COUNTRY EVALUATION: NIGERIA - UNDPweb.undp.org/.../ADR/ADR_Reports/ADR_Nigeria.pdf · Nigeria is...

United Nations Development ProgrammeEvaluation Office

COUNTRY EVALUATION:ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

NIGERIA

Design: Colonial Communications Corp., Staten Island, NYCover and title page images:Galbe.comProduction: John S. Swift Co., East Rutherford, NJ

Contents

Foreword ____________________________________________1

Executive summary __________________________________3

1. Introduction _______________________________________13

2. Nigeria’s development context _____________________ 21

3. Strategic positioning andrelevance of UNDP programmes ___________________ 27

4. Assessment of development results and UNDP’s contribution to Nigeria’s Human Development Priorities _____________________ 37

5. Conclusions: Lessons, recommendations and future directions _______________________________ 47

Annexes ___________________________________________ 551. Terms of reference .....................................................................552. References and documents consulted ........................................613. List of Key Persons Met ...........................................................644. Nigeria Strategic Results Framework ........................................685. Nigeria Map of Intended Development Results .......................706. UNDP Share of Gross Budget .................................................. 717. Data on Official Development Assistance

Environment in Nigeria ............................................................ 728. Comparison of Key Indicators between

Nigeria and Other Countries .................................................... 749. Selected Social and Economic Indicators in Nigeria ............... 7510. Abbreviations .............................................................................76

C O U N T R Y E VA L U AT I O N : A S S E S S M E N T O F D E V E LO P M E N T R E S U LT S – N I G E R I A

Pho

to:G

alb

e.co

m

Foreword

This report presents the findings of the Nigeria country evaluation carriedout by the Evaluation Office (EO) of the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP) in March 2003. The evaluation forms part of a seriesof independent country evaluations, termed Assessments of DevelopmentResults (ADRs), that the Evaluation Office undertakes every year in selectedcountries. These are forward-looking exercises that seek to capture anddemonstrate UNDP’s contributions to development results at the country levelwith a view to generating lessons on how best to improve the performance andthe development effectiveness of the organization. ADRs also support theUNDP Administrator’s substantive accountability to the Executive Board.

Despite Nigeria’s significant natural and human resources, and its considerableeconomic potential, the country’s human development index (HDI) and allother social indicators have declined since the 1970s. The challenges ofrevitalising the economy while dealing with globalisation and consolidatingthe transition to democracy demand a rethinking of past approaches infavor of a stronger human development agenda.

During the period under review, UNDP was able to stay the course throughoutthe difficult political situation prior to 1999 and to embark on innovative andparticipatory downstream activities in all 36 states of the federation, targetingthe poorest of the poor. Some of these interventions have the potential forreplication and scaling up to upstream policy levels. In addition, the National

COUNTRY EVALUATION: ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS – NIGERIA 1

Pho

to:G

alb

e.co

m

Human Development Reports (NHDRs) of1996, 1998 and 2000/2001 enhanced UNDP’sadvocacy role on key development issues andhelped to stimulate national debate on thecountry’s human development priorities. Thechallenge for UNDP is to narrow its focus andgeographical spread and link its successfulmicro level interventions to upstream policiesin order to have impact on the country’s broaderdevelopment agenda.

Many people contributed to the success of this evaluation. First and foremost, we aregrateful to Ms. Mary Chinery Hesse, formerDeputy Director General of the InternationalLabour Organization and current Chairpersonof the Ghana Planning Commission, whosevast experience and skillful leadership of theteam, was invaluable; Dr. Paul Collins, publicAdministration expert and international consultant on the team, Professor AdebayoAdedeji, former Executive Secretary of theEconomic Commission for Africa (ECA) andhead of ACDESS, who was Senior Advisor to the team; Professor Abumere of theDevelopment Policy Center, (DPC) and theUniversity of Ibadan, and Dr. Elaigwu,Director of the Institute of Governance andSocial Research (IGSR), who undertook thein-depth studies on Poverty and Governance,respectively; Mr. Peter Metcalf, former UNDPResident Representative; and Ms. FadzaiGwaradzimba, Senior Evaluation Advisor andtask manager for this evaluation. Mr. SamuelChoritz carried out background desk studiesfor the evaluation and Ms Elvira Larrain andMr. Anish Pradhan gave valuable technicaland administrative support.

This exercise would not have been possiblewithout the generous contributions of the Nigeriangovernment officials, donors, representatives ofthe United Nations (UN) system and the manyindividuals cited at the end of this report.We are grateful to all of them, especially thosein Nigerian government, for their valuableinsights. At the risk of leaving out many othersdeserving mention, we would like to extend aspecial thanks to Dr. Magnus Kpakol, ChiefEconomic Adviser to the President and Director

of the National Planning Commission (NPC),and to the Governors of Nassarawa, Lagos,Kano and Akwa Ibom states and the FederalCapital Territory (FCT) of Abuja and theirState Planning Commission Chairmen (SPCC)and State Programme Monitoring Advisors(SPMAs) for the excellent hospitality andorganization of the team’s visits to thesestates. The visits greatly enriched the findingsof the report.

The support of the Regional Bureau for Africa(RBA) and the Country Office has beeninvaluable. We are grateful to Mr. AbdoulieJanneh, Assistant Administrator and RegionalBureau Director, the Deputy Director,Mr. Jacques Loups and their team, especially Mr. Pascal Karorero, Programme Advisor, andMr. Mar Dieye, Country Director, West AfricaRegion. The Evaluation Office extends itsthanks to the former Resident Representative,Mr. Mbaya Kankwenda, the ResidentRepresentative a.i, Mr. Jules Frippiat, theDeputy Resident Representative, Ms. NancyAsanga, and the entire country office team for their unwavering support throughout.Mr. Kabiru Nasidi and Mr. Samuel Harbor,country office focal points for the NigeriaADR, deserve our special thanks.

Nigeria is a country of strategic importance toAfrica, and to UNDP. A vibrant and thrivingNigeria could easily become an economicengine for Africa and the sub-region. Thefindings of this evaluation show that Nigeriahas sufficient resources of its own to workwith UNDP and other development partnersto make a difference. The restoration of democratic rule since May 1999 presentsunique opportunities for rethinking the pastand scaling up success stories. We hope that this report is in some small measure a contribution towards this process.

Khalid MalikDirector UNDP Evaluation Office

C O U N T R Y E VA L U AT I O N : A S S E S S M E N T O F D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U LT S – N I G E R I A2

Executive summary

BACKGROUND

This report presents the findings of the Nigeria country evaluation, whichwas undertaken by the UNDP Evaluation Office in March 2003. The evaluation is part of a series of independent Assessments of DevelopmentResults (ADRs) that the Evaluation Office undertakes every year in selected countries. The purpose is to assess the key development results and overall contribution of UNDP support to Nigeria during the period 1997-2002 and to recommend strategies for strengthening theorganization’s performance.

The Nigeria ADR seeks to assess how UNDP has responded to Nigeria’sdevelopment challenges and strategically positioned itself to bring addedvalue in such a populous and relatively well-endowed country. The evaluation is, above all, a forward-looking exercise intended to draw lessonsfor the strategic positioning of UNDP’s support in the future and to serve as a basis for dialogue between UNDP and the government asNigeria consolidates its transition to democracy. The report draws uponfindings gathered through detailed background desk studies, field visits andinterviews, as well as in-depth studies on poverty and governance, the twothematic areas to which the bulk of UNDP resources were allocated during the period under review.

