Columbia University Graduate School of Arts & Sciences
Liberal Studies Master of Arts
South Asian Studies
The Indian and Pakistani Diaspora in the U.S.: Interest Groups, American Politics and Policy Process
a final paper by
Britt Roels
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements For the degree of Master of Arts
February 2005
1
Introduction
The United States has always been a nation of immigrants where people from every
region of the world have come to begin a new life.
Who are these immigrants? Why did they decide to come? How well have they
adjusted to this new land? What has been the general reaction to these immigrants? Numerous
studies about earlier waves of immigrants, i.e. the Irish, Germans, Jews, Italians and Poles
have assiduously been published, but relatively little has been written about those arriving
since the passage of the 1965-Immigration Act.1
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how the Asian Indian2 and Pakistani
American community has asserted itself over the last 50 years and how the coming of age of
both diaspora communities has contributed to its infiltration in mainstream American politics.
Moreover, to what extent have these diaspora communities been able to steer and guide U.S.
foreign policy as to favor India or Pakistan? Do Indian and Pakistani Americans play a role in
improving respectively India-U.S. or Pakistan-U.S. relations? Have these minority groups
been able to 'capture' foreign policy, i.e. control policy toward a foreign nation such that the
result is variance with the policy preferences of the majority of the Americans?
As we advance into the 21st century more people will be on the move. Already, the
result is a world where the demographic and political maps diverge. Only a small minority of
the world's states conforms to the nationalist ideal of a nation state - one culture one state.
Most states are multi-cultural, home to diasporic communities, some of which have been long
established, while others are much more recent. How are governments to react to this
phenomenon, which although not new in itself, has gained much greater visibility since the
end of the Cold War and in the context of globalization? Countries have benefited from
continuing links with the diasporic communities that their emigrants established in a new
1 Leonard, K.I., 1997 2 I will use the terms Asian Indian, Indian American and Indo-American interchangeably. These three terms all indicate people of Indian (as from South Asia, not to be confused with Native Americans) origin in the U.S.
2
country. With the development of the global economy, these countries of origin have been
able to look to these outreach communities as trading partners, sources of foreign investment,
and also as diplomatic 'friends at court'. Unlike immigrants hundred years ago, the new
diasporas can live in the U.S. and genuinely retain their political and affective connections
with India or Pakistan. Frequent trips to the subcontinent, phone calls, daily internet use,
periodic visits to South Asian stores to buy magazines, videos, newspapers…are all means to
keep in touch with the events in India or Pakistan.
This thesis developed from the paper The Indian American community in the U.S.: a
catalyst for U.S.-India relations?, that I wrote in the Spring of 2004 for Dr. Saeed Shafqat's
course International Politics of South Asia. The paper examined to what extent the bipartisan
U.S. Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans, established in the House of
Representatives in 1993, has been able to influence, steer or guide U.S. politics in favor of
India. Additionally, it highlighted the role that the Indian American community has been
playing in lobbying legislators on Capitol Hill and looked at the way this community has been
trying to convert their overall financial successes into a political clout.
When a Congressional Caucus on Pakistan and Pakistani Americans in the U.S.
House of Representatives was established in the summer of 2004, we decided it would be
interesting to look at the Pakistani American side of the question and make a comparison
between the two diaspora groups. This is how the idea for this thesis came into being.
It is obvious that the India Caucus and Pakistan Caucus -as they will be named from
now on- do not operate in some sort of vacuum but are influenced by contextual
circumstances. To set the stage, Chapter 1 presents a brief description of the Indian and
Pakistani community in the U.S. and gives some historical background of South Asian
migration to the U.S. Chapter 2 looks at the ways the Indian Americans and Pakistani
Americans have been organizing themselves. I compiled a catalogue of the most prevalent
Indian and Pakistan immigrant organizations at the federal level. The agendas of political,
3
religious and professional associations specifically were examined because they display overt
as well as covert political agendas. These immigrant associations are important because
research has proved that participation in immigrants associations often becomes a first step in
gaining full political participation in the U.S.3 Additionally, Chapter 2 also gazes at other
means of political participation employed by the Indian and Pakistani Americans.
Chapter 3 and 4 describe the ways the India and Pakistan Caucus came into being and
how both diaspora communities were more than instrumental in these processes. Since both
caucuses are not officially recognized4 but more informal groups of members of Congress
with shared interests in specific issues regarding India or Pakistan and their diaspora
communities in the U.S., it was hard to find consistent, coherent and uniform resources about
it. Consequently, I was forced to use primarily newspaper articles that mention the caucuses.
In addition, very few scholars have been analyzing the impact the India Caucus and the
Pakistan Caucus have been able to exert on U.S. politics and foreign policy; mainly - I figure
- because they are very recent phenomena and precisely because of their informal nature. In
contrast, the Jewish lobby in the U.S. has received much more scholarly attention.
In the course of my research, I realized the best way to investigate the caucuses'
influence on U.S. politics, was to trace all the names of the congressmen aligned with the
caucuses, subsequently delve into the congressional records and trace which caucus members
participated in congressional hearings concerning India or Pakistan and voted pro or contra
issues about India or Pakistan. In Chapter 5, I tested the voting behavior of caucus members
by means of conducting a sample survey on 8 different congressional resolutions. Chapter 6 is
a follow up in which I identify the issues of concern to both diaspora communities and
analyze the nature of matters of importance to them. Again, I used articles published in
community newspapers and looked at the activism of some of the immigrant associations.
3 De la Garza, R.O., Hazan, M., 2003 4 There is only one officially recognized caucus, i.e. the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control established by law in 1985.
4
This thesis would not be complete if I had not presented the highlights of U.S.-India
and U.S.-Pakistan ties. Chapter 7 presents U.S.-India relations from the 1980s onwards and
Chapter 8 U.S.-Pakistan ties from Pakistan's inception in 1947 till 2004.
Chapter 9 deals with the relationship between India and Israel and the role of the
Jewish and Indian community in the U.S. has played in enhancing those ties. I incorporated
this chapter because I believe this development will gain much importance in U.S. ethnic (and
foreign) politics over the next few years.
Not only Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans have tried to influence U.S.
foreign policy, but also the Indian and Pakistani nation-state have recently discovered the
benefits their diasporas can bring to the countries. Consequently, the states have been actively
reaching out to their diaspora communities in the U.S. with the hope of improving Indo-U.S.
or Pakistan-U.S. relations. In Chapter 10, I discuss some of the methods that Indian and
Pakistani government have deployed to reach this goal.
The concluding chapter looks at future prospects in Indo-U.S. and Pakistan-U.S.
relations and after a general assessment of the political activity and influence of the Indian
Americans and Pakistani Americans in U.S. politics is made.
Much of my research is based on the analysis of articles that appeared in Indian
American newspapers such as India Abroad, India - West and The Times of India. I
acknowledge that there is a lack of use of Pakistani American resources. Pakistani Americans
are not yet as efficiently organized as their Indian counterparts. While Indian Americans have
a couple of national ethnic newspapers and journals with high standards of journalism and
production, Pakistani Americans do not. Additionally, I believe there is an enormous lack in
scholarly research about the Pakistani Americans. Whereas many books on Indian Americans
have been published over the last two decades, Pakistani Americans are largely ignored. They
are incorporated in works about South Asian Americans but in these cases often
overshadowed by a focus on Indian Americans. This to say I am guilty of doing the same and
5
tend to focus a little more on the Indian American community than on the Pakistani
American.
Last but not least I want to specify own position in this research. I am a European -
more specifically Belgian- graduate student at Columbia University enrolled in a South Asian
studies program. I am not American but came to the U.S. to study here. My connection and
fascination with South Asia has its origins into several trips to the subcontinent (to India,
Pakistan as well as Nepal) and the fact that I have a master's degree in Oriental Languages
and Cultures of the Ghent University in Belgium. My fascination with immigrants and
diasporas grew out of a curiosity of how people deal with their mother countries once they
have left them behind. Drawing all my interests together has resulted in several papers on the
South Asian diaspora in the U.S. and hence in this thesis. I do not have Indian or Pakistani
roots and can thus be considered to be a complete outsider in this project, i.e. an European
examining South Asian minority politics in the U.S. Simultaneously, I believe my position
has enabled me to look at the central question of this work from a unbiased point of view.
6
1. The Indian and Pakistani diaspora in the United States
1.1 The Indian diaspora in the United States
The Asian Indian5 or Indian American community is currently one of the fastest
growing groups in the U.S. In 1980 there were about 387,223 Asian Indians, in 1985 525,000
and by 1990 815,447.6 From 1980 to 1990, the Indian American population grew with 111%.
While the increase may look small when measured against the 819% increase for
Cambodians, it is impressive when compared with the 4% increase in non-Hispanic whites or
13% increase among blacks.7
Indian immigration to the U.S. jumped over 29% in the fiscal year from 1995 to 1996.
India ranked third after Mexico and the Philippines as the country of origin for U.S.
immigration. In 1996, Indians had more family-sponsored immigration than any other country
except Mexico. They also ranked second among all countries in employment-based
preferences behind China. In the category of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, India was in
the 5th place behind Mexico, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, and mainland China.
In some states such as New Jersey, Indians were the number one immigrant group in 1996. In
Illinois and Texas, they formed the third largest newcomer group, while Pakistanis were on
the 8th place in Texas. In California, Indians were the 5th largest immigrant group and in
New York they formed the 7th largest portion of new immigrants.8
The 2000 U.S. Census indicated that the U.S. population counted 281.4 million on
April 1, 2000. Of the total, 11.9 million, or 4.2%, reported Asian. The term Asian refers to
people having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the
5 The ethnic category or label 'Asian Indian' is a term that requires some explanation. It is uniquely American. People of the South Asian subcontinent historically known as India think of themselves as 'Indians'. The misnomer 'Indians' ascribed to the Native American population of North America by early explorers necessitated a more specific term for Indians in India - Asian Indians - in order to distinguish the two populations. (Arpana, S. ; 2000, p.3; Mogelonsky, M., Aug 1995, p.34; Mohapatra, M.K., Mohanty, A. & C0, 2003, p. 98) 6 Mohammad-Arif, A., 2000, p. 33 7 Mogelonsky, M., Aug 1995, p. 34; Weiner, M., 1990, p. 245 8 Springer, R., May 2, 1997
7
Indian subcontinent.9 The Chinese form the largest group among Asians directly followed by
Filipinos and Asian Indians.10
The 2000 Census illustrated an increase of 105.87% in the Asian Indian American
population from 1990 to 2000, coming down to 1.678 million.11 About 1.7 million people
reported only Asian Indian and an additional 0.2 million reported Asian Indian in
combination with one or more other races or Asian groups. A total of 1.9 million people
reported Asian Indian alone or in combination with at least one other race or Asian group.12
The percentage of Asian Indian in the U.S. population comes down to 0.68%. This growth is
the highest among all Asian origins groups. California has the largest concentration of Indo-
Americans, followed by New York, New Jersey, Texas and Illinois. Other states with a
sizeable Indian community are Florida, Pennsylvania and Washington DC.13
The latest estimates indicate another phenomenal growth in the Asian Indian
population. Whereas in 2000 there were about 1.9 million Asian Indians, the numbers of the
2003 American Community Survey displays an average of 2,226,585 Asian Indians.14
Almost 28% of all Asian Indian Americans were born in the U.S.; another 29.04%
have become naturalized citizens. So, 56.11% of the Asian Indians are U.S. citizens. Almost
97% of the Asian Indians lives in urban areas.15
The Asian Indian American is relatively young. Nearly two-thirds of the Indian
American community is 35 years old and younger.16 They have also attained a higher level of
education than the general population. Indian American children tend to start school earlier
than children in the general population. However, it is stated that Indian American women
9 Barnes, J.S., Bennett, C.E., 2002, p. 1 10 Id., p. 7-8 11 http://www.census.gov; http://www.iacfp.org 12 Mohammad-Arif, A., 2000, p. 7-9; Dumm, C., Jain, N., August 2004, p. 2 13 Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian diaspora, December 2001, p. 169 14 2003 American Community Survey Summary Tables, U.S. Census Bureau 15 Dumm, C., Jain, N., August 2004, p. 2 16 Id , p. 4-5
8
generally do not attain the same high level of educational attainment as Indian American
men.17
The unemployment rate for the Indian American community is lower than the
unemployment rate for the general population. While the median household income, as well
per capita income, in the Indian American community is higher than the norm, it should be
noted that there are significant pockets of poverty within the community. Additionally, Indian
Americans receive a significantly lower share of public assistance than the general
population. This trend could mean a lack of knowledge about available programs and a lack
of desire on the part of the community to apply for public assistance.18
1.2. The Pakistani diaspora in the United States
The Pakistani population in the U.S. is much smaller, but has been growing faster
than the Indian.19 In 1980, the Pakistani population numbered officially 40,000, in 1985
75,000 and in 1990 93,663.20 In 1996, comparing immigration in the U.S. from other
countries, Pakistan was ranked in the 20th place. In 1995, Pakistan was 18th in the ranking by
country of origin. And from 1995 to 1996, Pakistanis rose from 4,856 to 5,402 in family-
sponsored preferences and more than doubled (from 725 to 1,694) in employment-based
preferences.21
In 2000, the Pakistani American population totaled 201,309. People reporting as 'only
Pakistani' counted for 164,628 and as 'Pakistani in combination with one or more other races
or Asian groups' for 39,681.22 The 2003 numbers of the American Community Survey report
an average of 183,508 Pakistani Americans with a lower bound number of 156,406 and a
higher bound of 210, 610.23
17 Id., p. 6 18 Id., p. 7 19 Mogelonsky, M., Aug 1995, p. 34; Weiner, M., 1990, p. 245 20 Mohammad-Arif, A., 2000, p. 33 21 Springer, R., May 2, 1997 22 Barnes, J.S., Bennett, C.E., 2002, p. 7-9 23 2003 American Community Survey Summary Tables
9
I should point out that since 1980 there has been a specific category of Asian Indian
in the census classification, but Pakistani immigrants are still classified as 'other Asian'.24
Additionally, Pakistan did not exist before 1947, so immigrants born before these dates,
especially those who did not arrive directly from those countries, can find it difficult to define
themselves. Furthermore, some immigrants arrived via East Africa, Guyana, England or
Canada and since the census asks about the country of origin of one's ancestors, some of those
whose parents were born in the previous named places will tend to name these countries as
their country of origin. Last of all, some cases are especially complicated because of political
events in the Indian subcontinent. Some Kashmiri Muslims, for example, refuse to give either
India or Pakistan as their country of origin and prefer to write "Kashmir".25
The 2000 U.S. Census also provides a category that shows the ancestry of the U.S.
population. According to this list, there are 1,546,703 persons of Asian Indian ancestry and
253,193 of Pakistani descent. The data indicating Pakistani descent does not converge with
the latest 2003 estimations. This might be explained as follows: ancestry is a broad concept
that can mean different things to different people. The ancestry groups listed on the table of
the 2000 U.S. Census were self-identified. The Census Bureau defines ancestry as a person's
ethnic origin, heritage, descent, or "roots", which may reflect their place of birth, place of
birth of parents or ancestors, and ethnic identities that have evolved within the U.S.
Consequently, many respondents listed more than area of ancestry; the sum of the persons
reporting the ancestry was greater than the total U.S. population.26
24 Kurien, P., 2003, p. 267 25 Mohammad-Arif, A., 2000, p. 32-33 26 Ancestry: 2000, U.S. Census Bureau
10
1.3 Historical background of the South Asian diaspora in the United States
Immigration from South Asia to the U.S. has occurred during two contrasting periods
in U.S. history. The immigration patterns of Indian and Pakistani immigrants in the U.S.
must be placed in a broader context of Asian migration to the U.S.27
The early phase (which started around the end of the 19th century) consisted largely
of male immigrants coming from the British Indian province Punjab. They came
predominantly from farming backgrounds and worked in agriculture in California. These
Punjabi men came at the end of a series of Asian migrations to the West Coast. However, as a
result of some severely discriminating immigration laws towards Asian immigrants28, this
early phase ended around 1924.29
The second phase of South Asian immigration in the U.S. started after 1965 when the
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Act came into being. This phase occurred in a
significantly different American context. It is on these post-1965 immigrants that this thesis
will concentrate.
Whereas pre-1965 South Asian immigrants in the U.S. were largely coming from a
rural background, the post-1965 immigrants are often referred to as the "brain drain-
generation". These immigrants differed greatly from the ones of the first phase, both in their
place of origin as well as in their socio-economic characteristics. First of all, the Indian
immigrants now came from all over India30 and only half of the Pakistani immigrants came
from the Punjab.31 Currently all the languages, as well as the different religions of the
subcontinent are represented among the South Asians in the U.S.32 Secondly, among Asian
Indians in the work force in 1990, 30 % were employed in professional specialty occupations,
27 Leonard, K.I., 1997, p. 39-40 28 cf. Lowe, L., 1996; Chan, S., 1991; Takaki, R., 1989 (1998) 29 Leonard, K.I., 1997, p. 39-40; Takaki, R., 1989 (1998), p. 63; Chan, S., 1991, p. 55; Kitano, H., Daniels, R., 2001, p. 232 30 Leonard, K.I., 1997, p. 70-71; Weiner, M., 1990, p. 247 31 Takaki, R., 1989 (1998), p. 445 32 Leonard, K.I., 1997, p. 70-71; Weiner, M., 1990, p. 247
11
compared with 13 % of all U.S. employees. Twenty percent of foreign-born Indian
professionals are physicians, 26% are engineers, and 12% post-secondary teachers.33 As of
the 1990 Census, 71% of Indians have college or post-graduate degrees, making them the
most highly educated of any ethnic group in the U.S.34 Also; the post-1965 Pakistani
newcomers were highly educated professionals.35 Both immigrant communities constitute a
very affluent community and are - largely because of their employment in industrial and
service sectors of the economy - more concentrated in metropolitan areas than the general
U.S. population. The steady stream of Indian and Pakistani immigrants is constituted mostly
out of students coming to the U.S. for a higher education.36
However, their professional and material advancements have not made these two
South Asian communities in the U.S. complacent. Commensurate with their success in life,
they now want to play an active role in American politics. They realize that without this they
can neither protect their rights as a minority nor safeguard their interests or ensure their
security against other competitive or less privileged groups. The leaders and opinion-makers
of the Asian Indian communities (and to a certain extent also of the Pakistani American) are
therefore, now engaged in educating their community to actively participate in American
politics.37
Citizenship is an important issue for these immigrants. Many immigrants have family
networks, financial interests and political commitments that span two nations. Since the
earlier generations of immigrants saw themselves as economic migrants coming to the U.S for
educational purposes or better employment opportunities, obtaining U.S. citizenship was
33 Mogelonsky, M., Aug 1995, p. 35; Cohen, S.P., 2001, p.116, p. 288 34 Alba, R., Nee, V., 2003, p. 210 35 Takaki, R., 1989 (1998), p. 445 36 Leonard, K.I., 1997, p. 70-71; Mogelonsky, M., Aug 1995, p. 35; Cohen, S.P., 2001, p.116, p. 288; Jha, N.K., 2003, p.169; Springer, R., November 23, 2000 37 Jha, N.K., 2003, p. 165
12
often not taking into consideration. Many immigrants cherished the plan to return38 and had
thus no immediate reason to opt for U.S. citizenship.39
Since the mid-1980's gradual changes started to take place. Indian and Pakistani
families are now more strongly rooted in the U.S. The first generation produced a second one
and realizes that its children will not return to India or Pakistan. The benefits of citizenship
are quite clear: citizens are in a much stronger position than non-citizens to challenge existing
laws and practices, mobilize public opinion and initiate new laws. Moreover, there is a desire
to help the homelands by changing U.S. policies, i.e. influencing the U.S government to be
more pro-India or pro-Pakistan. This kind of influence requires funding and support for the
major political parties. Indian and Pakistani interests must be protected and local, state and
federal political representatives are simply more responsive to voters.40
38 This plan is always referred to as "the myth of return". (Lessinger, J., 2003, p. 173; Leonard, K.I., 1997, p. 76) 39 Leonard, K.I., 1997, p. 70-71 40 Leonard, K.I., 1997, p. 70-71
13
2. The participation of Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans in U.S. politics
2.1. Immigrant associations
Rangaswamy (2000) writes: "The process of rediscovery for Indian immigrants
involves digging into their own national consciousness and retrieving a repository of
knowledge accumulated not only during their own lifetimes but generations past. It means
drawing upon myths and legends, folklore and history. It also means getting organized
because unless they act as a group they cannot hold on for long either the outward symbols of
their identity such as language, food, and dress, or their inner, mental symbols such as their
morality, religion and family values. Institutions thus both reflect and shape a complex sense
of identity, which must be created anew by immigrant if he or she is to survive the immigrant
experience."41
What Rangaswamy is saying is that the formation of organizations or institutions for
the Indian immigrant community is essential for its survival in a new environment. The same
argument can be used for the Pakistani immigrants in the U.S. The very first organizations set
up by immigrants are usually meant to organize cultural or religious events. Initially - Prashad
(2000a) argues- the desi sundered the world into two: the outside world, the world of the
workplace, is a world of capital that must be exploited as much as possible, and the inside
world, the world of home is a world of culture that must be protected and cherished.42 The
identities of South Asians were marked by their entering an implicit social contract with a
racist policy by making a pledge to work hard but to retain a social life somewhat removed
from the society of the U.S.43 However, the lived experience taught them this was not enough.
Unemployment, job discrimination, hate crimes, police brutality, lack of access to adequate
health care, poverty and overt racism have become everyday experiences. These lasting
experiences resulted in the mushrooming of political initiatives, both organized and informal,
41 Rangaswamy, D., 2000, p. 217 42 Prashad, V., 2000, p. 104 43 Mahmud, T., 2001
14
to build solidarities sometimes with similarly placed non-desi communities, and to design
strategies to protect economic, political, and human rights of vulnerable sections of desis.44
Thus, with the coming of age of immigrant groups a growing need for political organizations
started to simmer. Rangaswamy (2000) makes a similar argument and states that the excuse
for political inaction that held good in the early years of immigration became obsolete in the
1990s. The early argument was that Indians had no real problems. As an economically
successful group, they had no need to fight political battles; the theory was that only the poor
or those on the fringes of society needed to get politically organized. With the growth and
thus heightened visibility of the Indian community a host of problems such as job
discrimination, racial attacks, and restrictive immigration laws have arisen.45
There are generally two kind of political organizations among immigrant groups:
those who believe that the immigrants should get more involved in the politics of the
homeland and make a contribution to the survival of their own ideals in the home country,
and those who believe that they should get more involved in local politics and be part of
mainstream America. A third group believes that an informed immigrant should be
knowledgeable and active in both areas. First-generation immigrants usually maintain ties to a
national community of origin, which are kept alive in memory by the desire to return.
However, the longer immigrants stay in the U.S., the greater the tension between the home
country and host country. The problem is that loyalties to different territorial political
communities are often perceived as irreconcilable.46
The "myth of return" can directly affect people's political involvement in the U.S. It
has further implications for migrants' organizational and political life.47 Jones-Correa (1998)
talks about the in-between-politics of (in this case Latino) immigrants and considers this
44 Ibid. 45 Rangaswamy, D., 2000, p. 296 46 Jones-Correa, M., 1998, p. 5 47 Id., p. 100-101
15
phenomenon as an incentive for immigrants to lobby for dual citizenship in order they can
lower the costs of participation in the two states.48
Rangaswamy (2000) in his research on the Asian Indians in Chicago claims that
politically active groups lack community-wide support. They operate with a small set of
committed individuals who often feel they are up against a brick wall but continue to work
because of their faith in their cause.49 Ranjit Ganguly, the founder member of the Indo-
American Democratic Organization (cf. 2.2.2.), proclaimed that getting Indians interested in
political issues is hard. He lamented: "Indians are only keen on cultural extravaganzas, they
are not interested in issue-oriented politics. In fact, to most Indians here politics is a dirty
word. They don't realize that if you don't organize politically, you don't exist, at least in the
eyes of the government."50 However Prashad (2000b) claims the reason why immigrants tend
to keep away from U.S. politics is because they don't feel entirely enfranchised perhaps
because of the undertow of anti-immigrant sentiment. In many cases, the gesture to keep
away from the political life comes from the fear that their participation may fuel more anti-
immigrant sentiment. He claims that the dynamic forces fueling Indian political participation
in the U.S. come from the second generation whose affective ties to the subcontinent are not
so great as those of their parents.51
2.2. South Asian American, Indian American and Pakistani American organizations
Indians and Pakistani in the U.S. have been organizing themselves in many different
ways. Some establish South Asian organizations what means that everybody from the South
Asian subcontinent (i.e. India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, the Maldives and
Bhutan) can join the organization. However, it has been stated more than once that these
organizations are more Indian than South Asian in the sense that Indians make up for the
large bulk of the members and thus Indian concerns receive greater attention so that Pakistani,
48 Id., p. 152 49 Rangaswamy, D., 2000, p. 291 50 Id., p. 294 51 Prashad, V., September 30, 2000
16
Bengali, or other concerns are glossed over. Kurien (2003) states that the South Asian term is
often just another term for Indian and could lead to a further exclusion of the voices and
concerns of non-Indian South Asian groups. The flipside of South Asian coalitions that are
truly all inclusive, is that they are not without cost in that while they might increase influence
over American domestic policy, they might decrease influence over American foreign policy.
Pan-ethnic coalitions should keep away from foreign policy issues altogether in order to avoid
dissent within the group.52
Kurien's article To be or not to be South Asian (2003) examines the way Indian
Americans enter the public sphere in the U.S. by means of mobilizing around a South Asian
(i.e. secular, multi-religious and multi-cultural) or a pan-Hindu or Indic (i.e. Hindu-centric)
identity.53
The South Asian organizations tend to characterize themselves as progressive and
argue that there are many cultural similarities between individuals of South Asian background
and that they face common concerns in the U.S. These associations also stress that they are
forward-looking and targeting the second and later generations.54
The Hindu or Indic groups describe themselves as proud Hindus and patriotic Indians
trying to build community solidarity and on the basis of an identity and culture that is
thousands of years old. Their definition of solidarity includes Buddhists, Sikhs, Jains (since
their religions are "indigenous to India"), but excludes Indian Muslims and Christians.55
It is obvious that the incentive for Indian and Pakistani expatriates to form
organizations have their origins in regional, religious, cultural, national as well political
affiliations and this ultimately results in an amalgam of many different immigrant
52 Kurien, P., 2003, p. 283 53 Id., p. 263 54 Kurien, P., 2003, p. 264 55 Id., p. 265-7
17
associations. As Shukla (2003) has pointed out: "The nations of diaspora are heterogeneous
and composed of many contradictory fragments."56
Additionally, it is necessary to realize that the establishment of groups, organizations
or associations is a situational response to the politics of recognition of American
multiculturalism. The politics of recognition has its basis in three matters. First, since social,
economic and political resources are distributed on the basis of ethnicity in the U.S. as a
multicultural society, there is pressure on individuals to organize into ethnic groups. Second,
ethnic categorization generally is mobilizing by virtue of national origin or on the basis of
allegiance to the homeland tends to be viewed as politically threatening. Thus, immigrants
mobilizing among ethnic lines have to be careful to emphasize and demonstrate their loyalty
to the U.S. Third; race remains an important principle of classification in the U.S. that does
not always fit with the official ethnic categories of American society.57
I tried to compile a list of the different 'pure' (meaning those organizations that target
expatriates from a certain country and not a region) Indian American and Pakistani American
organizations on the federal level in the U.S. Many semi-influential organizations merely
operate at the local or state level and that many of the federal organizations have chapters in
different states of the country.
For the purpose of my project I am highlighting those organizations that hold political
aspirations. Compiling a catalogue of all religious or cultural Indian American and Pakistani
American organizations in the U.S. would be a long-term project and goes beyond the scope
of my research. I do point to some local, religious organizations that have been studied
extensively because of their transnational links with political parties such as the BJP in the
Indian subcontinent.
It is also necessary to realize that political activism of diaspora groups occurs on
different levels. First there is the local level: the main goal is to make life comfortable in the
56 Shukla, S., 2003, p. 13 57 Kurien, P., 2003, p. 276
18
area where one lives. Second and third: diaspora groups fight respectively for state and
federal causes. These three levels are part of domestic politics in the U.S.
Political activism at the fourth level encompasses matters that affect the homeland. It
takes up the challenge to steer (to a certain extent) U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis one's mother
country and attempts to make actual changes in the politics and policies of the mother
country. We could say that this level of activism belongs to the sphere of international or even
transnational politics. Nonetheless, Rangaswamy asserts: "Though Indians in Chicago are
interested in the happenings in the homeland, there are very few issues exciting enough for
them to become aggressively involved. One reason why Indians are complacent is that they
are generally supportive of the government in India and seek to work in cooperation with it
rather than trying to change it from the outside."58 My research proved that some of the Asian
Indian and Pakistani American organizations have aspirations to enforce changes in their
home country while others try to find a place in the politics of their host country.
It is quite hard to delineate all these organizations because most of them have
simultaneously political, professional, and social as well as economic incentives. For
example, an organization is hardly ever purely political and holds often simultaneously an
economic agenda. Some of the organizations also traverse the borders of the U.S. and
represent, for example, the whole of North America.
2.2.1. South Asian American organizations
A. Organizations with political motives and goals
South Asian American organizations with political motivations tend to apply the
name "South Asian" because they want to show that their loyalties are not split with a foreign
government. Being perceived as a patriotic American is an important motivation for
politically active Indian Americans or Pakistani Americans adopting a South Asian identity.59
These are the kind of organizations who want to show that they do not have split loyalties and
58 Rangwaswamy, D., 2000. p. 298 59 Kurien, P., 2003, p. 271
19
are working towards integration in the U.S. society. Disloyalty towards the American nation-
state on the behalf of new immigrants is a great concern to writers such as Huntington (2004)
who blame the new immigrants for investing more in their home countries than host
countries.
The concept of South Asianness became more widespread in the post 9/11-period
because to the American bigot Pakistanis, Indians, Bangladeshis, Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs
all look the same. Many victims of racism became conscious they had much more in common
than they previously had realized and consequently decided to form associations along
regional instead of national lines. 60 However, many immigrants or first-generation Indian
Americans believe that the label 'South Asian' ignores the powerful religious and national
histories of the separate countries of South Asia.61
♣ South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow (SAALT)
SAALT was originally formed as the Indian American Leadership Center in February
2000 and became a South Asian American organization in 2001 to broaden its scope. It is a
national non-profit organization dedicated to ensuring the full and equal participation by
South Asians in the civic and political life of the U.S. It focuses on domestic issues of
concern to the South Asian American community such as immigration, discrimination, hate
crimes, and civil rights.62 They say not to be interested in the geopolitics of the South Asian
subcontinent. 63
♣ The Subcontinental Institute
The Subcontinental Institute is a registered non-profit educational corporation that
seeks to provide a forum for the development of South Asian American political identity
utilizing educational and literary activities of benefit to subscribers and the general public.
This non-partisan organization is committed to enabling the expression of South Asian
60 Kurien, P., 2003, p. 273; Srikanth, R., 1999/2000, p. 69 61 Srikanth, R., 1999/2000, p. 69 62 http://www.saalt.org/aboutus.htm 63 Kurien, P., 2003, p. 269
20
American political identity that is inclusive and representative of the various perspectives on
issues that affect the South Asian American community.64 Different from SAALT, this
organization does not avoid foreign policy issues. It publishes and distributes a journal
targeted at politically active South Asians and policy-makers in Washington. 65
2.2.2. Indian American organizations
A. Organizations with political motives and goals
♣ U.S.-India Political Action Committee (USINPAC)
USINPAC's mission is to impact policy on issues of concern to the Indian American
community in the U.S. It provides bipartisan support to candidates for federal, state and local
office who support the issues that are important to the Indian American community. These
issues include: strengthening U.S.-India bilateral relations in defense, trade, and business,
promoting a fair and balanced policy on immigration, ensuring protection from hate-crimes,
advocating for appointments of Indian Americans in the executive and judicial branches of
the government, ensuring equal protection under the law, and protection of rights and
advocating for issues such as small business. It also supports financially candidates for public
office, on a bipartisan basis, who proactively address the concerns of the Indian American
community, and makes an effort to create a platform that enables entry of Indian Americans
in the political process.66 It also wants to serve as watch dog for inaccuracies and bias in
media coverage about India or Indians in the U.S.67 Additionally, USINPAC has built strong
alliances with the leading Jewish American organizations.68 It is therefore patterned after the
highly effective Israeli lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).69
In the election campaign of 2004 USINPAC endorsed selected candidates for the U.S.
