Competition in Crime Deterrence

Competition in Crime DeterrenceAuthor(s): Nicolas MarceauSource: The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique, Vol. 30, No. 4a(Nov., 1997), pp. 844-854Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Canadian Economics AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/136273 .

Accessed: 17/06/2014 03:09

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Wiley and Canadian Economics Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extendaccess to The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 62.122.78.49 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 03:09:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cea

http://www.jstor.org/stable/136273?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


Competition in crime deterrence NICOLAS MARCEAU Universite du Quebec a Montreal

Abstract. This paper studies competition between jurisdictions in the eradication of crime. In one story, criminals choose the jurisdiction in which they will commit their crimes while jurisdictions choose the amount of resources devoted to deterrence to protect local production. In another story, the criminals cannot change jurisdiction but they can rob the owners of mobile capital. Jurisdictions choose the amount of resources devoted to the deterrence of local crime so as to secure property rights and to attract capital. In both stories, competition between jurisdictions leads to overdeterrence relative to the Pareto optimal level.

Concurrence dans la dissuasion du crime. Ce texte 6tudie la concurrence que se livrent des juridictions dans la dissuasion du crime. Dans un premier modele, les criminels choisissent la juridiction dans lacquelle ils commettent leurs crimes alors que les juridictions, afin de prot6ger leur production, choissisent la quantite de ressources d6volues a la dissuasion. Dans un deuxieme modele, !es criminels ne peuvent changer de juridiction mais ils volent les propri6taires d'un capital qui est, lui, mobile. Les juridictions, afin d'attirer le capital, consacrent des ressources a la dissuasion pour que soient respect6s les droits de propri6te. Dans les deux modeles, la concurrence que se livrent les juridictions se traduit par une dissuasion excessive relativement a l'optimum de Par6to.

1. INTRODUCTION

In this paper competition between jurisdictions in the eradication of crime is examined, and it is argued that it leads to too many resources being devoted to it (i.e., it leads to overdeterrence). This result obtains because the resources de-

I am grateful for comments from Benoit Delage, Georges Tanguay, Francois Vaillancourt, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the 1996 meeting of the Soci6t6 canadienne de science 6conomique. Financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged. Errors are mine.

Canadian Journal of Economics Revue canadienne d'Economique, xxx, No. 4a November novembre 1997. Printed in Canada Imprim6 au Canada

0008-4085 / 97 / 844-54 $1.50 ? Canadian Economics Association



Competition in crime deterrence 845

voted to deterrence by a juridiction create a negative externality borne by adjacent jurisdictions.

There are at least two sources of competition between jurisdictions. First, a criminal deterred from committing a crime in one jurisdiction may simply decide to commit it in another. The phenomenon of crime displacement (or deflection, or spillover, etc.) can take many forms. Davidson (1981) reports four types of displacement that target hardening can lead to. As in one story of the current paper, hardening the target in one place may lead to the criminal's looking for a target elsewhere.1 Crime can also be displaced in time, the criminal simply waiting for the appropriate moment. The criminals can also simply change method or turn to another type of crime. Several examples of displacement are presented in Clarke (1995). He reported that, according to one study, a property-making program in Ottawa led to the displacement of burglaries from the houses of participants to those of non-participants. According to another study, a program of target hardening in a British public housing estate displaced burglaries to adjacent areas. Finally, according to other studies, displacement is reported to have occurred in New York City, Newark (New Jersey), and Columbus (Ohio). The possibility of displacement is a potential source of competition between jurisdictions, because, by increasing its effort in deterrence, a jurisdiction can redirect criminals operating on its territory to neighbouring jurisdictions. It can also prevent criminals operating elsewhere from being redirected towards itself.

Second, jurisdictions can compete in crime deterrence so as to be more attractive to investors. Other things being equal, the owners of capital will prefer a jurisdiction with more secure property rights, that is, a jurisdiction in which fewer crimes are committed. Besley (1995) provides evidence that better land property rights facilitate investment. The mobility of capital investments is then also a source of competition between jurisdictions, because, by increasing its effort in deterrence, a jurisdiction can attract investments that would otherwise locate in other jurisdictions.