COUNTRY EVALUATION: ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS – NIGERIA 3

Pho

to:G

alb

e.co

m

NIGERIA’S DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

With an estimated population of 120 millionpeople, Nigeria is Africa’s most populous countryand its annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP)of US $50 billion makes it one of sub-SaharanAfrica’s largest economies. Although wellendowed with natural resources, it is a countryemerging from a long-standing economic andpolitical crisis that started with the collapse of oilprices in the mid-1980s and was exacerbatedby periods of increasingly arbitrary militaryrule. Despite having the seventh largest oiland gas reserves in the world and being theworld’s 6th largest exporter of crude oil,Nigeria’s GDP per capita annual growth ratein real terms has been negative or zero formore than two decades. Current GDP percapita, in terms of purchasing power parity(PPP) is US $896, which is significantly lowerthan the 1977 figure of US $1,160. In addition,there are large income disparities between therich and poor, and between men and women.For example, the poorest 10% of the populationaccounts for a mere 1.6% share of nationalincome while the richest 10% accounts for40.8%. The economy is dependent on a singlecommodity (oil) that is subject to serious pricefluctuations. Total federal public debt (internaland external) amounts to approximately 41percent of GDP and the cost of debt servicingis equivalent to 42 percent of exports.

Nigeria is ranked low on the Human DevelopmentIndex1 and the Nigeria 2000/2001 NationalHuman Development Report (NHDR) alsoreveals that there are significant regional disparities. Compared to other countries of similar size but fewer resources, Nigeria’s economic performance and human developmenthave not matched its potential.

While the restoration of democracy in 1999 is widely seen as a turning point for the better, Nigeria faces a number of developmentchallenges. Greater freedom of associationand expression has led to increased tension inthe north and in the Delta region and, despite

the steady increase in oil prices since 1998, theeconomy has yet to show any markedimprovement. The Presidential election ofApril 2003 took place relatively peacefully andrenewed the mandate of the incumbent, butNigeria’s democratic consolidation remainsfragile and much still needs to be done tobuild a strong culture of open and accountablegovernment at all levels.

As the report shows, the economic and socialchallenges are enormous and there is, aboveall, an urgent need to restore the non-oil productive sectors, increase employment andcombat poverty and the spread of HIV/AIDS.

FOCUS OF UNDPPROGRAMMES 1997-2003

The 1997-2002 Country Cooperation Framework(CCF) was drafted when Nigeria was stillunder a military government and when mostbilateral donors were withdrawing from thecountry. Given these circumstances, the UNDPExecutive Board approved the CCF on thecondition that 80% of UNDP core resourceswould "directly benefit the poorest sections ofthe population and deliver their benefits at thegrassroots level".2 Consequently, UNDP’sactivities were mainly targeted at the grassrootslevel and dispersed throughout Nigeria’s 36 statesand the Abuja Federal Capital Territory (FCT).

The original 1997-2002 CCF document identified poverty alleviation as its overall objectiveand provided support under four thematic areasof concentration: poverty reduction, governance,gender and the environment. Programmesunder these thematic areas of concentration,which were also used as the framework for thenew initiatives that were introduced after 1999,were organised under the following umbrellaprogrammes: the National Management ofSocio-Economic Development (NMSED)programme, under which governance andcapacity building for policy planning and economic management were provided; and


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. See Nigeria’s National Human Development Report, 1996, 1998 and 200/20012. 1997 Executive Board Decision, DP/1998/2, 8 October 1997.

the Job Creation and Sustainable LivelihoodsProgramme, the Social Development Programmeand the Sustainable Agriculture, Environmentand Rural Development Programme, the threeprogrames under which poverty reduction,gender, the environment and HIV/AIDs wereaddressed. (See Annexes 4-6 for a map ofintended development results and resourceallocation by theme.)

When democracy was restored in 1999, theFederal Government of Nigeria (FGN) intro-duced a new economic programme for theperiod 1999-2003 which stressed raising livingstandards and creating employment opportunities.The FGN immediately requested UNDP toundertake a variety of initiatives at the federallevel in the areas of policy and strategy formulation and capacity building for povertyalleviation and good governance. Significantly,about half way through the CCF period,UNDP found itself adding a new dimensionto its Nigeria programme in addition to havingto realign its ongoing programmes in accordancewith the corporate results-based management(RBM) tools introduced in 1999.

MAIN FINDINGS

I. Strategic Positioning andRelevance of UNDP SupportThe findings of this evaluation suggest thatUNDP is well known and enjoys relativelyhigh visibility in the country, particularly withininstitutions and among the states where it hasprogrammes. Domestic constituencies andexternal donors alike clearly respect UNDP’srole and expect the organization to play an evenstronger facilitation role vis-a-vis the country’shuman development agenda. UNDP’s role as aneutral convener, its access to global knowledgenetworks, and its advocacy on critical issues ofhuman development and human rights clearlyemerge as the organization’s comparativeadvantages in Nigeria.

Based on the ADR, the following conclusionscan be reached regarding the strategic posi-tioning of UNDP and the relevance of its

programmes from 1997-2003. In generalterms, UNDP has responded flexibly to theevolving development challenges in Nigeria andto the expressed priorities of the government.The downstream orientation required by theExecutive Board at the beginning of the firstcountry cooperation framework (1997-2002)was appropriate and UNDP positioned itselfaccordingly. After the restoration of democracy,UNDP made a serious effort to respond tothe government’s need for policy advice and capacity building in strategic institutions,but its approach was not sufficiently structuredor coherent.

UNDP’s comparative advantage in Nigeria hastranslated into a high degree of governmenttrust and access to the most senior governmentrepresentatives at both the federal and statelevel. At the beginning of the period underreview, UNDP was appreciated as one of thefew donors to remain in the country. After therestoration of democracy in 1999, the newgovernment immediately requested UNDP tointervene in crucial and sensitive areas such aselections and conflict prevention. This type ofsupport, combined with UNDP’s involvementwith promoting national dialogue on the country’shuman development agenda through the pub-lication of the National Human DevelopmentReports (NHDRs) and the 2010 Vision, anational consultative envisioning process, hasreinforced its coordination and advocacy role.

With respect to strategic partnerships, UNDPhas developed a number of useful linkageswith government and non-governmentalorganizations and donors, but to be strategic,these initiatives need to be anchored within acoherent development policy framework.Partnerships with government, especially at thestate level, often seem to have been driven byresource mobilisation imperatives rather thansubstantive development concerns. Furthermore,partnerships in grassroots projects tend to havebeen UNDP-dominated, without a plannedUNDP exit strategy or enough local ownershipto support scaling up and long-term sustainability.

UNDP’s partnership initiatives with the privatesector seem to be the most promising ones

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y 5

developed during this period. Partnershipswith the potential for replication have beendeveloped through the National PartnershipForum (NPF) and the Human DevelopmentFund and with Chevron Oil Company.UNDP’s relationship with the NationalPartnership Forum and the Human DevelopmentFund (HDF) stands out as a good example ofstrategic partnering and advocacy on humandevelopment and corporate responsibility. Asof the end of 2001, the NPF was supported bysixty organizations (including major Nigerianand foreign corporations, oil companies andbanks) in an initiative for the implementationof the Global Compact at the national leveland for the realisation of the MillenniumDevelopment Goals (MDGs). The HDF actsas the resource mobilisation instrument forthe NPF and focuses on providing support tocommunity development activities that benefitthe poor or marginalised and vulnerable groups.Yet, while these partnership initiatives arecommendable, they seem to suffer from the sameproblems of dispersion and weak supervisionthat affect the UNDP grassroots programmes.

A more recent UNDP agreement withChevron Nigeria Ltd. (concluded at the endof 2002) also offers a promising example ofcollaboration with the private sector, in thiscase with one of the country’s major oil companies. The agreement between UNDPand Chevron recognises the company’s socialobligation to the communities where it operatesand UNDP’s potential role in providing advisoryservices for Chevron’s community developmentactivities. For this initiative to be judged asuccess from the organization’s point of view,UNDP must be seen to be playing a neutral,facilitative and development-oriented role andnot simply that of an adjunct to a corporatepublic relations exercise.