Congress based on their stand on issues affecting Indian Americans and U.S.-India relations.
64 http://www.thesubcontinental.org/public/index.jsp 65 Kurien, P., 2003, p. 269 66 http://www.usinpac.com/ 67 Aggarwal, Y., October 15, 2004 68 http://www.usinpac.com/ 69 Aggarwal, Y., October 15, 2004
21
The organization believes that the next generation of pro-India leaders actively seeking to
advance the cause of U.S.-India relations will likely emerge from college campuses in the
U.S. and therefore they seek to get Indian American students at colleges actively involved in
USINPAC.70
♣ Indian American Center for Political Awareness (IACFPA)
The IACPA was founded in 199471 by the publishers of India Abroad, the largest
circulating Indian American newspaper in the U.S. In the fall of 1996, the Center established
a full-time office in the nation's capital to expand and enhance its activities, becoming one of
the only professionally staffed Indian American organizations serving the community
nationwide. Its mission is to increase awareness and public understanding of the concerns of
the Indian American community and encourage participation by the Indian American
community in the American democracy.72
♣ Indian American Forum for Political Education (IAFPE)
The IAFPE better known as the FORUM, is the oldest and largest Indian American
organization for political education in the country and is nationally recognized for its
outstanding work in political empowerment process.
The Forum, established in 1982, has 27 state chapters across the nation. It is a
dynamic and growing organization that has helped educate the Indian American community
to participate as full partners in American democracy. 73
Its mission is to empower Indian Americans politically by raising civic consciousness
and increasing participation in community affairs and the mainstream political process, to
promote voter registration and encourage Indian Americans to exercise their rights to vote and
to run for public office, to identify issues of concern to Indian Americans and pursue
70 Ibid. 71 An other source mentions that the IACPA was founded in 1993 (Nurnberger, R., February 21, 1997). 72 Nurnberger, R., February 21, 1997; http://www.iacfpa.org/ 73 http://www.iafpe-ne.org/about.asp http://www.iafpe.org/php/showPressDetails.php?linkid=7&newsid=1
22
solutions within the political system, and to facilitate and promote ongoing Indo-U.S.
relations.74
It also promotes an internship program wherein interns will spend 6-10 weeks
working in the office of a congressman or senator at the state or federal level, at a non-
government agency, or for political parties. Past interns have worked at the Office of the
Attorney General, the White House, Congress, the State House and the Indian Embassy and in
various governmental agencies such as the Department of Energy.75 A history of their
political accomplishments can be found on their website.76
♣ National Association of Americans of Indian Descent (NAAAID)
This organization is supposed to be exclusively political but I could hardly find any
resources about it, neither have they a website in contrast to all other associations.
The NAAAID only represents naturalized citizens of Indian descent and concentrates
on fielding and funding candidates for political office.77
♣ Association of Indians in America (AIA)
The AIA is a non-profit organization known as the oldest national association of
Asian Indians in America, founded on August 20, 1967 and incorporated in 1971 a non-
political and non-partisan organization. AIA was granted the IRS tax-exempt status in January
1973.78
Its objectives are to concern itself with the social welfare of the Indians who have
decided to live in the U.S. and help them become a part of the mainstream of American life,
to facilitate participation by the membership of AIA and others in the development and
progress of India and involvement of members of the association in American community life
74 http://www.iafpe.org/ 75 http://www.iafpe-ne.org/internship.asp 76 http://www.iafpe.org/; http://www.iafpe.org/php/showForums.php?linkid=1 77 Leonard, K.I., 1997, p. 89-90; Mohapatra, M.K., Mohanty, A. & Co, 2003 p. 21-22 78 http://www.namasthenri.com/associations/aia.html; http://www.aia-dc.org/; Rangaswamy, P., 2000, p. 224
23
through charitable, educational and cultural activities. It has branches in several U.S. states,
such as in New York79 and Washington D.C.80
It was moreover this association that pushed in the 1970s for the registration of the
category of "Asian Indian" in the U.S. Census as a way to identify the Indians in the country
and make them more visible.81 The association wrote in 1975 to the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission that "Indians are different in appearance; they are equally dark-skinned as other
non-white individuals and are, therefore, subject to the same prejudices."82
♣ Federation of Indian Associations (FIA)
The FIA is a Fremont based umbrella non-profit organization. It consists of over 40
member organizations. It was founded in 1983.83 Over the last 21 years, the Federation has
continued to work with its member organizations on various community-based initiatives and
has emphasized that its members should continue to remain engaged in every aspect of the
community. Its objectives are to provide a forum for the community to communicate among
themselves, to represent the common interests and goals of the communities in which they
reside, to help shape public policy through active participation in the public process, to
participate collectively in local charitable and humanitarian causes, to protect the civil and
human rights of individuals, to widen opportunities within the business and professional fields
and to forge links with other community based organizations.84
As the AIA it has several branches in different states like Ohio85 and North
Carolina.86
79 cf. http://www.aianewyork.org/ 80 http://www.namasthenri.com/associations/aia.html; http://www.aia-dc.org/; http://www.aia-dc.org/ 81 Shukla, S., 2003,p. 60 and 66; Rangaswamy, P., 2000, p. 224 82 Lal, V., 1999, p. 44 83 http://www.fia-ohio.org/about.asp 84 http://www.fiaonline.org/index.php 85 http://www.fia-ohio.org/about.asp 86 http://www.fiaonline.org/index.php
24
♣ National Federation of Indian American Associations (NFIA)
The NFIA is a non-profit organization that was established in 1980 with the aims to
unify the diverse Indian American communities by coordinating and promoting the activities
of its member associations.87 Its priorities are to advocate and create awareness related to
immigration, visa, and hate-crime issues, to participate in politics by providing opportunities
to individuals, to cater U.S.-India relations on the political, economic, social and cultural level
and to address issues affecting seniors, women and youth in the diaspora.88
The NFIA is headed by Niraj Baxi who in January 2003 described that the future
initiatives NFIA would like to pursue in the economic spheres to enhance U.S.-India
economic relations are: tourism and hospitality industry, health care industry infrastructure
i.e. hospital, pharmaceutical, nursing and other allied areas, service industry sector of
insurance, banking, housing and urban development, bio-technology and bio-informatics,
environmental sciences, and infrastructure building.89
The organization also organizes fund raisings for politicians active in dealing with
Indian American matters. This organization mobilized the Indian community in 1987 with
apparent success to persuade the Congress to withdraw the sale of sophisticated AWACS
planes to Pakistan.90
♣ Indo-American Democratic Organization Inc. (IADO)
The IADO was founded in Chicago in 1980. Its mission is to lobby on behalf of the
Indian American community on issues such as immigration, affirmative action, education,
social security, healthcare reform and hate crimes. The goal is also to get more Indian
Americans to participate in the political process from voting to running for office. They have
been successful in registering thousands of Indian Americans to vote, conducted candidates
forums during elections years, worked on numerous campaigns for candidates running for
87 http://www.nfai.net 88 http://www.nfia.net/indian_community.htm 89 http://www.nfia.net/Delhi%20Press%20Release.html 90 Lal, V., 1999, p. 45
25
local, state, and federal office, led campaigns against media stereotypes, and formed
partnerships with Asian American and other communities on various issues such as hate
crimes, affirmative action, and glass ceiling issues.91
IADO was started in Chicago when members of the Indian community realized that
no matter how active they were socially and culturally as a group, City Hall wouldn't pay any
attention to them unless they were a political body. IADO was thus formed to gain legitimacy
and recognition in the host society.92
Membership in IADO has grown to five hundred over the years, but is still far short
of representing the strength of the community. Its merits lies in the fact that it has forced
people to sit up and take notice of Indians as an ethnic group. They have worked on severeal
issues with different groups, teaming up with the Latin American community for voter
registration, with the African-American community on affirmative action and discrimination,
and with other Asians on the issue on the fair representation of civic bodies.93 It supports
independent candidates and those who run on a bipartisan basis, if they are Indian
American.94
♣ Forum of Indian Leftists (FOIL)
The FOIL describes itself as a sort of clearinghouse for Indian radicals in the U.S.,
Canada and England. It is a place to share information, offer support, and encourage fellow
Indians to write in the open media on issues pertaining to Indians overseas and India itself,
and help build projects that make their radical politics more material. These Indians felt it was
time to come together and take common positions and intervene on political matters. Its
mission is quite broad and takes up matters such as combating the IMF/World Bank/MNC
onslaught against the Indian workers and peasants, opposing the saffron wave across India,
England and North America, and preventing conservative middle class politics from shaping
91 http://www.iado.org/ 92 Rangaswamy, P., 2000, p. 294 93 Id., p. 294-295 94 Id., p. 296
26
the politics of the entire community. The forum publishes a magazine Ghadar that is "aimed
at providing a forum for a conversation within the left for clarifying/pushing our thinking
further". 95
B. Organizations formed along religious lines
Religion and religious institutions have often been described as playing a role in the
process of ethnic formation. In American society religion has been viewed as the most
legitimate basis for community formation and expression since maintaining a religious
identification is not politically threatening to an American identity. Huntington (2004)
however, would claim the opposite. He argued that new immigrants organizing around a
religious identity indeed form a threat to the "American creed" that is in its origins pure
Anglo-Saxon protestant. And consequently, new immigrants fuel the erosion of American
politics.96
♣ Indian Muslim Council - USA (IMC-USA)
The Indian Muslim Council - USA was launched on August 15th 200297, accepting
fully the symbolic significance of the day in Indian history and pledging to ensure the
independence of people and institutions from ideologies such as Hindutva-fascism, by
safeguarding the common values that bind the world's two largest secular democracies, India
and the U.S.98
Its objectives are five-fold: (1) to promote the common values of pluralism, tolerance,
and respect for human rights that form the basis of the world's two largest secular
democracies - the U.S. and India, (2) to work towards increasing inter-faith and inter-
community understanding in the U.S., with particular focus on the Indian diaspora with a
view to safeguard individuals and societal institutions from infiltration by divisive and hate-
filled ideologies, (3) to provide a platform for increasing education and awareness about
95 http://www.proxsa.org/resources/foil/foilpg.html 96 Huntington, S., 2004, p. 94 97 India and Pakistan became independent on August 15, 1947. 98 http://www.imc-usa.org/cgi-bin/cfm/whoweare.cfm
27
issues of interest to the Indian community in the U.S., (4) to build alliances and relationships
with all individuals and groups who share our basic values, in order to work together to
achieve the above objectives, and (5) to provide a responsible voice for the Indian Muslim
diaspora in the U.S. in their quest for all of the above objectives.99
♣ Federation of Hindu Associations (FHA)
The FHA are independent, regional, American organizations but interlinked with the
Vishwa Hindu Parishad of America (VHPA)100 and the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh (HSS) in
a variety of informal ways.101 The FHA are based in Southern California and have been trying
to influence American foreign and domestic policy by assiduously wooing politicians in an
attempt to communicate their ideas regarding Indian society and politics and an Indian
American identity. On top of that, the FHA has allied with far-right Jewish and Christian
groups.102
The FHA was formed in 1993 in the wake of the demolition of the Babri Masjid in
Ayodhya and was one of the first umbrella organizations to be based in the U.S. In the first
few years of operation, the FHA refused to get themselves registered as a religious
organization and thus obtain tax-exempt status since that would have meant that they would
not be able to promote an overt political agenda. Under pressures from donors they registered
themselves but this overall did not change their platform much.103
99 http://www.imc-usa.org/cgi-bin/cfm/objectives.cfm 100 An other important umbrella organization that can be ranked under the same category is The Overseas Friends of the BJP. This association was set up in New York in 1991 to disseminate party ideology. The BJP-VHP combine as it is referred to in the Indian press is a powerful mouthpiece because it has a large following within the Indian business community and top professionals in both Canada and the U.S. The active BJP-VHP membership in North America is said to exceed twenty thousand. Some of the party's objectives, such as developing a common civil code and reserving the right to develop nuclear weapons for self-defense, have strong appeal for those who want a strong and united India. Overseas Friends of the BJP makes arrangements for visits of party leaders to the U.S. They ensure that they get a chance to meet U.S. government representatives such as state governors, congressional leaders and State Department officials. After the Babri Masjid incident, BJP party leaders toured the U.S. and Canada, and the Caribbean "to acquaint people in the West with crucial facts about Ayodhya." (Rangaswamy, D., 2000, p. 299) 101 Kurien, P., 2003, p. 270 102 Id., p. 272-3 103 Id., p. 268-9
28
Many Hindu groupings in the U.S. - especially in the wake of 9/11 - have made it
clear that there is a big difference between Hinduism and Islam in order to differentiate them
from Muslims and Arabs. Hindus - and to an extent also Sikhs - demand not to be called
Asians and lumped with Muslims.104 This movement is in some way the counter-movement of
the South Asian organizations that realized after 9/11 that Americans did not make
distinctions between South Asian Muslims, Hindus or Sikhs.
The Hindutva (Hinduness) ideology has become an important center around which
many Indians from a Hindu background coalesce in their effort to obtain recognition and
resources as American ethnics and to counter their relative invisibility within American
society. This explains the glorification of Hinduism as well as their anti-Muslim agenda. 105
It is important to emphasize that the composition, platform and goals of this
organization is not representative of the average Hindu immigrant in the U.S.106
♣ The American Federation of Muslims from India (AFMI)
The AFMI is a national organization formed in Washington in 1989 as a social
service association dedicated to the uplifting of Muslims in India. They promote secularism
and communal harmony and support underprivileged groups in India.107
They also sponsor visits of prominent Indian politicians and public personalities who
support their platform. AFMI also works with other organizations such as the Muslim Public
Affairs Council (MPAC) or Indian Muslim Relief Council (IMRC) to stay in regular contact
with legislators and has become a significant political lobby group in Washington. For
example, in 1995 several AFMI members were invited to the White House to meet State
Department officials and attend a reception hosted by Mrs. Hillary Clinton.108
104 Id., p. 274-5 105 Id., p. 281 106 Id., p. 264 107 http://www.afmi.org/aboutafmi.cfm 108 Kurien, P., 2001, p. 270
29
In the same way as the FHA cannot be considered as representative for every Indian
Hindu immigrant, the composition, platform and goals of AFMI is not representative of every
Indian Muslim in the U.S.109
C. Organizations formed along professional lines
Most of the professional organizations were formed in the 1980s when Indians
realized they needed to go beyond informal networking in order to further their career and
business interests. They also saw that by coming together as professionals, they could
contribute to the welfare of India by transferring their technological expertise and material
resources such as hi-tech equipment through organized channels. The growing conservative
climate in the U.S. in the 1980s alarmed many Indians who felt they had to band together and
network among themselves in order to be professionally successful. These organizations cut
across linguistic, regional and religious lines, giving Indians a chance to meet on purely
professional grounds.110 Also, Lal (1999) believes the impetus for the formation of Asian
Indian professional organizations can be attributed to the discrimination that immigrants faced
which acquired some urgency in the early 1980s. He describes how the tightening of laws
governing the admission of doctors from overseas into the American medical profession was
an incentive for Indian doctors to form the American Association of Physicians from India.111
♣ American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin (AAPI)
This must be one of the most influential professional Asian Indian organizations in
the U.S. It boasts a membership of 35,000 physicians and has been active in several arenas for
over twenty years. It regularly hosts fund raisings for politicians on the local, state as well as
federal level and has consequently been able to influence quite a number of legislators,
probably more than any of the political organizations.
109 Id., p. 264 110 Rangwaswamy, D., 2000, p. 301 111 Lal, V., 1999, p. 45
30
Its mission is to serve as a forum to facilitate and enable Indian American physicians
to excel in patient care, teaching and research, and to pursue their aspirations in professional
and community affairs.
Its headquarters are located in Chicago but they also have an office in Washington,
DC where AAPI is recognized as a strong voice in the healthcare legislation and policy
arena.112 They strongly believe in "giving back to the community" and actively do this
through the AAIP Charitable Foundation. This commitment extends back to India, as well as
to a variety of local projects led by member associations here in the U.S. 113
The AAIP has been quite successful in lobbying congressmen and as early as 1985 it
already agitated against proposed legislation that would have cut deeply Medicare funding to
hospitals employing doctors with foreign medical degrees.114 The AAIP's most spectacular
coup must have been when it managed to get President Clinton to be the featured speaker at
its 13th annual convention held in Chicago in July 1995. It was the first time ever that a
sitting president had addressed an Indian professional organization. Notwithstanding the
controversy over the fact that the President did make a quick, easy and substantial addition to
his campaign coffers at the expense of the Indian community, his presence at the AAIP 1995
had a symbolic significance for all Indians, and for Indian physicians in particular. It showed
that Indians had made the transition from an "invisible model minority" to an organized,
visible group with problems that they could address through political involvement.115
In April 2004, Rep. Frank Pallone, an active India Caucus member, even introduced a
resolution in the House honoring "the contributions to the U.S. made by the AAIP and its
constituency of 38,000 physicians and 12,000 medical students and residents". House
Resolution 579 lauded the AAIP "for its commitment to improving access to quality,
112 http://www.aapiusa.net/legislative.htm 113 http://www.aapiusa.org/aapi.nsf 114 Lal, V., 1999, p. 45 115 Rangaswamy, D., 2000, p. 303
31
affordable healthcare and to enhancing awareness and action on issues affecting Indian
American health."116
And last but not least, Congress provided AAIP in 2003 with a grant of $500,000 to
launch a pioneering study of diseases disproportionately affecting Americans of Asian Indian
descent. Moreover, this was the first time in the history of Congress that a specialty
organization representing an ethnic minority has been provided "such a substantial grant".117
♣ Indo-American Chamber of Commerce (IACC)
The IACC calls itself India's only bi-lateral Chamber of Commerce with the U.S. It is
focused on promoting trade, highlighting opportunities and acting as a catalyst for developing
economic growth between the two nations.
It was formally inaugurated on October 28, 1968 by Chester Bowles, the then U.S.
ambassador to India. IACC has played a dynamic role in adding stimulus to business relations
between India and the U.S.A. Today, there are more than 2600 members and over 300 joint
venture companies (between India and the U.S.) that have enrolled with them and they have
signed 7 prestigious MOU's (Memory of Understanding) with U.S.-based Chambers of
Commerce.118
♣ Network of Indian Professionals (NetIP)
The NetIP is a professional, not for profit organization dedicated to the overall
achievement and advancement of South Asian American professionals in the communities in
which they live and work through professional development, political participation, cultural
enrichment, community service, and social interaction.119
It was established in Chicago in 1990. Since then, it has expanded to include almost
5,000 members in most major metropolitan areas across North America. Currently, NetIP has
116 Haniffa, A., April 9, 2004 (a) 117 Ibid. 118 http://www.indous.org/aboutus.php 119 http://www.netip.org/html/quarterlythemes.html
32
large chapters in Chicago, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, DC, Atlanta, Dallas,
Houston, Pittsburgh, Los Angeles and San Francisco.120
The mission of the NetIP is to meet the needs of all Indian professionals as they grow
in their personal and professional lives. Among their professional, cultural and community
awareness program, the organization holds also a political agenda and strives to educate its
membership about the political process in the U.S., at the local, state and federal level. NetIP
hosts forums where members can hear about current issues in the news from experts, and
discuss amongst themselves what is occurring in the world. NetIP also hosts meetings with
elected officials to understand what they are doing to assist the professional community. 121
The association recently hosted a "political luncheon" that they announced with the
catchy phrase "Get energized for the upcoming election by meeting two local South Asian
elected officials." These two officials were Sanjay T. Tailor, a judge in Cook County Circuit
Court and Pramod C. Shah, Niles Township Collector. The three questions raised were: "Are
South Asians ready to enter the political realm and is the political world ready for us?" "Why
is it important for South Asians to be represented in U.S. government and what are our
challenges as an ethnic group?" and "What steps should one take if they wish to hold an
elected position in the future?"122 The interesting aspect about these questions is that they
address the South Asian community and not the Indian community in the U.S.
Kurien (2003) has pointed out that this organization is quite progressive and despite
its name encourages broader entrepreneurship among South Asian Americans (as can be read
in its mission statement).123 More broadly, NetIP is understood as a social space to meet other
young Indians, and particularly dating and marriage prospects.124
120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 122 Political Luncheon - Two Final Days to Register, October 26, 2004 123 Kurien, P., 2003, p. 268 124 Shukla, S., 2003, p. 234
33
2.2.3. Pakistani American organizations
A. Organizations with political motives and goals
♣ National Council of Pakistani Americans (NCPA)
The vision of the NCPA is to develop an organization in Washington that serves
Pakistani-Americans and other common Pakistani organizations by sharing resources for
lobbying, media relations, and civil rights campaigns.125
NCPA is incorporated in the District of Columbia as a non-profit corporation with the
purpose to “provide a national structure within which Pakistani Americans may express and
act upon their shared concerns, promote, encourage and foster better understanding in the
U.S., of political, economic, and cultural interests of the community, and encourage and foster
the common good and general welfare of the people of the U.S.”126
Its goals are (1) to educate and encourage Pakistani-Americans to partake in the
American political process, (2) to enhance and progress the empowerment of Pakistani-
Americans at all levels of American political process, (3) to educate and impact American
policy makers on issues concerning to Pakistani-Americans and simultaneously contribute
positively on the local, national level politics, and back in Pakistan, (4) to present true
Pakistani traditions, values, history and culture to America and the West, (5) to improve the
image of Pakistan and Pakistani-Americans by working with the media, think tanks, NGO
organizations, and universities, (6) to strive for assurance of basic human and civil rights of
all Americans and all Pakistani-Americans and (7) to strive with fellow Americans to
eliminate in American society any vestiges of discrimination or intolerance on the basis of
race, sex, religion, and ethnicity.127 On its website is a link showing people how to "web-
lobby" congressmen and senators.
125 http://www.ncpa.info/ 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid.
34
The association itself is meant to be strictly bipartisan and will not be endorsing
candidates. The immediate objectives are facilitating fundraisings for local, state and federal
elected officials, registering voters and encouraging Pakistani Americans to become
candidates.128
♣ Pakistan American Public Affairs Committee (PAKPAC)
PAKPAC is a nationwide, membership based, non-profit lobbying organization
registered with the U.S. Federal Government. PAKPAC’s mission includes advancement and
strengthening of U.S.-Pakistan relations. It is organized to be a unified voice on issues and
concerns common to the Pakistani American community. PAKPAC’s focus includes an active
environment to foster greater political and civic engagement amongst the Pakistani
Americans.
PAKPAC is also concentrates on collaborating with other regional and national
Pakistani American organizations to ensue increased efficacy and reduced duplication of the
stated goals. PAKPAC along with affiliates is working to serve as a watchdog for
inaccuracies and bias in media coverage about Pakistan and Pakistani Americans. They are
also involved in educating media groups, journalists, politicians, academicians and members
of think tanks about views of concern and importance to the Pakistani American
community.129
♣ Pakistan American Liaison Center Political Action Committee (PALC-PAC)
PALC-PAC seeks to politically mobilize the Pakistani American community through
educational outreach initiatives, social networking and community organizations. Its website
provides a list of all the members of the Pakistan Caucus in the U.S. Congress and also spurs
members to take action when it comes to certain proposed resolutions and bills.130
128 Pakistani Americans organize politically, May 21, 2004 129 http://www.pakpac.net/ 130 http://www.pal.us/
35
♣ Association of Pakistani Professionals (AOPP)
AOPP is an independent group making an effort to act as a bridge between the people
of the U.S. and Pakistan - to help Pakistanis to understand the American perspective and to
help Americans to understand Pakistan and South Asia. AOPP stands for a progressive and
democratic Pakistan and endeavors to support liberal and progressive forces in Pakistan and
discourage religious extremism in Pakistan. AOPP endeavors to ensure Americans (policy-
making and media) that the majority of Pakistanis are moderate and progressive people and
Pakistan needs America's help and support.131 Its website displays examples of how to write
to congressmen and senators asking them to vote for or against certain bills.
♣ Pakistani American Congress (PAC), Organization of Pakistani Americans
PAC (Washington, DC.) is a nation-wide umbrella entity of Pakistani Americans and
Pakistani Organizations in North America in effect since 1990. PAC is incorporated as a non-
profit, non-religious and non-partisan premier community organization. It is a catalyst of
social, educational and political activities, which promote the interests and protect the civil
rights and liberties. 132
Delegates of the Pakistani American Congress also visit Pakistan were they have had
meetings with President Musharraf, governors and generals and participate in discussions on
Pakistan Television networks.133
B. Organizations formed along religious lines
It seems that most of the Pakistani Muslims join Islamic associations that serve as
umbrella organizations for Muslims of many different countries. An article in The
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs published in 2000 pointed out that the barriers to
American Muslims' political cohesiveness are largely internal, due to the American Muslim
community's multiculturalism. The American Muslim community has been very successful in
131 http://www.aopp.org/ 132 http://www.pacus.org/main-page.html 133 Ahmad, C.N., 2002
36
building Islamic institutions like mosques, Islamic centers and schools etc. However, in the
arena of politics it has not yet enjoyed victories. In 2000, the barriers were assumed to be
largely internal. 134 We can assume that in a post 9/11 context, this is no longer the case.
One of these internal barriers was the inability of the community to prioritize its
political goals and evolve a widely accepted short list of political goals. This is a consequence
of the fact that American Muslims come from many parts of the world and with the growth of
the American Muslim community over the last few decades many subgroups have emerged.
The biggest two subgroups represent Muslims from Arab countries and from South Asia.
Each subgroup attempts to organize around its own goals rather than any overall goal of the
Muslim community.135
The same article exclaims that the best-organized group is the Pakistani American
one. They are supposed to have as many political action committees as all the rest of the
American Muslim community. The article states: "While on pure Islamic issues, such as
building mosques or Islamic schools, Pakistanis remain an integral part of the general
American Muslim community, on political issues they have charted their own separate
territory."136
C. Organizations formed along professional lines
♣ Association of Pakistani Physicians in North-America (APPNA)
APPNA is a non-profit organization formally incorporated in August 1977 and
organized for educational and scientific purposes, including for such purposes, distributions to
organizations that qualify as exempt organizations.137
Its other aims and objectives are: to support medical education and research, to
advance the interests of medicine and medical organizations, to foster scientific development
and education in the field of medicine for the purpose of improving the quality of medicine
134 Khan, M., 2000 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid. 137 http://www.appna.org/objectives/
37
and delivery of better health care, without regard to race, color, creed, sex or age, to facilitate
a greater and better understanding and relations amongst Pakistani physicians and between
them and the people of North America, to support the efforts of those who would preserve,
protect and enhance the reputation and services of the medical profession in general and
Pakistani physicians in particular, to assist newly arriving Pakistani physicians in orientation
and adjustment, to institute ways and means to cooperate with other medical organizations in
North America, to encourage medical education and delivery of better health care in Pakistan,
specifically by arranging for donation of medical literature, medical supplies, and by
arranging lecture tours, medical conferences, and seminars in Pakistan, to participate in
medical relief and other charitable activities both in Pakistan and in North America.138
♣ U.S.-Pakistan Business Council (USPBC)
The U.S.- Pakistan Business Council is an integral component of the South Asia
Affairs Department at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The Council was formally
inaugurated at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on September 30, 2002. The primary role of
the USPBC is to foster a greater awareness of business opportunities in Pakistan, and to
further increase U.S. foreign direct investment in Pakistan. The Council brings together
Pakistani and American business leaders for constructive discussions of business conditions
and policy related issues. The Council provides a forum for dialogue on key economic,
commercial and other relevant issues of interest to American companies doing or planning to
do business in Pakistan.139
♣ Pakistan International Chamber of Commerce Inc. (PICC)
PICC is an internationally active non-profit, non-political and pro-business entity
founded in the year 2000. PICC represents businesses, institutions and organization of
different nature and sizes. PICC keeps an eye on the international economy as well as the
changing legislation in Washington and Islamabad that could hurt Pakistani business. It also
138 Ibid. 139 http://www.uschamber.org/
38
surveys government’s action and policies related to business and business environment. PICC
is dedicated to facilitating trade and industry with a focus on economic development in
Pakistan, helping Pakistani communities living in the U.S. and other countries. PICC is the
first and only business organization of its kind outside Pakistan that promotes direct dialogue
on bilateral economic issues between the Pakistani business community and business sectors
of other nations.140
♣ Pakistan American Business Association (PABA)
PABA, an independent, non-profit organization established in 1986 under U.S. and
Virginia laws, is located in Burke, Virginia. The association serves the professional,
educational, career development and networking needs of entrepreneurs, proprietors,
executives and professionals, provides special business services to the business community,
promotes trade and investment opportunities in the U.S., Pakistan and other countries,
advances common business interests of the Association's members and offers business
education and information to enhance the business management, marketing and computer
skills of its members. 141
♣ Pakistani American Business Executive Association (PABE)
PABE is an organization of business leaders from Pakistan and the U.S. that seeks to
foster and facilitate trade and investment between Pakistan and the U.S. as well as to mentor
businesses new to the international market place. It is a non-profit business association
working to promote business and economic growth in Pakistan and the U.S. It is not a social
group or a political organization. Its members are key executives from a broad range of
company sizes, from small entrepreneurial firms to large multinational corporations.142
140 http://www.pakchamber.com/ 141 http://www.pabausa.com/ 142 http://www.pabe.org/
39
♣ Association of Pakistani Scientists and Engineers of North America (APSENA)
APSENA's mission is formulated as follows: "initiate ways and means for fostering
and encouraging cooperation with and among scientists and engineers of Pakistani origin in
North America and their specialized organization to not only increase their contributions to
science and technology in the U.S., but also to become the vehicle for successfully
disseminating knowledge to the developing countries, particularly to the country of their
origin."143
♣ Organization of Pakistani Entrepreneurs of North America (OPEN)
OPEN was formed in 1998 by a group of Pakistani-American entrepreneurs and
corporate executives with the aim of nurturing entrepreneurship in the nascent community.
OPEN Inc., registered in the state of Massachusetts in the year 2000, is a non-profit
organization with the charter to provide networking opportunities for Pakistani entrepreneurs
and professionals in the high-tech industries. Its goals are: to facilitate and encourage the
growth of Pakistani entrepreneurs in the technology field, to draw attention to and promote
Pakistani hi-tech entrepreneurs within the greater technology community, to provide
financing assistance and mentorship to enterprising individuals through programs such as the
business plan competition and monthly business plan critiques, to develop ongoing events
where technology professionals can meet and network with other influential individuals and
to recognize accomplishments by Pakistani entrepreneurs and professionals in the technology
field.144
2.3. Assessment of the organizations
Despite the fact that many of the previously described organizations present
themselves to be religious or professional, it is clear form the description of their goals that all
of them in one way or another try to influence either domestic or foreign politics and policies
143 http:// www.apsena.org/ 144 http://www.open-us.org/
40
of the U.S. and/or domestic and foreign politics and policies of their mother countries. With
the exception of SAALT, all hold transnational links with their home country.
I should stress that this list is probably not including all the Indian American and
Pakistani American organizations on the federal level and my research was primarily
conducted through the internet. Interestingly, if we exempt the religious associations, both
diaspora communities have an equal number (12) of political and professional organizations.
Indian Americans have a higher number of political associations (9) than the Pakistani
Americans (3). This is not at all surprising because Indian Americans have been much longer
politically active in the U.S. than Pakistani Americans. Pakistani Americans have a higher
number of professional associations (5) than the Indian Americans (3). But - as I have
indicated earlier - the demarcation between professional and political is not fixed and clear, so
we could say that Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans have an equal number of
organizations on the federal level.