It is argued in this paper that competition between jurisdictions leads to over-deterrence. The intuition behind this result is that jurisdictions, when choosing their effort in deterrence, neglect the harm they impose on other jurisdictions (owing to the displacement of criminals or the relocation of capital). Since an external cost is neglected, too much deterrence takes place relative to the social optimum.

The problem of competition between jurisdictions has attracted the attention of many economists recently. Mintz and Tulkens (1986) and Wildasin (1988) examined tax competition when jurisdictions behave strategically. Assuming that the jurisdictions are the players of a Nash game, they showed that the resulting Nash equilibrium is generally non-optimal. But the jurisdictions can also compete in other dimensions. In Oates and Schwab (1988) and Markusen, Morey, and Olewiler (1993), they compete in taxes and in the level of environmental regulation, while

1 Target hardening can also have the perverse effect of signalling that something worth stealing is being protected. This is considered in Lacroix and Marceau (1995).



846 Nicolas Marceau

in Kanbur and Keen (1993), they compete in taxes in the presence of cross-border trade. Again, the equilibria obtained generally are non-optimal.2

Several papers have considered the choice of target by criminals. In Deutsch, Hakim, and Weinblatt (1987), a sophisticated model of criminals' choices is developed, allowing for many possible targets in many possible jurisdictions. The deterrence policies of the jurisdictions are not endogenized, however, as they are in the current analysis. In Hakim et al. (1979), a general equilibrium model is built in which a jurisdiction makes its choices given the choices of the other jurisdictions. The model is built, however, with macroeconomic relationships between crime and expenditures on deterrence; the authors clearly had in mind its empirical imple- mentation. The microeconomic behaviour of the criminals and the jurisdictions is not explicit.

There are also papers in which more than one agent allocates resources to deter criminals. Usher (1987) studies a general equilibrium model in which individuals choose between production and predation. Producers also choose how much time to allocate to crime deterrence (protection of their production). In Usher's model, and in contrast with the current analysis, individuals behave competitively (rather than strategically), and the focus is on the cost of criminal activity rather than on the optimal level of deterrence given criminal activity. In Grossman and Kim (1995), a general equilibrium model is built in which individuals allocate resources to production, predation, and protection. They also focus on the cost of criminal activities in equilibria with more or less secure property rights. Finally, Shavell (1991) studies individual precautions against crime. In his model, individuals behave non- cooperatively in their choice of precaution. He compares the private choice of precaution with its socially optimal level. For the case where precautions are ob- servable, he discovers that the private level of precaution can be larger than, equal to, or smaller than the optimal level. The last result differs from the one obtained in the current analysis because in Shavell's model, criminals can be completely deterred from committing a crime.3

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, a simple two- jurisdiction game in deterrence is presented. In this section, it is assumed that the jurisdictions have an objective function with some specific properties. Given this, it is shown that the jurisdictions undertake too much deterrence. In section III, I present two stories that formally generate the objective function used in section II and therefore for which the overdeterrence result holds. Hence, criminals choose the jurisdiction in which they will commit their crimes, while jurisdictions choose the amount of resources devoted to deterrence to protect local production. In section IV, the criminals cannot change jurisdiction, but they can rob the owners of mobile

2 But see King, McAfee, and Welling (1993) in which jurisdictions compete on infrastructures in order to attract firms. Their model is set-up, so that the net effects of a choice of investment by a jurisdiction are internalized. Hence the Nash equilibrium resulting from the investment game is efficient.

3 See also Marceau (1994) for an analysis in which criminals can be completely deterred from committing a crime.




capital. Jurisdictions choose the amount of resources devoted to the deterrence of local criminals so as to secure property rights and to attract capital.

