28
I AD-AO09 015 CONTROL DYNAMICS CO HUNTSVILLE AL F/G 15/3.1 GUIDANCE AND CONTROL OF ANTI-TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILES.oU) NOV 80 H E WORLEY DAAHOI-BO0-O399 UNCLASSIFIED NL END
I AD-AO09 015 CONTROL DYNAMICS CO HUNTSVILLE AL F/G 15/3.1GUIDANCE AND CONTROL OF ANTI-TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILES.oU)NOV 80 H E WORLEY DAAHOI-BO0-O399
UNCLASSIFIED NL
END
I
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OP THIS PAGE II MI ld Interco_ _
RIAV WINIiCTION IREPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE EFORE COMPLZ=TG FORM
1. APORT MNGER GOVT ACC.FSION NO: S. RECSPIENT5 CATALOG NUM8E9
I.. TITLE fo u bdietle) -- - - - -evieFinal Technical Aep
Guidance and Cnntrol of Anti-Tactical Ballistic 17 Seposso - _ NovMissiles*
1o N / -~ /.'/ ~. /~DAAHO1-8p-M-A399S. PERPORNiMG ORGANIZATION NAME AN AOORLESS i0. 'st GA I '
AmicsCiA IC UNIT telbeff"
Hiuntvill., alabam 35801-
It. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND AOORES$
Camiiander, 6/ 5 otkr'198j~
1 MONITORING AGENCY NAMC a AOORESU U digtneit emf Cnftulinl Office) IS. SECURITY CLASS. (a# te .uPeOO)
Unclassified
IS.OCLASPICATION/ OOWNGR44ADImGSC E OU tE
14L oisTiIeUT1ON STATEMENT (of le Report)
Distribution unlimited; approved for public release
17. OISTRISUTION STATEMENT (01 the asedreat entered In Black 2@. It different Item Report)
/
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
IS. (CY WORDS (Cm niuu. an tveree side If ncssev and Identify by block nmaber)
GuidanceControlAnti -Tactical
\dX"7'NAC? M Mi 861 it ,WW&& sd W~ PY by block nhnber)This technical report covers the efforts undertaken to review guidance andcontrol development status of a interceptor vehicles of tactical ballistic
• . missiles. Technology needs are indentified for promising concepts beingpursued by other agencies. Of particular interest in this review is theNavy High Angle threat (HAT) defense concepts.
AO 1473 Eo, oU', NOV sl 0so .T UnclassifiedSECU*67Tf CLASSIFICATION OP THIS PAGE (wt., Date Enter0
I GUIDANCE AND CONTROL OF
ANTI-TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILES
by
H. Eugene Worley
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR
6 November 1980
FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT
This research was performed for the US Army Missile CommandRedstone Arsenal, Alabama 35898
under
Contract No. DAAHO1-80-M-0399
CONTROL DYNAMICS COMPANY221 East Side Square, Suite 1BHuntsville, Alabama 35801
I
I
41 _ _
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT i
SECTION I. INTRODUCTION 1
SECTION II. DISCUSSION 2
SECTION III. SUMMARY 3
APPENDIX A 4
APPENDIX B 6
APPENDIX C 16
DISTRUBUTION LIST 22
" .c ,: . ';
A I
IIABSTRACT
This technical reDort covers the efforts of the Control Dynamics Company
I in completing the requirements set forth in the scope of Work dated 13 August
1980 entitled "Guidance and Control of Anti-Tactical Missiles". Under this
effort the guidance and control development efforts for interceptor vehicles
of tactical ballistic missiles were investigated. The results of this effort
are sumarized and recommendation for future efforts are made.
,
'I
ii
I
I' SECTION I. INTRODUCTION
1 As the US Army Missile Command embarks on the ambitious task of defining
the systems required to develop an anti-tactical ballistic missile defense
system, it is prudent to investigate other avenues of approach to similar
threats. These approaches are found not only in the strategic BallisticMissile Defense (BMD) concepts but in the Navy High Angle Threat (HAT) defense
concepts. Although there is a wide disparity in the total threat scenario
for BMD and HAT, there are a number of areas of technical investigations that
are of mutual concern to BMD, HAT and the Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile
(ATBM). Details of these areas of commonality and similarity are contained
as Apoendix A, Appendix B and Appendix C to this report.
i
,i
' t 1
SECTION II. DISCUSSION
The major effort expended was in the review of the various HAT contractor
reports and participation with the Navy in the formulation of their future
activities plan. The reports reviewed are as follows:
1. "High Angle Threat (HAT) Defense Systems Concepts
Study (U)", SECRET Document by General Dynamics
Company dated April 1979.
