nd Cavalry.

X

TAW

52ndBRIGADE OF 52nd

ARMOREDDIVISION

IRAQI ARMY

X

TAWALKANAREPUBLICAN

GUARD BRIGADE

(Wolfpack)

(War Eagle)

3

Rear GuardCovering Iraqi

Republican

Guard CorpsWithdrawal

Plan resulting fromdecision by LTG Franks lateon 25 February to move 2nd

Cavalry back into the fighton 26 February.


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Cougar Battle Group Combat Power

Soldiers - 1,100

M1A1 Abrams Tanks 42

Armored Fighting Vehicles (Bradleys) 41

155mm Self Propelled Howitzers 8

4.2 Mortars mounted in M113s 6

M113A2 12

Republican Guard Brigade Combat Power

Soldiers 2,100 to 2,300 (estimated)

T-72 Tanks 70 (estimated since tanks from

retreating units mixed in during fighting)

Armored Fighting Vehicles (all types) 80+

Artillery Systems (all types) 20+

Trucks 40-50

Versus


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Ghost Troop

Eagle Troop

Fox Troop

Hawk Company

II

XX

I

Cougar Squadron in the BoxFormation on 26 February 1991

Direction ofMovement toward

73 Easting

Ten KilometerZone of

attack.BoxFormationwas ten

kilometersdeep.

Dragoon Base issued a new fragmentary order (FRAGO) around 0522 hours to theregiment: 2nd ACR [Armored Cavalry Regiment] attacks East to fix Tawalkana

Mechanized Division; on order, 1 ID [1st

Infantry Division] passes through 2nd ACR tocontinue the attack East acknowledge, over!

Cougar 32, I said very slowly and deliberately, be careful what you report to Dragoon.Be accurate, but dont give Dragoon Base an excuse to stop us, over.


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MINES

MINES

3ADXX

2nd Cavalry

3 T7213 BMP

1 T721 BMP

3ADXX

2nd Cavalry

17 T7218 BMP

00

05

59 68 73

Cougar

IIWolfpack

Eagle Troopdestroys battalion +

and consolidatesalong 73 Easting1645-1700 hrs.

Ghost 3rd Platoon Scouts Arrive 1620hrs. 2nd Platoon Tanks attack at

1630.

Situation between 1600and 1700 hours

3 T72sForward Line ofTroops along the73 Easting1645

hrs.

1618 hrs EagleTroop PunchesRight to attack

main defense.

GhostTroop

2 T72Ghost 1st

Platoon ScoutSection

destroys T72sin sandstorm

1640 hrsEagleTroop Smashesthrough Brigade

Defense to 73Easting

1618 hrs Cougarattacks East

toward 70 Easting

MINES

MINES

Eagle

Troop

29 T722 T5511 BMP3 MTLB

1 SA13


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Ghost Troop

Eagle Troop

Fox Troop

ll

Hawk Company

2nd Squadron

3rd SquadronIron Troop

Forty minutes after Eagle Troopattacks, Iron Troop attacks to 73

Easting, then falls back behind 70

Easting, 2nd Cavalry Limit ofAdvance.

Note: Caisson BatterysGun Platoons were

positioned immediatelybehind Ghost and Eagle

Troops.

Actual CougarDeployment along

the 73 Eastingfrom 1643 to 0600

hrs

2nd CavalrysLimit of Advance

1700 hrs 26 Febto 0600 hrs 27

Feb along the 70Easting

Heavy Black Line

Marks CougarSquadrons

Positions Alongthe 73 Easting

after 1700 hours

26 February

3rd Armored DivisionZone of Attack

N

E

73 Easting


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Mortars

Ghost FIST(Deskevich)

Blue 1(Hanes)

Ghost 5(Mecca)

Ghost 6(Sartiano)

Green 1(Kinsley)

COLT

White 1(Kilgore)

BMP Bunker

BMP Bunker

(1700 hrs)

Actions in Ghost Troop Zone of Attackalong the 73 Easting 1700 to 2100

hours, 26 February 1991EagleTroop

Counterattack

Bradley FightingVehicle with Scout

Squad

Abrams Tank

73 Easting

(SFC Newman)

73 Easting

70 Easting,

2nd CavalryLimit of Advance

4 T 72 tanks, 10 BMPs +BRDMS

Red 1(Garwick)


16/18

In ten years, well be back.The Soldiers of Cougar Squadron, 2ndSquadron, 2nd Armored CavalryRegiment in May 1991.