11. A TWO-JURISDICTION GAME IN DETERRENCE

Consider a world divided into two jurisdictions, 1 and 2. For reasons that will be developed later, the jurisdictions spend some resources on deterrence. Denote by dj C D the level of deterrence activities chosen by jurisdiction j, where D denotes the set of possible deterrence activities. Suppose that the welfare (of the residents) of jurisdictions 1 and 2 can be represented by V1 (dl, d2) and V2(d2, d1), respectively.4 Hence, the level of deterrence activities chosen by jurisdiction 2 has an impact on the welfare of jurisdiction 1 (and vice versa). Suppose further that Vj(dj, dk) is strictly concave in dj and that aVj/ldk < 0,] k. Then the latter inequality implies, using the terminology of Eaton and Eswaran (1991), that the deterrence activities of the jurisdictions are plain substitutes. The fact that deterrence taking place in jurisdiction k affects negatively the welfare of jurisdiction j can be rationalized in the two stories that were mentioned earlier in the introduction and that are fully developed in sections III and IV. In the first story, more deterrence in k can hurt j because criminals find it relatively more profitable to operate in j. One can then expect an increase of crime in j. In the other story, more deterrence in k means that property rights become relatively more secure in k. Consequently, some capital can be expected to relocate from j to k.

The problem of jurisdiction 1 is maxdl V1(dl, d2). The first- and second-order conditions of this maximization problem are, respectively, aV1 (di, d2)/ad1 = 0 and &2V1(d1,d2)/ad 2 < 0. These define a reaction function for jurisdiction 1: d,= 61 (d2). For jurisdiction 2, the anlog to the problem of jurisdiction 1 leads to a reaction function d2 = 62(d1). A Nash equilibrium is then a pair (d', d-') such that dN - 61(,(dN) and df 62(d N). This is depicted in figure 1 in the (d1, d2) space. The case where the reaction curves are negatively sloped is here represented. The Nash equilibrium pair (d,, d_I) lies at the intersection of the two reaction curves and is denoted N.

It has been shown by Eaton and Eswaran (1991) that for the case where the actions of the players are plain substitutes, the Nash equilibrium level of the actions is higher than the Pareto efficient level. In the context of the current analysis, this means that the Nash equilibrium level of deterrence activities is higher than the Pareto efficient one.5 In other words, the jurisdictions undertake too much deterrence. This can be seen in figure 1, where the jurisdictions' indifference curves through the Nash equilibrium are depicted (denoted ul and U2, respectively).6 Note

4 These functions can be interpreted as general social welfare functions. Alternatively, and in the public choice tradition, they can be seen as the utility functions of government officials for which fewer crimes means a better chance of re-election.

5 The Pareto efficient combination is the solution to maxdl,d2 V1 (dl, d2) subject to V2(d2,di) _ V. 6 Note that u1 is the indifference curve that is the closest from the horizontal axis given a level of

deterrence activities d2N therefore ensuring the highest possible welfare to jurisdiction 1 given dN. 2'~



848 Nicolas Marceau

that because the deterrence activities are plain substitutes, an indifference curve for jurisdiction 1 (2) is necessarily concave to the horizontal (vertical) axis.7 It is possible to see that all the points in the hatched area at the southwest of N (where d1 ?< d N and d2 ?< d N) would make the two jurisdictions better off. Hence, the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto efficient: it entails too much deterrence. Note that this result holds whether the deterrence activities of the jurisdictions are strategic substitutes (6b < 0, as in figure 1) or strategic complements ( > 0).

The intuition behind the overdeterrence result is that a jurisdiction, when choosing its level of deterrence activities, trades off its own benefits (reduced number of criminals or increased capital investment) and costs (forgone and stolen production) but does not take into account the fact that these have a negative impact on the welfare of the other jurisdiction. In other words, there are costs to other jurisdictions that are not internalized.

Having obtained the result of overdeterrence, I shall now generate formally the functions V1(di, d2) and V2(d2, d1) used above.