Many articles about the funding of U.S. congressmen draw attention to the powerful
role of ethnic contributions in American politics and the degree to which U.S. lawmakers, in
catering to ethnic voting blocs, may become advocates for foreign powers. New groups of
politically ethnics are emerging and they have learned over the course of decades that money
is perhaps the fastest route to recognition. Moreover, many ethnic Americans have been
drawn to the political process by a desire to influence U.S. policies affecting their
homelands.145 Ethnic lobbies have been playing a more visible role in policymaking.
Increasingly, some observers fear, American foreign policy will be driven and often
fragmented by the pressures of groups with intense interests. Even more so, ethnic lobbies are
expected to shape American foreign policy abroad. 146
There are several ways these organizations gain recognition in the eyes of
congressmen and senators. Naturally, the most sufficient tactic to make sure that your
145 Morgan, D.; Merida, K., March 24, 1997; Greenberger, R.S.; Kuntz, P., May 19, 1998 146 Lindsay, J.M., Winter 2002, p. 37
41
organization is being noticed, is to fund congressmen's and senators' political campaigns.
Many organizations coordinate lavish fund raising parties. A number of the previously
discussed associations are also Political Action Committees (PAC).147
On the website opensecrets.org, the website of the American government which
enables you to track the funding of U.S. parties, senators and representatives, I found that
only two of the above discussed Indo-American and Pakistani-American PACs made
contributions in the past elections: the Indo-American USINPAC, and the Pakistani American
Physicians PAC.
The summary data for the 2004 election indicate that the USINPAC donated money
to federal candidates for the total sum of $82,000 (according to the last report of October 13,
2004). Forty-seven percent of this money went to Democrats and 53% to Republicans. Forty-
five thousand five hundred dollars of this money was given to 12 House candidates. Only
three among the twelve were not a member of the India Caucus. Also among the Senate
candidates-recipients were several members of the Senate India Caucus. It is important to
stress that these figures only reflect sponsoring by the PAC of federal candidates.
Contributions to this PAC from individual donors exceeded $270,000. In the elections of
2002 this PAC only donated $750 and all this money went to the Republicans. Two hundred
and fifty dollars was given to a House India Caucus member. Again, contributions of
individual donors to this PAC were much higher and totaled $36,961.148 I did not find out
what was done with the remaining money. Do not forget that USINPAC was only founded in
2002.149
147 A PAC is a popular term for a political committee organized for the purpose of raising and spending money to elect and defeat candidates. Most PACs represent business, labor or ideological interests. PACs can donate $5,000 to a candidate committee per election (primary, general or special). They can also give up to $15,000 annually to any national party committee, and $5,000 annually to any other PAC and may receive up to $5,000 from any one individual, PAC or party committee per calendar year. A PAC must register with the FEC within 10 days of its formation, providing name and address for the PAC, its treasurer and any connected organizations. Affiliated PACs are treated as one donor for the purpose of contribution limits. (http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacfaq.asp) 148 www.opensecrets.org 149 http://www.usinpac.com/Content.asp?SEC_ID=27
42
Pakistan American Physicians PAC donated $6000 (according to the last report of
June 30, 2004) to federal candidates in the election of 2004. Eighty-three percent went to the
Democrats and 17% to the Republicans. All sponsored House candidates are members of the
Pakistan Caucus. The contributions of individual donors to this PAC reached $24,878.
Donations in the 2002 election totaled $4700 of which 4% went to the Democrats and 96% to
the Republicans. None of the current members of the Pakistan Caucus were recipients of any
of this money. The contributions of individuals in 2002 reached $33,600. In the 2000
elections this PAC donated $2500 to the Democrats and the Republicans were granted
nothing. One of the two recipients is a member of the India as well as Pakistan House
Caucus. The contributions of individuals to this PAC totaled $26,105. The 1998 summary
data show that 56% of the donations went to the Democrats and 44% to the Republicans,
coming to a total of $4500. Again, none of the recipients are now a member of the Pakistan
Caucus. Interestingly, the contributions of individuals made to this PAC reached an all time
high of $75,950.150 Again, I do not know what happened with the remaining money.
What is interesting about these data is that they display the true bipartisan orientation
of the Indo-American as well as the Pakistani-American community. During one election
cycle they seem to favor Democrats, in the other they favor Republicans. Hathaway (2000
and 2001) indeed states that the Indian American community as a whole has avoided
identification with either of the major political parties and has given generously to the
Democrats as well as to the Republicans.151 This attitude is clear from these figures.
Nevertheless, I was surprised that I was able to track only two organizations on the
Opensecrets-website and had expected a far higher number.
Besides organizing fundraising parties, many of the Indian American, Pakistani
American or pan-Asian professional associations are also actively reaching out to their
Washington representatives. The American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin
150 www.opensecrets.org (consulted on 10/27/2004) 151 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 24; Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000
43
(AAPI), the Indian American Friendship Council, the Asian American Hotel Owners
Association152, and similar groups host legislative conferences in Washington each year,
which prominent U.S. lawmakers are invited to address. 153
It is noteworthy that not only Indian American or Pakistani American associations
lobby congressmen but also American corporations actively lobby Congress for legislation
favourable to India154, especially around issues relating to working visas.155 Organizations
such as the Indian-owned National Association of Software and Service Companies
(NASSCOM) has by means of donations lobbied the U.S. Senate to allow more outsourcing
of jobs to India and more non-immigrant visa holders (i.e. H-1B work visas) to take jobs in
the U.S. NASSCOM has also helped to organize trade delegations to India for members of
the India Caucus.156
2.4. Other means of political participation
Setting up and joining organizations with political incentives is only one way to
participate politically in U.S. society. In fact, organizations do not function on the individual
level but always require some degree of cooperation between individuals. Individual and
semi-individual ways of political participation are voting, sponsoring political campaigns as
an individual, establishing personal relations with elected officials, running for office and
carrying out internships.
152 The Asian American Hotel Owners Association is relevant in this case because many Indian Americans are motel owners. Apparently the organization is now dominated by Gujarati Patels. (Leonard, K., 1997, p.95) Indians in the U.S. are believed to own close to 40% of all small motels (Kotkin, J., 1992, p.208) The 2004 summary data of the Asian American Hotel Owners association PAC indicate that $5,000 was donated of which 20% went to the Democrats and 80% to the Republicans. Four thousand dollars was donated to the Indian American (recently elected) Republican Representative of Louisana, Bobby Jindal. 153 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 25; Romney, L., November 28, 1996, p. 1; Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000; Lancaster, J., October 9, 1999; Shogren, E., October 29, 2000; Raghavan, B.S., February 2, 2001; Khare, R.S., 2002, p. 280 154 Cohen, S.P., 2001, p. 289 155 Datta-Ray, S.K., 2002, p. 281-383 156 Sanchez, R., October 27, 2003; McKellar, H., March 2004
44
2.4.1. Voting
Putnam (2000) writes that voting is by a substantial margin the most common form of
political action and it embodies the most fundamental democratic principle of equality. Not to
vote is to withdraw from the political community. Moreover, voting is an instructive proxy
measure of broader social change. Compared to demographically matched nonvoters, voters
are more likely to be interested in politics, to give charity, to volunteer, to serve on juries, to
attend community school board meetings, to participate in public demonstrations, and to
cooperate with their fellow citizens on community affairs. It is sometimes hard to tell whether
voting causes community engagement or vice versa, although some recent evidence suggests
that the act of voting itself encourages volunteering and other forms of good citizenship.
However, others state that it is incomplete and misleading to understand citizen participation
solely through the vote.157
The numbers indicating the voting behavior of Indian Americans and Pakistani
Americans are but mere estimations, but nevertheless interesting to take a look at. According
to the publication Current Population Survey of the U.S. Census Bureau, 37.75% of Indian
Americans who are U.S. citizens of voting age voted in the 2002 election. Census data
indicate that Indian Americans have generally had a lower voter registration rate than the
general population. When registration in the general population averages between 66.5% and
79.9% of eligible people registered to vote, 55.8% to 65.5% of the eligible in the Indian
American population is registered. However, in the years of a presidential election, voter
registration as well as turnout in the general and in the Indian American community is
higher.158 Numbers of the 1990 Census show even a lower voter turnout, i.e. 30% of the
Indian American community voted in the presidential election. From this 30% in 1990,
roughly 10% of Indian Americans contributed to a political party or candidate, although half
157 Putnam, R., 2000, p. 35 158 Dumm, C., Jain, N., August 2004, p. 5
45
of those contributions were under $100.159 Another source, however, claims the opposite
stating that despite the small number of the Indian American voters, it is generally agreed that
they vote in high proportion to their total.160
I hardly found any resources about the voting turnout of Pakistani Americans.
However, it is believed that Pakistani Americans have become more politically active in the
aftermath of 9/11. Rashad Khan an appointed member of the Pakistani American Democratic
Committee in Northern Virginia and businessman to the Board of Supervisors Criminal
Justice Advisory committee, exclaimed: "Nine-11 was a kind of jolt for Pakistani Americans
that they have the right to vote." Other members of the same committee expected Pakistani
Americans in the presidential election of 2004 to come to the polls for the first time. More
numerical research should be carried out on the question of the voting behavior and turnout of
Pakistani Americans.161
During the 2004 election campaigns the New California Media Company made a
study of the voting behavior of Asian Americans in the 2004 presidential election. Chinese
Americans represented the largest voting block among ethnic Asian voters, carrying about
26% of the Asian American vote. The Chinese were followed by the 20% of Indian American
voters. The study proved that Asian Americans preferred Senator Kerry with the strongest
support coming from the Chinese (58-23%) and the Indian Americans (53-14%). However,
the study also revealed that the Asian Indians were by far the largest group of undecided
voters (30%).162 Other sources mentioned that the Asian American population definitely
lacks the political clout in order to be able to make a serious difference in election results.163
When it comes to voting, one of the main obstacles is the question of citizenship.
While many Indians (and probably Pakistanis too) are eligible, very few bother to enter the
159 The Indian American population, IACPA 160 Trunzo, J.D., Pakistani/Indian-Americans Raise Political Visibility 161 Husain, A., October 30, 2003 162 Lobe, J., Asian Americans lean toward Kerry 163 Armas, G.C., July 19, 2004
46
naturalization process. If Indian Americans do get involved, it is often with a limited or no
agenda; most fail to hold their elected representatives accountable, treating officials like
celebrities rather than public servants.164 Other observations concerning citizenship claim that
the motives for naturalization among Indians are often related to family reunification benefits,
scholarship benefits for college-going youth, and Social Security benefits for elderly. Voting
is not the primary reason to become naturalized.165 In order to exercise the most basic
democratic right of voting, one must first become a citizen.
On November 5th, 2004 (right after the presidential elections) I received an email
from the organization South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow (SAALT) applauding the
efforts of South Asian Americans in the last elections. It stated that there had been an
unprecedented level of interest and engagement in this election year which is a clear sign that
the community understands the integral role of civic participation in addressing policy issues
that impact the South Asian communities. It also said: "There can be no doubt that South
Asians are ready, willing and able to contribute to and strengthen our democracy by raising
critical issues, registering new voters, coming out to vote, and safeguarding the rights of new
voters to cast ballots without intimidation."166
2.4.2. Donating money as an individual
Apart from donating money to PACs (which usually ends up with political
candidates), it is also possible to fund congressmen individually, i.e. without a PAC serving
as an interlocutor. There is no way of finding out how much exactly the Indian American and
Pakistani American individuals (or the community as a whole) is contributing, but the fact
that the community newspapers such as India Abroad and India Times publish so many
articles on the subject can serve as an indicator that both diaspora communities are very active
in funding political candidates. Both Cohen (2001) and Khare (2002) have pointed out that
164 The Indian American population, IACPA 165 Rangaswamy, D., 2000, p. 295 166 SAALT statement: South Asians Emerge as Force in 2004 Elections, November 5, 2004
47
Indian Americans have been translating their wealth and status into a political clout. Despite
the fact that this has occurred over the last few years only, it has nevertheless become an
important source of funding in House and Senate races.167
Consequently, tapping into the financial clout of Indian Americans or Pakistani
Americans has thus become an effective way for pro-India or pro-Pakistan congressmen to
raise money for their campaigns. In the 1980's, Stephen Solarz was one of the rare lawmakers
benefiting from these Indian-American funds.168 Indian Americans raised $4 million on behalf
of political candidates for the 1992 election; six years later, this figure had almost doubled to
more than $7 million.169 Senator Pressler for example, had in 1996 an ad placed in the
community newspaper India Abroad in which he appealed for a "generous contribution for a
friend of India".170 This same newspaper regularly features brief articles by members of
Congress. By providing this forum, the paper encourages congressional offices to address
issues of concern to the Asian Indian American community and to go on record in favor of a
close Indo-U.S. partnership. Legislators have found these articles a useful way to educate
themselves and their constituents on domestic as well as foreign policy issues. Drafting the
articles also forces Congress members and their staff to reflect upon these issues.171 In
September 1996, President Clinton held a fund raising event in the Mayflower Hotel (New
York) where he addressed a group of prominent Indian Americans. The event raised
approximately $400,000. Clinton lauded the ethnic group's achievements and the promise of
better U.S.-India relations. He also vowed to focus more on South Asia if he would be re-
elected. These kinds of events and statements reveal that American policy makers are
167 Cohen, S.P., 2001, p. 288; Khare, R.S., 2002, p. 280 168 Greenberger, R.S.; Kuntz, P., May 19, 1998 169 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 24 170 Morgan, D.; Merida, K., March 24, 1997 171 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 26; ; Shukla, S.R., 2003, p. 209; Nurnberger, R., February 24, 1995
48
recognizing a new reality, i.e. the rise of an affluent ethnic community that increasingly wants
to make its influence in the political arena.172
2.4.3. Establishing personal relations with elected officials
Individual participation can also be established through building up and maintaining
relationships with elected officials. At a minimum, this means writing letters or calling
officials to ensure that your opinions are included in the decision-making progress. Indian
Americans have definitely recognized this method as is clear from the following two
examples. In 1994, Indian Americans contacted the Clinton administration personally to
support the nomination of Stephen Solarz as the next ambassador to India.173 Another
remarkable sign of their political engagement is evident in the next anecdote. After the Kargil
insurgency, Asian Indian American computer professionals, urging a condemnation of
Pakistani actions, organized an email campaign that startled congressional offices. One staff
member reported receiving 400 e-mails in a 24-hour period. Although this congressional aide
was irritated rather than persuaded by the messages, the potential impact of a mobilized and
technologically savvy bloc of voters did not escape notice.174 As far as the Pakistani American
community is concerned, I did not find any sources mentioning these kinds of actions. I did
read many speeches of Pakistani American community leaders who urged their communities
to contact their legislators.
2.4.4. Running for office
One way for an ethnic community to increase its influence over Congress is to make
sure that one of its own members gets elected as a representative or senator. In general this is
a very slow and gradual process where a person starts out at the local level as a school board
member or as a council member of the City Council to eventually end up as a representative
in Congress. The record of Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans serving in U.S.
172 Greenberger, R.S.; Kuntz, P., May 19, 1998; Hiebert, M., March 23, 2000 173 Nurnberger, R., March 25, 1994 174 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 24; Lal, V., 2001, p. 189-190; Lancaster, J., October 9, 1999; Chanda, N., March 30, 2000
49
Congress is meager and practically non-existent. Up till the 2004 elections, there had only
been one Indian American who had served in the U.S. House of Representatives. This man,
Dalip Singh Saund, was elected as a judge of a court of justice in 1953 and thereafter to the
U.S. House of Representatives in 1956. He was also appointed to the House of Foreign
Affairs Committee.175 Saund finally got his long awaited follower in the elections of 2004. An
Indian American Republican of Louisiana, Bobby Jindal won a seat in the U.S. House of
Representatives with 78.3% of the vote.176
India Abroad regularly features articles about Indian Americans actively running for
office, but (with the exception of Bobby Jindal) they have not been extremely successful and
their success has been limited to winning seats in State Assemblies or in political
committees.177 By contrast, there are three Indians elected to the Canadian House of
Commons and two British members of Parliament of Indian origin.178
As far as the Pakistani American community is concerned, there has never been a
Pakistani American representative or senator in U.S. Congress. In January 2004, the first
Pakistani-born American became mayor of a New Jersey municipality and he is probably the
first person to hold that post in the U.S.179
In contrary to the Hispanics or Latinos in the U.S. who have organized themselves
politically under a pan-ethnic umbrella and in doing this have been quite successful, the
Indians' and Pakistanis' South Asian origin does not constitute a basis for cohesion among
Indians and Pakistanis residing in the U.S. and consequently no South Asian candidate has
been elected on that basis.
175 Jha, N.K., 2003, p. 166; Shukla, S.R., 2003, p.148; Mohapatra, M.K., Mohanty, A. & Co, 2003, p.21; Srikanth, R., 1999/2000, p. 63 176 Indian American Candidate Election Summary, November 3, 2004; Rajagopalam, S., November 3, 2004 177 Nanda, T.K., November 16, 2001 178 Rangaswamy, D., 2000. p. 291 179 Pakistani American Elected as Mayor of New Jersey Town, January 23, 2003
50
2.4.5. Internships for the second generation
One of the main reasons why it is so hard to run successfully for Congress, is the
hardship to defeat an incumbent, especially as the sitting member has such advantages as
name, recognition, access to campaign funds, full-time staff dedicated to enhancing their
reputations, experience in getting elected and putting together successful campaigns, and an
ability to build support by providing services for individual constituents.180
A way to ease this difficult undertaking is to spur the second generation of Indian
Americans and Pakistani Americans to become politically active. Many members of Congress
began their careers as interns or staff working for other political leaders. The next generation
will probably also be much better educated than their parents or grandparents about the
American political game and will know to a larger extent who their senators and
representatives are.181 Consequently, a strategy of the IACPA has been to attract young (i.e.
second generation) Indian Americans to carry out an internship at the office of a
representative or senator. The IACPA program has been increasingly popular, according to an
article in India Abroad. The title of the article From one intern in 1995 to 15 in 2003, with an
alumni of 115; The growing Indian-American community has come to understand the
importance of setting and achieving political goals, needs no further explanation. Second
generation Indian Americans in their applications wrote statements such as "Although Indian
Americans are becoming increasingly political active, I have long lamented the conspicuous
absence of South Asians at the top of the American political sphere, and I am convinced that
it is up to my generation to fill the void." and "By more representation on Capitol Hill and in
state and local government, Indians in general would be helped…We must continue to discuss
politics at Indian functions, encourage politicians to attend our events and mingle, have
organizations work on lobbying Congress to further the Indian American agenda.".182
180 Nurnberger, R., June 19, 2001 181 Putnam, R., 2000, p. 36 182 Nurnberger, R., July 25, 2003
51
Again, I did not run into Pakistani American organizations that are engaged in similar
projects. Of course, that does not mean that these organizations do not exist. Nevertheless, the
Indian American is very much engaged in advertising the IACPA's internship program as
many articles in India Abroad mention the program and spur Indian American university
students to apply.
2.5. Conclusion
The most effective and direct way of building up political influence as an ethnic
community probably still remains lobbying congressmen for certain causes and
simultaneously funding their campaigns. American legislators have clearly recognized the
potential source of funds and have responded by sending increasing numbers of direct mail
solicitations to the community. Many articles however, have pointed out that Indian
Americans have been donating money too randomly without taken into account the
congressman's voting history and stand on issues. A certain congressman has stated "Indian
Americans are being taken for a ride by many members of Congress and political candidates."
Apparently, officeholders and candidates routinely seek the funds from the community
largely because many Indian Americans make campaign contributions without researching
the records of the political candidate. Observers have commented that the obsession Indian
Americans have for the "photo-op" makes them spend hundred of dollars merely for the
privilege of having their picture taken with a prominent politician. No effort is made to
develop a political, issue-oriented platform. Thus, other than requesting a photo with a
politician, most Indian Americans rarely ask for anything in return for their funds. Most feel
that the act of giving money is the end, and not the beginning, of their political
involvement.183
What is clear from my research is that the Indian diaspora communities in the U.S.
have reached a point that they are much more efficiently organized than the Pakistani
183 Nurnberger, R., October 25, 1996; Rangaswamy, D., 2000, p. 292
52
Americans. A major advantage of the Indian community is the prevalence of Indian American
newspapers such as India Abroad and News India which are both available on paper and on
the internet. As Benedict Anderson has pointed out in Imagined Communities, print-
capitalism and print-languages provide a basis for national consciousness and connects fellow
readers (who do not even know each other) in nationally imagined communities.184 This
exactly what India Abroad does with Indian Americans, it provides a forum for the diaspora
community to communicate and to envision their specific community in the U.S.
In 2003, Stephen Cohen a fellow of the Brookings Institution, specified four tasks for
the Pakistani American community. It is imperative to mobilize a learned Pakistani academic
who is a professor at a renowned American university. This person could interact with various
think tanks, congressmen, State Department officials, and researchers engaged in the study of
South Asia. The second task involves the sponsoring of visits of American academics to
Pakistan. The visit could offer the researchers an opportunity to share the Pakistani perception
on various issues as well as to know the country and the people more intimately. Third,
Pakistani Americans should be supportive of the education sector in Pakistan. Last and
foremost, Pakistani Americans should serve as a bridge between the U.S. and Pakistan, lobby
for Islamabad and project the national point of issues on crucial issues like Kashmir.185
It appears to me that the Pakistani American communities have just started to
organize politically and still have a long way to go reaching the point where Indian
Americans are now. Where the Indian Americans send their first second generation member
as an intern to Capitol Hill in 1995, the Pakistani Americans have just recently started
thinking about doing the same. As Faiz Rehman, the PAL-C executive director stated in May
2004: "Our goals also include educating Pakistani Americans, especially, the young
generation, in legislative affairs and public policy by creating a support network and
184 Anderson, B., 1983 (1991), p. 44 185 Faruqui, A.M., March 21, 2003
53
encouraging them to diversify their interests and adopt careers in non-traditional fields such
as politics, journalism, and law."186
Perhaps one of the strongest developments favoring India and Indian Americans or
Pakistan and Pakistani Americans has been the birth of the India Caucus and Pakistan Caucus
in U.S. Congress, which are presumed to take an active role in looking after the interests of
India and respectively Pakistan on Capitol Hill. Both diaspora communities were more than
instrumental in its creation.
186 Hasan, K., May 31, 2004; Bughio, K.; June 22, 2004
54
4. Caucus on India and Indian Americans in the U.S. House of Representatives
The House Caucus on India and Indian Americans was established in February
1993187 during the first Clinton administration. When Clinton came to power in 1993, Robin
Raphel was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia. However, Raphel's
'mismanagement' regarding issues of the subcontinent annoyed numerous Asian Indians in the
U.S. as well as abroad. Consequently, one of the prominent members of the Indian American
Forum for Political Education, Kapil Sharma, pushed for the creation of a Congressional
Caucus on India, along the lines of the Black Caucus that already existed in Congress. The
idea was to educate Congress members on issues concerning India so that the Congress in
turn could question the administration and influence American foreign policy towards
India.188
Initially, the Forum decided to target those representatives whose election
constituency or district had a large Indian population. New Jersey was the state to get started.
Three representatives were targeted, including Frank Pallone (D-NJ), who would become the
first Democratic co-chairman of the Congressional India Caucus.189
At its inception in 1993 the Caucus had only eight members.190 Over the past ten
years the India Caucus has rapidly grown to consist of 186191 members of Congress and is the
largest country caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives.192
Frank Pallone (D-NJ) and Bill McCollum193 (R-FL) served as co-chairmen from 1993
until October 1998.194 Gary Ackerman (D-NY) and James Greenwood (R-PA) who served
from 1998 till 2000 succeeded them. In the 107th Congress (2000-2002), the co-chairmen
187 Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7; Rubinoff, A.G.,Spring 2001 188 Diwanji, A.K., Sept. 18, 2002; Datta-Ray, S.K., 2002, p. 212-213 189 Diwanji, A.K., Sept. 18, 2002 190 Diwanji, A.K., Sept. 18, 2002; http://joewilson.house.gov/Issues/Issue/?IssueID=105 191 This number was last updated on June 18, 2004. 192 http://joewilson.house.gov/Issues/Issue/?IssueID=105 193 Bill McCollum joined the Caucus because he was very critical about Pakistan's record on narcotics and terrorism (Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 504; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 40) 194 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 28
55
were Jim McDermott (D-WA) and Ed Royce (R-CA). In the 108th Congress Joseph Crowley
(D-NY)195 and Joe Wilson (R-SC) carried out the roles of co-chairmen.196
Invariably referred to as the India Caucus, the group promotes both Indo-U.S.
relations and other issues of concern to the Indian American community. It is active on
immigration issues197, family reunification, and health care issues; and works against
discrimination, hate crimes and glass ceilings.198
Members199: House India Caucus 200
(108th Congress elected in November 2002) (list updated June 18, 2004)
112 Democrats, 74 republicans, Total 186
16% of its members (30/186) are also aligned with the Caucus on Pakistan and Pakistani
Americans. Among these 30, 19 are Democrats and 11 Republicans.
19 members (18 Democrats, 1 Republican) are Jewish members of Congress who are known
to be actively involved members of the India Caucus. This is more than half of the Jewish
representatives (i.e. 26) in the House of Representatives201. While there is no pro-Israel
equivalent of the India Caucus, it is interesting to see how many Jewish members of the
House are active leaders of the causes to enhance America's relations with both India and
Israel.202 Three (all Democrats) Jewish members of the India Caucus are also members of the
Pakistan Caucus. (cf. Chapter 9)
Joseph Crowley, Co-Chairman
D-New York Joe Wilson, Co-Chairman
R-South Carolina
Neil Abercrombie
D-Hawaii Gary Ackerman JC
D-New York
195 Denton, W., February 4, 2002 196 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 29; Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000 http://www.usindiafriendship.net/congress/caucus/caucus.html http://joewilson.house.gov/Issues/Issue/?IssueID=105 http://crowley.house.gov/biography/index.htm 197 To give an example: in 2000, forty Indian computer programmers were arrested in San Antonio. Consequently, the issue of racism and discrimination echoed among some of the Indian computer-consulting firms that employ Indian professionals on H-1B temporary work visas. The State Department was heavily pressured by the India Caucus to obtain a full report from the INS (Immigration and Nationalization Service). (Chandra, N., February 9, 2000) 198 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 28 199 ● : Democrats ● : Republicans underlined: member of House India Caucus AND House Pakistan Caucus JC ● : Jewish affiliation 200 http://www.usindiafriendship.net/congress/caucus/caucus.html 201 http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/jewcong108.html 202 Nurnberger, R., February 15, 2002
56
Robert Andrews
D-New Jersey Joe Baca
D-California
Brian Baird
D-Washington J. Gresham Barrett
R-South Carolina
Bob Beauprez
R-Colorado Xavier Becerra
D-California
Chris Bell
D-Texas Shelley Berkley JC
D-Nevada
Howard Berman JC
D-California Judy Biggert
R-Illinois
Michael Bilirakis
R-Florida Rob Bishop
R-Utah
Earl Blumenauer
D-Oregon Rick Boucher
D-Virginia
Kevin Brady
R-Texas Corrine Brown
D-Florida
Henry Brown
R-South Carolina Sherrod Brown
D-Ohio
Ginny Brown-Waite
R-Florida Michael Burgess
R-Texas
Max Burns
R-Georgia Ken Calvert
R-California
Chris Cannon
R-Utah Eric Cantor JC
R-Virginia
Lois Capps
D-California Michael Capuano
D-Massachusetts
Dennis Cardoza
D-California Brad Carson
D-Oklahoma
Steve Chabot
R-Ohio Ben Chandler
D-Kentucky
Jim Cooper
D-Tennessee Chris Cox
R-California
Barbara Cubin
R-Wyoming Danny Davis
D-Illinois
Jim Davis
D-Florida Peter DeFazio
D-Oregon
William Delahunt
D-Massachusetts Peter Deutsch JC
D-Florida
Jim DeMint
R-South Carolina Norm Dicks
D-Washington
Lloyd Doggett Michael Doyle
57
D-Texas D-Pennsylvania
John Duncan, Jr.