Each service was allowed to attack the way itpreferred, with little thought about how anattack in one area would affect the fighting inanother. Schwarzkopf yielded too unthinkinglyto the Marines demand that they be given amajor piece of the war and accepted more

than he would later acknowledge Franksmindset that the Iraqis were a determinedenemy that was prepared to stand and fight.

Lieutenant General Mick Trainor andMichael Gordon, The Generals War,

page 432.

Cougar Squadron destroyed 93 Enemytanks in its zone of attack along with ahundred armored fighting vehicles andtrucks. After the battle, more than 500Republican Guards surrendered. Howmany died is unknown, but at least 1,100

is a reasonable estimate.

Cougar Squadron lost one BradleyFighting Vehicle to enemy fire, one mankilled and two wounded.

NOTE: VII Corps used less than

15 percent of the 70,000 tons ofammunition at its disposal.

Tactical Outcome Strategic Outcome


17/18

Measured in 2010 dollars, the Korean Warcost $393,000 per year for every persondeployed. And the Vietnam conflictcost $256,000. By contrast, the Iraq and Afghanistancommitments have cost $792,000 per year per person.

Carl Conetta, The Pentagons Runaway Defense Budget, AntiWar.com, 4 March 2010

When Lieutenant General William Wallace, Cdr of the U.S. Armys V Corps, and MajorGeneral David H. Petraeus, Cdr of the 101st Airborne Division met on 27 March 2003 at asite near Najaf, only five days after American forces began the attack to Baghdad, thegenerals were deeply pessimistic. As far as they were concerned, the war was in dismalshape.

Rick Atkinson, Peter Baker and Thomas E. Ricks, Confused Start, Decisive End, Washington Post, April 13,2003, page A01.

The American people dont fully realize whats going on, said the 27 year old Staff Sergeantfrom Buffalo, New York. They just know back home what the higher-ups here tell them. Butthe higher-ups dont go anywhere, and actually they only go to the safe places, places with alittle bit of gunfire. They dont ever (expletive deleted) see what we see on the ground.

Joshua Partlow, I Dont Think This Place is Worth Another Soldiers Life, TheWashington Post, 27 October 2007, page A10.

Cash is my most important weapon in the war on terror.General David Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command

Desert Storms Military Legacy


18/18

Sergeant NelsAndrew Moller,

Ghost Troop, 2ndSquadron, 2nd

Armored Cavalry

Regimentkilled 26 February

1991.

The battle of 73 Easting offers conclusive evidence that a much more aggressive

advance across Southern Iraq by the Armys VII Corps would have cut off anyattempted retreat by the Republican Guard Divisions leading to their destruction orsurrender in a larger corps-size battle on the model of Cougar Squadrons fightalong the 73 Easting, solving many of Americas geopolitical concerns withoutoccupying Iraq.

Understanding why Desert Stormfailed to achieve its true strategic aims in 1991and why operations since 2001 in Afghanistan and Iraq have been frustrating andexpensive, means grasping the difference between the soldier who fights and thegenerals who command: No amount of courage and competence at thesoldiers level can compensate for deficiencies of leadership and characterat the general officer level.

The distant rear of an armyengaged in battle is not the bestplace from which to judgecorrectly what is going on in

front.General U.S. Grant, Memoirsof U.S. Grant, page 152.

Desert Storms Military Legacy(continued)

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Warrior's Rage: Macgregor's Salon Presentation 10 March 2010

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