111. STORY 1: MOBILE CRIMINALS AND LOCAL PRODUCTION

Consider the following geography of the world. Suppose that on a line of unit length, jurisdiction 1 is located at 0 (the far left) while jurisdiction 2 is located at 1 (the far right). The n criminals are located uniformly on the line between 0 and 1. Jurisdiction j can use its endowment e as a capital good kj used in production or for deterrence activities dj. Jurisdiction j therefore faces the resource constraint kj +dj = e.

The technology used to transform capital into production yj is given by yj =

f (kj), where f' > 0 and f " < 0. In this world, criminals will steal some of jurisdiction j's production. It is assumed that a criminal steals an amount of production g that depends on the effort he exerts (according to a function specified below). Because it prefers to keep its production rather than to have it stolen, jurisdiction j undertakes deterrence activities dj. These translate into a probability p(dj) of appre- hending any criminal operating in j, where p' > 0 and p" < 0. It is assumed that the amount stolen by a criminal is dissipated, even if he is caught. An exogenous sanction could be imposed on a criminal if he is caught, but for simplicity, suppose that the only sanction he faces is that he is deprived of 'consuming' the return g of his criminal activity.

The criminals will choose between jurisdictions 1 and 2, taking into account the probability of being caught, the cost of travelling to the jurisdiction, the amount of resources that can be stolen in the jurisdiction, and the effort that has to be put into the process. I assume that travelling a distance A costs tA, where t is a

This indifference curve is tangent to a horizontal line going through d2N. Therefore, the point of tangency (in this case (dr, d2N)) belongs to the reaction curve 6i (d2). The same reasoning applies for indifference curve u2.

7 If the deterrence activities were plain complements, those indifference curves would necessarily be convex to the horizontal and vertical axes, respectively.




d2

62 (di)

&1 (d2)

dN d

FIGURE 1 Nash equilibrium is Pareto dominated.

fixed, strictly positive parameter. Also, suppose that the amount g of resources that can be stolen in a jurisdiction increases if the criminal puts in more effort z C [0,2] according to g(z), with g' > 0, g" < 0, g(O) > 0, and g(z) < oo. For the criminal, the utility cost of effort z is simply z (i.e., the price of effort is 1). Then, the expected return of a criminal exerting effort z and located at distance A from a jurisdiction undertaking deterrence activities d is (1 - p(d))g(z) - z - tA. If a criminal were to operate in such a jurisdiction, he would optimally set his effort z so as to maximize his expected return. Hence, let z(d, A) be the solution to maxz (1- p(d))g(z) - z - tA. The first-order condition of this problem is simply (1 - p(d))g'(z) - 1 = 0. It is immediately apparent that this solution is independent of A, and so we can write, abusing notation, z(d, A) _ z(d). It is also useful to note



850 Nicolas Marceau

that effort decreases when deterrence activities increase: z' = p'g'/(l - p)g" < 0. For simplicity, it is assumed that g(z) is large relative to t, so that a criminal would always operate in one of the two jurisdictions (even if he had to travel a distance A = 1).8 But ceteris paribus, a criminal will operate in the nearest jurisdiction. It is immediately useful to note that the criminal who is indifferent between the two jurisdictions is located at distance A(di, d2) given by

(1 - p(d1 ))g(z(d1 ))-z(d1 -tA = (1 - p(d2))g(z(d2))

-z(d2)-t(l-A) (1)