R-Tennessee Jennifer Dunn
R-Washington
Vernon Ehlers
R-Michigan Eliot Engel JC
D-New York
Phil English
R-Pennsylvania Anna Eshoo
D-California
Lane Evans
D-Illinois Eni Faleomavaega
D-American Samoa
Tom Feeney
R-Florida Mike Ferguson
R-New Jersey
Bob Filner JC
D-California Mark Foley
R-Florida
Randy Forbes
R-Virginia Harold Ford
D-Tennessee
Barney Frank JC
D-Massachusetts Trent Franks
R-Arizona
Martin Frost JC
D-Texas Scott Garrett
R-New Jersey
Richard Gephardt
D-Missouri Paul Gillmor
R-Ohio
Phil Gingrey
R-Georgia Bob Goodlatte
R-Virginia
Bart Gordon
D-Tennessee Kay Granger
R-Texas
Gene Green
D-Texas Mark Green
R-Wisconsin
James Greenwood
R-Pennsylvania Luis Gutierrez
D-Illinois
Katherine Harris
R-Florida s Alcee Hastings
D-Florida
J.D. Hayworth
R-Arizona Jeb Hensarling
R-Texas
Joseph Hoeffel
D-Pennsylvania Rush Holt
D-New Jersey
Darlene Hooley
D-Oregon Mike/Michael Honda
D-California
Steny Hoyer
D-Maryland Jay Inslee
D-Washington
Steve Israel JC
D-New York Sheila Jackson-Lee
D-Texas
58
Eddie Bernice Johnson
D-Texas Walter Jones
R-North Carolina
Paul Kanjorski
D-Pennsylvania Marcy Kaptur
D-Ohio
Sue Kelly
R-New York Patrick Kennedy
D-Rhode Island
Dale Kildee
D-Michigan Ron Kind
D-Wisconsin
Peter King
R-New York Mark Kirk
R-Illinois
Joe Knollenberg
R-Michigan Jim Kolbe
R-Arizona
Dennis Kucinich
D-Ohio Ray LaHood
R-Illinois
Nick Lampson
D-Texas Tom Lantos JC (survivor Holocaust)
D-California
Rick Larsen
D-Washington Steven LaTourette
R-Ohio
Barbara Lee
D-California Sander Levin JC
D-Michigan
Jerry Lewis
R-California John Lewis
D-Georgia
John Linder
R-Georgia Frank Lobiondo
R-New Jersey
Zoe Lofgren
D-California Nita Lowey JC
D-New York
Carolyn McCarthy
D-New York Karen McCarthy
D-Missouri
Thaddeus McCotter
R-Michigan Jim McDermott
D-Washington
Mike McIntyre
D-North Carolina Michael McNulty
D-New York
Denise Majette
D-Georgia Carolyn Maloney
D-New York
Donald Manzullo
R-Illinois Jim Matheson
D-Utah
Martin Meehan
D-Massachusetts Kendrick Meek
D-Florida
Gregory Meeks
D-New York Robert Menendez
D-New Jersey
59
Juanita Millender-McDonald
D-California Brad Miller
D-North Carolina
Gary Miller
R-California Jeff Miller
R-Florida
Alan Mollohan
D-West Virginia Jim Moran
D-Virginia
Sue Myrick
R-North Carolina Grace Napolitano
D-California
Richard Neal
D-Massachusetts Bob Ney
R-Ohio
Frank Pallone
D-New Jersey Donald Payne
D-New Jersey
Steve Pearce
R-New Mexico Charles Pickering
R-Mississippi
Joseph Pitts
R-Pennsylvania David Price
D-North Carolina
Deborah Pryce
R-Ohio Adam Putnam
R-Florida
George Radanovich
R-California Nick Rahall
D-West Virginia
Charles Rangel
D-New York Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
R-Florida
Steven Rothman JC
D-New Jersey Edward Royce
R-California
Tim Ryan
D-Ohio Linda Sanchez
D-California
Loretta Sanchez
D-California Jim Saxton
R-New Jersey
Janice Schakowsky JC
D-Illinois Adam Schiff JC
D-California
Robert Scott
D-Virginia Edward Schrock
R-Virginia
Pete Sessions
R-Texas Brad Sherman JC
D-California
Adam Smith
D-Washington Hilda Solis
D-California
Mark Souder
R-Indiana John Spratt
D-South Carolina
Fortney "Pete" Stark
D-California Cliff Stearns
R-Florida
Mike Thompson John F. Tierney
60
D-California D-Massachusetts
Pat Toomey
R-Pennsylvania Edolphus Towns
D-New York
Michael Turner
R-Ohio Mark Udall
D-Colorado
Tom Udall
D-New Mexico Fred Upton
R-Michigan
Chris Van Hollen
D-Maryland Peter Visclosky
D-Indiana
David Vitter
R-Louisiana James Walsh
R-New York
Diane Watson
D-California Melvin Watt
D-North Carolina
Anthony Weiner JC
D-New York Dave Weldon
R-Florida
Robert Wexler JC
D-Florida Ed Whitfield
R-Kentucky
David Wu
D-Oregon Albert Wynn
D-Maryland
61
5. Caucus on Pakistan and Pakistani Americans in the U.S. House of Representatives
The Caucus on Pakistan and Pakistani Americans is of a much younger age than the
India House Caucus. In fact, it was only just recently on May 27th 2004 that the Pakistani
community in the U.S. initiated steps towards forming a Pakistan Caucus on Capitol Hill.203
The idea to form a group was conceived by a group of more than hundred Pakistani
Americans from around the country who had gathered in Washington on February 28th,
2004.204 The caucus is formed and headed by U.S. lawmakers but receives support from the
PAL-C which works on the Caucus' link to the community it represents.205 PAL-C urges the
Pakistani Americans to make contributions to national campaigns through PAL-C PAC and
will simultaneously make sure that "the impact of their contributions is profound and
noticeable".206
The plan is to build a proactive bipartisan caucus that will create a strategic bridge
between Pakistani-Americans and their representatives in the U.S. Congress. The Pakistan
Caucus will maximize upon the strength of the Pakistani-American community and use it as a
conduit in fostering a solid, long-term relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan. It is
believed that the pursuit of policies that ensure a friendly U.S.-Pakistan relationship and an
engaged and active Pakistani-American community will produce long-term advantages for
both the U.S. and Pakistan.207
The Pakistan Caucus will serve the following objectives (as mentioned in the "Dear
colleague"-letter of Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN) and Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) sent on
July 9, 2004): to foster mutual respect, understanding and cooperation between Americans
and Pakistanis in abroad range of fields, to improve and develop long term political and
security relations between the U.S. and Pakistan, to enhance U.S.-Pakistan economic relations
203 Pakistan Caucus on Capitol Hill formed, May 28th, 2004 204 Pakistan Caucus on Capitol Hill formed, May 28th, 2004; PAL-C PAC Launched, May 27, 2004 205 Pakistan Caucus on Capitol Hill formed, May 28th, 2004 206 PAL-C PAC Launched, May 27, 2004 207 The Establishment of the Congressional Pakistan Caucus at the US House of Representatives, September 17, 2004; http://www.palc.us/index.php?id=49
62
and lend support to a bilateral Free Trade Agreement, to support and increase academic
interaction between the U.S. and Pakistan, to support Pakistan's efforts towards socio-
economic improvement and its drive toward human resource development, and to support the
interests of the Pakistani-Americans and work for their integration into the mainstream
American society.208 The initiative should also help to counter the "vicious" campaigns and
attacks on Pakistan of the USINPAC.209
PAL-C registered a PAC in the first week of June with the Federal Election
Commission in Washington to support and endorse public officials.210 The Caucus was
formally inaugurated on September 22nd, 2004 by President Musharraf addressing the
inaugural session on the Hill. The President said: "This Caucus will help in building the
image of our country in the U.S. and I am very happy to see this reality come true." He urged
the Caucus members to visit Pakistan and have a better understanding "and remove
misconceptions about our country". He also asked the Caucus members to highlight Pakistan's
role in the war against terrorism and reminded them that so far Pakistan had arrested more
than 600 terror suspects extraditing some to the U.S. Additionally; he congratulated the
Pakistani community, particularly the PAL-C, which helped to form the Caucus. He reminded
the Caucus members of the fact that Pakistan had played a key role in several conflicts
wherein the U.S. was involved; "We also contributed a lot in the past, specially during the
Cold War and the struggle for freedom in Afghanistan This is a long-term and broad-based
relationship."211
The Republican co-chair of the Pakistan Caucus is Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN) and the
Democratic co-chair is Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX). It should be noted that Rep. Jackson Lee
is also a member of the House India Caucus. Rep. Jackson Lee said; "the establishment of the
208 Join the Congressional Pakistan Caucus, July 9, 2004; The Establishment of the Congressional Pakistan Caucus at the US House of Representatives, September 17, 2004 209 Pakistan Caucus on Capitol Hill, June 1st, 2004 210 Pakistan Caucus on Capitol Hill, June 1st, 2004 211 Musharraf calls for promoting Pakistan interests in US , Sept 24th, 2004
63
Congressional Pakistan Caucus, which is an official entity of the U.S. Congress, is an historic
event."212
PAL-C believes that the establishment of the Pakistan Caucus will develop the values
of citizenship and political participation in the Pakistani-American community through
increased voter registration, campaign contributions, and lobbying activities. The Caucus will
also enhance the standing of Pakistani-Americans in the U.S. political system, believing that
Americans of Pakistani heritage are significantly underrepresented in the American political
system.213
Despite the fact that the Caucus was only formed in September 2004, Rep. Jackson
Lee did not hesitate in November 2004 to designate it as a "phenomenal success". She used
more symbolic rhetoric when exclaiming: "It was the famed civil rights leader and proud
Muslim-American Malcolm X who said: “The future belongs to those who prepare for it
today. That sentiment was proven true on Tuesday, November 2 when a record number of
Muslim Americans went to the polls and voted."214
Allegedly, an earlier informal Congressional Caucus on Pakistan and Pakistani
Americans was formed in 1994 or 1993, but became defunct quite quickly. Dan Burton, at
that point a ranking member of the International Relations Committee, was also then one of
the co-chairmen. Apparently, Rep. Burton and also Rep. Robert Torricelli used to receive
lavish campaign contributions from pro-Khalistani Sikhs, Pakistani Americans and Indian
Americans who supported independence for Kashmir from India.215 Moreover, after its
dissolution a Kashmir-Pakistan Caucus led by Major Owens (D-NY) allegedly replaced it.216
Unfortunately, I did not find more information about these caucuses.
212 Congresswoman Sheila Lee Terms Congressional Pakistan Caucus an 'Historical Event', August 8, 2004 213 The Establishment of the Congressional Pakistan Caucus at the US House of Representatives, September 17, 2004 214 Bughio, K., November 19, 2004 215 Haniffa, A., March 28, 2007 216 Trunzo, J.D., Pakistani/Indian-Americans Raise Political Visibility; Haniffa, A., January 19, 2001
64
Members217: House Pakistan Caucus 218
29 Democrats, 26 Republicans, Total 55
55% of its members (30/55) are also aligned with the Caucus on India and Indian
Americans. Among these 30, 19 are Democrats and 11 Republicans.
Three (all Democrats) members of the Pakistan Caucus are Jewish members of the House of
Representatives and all three are also members of the India Caucus.
Dan Burton R 5th IN Co-chair Sheila Jackson Lee D 18th TX Co-chair
Todd Akin R - 2nd MO Joe Barton R - 6th -TX
Chris Bell D 25th TX Shelly, Berkley D - 1st - NV JC
Judy Biggert R - 13th - IL Jeb Bradley R - 1st - NH
Ginny Brown-Waite R 5th FL Sherwood Boehlert R 24th NY
Howard Buck Mckeon R 25th CA Steve Chabot R 1st OH
Ben Chandler D 6th KY John Conyers Jr. D 14th MI
Christopher Cox R 48th CA Elijah Cummings D 7th MD
Danny K. Davis D 7th IL Thomas Davis R 11th VA
Martin Frost D 24th TX JC Charles Gonzalez D 29th TX
Gene Green D 29th TX Kay Granger R 12th TX
Jeb Hensarling R 5th TX Pete Hoekstra R 2nd MI
Rush Holt D 12th NJ Michael Honda D 15th CA
Henry Hyde R 6th IL Johnny Isakson R 6th GA
Sam Johnson R 3rd TX Marcy Kaptur D 29th OH
Dale Kildee D 5th MI Peter King R 3rd NY
John B. Larson D 1st NY John Lewis D 9th GA
Ed Markey D 7th MA Karen McCarthy D 5th KS
James McGovern D 4th MA Gregory Meeks D 6th NY
Gary Miller R 42nd CA Solomon Ortiz D 27th TX
Major Owens D 11th NY Nick Rahall D 3rd WV
Joseph Pitts R 16th PA Rick Renzi R 1st AZ
Dana Rohrabacher R 46th CA Bobby Rush D 1st IL
Linda Sanchez D 39th CA Loretta Sanchez D 47th CA
Janice D. Schakowsky D 9th IL JC Pete Sessions R 32nd TX
Rob Simmons R 2nd CT Jim Turner D 2nd TX
Fred Upton R 6th MI Curt Weldon R 7th PA
Albert Wynn D 4th MD
217 ● : Democrats ● : Republicans underlined: member of House India Caucus AND House Pakistan Caucus JC ● : Jewish affiliation 218 http://www.palc.us/index.php?id=49
65
5. Voting behavior of India Caucus and Pakistan Caucus members: a sample survey
In order to examine (the sincerity of) the members' attachment to the India or Pakistan
Caucus or both, I decided to look at the members' voting behavior. Are members of the India
Caucus consistently voting pro-India when a resolution that might affect India is introduced in
the House?219 What is the voting behavior of those congressmen who are aligned with both
caucuses? Do they have a preference for one of the two countries or do they just vote
randomly? Do all members of the caucuses vote or are many not participating in the voting
process? Why do some members decide to abstain? I tried to answer these questions by means
of looking at eight very different resolutions.
The resolutions and the additional voting records of the congressmen used for this
sample survey were retrieved from the U.S.-India Friendship Council website.220 The U.S.-
India Friendship Council provides this information to spur Indian Americans to contact their
representatives either to thank them for voting pro-India or either to encourage them to vote
for India (when they did not previously). The Council does not provide voting records of
every resolution passed in the House concerning India or Pakistan, but offers a selection of
the one's that are deemed most valuable to the Indian American voters in the U.S. What I
explicitly want to point out is that my selection of resolutions was not randomly: I presumed
that those posted on the website are the one's that are essential to the Indian American
community in the U.S., and therefore, I decided to use these. Unfortunately, I did not find a
similar Pakistani American organization that provides the same sort of information. If this had
been the case, I would also have analyzed that organization's selection of resolutions.
Additionally, it would have enabled me to make a comparison between the resolutions
selected by Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans and thus detect whether similar or
dissimilar issues ignite the diaspora communities. This to say that I am not taking on an India-
focused perspective, but that I was restricted by the sources available to approach this
219 The same question can of course be posed about members of the Pakistan Caucus. 220 http://www.usindiafriendship.net/congress/votingrecord/votingrecord.html
66
question from the perspective of both diaspora communities. So, I will try to approach the
outcome of my analysis from a neutral point of view
I considered it necessary to tap into a wide range of resolutions since both the India
and the Pakistan Caucus are believed to be active on many different issues ranging from
improving U.S.-India, respectively U.S.-Pakistan ties to immigration-related matters
concerning the Indian American or Pakistani American community in the U.S.
The eight selected resolutions all have a very different makeup and features. The
earliest resolution dates from June 1999 and the most recent was passed in June 2004. I will
deal with them chronologically. Effectively this means that the first four resolutions (#1-4)
date from the 106th Congress (1998-2000), the fifth resolution (#5) was issued during the
107th Congress (2000-2002) and the final three resolutions (#6-8) were brought to the fore of
the House during the 108th Congress (2002-2004). This led to a difficulty to determine the
voting behavior of the members of the Pakistan Caucus. It was only very recently (i.e. May
27th, 2004) that the Pakistani American community in the U.S. initiated steps towards
forming a Pakistan Caucus on Capitol Hill.221 The Pakistani American Liaison Center (PAL-
C) registered a Political Action Committee (PAC) with the Federal Election Commission in
Washington to support and endorse public officials only in the first week of June 2004222 and
finally President Musharraf formally inaugurated the Caucus while addressing the inaugural
session on the Hill on September 22nd, 2004.223 This means that none of the resolutions I
deal with was passed after the formal launching of the Pakistan Caucus on the Hill.
Nevertheless, I did decide to analyze the voting behavior of the Pakistan Caucus members
using the resolutions that were passed before the formal launching of the Caucus. I have
assumed that when a congressman decides to join a certain caucus, he or she does this out of
his of her 'true' interests in the rationale the caucus defends (and not because it would render
221 Pakistan Caucus on Capitol Hill formed, May 28th, 2004 222 Pakistan Caucus on Capitol Hill, June 1st, 2004 223 Musharraf calls for promoting Pakistan interests in US , Sept 24th, 2004
67
him or her more votes from its constituents or a surplus in campaign funds). If there were any
consistency in a congressman's (voting) behavior, he or she would have already been voting
pro-Pakistan before the creation of the Pakistan Caucus. Therefore I did not consider this an
unbridgeable research problem. I will thus analyze the past voting behavior (i.e. before they
were actually members) of the congressmen aligned with the Pakistan Caucus. In this
perspective, I should mention that I also consider it quite ambiguous that some members are
aligned with both caucuses.
The method I applied was as follows. I compiled a list of the members of both the
India as well as the Pakistan Caucus, indicated which members belong to both caucuses and
then checked whether the members voted pro or contra India or Pakistan, abstained from
voting or did not participate in the voting at all. It is important to note that some resolutions
were withdrawn before they were even voted on and other resolutions never came to the full
House for voting.
5.1. The selected resolutions
1) The HIRC Kargil Resolution (House International Relations Committee, June
1999). This resolution was brought to the fore in June 1999 in the House International
Relations Committee (HIRC). The HIRC opposed Pakistan's support for the incursion into
Kashmir. Prior to the July 4, 1999 meeting between President Clinton and the Prime Minister
of Pakistan, when the latter pledged he would take concrete steps to restore the Line of
Control in Kashmir, the House International Relations Committee (HIRC) had approved a
resolution (The Gilman-Ackerman Kargil Resolution) calling on the Clinton Administration
to oppose Pakistan's support for the incursion into Kashmir and to block loans from
international financial institutions until Islamabad withdrew its forces from the Kargil-Drass-
Batalik areas. Since it was overtaken by events, the resolution did not come to the full House
for voting.
68
Gilman was the chairman of the Committee on International Relations and Ackerman
(D-NY) the Democratic co-chair of the India Caucus. The Resolution was passed by 22 votes
in favor, 5 opposed and 1 abstaining in the HIRC.
2) The Goodling Amendment (House of Representatives, July 21, 1999). The
Goodling Amendment, defeated in the House on July 21, 1999 by a vote of 169-256, would
have prohibited foreign military assistance (but not humanitarian aid or developmental
assistance) to countries (like India) that failed to support the U.S. at least 25% of the time in
the U.N. General Assembly.
Prior to the voting the co-chairmen of the India Caucus Ackerman (D-NY) and
Greenwood (R-PA) sent a "dear colleague" letter to all 435 lawmakers in the House. It stated:
"We do not believe that a nation's voting record on recorded votes in the U.N. is a fair way to
assess whether a country shares our values or our positions in the General Assembly. In the
General Assembly, 78% of resolutions were adopted by consensus and when those votes are
taken into consideration, India supports the U.S. position 84.2% of the time; on votes
designated as important by the State Department, India's voting co incidents with the U.S.,
including consensus, is 75%. Unlike Libya, Laos, Vietnam, Syria, Cuba and North Korea,
countries similarly affected by the Amendment, and that have consistently demonstrated their
hostility toward U.S. interests, India has sought to expand relations with the U.S. on a broad
range of economic, security and cultural issues. India clearly does not belong in the company
of these other nations targeted by this ill-advised proposal." The letter also added: "India is a
thriving sister democracy, which has recently celebrated its 50th year of independence. There
is much in common that we share with the world's most populous democracy. There are many
issues that bind our relations with India, including the important contributions made by the
well-educated and productive Indian-American community. U.S. assistance to India, and
elsewhere, serves our national interests and is provided because it promotes our policy ends,
not because it is a reward."
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The voting record on the Goodling Amendment was: 256 (Democrats-201;
Republicans-54; Independent-1) rejected the amendment, 169 (Republicans-161; Democrats-
8) voted in favor and 9 (Republicans-7; Democrats-2) did not participate in the voting.
After the floor vote, Ackerman issued a statement saying " We were privileged once
again in being victorious over those who are senselessly bashing India for whatever reason of
their own…The irony of this Amendment was that it would penalize India while holding
Pakistan harmless at a time when the world community had just caught Pakistan red-handed
in the commission of terrorist acts and acts of aggression, while India conducted itself in a
statesman-like fashion using admirable restraint as a nuclear power. Because of our efforts,
members (of the House) understood this reality and helped us in defeating this short-sighted
amendment." In his extended remarks Ackerman also explained: " India is making continued
progress on human rights and even with successive coalition governments, is pursuing
economic liberalization which will promote economic growth and provide U.S. companies
with economic opportunity."
3) The Burton Amendment (House of Representatives, August 2, 1999). This
amendment was never put to a vote on the House floor because it was withdrawn by its
supporter Dan Burton (R-IN), currently the republican co-chair of the Pakistan Caucus. The
proceedings in the House of Representatives on the Burton Amendment however make an
interesting reading. Twenty-one representatives spoke in favor of India. Only three, including
Rep. Burton, spoke against India, before the Amendment was withdrawn. In order to make an
assessment of this amendment, I will analyze its proceedings.
4) Support of Congress for recent elections in the Republic of India (H. Con. Res.
211, House of Representatives, November 16, 1999). On November 16, 1999 the House of
Representatives passed by an overwhelming vote of 396 to 4 a resolution affirming strong
support for India. The House lauded India as "a shining example of democracy for all of Asia
to follow" and urged President Clinton to visit India and "broaden our special relationship
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with India into a strategic partnership". The resolution stressed that India and the U.S. "share
a special relationship as the world's most populous democracy and the world's oldest
democracy, respectively, and have a shared commitment to upholding the will of the people
and the rule of law."
The resolution was introduced by the democratic co-chair of the India Caucus
Ackerman (D-NY), and cosponsored by Sam Gejdenson (D-CT), Tom Lantos (D-CA),
Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and Alcee Hastings (D-FL).
5) The House's condemnation of the Taliban's move against minorities (House of
Representatives, May 25, 2001). On May 25, the U.S. House of Representatives International
Relations Committee unanimously condemned the Afghanistan Taliban's move to require
Hindus to wear symbols identifying their religious identity. The concurrent resolution was
referred to the Committee on International Relations. On June 13, the House passed the
Resolution, which was cosponsored by over 80 lawmakers, by a vote of 420 to 0.
6) Commending India on its celebration of Republic Day (H. Con. Res. 15, House of
Representatives, January 27, 2003). The concurrent resolution on the commending India on
its celebration of Republic Day stated: "Whereas the Republic of India is the world's largest
democracy; Whereas on January 26, 1950, India adopted its Constitution, which formalized
India as a parliamentary democracy; Whereas the celebration of India's republic Day on
January 26th is the second most important national holiday after Independence Day; Whereas
the framers of India's Constitution were greatly influenced by the American Founding Fathers
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Adams; Whereas among the rights and
freedoms provided to the people of India under its Constitution is universal suffrage for all
men and women over the age of eighteen; Whereas India´s Constitution adopted the
American ideals of equality for all citizens, regardless of faith, gender, or ethnicity; Whereas
the basic freedoms we cherish in America such as the freedom of speech, freedom of
association, and freedom of religion are also recognized in India; Whereas Mohandas
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Mahatma Gandhi is recognized around the world as the father of India´s nonviolent struggle
for independence; Whereas people of many faiths, including Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and
Christians, were united in securing India´s freedom from colonial rule and have all served in
various capacities in high-ranking government positions; Whereas the Republic of India has
faithfully adhered to the principles of democracy by continuing to hold elections on a regular
basis on the local, regional, and national levels; Whereas the people of the United States and
the Republic of India have a common bond of shared values and a strong commitment to
democratic principles; and Whereas President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Atal
Bihari Vajpayee are elected leaders of the world's two largest democracies and are actively
cultivating strong ties between the United States and India: Now, therefore, be it resolved by
the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That Congress (1) commends India on
its celebration of Republic Day; and (2) reiterates its support for continued strong relations
between the United States and India." The concurrent resolution was referred to the
Committee on International Relations (H.R. 171).
7) Lauding Indian Americans (H.R. 352, House of Representatives, May 12, 2004).
For the first time ever, the House of Representatives passed 415 to 2 a resolution lauding the
contribution of Indian Americans. The resolution noted that "people of Indian origin, who
have for decades immigrated to the United States, have made extraordinary contributions to
the United States, helping to make the United States a more efficient and prosperous country."
It praised, "The generations of doctors and nurses, scientists who have helped in defense,
space, medical and computational research." It highlighted their participation in the space
shuttle program, "at great personal sacrifice", a reference to Kalpana Chawla who died in the
Columbia space shuttle disaster in 2003 along with six of her colleagues. Additionally, it
asserted, "people of Indian origin have shared and integrated their rich culture into the fabric
of American daily life."224
224 Haniffa, A., May 28, 2004
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8) Amendment to Homeland Security Act (H.R. 4567, House of Representatives,
June, 2004). This amendment introduced by Tom Tancredo (R-CO) sought to make state
security authorities responsible in some matters to the Immigration Service, a step that Joe
Crowley (D-NY), co-chair of the India Caucus, said was “mean spirited” and “forced local
state and police officers into positions of federal immigration agents.”225
The amendment stipulated that none of the funds in the Act may be made available to
any state or local governments who refuse to share information with U.S. Immigration and
Customs officials as required by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility of 1996 -- 8USC1373(a) or to any state government that has enacted
legislation allowing persons not legally present in the U.S. to obtain drivers licenses because
according to Tancredo "drivers licenses are in fact domestic passports." According to
Tancredo "the refusal of local governments to share information with federal immigration
authorities often results in local law enforcement arresting, and then releasing criminal aliens
-- who may then move on to commit crimes in other parts of the country rather than being
deported. The Washington Times, for example, reported in June of last year that in, '[a]
December rape of a woman in [New York,] four of the five men charged in the case were
illegal immigrants and three had prior convictions that, in keeping with federal law, would
have allowed their deportation.' [Yet], New York City's sanctuary policy prevented that from
happening."226
As this citation shows, the amendment links immigrants in general to crime. It would
also promote persecutions and deportations of families that are already integrated in the
American economy.
225 Amendment seeking change in immigration service security defeated, June 18, 2004 226 Ibid.
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The amendment was defeated by a vote of 259 to 148 with 146 Republicans
supporting the measure and 68 Republicans opposing it. Among Democrats, 190 opposed the
amendment and two supported it.227
5.2. Analysis of the resolutions and the voting behavior
1) The HIRC Kargil Resolution: the disposition of this resolution is international in
the sense that it holds opinions about foreign relations between the U.S., India and Pakistan.
Since the main goal was to block loans for Pakistan from international financial institutions, it
is obvious that voting in favor of the resolution is voting against Pakistan. Additionally, it
implies that it is a pro-India vote because the resolution also called on the Clinton
administration to oppose Pakistan' support for the incursion into Pakistan.
The resolution never came to the full House for voting but was only passed in the
House International Relations Committee. Of the 22 votes in favor of India 13 members were
members of the India Caucus. One of these 13 is now also a member of the Pakistan Caucus.
This means that in this case this representative favored India instead of Pakistan.
Among the 5 who cast a vote against the resolution were two representatives who are
currently leading members of the Pakistan Caucus. They were Dan Burton (R-IN), the
republican co-chair of the Pakistan Caucus and Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA).
One representative, William Goodling (R-PA), abstained and that is quite surprising
since he introduced the Goodling Amendment about a month later (cf. resolution #2).
2) Contrary to the HIRC Kargil Resolution, the Goodling Amendment did come to
the full House for voting. It is thus essential to analyze the voting behavior of all the
members of both the India as well as the Pakistan Caucus.
Again the amendment's stance is international. It calls for the prohibition of foreign
military assistance to countries that failed to support the U.S. at least 25% of the time in the
U.N. General Assembly. The resolution also affects other countries besides India such as
227 Ibid.
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Cuba, Vietnam, Libya, Syria, Laos and North Korea. Therefore, I believe that Ackerman's
comment that "We were privileged once again in being victorious over those who are
senselessly bashing India for whatever reason of their own." is somewhat exaggerated or too
India-centric, since the amendment might just as well been introduced to "bash" other
countries. I want to underscore that voting in favor of the amendment (and thus against India)
would not have implied simply bashing India but simultaneously also other countries. And
vice versa, voting against it might have meant favoring India but could also have meant
favoring Libya, North Korea, etc. One could question whether it even makes sense to analyze
these votes. I think it does for two reasons. First, it is one of the few selected resolutions that
came to the full House for voting. Second, I consider it imperative in this case that the
members of the India Caucus voted against the resolution in order to 'prove' their 'true
interests' in the country and of course, the opposite (i.e. voting in favor) counts for members
of the Pakistan Caucus.
It is apparent in the general voting record228 regarding this issue that a strong
Republican-Democrat divide took place. The majority of the members (131) of the India
Caucus participated in the voting. Hundred and five members voted against the amendment
(i.e. pro-India). Among the 105, there are 8 members that are now also members of the
Pakistan Caucus. This does not mean that the latter voted explicitly against Pakistan because -
as explained earlier- this amendment would not have affected Pakistan in a malignant way.
Nevertheless, 26 members of the India Caucus voted in favor of the amendment; 7 (all
Republicans) among them are now members of the Pakistan Caucus. Interesting about the
India Caucus members who voted against India, 25 of them are Republican. This might be an
indicator that these representatives were not as much driven by their 'India-connection' as by
their Republican affiliation. Two India Caucus members did not participate in the voting.
228 256 (Democrats-201; Republicans-54; Independent-1) rejected the amendment, 169 (Republicans-161; Democrats-8) voted in favor and 9 (Republicans-7; Democrats-2) did not participate in the voting.
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An overwhelming majority of the Pakistan Caucus members cast their vote. Only 14
of the 55 did not participate. This matter however is irrelevant since I used the list of
members of the 108th Congress in order to look at an event that took place in the 106th
Congress. This means that some of the non-participating members might not have been a
representative at that time.
More than half (28) of the Pakistan Caucus members voted against the resolution and
thus pro-India (but also other countries), but let's not forget that 8 of these are also members
of the India Caucus; among them the Democratic co-chair of the Pakistan Caucus Sheila
Jackson-Lee (D-TX). Thirteen Pakistan members voted in favor of the amendment and thus
against India (but also other countries), but more than half (7) is aligned with the India
Caucus. Again the Republican-Democrat divide pops up, because all the members of the
Pakistan Caucus who voted in favor of the amendment are Republicans.
Can we make a general assessment with this information? The question is what
happened with the large bulk of India Caucus members who did not cast their vote? And,
what is the explanation of the two India Caucus members who did not participate? Clearly
party-affiliation (i.e. whether one is a Republican or Democrat) is paramount to the fact that
one is a member of one of the caucuses.
Finally, in addition to their membership of one or two caucuses, and to their being
Democrat or Republican, we should mention motivations that transcend these partisanships.
As an example, principles of international collaboration and respect of the equality and
freedom of all nations to decide for themselves, should condemn the “punishment” of an
“evil” nation that was only exerting its rights to vote. Analysis of arguments brought forward
in the House by individual representatives would reveal such considerations.
3) The Burton Amendment. As mentioned before, the sponsor withdrew this
amendment before representatives could cast their ballot. The Burton amendment was
obviously important regarding U.S.-Pakistan as well as U.S.-India relations. Previously in
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1997, a similar amendment was offered by Burton and it was rejected by a vote of 342-82.
The proceedings are nevertheless interesting. Therefore, I decided to highlight the remarks of
those who spoke in favor of India and thus clearly against Pakistan and those who spoke
against India and in favor of Pakistan.
Twenty-one representatives spoke in support of India. Almost all of them are aligned
with the India Caucus. Among them were also Ben Gilman (R-NY), the chairman of the
Committee on International Relations and Doug Bereuter (R-NE), the chairman of the
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. However, two of them are now also members of the
Pakistan Caucus, i.e. Rep. Davis (D-IL) and Rep. Jackson Lee (D-TX). The latter -not to
forget- is now the Democratic co-chair of the Pakistan Caucus.
Those who spoke against India are the current Republican co-chair of the Pakistan
Caucus, Dan Burton and two other members of the current Pakistan Caucus, i.e. Major Owens
(D-NY) and Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA). However, both Owens and Rohrabacher also made
positive remarks about India.
In order to defend his case Rep. Burton kept on stressing India's human rights
violations: "We have been concerned about human rights around the world on a very selective
basis in this country." Adding: "India also wants to help Iraqi rehabilitate some Iraqi oil
refineries and a lubricant oil plant…So India wants to help one of the worst tyrannical
regimes in the world, Saddam Hussein's, at a time when we are participating in a U.N.
embargo."
In reply to Burton's human rights violation-argument, Rep. Berman (D-CA), a
member of the India Caucus argued: "According the latest State Department report on human
rights practices, India is making real progress."
A prominent Pakistan Caucus member Rep. Rohrabacher pointed to the major errors
that India has such as Kashmir: "When it comes to the Kashmir and the Punjab and Jammu,
the Indian Government might as well not be a democracy. For people in those areas, India
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might as well be Nazi Germany." Acknowledging the democracy in India, he declared: "First
of all, and again let me go back to, India is a democratic government. I would hope people
would invest in India, and I hope that the United States has closer ties to India in the future.
Nothing would make that more likely than for them to seek peace in Kashmir by permitting
the people there to have a vote of plebiscite which India, because of ego, continues to say no,
no, no. And as long as that happens, India will be spending tens of millions if not hundreds of
millions of dollars on weapons. Mr. Chairman, think of this. Today we are only talking about
decreasing the foreign aid to India by $11 million, when the Indians themselves are spending
hundreds of millions on conventional weapons and at least tens of millions, probably
hundreds of millions, on nuclear weapons as well. That makes no sense at all for us to be
subsidizing the weapons program of India. Instead, we should be sending this message to
convince them to solve this long-festering problem in Kashmir and permit some of the
democratic reforms to take place in Punjab and Jammu."
Rep. Clayton (D-NC) speaking in defense of India, proclaimed: "Any action by the
United States to stigmatize India on inaccurate human rights allegations will likely complicate
our efforts to create a lasting and meaningful friendship in a very dangerous part of the
World. It should also be noted that the aid we provide to India goes to very important
projects. The aid we provide to India goes to the control of AIDS, to population control,
disease control and rural development. These are important and worthy causes, causes that not
only benefit India, they benefit us and the rest of the world." Similar comments were made by
a number of representatives.
The current Democratic co-chair of the Pakistan Caucus had only one remark: "Mr.
Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Burton amendment."
Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ), a former co-chair of the India Caucus found it "so sad to
listen to my colleagues in support of this Burton amendment spread inaccurate information
about India which has tried so hard to deal effectively with human rights problems within the
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country. The true human rights problem in Kashmir is that of a violent separatist movement
supported by outsiders, supported by Pakistan, carried out by the followers of bin Laden and
other extremist terrorist leaders destroying the homes and lives of thousands of peace-loving
Hindus and Muslims." Rep. Burton denied the fact that he was spreading inaccurate
information and added: "My colleagues are obviously concerned about constituents of theirs
who lobby them hard. I understand that." And some time later: "I think India unleashed all of
its resources that they possibly could to lobby this body so that we would not ever do it again.
They evidently have been fairly successful."