While partnerships with other external development partners seem promising, theyare at best uneven. The basis for UNDP partnerships with bilateral donors is the comparative advantage that stems from itsneutrality. This has allowed UNDP to play astrategic and important role in areas where

political sensitivities prevail, such as (i) elections,(ii) conflict prevention and resolution, and (iii) the fight against corruption. For example,UNDP played a key role in coordinating andmanaging various donor inputs to the 2003elections. It is also collaborating with NORADon conflict prevention and has joined the WorldBank and the Department for InternationalDevelopment (DFID) in supporting the Institutefor Peace and Conflict Resolution’s (IPCR)joint Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA).Collaboration with the other developmentpartners in the United Nations system is weak,especially in the area of HIV/AIDS andmicro projects, and the United NationsDevelopment Assistance Framework (UNDAF)has not provided a sufficiently robust frameworkfor synergies and strategic focus of UN efforts.

With respect to challenges ahead, there are anumber of areas that should be addressed ifUNDP is to make the most of its comparativeadvantage. These include frequent changes insenior management, the failure to move toAbuja and the perception by some stakeholdersthat UNDP is overburdened with bureaucracyand more concerned with process than substance.UNDP’s efforts at convening and coordinationhave also been hamstrung by the lack of a strongnational donor coordinating body and a clear,overarching government policy framework.The National Planning Commission (NPC),which is responsible for donor coordination, isrelatively weak, like many Nigerian institutionsthat are being revitalised after years of military rule; and may require time to trulytake charge of Nigeria’s development agendasetting and donor coordination efforts.

With respect to the strategic focus and relevanceof UNDP’s support, the ADR team concludedthat the original orientation of CCF-1 to grass-roots development activities was appropriateduring the difficult years prior to 1999. It alsorecognised the equity considerations that have led to coverage in all 36 states and theFCT. However, this approach spread UNDP’sactivities too thin and reduced the capacity ofthe UNDP Country Office to provide adequatesupervision and monitoring. This extensive


coverage of the whole country has also meantthat hardly any of the interventions haveachieved sufficient critical mass either toencourage scaling up or replication or toinfluence upstream policy formulation.

In assessing how well UNDP has performedor strategically positioned itself to play its rolebetter in the future, there is a need to balanceexpectations against reality. Nigeria is a country with domestic resources that dwarfOfficial Development Assistance (ODA) by aconsiderable margin and this has implicationson the role of external aid, including UNDPassistance. Nigeria also has a complex threetier federal system with 36 states and 774 localgovernment authorities whose autonomy isguaranteed under the Constitution. Moreover,Nigeria’s political history has resulted in a situation where any intervention will be hampered by the tensions that are often evident at every level of government. It is possible for UNDP to provide strategic support at both the federal and state level, butwithout a strong institutional and policy frame-work, and reforming champions from withinto carry forward the development agenda,coordination and facilitation alone may notlead to concrete results. This suggests that theNigeria government and UNDP will need towork together on a new or revitalised agenda.

The Nigerian development context seems torequire a highly focused and agile role on thepart of the UNDP, yet one that is multifacetedand flexible enough for the organization toremain strategic and relevant in view of thecomplex challenges and opportunities that thecountry presents. With the return of mostdonors to Nigeria following the democraticelections of 1999, UNDP may well need tofocus on doing a few critical things, and doingthem well. It will also be necessary to workwith the government to establish a strong policyframework for promoting the human develop-ment agenda at the federal and state level.

II. Key Development ResultsOverall, the findings of the Nigeria ADRshow mixed results. In line with Executive

Board decision 97/25 that at least 80% theCCF-1 resources should be directed to thecommunity level, UNDP was able to redirectits operations and initiate participatory povertyreduction interventions throughout the countryaimed at supporting the poorest segments ofsociety. Despite positive results registered at the community level, evidence from theADR shows that in terms of sustainabilityand cumulative impact, UNDP’s integratedcommunity development programmes, withtheir wide geographical spread, have led todispersion, overextension and limited impact.Development results have been largely dependent on institutional capacities and the dynamism and interest of state governments, and issuesof ownership and sustainability of UNDPinterventions will need to be addressed.

Advocacy, Partnerships and Policy SupportUNDP’s most significant achievements havebeen in the area of advocacy for human development through the national humandevelopment reports of 1996, 1998, 2000-2001, Vision 2010, the National PartnershipForum and the Human Development Fund.The NPF and HDF have established animportant dialogue forum that brings togethergovernment, the private sector and civil societyorganizations. The major innovation hasinvolved corporate responsibility initiativeswith Shell and Chevron, key oil companies inthe Delta Region, around issues of conflictresolution, peace-building and resourcemobilisation for community-based povertyreduction programmes.

Capacity Development The main output of the original NationalManagement of Socio-Economic DevelopmentProgramme was the training of large numbersof statisticians in state and local governmentand the establishment of Sustainable HumanDevelopment (SHD) databanks in the LocalGovernment Authorities (LGAs). This shouldhelp to improve the quality of statistics overtime and have a positive impact on developmentplanning and implementation at the state andlocal level.


Governance Within the framework of the FGN’s NationalGovernance Programme (NPG), UNDP hasprovided capacity building for the NationalAssembly and support to civil society organi-zations, political parties and business groupsfor civic education, political participation andconflict management. UNDP also provided aSenior Governance Adviser to the NPG, whohelped to guide and coordinate its initiatives.In addition, UNDP has collaborated withNORAD to support the Institute for Peace andConflict Resolution. One other interventionin this area was to assist in setting up anIndependent Policy Group (IPG) to providedirect advice to the President, an initiativethat was undertaken in collaboration with theSoros Foundation and Africare.

Although it is too early to identify specificdevelopment outcomes, the ADR team wasfavourably impressed by these initiatives. TheNPG provides an important framework forsupporting governance interventions inNigeria and strengthening democracy, even ifit has not as yet adopted a very systematicapproach to the governance challenges facingthe country. The process of preparing the programme undoubtedly promoted consensusbuilding among national and internationalpartners around the importance of promotinggood governance initiatives. Support for anti-corruption initiatives and civic educationis a necessary condition for democracy andshould continue to be actively promoted. TheIndependent Policy Group performs a usefulfunction but it is not sufficiently institutionalisedto have a long-term impact and its status will needto be reviewed during the second CCF period.

Poverty Reduction( i) Job Creation and Sustainable LivelihoodsSince 1999, the political leadership has becomeincreasingly concerned about the linkagebetween youth unemployment and civil unrest,and has stressed the importance of skillsdevelopment and micro-credit schemes totackle poverty. UNDP has established SkillsDevelopment Centres (SDCs) and, in parallel

with the United Nations Capital DevelopmentFund (UNCDF), has promoted micro-financeand micro-credit schemes in all 36 states and the FCT. The results of these initiatives havevaried widely depending on local conditions,especially the degree of local ownership.Furthermore, given the size of Nigeria’s population, these projects have had only a marginal impact on the unemployment problems of each state. In some states it wasalso noted that there was little synergybetween the Skills Development Centres andthe micro-credit programme. An importantdevelopment, however, is that UNDP/UNCDF’s micro-credit programme hasencouraged the Central Bank to developguidelines and a national policy frameworkfor micro-credit. In the poverty reductionarea, UNDP’s interventions have been lesssignificant. Their impact has been inevitablylimited, given the fact that 70 percent ofNigerians live below the poverty threshold.As the analysis of key development results in subsequent sections of this report show,much more must be done to ensure that theoutcomes of UNDP’s interventions are durableand sustainable.