Using (1), it is then possible to show that A(di, d2) is decreasing in d1 but increasing in d2. It can also be seen that all criminals with A < A(d1, d2) will operate in jurisdiction 1, while all those with A > A(d1, d2) will prefer jurisdiction 2. Therefore, n1 (dl, d2) = nA(dl, d2) criminals will operate in jurisdiction 1 and n2(dl, d2) = n(l - A(d1, d2)) will operate in 2. The number of criminals operating in 1 therefore decreases with d1 but increases with d2 (the reverse is true for jurisdiction 2). It is worth noting here that given the above assumption on the relative size of g(z) and t, a criminal can be only displaced or induced to exert less effort, but he cannot be completely deterred from operating in the market for crime. Using the terminology of Shavell (1991), deterrence activities here have a diversion effect or a theft reduction effect but no deterrence effect. For an increase in di, a diversion effect obtains when ni decreases but at the expense of an increase in nj. As for a theft reduction effect, it designates the fact that the effort z of criminals operating in jurisdiction i decreases after an increase in di. Finally, a deterrence effect would obtain if an increase in di was to lead to a decrease in both ni and nj.9 The presence of the theft reduction effect means that deterrence activities have some social value. If crime could be only displaced, deterrence activities would be a pure loss.

Assuming that the jurisdictions simply maximize net total output, and noting that all the criminals operating in a jurisdiction will exert the same level of effort, the problem of jurisdiction 1 can be written as10

max f(kl) - n (dl, d2)g(z(dl)) (2a) kl ,d,

subject to

k1 + d1 = e. (2b)

8 Formally, it is assumed that Vd C D, (1 - p(d))g(z(d)) - z(d) -t > 0, where z(d) is the optimal effort of the criminal.

9 The last effect is absent from the current analysis but could be incorporated easily, as is discussed at the end of this section.

10 Note that the objective function of a jurisdiction does not take into account the welfare of the criminals. Also note that the criminals are not attached to a jurisdiction: they may operate in one or the other jurisdiction. Thus, if the objective function was to take into account the welfare of the criminals, it would in fact take into account the welfare of individuals that may or may not reside on its territory. This is a delicate matter as is discussed by Mansoorian and Myers (1995).




Substituting equation (2b) in equation (2a) leads to

max V1 (dl, d2) _ f (e - di) - n (d, d2)g(z(d1)), (3) d,

where the objective function V1 (dl, d2) in equation (3) has the property required for the overdeterrence result to hold"

aV1(dl,d2) _ ,n1(dl,d2) g(z(dl)) < 0. (4) ad2 dd2

Of course, using the same reasoning, one can obtain an objective function V2(d2, dl) that also has the necessary property.

Since the objective functions are such that the deterrence activities of the jurisdictions are plain substitutes, the overdeterrence result presented in section II follows in this story. Hence, while the Pareto efficient level of deterrence activities is certainly positive because deterrence has some social value (due to its theft reduction effect), the Nash equilibrium will entail more deterrence than is optimal because jurisdictions neglect to take into account the harm caused by their deterrence activities to the other jurisdictions.

Note that the overdeterrence result may not obtain in a world where deterrence activities have a deterrence effect. Again, this effect describes a situation in which the deterrence activities of jurisdiction i decrease the number of criminals (or the effort of a given number of criminals) in both jurisdictions i and j. This would occur in the following modified version of the current story. Suppose that there are four jurisdictions, 1A and 1B located in Region 1, and 2A and 2B located in Region 2. Suppose also that individuals have to choose their occupation, worker or criminal, not knowing in which region they will end up (they are assigned randomly to a region), but knowing that once in a region, they will have the possibility to select the jurisdiction of their choice in this region. Assuming that the jurisdictions select their level of deterrence activities before the individuals select their occupation, it becomes clear that the deterrence activities of any jurisdiction can deter an individual from choosing to become a criminal. Hence, an increase in di can lead to a decrease of n1A, n1B, n2A, and n2B. Of course, in such a world, the other effects described in the current analysis are still present. Thus, deterrence activities now entail both a negative externality (the diversion effect) and a positive one (the deterrence effect). Either could dominate, and therefore the overdeterrence result does not necessarily hold.