Rep. Hastings (D-FL) opposed the amendment for economic reasons: "The United
States is India's largest trading partner and largest investor. U.S. Investment has grown from
$500 million per year in 1991 to more than $12 billion in 1999. Many large American
companies have seen the economic opportunities in India and have invested heavily there. We
clearly need to sustain and further strengthen the momentum that has been gained in U.S.-
Indo relations. Instead of proposing legislation that merely alienates an important ally, I
suggest the esteemed member from Indiana [Rep.Burton] first take the time to travel to India
and see its progress first-hand." Rep. Burton replied: "I would just like to point out that there
are seven multilateral and 13 bilateral donors that provide assistance to India. The United
States is the seventh largest donor after the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the
European Union, Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom. So there is a lot of people that
are giving money to India. But nobody is sending any kind of a message to them that they
ought to clean up their act as far as the human rights tragedies that are going on."
Others stressed the fact that: "Democratic India is in a tough neighborhood. China
occupies Tibet to India's north. China sells nuclear and ballistic technology to Pakistan on
India's west, and China has sold over $1 billion worth of arms to the drug-running Burmese
military junta to India east. Our Nation should be strongly supporting India, the only truly
democratic nation of the subcontinent. Passage of the Burton amendment would undercut our
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strategic goals of supporting peace and stability through the promotion of democratic
governments in the region."
I highlighted these pieces of the debate to show what kind of rhetoric is used in this
discussion. While Rep. Burton kept stressing India's human rights violations in order to
defend his proposal (his only argument in fact), others contested his statements by pointing
out the economic advantages of a strong U.S.-India relationship, by lauding India's
democratic government, by bashing other countries such as China and by proclaiming that
cutting aid would imply cutting aid for the control of AIDS and rural development programs.
4) The House Resolution that expresses the Congress' support for the recent elections
in the Republic of India is from a different nature than the previous three resolutions I
discussed. Where the former three resolutions clearly involved or would have involved a
'substantive' impact on India or Pakistan (meaning that they all dealt with some sort of
financial assistance or withdrawal), this resolution can be called symbolic only. This is not to
say that it does not have any impact on foreign relations between India and the U.S. On the
contrary, I believe that these sorts of resolutions can have a significant impact on foreign
relations in the long run and that they are often a launch pad for closer ties between countries.
The resolution, for example, called on "the President to travel to India as part of any trip to
South Asia" and also urged "the President to broaden our special relationship with India into a
strategic partnership."
This resolution in particular stressed that India and the U.S. "share a special
relationship as the world's most populous democracy and the world's oldest democracy,
respectively, and have a shared commitment to upholding the will of the people and the rule
of law." Simultaneously, the Congress wanted to congratulate "the people of the Republic of
India on the successful conclusion on their recent national elections and the Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee on his reelection." I think it is not unjust to state that the congratulation
on behalf of Vajpayee's reelection is at the same time an endorsement of his leadership. Much
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of the rhetoric used in the congressional proceedings is very similar to the rhetoric that was
used in opposition of the Burton amendment and comes across quite repetitive.
The resolution was voted on in a full House. Some of the representatives who spoke
in favor of it, did not refrain from making comparisons between India and Pakistan and make
use of the situation to resort to some 'Pakistan bashing'. Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA) said:
"While India undertook this monumental free and democratic election, there was a military
coup in Pakistan where the democratically elected government was thrown out of office and
its leaders imprisoned. I think it is important for all of us, Members of Congress and
presidential candidates, to understand that a military coup is not something that should be
applauded by the American people or Members of our Congress or any political figure." Also
Rep. Sam Gedjenson expressed his frustration about Pakistan by saying that "apparently we
are not going to be able to bring forward the resolution on Pakistan because I think it is
important for this Congress to speak clearly about the importance of democratic institutions.
India and the United States have a strong relationship that is going to continue to grow."
What is remarkable about this resolution's proceeding is that quite a number of the
representatives use their speaking minutes to condemn other countries and China in particular.
Rep. Sherrod Brown (D-OH) refers to China by exclaiming "our State Department, our U.S.
Trade Representative's Office and the Republicans in this Congress should quit lavishing all
their attention on the People's Republic of China and start working with our sister democracy
in India to bring stability to South and to East Asia."
Surprisingly, one of the more active members of the Pakistan Caucus, Dana
Rohrabacher (R-CA) (who supported the Burton amendment, cf. #3), also spoke in favor of
India. He exclaimed: "I rise in strong support of this resolution commending India for having
yet another free election which again underscores India's commitment to democracy. Over the
last four decades, however, let us recognize that India has not, and I repeat, not been a friend
of the United States. During the Cold War, India consistently voted against the United States,
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consistently condemned everything that they could about the things we were doing while
overlooking misdeeds of the Soviet Union. They were, in fact, a friend of Russia and the
Soviet Union and not a friend of the United States. However, with that said, the Cold War is
over and India's commitment to democracy, as demonstrated by this free election, I think
should bring the United States and India closer together in the future. Yes, we should forget
any disagreements we had in the past and work on those things that bind us together with this
great, huge democracy. I agree with the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown). Our businessmen
and people of the United States should look to India, this democracy, in terms of investment
and in terms of trying to work together economically and politically rather than with the
world's worst human rights abuser in China."
Let me now turn to the voting records. Since this resolution solely deals with India as
its subject, voting for this resolution definitely means voting pro-India. However, voting pro
does not automatically signify a contra-Pakistan stance, but we should keep in mind that some
malicious remarks about the country were made in the congressional proceedings.
The motion was agreed to by a vote of 396-4 (Republicans 200-2, Democrats 195-2,
Independents 1-0, 34 representatives did not participate in the voting). Not so astonishing, a
tremendous majority of the India Caucus members (i.e. 145) voted in favor of the resolution;
none voted against it, but quite a high number (10) did not cast its vote. It is obvious from
this voting record that the India Caucus members consistently voted pro-India.
None of the members of the Pakistan Caucus voted against the resolution, not even
the infamous "India-basher" Dan Burton (R-IN). Forty-one members cast their vote in favor
of India of which 23 are also members of the India Caucus. Two members refrained from
voting.
The four representatives voting against India were Rep. Bonior (D-MI), Rep. Helen
Chenoweth-Hage (R-ID), Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA) and Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX). Bonior's
Press Secretary explained his vote by stating that Bonior voted against the resolution
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"primarily because it made no mention of the problems in Kashmir." Rep. Chenoweth-Hage
agreed with the primary message of the resolution, which congratulates the Republic of India
for its successful national elections and election of the Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
However, she felt that the resolution was very vague in defining what a "strategic partnership"
might entail between the United States and India. An aide to Rep. Markey said: "Part of the
resolution expressed congratulations to Prime Minister Vajpayee. His Administration was the
one that broke the moratorium on nuclear testing and the Congressman did not want to
support the Administration that had gone forward with a nuclear test." Rep. Markey is now
ironically enough a member of the Pakistan Caucus. According to Rep. Paul's Chief of Staff:
"Rep. Paul votes against things that praise or condemn foreign governments. Mr. Paul
believes that it is not a constitutional function of our government to comment on other
countries' internal policies. That's their business, not ours." In an aside, he mentioned that
hypothetically, if there had been a previous resolution condemning India, the congressman
would have voted against that as well for the same reason.
5) The resolution that condemns the Afghanistan's Taliban move to require Hindus to
wear symbols identifying their religious identity is to a large extent a human rights issue but
also expresses a sentiment about U.S. foreign relations.
The concurrent resolution was introduced by Rep. Eliot Engel (D-NY) and co-
sponsored by 62 representatives. Since the vote came to a vote in a full House and was passed
by a vote of 420-0, it is unnecessary to analyze the India and Pakistan Caucus members'
voting behavior. Clearly, all the members voted in favor of the resolution.
Interestingly, 40 of the co-sponsors who introduced the concurrent resolution are also
members of the India Caucus. Among these 40, 13 members are aligned with the Jewish
Caucus (3 are member of both caucuses). This is not so surprising since the Taliban's move to
require Hindus in Afghanistan to wear symbols identifying them as Hindu is exactly what
Nazi Germany forced Jews to do. This kind of rhetoric was applied in the resolution:
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"Whereas on May 22, 2001, the Taliban regime of Afghanistan directed Hindus and other
non-Muslims to wear a yellow identity symbol and for Hindu women to fully cover
themselves in a veil; Whereas this proposal is reminiscent of the yellow Star of David that
Jews were forced to wear in Nazi Germany and Nazi-occupied areas… That Congress
strongly condemns the Taliban's use of Nazi tactics to force Hindus in Afghanistan to wear
symbols identifying them as Hindu…"
Eleven of the co-sponsors are members of the Pakistan Caucus. Eight among them are
members of both caucuses. The resolution "calls on the Government of Pakistan to use its
influence with the Taliban regime to demand that the Taliban revoke the reprehensible policy
of forcing Afghan Hindus and other non-Muslims to wear a yellow identity symbol."
Additionally, Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA), the only Holocaust survivor in the U.S. Congress,
stated that Pakistan is the one country left that can influence and affect the Taliban and yet the
government of Pakistan is reluctant to use its influence with the Taliban. And also Rep. Dana
Rohrabacher (R-CA), aligned with the Pakistan Caucus, stated that he was happy to hear Rep.
Lantos will put the Pakistan Foreign Minister on the spot, not only on Pakistan's
acquiescence, but also on their direct involvement in the creation and support of the Taliban.
Additionally, he declared that we need to make sure as Americans that we stand against
fanaticism like the Taliban, for it is fanaticism that will bring down Pakistan and our friends
in that area.
Members of the India and Pakistan Caucus are unmistakably sensitive about these
kinds of human rights issues. Despite the fact that some Pakistan members might not be so
warmhearted to Hindus (beware: this is a pure hypothetical statement!), not one of the
Pakistan Caucus members voted against the resolution.
6) The resolution that commends India on its celebration of Republic Day is very
similar to the House resolution that expressed its support for the elections in India (#4). The
same rhetoric wherein the democratic ideals of the U.S. and India are underscored is used
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assiduously. Again, this resolution has more a symbolic value, but -as explained before- this
resolution sends an important message of warming relations between India and the U.S.
Rep. Joe Wilson (R-SC) the co-chair of the India Caucus in the 108th Congress
introduced the concurrent resolution in the Committee on International Relations. Thirty of
the 32 co-sponsors are members of the India Caucus, 6 of the Pakistan Caucus and 5 were
members of both caucuses.
I assume this resolution was introduced by some of the members of the India Caucus
to satisfy its Indian American constituents. This assumption can also be made about
resolution #4. The only difference between #4 and #6 is that in the concurrent resolution of
the latter representatives did not resort to bashing Pakistan or China.
7) The resolution lauding Indian Americans is quite exceptional and this for several
reasons. First, the overwhelming majority of congressmen that voted in favor of the resolution
(415-2) is quite remarkable (14 abstained). Second, the fact that it was introduced by a junior
pro-India lawmaker Juanita Millender-McDonald (D-CA) and was expected to go nowhere.
Rep. Millender-McDonald an African American had apparently a very good reason to
introduce the proposal. The Indian community, particularly the Indian American Friendship
Council (IAFC) supported her and that even held fundraisers on her behalf (though an Indian
American was running against her). With the IAFC's backing, she clobbered Peter Mathews,
who was expected to sweep the Indian American vote. It was also the IAFC that convinced
her to join the India Caucus. Third, her resolution -as stated in India Abroad- may not have
gained traction if it had not caught the attention of Rep.Tom Lantos (CA-D). Rep. Lantos
himself had relied on support from the Indian American community to beat Ro Khanna in the
primaries and he decided to put all his weight behind the proposal.229 Fourth, this resolution is
doubtlessly symbolic. Especially if we consider the reason why this proposal was introduced.
Rep. Millender-McDonald as well as Rep. Lantos made this move in order to thank their
229 Haniffa, A., May 28, 2004
85
Indian American constituents who supported them during their election campaigns.
Furthermore, this resolution does not enjoy the power of law. Contrary to resolution #4 and
#6, this one does not have an impact on foreign relations and merely focuses on Indian
American citizens who hold the power to vote.
All the members of the India Caucus voted in favor of the proposal except Rep. Peter
DeFazio (D-OR). He abstained saying that while he agreed with the broad message of the
resolution and fully endorsed the portion lauding the Indian American community, he felt it
presented an unbalanced picture of India-U.S. relations, particularly in view of concerns over
outsourcing to India and consequent unemployment in the U.S. He complained: "While the
resolution mentions the export of US goods to India, it fails to acknowledge the rampant
export of American jobs to India. U.S. trade policies including our policy toward India have
failed American workers. Around 400,000 service jobs, including 27,000 technology jobs,
were siphoned off to India, China and other low-wage havens last year."230
Two representatives voted against the resolution. One of them was Rep. Paul (R-TX)
who also voted against the resolution that expressed support for the elections in India (cf. #4).
The second one was Rep. Sam Johnson (R-TX) who is a member of the Pakistan Caucus.
As stated before- this resolution was clearly a way for the India Caucus members to
thank and reach out to those Indian American constituents who have been supporting them by
means of funding and votes. While it is a valuable gesture, one should seriously question what
the real value and usefulness of this resolution is. Furthermore, it is an indicator of the
reasonable power that Indian Americans hold to lobby congressmen. I do not think the
Pakistan Caucus members would be able to pass a resolution lauding Pakistani Americans
with the same overwhelming majority of the votes. Simply because the Pakistani American
population does not make up for a third of the Indian Americans in the U.S. and because they
are less efficiently organized.
230 Ibid.
86
8) The Tancredo amendment came to a vote in a full House and can be considered
completely different from all the previous resolutions I discussed. This proposal is not
symbolic nor has it an overt influence on U.S. foreign relations. It belongs to the sphere of
U.S. domestic politics and is important for this research because it involves the treatment of
immigrants and therefore it affects Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans. One might
think it is not relevant to both the Indian American and Pakistani American community in the
U.S. because it focuses on illegal immigrants, but this is not the case. Primarily because a
segment of Indian and Pakistani immigrants in the U.S. is illegal, although a reliable estimate
of their numbers is not available. Second, while this proposal might affect illegal immigrants,
it can be considered as a starting point for other restricting immigration laws that could affect
legal immigrants. According to Ralph Nurnberger a very active member of the Indian
American Center for Political Awareness (IACPA), proposals dealing with immigration
reform have enormous consequences for the Indian American and Pakistani American
community.231
The reason why I included this proposal was to see whether India Caucus and
Pakistan Caucus members are also paying attention to matters that can affect the Indian
American and Pakistani American population. Let us not forget that the official names of both
caucuses are the Caucus on India and Indian Americans and the Caucus on Pakistan and
Pakistani Americans. In other words: all representatives who voted in favor of the amendment
voted against the lot of Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans.
Again, I believe it is important to keep the noticeable Republican-Democrat divide
(cf. #2) vis-à-vis this issue in mind. All the members (except 6) of the India Caucus
participated in the voting. Hundred twenty-three members (22 Republicans, 101 Democrats)
opposed and 49 (all Republicans) approved the Tancredo-amendment. Seven Democrats and
one Republican abstained. Among those opposing the amendment 22 members (3
231 Nurnberger, R., January 30, 2004
87
Republicans, 19 Democrats) are also members of the Pakistan Caucus, among those
approving 8 members are connected to the Pakistan Caucus.
All 55 members of the Pakistan Caucus cast their ballot. Nineteen (all Republicans)
were in favor of the amendment, while 34 (5 Republicans, 29 Democrats) opposed it and 2
members abstained. Among those 34 who voted against the resolution 22 (3 Republicans, 19
Democrats) are members of the India Caucus; and among those 19 who favored it 8 are
members of the India Caucus.
This voting record shows again that their Republican party-affiliation triumphs over
the fact that a representative is a member of a certain caucus. Republicans favored this
amendment and that is apparent in their voting behavior despite the fact that they are
members of the India or Pakistan Caucus. Evidence for this statement can be found in the fact
that both the Republican co-chair of the India Caucus Rep. Joe Wilson (R-SA) as well the
Republican co-chair of the Pakistan Caucus Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN) voted in favor of the
Tancredo-amendment, while the Democrat co-chairmen of both caucuses voted against it.
The reason why 8 members of the India Caucus and 2 of the Pakistan Caucus
abstained from voting is not clear, nor the fact that 6 members of the India Caucus did not
participate at all. I should point out that the latter have a very low voting participation in
general (as tested on all 8 resolutions) concerning India-related issues.
88
HIRC Kargil Resolution
Goodling Amendment
Burton Amendment
Support for Elections in India
Condemnation of Taliban
Commending India on
Republic Day
Lauding Indian
Americans
Tancredo Amendment
General Voting Record
In favor 22 169 - 369 420 32 415 148
Against 5 256 - 4 0 - 2 259
NP/A 1 9 - - - - 14 -
India Caucus members
In favor 13 26 (R 25) - 145 - 30 185 49 (R)
Against - 105 - 0 - - 0 123
NP/A - 2 - 10 - - 1 6
Pakistan Caucus members
In favor - 13 (R) - 41 - 6 54 19 (R)
Against 2 28 - 0 - - 1 34
NP/A - 14 - 3 - - - 2
India Caucus -Pakistan Caucus members
In favor 1 7 (R) - 23 - 5 30 8
Against - 8 - - - - - 22
NP/A - - - - - - - -
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5.3. A general conclusion
It is almost impossible to make a synthesis and general interpretation of the voting
behavior of the caucuses' members. It is even questionable whether if those would be possible
if more resolutions were examined. Nevertheless, to a certain extent some conclusions can be
made.
Some of the resolutions introduced in the House undeniably display the vigor of some
of the members of the India Caucus to show their commitment to India and Indian Americans
in the U.S. However, many of these resolutions can be categorized under the 'symbolic' type.
Second, there appears to be a core of active, committed members (about 25 to 30 maximum)
who always speak in favor of India or consistently vote pro-India, but there is a huge bulk of
members who seems to be voting randomly and a significant portion that hardly ever
participates in the voting. Furthermore, members of the India Caucus vote pro-India only
when this does not conflict with their party-affiliations. The same conclusion can be made
about the members of the Pakistan Caucus.
Members who are aligned with both caucuses tend to have a shifting opinion and
defend India on one occasion and Pakistan on the other. Personally I consider it quite
troubling that the Democratic co-chair of the Pakistan Caucus is also a member of the India
Caucus. Consequently, Rep. Jackson-Lee's voting behavior is far from consistent. We should
hope that such double membership will favor respect for the common interests of the
population in both India and Pakistan (and thus also Indian Americans and Pakistani
Americans), instead of perpetuating feelings of antagonism and hostility. Joseph Crowley, the
Democratic co-chair of the India Caucus, said he did not see overlapping membership as
"conflicting, because of the movement in peace talks between the two nations." Confident that
the presence of members in both caucuses would not undermine the work of the India Caucus,
he also believed "the India Caucus advocates many different issues, and supporting both India
and Pakistan should not be viewed as a conflict. In addition the caucus focuses on Indian
90
Americans and their concerns of better education, healthcare, hate crime legislation, many
issues which Pakistani Americans and other new Americans are also concerned about."232
Personal opinions or secondary aspects may also triumph over a member's affiliation
with a caucus. This is clear from the fact that Rep. DeFazio voted against the resolution
lauding Indian Americans because he was concerned about the outsourcing problem.
When 'symbolic' resolutions are introduced such as the one lauding Indian Americans,
members of the Pakistan Caucus do not really display such an enormous 'grudge' against India
that it compels them to vote against it. Simultaneously, this might be an indicator that these
kinds of resolutions are not deemed influential.
When it comes to human rights issues (cf. #5), members of both the India Caucus and
Pakistan Caucus consistently defend human rights. On the other hand, one can also say that
for some members human rights are more important than for others. This is clear from the
discussion about the Burton amendment.
It remains to be seen whether members of the Pakistan Caucus in the future will
introduce similar bills as the members of the India Caucus; one lauding Pakistani Americans
for example. Questionable is whether it would pass with the same overwhelming majority
vote as the one lauding Indian Americans. The hard core of Pakistan Caucus members
(around 2-3) is not comparable in size with the one of the India Caucus, but this of course
might change over time. Especially the Republican co-chair Dan Burton has in the past been
very active on Pakistan-issues and also Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) should be given some
credit. Further, I believe one of the main hurdles the Pakistan Caucus should overcome is the
problem that 55% of its members are also aligned with the India Caucus and this will elicit
conflicting opinions in the future, unless -of course- the relationship between both countries
improves.
232 Sen, A.K, September 22, 2004
91
Broadly, these resolutions can be categorized as either 'symbolic' or 'substantive'.
Issues surrounding the symbolic resolutions (#4, 6 and 7) are rather vague or amorphous and
involve lauding and ceremonial acts. Lauding Indian Americans or India on the celebration of
its Republic Day do not directly affect foreign relations between the U.S. and India but are
nevertheless a clear sign of warming relationships. They do not have further implications for
India as a country. They do have a certain value as examples of these resolutions are often
hauled by Indian Americans in order to show off their growing influence on U.S.
congressmen and increasing visibility in U.S. society. Conversely, the symbolic resolutions
are an easy way for the India Caucus members to prove that they are in fact committed to the
Indian cause.
Substantive resolutions with a real impact on India or Pakistan often involve matters
of military or economic assistance. In my opinion these are much more valuable. They can
actually affect India or Pakistan, either positively or negatively. Another sort of substantive
resolutions evolves around migration issues, thereby not so much focusing on foreign
relations but on the Indians and Pakistanis in the U.S.
92
6. Issues of concern
In order to present a complete picture of the political activities of the Indian American
and Pakistani American communities in the U.S., we need to ask ourselves what their issues
of concern are. What kinds of issues move the diaspora communities? What sorts of matters
ignite them to organize themselves or become politically active and mobilize congressmen to
defend their causes? As is clear from the resolutions discussed in the previous chapter, their
issues of concern cover a broad range of matters, from symbolic to substantive. However, in
the previous chapter I only highlighted those issues that actually made it to the House floor. I
assume the fact that they are raised on the House floor is a consequence of lobbying efforts of
the diaspora communities, but let us keep in mind that this might not be the only cause.
In this chapter, I want to detect through the analysis of articles written in ethnic
community newspapers such as India Abroad, India West, Pakistan Link, etc. and emails I
received from numerous diaspora associations the issues raised by the diaspora communities
themselves. It is hard to find any consistency among these. One should keep in mind that as
the world changes from day to day, the context surrounding these issues is constantly
changing as well and thus the matters of importance change too.
I decided to start with the most recent issues of concern and to go back in time; I
focus particularly on 2004 and 2003. Again, it was more difficult to examine the Pakistani
side of the question because the newspapers of the Pakistani American community are far less
widespread. Overall the Pakistani American community is far less efficiently organized than
the Indian American. Additionally, I believe there is a lack of thorough and in-depth research
about the Pakistani American community.
The latest major issue of concern to both communities has been the upsurge in anti-
immigrant legislation, in particular the 9/11 Commission Recommendations legislation
containing alarming provisions that would hurt immigrants and that mirror elements of the
Patriot Act. The South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow (SAALT) called for a national
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call-in day for the South Asian community on December 2nd, 2004. The organization urged
the members of the community to "take ten minutes to express your thoughts to decision
makers in Congress and the White House". The main reason why this is so important to both
communities is that there is a possibility that the final bill that will be send to the White
House will contain anti-immigrant provisions, as well as measures that could threaten civil
liberties. While the 9/11 Commission legislation went through many changes over the
previous three months, some of the alarming provisions appeared in its various versions have
included measures that would: (1) make it difficult for judges to review deportation decisions
made against non-citizens, (2) limit the ability of people to obtain political asylum in the U.S.,
(3) make non-citizens with valid, un-expired visas that are revoked subject to deportation and
(4) deport non-citizens to countries that won't accept them. Second, if the bill would become
law and contains anti-immigrant provisions, South Asian immigrants and their families may
be affected. Since 9/11 there has been continuous reporting of immigrant families being torn
apart due to policies that are having a negative impact on South Asians and other
immigrants.233 Previously, similar concerns have been expressed by means of highlighting
harassments that Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans have faced since 9/11.234
I believe one of the main concerns for both communities in 2004 must have been the
U.S. presidential election. The elections proved to be hard choices for both communities. I
received an assiduous number of emails from several Indian American as well as Pakistani
American organizations urging community members to register to vote and cast their ballot.
Simultaneously, members were discussing the viewpoint of both candidates toward India or
Pakistan and debating which candidate would be the best president in terms of a favorable
foreign policy toward their home country. Organizations generally tried to avoid endorsing a
233 South Asian response to anti-immigrant legislation needed, December 1, 2004; Anwar, I., October 3, 2004 234 Pakistani American harassed at New York airport, August 19, 2004; U.S. Legislators Interact with Delegates of NFIA and AIA at the Congressional Luncheon, June 5, 2004; NCPA Welcomes House
Judiciary Committee's "Yes" Vote on Hasan Family, May 13, 2004
94
presidential candidate. There is no way to find out for which candidate Indian Americans and
Pakistani Americans have voted. In the past, Indian Americans generally supported the
Democratic Party whereas the party made an effort to enlist their support. The Republicans
did not attract many Indian immigrants as they were hostile to India's cause (cf. Nixon's tilt in
favor of Pakistan in 1971) and also made no effort to welcome the newly arrived immigrants
to its fold. Especially, President Clinton's era prove to be a turning point where Indians were
appointed to political jobs and were welcomed at party meetings, fundraisers and political
discussions. A few Indians did also join the Republican Party but their numbers were too
small.235 Certainly, it must have been a difficult choice. Some articles mentioned that John
Kerry is "a keen admirer of Musharraf" and "lauded the role of Pakistani Americans in
strengthening the bonds between the U.S. and Pakistan".236 Additionally, he held an openly
anti-Indian sentiment on outsourcing and other business matters.237 George W. Bush failed to
list India among America's allies in Asia, decided to designate Pakistan as a major non-NATO
ally and announced that there "will be an infusion of sophisticated weapons into Pakistan".238
In contrast to Senator Kerry, Bush did encourage the BPO (Business Process Outsourcing)
and did declare India (early on during his administration) a strategic partner.239
Some of the organizations also sent out emails to its members to educate them on the
political process of voting and to call attention to their voting rights. One email laid out all
the voting rights and even mentioned a phone number one could call if any problems should
occur.240
A matter of great concern to the politically active Indian American community was
obviously the creation and establishment of the Congressional Pakistan Caucus in the House
of Representatives. The matter that upset some of the community members was the fact that
235 Sud, H., 2004 236 Kerry a keen admirer of Musharraf, September 2, 2004 237 Sud, H., 2004 238 Iqbal, A., September 2, 2004 239 Sud, H., 2004 240 ELECTION DAY NOV. 2, November 1, 2004
95
some of the India Caucus members joined the Pakistan Caucus and that President Musharraf
came to Washington personally to inaugurate the Caucus on the Hill. A sample letter to send
to House Representatives was spread among community members saying: "The law passed by
Congress that says that U.S. taxpayer money cannot be provided to countries whose
governments have been overthrown by military coups, is still in existence. We have
overlooked this due to Pakistan's help in the war against terrorism". The sample letter went on
in this kind of polemic and confrontational language to conclude with "You [the
representative] have a choice before you to give the General [Musharraf] a message that he
needs to bring democracy back to his country not by rewarding him with a Caucus and
making a mockery of our system."241 When a couple of months earlier, the formation of the
Caucus was announced, similar emails were send around. Indian Americans were asked to
"IMMEDIATELY contact their House Representatives, if they are members of the India
Caucus, and request them not to join the Pakistan Caucus if they are approached with a
request. They need to be told that if they become members of both the Caucuses, there will
be a conflict of interest."242
In 2004, a number of symbolic issues were brought to the community fore as well.
For example, community members were urged to sign a petition online or send a support
letter to the Stamp Advisory Committee to issue a commemorative stamp on November 6,
2006 in honor of the first U.S. Congressman of Asian origin, the India born Dalip Singh
Saund at the 50th anniversary of Saund's victory in the 1956 congressional election.243 Also
events such as the India Independence Day Parade in Chicago were considered very important
to the community stating that this year's parade attracted a record-breaking crowd and
241 SAT on Congressional Pakistan Caucus in the House of Representatives, September 20, 2004 242 Congressional PAKISTAN CAUCUS**, July 2, 2004 243 Stamp for Dilip S. Saund, September 10, 2004
96
"provided an outstanding opportunity to the families to celebrate our cultural heritage, and
cherish our time-honored values, traditions and history."244
Professional organizations also raised their issues of concern. The AAIP (in
cooperation with IADO) tried to mobilize community members to contact their legislators in
order they would vote against a Senate bill245 that had not been written in the physicians'
interests.246 The India-U.S. Joint Business Council has been working on a Free Trade
Agreement proposal between India and the U.S. Advantages of this proposal for the U.S.
would be that American banks and insurance companies could open up as many branches as
they want in India, accountants and retailers could enter India, etc. The FTA could allow
Indian professionals to gain unrestricted access to the U.S. market. Additionally, it would
boost outsourcing. Professionals would be able to take up jobs in the U.S. without visa hassles
and U.S. investment in the Indian service industries would increase.247
Foreign policy matters also formed a part of the agendas of the diaspora communities.
Both Indian Americans as well as Indians were concerned about the Bush administration's
decision to accord Pakistan Non-NATO ally status without warning New Delhi.248 The
Indian Ambassador Lalit Mansingh spoke of a "breach of trust" and Rep. Frank Pallone, a
prominent India Caucus member called the granting of the status "particularly outrageous".249
244 Record Breaking Crowd Converge to Witness FIA's India Independence Day Parade in Chicago, August 19, 2004 245 More specifically: Senate Bill 2239. The big matter of concern was an amendment added by trial lawyers based around the idea of "personal assessment protection" as method of addressing Illinois medical litigation crisis. It meant that (1) physicians would be forced to settle non-meritorious claims which would cause liability premiums to rise; (2) asset protection would be left to the whims of the court in post-verdict proceedings; and (3) as a result, insurers would avoid Illinois, and current insurers would be forced to restrict coverage. (Doctors are in danger of losing everything, July 21, 2004) 246 Doctors are in danger of losing everything, July 21, 2004 247 Trading Places, FTA is terrific idea, August, 7, 2004 248 Haniffa, A., April 9, 2004 (b);U.S. Legislators Interact with Delegates of NFIA and AIA at the Congressional Luncheon, June 5, 2004 249 Haniffa, A., April 9, 2004 (b)
97
The Indian Americans have also followed the improving relationship between India
and China. The fact that China endorsed India's candidature to the U.N. Security Council is
considered to be a substantial upgrading of the relationship between the two countries.250
When in April 2004 a U.S. Senate India Caucus (cf. 11.3.) was established, this was
of course a matter of great delight for the Indian Americans.251 The creation of the U.S.
House Pakistan Caucus was obviously for the Pakistani Americans a reason to celebrate.
Pakistani Americans usually raise issues that have a similar nature as the ones brought
up by Indian Americans. However, they have not yet reached the same level of political
activism as that of the Indian Americans. In other words, there seems to be a lot of talk and
discussion but not as much action.
In October 2004, the Pakistani American community was priding itself because
Senator Hillary Clinton, addressing a large number of Pakistani Americans at a reception in
Los Angeles, lauded Pakistan's role in the war on terrorism. The reception was hosted by the
director of the PAL-C who is a prominent Pakistani businessman. Senator Clinton also
mentioned that the U.S. and Pakistan are facing several common challenges of which
terrorism is the most significant one. She also recalled her meetings with President Musharraf
during her last visit in Pakistan and said, "He had made difficult but right choices".252 What is
remarkable about these newspaper articles is that none of them mentions that the Clinton
couple's visit253 to Pakistan only lasted about five hours and was part of a South Asia trip of
which five days were spent in India. The articles also fail to mention that she is in fact one of
250 Bagchi, I., October 21, 2004 251 Haniffa, A., April 9, 2004 (c) 252 Pakistan made difficult but right choice: Hillary, October 18, 2004; Long-term ties with Pakistan in US interest: Hillary, October 18, 2004 253 The stop-over in Islamabad was quite a controversial topic in the U.S. as well as in India. India had invited President Clinton and his wife, but since it did not concern a conditional invitation, the Clinton administration was also considering a stopover in Islamabad. While India stressed this was a sovereign decision to be taken on the American side, India's Foreign Secretary did inform the American officials that a stopover in Islamabad would be frowned upon by Indian public opinion. Consequently, a number of members of the India Caucus urged the President not to go to Pakistan and circulated a "Dear colleague" letter to representatives to gather support against a possible presidential visit to Pakistan. (Haniffa, A., March 3, 2000; Haniffa, A., March 10, 2000)
98
the co-chairs of the Senate India Caucus. Pakistani Americans do not seem to be questioning
these kinds of contradictions.