2. "High Angle Threat Defensive Systems Concepts (U)",
SECRET Document by Hughes Aircraft Company dated
22 June 1979.
3. "HAT Weapon System Concept Formulation Study (U)", SECRET
Document by General Research Corporation dated 22 June 1979.
4. "High Angle Threat Weapon System Formulation Study (U)",
SECRET Document by McDonnell Douglas Corporation dated
1 May 1980.
An overview of these reports is presented in Appendix A entitled
"Review of High Angle Threat (HAT) Defense Concepts". These results were
presented to the HAT Review Group on 15-16 October 1980, and these
presentation materials are contained as Appendix 8 entitled "High Angle Threat
(HAT) Defense Concepts Comonaility with Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile
'1 (ATBM) Concepts". Because of its sensitive nature, a portion of the document
which comprises Appendix A has been deleted from this report. However, the full
document is in the hands of the contract director, Dr. Pastrick.
I
ICONTROL DYNAMICS COMPANY
221 East Side Square, Suite 1B TelephoneI Huntsville, Alabama 35801 (205) 539-1342
August 22, 1980
FROM: Eugene Worley, Control Dynamics Company
I TO: Dr. H.L. Pastrick, DRSMI-RGN
I SUBJECT: Review of High Angle Threat (HAT) Defense System Concepts
At your request, we have reviewed the reports provided on the HAT (High Angle Threat)J Defense Concepts. These reports covered the work by four contractors; General Dynamics,McDonnell Douglas, General Research Corporation, and Hughes. In addition, we areprepared to support your organization in an evaluation and planning meeting at theNaval Surface Weapons Center on 27-28 August 1980.
General Comments relating to all of the contractors are as follows:
1. The basic study was oriented toward the defense of a Navy target or targetsagainst a coordinated attack from a number of sources (land and sea) withparticular emphasis to those threats that attack from a high angle re-lative to the horizontal.
2. The key issues arrising are then: (a) Detection of the potential threatwith sufficient time and accuracy to initiate appropriate action; (b)Tracking of potential threats with sufficient accuracy to enable accuratepredictions of the trajectory during exoatmospheric and endoatmosphericflight; (c) Formulation of real time battle strategy that would deploythe defenses against this threat in an optimum manner; (d) Guidance andcontrol of defense missiles to within the range of appropriate onboardsensors; (e) Autonomous guidance and control of the defense missilesagainst the designated threats; and (f) Fuzing and subsequent detonationof the kill weapon.
. 3. Because of the emphasis on system analysis and top level trades, there
was very little detail available on subsystem analyses, detail subsystemtrades or technical results that would support performance requirements.The most detail appeared to be available in the sensor area due to thestringent requirements that exist as a result of the range, accuracy, anddiscrimination requirements.