(ii) Social Development ProgrammeThe Integrated Community DevelopmentProjects (ICDPs) provided the framework forthe Social Development Programme. By2002, some 750 ICDPs were bringing basicsocial services to deprived communities.These projects included water and sanitation,renovation of health facilities, training forcommunity health workers, and functional literacy classes. These initiatives have undoubtedlybeen highly appreciated locally but sufferfrom the same issues of limited ownership,lack of replication and low impact on policy as the Job Creation and SustainableLivelihoods Programme.

Sustainable Agriculture,Environment and Rural DevelopmentThis programme has not had sufficientresources and its interventions have largelybeen subsumed under the ICDPs or the


micro-credit projects. For example, grindingmachines and drying areas have been financedfor women’s groups in more than twenty states.With regard to the environment, it must berecognised that, despite the magnitude of theenvironmental problems facing Nigeria, UNDP’sattention to environmental issues has beenmarginal during the period under review.

Gender Mainstreaming With respect to creating an enabling policyenvironment on gender issues, UNDP isundoubtedly making an impact and this is highlyappreciated by its government counterparts,especially in the Ministry of Women inDevelopment. Perhaps one of UNDP’s mostsignificant contributions has been advocacyfor legislation against harmful practices towomen, which has contributed to a number oflegislative changes. Despite cultural differencesamong states in the area of female genitalmutilation (FGM), the following has beenachieved: (a) passage of a federal bill on FGM;(b) passage of FGM-related legislation andlegislative changes in Enugu and Edo States;(c) prohibition of early marriage in Kebbi andNiger States; (d) legislation against withdrawalof girls from school (Kano, Borno Gombe andBauchi States); (e) laws against trafficking inwomen and children (Edo and Zamfara States)and a bill before the Lower House of theNational Assembly; (f ) various state laws onsexual abuse and prostitution; (g) safe housesfor victims of domestic and sexual violence inthree states and the FCT; and (h) censorshipof pornographic and violent films.

It is too early to expect full implementation ofthe UN global agreements on gender equalitybut these are encouraging steps. Mainstreaminggender sensitivity in structural and institutionalterms is not something that can be accomplishedthrough “quick fix” type interventions, and along range view will be necessary. The UNsystem treats gender as a cross cutting themeand provides advocacy regarding global normsand practices, but the challenge is how to“domesticate” global norms in ways that aresensitive to local cultural and religious traditions.

LESSONS LEARNED AND EMERGING ISSUES

n Political will and an enabling policyenvironment are crucial for achievingresults. With hindsight it is always possible to see areas where UNDP mighthave made a more effective contributionthrough advocacy or policy formulation.However, it is also important to take intoaccount the fact that there is a lack of an overarching poverty reduction andmacro-economic policy framework inNigeria, and the FGN policy influenceover the states is relatively weak. It is theview of the ADR team that even ifUNDP had intervened more strongly inthis area, it is unlikely that it would havehad a significant impact, given the realityof federal/state relations.

n Partnerships for resource mobilisationand delivery are critical ingredients forachieving development results, butpartnerships need not be only aboutresource mobilization. Partnerships canalso promote UNDP’s core messages onhuman rights and human development.Toomuch emphasis on resource mobilisationis not always compatible with coherentprogramming and effective delivery.UNDP’s experience in Nigeria has shownthat focusing on resource mobilisationand delivering UNDP resources within agiven timeframe is not always compatiblewith ‘making a difference’. Moreover,pressure from UNDP Headquarters toaccelerate resource mobilisation can inadvertently lead to compromising ofUNDP’s goals.

n Micro level projects should be catalyticand linked to broader policy goals, andshould establish clear exit and replicationstrategies in order to minimise the‘dependency syndrome’ and promoteownership and sustainability. Directdelivery of resources, and too strong apresence by UNDP in grassroots level projects


without substantive local commitment,can create the impression that UNDP isacting as a substitute for government.If UNDP is to work successfully at thegrassroots level, projects and programmesneed clear exit strategies and direct linksto broader policy goals in order to generatelong-term sustainable results. Whenthere is a requirement that UNDP mustsupport projects in all 36 states (as was thecase under CCF-1), programme flexibilitywill be reduced and there will be differentlevels of quality and impact. It should benoted,however, that it takes longer to produceresults at the macro or policy level (outcomes)than at the micro or downstream level(outputs), and thus modification is requiredin the definitions of outcomes in theStrategic Results Framework (SRF) to reflectthis reality. External agencies tend to findit easier to intervene directly than tostand on the sidelines with advice andencouragement. This approach, however,is more suited to achieving outputs thanoutcomes and is a major reason why so manyprojects fail once the donor has withdrawn.This has certainly been the case with UNDPprojects where issues of ownership, scalingup, replication and exit strategies do notseem to have been sufficiently incorporatedat the design stage of the programmes.Thishas contributed to the phenomenon of‘micro-successes’ in a sea of ‘macro-failure’,which can justifiably be said of many of theUNDP grassroots poverty reduction projectsin Nigeria, especially as they are not linkedto any macro-level policy framework.

n Learning and internalisation of newRBM concepts and innovations take time,and frequent changes at the corporatelevel can undermine the process. Since1999, UNDP has developed many conceptsand corporate RBM tools and procedures.However, as is the case with most UNDPoffices, the Country Office staff membersseem somewhat overwhelmed by the frequent corporate changes and have nothad the time to internalize them fully orto put them into practice.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the high transaction costs and the lackof coherence created by undertaking a largenumber of widely dispersed projects, theADR team recommends narrowing the focusof UNDP’s activities and adopting a judiciousmix of micro and macro-level interventionsthat draw on the organization’s comparativeadvantage. To do this effectively, UNDP willneed to identify good practices and seek localpartners to scale up and consolidate the positive outcomes of its most successful pilots.UNDP has been a responsive and trustedpartner to the government and its future challenge is to leverage the lessons learned fromits projects, and its organizational assets, toinfluence policy and agenda setting at the federal and state level. Specific recommendationsbased on the findings are as follows:

n UNDP’s role should be catalytic and not asubstitute for government or local efforts.Due to Nigeria’s size and oil wealth, thetotal level of donor contributions to thecountry is insignificant in relation toGDP, and the level of donor influenceover government policy is commensuratelysmall. In this context, if UNDP is tomake a difference, this must derive fromthe level of trust accorded to it by the government and from the optimalexploitation of its comparative advantage.UNDP should therefore seek to strengthenits advocacy and policy support for povertyreduction and human development andconcentrate on strengthening the enablingpolicy environment to address the highlevels of poverty in Nigeria. NHDRs shouldbe complemented by the launch of StateHuman Development Reports (SHDRs)to broaden and deepen national dialogueon poverty reduction and the MillenniumDevelopment Goals.

n Narrow the focus and geographicalspread. UNDP should narrow its focusand geographical spread and sharpen thesubstantive elements of its support. The

C O U N T R Y E VA L U AT I O N : A S S E S S M E N T O F D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U LT S – N I G E R I A1 0

ADR team supports the 2003-2007 CCFthematic focus on governance, povertyand HIV/AIDS but recommends thatUNDP should not aim to support allthree focus areas in all 36 states and theFCT. There should be some judiciouswinnowing out of ongoing activities atthe state level.