IV. STORY 2: LOCAL CRIMINALS AND MOBILE CAPITAL

Suppose now that criminals are immobile between jurisdictions but that capital is mobile.12 Denote by kj the amount of capital invested in jurisdiction j and by K

11 Note that the strict concavity of the objective function is not guaranteed, but that it can certainly be assumed.

12 The basic model used in this section is inspired by that of Wildasin (1988).



852 Nicolas Marceau

the fixed world supply of capital, K = k, + k2. Assume that a technology f (with f' > 0 and f" < 0) is available in both jurisdictions that transforms capital into production. The total gross return of the owners of capital invested in jurisdiction j is kjf'(kj). It is assumed that the representative resident of jurisdiction j is the owner of some fixed factor used in production. The return of the fixed factor (the income of the representative resident) is therefore f (kj)-kj f '(kj).

Suppose that in each jurisdiction, a number of criminals attempt to appropriate the return on the capital invested. Suppose that for the owners of capital invested in j, the probability of not being robbed by criminals is 7r(dj). This probability reflects the security of property rights. It is assumed to depend on the investment in deterrence dj made in jurisdiction j, with iv > 0 and ir' < 0. The price of a unit of deterrence is 1. Given this, the expected total return of the owners of capital invested in jurisdiction j is 7r(dj)kj f '(kj). For simplicity, suppose that the portion of the total return that is robbed is completely dissipated, that is, (1 - r(dj))kJf'(kj) vanishes.

Since capital is mobile, it will migrate to the jurisdiction in which the expected return is the largest. The process will end when the expected returns are the same in both jurisdictions. Thus, given a pair of deterrence policies (d1, d2), the allocation of capital (k1, k2) is given by

k, + k2 = K (5a)

7r(dl)f'(k,) = 7r(d2)f'(k2). (Sb)

These equations yield the level of investments in jurisdictions 1 and 2 as functions of the deterrence levels: k1 = s(d1, d2) and k2 = K - s(d1, d2). From equations (Sa) and (Sb), it is possible to show that k1 increases with d1 but decreases with d2 (the reverse is true for k2): capital is attracted by more deterrence because more deterrence means more secure property rights.

The problem of the representative resident of a jurisdiction is to maximize the return on the fixed factor net of deterrence costs.13 Hence, the problem of the representative resident of jurisdiction 1 can be written as

max f(k) ki f'(ki d- (6a) di

subject to

kI = K(d1, d2). (6b)

This problem can be rewritten as

max V1 (d1, d2) _ f(K(d1, d2)) - s(d1, d2)f'(s(di, d2)) - d1. (7) di

13 Note that again the welfare of criminals is not explicitly taken into account. Indeed, in this model the behaviour of the criminals is not explicit. It could be argued, however, that the price of deterrence activities includes the utility cost suffered by the representative resident of the jurisdiction (when he acts as a criminal).




The objective function in (7) is well defined (strictly concave in d1) and can be used to obtain the overdeterrence result, since

aV1 (di 7d2) - ,k ft ar,(d1 7d2) (8) ad2 ad2

Using the same reasoning, it is possible to obtain an objective function V2(d2,dl), which also has the desired property (aV2(d2, d1)/ad1 < 0).

Note that here the Nash equilibrium level of deterrence activities is strictly positive, while the optimum requires no deterrence activities at all. The optimality of no deterrence in this story is due to the absence of a theft reduction effect. If the objective function of the jurisdictions was to take into account the welfare of the owners of capital, then deterrence would have some social value and the optimum would entail a positive level of deterrence.

V. CONCLUSION

The objective of this paper was to show because crime deterrence is typically done at the local level, harmful competition between jurisdictions in the eradication of crime is likely to take place. In two simple stories, it was shown that competition leads to overdeterrence relative to the optimum. This result can hold in a world where jurisdictions undertake deterrence activities so as to drive out criminals. It can also hold when deterrence activities are undertaken so as to attract capital investment.

No normative results were presented in this paper. The overdeterrence result suggests, however, that there is most probably room for intervention from an upper- level authority or for some coordination between jurisdictions. Indeed, there seems to be significant cooperation between jurisdictions in the real world. It is also clear that governments at many levels are involved in chasing criminals. On the other hand, it is not obvious that what we observe in the real world can correct for the tendency of local jurisdictions to spend too much on deterrence.