4. Concerns/issues arising are as follows:
a. Early detection of potential threats is crucial;
b. Peculiar interceptor designs are required for endo or exoatmospheric intercept;
c. The employment of 2 on 1 targeting reduces leakage possibilitiesbut is made difficult if nuclear warheads are employed;
APPENDIX A
4- _ __ _ __ _
II CONTROL DYNAMICS COMPANY
d. Shoot-look-shoot philosophy further reduces leakage butrequires an assesment of kill and places stringent require-ments on both targeting philosophy and guidance implementation;
e. Terminal phase guidance and control success will play a strongrole in overall mission success but was not adequately covereddue to the system nature of the study (Some contractors assumedthat whatever control acceleration was required was instantlyavailable while others indicated that control may be an arearequiring the development of new technology);
f. The end game philosophy will not only require guidance and controlto a position but also with proper roll and azimuth coordinates;
g. Multiple targeting will require efficient and practical energymanagement schemes;
h. Intertial guidance errors will probably be the largest component in theuncertainty volume at hand-over to the autonomous interceptorguidance system;
i. Communications and data management are sure to be hardware/soft-ware drivers;
j. Results of nuclear/non-nuclear trades will have a significantimpact on guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) requirements;
k. GNC capabilities should/must be factored into the selectionprocess for not only the "best'system, but also into the actualbattle selection of the "optimum" interceptor to deploy:
1 PH'. Eugene Worley
APPENDIX A
III
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CONTROL DYNAMICS COMPANY
3 221 East Side Square, Suite 1BHuntsville, Alabama 35801
October 18, 1980
MEMO:
TO Dr. Harold L. Pastrick, DRSMI-RGNFROM: Dr. R. Eugene WorleySUBJECT: HAT Review meeting, 15, 16 Oct 1980
The agenda for the subject meeting is contained in the Enclosure. This agendawas essentially followed with the exception that the attempt to synthesize oneor two viable concepts was not successful. The failure to meet this objectivewas probably attributal to the difficulty of the task as well as a lack of clearobjectives and groundrules. Not only is the defined Navy threat composed ofelements that are doubtful future threats, but the degree of Navy resourcesavailable to the HAT defense is apparently open to some discussion and to somearbitrary definition (e.g. How much of the Aegis Spy-1 radar system resourcecan/will be available for HAT defense?). It is felt that our participation,however, has been of value both to the Navy and to MICOM in that we have learn-ed a significant amount about potential threats, technology drivers, technologyvoids, and system constraints and considerations. Additionally, it is apparentthat a study directed toward,"Tell all you know about HAT(read TBM) defense",without a good definition of not only the projected threat, but also the fund-amental groundrules, assumptions, resources, and system performance require-ments will lead to a rather general work package as a result and more detail-ed activities will be required to unravel the ambiguities that result. It isour Judgement that MICOM technical personnel must maintain a strong hand in notonly the evaluation of results, but in the formative stages of the program planas well (this appears to be the current thrust of MICOM activities). The re-port is organized into mission phases as follows:
A. DETECTION AND BOOST TRACK
, B. POST BOOST TRACK
C. BATTLE SPACE SELECTION
D. INTECEPTOR DESIGN
E. WARHEAD/FUSE
A
iAPPENDIX C 16
I!CONTROL DYNAMICS COMPANY
A. DETECTION AND BOOST TRACKIAll systems require an early detection of the threat, with the most stringentrequirement arising out on an exo-atmosphere engagement of the threat. Pot-J ential systems to perform this function are as follows:
1. DSP Satellite
2. Infrared sensor aircraft platform
3. Radar aircraft platform
4. Shipboard radar (Aegis Spy-i)
The temperature of the exhaust plume and the resolution capability of IR sensorsmakes the use of IR platforms an attractive system. However, the requirement tohave from 1 to 4 aircraft on station at all times puts a severe stress on Navyresources and may be totally prohibitive. The in-house Navy scenario utilizedland based Remote Pilotless Vehicles (RPV) in order to provide this function atessentially no expenditure of fleet resources. However, during the course ofthe meeting, it was discovered that the Spy-1 radar system had the capabilityto perform this function if the timeline requirements imposed would permit it.It was stated, without supporting data, that for the endo-atmospheric interceptthe Spy-i radar had the capability to do the job. The remaining question, assum-ing that this is true, was: could the Spy-1 be diverted from its other dutiesto perform the HAT surveillance function? The general feeling was, probablyyes. However, it is interesting to note that none of the four contractorsperceived that this was a viable alternative.
B. POST BOOST TRACK
The requirements here become an even stronger function of the planned interceptregion, of course. If a exo-atmosphere intercept is planned, then very accuratedata must be obtained as quickly as possible and relayed to the command station.The competing systems for exo-atmosphere intercept appear to be as follows:
4 1. IR aircraft platform
2. IR/Laser aircraft platform
3. IR rocket probe
The rocket probe was considered by Hughes in order to get the IR sensors as farout of the atmosphere as possible to minimize the effects of atmospheric absorp-tion of the long wave length IR emission from the threat skin. The probe wouldbe launched upon a signal from the early warning system. However, the conflict-ing requirements of long stay time and sky background (not earth), in additionto the use of nonreuseable resources, places the efficacy of this approach insome doubt.