Several orators at the Annual Summit of the Pakistani American Congress in
Washington on June 26, 2003, called on their community to become more involved in the
political arena and to educate fellow citizens about Pakistan uttering that "by your own
conduct with Americans, you can…correct misconceptions about Pakistanis." Pointing out
that many young Pakistanis enter the field of engineering while few enter the fields of law
and political science, they emphasized the need for more advocates in the community,
especially after 9/11. Women's issues were addressed as well. Women were urged to join the
Pakistani American Congress and to present themselves as "outspoken fighters for
democracy".254 The report about the 2004 summit, however, said that the audience was
constituted mainly of Pakistani males.255
A different focal point of the 2003 summit was General Musharraf's visit to the U.S.
It was a quite controversial topic. While some speakers expressed that "Musharraf's visit has
brought improvement in the [U.S.-Pakistani] bilateral relationship, others exclaimed that they
do not accept Musharraf as president because he has yet to be elected while echoing a belief
that the Bush administration is using Pakistan's military dictatorship to do Washington's
bidding.256 Interesting about this report is that it shows that the opinion of some Pakistani
Americans about Musharraf's leadership does not converge with the opinion of Pakistanis in
the homeland who by now have largely accepted Musharraf as their President. Furthermore,
the report displays the diversity of the Pakistani American community's interests and concerns
ranging from U.S.-Pakistan relations, mobilizing women to Musharraf's visit to the U.S.
254 Rizzuto, P., September 2003 255 Ibrahim, M., September 2004 256 Rizzuto, P., September 2003
99
A serious matter of concern for the Pakistani American community in 2003 was the
required Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) registration257 for certain categories of
Pakistani nationals. The new U.S. immigration laws required Pakistani visitors to register
regularly with the authorities about their whereabouts. The inclusion of Pakistan on the list of
those countries whose nationals were to register with the INS sent shock-waves through the
Pakistani community. The Pakistani Ambassador, in an open letter to his community in the
U.S., said Islamabad was doing all it can to minimize the impact of the new U.S. immigration
regulations. He reassured his community that embassy officers had been in touch with the
INS and their main thrust was to remove Pakistan from the list. The Ambassador also said:
"The Pakistani community in the U.S. is our government's biggest asset", and he urged
Pakistanis in the U.S. to "use their influence with their respective Congressmen/Senators,
administration officials and other American friends to sensitize them about the community's
concerns on the registration process."258
Pakistani Americans have not been completely inoperative and have at some points
tried to influence U.S. administration by mobilizing community members. In May 2002, five
major Pakistani American organizations joined together to form the Pakistan American
National Alliance (PANA)259 in order to protect and promote vital Pakistani American
interests in the U.S. Immediately, after its formation, PANA launched a nationwide campaign
to send letters, faxes, emails and petitions to President Bush and Secretary of State Colin
Powell urging them to use their influence to defuse escalating tension between Pakistan and
India.260 Also, the Pakistan American Democratic Forum made an effort to influence U.S.
administration earlier that year. It urged the administration to declare India's extremist groups,
257 Pakistani men over the age of 16 without permanent residence status in the U.S. were added on December 16, 2002 to the list of immigrants asked to register with federal officials. Those who failed to comply faced criminal charges and immediate expulsion from the U.S. (Springer, R., December 20) 258 Dutt, El., January 17, 2003 259 PANA includes members of the Association of Pakistani Physicians of North America, Council of Pakistan American Affairs (COPAA), Pakistan American Congress (PAC), Pakistan American Democratic Forum (PADF), and PAK-PAC. (Ghazali, A.S., September/October 2002) 260 Ghazali, A.S., September/October 2002
100
Vishva Hindu Parishad and Bajrang Dal, as terrorist organizations for their activities against
Muslims and Christians, pointing out that the ideology of these organizations is anti-humanist
and racist.261
Other concerns of the diaspora communities are the attempts to alleviate the suffering
of men, women and children, poverty and illiteracy in their home countries. There are
innumerous non-profit diasporic associations dedicated to these problems. Regularly, fund
raisings are held in order to create and implement effective development policies for the
unprivileged in the mother country.
Undoubtedly, the most concerning issues in U.S. domestic politics for Indian
Americans and Pakistani Americans in the post 9/11 period, has been the increase in racism
and the tightened immigration regulations. I believe it has affected the two diaspora
communities disproportionately and it has been harder on Pakistani Americans because
people tend to categorize them as Muslims/terrorists.
Of course not all Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans are concerned about the
same kinds of issues and my outline is but a glimpse of what makes it to the headlines of the
community newspapers. As the diaspora communities are far from homogenous in their
outlook, so are their issues of concern.
261 US body seeks ban on VHP, Bajrang Dal, January 3, 2002
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7. U.S.- India ties
In 1996, Rubinoff wrote about the Missed Opportunities between India and the U.S.
during the Clinton-Rao years and ascribed this failure to the fact that most Americans
cherished diffused perceptions and misconceptions about India as a country that was solely
"poverty-stricken and helpless" and where problems of disease and illiteracy wielded.
Consequently, the Congress, most likely to be representative of public attitudes and receiving
their news and impressions about India from the media, did not pay a lot of attention to India.
India had a low priority in both the executive as well as the legislative branches of American
politics.262 Glazer & Glazer (1990) pointed out that perceptions have been paramount in
shaping U.S. policy towards South Asia.263
If we highlight past relations between the U.S. and India, we bump into numerous
extreme low points in this relationship: the Korean War, Pakistan's inclusion in the American
alliance system in 1954-55, the sending of the carrier Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal in
1971 during East-Pakistan's liberation struggle; and more recently there were irritants centred
around economic and nuclear non-proliferation issues. Additionally the State Department and
Capitol Hill held on to the perception that India was on the wrong side of two major conflicts
in the 20th century, i.e. World War II and the Cold War. The American attitude towards India
has been described as one of "benign neglect".264
● The 1980s
In the 1980s, during the Reagan administration, Pakistan was constantly favoured at
the expense of New Delhi. For example, the Reagan administration proposed a weakening of
the 1978 Symington Amendment265 as a way of enabling Pakistan to meet its security needs.
262 Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 500; Glazer, S.R.; Glazer, N. (Eds.), 1990, p. 1-19; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 40 263 Glazer, S.R.; Glazer, N. (Eds.), 1990, p. 1-19 264 Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 507-509; Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 23; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p.42 265 The Symington Amendment (adopted 1976, section 101 of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended) gave Congress the authority to suspend
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Despite the fact that Congress declined to weaken the Symington Amendment, it did grant
Pakistan a six-year exemption in the interest of national security. Further, Reagan signed in
December 1981 (under public law) the waiving of the application of the Symington
Amendment in the Pakistani case as long as Soviet forces were stationed in Afghanistan.266
After an incident in which a Pakistani citizen was arrested in Houston trying to
smuggle electronic switches that trigger nuclear bombs, Congress passed the Solarz-Pressler
Amendment267 in 1985. However, lobbyists for the Pakistani Embassy continued to be very
successful on the Hill and were able to induce Congress to temporarily cut aid to India in
1987 when its own funding was in jeopardy because of embarking on a nuclear weapons
program.268
Another indicator of the benign neglect of India is the fact that until 1991 the State
Department combined South Asia with the Near East and resisted the creation of a separate
bureau for the South Asian region. Attaching the South Asian region to the Near East, it was
constantly overshadowed by Arab-Israeli matters. Only when the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee came under the chairmanship of Stephen Solarz269 (D-NY) (1981-1993), the
foreign aid of arms sales to countries, which receive nuclear enrichment equipment or technology and do not accept International Atomic Energy Agency-safeguards. (Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 503; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p.43) President Jimmy Carter found Pakistan in violation of the Symington amendment in 1979 because of Islamabad's clandestine construction of a uranium enrichment plant. U.S. aid to Islamabad was possible between 1982 and 1990 only through the use of presidential waivers. (Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000) 266 Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 503; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 43 267 The Solarz-Pressler Amendment (adopted section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended) stipulated that American assistance to Pakistan would immediately be cut off if the president found that the country had tried illegally to acquire American material for making nuclear weapons. (Nayar, B.R., Paul, T.V., 2003, p. 226; Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 504; Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000; Nayar, B.R., Paul, T.V., 2003, p.226) 268 Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 504; Lal, V., 2001, p. 189-190; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 44 269 During the Cold War, when New Delhi was perceived as a surrogate of the Sovet Union and Pakistan was Washington's favorite ally, Stephen Solarz was a veritable one-man India Caucus on Capitol Hill. He argued India's case and denounced Zia al-Haq's dictatorship and Islamabad's clandestine nuclear weapons program. He became a casualty of redistricting in 1992 and lost his seat in Congress. Ever since, he has worked at several consulting companies including his own (Haniffa, A., April 25, 2003; Haniffa, A., April 25, 1997). Many expected him to become the U.S. Ambassador to India in 1994 after the previous one, Thomas Pickering, was shifted from New Delhi to Moscow. However, some allegations were made that Solarz had helped a Hong Kong mobster-businessman with a criminal record to obtain a U.S. visa and this resulted in a FBI investigation which slowed down the process of Solarz's appointment as Ambassador tremendously (Haniffa, A., February 4, 1994) Most
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committee's interest in South Asian issues reached an all-time high.270 It was Stephen Solarz
as well who secured a passage of a bill establishing a separate South Asia Bureau with an
Assistant Secretary in 1991.271
● The 1990s
The end of the Cold War and the Soviets retreating from Afghanistan involved a
slight deterioration of the U.S.-Pakistani ties. In October 1990, President George Bush
refused to certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear explosive device and the Congress
invoked the 1985 Pressler Amendment. In the meantime, Indo-American relations had been
on the rise.272 Due to India's economic liberalization and market-opening beginning in 1991,
Capitol Hill suddenly discovered new South Asian markets for U.S. goods and the U.S.
became New Delhi's leading trading partner and foreign investor. Consequently,
congressional thinking about the region slowly began to shift.273 Especially the election of a
Democratic administration in Washington (in 1992) was greeted warmly in New Delhi.
Nevertheless, Clinton's administration held a contradictory agenda: some American diplomats
praised India's Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's economic liberalization campaigns, others
were very critical of the Indian government's violation of human rights in suppressing the
ongoing Sikh rebellion in the Punjab.274
As mentioned before (cf. chapter 3), the appointment of Robin Raphel as Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of South Asian Affairs triggered the lack of sound and
comprehensible communication between Washington and Delhi even more. In India, she was
interesting is that Robert M. Hathaway who has been publishing many articles on the political participation of the Indian diaspora in the U.S., is Solarz's former aid. Hathaway helped to craft the legislation that led to the creation of the South Asian Bureau (Haniffa, A., April 25, 1997). 270 Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 501; Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 28; Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 38 271 Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 505; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 38; Haniffa, A., April 25, 2003; Haniffa, A., February 4, 1994 272 Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 505-6 273 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 23; Mathur, A., 2003, p.30, p. 170; Khare, R.S., 2002, p. 278 274 Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 505-6; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 44; Mathur, A., 2003, p. 27-28; Rubinoff, A.G., 2002, p. 536
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perceived as being pro-Pakistani and she also annoyed numerous Asian Indian Americans in
the U.S.275
Another factor that turned out to be a strain on Indo-American relations was the
return to power of Benazir Bhutto in late 1993. Bhutto was well connected with Washington
and perceived as pro-American. Simultaneously in November 1993, Senator Larry Pressler
(R-SD) revealed that the Clinton administration was considering rescinding the 1985
legislation that had led to the cut-off of assistance to Pakistan in 1990. Also Robin Raphel
claimed that the Pressler Amendment was an obstacle to improved ties with Pakistan, which
again proved her "love" for Pakistan. The efforts to rescind the Pressler Amendment were
vigorously resisted by Senator Pressler and John Glenn (D-OH), documenting violations of
the original legislation by Pakistan, which was covertly proceeding its nuclear program. In the
non-proliferators' perspective, repeal would send out the wrong message and reward Pakistan
for non-compliance. Additionally, the efforts to repeal the Pressler Amendment were
bolstered by Hillary Clinton's visit to South Asia in March 1995 and a visit by Benazir Bhutto
to Washington in early April where she lobbied congressional leaders. Hillary Clinton
pledged the Congress to show some flexibility in the Pressler Amendment so there could be
some economic and military cooperation. Furthermore, Stephen Solarz's defeat in the 1992
elections immensely reduced the pro-India policy in the Subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific of the House of Representatives and symbolized a decline in Indo-U.S. relations.276
When in 1995, Hank Brown became chairman of the Foreign Relations
Subcommittee dealing with South Asian affairs; he replicated the administration's
contradictory approach toward India. He promoted the expanding commercial relationship
between the U.S. and India, but simultaneously he also became the administration's point
person for watering down the Pressler Amendment. In September 1995, the Brown
275 Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 506; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 44, Mathur, A., 2003, p. 28, p. 52; Haniffa, A., April 25, 1997 276 Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 506; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 45; Rubinoff, A.G., 2002, p.439
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Amendment277 was taken up on the Senate Floor. This proposal contained a one-time waiver
of the Pressler Amendment to sell Pakistan $368 million military equipment. Again, critics of
the Brown Amendment, John Glenn and Larry Pressler, were concerned that the wrong
message was being sent to nuclear proliferators.278 The Senate voted in favour of the Brown
Amendment, which was passed by a margin of 55-54. Despite heavy objections raised by the
Congressional India Caucus, the House of Representatives followed suit by a vote of 348-69
and President Clinton signed the legislation on January 27, 1996. 279 At the same time, the
passing of the Brown Amendment was also a major setback for some members of the India
Caucus, such as Bill McCollum (R- FL) who in November 1994 had urged the State
Department to put Pakistan on its watch list of countries supporting terrorism because of
Islamabad's continuing involvement in fomenting the insurgency in Kashmir.280 In March
1995 other members of the India Caucus, after the killing of two American diplomats and the
wounding of a third in Karachi, pressured the Clinton administration to designate Pakistan as
a sponsor of international terrorism and to censure Islamabad.281 The passing of the Brown
Amendment was a serious wake-up call for the Indian American community that it was
necessary to develop deeper ties with congressmen.282
Weiner (1990) exclaimed in 1990 that the actual impact of the Indian community on
U.S. policy toward India had been negligible compared with foreign policy impact of
277 The Brown Amendment exempted most forms of economic assistance from the Pressler Amendment prohibitions. (Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000; Rubinoff, A.G., 2002, p. 441-2) The passing of the Brown Amendment provided sophisticated weapons to Pakistan. Brown argued that the weapons should be delivered to Pakistan for essentially three reasons: (1) Pakistan had paid for the equipment and it would be wrong of the U.S. to take money and then not deliver the weapons; (2) the sale would reaffirm American support for the regime of Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and (3) it would lead to better cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan without upsetting the strategic balance in the region or undermining the security of India (Nurnberger, R., October 20, 1995). 278 Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 507; Nurnberger, R., October 20, 1995 279 Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 508; Nayar, B.R., Paul, T.V., 2003, p. 228; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 45 280 Haniffa, A., November 4, 1994 281 Haniffa, A., March 24, 1995 282 Nurnberger, R., October 20, 1995
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American Jews, Cubans, Greeks and Poles.283 Rubinoff in 1996 wrote, "Since no significant
segment of the American population originates from South Asia, congressional concern about
the region is not constant".284 Nevertheless, it is quite clear that paralleling the coming of age
and growing of the Asian Indian diaspora in the U.S. and also India's liberalisation,
substantial changes slowly occurred in America's India-policy and its congressional attitudes
about India. The new politically inspired interests in the region from 1991 onwards, reflect
the significant changes that took place within the Indian American community. Boasting large
numbers of professionals, the community became increasingly affluent during the last decade
of the 20th century. It became more politically active, and devoted more attention to making
its views known on Capitol Hill. Most strikingly, it outnumbered the Pakistani American
community that was only about one-tenth the size of the Indian American community.285
In 1997, members of the India Caucus had learned from previous set-backs and
started the new year with circulating a "dear colleague" letter urging for closer U.S.-India
while pointing out India's benevolence in the India-Bangladesh water-sharing agreement and
other virtues.286 The same week President Clinton sent out a congratulatory message to the
people of India on the occasion of the country's 50th anniversary of its independence. He also
said that the U.S. was eager to strengthen relations with India to foster mutual security and
prosperity.287 That same year, a report of the American Council on Foreign Relations argued
for the adoption of a new strategy towards India. It suggested that India's growing power
should be acknowledged, curbs on technology transfer reduced and military co-operation
increased.288 Eventually, after months of speculation Clinton also decided to replace the
283 Weiner, M., 1990, p. 251 284 Rubinoff, A.G., 1996/7, p. 504 285 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 23 286 Haniffa, A., January 24, 1997 (a) 287 Haniffa, A., January 24, 1997 (b) 288 Finding its place in the world, October 4, 1997
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controversial Robin Raphel, the first Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs;
something that felt as a relief to the Indian American community.289
One of the first little signs of a change of attitude towards India was that Frank
Pallone as co-chair of the India Caucus, on September 26, 1997 moved a resolution that
backed India's case for a permanent seat in the Security Council.290 Although his efforts were
largely ignored by the administration291, the fact that he could make such a claim is in itself a
sign of advancement and it would definitely have been unthinkable off a decade earlier.
A huge step forward in Indo-American relations was Clinton's (in 1998) announced
visit to India. The president of the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce, a very powerful
business association that has played a major role in adding stimulus to business relations
between the U.S. and India292, proclaimed prior to Clinton's visit that "this visit will
demonstrate how important India is for the U.S. and enormously strengthen bilateral political
and economical ties"293.
Then, India held its nuclear tests at Pokhran in May 1998. Most legislators conceded
that President Clinton had little choice but to invoke the Glenn amendment294, which imposed
extensive economic and military sanctions on New Delhi (and following Pakistan’s tests, on
Islamabad as well).295 Pakistan, however, was treated more mildly than India with respect to
the curbing of multilateral assistance by international granting agencies, so sanctions would
not destabilize its weak government. More importantly, Pakistan was the third-largest foreign
289 Haniffa, A., April 25, 1997 290 Finding its place in the world, October 4, 1997 291 Haniffa, A., October 9, 1998 292 http://www.indous.org/ 293 Clinton Visit, December 22, 1997 294 The Glenn Amendment was adopted in 1977 (as section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly section 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended). It prohibits U.S. foreign assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon state (as defined by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) that, among other things, detonates a nuclear explosive device. President Bill Clinton imposed Glenn amendment sanctions against India on May 13, 1998, two days after New Delhi broke its self-imposed 24-year moratorium on nuclear testing. On May 30, 1998,Clinton invoked similar sanctions against Pakistan, following Islamabad's six nuclear tests on May 28 and 30. (Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000). There is also a 1994 Glenn Amendment, better known as the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, that calls for sanctions on states that engage in nuclear testing (Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 57). 295 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 22
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purchaser of U.S. wheat at a time when the U.S. farming industry was in a desperate crisis.296
Yet, the members of the India Caucus began to voice doubts about the wisdom of an action
their own legislation had mandated. Within 18 months, the U.S. Congress swung from
applauding strict sanctions to urging the president to waive not only the Glenn amendment,
but also the Pressler and Symington amendments297. By the end of 1999, U.S. lawmakers had
completely turned their backs on sanctions as a tool of non-proliferation policy.298
In the summer of 1999, the Indians Americans' political influence became
increasingly noticeable when the House International Relations Committee took up a
resolution dealing with the Pakistani-backed incursion into the Kargil sector of Indian
Kashmir. A remarkable sign of Indian Americans' political engagement is evident in the
following anecdote. After the Kargil insurgency, Indian American computer professionals,
urging a condemnation of Pakistani actions, organized an e-mail campaign that startled
congressional offices. One staff member reported receiving 400 e-mails in a 24-hour period.
Although this congressional aide was irritated rather than persuaded by the messages, the
potential impact of a mobilized and technologically savvy bloc of voters did not escape
notice.299 President Clinton, citing congressional pressure, did not only urge the Pakistani
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to withdraw his forces, but also unequivocally condemned
Pakistan's abrogation of the Line Of Control. This is a clear sign of the political influence that
296 Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 57; Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000 297 The waiving of all these sanctions happened because of the enactment of two amendments, i.e., Brownback I and II. Brownback I, adopted in October 1998, also known as The India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, incorporated into the fiscal 1999 omnibus appropriations bill (Public Law 105-277), granted the authority to the president to waive all sanctions except those pertaining to military assistance, dual-use exports and military sales for one year. A year later, Brownback II (adopted 1999. Incorporated into the fiscal year 2000 defense appropriations bill (Public Law 106-79) gave the president permanent authority to waive, with respect to India and Pakistan, all the provisions of the Glenn amendment. In addition, it authorized the president to waive the Symington and Pressler amendment sanctions, which had prohibited almost all U.S. economic and military assistance to Pakistan since 1990. Brownback II represented an extraordinary reversal of American policy. The measure handed the president the authority to lift all sanctions imposed upon India and Pakistan as a result of their 1998 nuclear tests. (Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 47; Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000) 298 Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000, p. 7; Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 22; Lancaster, J., October 9, 1999; Jha, N.K., 2003, p.168-169 299 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 24; Lal, V., 2001, p. 189-190; Lancaster, J., October 9, 1999; Chanda, N., March 30, 2000; Lal, V., 2003, p. 106
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Indian Americans can exercise among American legislators.300 Later that year, in November,
India Caucus members introduced the U.S. Support for a Democratic Pakistan Act (H.R.
3330) stating that certain actions against Pakistan cannot me waived until the President
certifies that Pakistan has a democratically elected government.301
All this activism, of course, is not to suggest that the Indian American community is
any more monolithic in its views than other groups in U.S. politics. For instance, in the 1980s
and early 1990s, an active Sikh presence on the Hill criticized Indian actions in the Punjab
and urged Congress to adopt punitive measures toward New Delhi and to support the creation
of an independent Khalistan.302 Dr. Gurmit Singh Aulakh, head of the Council of Khalistan,
was not an unfamiliar figure on Capitol Hill and worked closely with Dan Burton (R-ID),
"The India basher", and other congressional offices to focus attention on Indian actions in
Punjab. Even after conditions in Punjab returned to normal during the 1990s, Aulakh’s
congressional supporters continued to write letters and draft legislation denouncing Indian
actions. In June 1998, 19 legislators from both parties sent a letter to Clinton condemning
New Delhi’s “miserable record of ethnic cleansing.” Two years later, a similar letter signed
by 20 lawmakers urged Clinton to place India on the U.S. “terrorism list” and declared it was
time for the U.S. to support “self-determination for all the peoples and nations living under
India’s brutal rule.”303
Nonetheless, by the end of the decade, the fissures within the Indian American
community had not prevented the emergence of a reasonably unified Indian American
position on most South Asia-related issues on the congressional agenda. It is worth noting that
India’s large Muslim population operates within this consensus and has not developed a
300 Lal, V., 2001, p. 189-190; Lancaster, J., October 9, 1999: Hiebert, M., March 23, 2000; Chanda, N., March 30, 2000; Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000, p. 48; Kux, D., May/June 2002, p. 94 301 United States Support for a Democratic Pakistan Act of 1999, November 10, 1999 302 Awanohara, S., May 23, 1991, p. 34; Weiner, M., 1990, p. 252 303 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 25
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competing voice within the Indian American community in the U.S.304 Except when it comes
to the cooperation between Jewish Americans and Indian Americans, Indian Muslims do
express sentiments of resentment (cf. chapter 9).
As implicitly suggested earlier - the enhancement of India on Capitol Hill in recent
years certainly reflects a greater interest on the part of the U.S. business community. The
Indian market has attracted the attention of Wall Street and U.S. corporate interests have
responded to the efforts of successive Indian governments in the 1990s to move away from
the tightly regulated economic policies of the past by expanding their operations in India. This
new interest in trade and commercial opportunities has also encouraged U.S. lawmakers to
reconsider their former indifference toward India. Many members of Congress are constantly
on the lookout for fresh markets, more jobs for constituents and greater profits for local
businesses in India. Whereas congressional trade delegations to India in the 1970s were
rarities, they have now become quite popular.305 Economic opportunity figures clearly in
congressional thinking about India. PepsiCo and General Electric, which have major
investments in India, have also become important lobbyist for India in Washington. As
American investment in India increases, so too does New Delhi's influence in Washington
and this largely due to the efforts of the U.S.-India Business Council and the India Interest
Lobby Group.306
The political clout of the India Caucus has been nowhere more apparent than in the
House’s annual consideration of the Burton amendments. Nearly every year, Dan Burton (R-
ID), often referred to as an "India-basher"307, offers an amendment to the foreign aid bill to
reduce or eliminate U.S. assistance to India. These amendments tap into anti-India or pro-
Pakistani sentiment, but also appeal to the widespread distaste for foreign assistance that
304 Id., p. 26 305 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 26; India: U.S. interest group, February 20, 1999; Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000; US to partner-country in Indiachem 2000, November 13, 1999; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001. p. 37 306 Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 58; Rubinoff, A.G., 2002, p. 449 307 Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000, p. 7; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 38
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permeates Congress. Burton usually justifies these measures as a way of compelling New
Delhi to improve its human rights behavior. Burton has never succeeded in having one of his
anti-India measures signed into law, but in 1992, the House did adopt a Burton amendment to
eliminate development assistance to India.308 However, by the mid-1990s, the shift in
congressional attitudes toward India made Burton’s task more difficult. The first turning point
occurred in 1996, when the Burton amendment lost by a resounding 169 votes. A year later, a
comparable Burton measure lost by 260 votes.309 One of the reasons that the Pakistani-
Americans are not equally influential on the Hill is that the Pakistani-American population is
only one-tenth the size of the Indian American community. Pakistan had until very recently
no congressional equivalent of the India Caucus. Previously, various efforts to organize a
Pakistan Caucus foundered on congressional indifference and the hard political reality that
publicly aligning themselves with Pakistan holds few political incentives for most members
of the U.S. Congress.310
● Entering the 21st century
In March 2000 Clinton made his widely acclaimed visit to India, representing the first
presidential trip to the subcontinent in more than two decades.311 He mentioned the growing
importance of the Indian immigrant community in the U.S. as one of the reasons for his
visit.312 Six months later, the Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in his turn made an
308 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 28; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 59 309 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 28; Ramesh, M., June 5, 2000; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 59 310 Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000; Hiebert, M., March 23, 2000; Lindsay, J.M., Winter 2002, p. 40; Basu, M., Augustus 23, 2002; Datta-Ray, S.K., 2002, p. 218 311 President Jimmy Carter was the last American president, prior to Clinton, to visit India in 1978. 312 Clinton:" I think one of the reasons we've been able to play a meaningful role in Northern Ireland is we have so many Irish Americans here. I think one of the reasons we've been able to play a meaningful role in the Middle East is we have a lot of Jewish Americans and a lot of Arab Americans. I think we forget that among all the some 200-ethnic groups we have in our country, Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans have been among the most successful in terms of education and income level. They have worked and succeeded stunningly well in the United States." (Shukla, S.R., 2003, p. 9)
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official state visit to Washington, where he was honored by the U.S. political, economic, and
entertainment elite and invited to address a joint session of Congress.313
It is clear that since India became an important player in the global economy, U.S.
foreign policy toward the country moved away from the nuclear proliferation issues and
started to focus on trade and investment. Indian Americans are said to have played the single
most important role in changing American policy toward India.314 In 1998, Karl Inderfurth,
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, proclaimed: "The economic and commercial
investment part of our relationship should be the centerpiece of our relationship with
India".315
Security considerations also contributed to the tightening of the U.S.-India
relationship. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, congressional anxieties have
increasingly centered on two other potential challenges to American security: China and
Islamic fundamentalism316. Members of the India Caucus have tapped into these kinds of
feelings. Prior to Clinton's visit to India and after the Pokhran tests, Frank Pallone called for
an alliance with India instead of hoping for a strategic partnership with China. Pallone said: "I
believe we should recognize the benefits of closer defense ties with India, a country which
also in contrast to China, does not threaten its neighbors".317 Co-chairman of the India
Caucus, Ed Royce, expressed similar feelings highlighting the need to facilitate trade and
investment links between the two countries and stating it would be in the long run be more
profitable to invest in a country that has a democratic system.318
The terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001 had a serious impact on the
U.S. foreign policy and its change in focus. The George W. Bush-administration sought not
313 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 22; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 48; Kux, D., May/June 2002, p. 94; Rathnam, I., 2002 314 Hiebert, M., March 23, 2000; Chanda, N., March 30, 2000; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 37; Nayar, B.R., Paul, T.V., 2003, p. 227 315 Greenberger, R.S.; Kuntz, P., May 19, 1998; Melwani, L., 2000 316 Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000 317 Chanda, N., March 30, 2000; Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 27 318 US Sanctions may be lifted soon, February 22, 2001; Rathnam, I., 2002
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only to continue the latter-day Clinton legacy of seeking engagement with India, but also to
deepen the relations between the two countries. Already in his election campaign George W.
Bush had made some very favorable references to India; while Condoleezza Rice, his national
security advisor, underlined the strategic importance of India. After the elections, Bush
emphasized the theme of the common commitment to democracy as the force behind the
drive of the two countries for closer relations.319
In early April 2001, two months into the administration of Bush, India's External
Affairs and Defense Minister journeyed to Washington. During his one day visit, Jaswant
Singh met with the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and Condoleezza Rice, all whom
emphasized that the new administration had high expectations for U.S.-India relations.320
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, India decided to offer its "unconditional and
unambivalent" support for the U.S. war on terrorism, which marked a further step in the
rapprochement with Washington.321 But simultaneously, the conflict in Afghanistan
implicated a swift reconciliation between the U.S. and Pakistan - as a major non-NATO ally -
and this created anxiety in New Delhi.322 The Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee
visited the U.S. again in November 2001 where he met President George W. Bush Jr., held
meetings at Capitol Hill with House as well as Senate leaders and members of foreign affairs
committees belonging to the India Caucus.323
Additionally, the Bush administration's lack of emphasis on the nuclear issue helped
smooth things over even more. In the wake of September 11, the U.S. lifted all remaining
sanctions and eased export controls on so called dual-use technology. And in the meantime,
the political muscle of the economically booming Indian American community continues to
319 Nayar, B.R., Paul, T.V., 2003, p. 244-245; Kux, D., May/June 2002, p. 94 320 Hathaway, R.M., 2002, p. 6 321 Sipress, A., November 9, 2001; Kux, D., May/June 2002, p. 94; Hathaway, R.M., 2002, p 6 and p. 16 322 Kux, D., May/June 2002, p. 96 323 Sipress, A., November 9, 2001
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grow.324 An Indian software engineer said: "We are now playing a more active role, Indians
are no longer on the sidelines".325 Simultaneously, the Bush administration also angered India
by lifting U.S. sanctions against Islamabad, pledging to provide generous assistance and
helping Pakistan to renegotiate its debt obligations and ignoring new Pakistani-backed
terrorism in Kashmir. Many Indians concluded that the Bush administration was guilty of a
double standard - calling for a war against those perpetrating violence on the U.S. territory,
while ignoring terror directed at India.326
Nevertheless, the attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 did draw the two
countries closer together because of the belief of fighting a common enemy. Officials in both
capitals today are much more aware of their common interests and shared perspectives, and
are far more open in talking about them, than their predecessors of a decade ago. But the
process of translating these similar concerns into joint or coordinated policies has rarely
begun.327
In the meantime, India Caucus members while emphasizing major areas of concern
such as non-proliferation, terrorism and democratization, tried to block or add strings to aid
for Pakistan328, but have not been successful.