An example of cooperation between jurisdictions is Interpol, an organization of 176 countries that seeks to foster mutual assistance between the police organi- zations of its members. While participation in Interpol may make a country more aware of the possible displacements of criminals (it may even prevent some of those displacements by tightening the borders for the criminals), it does not remove its incentive to overinvest in deterrence. A more beneficial cooperation between countries could be achieved by specifying, for each member, the (maximum) amount of resources that can be devoted to deterrence.

The fact that many levels of government are involved in deterrence is no more likely to yield efficiency. Again, when an upper government spends resources on deterrence, this does not remove the incentive for local governments to overinvest. In fact, standard theory suggests that to restore efficiency, an upper level government should tax (or find some other mechanism to limit) the deterrence activities of



854 Nicolas Marceau

local governments rather than spend its own resources on deterrence.14 The current system of crime deterrence at many levels of government therefore remains to be explained.

REFERENCES

Besley, T. (1995) 'Property rights and investment incentives: theory and evidence from Ghana.' Journal of Political Economy 103, 903-37

Clarke, R.V. (1995) 'Situational crime prevention.' In Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention, ed. M. Tonry and D.P. Farington (Chicago: Univer- sity of Chicago Press)

Davidson, R.N. (1981) Crime and the Environment (New York: St Martin's Press) Deutsch, J., S. Hakim, and J. Weinblatt (1987) 'A micro model of the criminal's location

choice.' Journal of Urban Economics 22, 198-208 Eaton, B.C., and M. Eswaran (1991) 'The nature of noncooperative equilibria in one-shot

games: a synthesis.' Mimeo Grossman, H.I., and M. Kim (1995) 'Swords or plowshares? A theory of the security of

claims to property.' Journal of Political Economy 103, 1275-88 Hakim, S., A. Ovadia, E. Sagi, and J. Weinblatt (1979) 'Interjurisdictional spillover of

crime and police expenditure.' Land Economics 55, 200-12 Kanbur, R., and M. Keen (1993) 'Jeux sans frontieres: tax competition and tax coordina-

tion when countries differ in size.' American Economic Review 83, 877-92 King, I., R.P. McAfee, and L. Welling (1993) 'Industrial blackmail: dynamic tax competi-

tion and public investment.' Canadian Journal of Economics 26, 590-608 Lacroix, G., and N. Marceau (1995) 'Private protection against crime.' Journal of Urban

Economics 37, 72-87 Mansoorian, A., and G.M. Myers (1995) 'On the consequences of government objectives

for economies with mobile populations.' Mimeo Marceau, N. (1994) 'Crime deterrence when there are many jurisdictions.' Cahier de

recherche 9414, Departement d'6conomique, Universit6 Laval Markusen, J.R., E.R. Morey, and N. Olewiler (1993) 'Competition in regional environ-

mental policies when plant locations are endogenous.' Journal of Public Economics 56, 55-77

Mintz, J., and H. Tulkens (1986) 'Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency.' Journal of Public Economics 29, 133-72

Oates, W.E., and R.M. Schwab (1988) 'Economic competition among jurisdictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?' Journal of Public Economics 35, 333-54

Shavell, S. (1991) 'Individual precautions to prevent theft: private versus socially optimal behavior.' International Review of Law and Economics 11, 123-32

Usher, D. (1987) 'Theft as a paradigm for departures from efficiency.' Oxford Economic Papers 39, 235-52

Wildasin, D.E. (1986) Urban Public Finance (New York: Harwood Academic Publishers) - (1988) 'Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition.' Journal of Public Economics

35, 229-40

14 See Wildasin (1986) for a discussion on the provision, by a jurisdiction, of public goods that have benefits that spill over to other jurisdictions.



Date post:	16-Jan-2017
Category:	Documents
Upload:	nicolas-marceau
View:	214 times
Download:	0 times

Competition in Crime Deterrence

Documents