n Deepen and strengthen support to consolidation of democracy. UNDPsupport should deepen and continue to strengthen its support towards theconsolidation of democracy, conflict prevention and anti-corruption initiatives.This support should build on the existingNational Governance Programme (NGP)and the ongoing initiatives of other partners and focus on strengthening ofkey government institutions such asParliament, the Institute for Peace andConflict Resolution and the IndependentCorrupt Practices Commission (ICPC).The approach should be within a clearconceptual framework and not pursued ona purely ad hoc basis. Conflict preventionand promoting peace and stability remainmajor challenges for Nigeria. UNDPshould, therefore, continue to support thegovernment in improving peace and stabilitythrough the IPCR, an important newnational institution which needs to benurtured and substantially strengthened ifit is to fulfill its role effectively. Similarly,support to the ICPC should be continued,but this should be results-driven and anyinitiative should be highly sensitive to thedegree of political will behind anti-corruptionmeasures.To strengthen Nigeria’s democracy,UNDP should continue support to theIndependent Policy Group and the NationalPlanning Commission. Support to theIPG should focus on advocating theinstitutionalisation of its role as a thinktank rather than as an ad hoc presidentialadvisory body. With respect to the NPC,UNDP should examine the political supportfor this institution and its potential tobecome effective, and should plan itsapproach accordingly.

n Accord priority to states as strategic entrypoints for upstream policy support.Under Nigeria’s federal system, the statesare important entry points for upstreampolicy support. In Nigeria, the statesenjoy considerable freedom of action inboth policy formulation and projectimplementation and due to population size,can have an impact on relatively largenumbers of people. Consequently, strategicand macro-level policy interventions byUNDP at the state level can be as importantas those at the federal level, and should beaccorded some priority.

n Build and expand partnerships with theprivate sector. With regard to partnerships,resource mobilisation and operationalmodalities, UNDP should seek to expandopportunities for cost-sharing, includingin collaboration with the private sector.The cost-sharing modality is not alwaysconsistent with maximum programmeimpact but in the case of Nigeria wheredomestic resources dwarf ODA by a widemargin, government and domestic privatesector cost sharing can offer a positive wayto expand UNDP’s capacity to promoteits human development agenda, and thisshould be actively encouraged.

n Build substantive capacity within theCountry Office. UNDP should buildsubstantive capacity within the CountryOffice to meet Nigeria’s developmentchallenges and complexities. Every effortshould be made to avoid the frequentchanges of Resident Representative andthe long gaps between the assignments of Resident Representatives that haveweakened UNDP’s leadership role duringthe past decade. With regard to the staffingof the Country Office, with the transitionfrom the Government Counterpart CashContributions (GCCC) modality to costsharing for the operational programmesin the states, cost sharing resources shouldbe used to strengthen the number of programme (and possibly administrative)staff in the Country Office. In order tostrengthen its coordination role, UNDP

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y 1 1

should move immediately to Abuja. Theabsence of the Country Office from Abujahas undoubtedly weakened UNDP’sleadership within the UN system andamong donors.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The ADR team recognises that due to Nigeria’ssize and relatively complex administrativestructures, it is not a place where one canexpect "quick results." The evaluation team alsorecognizes the difficult political environmentthe CCF operated under. The ADR team’sconclusion is that, while the picture is mixed,there have been some important contributionsduring the period under review and UNDPhas definitely made a difference in Nigeria.Notable contributions include the awarenessand policy dialogue engendered throughadvocacy using the NHDR series (1996,1998, 2000/2001), the Vision 2010 processand the National Partnership Forum. UNDP’scontributions to legislation barring harmfulpractices against women and establishing aregulatory framework for micro-credit arealso important contributions in the policyarena. A contribution that could prove usefulin addressing conflict has been the initiationof corporate responsibility initiatives withShell and Chevron around issues of conflictresolution, peace building and resource mobilisation for community-based povertyreduction programmes. In the governancearea, UNDP is also starting to provide capacity building for institutions that drivethe development agenda.

Nigeria has considerable human and naturalresources of its own. However, as the reporthas underlined, it is still possible for UNDPto carve out a niche and work on key humandevelopment issues if it focuses on areas whereit has a clear comparative advantage, is selectivein its choice of entry points, maintains flexibilityand brings substantive capacities to meet the challenges.

A number of opportunities place UNDP at anadvantage as it begins the implementation ofthe 2003-2007 country cooperation framework.UNDP has high-level access to the governmentat the federal, state and local governmentlevel. It has also been able to mobilise sizeableadditional resources from both the federal andstate governments and the private sector. Thechallenge is to make the most of these assetsand leverage them to influence policy andagenda setting at both the federal and statelevel. Even more important, it should aim atdoing a few things and doing them well.

The re-election of the government in April2003, the launching of the 2003-2007 CCFand the move to Abuja taken together offer UNDP an opportunity to reassess where it can make a real difference.Eventhough UNDP’s ‘development effectiveness’depends to a large extent on the political will of the Nigerian government, UNDP’s‘organizational effectiveness’ could be signifi-cantly improved through a more strategic andselective approach to programming and strongercollaboration between UNDP Headquartersand the country office.


Introduction

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this evaluation is to provide an overall assessment of the keydevelopment results achieved through UNDP support and in collaborationwith other key development partners from 1997-2003. It seeks to capture anddemonstrate the added value of UNDP’s contributions to Nigeria’s developmentpriorities, either directly or in partnership with other organizations, and toidentify lessons that can guide current and future UNDP programming andthe strategic choices the organization must take to enhance its developmenteffectiveness at the country level. ADRs also support the UNDP Administrator’ssubstantive accountability to the Executive Board.

The Nigeria ADR principally covers the 1997-2002 Country CooperationFramework (CCF-1), but it also takes into account, as appropriate, both theresults of earlier country programmes and the 2003-2007 CCF.

As the continent’s most populous country, Nigeria is of strategic importanceboth to Africa and to UNDP and it presents considerable developmentchallenges and opportunities. A thriving and stable Nigeria could easily becomea rallying point for regional and continental economic integration effortswithin the Economic Commission for West African States (ECOWAS)and the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).The Nigeria ADR seeks to assess UNDP’s contributions and how it hasstrategically positioned itself to respond to national development priorities.

1

COUNTRY EVALUATION: ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS – NIGERIA 1 3

Pho

to:G

alb

e.co

m

The purpose is to determine how the organiza-tion can make a difference in such a populousand relatively well-endowed country. TheADR also aims to provide guidance for theprogramming and implementation of UNDP’s2003-2007 CCF. In addition, it is intended toserve as a basis for dialogue between UNDPand the government and other developmentpartners on the strategic choices to be made tostrengthen support for human development inNigeria as the country consolidates its transitionto democracy.

RATIONALE FOR THE EVALUATION

In line with UNDP’s results-based management(RBM) orientation, the Nigeria ADR focuseson outcomes and examines both achievementsand constraints. It addresses in particular theissues of enabling policy environments, countryownership, sustainability and capacity develop-ment as all these factors ultimately determinethe development effectiveness and long-termimpact of development interventions at thecountry level.The Terms of Reference (TORs)and methodology used are detailed below andin Annex 1.

The evaluation of UNDP support to Nigeria atthis juncture is significant for various reasons.First, the timing is extremely opportune. InMay 1999, after 16 years of military rule, anew phase began in Nigeria’s political historywhen a democratically elected governmentwas installed. On 19 April 2003, a second roundof democratic elections returned the incumbentPresident to office and this coincided with thebeginning of UNDP’s new 2003-2007 CCF.The return to democracy has created anopportunity for enhanced dialogue with thegovernment and offers both a chance toreview the community focus of UNDP’s earlier programmes and to identify what realvalue-added UNDP can bring to Nigeria.

Second, although Nigeria is relatively rich innatural resources, it has yet to fulfill its economic and human development potential.

Its size, wealth and diversity generate highexpectations but it remains “a rich country withpoor people.”3 Its oil wealth and considerableagricultural potential have not translated intobetter living conditions for most of its people.Over two thirds of the population lives on lessthan US $1 per day. Furthermore, the numberof people living in poverty has doubled in recentyears and, according to most recent economicand social indicators, most Nigerians seem tobe worse off than they were in the 1970s.