There are several recent actions of members of the India Caucus. In April 2004,
Pallone, who appears to be one of the most active members, wrote a letter urging the
Pakistani President Musharraf to allow American intelligence agencies to question scientist
Abdul Qadeer Khan about his role in nuclear proliferation. Pallone expressed distrustful
feelings towards Pakistan, proclaiming that despite the fact that Pakistan has been declared an
ally in the global war on terror, its nuclear behavior exemplifies just the opposite.
Additionally, Pallone believes that the US Department of State should work with the United
324 Kux, D., May/June 2002, p. 94-95 325 Basu, M., Augustus 23, 2002 326 Hathaway, R.M., 2002, p. 17 327 Id., p. 18-19 328 Haniffa, A., July 18, 2003; Haniffa, A. November 7, 2003
115
Nations and appropriate agencies to enter Pakistan and monitor its nuclear program.329
Members of the Caucus also issued a joint statement in the House of Representatives, warning
that if the floodgates of military aid are reopened through the 'major non-NATO ally' device,
it will seriously impact on the promising efforts being made to normalize Indo-Pakistan
relations. Gary Ackerman, another prominent India Caucus member, uttered: "What is truly
amazing is that, in addition to giving a pass on democratic development, the administration is
also giving them a pass on proliferating nuclear technology".330
Later that month (on April 25th, 2004) Pallone held a press briefing on Capitol Hill
announcing the plan to introduce legislation in remembrance of the Bhopal gas tragedy that
took place in December 1984 when leaking gas from the pesticide plant owned by the Union
Carbide Corporation had killed thousands of people and afflicted hundreds of thousands.
Pallone called upon Dow Chemical, the American corporation that now owns Union Carbide,
to step forward and take full responsibility for the company's actions. The planned efforts are
four-fold and quite drastic: (1) hand over Union Carbide Corporation officials and its former
chairman and CEO Warren Anderson on criminal charges to face trial in Bhopal; (2) provide
long-term healthcare and monitoring for survivors and their children as well as the release of
information on the health impact of the gases that were leaked; (3) demand clean-up of the
former Union Carbide site and the surrounding area; and (4) obtain adequate economic and
social support to survivors who can no longer pursue their trade because of illness or to
families widowed by the disaster. 331 In the meantime, the Indian government issued criminal
charges against the former Union Carbide chairman Warren Anderson who is now retired and
lives in New York. Last year the Bhopal city court ruled that Anderson should face charges of
culpable homicide, but the U.S. has rejected India's request for Anderson's extradition.332
329 Allow U.S. intelligence to question Khan: Pallone, April 15, 2004 330 Nasir, P., April 14, 2004 331 Pallone plans legislation on Bhopal gas victims, April 27, 2004 332 Iype, G., Singh, O., July 30, 2004
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8. U.S.-Pakistan ties
The relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan has always been very different from
the U.S.-India relationship. While India initially maintained a policy of non-alignment,
Pakistan needed the U.S. for its survival. With Truman in the White House, the U.S. sought
good relations with both Pakistan and India and tried to avoid taking sides between the two
countries. The principal American interest was in solving the Kashmir dispute in order to
prevent instability in South Asia. Cold War considerations overshadowed all other issues in
U.S. foreign policy. Still officials in Washington favored Pakistan's pro-Western foreign
policy to the approach of neutralist India. 333
● The 1950s
Shortly after the establishment of the Pakistani nation-state, Pakistan sought security
insurance and military back-up. When Dwight Eisenhower became president in 1953, U.S.
policy emphasized strengthening the collective security around the communist bloc. The U.S.
saw Pakistan as a useful partner in bolstering the defense of the Middle East.334 In 1954,
Pakistan became part of the U.S. alliance system and America agreed to supply Pakistan with
modern arms. Up until this point, India had not considered Pakistan as a serious threat. 335 By
the time, Eisenhower had finished his second term as a President the U.S.-Pakistan
relationship seemed solid and the U.S. was happy that Pakistan as an ally appeared to be
getting on its feet under Ayub Khan and was beginning to make tangible economic
progress.336
333 Kux, D., 2001, p. 49 334 Id., p. 84 335 Cohen, S., 2001, p. 131 336 Kux, D., 2001, p. 114
117
● The 1960s
The 1950s relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan was not tenable. It collapsed
because the U.S. saw its ties solely in global terms of containing the Soviet Union and China,
whereas Pakistan saw the support mainly in regional terms, i.e. against India.337
With Kennedy becoming the new president of the U.S. in 1961, the alliance started to
unravel because Kennedy was bent on providing long-term military aid to India. Also Lyndon
Johnson, Kennedy's successor, would show less understanding of Pakistani sensitivities.338
This was laid bare when the U.S. failed to support Pakistan against India in their war of 1965.
The years thereafter U.S. concern with Pakistan remained at a consistent, fairly low, level.339
● The 1970s
The Nixon years in the White House, marked a tumultuous and tragic time for
Pakistan: Ayub Khan tumbled from power, his successor Yahya Khan blundered in crushing
East Pakistan's independence aspirations and the country was split up.340 The U.S. became
involved, albeit futilely, in giving Pakistan political support in the Indian-Pakistani war of
1971.341 Pakistan's new leader, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto sought friendly relations with the U.S.342
Gerald Ford, Nixon's successor, maintained Nixon's policy of warm relations toward Pakistan.
The only significant bilateral problems were the nuclear issue and Pakistan's efforts to match
India's nuclear explosive capability.343 In the early Carter years the U.S.-Pakistani
relationship deteriorated drastically over the nuclear issue, only to improve greatly in
response to the invasion of Afghanistan. Each of these deviations came about not because of
specific U.S. interests in Pakistan but as a result of global concerns.344
337 Thornton, T.P., 1989, p. 149 338 Kux, D., 2001, p. 146 339 Thornton, T.P., 1989, p. 149 340 Kux, D., 2001, p. 213 341 Thornton, T.P., 1989, p. 149 342 Kux, D., 2001, p. 214 343 Id., p. 225-226 344 Thornton, T.P., 1989, p. 149
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● The 1980s
When Ronald Reagan became President in 1981, a new U.S.-Pakistan relationship
was established. The amount of aid Pakistan received in order to fight Soviet troops in
Afghanistan was very large. Beginning in 1982, the U.S. provided aid in the amount of $3.6
billion for five years, divided equally between economic and military assistance. In late 1987
Washington agreed to provide a further package of $4.02 billion for the next six years with
57% targeted as economic aid and the remainder as military assistance, mainly for the
purchase of U.S. weapons.345 At the end of his term at the White House, Reagan had certified
for a third time under the Pressler amendment that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear
weapon.346 But as indicated before, American arms were provided in response to the Soviet
invasion and in order to train soldiers to fight the communists. After the Soviets were
overthrown, however, the U.S. lost its interest in the region.
● The 1990s
The Cold War, the glue that held together U.S.-Pakistan ties, was over and
Washington did not only loose its strategic interest in Pakistan but saw Islamabad as a nuclear
troublemaker and a source of regional instability. The U.S. decided to impose the Pressler
Amendment again and in Pakistan this turn in U.S. policy was seen as evidence that the U.S.
was not a true friend.347
In the 1990s, during the second Benazir Bhutto administration, the U.S. placed
Pakistan on a terrorist watch list following increased violence in Kashmir and in India's East
Punjab that was somehow linked to Pakistan. Pakistan was implicated in terrorist incidents in
Europe and the U.S., which suggested an Afghan mujahiddin connection. Benazir was
pressured to freeze Pakistan's nuclear program. She refused to yield to American entreaties
but sought another way to deal with the issue and ordered 5000 Pakistani soldiers to Somalia,
345 Id., p. 151 346 Kux, D., 2001, p. 294 347 Id., p. 320
119
where they served in the U.N.'s peacekeeping force. She also sent troops to Haiti and other
world trouble spots. Nevertheless, she did not receive support for Pakistan's claim to Kashmir,
nor did Clinton grant her any aid that had been blocked by the previous Bush Sr.
administration.348 However, due to the lobbying of pro-Pakistani congressmen in Congress,
the U.S. Senate did vote on September 21, 1995, to lift temporarily the Pressler Amendment
ban on releasing American arms to Pakistan. The vote came on an amendment to the Foreign
Aid Bill offered by Sen. Hank Brown (R-CO) and was in line with the promise that President
Clinton had made to Bhutto that arms Pakistan had paid for would be delivered or the money
returned. The passing of the amendment is attributed to the efforts of pro-Pakistan groups.349
Also during Nawaz Sharif's and Musharraf's administration, Pakistan was scrutinized
because of its connection to Osama bin Laden and the bombing at the American embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania.350 Furthermore, the U.S. condemned Pakistan's Kargil adventurism in
1999 when it crossed the LoC. During his first year of power Musharraf was not a welcome
figure in Washington or Europe. The chill in U.S.-Pakistan relations was acknowledged in
March 2000 when Clinton spent a full week in India but barely more than a few low-profile
hours in Pakistan.351
In June 2001, Christina Rocca (at that point incoming Assistant Secretary of State for
South Asian Affairs) addressed the Pakistan American Congress and said she wanted "to
recognize the efforts of your community to promote an ongoing exchange in both government
and the private sector on relations between the U.S. and Pakistan." What is particularly
interesting about Rocca's speech is that all of the sudden she jumps from using the term
Pakistani Americans to South Asians in the U.S. stating that "South Asians [my emphasis]
have made contributions beyond their numbers in academia, the sciences, medicine and the
arts." She also added that Pakistan occupies a central place at the crossroads of Asia and that
348 Ziring, L., 2003, p. 235 349 Ali, M.M., November 30, 1995; Kux, D., 2001, p. 331 350 Ziring, L., 2003, p. 251 351 Id., p. 271
120
the new Bush administration intended to work with the government of Pakistan to promote
political stability and strengthen democratic reforms as well as retard the growth of
extremism.352
● Post-9/11
After the 9/11 attacks the Bush administration ignored nuclear and other issues (that
were previously on the U.S. foreign policy agenda) and fighting terrorism became the most
important matter and Pakistan became a very useful tool in doing so. Pakistani Americans
became increasingly concerned about the anti-immigrant backlash that raged through the
country but already in November 2001, President Bush and some senior officials took the
time to meet a delegation of Pakistani Americans to discuss issues relating U.S.-Pakistan ties
and matters concerning the Pakistani community in the U.S. The major items discussed were
debt rescheduling for Pakistan and U.S. economic aid. Bush also assured the delegation that
he was aware of the hate crimes and instances of harassment Pakistani Americans had
endured since 9/11 and he asked the community to bring cases where civil rights were
affected to the notice of the Attorney General.353
The decision of Pakistan to help out the U.S. in its fight on terrorism did trigger some
anti-American sentiments in Pakistan. As an article in the New York Times testified Pakistan
had hoped that Americans would reciprocate Pakistan's help by lowering limits on imports of
Pakistan-made clothes. Pakistan's textile business and apparel industries, dominating the
country's economy and accounting for 60% of its industrial employment, have been battered
by a combination of restrictive American trade policies and repeated fears of war (first from
the conflict in Afghanistan and later with Pakistan's confrontation with India). One result of
these trade policies was major lay offs and this created an increasing feeling of resentment
among young Pakistanis. In the fall of 2001, Pakistan asked the U.S. and E.U. to waive
import duties on textiles and clothing and liberalize quotas on textile imports as a reward for
352 Rocca reaffirms importance of U.S./Pakistan ties, June 29, 2001 353 Pakistani Americans meet Bush, November 28, 2001
121
its help against Al Quada and the Taliban. But instead, the Bush administration opted in
February 2002 for a small increase in quotas while backing legislation to lower import duties
on just two categories of the textile industry (i.e. leather gloved and hand-knotted carpets). In
the meantime Pakistan's textile business languished and government officials in Islamabad
were upset that the U.S. did not roll back import duties of more than 25% on cotton clothing
from Pakistan, which would have helped Pakistani producers offer lower prices and avoid
losing sales to manufacturers in other countries.354
In June 2004, Torkel Patterson, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South
Asian Affairs, addressed the Pakistan American Congress. He said that Pakistan can play a
central role in broader South Asian economic development but would need to cultivate
stronger trade ties with its neighbors India and Afghanistan to fully realize that potential. He
reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to provide economic support to Pakistan and recalled Bush's
pledge to work with Congress to secure $5 billion in military, economic, health, education
and institutional assistance over the coming three years. He also urged the Pakistani American
community to use their influence to encourage the building of a strong, independent judiciary
and functioning legislature in Pakistan, "We need to see how we can translate [your] success
outside of Pakistan, into success inside Pakistan."355
354 Bradsher, K., June 23, 2002 355 Pakistan has key role to play in South Asian development, June 25, 2004
122
9. The U.S.-Israel-India triangle
An interesting and quite recent development in ethnic minority politics in the U.S.,
has been the rapprochement between Indian Americans and Jewish Americans. India and
Israel only started about a decennium ago - after a stillborn relationship for forty years - to
normalize their relationship; a process in which Indian Americans and Jewish Americans
have definitely played a role. Several American Jewish associations and the U.S. Indian
Political Action Committee (USINPAC) have closely been working together over the last few
years in order to reach similar goals. Hathaway (2004) even designates the new collaboration
between Indian Americans and Jewish communities as "Washington's new strategic
partnership".356
Some authors also emphasize the similarities between the Jewish and Indian diaspora.
Kotkin (1992) asserts that in a manner perhaps most reminiscent of the Jews before the
establishment of state of Israel, the Indian diaspora has concentrated on those fields where
global extension, a solid ethic of hard work and communal self-help, and the ability to think
and adapt quickly to changing economic conditions are critical advantages. Indians have - to a
remarkable extent - flourished in many of the very niches - garments, real estate, trading,
finance, entertainment, and diamonds - where Jews have traditionally found their greatest
success.357 Nevertheless - as Shukla (2003) points out - there is a big difference with the
Jewish diaspora that is very much premised on a rehearsal of originary forms of suffering and
persecution that have created dispersals, and that construct a compensatory nation.358
9.1. Historical background
The relationship between India and Israel was from its beginning onwards a hostile
one. India's hostile attitude toward Israel started with Gandhi who did not give credence to
Jewish nationalism associated with a particular territory, and continued under Nehru who
356 Hathaway, R.M., June 2004 357 Kotkin, J., 1992, p. 205 358 Shukla, S., 2003, p. 13
123
depicted the Palestine issue as analogous to the situation on the Indian subcontinent. Just as
the British were employing the tactics of divide and rule between Hindus and Muslims to
perpetuate their domination, he saw the English in Palestine pitting "Jewish religious
nationalism against Arab nationalism, and [making] it appear that [their] presence is
necessary to act as an arbiter and to keep the peace between the two." After India's
independence, India was appointed to a special U.N. committee charged to consider the
appropriate solutions for Palestine. New Delhi recommended a federation of two autonomous
Arab and Jewish states.359
Despite India's anti-Zionist stand, Israel cultivated India in its attempt to gain
acceptance in Asia and establish legitimacy in the world. However, New Delhi never
reciprocated, and when Israel became a reality in 1948, India still felt the need to take into
account Muslim opposition to its creation. Nehru did not recognize the Israeli state and in
1949 India opposed U.N. membership for Israel. It was only in September 1950 that the
Indian government accorded recognition, but still no exchange of ambassadors took place 360
and in 1953 no more than the opening of an Israeli consulate was allowed in Bombay.361
The following decade, India remained a defender of the Arab countries and after
Israel invaded Sinai in 1956, Nehru exclaimed that Israel was "a source of continuous
trouble". After Nehru's death Indian hostility even increased and so New Delhi refused to
accept Israeli assistance in redeveloping the barren wastelands of Rajasthan. Similarly, in
1966 the Indian government for "political reasons" declined an Israeli offer of famine
relief.362
A decline in Indo-Arab relations as a consequence of an outright endorsement of
Pakistan's stance on the disputed area of Kashmir by most of the Arab states, Israel's full
support of New Delhi's stand on Kashmir and its supplying of heavy mortars to India in the
359 Rubinoff, A.G., May 1995, p. 488-489 360 Id., p. 490 361 Inbar, E., 2004, p. 90 362 Rubinoff, A.G., May 1995, p. 494
124
1965 war between India and Pakistan, urged Indian intellectuals to rethink the country's West
Asia policy. In this period, the Indian Friends of Israel was founded to promote better
relations between the two countries.363 Despite the divergence of views about Israel between
the government and people of India, New Delhi kept backing the Arab countries and sought
actively punitive sanctions against Israel in the U.N. and supported the PLO in international
meetings including vigorous endorsement of the PLO's bid for observer status at the U.N. in
1974. Also, in the 1980s under the leadership of Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv, New Delhi
kept perceiving Israel as a "relentlessly expansionist" state. 364
For years India's overt hostility toward Israel had formed an impediment in its
relations with the U.S. It had especially alienated many of India's most ardent supporters in
U.S. Congress who were Jewish. Ironically, cooperation with Israel's lobby in Washington
started the process of normalization when the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee
helped the Indian embassy campaign against the sale of AWACS (Airborne Warning and
Control System) planes to Pakistan in 1987.365
The coming to power of the Janata Dal government in 1989 ended the official anti-
Israel rhetoric and marked the beginning for a change of policy. The ascendance of the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the Indian political system removed some hesitations about
Israel. To the BJP, with its nationalist, Hindu outlook, the Jewish state was not so much a
burden as a potential ally against Pakistan and radical Islam.366 An important development
took place when India allowed the refueling of American combat aircrafts during the Gulf
War of 1991. Especially in the early 1990s, New Delhi found the Israeli lobby useful in
Washington on such issues as Kashmir. Due to the rise of Islamic-inspired terrorism in that
Muslim-majority state, a parallel way of thinking on terrorism in New Delhi and Tel Aviv
came into being. However, it remained for the Congress government of Narasimha Rao
363 Id., p. 495 364 Id., p. 501-502 365 Id., p. 502-503 366 Inbar, E., 2004, p. 91
125
(coming to office in 1991) to complete the process of normalization. Rao, determined to
correct what he regarded as an "unnecessary aberration in our foreign policy", convened a
meeting of four former foreign secretaries who agreed that India should vote to rescind the
1975 "Zionism as racism resolution" that it had co-sponsored in the General Assembly. This
set the stage for the next step toward an exchange of embassies. In March 1992 a diplomatic
office was established and in August an embassy opened its doors in New Delhi. Since then a
steady stream of Israeli notables has visited India, most prominently Simon Peres who signed
economic, tourist and trade agreements in May 1993. India's union ministers of Agriculture,
Human Resources, Commerce, Science, and Tourism as well as chief ministers of various
Indian states have visited Israel. As a result, financial transactions have increased
dramatically; bilateral trade surpassed $400 million in 1995367 and by 2002 it had reached
$1.5 billion.368 Besides its traditional export of diamonds, Israel now sells potash, phosphate
fertilizers, and agrochemicals to India in return for textiles, yarn, rice, and leather goods.
Israel has also targeted India as a market for health services, environmental technology, and
armaments. In addition to a number of bilateral governmental agreements, joint ventures have
been established that will enable India to act as a middleman to West Asian countries with
which Israel has no links.369
By the late 1990s the two countries had discovered their common outlooks on
disputes in their regions, as well as a common strategic agenda. The American decision in
January 1999 to lift the sanctions it imposed after India's May 1998 nuclear tests removed a
serious obstacle in Jerusalem's relations with New Delhi, paving the way for achieving even
closer ties. September 11 and the war on terror appeared to create a climate even more
conducive to Indo-Israeli collaboration. This whole normalization process is an indicator that
367 Rubinoff, A.G., May 1995, p. 502-505 368 Inbar, E., 2004, p. 92 369 Rubinoff, A.G., May 1995, p. 502-505
126
in the international circumstances of the 1990s, a common stand against fundamentalist
terrorism is a better basis for relations than shared democratic institutions.370
India and Israel cherish a similar outlook towards their regional disputes. India, like
Israel feels beleaguered in its own region. Within their respective regions the two states are
involved in protracted conflict characterized by complex ethnic and religious components.
The threat for the two nations is the same: radical offshoots of Islam in the greater Middle
East. Both states want the U.S. to confine itself to the role of mediator in the disputes.371
The Indian defense establishment has always been less hostile toward Israel than the
Indian government has. The defense ties between the two countries include weapon
procurement, plans for co-producing military equipment, and cooperation in counter-terrorism
and low-intensity conflict. Lately, they have also developed ties in the area of space activities.
Israel has become India's second largest defense supplier after Russia.372
9.2. The Washington dimension
A dozen years ago, India Abroad publisher Gopal Raju asked Rep. Stephen Solarz for
advice on how the Indian American community might increase its political clout in
Washington. Solarz recommended Raju to hire someone from the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee.373 Already in 1993, India Abroad featured articles about "the Jewish
Americans' Path to Influence" in which similarities between the Jewish American and Indian
American community were highlighted and how the political involvement of the American
Jewish community could serve as a useful model for the Indian American community.374
The nascent Indian-American relationship, in particular after 9/11, has not been
enough to bring India into the American fold. New Delhi continues to suspect Washington of
being a false friend because of its continued cordiality with Pakistan and China. It is believed
370 Inbar, E., 2004, p. 92 371 Id., p. 93 372 Id., p. 94 373 Hathaway, R.M., June 2004 374 Nurnberger, R., December 24, 1993
127
that New Delhi's link with Jerusalem might have the potential to smooth over some of the
Indo-U.S. issues.375
America's Jewish lobby is quite powerful, unquestionably much more than the Indian
American one. American Jewish organizations were politically astute enough to understand
India's importance to the U.S. and Indian community in the U.S. Cooperation between the
two diasporas has the potential to magnify the voices of the two communities (small in
number: about 5.2 million Jews and 1.8 Indians) that is highly educated, affluent, and
attached to democratic homelands. The American Israel PAC, the American Jewish
Committee, the Jewish Institute on National Security Affairs, and the Jewish American
Congress nourish ties with India and with the Indian lobby in Washington. Many members of
USINPAC are blunt about their desire to emulate American Jewish groups and are interested
in building a long-term relationship.376
The two lobbies' relationships are excellent. Increasingly, senior Indian leaders meet
with American Jewish groups whenever they visit the U.S., and the past two years India's
ambassador has hosted Hanukkah celebration at his residence.377 The two lobbies are working
together on a number of domestic and foreign affairs issues, such as hate crimes, immigration,
anti-terrorism legislation, and backing pro-Israel and pro-India candidates. The Jewish-Indian
alliance worked together to gain the Bush administration's approval for Israel's sale of four
Phalcon radar planes to India. Moreover, in July 2003 they were successful in adding to a
U.S. aid package for Pakistan an amendment calling on Islamabad to stop Islamic militants
from crossing into India and to prevent the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
378
Since its inception in 2002, USINPAC has been remarkably successful in establishing
a presence on Capitol Hill and in forging friendships with key U.S. legislators. The PAC has
375 Inbar, E., 2004, p. 102 376 Ibid. 377 Hathaway, R.M., June 2004 378 Inbar, E., 2004, p. 103; Hathaway, R.M., June 2004; Gupta, A., September 2004, p. 8
128
worked closely with a variety of Jewish groups to promote ties between Indian Americans
and U.S. Jews.379
In July 2003, a first joint reception between the USINPAC, the AJC and the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) for U.S. lawmakers on Capitol Hill was
held. Joe Wilson, co-chair of the Congressional India Caucus, announced that it was
"appropriate to make this bond." Gary Ackerman, former co-chair of the Caucus, said: "The
problem for the two nations was that Israel was surrounded by 120 million Muslims, while
India has 120 million within."380
Another joint endeavor between AJC and USINPAC involved the presentation of a
memorial plaque to the American space agency NASA to commemorate last year's Columbia
space shuttle tragedy, in which an Israeli astronaut and an Indian American scientist died.381
USINPAC also collaborated with the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
(JINSA) to organize a conference in Washington on terrorism in India. Conversely, the AJC
has also made some serious efforts in order to improve relations between India and Israel.382
Allegedly, the AJC helped to establish the Congressional India Caucus.383 It has sponsored
trips to Israel by Indian American community leaders and organized several trips to India for
prominent U.S. Jews. AJC even opened an office in New Delhi.384
JINSA has been particularly active in working to foster trilateral cooperation among
India, Israel and the U.S. In 2003, it organized a conference in New Delhi on national
security, intelligence, and counter-terrorism. Among the conference speakers were retired FBI
and CIA experts, the former head of Mossad, and a former Israel Defence Force Deputy Chief
of Staff. A follow-on trilateral conference was held in Israel in 2004.385
379 Hathaway, R.M., June 2004 380 Zahir, J., October 2003 381 Hathaway, R.M., June 2004 382 Ibid. 383 India and Israel weigh, May 22, 2003 384 Hathaway, R.M., June 2004 385 Ibid.
129
Indian American groups have invited Jewish organizations to give seminars and other
means of maximizing their political effectiveness.386 One of the techniques of political
empowerment that Indian American organizations have borrowed from their Jewish allies is a
systematic program to place young interns in congressional offices on Capitol Hill.387
Interestingly - as I have pointed out before (cf. Chapter 3) - a substantial number of
Jewish members of Congress are aligned with the House as well as the Senate India Caucus.
Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA) a Jewish House India Caucus member, declared that the two
communities "have been drawn together by our joint fight against mindless, vicious, fanatic
Islamic terrorism".388
The two communities have also worked together during the 2002 elections to defeat
Georgia Congress-woman Cynthia McKinney (D)389 who was viewed as openly hostile to
both India and Israel.390 Rep. McKinney was unseated by Rep. Denise Majette (D-GA) with
the American Jewish and Indian American community heavily backing Majette because of
McKinney's strongly anti-Israel and anti-India opinions.391
On July 23, 2002, Frank Pallone wrote Secretary of State Colin Powell, a letter urging
the secretary to support the sale of the jointly developed US-Israeli arrow theater missile
defense system to India, as a move to "solidify" defense ties between the U.S. and India.
Pallone noted in his letter that he understood Powell objected to the deal while "there is
[reported] support within the Pentagon and support from Israel to make this sale a reality."
This is clearly an indicator of the warming Indo-Israel ties between Israel and the role of U.S.
congressmen as catalysts in this evolution.392
386 Hathaway, R.M., June 2004; Nurnberger, R., February 15, 2002; Ramer, L., October 11, 2002 387 Hathaway, R.M., June 2004; Nurnberger, R., February 15, 2002 388 Hathaway, R.M., June 2004; Cooperman, A., July 19, 2003 389 McKinney was said to be famous because of her unsubstantiated attacks on India and her unstinting report for Muslim causes. She introduced a statement into the Congressional record that called for the breakup of India and voted consistently for anti-India legislation introduced by Dan Burton (R-ID). (Dutt, E., September 6, 2002) In the meantime she has been re-elected. 390 Hathaway, R.M., June 2004; Cooperman, A., July 19, 2003; Feagans, B. October 22, 2004, 391 Berger, M.E., October 22, 2004; Dutt, E., September 6, 2002; Haniffa, A., October 11, 2002 392 Boese, W., April 2003
130
And in March 2004, the Israel Forum urged members to sign a petition that was
intended to stop Pakistan from being designated as a major non-NATO ally. This endeavor
took place in cooperation with USINPAC.393
Despite many positive feelings about the Indian American-Jewish American
partnership, there are some activists in both communities who worry that USINPAC and, by
extension, the Indian American community have allied themselves to closely with the
American political right wing. Others are concerned that USINPAC is affiliated to closely
with the Indian embassy in Washington and thus previously, with the government of the
BJP394, stating that USINPAC is an unrepresentative, radicalized group that ignores the BJP's
extremist ideology of Hindutva and thus rule out Christians and Muslims.395 It remains to be
seen whether USINPAC's orientation will change now the BJP is no longer the leading party
in India after the 2004 elections.
Additionally, the partnership might threaten to enlarge the already significant
divisions within the Indian American community. The partnership may be widely embraced
among Indian Americans who are Hindu, but Indian American Muslims as well as many
Sikhs find it disturbing. While the AJC has a history of reaching out to Indian Muslims in the
U.S., recently AJC leaders have been stung by the sharp complaints of Indian Muslims.396
Pakistani Americans have also been angered by this new alliance viewing it as
directed specifically against Pakistan. These sorts of resentments may serve to perpetuate old
antagonisms and to make cooperation more problematic between Pakistani Americans and
Indian Americans who have similar interests in the domestic arena.397
Skeptics see the new partnership as nothing more than a cynical marriage of
convenience built on the "lowest common denominator" of anti-Muslim sentiment and
393 Stop Pakistan from being designated a "major non-Nato U.S. ally", Israel Forum 394 Hathaway, R.M., June 2004 395 Zahir, J., October 2003 396 Hathaway, R.M., June 2004 397 Hathaway, R.M., June 2004
131
anxiety over terrorism. At the moment, it is also something of a one-sided partnership. Indian
Americans get more from the relationship, and also value it more highly than the Jewish
community. For example, Israeli officials visiting NY or Washington - in contrast to the
Indians - do not routinely meet with Indian-American groups. When asked why he valued the
partnership, one Jewish leader referred to a joke circulating among American Jews that
together, Hindus and Jews make up one-fifth of humanity. In other words, Israel may find
India a useful partner on the international scene, even if at the moment most of the domestic
benefits of the partnership flow to the Indian-American community.398
A trilateral alliance could result from the new U.S.-Indian-Israeli convergence on
strategic issues such as counter-terrorism, missile defense, and preemption. On an official
visit to the U.S. in May 2003, India's national security adviser Brajesh Mishra specifically
proposed an antiterrorism alliance between the three nations. "Such an alliance would have
the political will and moral authority to take bold decisions in extreme cases of terrorist
provocation," he said in an address to the American Jewish community in Washington. 399
Additionally, he added referring to the U.S.-India-Israel triad: "We are all democracies,
sharing a common vision of pluralism, tolerance and equal opportunity." He also pointed out
that all three countries uniquely confronted by the scourge of terrorism were "main targets of
international terrorism", and "should form an viable alliance against terrorism".400 As to U.S.
support for this, the U.S. ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, often clashed with Assistant
Secretary of State Christina Rocca in his support for Indian-U.S. defense relations and the
inclusion of Israel in a strategic triad. If the U.S. warms up to the idea, this trilateral
relationship might become attractive to India and Israel.401
398 Ibid. 399 Inbar, E., 2004, p. 103 400 Hathaway, R.M, June 2004 401 Inbar, E., 2004, p. 103-104
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10. Efforts of the Indian and Pakistani nation-states in reaching out to their diasporas
Both the Indian as well as the Pakistani nation-state have realized that their expatriate
communities possess great potential to uplift the respective mother countries and have
consequently encouraged them to invest in the mother countries and have granted them
favorable interest rates etc. Many Indian and Pakistani leaders have also lauded their
respective diaspora communities and urged them to become political active in their host
countries in order to have a hand in the host country's foreign policy making. India and
Pakistan both thus actively reach out to their diasporas and this is only likely to increase in the
future. Furthermore, both states have also tried to influence U.S. foreign policy through
efforts of their ambassadors and by means of hiring lobbying companies active on Capitol
Hill.