Apparently, BMD has done considerable research into the utilization of IR sensorsto perform this function, and consequently there was a strong presentation byTeledyne/Brown Engineering in support of IR sensors. Depending on the qualityof the data required, one or more IR platforms are required. A digression is
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probably in order here to discuss the type and nature of data available from IR
sensors. One reading from one IR sensor platform provides angle only data on theobjects in the field of view of the sensor. In order to commit an interceptor,a complete state vector is required. It is possible, and simulation data werePresented to support the theory, to construct the state vector for the sensedobject through a process known and presented as correlation. The process involvestaking samples of the angle to the threat at various times (3 samples spaced10 seconds apart are sufficient according to Brown). Assuming that the threatis acted on only by gravity (no maneuvers or thrusting) and that the accelerationenvironment of the platform is known (essentially one g), then a Kalman filterformulation is utilized to develop a state vector with an associated error volume.This determined error volume then can be propagated forward in time to producethe predicted trajectory of the threat. The error volume is in the shape of acigar, being thin normal to the line of sight between the sensor and the threat(on the order of 0.1 nM) and being long along the line of sight (1 to 10 nM.)An independent sensor located on another platform would produce an error volumeof similiar characteristics. The intersection of these two error volumes wouldthen have the effect of significantly reducing the error, and a very accurateestimation of the state vector of the threat can be produced. It was presentedthat such a system handling a large quantity of objects in the field of viewhas been successfully demonstrated. However, since IR platforms must be at least40,000 feet high in order to minimize the absorption of the atmosphere and alsoare required to be on station for extended periods of time (one would use thesame platform for the surveillance and track function) a significant stress isplaced on the Navy to support this function. The use of a laser sensor for thetrack function could potentially reduce the number of platforms required toonly one since accurate range and range rate data are available from one sensor.However, the indicated range capability of the laser tracker does not appear tosupport an exo-atmosphere intercept. If the intercept is to be endo-atmosphere,then the door is opened again to potentially utilize the onboard radar sensors andthus solve the resources problem associated with maintaining a number of sur-veillance and track aircraft in the air all the time.
C. BATTLE SPACE
Although the last thing that happens in the HAT defense scenario is the engagement,decisions made in this regard ripple through the entire system design. The
pI battle regions can be stated as follows:*1
1. Exo-atmosphere
2. Endo-atmosphere:1 The selection of the region in which to engage the threat is driven by consider-ation of leakage requirements (an extremely low leakage requirement will dictatea re-engagement after an unsuccessful first attempt, thus driving at least thefirst engagement to be as high as possible), maneuver capability of threat(get him before he maneuvers), signature of threat (booster attached exo-atmosphereconfuses IR track and kill), detection capability, and interceptor capability.Unfortunately, no system was presented that would work with high confidence in
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either exo or endo atmosphere. The hit-to-kill concept exo-atmosphere suffersfrom the fact that there is no assurance that an IR guided vehicle hitting thecentroid of the IR signature (probably the engine) will kill the warhead, andthe endo-atmospheric requires the development of a very sophisticated and precise
Sguidance scheme and associated high performance interceptor.
D. INTECEPTOR DESIGN
The major contribution in this area by the reviewers at the subject meeting wasin the area of propulsion system design. It was stated that the propulsion re-quirements appeared to be basically within the state of the art, and their rec-ommendation of a propulsion system must wait the selection of the type of vehiclerequired. Surprisingly, there was very little (in fact none other than thatcovered in our presentation) information regarding the guidance, navigation andcontrol problems. John Hopkins Applied Physics Labs (APL) had the designatedresponsibility for this area but they did not make any comments regarding theinterceptor G&C. It is therefore felt that there may be some avenues here wherethe MICOM expertise can be utilized by the Navy. There certainly appears to bea void within the Navy organizations in this regard.