Third, from a development perspective, Nigeriaoffers a chance to draw some interesting lessons.At only 0.4 % of Gross Domestic Product(GDP), ODA is of relatively little financialsignificance in Nigeria compared with mostother countries in Africa, which are extremelyaid-dependent. Its rich resource base offersthe potential for rapid development but hasalso contributed to inequalities in terms ofincome distribution and to social exclusion.The country is therefore a good place to test someof the variables that are considered to be ‘keydrivers of development’, including an enablingpolicy environment, country ownership andcapacity development, and for gauging howbest to deliver pro-poor programmes in amulti-tiered federal system.

METHODOLOGY

In accordance with UNDP’s results-basedmanagement approach, the ADR focuses primarily on any analysis of development outcomes to which UNDP has contributedrather than on specific programme or projectoutputs. The mix of evaluation methodsadopted by the team took into account theUNDP Evaluation Office’s ADR Guidelines,which advocate the “triangulation” of infor-mation gathered, through cross-referencing ofsources, corroboration and validation of theperceptions and views of stakeholders againstdocumentary evidence, and on-site project visits.

The evaluation was carried out in four phases:desk research, an exploratory mission to Nigeria,


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. See Nigeria’s National Human Development Report, 1996

in-depth studies and a country evaluationmission. During the first phase, the EvaluationOffice undertook a comprehensive desk studyto review background information and data onNigeria and conduct a thorough mapping andtrend analysis of the entire UNDP portfoliofrom 1992-2003.

This was followed by an exploratory mission to Nigeria to lay the groundwork for theADR by identifying key areas for in-depthinvestigation. Based on initial stakeholderviews, the ADR team decided to conduct in-depth studies on poverty and governance, twocritical areas where UNDP had concentratedmost of its resources during the period underreview. These studies were undertaken by twoNigerian research centers, the Institute forGovernance and Social Research and theDevelopment Policy Centre, respectively.They form an integral part of the mainevaluation and their findings have been incorporated into this report.

The main evaluation mission was conductedover a period of 3 weeks and employed variousmethodologies, including desk reviews of keybackground and policy documents, individualand focus group interviews, stakeholder meetings,questionnaires and selected project site visits. (SeeAnnex 2 for the full list of documents consulted.)

The ADR team interviewed UNDP CountryOffice staff, both at the beginning and end ofthe mission. These interviews helped to providecrucial information on UNDP programmes,clarify expectations, and validate stakeholderviews. The team also interviewed key UNDPHeadquarters units and senior managers oncorporate priorities and expectations regardingUNDP’s role in Nigeria. During the threeweeks spent in Nigeria, the team visited several UNDP projects and interviewed andadministered questionnaires to a large numberof people in the Federal Territory Capital ofAbuja, Lagos State, Nassarawa, Akwa Ibomand Kano States. Those interviewed includedfederal, state and local government officials,traditional authorities and stakeholders in target communities, research institutions,

non-governmental organizations, civil societyorganizations, the private sector, UnitedNations agencies, Bretton Woods Institutions,regional multilateral banks, and bilateral donors.(See Annex 3 for a list of key persons met.)

OVERVIEW OF UNDP’SPROGRAMME: 1997-2003

The 1997-2002 CCF, in essence, carried overmost of the nine core national programmesthat had been initiated during the FourthCountry Programme (1992-1996) and itreflected the difficult political and social situation that obtained in the country at thetime. Against the backdrop of a worseningpolitical and economic climate, the UNDPExecutive Board approved Nigeria’s CCF-1 onthe condition that at least 80% of programmeresources must directly benefit the poorestsections of the population and deliver theirbenefits at the grassroots level. (See Box 1).The CCF-1 had a combined resource allocationof US $76.8 million which included a carry-over of US $30.4 million from the previous cycleand US $97,000 government cost sharing(Box 2). Its overriding objective was povertyreduction and there were four thematic areasof concentration:a) National Management of Socio-Economic

Development and policy support forSustainable Human Development (SHD);

b) Job Creation and Sustainable Livelihoods;

I N T R O D U C T I O N 1 5

B O X 1 : U N D P E X E C U T I V E B O A R D D E C I S I O N 9 7 / 2 5

Decision 97/25 of 19 September 1997, of the Executive Board approved thefirst cooperation framework for Nigeria (DP/CCF/NIR/1) with the provisionthat the UNDP Administrator apply the following guidelines:(a) The programme must directly benefit the poorest sections of the

population and deliver their benefits at grassroots level;(b) The components of the programme must be prepared with the full

participation of the intended beneficiaries, in particular from thepoorest sections of the community, and implemented through organizations of civil society, including national and international non-governmental organizations;

(c ) The programme should be developed with clear monitoring componentsto enable the Administrator to report back to the Executive Board atits third regular session in 1998 on the content of the programme andto conduct regular evaluations of the programme at not less thanannual intervals." (Executive Board of the United Nations Programmeand the United Nations Population Fund, Decisions adopted by theExecutive Board during 1997, DP/1998/2, 8 October, 1997.)

c) Social Development;d) Sustainable Agriculture, Environment and

Rural Development.

Table 1 summarises the CCF’s Strategic Areasof Support (SAS) and intended outcomeswhile Figure 1 provides the breakdown ofresource allocation across the themes.

NATIONAL MANAGEMENT OFSOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTPROGRAMME AND POLICYSUPPORT FOR SUSTAINABLEHUMAN DEVELOPMENT (NMSED)

The NMSED’s stated overall goal, which isclustered under the governance Strategic Areaof Support within the Strategic ResultsFramework (SRF), is the creation of "enablingpolicies and institutional strengthening for

the achievement of the national objective ofpoverty reduction". This is to be achievedthrough capacity development for developmentplanning, good governance, the production ofdata and information and sound managementof the development processes. Support in thisarea (which received 22.2% of the 1997-2002CCF resources) focused on the followingobjectives: (i) improving national developmentplanning and decision-making at all levels,(ii) strengthening the national institutionalcapacity to formulate policies and strategieson social, economic, financial and debt management issues and (iii) supporting thegovernment’s attempts to improve its databasefor planning, monitoring and evaluation at alllevels. Management and public sector capacitydevelopment as well as strengthening thecapacity of national institutions to underpinthe government’s transition to democraticrule and good governance were also key elements of the NMSED. At the beginning of the 1997-2002 CCF the governance component was limited to supporting statisticaloffices but after 1999 there was a shift to supporting government efforts (a) to reinforcethe links between good policies, leadershipand institutions, (b) to promote public servicereform, (c) to build partnerships with civilsociety and (d) to strengthen the capacities of NGOs and CBOs. This orientation has been adopted more vigorously in the2003-2007 CCF.

JOB CREATION AND SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS

The stated overall goal of this programme(which falls under the Poverty Reduction SRFtheme) is to contribute to Nigeria’s efforts to

1 6

B O X 2 : O V E R V I E W O F C C F R E S O U R C E S( 1 9 9 7 - 2 0 0 2 ) ( I N T H O U S A N D S O F U S $ )

IPF CARRYOVER = $30,354

TRAC Resources = $41,755(including AOS savings)

Montreal Protocol = $830

RMT = $76 797

TA B L E 1 . U N D P S T R AT E G I C A R E A S O F S U P P O R T ( S A S ) A N D I N T E N D E D O U T C O M E S I N N I G E R I A , 1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 3

Governance

n Globalisation n Policy Dialoguen Parliamentary

capacity n Electoral

processesn Decentralisation

policies

Policy

Policies developed/implemented:n HIV/AIDS n Access to assetsn Access

to socialservices

Environment

n Policy/regulatoryframework

n Monitoringsustainability

n Global conventions

Gender

Nationalactionplans

UNDP Support to UN

Coordi-nation

Source: UNDP SRF 1999-2003

F I G U R E 1 : B U D G E T S U M M A R Y F O R N I G E R I AB Y G O A L , 1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2