In the 1970s, India created the terms PIO and NRI, respectively meaning 'Person of
Indian Origin' and 'Non Resident Indian'. The latter are Indian citizens, holding Indian
passports and residing abroad for an indefinite period, whether for employment, or for
carrying on any business or vocation, or for any other purpose. A PIO is applied to a foreign
citizen of Indian origin or descent.402 Already in 1973, the Indian Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act discussed the "person not resident in India," and by 1975 members of the
Indian Investment Center had begun to hold seminars for immigrant associations in the U.S.,
with the purpose of soliciting monies for new Indian industries.403 Since April 1999, India has
been issuing the PIO-card for the sum of $1000. The card enables Indians in the diaspora to
visit India without visa, own property, buy government bonds and apply to universities in
India for a period of 20 years. The divergent justifications of public officials for the program
402 Technically, the term can be applied in three cases: (1) a person who, at any time, has held an Indian passport; (2) anyone, either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents or great grandparents was born in and was permanently resident in India as defined in the Government of India Act of 1953; and (3) the spouse of a citizen of India or a person of Indian origin covered in the previous two categories (Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian diaspora, December 2001, p. viii). 403 Shukla, S., 1999/2000, p. 22
133
reflect a link between the more cultural yearnings for the homeland and the economic agenda
of the state. Home Minister Advani from the BJP, noted: "I have seen the hunger of Indians
abroad to have their children linked to their country of origin," while chief commissioner for
Investments and Non-Resident Indians at the Indian Investment Center of the government,
pronounced: "I hope the new card will encourage more investment."404 The concept of the
PIO-card has been criticized because of its elite nature (i.e. expensive price tag) by Indians
residing in other countries than the U.S. and the U.K. who are not nearly as affluent as the
Indian communities in North America and the U.K.405 Also the NRI-category was created by
the Indian state to repatriate investment from abroad. The NRI receives benefits that normally
would not be available to a person living outside the state, such as the right to own property
within its borders.406 The reason to create these categories was India's economic crisis and
Indian officials believed in the importance of outside investors. Investments of Indians abroad
were considered as a less threatening source of funds and so the state began actively seeking
financial remittances from abroad.407
Despite the fact that categories as the PIO and NRI were created in the 1970s, it is
interesting to note that the Government of India did not initially regard overseas Indians as
potential (political) ambassadors.408 In 1947, Nehru panicked when he thought about the
overseas Indians. He was afraid if India showed interest in them, they would be accused of
divided loyalty, of loving India more than the country in which they had settled.409 However
the picture began to change in the early 1990s when the Indian economy went practically
bankrupt and the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi called Indians abroad a bank "from
which one could make withdrawals from time to time."410 Ever since, there has been a more
404 Id., p. 19 405 Shukla, S., 2003, p. 17 406 Id., p. 10 407 Id., p. 59 408 Lall, M.C., 2001, preface 409 Parekh, B., 2003, January 8, 2003; Gupta, A., September 2004, p. 6 410 Wucker, M., 2004, p. 37; Gupta, A., September 2004, p. 6
134
concerted Indian effort to court overseas Indians in the interests of overcoming some of the
traditional constraints of India's development.411
Most recently, on January 9th, 2003, the Indian parliament unanimously adopted the
Dual Citizenship Bill412 and approved dual citizenship to PIOs from 16 countries. In reality,
dual citizenship is said not to offer much more than the PIO-card does. The basic difference is
that it is for life while the PIO card is only for 20 years. Dual citizenship is believed "to raise
the comfort level psychologically and to connect the PIO with India intensely." The 16
countries where Indians can obtain dual citizenship are the U.S., the U.K., Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Finland, France, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, Switzerland, Israel, Sweden,
Australia and New Zealand. These countries were chosen on the basis of two criteria: their
legal systems are compatible and explicitly admit dual citizenship; and PIOs living in those
countries have demanded the facility. 413 Dual citizenship will not entitle overseas Indian
citizens equal opportunities in matters of public employment to contest for election as
President or Vice President. They cannot become a member of the House of the People (Lok
Sabha) or the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) or any legislative assembly, nor can an
overseas Indian become a Supreme Court or high court judge. Overseas citizens do not have
the right to vote or be registered as a voter. Further has the Government of India the right to
cancel dual citizenship if an overseas citizen of India "has shown himself by any act or speech
to be disloyal or disaffected toward the Constitution of India as by law established."414 When
India's ambassador-at-large Bhishma Agnihotri in July 2002 announced the decision of the
Indian parliament at the annual AAIP convention, he urged the Indian Americans to continue
influencing the India-U.S. relationship.415
411 Lall, M.C., 2001, preface 412 Dual citizenship is granted to NRIs and PIOs up to the fourth generation (Ghosh, D., Makhijani, V., May 16, 2003). 413 Josy, J., January 2, 2004 414 Bhatt, S., July 11, 2003 415 Dutt, E., July 12, 2002
135
Besides offering dual citizenship, the Indian state has also set up a High Level
Committee on the Indian Diaspora that was constituted in September 2001. This committee
published in 2001 a report that is a systematic outline of the different Indian diaspora
communities in the world.416 What is more, the Indian diaspora has now also an ambassador
from the Indian nation-state to look after its concerns.417
As far as Pakistan is concerned, it has taken similar initiatives to reach out to its
diaspora communities. Overseas Pakistanis number over 4 million and have a combined
income of $600 billion (beware: this is an estimated number!). This income is equal to the
GDP of Pakistan. Thus, the 3% of Pakistanis abroad earn over half the combined income
generated by people of Pakistani origin. Successive Pakistani governments have ardently
wooed this group for remittances, long-term investments, as well as political support,
especially in the U.S. and other Western countries. Also the Pakistani diaspora is not
homogenous. The temporary migrant worker in the Gulf can hardly compare his lifestyle with
that of the Pakistani professionals and businessmen in the U.S. and the U.K. or even in the
Gulf for that matter. Allegedly, many of the permanently settled Pakistanis in North America
however hardly ever send any remittances, the bulk of which still comes from the Gulf. 418
For Pakistani, dual citizenship seemed possible, and many obtained U.S. citizenship
as others had obtained British citizenship earlier. While the U.S. and Pakistan do not have a
dual citizen agreement this is not problematic. Since one does not physically surrender the
Pakistani passport when swearing allegiance to the U.S., the passport is retained and used to
revisit Pakistan without getting a visa. In 1996, Pakistan decided to issue a "residency card"
or national identification card for Pakistanis who had become U.S. citizens. The card allows
its bearer all rights except voting in Pakistan.419
416 Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian diaspora, December 2001 417 Shukla, S., 2003, p. 251 418 Naseem, S.M., The Diaspora View of Economy 419 Leonard, K., 1997, p. 73
136
Furthermore, many Pakistani officials have been urging the Pakistani community in
the U.S. to get more involved. This was also the message of Foreign Minister Khurshid
Mahmood Kasuri who asked them in May 2004 "to get more involved in mainstream
American issues". He underlined the need for "political activism" and also stated that Pakistan
"pays special attention to the Pakistani American community and its causes, because it plays a
critical role in Pakistan-U.S. relations."420
The embassies in the U.S. of both countries continuously try to influence U.S. foreign
policy and often organize events to which legislators are invited in order to make them aware
of issues of importance to the diaspora communities. In 1995, the Pakistani ambassador
actively lobbied Senators to win support for the Brown Amendment and urged Pakistani
Americans to write their legislators asking them to vote for the administration's initiative.421
The Fall 2004 Conference of the Pakistani-American youth organizations, Rising Leaders and
the National Pakistani Students Association, was organized with the support of the embassy
of Pakistan in Washington. This event also portrays the embassy's efforts to mobilize second
generation Pakistani Americans.
Last but not least, both countries hire professional lobbying firms as well. These
lobbying firms are public relations giants with connection to the highest level of the U.S.
political establishment. The firms are also expected to deflect criticism against their client
country, if and when the U.S. Congress takes note concerning violations of human rights or
infraction of trade regulations and the like.
420 Bughio, K.R., May 19, 2004 421 Haniffa, A., August 11, 1995
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11. Future Prospects
11.1. The second Bush administration
We need to ask ourselves of what issues we should be attentive in the near future. The
first question is what the prospects for Indo-U.S. and Pakistan-U.S. relations are under a
second Bush administration. During the first Bush administration India's biggest gain has
been the new view in Washington that India must be treated as an emerging global power.
Most probably, relations between India and the U.S. will keep on growing. The Indian foreign
policy establishment has been nothing but smiles at the appointment of U.S. National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice as the next Secretary of State. And it has also applauded the
appointment of Stephen Hadley as the next National Security Advisor. Rice and Hadley have
both been described as "India's most trusted interlocutors over the last four years." Already in
2000, Rice argued that America "should pay closer attention to India's role in the regional
balance." 422 Bush has denied the claim that the designation of Pakistan as a major non-
NATO ally automatically means that there will be an infusion of sophisticated weapons into
Pakistan. Notwithstanding this statement, it has been understood that the Bush administration
has in fact decided to provide F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan. The Bush administration is thus
apparently going ahead with rewarding Musharraf for his contribution to fight against Al
Qaida423, while serving a U.S. aircraft manufacturer. It will, therefore, be interesting to see
how India's new government, the United Progressive Alliance, addresses the issue of relations
with the U.S. and also Israel and Palestine (cf. Chapter 9).
If the second Bush administration decides to follow the recommendations of The 9/11
Commission Report, then the U.S. will make a long-term commitment to the future of
Pakistan. The U.S. will most likely sustain the current scale of aid to Pakistan, support
422 Mohan, R., November 17, 2004; Srivastava, S., November 18, 2004; Rice is positive on India, November 16, 2004 423 Narayanan, R., November 7, 2004
138
Pakistan's government in its struggle against extremists and give military aid.424 The U.S. is
most likely to maintain its strategic partnership with Pakistan. Washington will keep
determining its policies according to calculations of its own interests.
Another concern of the entire South Asian immigrant community are the legal rights,
working conditions and relative absence of social protection of low-income immigrants such
as the New York City yellow taxicab drivers.425 It seems unlikely that the present
administration will give priority to such lamentations over projects in the realm of nuclear
warfare or business opportunities abroad.
11.2. India's IT Business
Another issue that requires attention is India's booming IT (Information Technology)
business and the outsourcing-problem. The last 5 years, India's IT business has reached
unmeasured heights. This evolution has attracted numerous U.S. businesses. As mentioned by
Christina Rocca426, Assistant Secretary for South Asia Affairs, both Bush and Vajpayee have
acknowledged the importance of the IT trade, sharing a vision of exchange of high technology
and IT experts. Simultaneously, it has created anxiety in the U.S. as a consequence of
outsourcing jobs to India. Several U.S. states are currently trying to outlaw outsourcing to
India. It will definitely be interesting to see whether or not members of the India Caucus will
try to prevent such potential legislation.
11.3. U.S. Senate India Caucus
A very important advancement for the Indian American community has been the
creation of a U.S. Senate India Caucus. Founded on April 29, 2004, it has been projected as
"the big push to Indo-U.S. relations". The first-ever grouping of its kind in the U.S. Senate
was formed along the lines of the House India Caucus. The idea of a Senate India Caucus has
424 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 369 425 Roels, B., Fall 2003 426 Rocca, R.B., April 21, 2004
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caught on with as many as 35427 senators signing up for it (cf. list of members in Appendix).
Democratic Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY) and Republican Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) are
the first co-chairs of the bipartisan caucus. It is a political formation that promises to be a
powerful club.428
According to Senator Cornyn, who allegedly is the "moving spirit behind the caucus",
the bipartisan coalition will expand areas of agreement between the U.S. and India, but
simultaneously discussions over areas of disagreement will also be held. The Caucus' primary
goals are to cooperate in the war on terrorism, advance peace and stability, deepen defense
relations between the two countries and create opportunities for trade and investment in order
to give a big boost to economic ties.429 Additionally, Cornyn stated: "As the world's two
largest democracies, it is particularly important that we maintain a strong strategic
relationship. The United States and India share a commitment to freedom, representative
government, free market principles and the war against terror.430 India and the U.S. have
nothing to fear from one another. We have great potential."431 He even addressed India as
"one of our greatest allies and a nation that shares the deepest convictions of democratic
freedom."432
The Caucus is meant to provide a forum for U.S. Senators as well as Indian leaders. It
will also cover matters affecting Asian Indian Americans.433 Cornyn did stress the fact that
"important differences do remain concerning; such as India's nuclear weapons program and
the pace of India's economic reforms and trade."434
427 List from Washington, D.C., June 8, 2004; http://www.usinpac.com/NewsContent.asp?CONTENT_ID=122&SEC_ID=14 428 Rajagopalan, S., April 30, 2004; Senators to announce, April 28, 2004; Senate caucus, April 28, 2004; US Senate launches, April 30, 2004 429 Rajagopalan, S., April 30, 2004; Senators to announce, April 28, 2004; Senate caucus, April 28, 2004; US Senate launches, April 30, 2004 430 US Senate launches, April 30, 2004 431 Krishnaswami, S., April 29, 2004 432 Senate caucus, April 28,2004; US Senate launches, April 30, 2004 433 US Senate launches, April 30, 2004 434 Rajagopalan, S., April 30, 2004; Senators to announce, April 28, 2004; Senate caucus, April 28, 2004; US Senate launches, April 30, 2004
140
Senator Clinton, claiming to represent approximately 250,000 Asian Indian
Americans in the NY-area435, said she looked forward to play a key role in stimulating
stronger economic relations between the two countries. Concerning the nuclear proliferation
issue, Senator Clinton visualized a new era of cooperation between the two countries. She
hopes to address issues like halting proliferation and preventing rogue states like North Korea
from holding out threats.436
The Caucus is thus overall meant to bring Republicans and Democrats together to
strengthen the relationship between the U.S. and India and work toward common goals,
including increasing trade and improving security "in an age of global terror".437
The launching of the U.S. Senate India Caucus occurred simultaneously with the
retirement and birthday of the 63-year old Indian ambassador to the U.S., Lalit Mansingh. He
exclaimed that the Caucus is "the best birthday gift I have ever been given in my life".438
Earlier this year at a dinner party of the American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin
in March, Mansingh attributed the formation of the U.S. Senate India Caucus to "all the
Indian leaders of the Indian American community that finally made this happen."439
It is believed that the Senate Caucus should be more effective than the House Caucus.
The clout of the Senate body is traditionally considered to be far greater than the one of the
House of Representatives. There are only 100 senators - as against 435 congressmen; and
while a senator is elected for six years, a congressman's term lasts only two years.440
435 cf. www.census.org 436 Senators to announce, April 28, 2004; US Senate launches, April 30, 2004 437 Senators to announce, April 28, 2004; US Senate launches, April 30, 2004 438 US Senate launches, April 30, 2004 439 Haniffa, A., March 31, 2004 440 Raghavan, B.S., April 2, 2004
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Conclusion
Many American and Indian ambassadors, U.S. as well as Indian officials have
described the Indian American community in the U.S. as a bridge or as catalysts between the
two countries. Amit Gupta (2004) argued that the claims about the community's political
power are overstated.441 It is quite clear from my account that the Asian Indian community's
power has not yet unfolded itself completely, but seems to be continuously on the rise.
Nevertheless, the community faces a range of challenges in the near future in order to
increase and retain its little power of influence. Although Pakistani officials have been
deploying the same kind of rhetoric about its diaspora, the Pakistani American community
has not nearly reached the same level of political influence as the Indian Americans have.
The main reason why Pakistani influence is lagging behind might purely numerical.
The Indian American community is about tenth times the size of the Pakistani American -
according to the latest estimations. This means that they are much more visible in U.S. society
than their Pakistani counterparts. Second, Pakistani Americans are less efficiently organized.
While Indians were already debating in the early 1990s on how to become politically active
and how to assert themselves in U.S. politics, the Pakistani Americans have just recently
started doing this. So Pakistani American organizations are about ten years behind. Third,
there is the question of the ethnic community newspapers. India Abroad, the most widespread
ethnic newspaper among South Asians, does not particularly exclude Pakistanis or
Bangladeshis but they do feel alienated from this paper.442 It is undeniable that India Abroad
targets Indian Americans more than other South Asians. This newspaper regularly features
editorials of congressmen and senators and has without a doubt taught the Indian American
community a lot about the American political system. Leonard (1997) writes that there is a
marked contrast between the representation and discussion of generational differences in the
Indian and Pakistani ethnic presses. Pakistani Muslim American papers and journals such as
441 Gupta, A., September 2004, p. 2 442 Shukla, S., 2003, p. 210
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Pakistan Link and The Minaret have columns on Children and the Family, Career Counseling,
and occasional special features on the second generation, but these are limited in the range of
subject matter and in writings by people compared to India Today, India-West, India Tribune
and India Currents. In the latter publications, Youth Pages or spotlights on youth regularly
feature young people writing about dating, homosexuality, marriage out of community, and
even living together before marriage. There are numerous observations about first-generation
parents and relatives back in India, whereas a typical second-generation quote from the
Pakistani press is: "We associate closely with our family traditions rather than the country
we're in."443 Pakistani American newspapers are not only less widespread, but also reflect a
more conservative attitude and moreover, an absence of desire to assimilate in the U.S.
society. Fourth, the Pakistani Americans only recently set up a House Pakistan Caucus, while
the House India Caucus has been in effect for about ten years now. In those ten years Indian
Americans have established valuable relations and have been able to change the 'bad' image
of India that once pervaded congressional thinking. Therefore, I believe one of the main
challenges for Pakistani Americans is to change the 'terrorist' image of their country as a
dangerous and rogue state.
Despite the Indian Americans' head start, they also have challenges to overcome.
First, they need to abandon their weak sense of national identity. Many Indians choose to
identify with their different regional, linguistic, and religious groupings and this impedes the
presence of a uniform political agenda. The community seems to be united when it comes to a
Diwali stamp or some other emotive issue, but is divided on many of the other, more
substantive matters. The pull of religious and ethno-linguistic ties leads to a diffusion of
mobilization efforts. There is a need for a public policy agenda that works to provide
leadership and guidance on policy issues in the U.S.444 Secondly -as Huntington (2004) has
argued- for institutions to survive they must be able to withstand a generational change. The
443 Leonard, K., 1997, p. 154 444 Gupta, A., September 2004, p. 3-4; Lal, V., 1999, p. 45
143
question then pops up whether the next generation of Indian Americans will have the same
type of affinity for their roots and with the home country that their parents have?445 It has
been stated that the children of the 1965-immigrants generally constitute their politics on the
basis of their own challenges as young people within the U.S.446 Additionally; diaspora
groups tend to support the home country as long as it fits into the interests of the host nation.
When these interests diverge, the diaspora groups tends to side with its country of domicile
rather than its country of origin.447 Nevertheless, the Indian American community is well on
its way. Politically, it has been a banner year for the community: a maximum number of
members of the community contesting in polls nationwide (28); maximum number to win in
an election cycle (8); maximum number of Indian Americans in state legislatures (5) and, of
course, the big one - India's first Congressman in 46 years, and only second in U.S. electoral
history. Additionally the community is learning from and cooperating with what is said to be
the most influential lobby group on the Hill. As Hathaway (June 2004) argued - Indian
Americans will flourish to the extent that the larger American body politics continues to
believe that India is an attractive partner for the U.S. On the other hand, I believe this might
change if continuous economic development of India into a world power would be perceived
as too competitive by American business circles. As a comparison, U.S.-European political
relations have changed from love between master and vassal, towards conditional agreements
and notorious disagreements (Iraq for example) concomitant with repetitive trade conflicts
with a powerful European economic community as reflected in reciprocal sanctions.
Besides examining the successes and/or failures of both diaspora communities, it is
necessary to question the true effectiveness of informal caucuses such as the House India
Caucus and Pakistan Caucus and the effect is can really have on foreign policy making.
445 Id., p. 12 446 Prashad, V., Mathew, B., 1999/2000, p. xii 447 Gupta, A., September 2004, p. 15
144
The main obstacle to efficiency is the bipartisan nature of both caucuses. As is clear
from the sample survey (cf. Chapter 5), a congressman's party affiliation triumphs over
his/her caucus affiliation. Hathaway (2001) notices that finding bipartisan consensus is often
difficult, especially regarding domestic issues. He claims the India Caucus has been most
effective on foreign policy issues. Nevertheless, the bipartisan nature often creates
difficulties. Nearly three-fourths of the members of the India Caucus are Democrats, and
Democrats over the years have tended to support pro-India measures more often than
Republicans. Nonetheless, some of New Delhi’s harshest critics also come from the
Democratic side of the aisle.448
Secondly, up till April 2004, the India Caucus was a creature of the House of
Representatives only. Members of the Senate are usually more apprehensive aligning
themselves with a certain ethnic group. It is yet to be seen whether this Senate India Caucus
will be capable of exerting more power in foreign policy issues concerning India.
Hathaway (2001) also points to the informal nature of one's membership of the
caucus. Whereas the India Caucus claims to be the biggest of its kind in U.S. politics with
more than 170 members, only a couple dozen of these members take an active interest in the
affairs of the Indian American community. Although most India Caucus members cast pro-
India votes, their activities on behalf of the community do not extend much beyond that.
Moreover, some legislators are said not to know that their staffs have signed them up for
caucus membership.449
Apparently, personal rivalries have also undercut the India Caucus effectiveness,
although by its very nature this development is difficult to document. In early 1999, Pallone
was forced out as Caucus co-chair and replaced by Ackerman. Allegedly this was because a
number of Caucus members had come to feel that Pallone had used the organization too much
448 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 29 449 Ibid.
145
as a vehicle for his personal ambitions and hoped to garner for themselves some of the
recognition Pallone had gained through his activity.450
What then can a caucus do to increase its power? The first option is to abolish the
bipartisan nature of the formation, but I believe that is not the right solution. The size of a
caucus does not seem to matter that much either. Indian Americans always pride themselves
that the India Caucus is the biggest one on the Hill, but that does not imply that it is the most
powerful. The caucuses should abandon their informal nature. This would mean that the
congressman or -woman signing up would have to ascertain and display the real motives and
genuine interests for joining the caucus. His/her previous voting records should be examined
and some sort of pledge that he/she will work actively for the caucus' causes should be taken.
The real power of Congress in general should also be questioned. Both Hathaway
(2000) and Rubinoff (Spring 2001) claim that when it comes to foreign policy, Congress is
better at obstructing executive branch desires than at fashioning a policy of its own. When the
Congress does play a constructive role, it is almost always on the "margins of policy". There
are very few examples in modern U.S. political history where Congress has successfully
launched a major foreign policy initiative in the face of executive opposition. As far as my
account of the caucuses' actions showed, it has merely been successful in preventing or
softening sanctions to be imposed on India or Pakistan or in suggesting to impose sanctions
on some of their rivals. Sanctions are often considered to be a blunt instrument, but we must
acknowledge it is better than no instruments. More importantly, sanctions can represent a
legitimate effort to warn foreign governments not to take particular actions or cross certain
lines and sometimes reflect a congressional distrust of the executive branch. Congress might
legislate non-proliferation sanctions, for instance, because it believes that the White House is
not giving this issue sufficient priority.451
450 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 29; Haniffa, A., October 16, 1998 451 Hathaway, R.M., Jan/Feb 2000, p.14; Rubinoff, A.G., Spring 2001, p. 49
146
In other words, the strength of the India Caucus - in particular - is often overstated
and its true accomplishments have been limited to passing (sometimes very
ceremonial/symbolic) resolutions rather than hardcore substantive legislation. For example,
one of the recent resolutions (March 10, 2004) proposed by members of the India Caucus
was to commend India on its celebration of Republic Day (H.CON. RES.15). This
congressional address did not give a comprehensive discussion of U.S.-Indian ties. Instead, it
was marked by an outpouring of praise of "the more than 2 million Indian Americans in the
U.S. who have become a living bridge between our two great democracies." Other gracious
rhetoric was used stating "there is no stronger relationship between the U.S. and India than
our shared commitment to democracy and civil society. We are truly natural allies."452
To finish, there is this question about the cash flowing out of the pockets of both
diaspora communities and arriving at the hands of U.S. politicians. Does American politics
welcome or exploit the Indian American and Pakistani American community? Many authors
have suggested that the community is being manipulated by politicians far more interested in
raising campaign funds than in promoting the interests of Indian Americans or Pakistani
Americans. Probably, the community has yet to develop a political maturity sophisticated
enough to distinguish between its effective advocates and those lawmakers whose
commitment is mainly verbal dependent on the size of the political donations they receive.
More than 25% of all the representatives belong to the India Caucus. To put that in
perspective: 0.6% of the population is Indian.453 For example, I wonder how the Pakistani
American community in New York that in 2000 raised $50,000 to support Hillary Clinton's
Senate campaign454, reacts to the fact that she has now become one of the co-chairmen for the
Senate India Caucus. Conversely, how does the Indian American community react if she
452 Congressional Record, House, Page H982, March 10, 2004, Congressional Quarterly Inc. 453 Hathaway, R.M., 2001, p. 30; AdLib: Struggle for empowerment, April 1, 1999; Schroeder, M., November 13, 2003; Gopakrishna, S., January 15, 2003 454 Bonner, R., March 14, 2000
147
lauds Pakistan's role in the war on terror. In fact this must not necessarily be harmful to the
populations of either Pakistan or India who have also common interests.
A question relating to this problem is whether economic empowerment (which both
communities in the U.S. have certainly achieved.) ultimately leads to political empowerment.
In the meantime, the visibility of Asian Indian and Pakistani American legislators in U.S.
politics has remained fairly low to non-existent.
To conclude, we can definitely state that the presence of the Indian American
community in the U.S. has led to an increase of congressional interest in the country and has
been to a small, but significant extent been able to influence U.S. policy, both domestically
and internationally. The image of India as a poverty-stricken country clearly does no longer
pervade congressional thinking about the country. Jaswant Singh, India's current External
Affairs Minister expressed similar perceptions during his visit to the U.S. in 2002:
"Americans of Indian origins have acted as a catalyst to Indo-U.S. relations that even I did not
see ten years ago."
However, it is clear that despite these positive processes, the Indo-American
community does still suffer from several other handicaps. Their percentage among the overall
population is still small as compared to the Jews for example. Given their relatively small
number, they are just not yet able to influence the American policy-makers significantly.
Although the previous outlined developments have constructed a somewhat new political
dimension and a desirable political beginning, I believe it will take a few more years of
dedicated Indian American political engagement before it will be able to influence U.S.
foreign policy significantly.
So what to expect for the future? We shall probably see a groundswell of the second
generation Indian Americans running for U.S. Congress positions as already numerous young
Indian Americans work or interns in the offices of congressmen and senators, giving them
148
hands-on experience with the American political process. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen
whether they will be able to be more influential in steering U.S. foreign policy toward India.
As far as the Pakistani American community is concerned: they have just started to
organize themselves effectively and they have without a doubt a long and hard struggle ahead
of them in order to come to the level where Indian Americans are now. Political
empowerment is a very slow and gradual process and without dedicated and charismatic
community leaders who ardently believe in their success, it will take even longer to achieve
an actual voice in U.S. politics.
149
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Websites - AAIP http://www.aapiusa.org/aapi.nsf - AIA http://www.aia-dc.org/ http://www.namasthenri.com/associations/aia.html - AJC List of Jewish members in the 108th U.S. Congress http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/jewcong108.html (consulted on 10/26/2004) - AFMI http://www.afmi.org/aboutafmi.cfm - AOPP http://www.aopp.org/ - APPNA http://www.appna.org/objectives/ - APSENA http:// www.apsena.org/ - FIA http://www.fia-ohio.org/about.asp http://www.fiaonline.org/index.php - FOIL http://www.proxsa.org/resources/foil/foilpg.html - IACC http://www.indous.org/aboutus.php http://www.indous.org/ - IADO http://www.iado.org/ - IAFPE http://www.iafpe-ne.org/about.asp http://www.iafpe.org/php/showPressDetails.php?linkid=7&newsid=1 http://www.iafpe.org/ http://www.iafpe-ne.org/internship.asp - Indian Muslim Council-U.S.A. http://www.imc-usa.org/cgi-bin/cfm/whoweare.cfm http://www.imc-usa.org/cgi-bin/cfm/objectives.cfm - Joe Wilson http://joewilson.house.gov/Issues/Issue/?IssueID=105 - Joseph Crowley http://crowley.house.gov/biography/index.htm
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- NCPA http://www.ncpa.info/ - NetIP http://www.netip.org/html/quarterlythemes.html - NFIA http://www.nfai.net http://www.nfia.net/indian_community.htm http://www.nfia.net/Delhi%20Press%20Release.html - OPEN http://www.open-us.org/ - Open Secrets.org http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacfaq.asp (consulted on 10/27/2004) - PABA http://www.pabausa.com/ - PABE http://www.pabe.org/ - PAC http://www.pacus.org/main-page.html - PAK-PAC http://www.pakpac.net/ - PAL-C PAC http://www.palc.us/index.php?id=49 (consulted on 10/14/2004) http://www.pal.us/ - PICC http://www.pakchamber.com/ - U.S. Census www.census.gov - US-India Friendship Council http://www.usindiafriendship.net/congress/friends/friends.htm# (consulted on 10/14/2004) http://www.usindiafriendship.net/congress/caucus/caucus.html (consulted on 10/14/2004) - USINPAC http://www.usinpac.com/NewsContent.asp?CONTENT_ID=122&SEC_ID=14 (consulted on 10/14/2004) http://www.usinpac.com/ http://www.usinpac.com/Content.asp?SEC_ID=27 - USPBC http://www.uschamber.org/
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Appendix
Members455: Caucus on India and Indian Americans in the U.S. Senate (108th Congress elected in November 2002)
Eight members of the U.S. Senate India Caucus are Jewish Congressmen. There are
11 Jewish Senators in the 108th Congress. Among these 6 are Democrats and 2
Republicans.
(list from Washington, D.C., June 8, 2004) 456 18 Democrats, 17 Republicans ,Total 35
Senator Cornyn (R - TX) –Co-Chair Senator Clinton (D - NY) –Co-Chair
Senator Hutchison (R - TX) Senator Lott (R - MS)
Senator Lautenberg (D - NJ) JC Senator Santorum (R - PA)
Senator Lieberman (D - CT) JC Senator Specter (R - PA) JC
Senator Daschle (D - SD) Senator Stabenow (D - MI)
Senator Bingaman (D - NM) Senator Cochran (R - MS)
Senator Frist (R - TN) Senator Corzine (D - NJ)
Senator L. Graham (R - SC) Senator Schumer (D - NY) JC
Senator Wyden (D - OR) JC Senator Coleman (R - MN) JC
Senator Chambliss (R - GA) Senator Bayh (D - IN)
Senator Durbin (D - IL) Senator Breaux (D - LA)
Senator Crapo (R - ID) Senator Levin (D - MI) JC
Senator Fitzgerald (R - IL) Senator Grassley (R - IA)
Senator Bennett (R - UT) Senator Boxer (D - CA) JC
Senator Nickles (R - OK) Senator Stevens (R - AK)
Senator Mikulski (D - MD) Senator Rockefeller (D - WV)
Senator Landrieu (D - LA) Senator Hatch (R - UT)
Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA)
455 ● : Democrats ● : Republicans underlined: member of House India Caucus AND House Pakistan Caucus JC ● : Jewish affiliation: 456 http://www.usinpac.com/NewsContent.asp?CONTENT_ID=122&SEC_ID=14
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Contents Introduction 1 1. The Indian and Pakistani diaspora in the United States
1.1 The Indian diaspora in the Unites States 6 1.2. The Pakistani diaspora in the United States 8 1.3. Historical background of the South Asian diaspora in the United States 10
2. The participation of Indian Americans and Pakistani Americans in U.S. politics
2.1. Immigrant organizations 13 2.2. South Asian American, Indian American and Pakistani American groups 15
2.2.1. South Asian American organizations 18 2.2.2. Indian American organizations 20
2.2.3. Pakistani American organizations 33 2.3. Assessment of the organizations 39 2.4. Other means of political participation 2.4.1. Voting 44 2.4.2. Donating money as an individual 46 2.4.3. Establishing personal relations with elected officials 48 2.4.4. Running for office 48 2.4.5. Internships for the second generation 50 2.5. Conclusion 51
3. Caucus on India and Indian Americans in the U.S. House of Representatives 54 4. Caucus on Pakistan and Pakistani Americans in the U.S. House of Representatives 60 5. Voting behavior of India Caucus and Pakistan Caucus members: a sample survey 5.1. The selected resolutions 67 5.2. Analysis of the resolutions and the voting behavior 73 5.3. A general conclusion 89 6. Issues of concern 92 7. U.S.-India ties 101 8. U.S.-Pakistan ties 116 9. The U.S.-India-Israel triangle 9.1. Historical background 122 9.2. The Washington dimension 126 10. Efforts of the Indian and Pakistani nation-states in reaching out to their diasporas 132 11. Future Prospects 11.1. The second Bush administration 137 11.2. India's IT Business 138 11.3. U.S. Senate India Caucus 138 Conclusion 141
166
Bibliography 149 Appendix 164