E. WARHEAD/FUSE
This area did not receive much attention since the expert in this area did notcome to the meeting. However, it was stated that nuclear warheads were notdesirable (apparently due to the effects on other systems operation), Select-able Aimed Warheads (SAW) did not have satisfactory performance (a fact quest-ioned by some in attendance), and Self Forging Fragement (SFF) warheads appearedtc have satisfactory performance. It was clear from the discussion on fusingthat there is a strong coupling between the fusing operation and the guidancecomputations. However, there is a desire on the part of the fuse designers to
A) be completely independent from the rest of the system, that is they wish to beable to operate even if the rest of the system doesn't. The stated key issuesin the design of a successful fuse are performance, autonomy, countermeasurescapability, survivability, target versatility, ability to handle a direct hit,and the usual risk development time and cost. It was stated that an operationalNavy fuse (MK 45) could probably be modified to do the job, with significantdevelopment risks in handling the large closing velocities involved.
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I SUMMARY
As stated in the introduction, the task of obtaining a viable and effectivesystem to serve as a defense to High Angle Threats is very difficult. However,assuming that the threat as defined is real and that the Navy must field themost efficient defense against it, then one is driven to rely on proven re-sources. The most fundamental question that drives the entire defense scenariois: Can non-nuclear devices kill the threat with high probability? Based ontoday's technology this question can not be answered in the affirmative with
* confidence. A number of technology thrusts are underway, of course, and these* may prove very successful but the earliest, reliable defense system seems to
include a nuclear kill of the threat. The decision for nuclear kill dictatesan endo-atmospheric intercept of the threat, which affords the detection andtrack system more time and enhances the probability of the Spy-i radar systembeing adequate. Consequently, I have hypothesized a deployment strategy thatevolves from a system with a nuclear kill to the high technology concept ofan exo-atmospheric kill with an early warning track IR platform.
In summary the system that is felt would have the qreatest probability ofdoing the job in the minimum time with the least strain on Navy resources isas follows (assuming the Spy-1 is all that it is cracked up to be and is madeavailable to HAT):Early System
Early warning and boost track Spy-1 radar
Post boost track Spy-i radar
Engagement Endo-atmosphere
Booster guidance "Optimal" with radar sensor
Warhead Low yield nuclear
First Product Improvement
Early warning and boost track IR PlatformPost boost track IR platform
Engagement Endo-atmosphere
Booster guidance "Optimal" with radar sensor
Warhead Non nuclear
Next Product ImprovementEarly warning and boost track IR platformPost boost track IR platform
Engagement Exo-atmosphere
Booster guidance Inertial plus IR guided terminal
Warhead Hit-to-kill
* .- r. ~20H. Eugene Worley /
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I... ENCLOSURE
AGENDA
HAT EVALUATION MEETING
0900-1600 15-16 Oct 1980
Wednesday, 15 Oct 1980
Review of 27-28 Aug meeting J. Walchak 0900-0915
Review of action items J. Walchak 0915-0930
Presentation of Evaluation Criteria 0930-1130
ATBM/Systems MICOMInterceptor, G&C APLWarhead, fuze NWCPropulsion NAUSEA/NSWCBattle management APLEarly Warning TBED3 and track TBEC3 and handover PME 108Optical adjunct TBE
Lunch 1130-1230
Defense Concepts Evaluation ALL 1230-1530
MDACGeneral Dynamics A,B,CGRCHughes A,BNSWC strawman
Thursday, 16 Oct 1980
Defense Concepts Evaluation (Con't) 0900-1000
Synthesis of Concept(s) 1015-1145
Lunch 1145-1245
Synthesis of Concept(s) 1245-1500
Wrao-up 1500-1530
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DISTRUBUTION LIST
CommanderDefense Documentation CenterATTN: DDC-TCACameron Station, Bldg. 5Alexandria, VA 22314
DCASMA Birmingham908 South 20th StreetBirmingham, AL 35256
CommanderUS Army Missile CommandRedstone Arsenal, Alabama 35898
ATTN: DRSMI-IYB/Sosebee
ATTN: DRSMI-RGN/Dr. Pastrick (3 copies)
ATTN: DRSMI-RDW/Dr. Sutherlin
ATTN: DRSMI-RDW/Tarras
ATTN: DRSMI-RG
ATTN: DRSMI-RGP
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