Governance – 43%

Other – 5%

Gender – 1%Special development situations – 1%

Environment – 9%

Poverty reduction – 41%

Source: UNDP SRF/ROAR 1999-2003

C O U N T R Y E VA L U AT I O N : A S S E S S M E N T O F D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U LT S – N I G E R I A

create jobs and sustainable livelihoods in ruraland urban communities through the "expansionof opportunities for enterprise creation anddevelopment, by improving access of micro andsmall enterprises/entrepreneurs to improvedskills, micro finance and ownership of productiveassets and empowering the poor at communitylevel." The Job Creation and SustainableLivelihoods programme was allocated 34.5%of CCF resources.The strategic objectives wereto establish a market-oriented economy and toopen trade and investment opportunities withthe aim of reducing poverty. Specific objectiveswere job creation, access to credit for marketoperators and penetration of export markets.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The Social Development programme, whosestated goal is "to contribute to the reductionof poverty through the social and economicemancipation of the poor men, women and thedisadvantaged segments of the population,"carried over a number of projects and initiativesthat had been started during the fourth and, in some cases, even the third CountryProgrammes (1987-1991 and 1992-1996respectively). This programme, which is nowgrouped under the poverty reduction SRFtheme, received 19.8% of CCF resources.Using an integrated community developmentapproach, support was channelled through thefollowing four sub-programme areas:n Functional Mass Literacy in response to

the government plan to increase the adultfunctional literacy rate in the countryfrom 60 percent to 90 percent by 2010.UNDP supported non-formal and adultfunctional education targeted at girls,women, farmers, informal sector operatorsand other community members.

n Health support for improved productivitythrough: (i) improving the nutritional statusof the people, (ii) eradicating the guineaworm, (iii) reducing diarrhoea, (iv) helpingto rehabilitate the disabled,and (v) preventingand controlling the spread of HIV/AIDS.

n Empowerment of women so that they canplay a greater role in the development process.

n Harmonised UN programming for povertyreduction.This involved joint programmingwith other UN agencies in some of thecommunities to support the developmentof model poverty-reduction projects.

SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE,ENVIRONMENT AND RURALDEVELOPMENT (SAERD)

The overall goal of the SAERD programme,which received 23.5% of the CCF resources,was "to assist the insecure and disadvantagedrural poor, especially women, increase theirproductivity, and improve their employmentopportunities, income and food securitythrough participatory environmentally friendlyrural development." As agriculture is themainstay of 60% of the rural-based population,this programme aimed to contribute to povertyreduction by (a) eliminating post-harvest foodlosses, (b) strengthening agricultural extensionservices, (c) adopting appropriate methods andtechnology, (d) establishing small irrigationdevelopment schemes, (e) improving input supplyservices and credit to farmers, and (f ) promotingthe role of the private sector. The programmealso had a component on natural resourcesand soil conservation which included projectsfor combating drought and desertification, waterresources management and the provision ofalternative/sustainable energy.

THE SECOND COUNTRYCOOPERATION FRAMEWORK – 2003–2007 The second CCF is more firmly groundedwithin UNDP’s results-based managementstrategic results framework (SFR) and drawsits inspiration from the priority themes andcooperation strategy of the United NationsDevelopment Assistance Framework (UNDAF)and of Nigeria’s draft National PovertyEradication Programme (NAPEP), its draftInterim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)and, through the NAPEP, the MillenniumDevelopment Goals (MDGs). The secondCCF has a narrower and more strategic focus


than the first one and has identified only threemajor thematic areas. With a core resourceallocation of US $62.8 million, it covers thefollowing themes: (a) Governance and HumanRights, (b) Poverty Eradication and (c) HIV/AIDS. Information and CommunicationTechnology and gender are cross cutting themes.

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

UNDP’s programme implementation strategyencompassed a two-pronged approach: (a) policysupport to assist in creating an enabling environ-ment and building capacity for human-centreddevelopment through improved macro-economicstrategies and policy frameworks and instrumentsand (b) programme support which would seekto direct UNDP activities towards the state andcommunity levels in the areas of job creationand sustainable livelihoods, social development,and sustainable agriculture and rural development.

Annexes 4 and 5 provide a matrix of theobjectives and strategic results areas (outputsand outcomes) that the 1997-2002 and the2003-2007 CCFs have sought to address.Annex 5 provides a map of the SRF and theintended development results for UNDP’sprogrammes in Nigeria for the period 1997-2003and articulates the intended outcomes andresults for the poverty, governance, environmentand gender themes across the 1997-2002 and2003-2007 CCFs and the UNDAF.This annexalso shows the alignment of the intendedresults with the UNDAF. It should be notedthat the SRF as a RBM tool was adopted byUNDP only in 1999. As has been the casewith most other country offices, while UNDPgrouped the four thematic programme areasof the 1997-2002 CCF under specific outputsand outcomes within the four programmeareas, this was by and large a ‘retrofitting’exercise to meet corporate imperatives. The100 plus projects were retroactively clusteredaround themes in line with SFR intendedoutcomes. This means that while the countryevaluation is concerned with outcome level results,the analysis has had to go beyond the stated SFRoutcomes to an analysis of project level outputs.

All the CCF programmes were nationally executed. UNDP operated programmes in all36 states and in FCT Abuja and sought tofurther decentralise the implementation andmanagement of the programme to the state andlocal government level and communities,including villages. At the federal level, theNational Planning Commission (NPC) wasthe counterpart agency that approved andcoordinated UNDP’s programmes and oversawthe CCF through the National ProgrammeCoordinating Commission (NPCC).

The same structure was replicated at all 36states. UNDP signed a memorandum ofunderstanding (MOU) with those states whichundertook to provide a specific percentage ofthe government cash counterpart contributions(GCCC) for the agreed programmes. In theinterest of equity, each of the states and theFCT received 80 million Naira from 1997-2002CCF resources and had programmes in each ofthe four thematic focus areas. State PlanningCommissions (SPCs) interfaced with UNDPand implemented the programmes through StatePlanning Coordinating Commissions (SPCCs).To bring in a community participatoryapproach, Stakeholder Boards were set upwhich included the line ministries involved,community representatives and members ofcivil society.

To undertake monitoring of the programmes,UNDP staffed the Monitoring and EvaluationUnits within the SPCCs with StateProgramme Monitoring Advisors (SPMAs).These SPMAs and other Unit staff are seconded from the government and UNDPpays for the former. There is no doubt thatthese seemingly parallel structures are the lifeline of UNDP’s programmes at the stateand local level without which coverage in everystate would not be possible. However, thisapproach also raises the issue of administrativeoverheads and institutionalising national execution as well as questions of ownershipand sustainability. All the four thematic focusareas incorporated elements of the IntegratedCommunity Development Programme’smicro-credit schemes and Skills DevelopmentCentres (SDCs).


According to UNDP records, the rule of thumbwas to allocate 50% of earmarked resources torural communities, 30% to state level povertyreduction and policy dialogue and 20% to federal level activities focusing on upstreampolicy formulation. These programmes broughtUNDP to the grassroots level but at the sametime created top heavy and somewhat unwieldyimplementation arrangements.This has earnedUNDP the reputation of being "too bureaucratic",cumbersome and process oriented even whileit was viewed as a trusted partner and noted in some circles, as a "household name." TheADR examines some of these issues in thenext chapters.

This introductory chapter has summarisedthe rationale of the evaluation and themethodology used and provided an overviewof UNDP’s programmes in Nigeria between1997-2003. Chapter 2 examines Nigeria’sdevelopment context and some of the country’smost pressing challenges. Chapter 3 assessesUNDP’s strategic positioning and the relevanceof its programmes, while Chapter 4 examinesthe development results achieved and UNDP’scontribution to the country’s developmentpriorities. Chapter 5 summarises the lessonsand recommendations that may be derivedfrom UNDP’s experience during the periodunder review and concludes with some suggestions for future directions.


2 1

KEY DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES FACING NIGERIA

This chapter provides a brief overview of Nigeria’s key development challengesin order to provide a basis for assessing UNDP’s responses and contributionsto the country’s development priorities during this period.

Nigeria is a relatively large country of considerable wealth. It has a rich naturalresource endowment and relatively high levels of human and social capital.With an area of 923,773 sq km and estimated population of 120 millionpeople,4 Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country and is home to some250 ethnic groups. Its annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US $50billion makes the country one of sub-Saharan Africa’s largest economies.

Notwithstanding its wealth and considerable economic potential, Nigeria hashad a chequered political history and has not as yet succeeded in effectivelytranslating its potential into economic growth, human development andoverall social transformation. Nigeria’s colonial legacy and subsequentpolitical instability have undermined its development. In the 43 years since

COUNTRY EVALUATION: ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS – NIGERIA

2Nigeria’sdevelopmentcontext

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Estimates of Nigeria’s population tend to vary depending on the source. The figure of 120 million is fromUNDP, United Nations and World Bank figures.

Pho

to:G

alb

e.co

m

independence, Nigeria has endured civil warand frequent military coups and has had onlythree short periods of civilian government.Prolonged military rule, spanning altogether28 years out of Nigeria’s four decades of independence, has led to the repeated supplanting of constitutional provisions bymilitary decrees. However, the return todemocracy on 29 May 1999 ushered in a newera which holds great promise for the future.

ECONOMIC TRENDS

Despite having the seventh largest oil and gasreserves in the world and being the world’s6th largest exporter of crude oil, Nigeria’sGDP per capita annual growth rate in realterms has been negative or zero for more thantwo decades (see Figure 2). Current GDP percapita, in terms of purchasing power parity(PPP) is US $896, which is significantly lower

than the 1977 figure of US $1,160. In addition,there are large income disparities between richand poor, and between men and women. Forexample, the poorest 10% of the populationaccounts for a mere 1.6% share of nationalincome while the richest 10% accounts for40.8%. Nigeria is ranked low on the HumanDevelopment Index (HDI)5 and the Nigeria2000/2001 National Human DevelopmentReport (NHDR) also reveals that there aresignificant regional disparities. Compared toother countries of similar size but without its rich natural resource endowment, Nigeria’seconomic performance and human developmenthave not matched its potential.

Nigeria displays many characteristics of a dualeconomy, with a modern sector dominated byoil overlaid on a traditional agricultural andtrading economy. The dominance of oil andthe government’s dependency on oil resourceshave all but crowded out productive economicactivity in other sectors, especially agriculturefrom which more than 70% of the populationderives its livelihood. While agriculture employsover 70% of the active labour force andaccounts for about 40% of GDP, the oil sectoremploys only 5% of Nigerians but accountsfor over 90% of Nigeria’s foreign exchangeand 80% of the federal government’s revenues.

The economic situation is also affected by aserious debt burden. In 1998, external debtstood at US $22.8 billion with an annual debtservice of about US $4 billion per annum, or42% of exports. Many observers also attributethe weak state of the economy to the adoptionof Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs)during the 1990s, which led to the underminingof Nigeria’s agricultural and industrial sectors.6

With regard to environmental resources,Nigeria confronts severe problems such asland degradation, deforestation, desertification,erosion and pollution. At present cuttingrates, Nigeria’s forests will disappear by 2020,while large-scale destruction of the ecosystemin the Niger Delta area has a significant effecton human and marine life.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. See Nigeria’s National Human Development Report, 1996, 1998 and 2000/2001.6. See, for example, National Human Development Report, 2000/2001.

B O X 3 : B A S I C D ATA O F N I G E R I A

Size 923,773sq km

Population(2000 est) 113.9million

HDI Rank (2002) 148

Life Expectancy at Birth (2000) 51.7 years

Adult Literacy Rate (age 15 and above) (2000) 63.9%

GDP Per Capita (2000 in PPP US$) 896.00

GDI Rank (2000) 124

Real GDP Growth Rate (2001 est) 3.5%

HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate (2001) 5.8%

F I G U R E 2 : R E A L G D P G R O W T H , 1 9 9 7 - 2 0 0 2



4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

01997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

n

n

n

n

n n

POVERTY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

As the data in Box 1 shows, the level of povertyhas increased significantly over the last decade.In 1992, 42.7% of the population fell belowthe official poverty line, compared to 70.2% in 2000. Moreover, 90.8% of the populationlives on less than $2 a day. On the HumanDevelopment Index, Nigeria is ranked 148 outof 173 countries. This reflects the lack of basicsocial services available in the country. Lessthan 10% of annual public expenditures isallocated to health and education; and, whileas little as 0.8% of public expenditure as a percentage of GDP is used on health, morethan three times that amount is used to serviceNigeria’s intractable external debt. Adult literacyremains low at 63.9% (55.7% of adult femalesas compared to 72.4% of adult males). Lifeexpectancy was 53 years in 1991 but by 2000it had dropped to 51.7. There has also been anincrease in childhood mortality during the lastdecade from 91 deaths/1000 in 1990 to 105/1000 in 1999. 57% of the Nigerian peoplehave access to improved water sources, and63% have adequate sanitation facilities.

The above situation is compounded by the5.8% HIV/AIDS infection rate (8.1% amongthe 20-24 age group). While there are markedregional variations in the infection rates (Benuestate, the worst affected has 13.5% of the population affected while Jigawa has only1.8%) it is expected that as many as 10-15million people will be infected by 2010.

With regard to gender equality, women facemany obstacles. Nigeria’s gender-relateddevelopment index (GDI) ranking is 124 outof 146 countries. In general, women have limited access to education, employment, creditand agricultural land. In 2000, women filledonly 5% of government ministerial posts.Long-standing gender-discriminatory practicesand harmful traditional practices, such as femalegenital mutilation, still abound.

CHALLENGES OF CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY

Prior to 1999, years of military rule, characterizedby neglect of the social sector and by decliningeconomic performance, had seriously erodedthe political and social fabric of Nigeria andresulted in the near collapse of the economy andsocial infrastructure. The emergency situationprecipitated by the annulment of the 1993elections and another military take over onlyserved to exacerbate the situation and to deepenhuman poverty among the majority of Nigerians.Virtually all the Organization of EconomicCooperation and Development (OECD)countries suspended their ODA during thisperiod, leaving UNDP and other United Nations(UN) agencies as the sole external developmentactors in the country. By 1998, Nigeria’s HDIstanding had plummeted to an all time low.Per capita income fell to less than US $3 per dayand about 70 % of the population was livingbelow the poverty line.

Since May 1999, when Nigeria installed itsfirst elected government after 16 years ofuninterrupted military rule, there have beensignificant improvements in human rights andindividual freedoms. However, Nigeria’s nascentdemocracy is by no means assured and muchneeds to be done to consolidate the transition andbuild a strong culture of open and accountablegovernment at all levels. As the 2001 UNDPHDR aptly notes: “Although Nigeria’s humandevelopment freedom index has improvedconsiderably since 1999, the effort of buildingsustainable democracy from the ashes of abrutal past requires healing of deep wounds,taming of repressive institutions, changingattitudes born of conflict and creating a cultureof consensus. And all these take time and requirepersistence.” (Nigerian Human DevelopmentReport 2000/2001 Millennium Edition, UNDP,Lagos, 2001.)

There are many institutional complexities inmanaging Nigeria’s large federation of states.These include: tensions arising out of thelegacy of unitary and authoritarian militaryrule; the ongoing search for balance among

N I G E R I A’ S D E V E L O P M E N T C O N T E X T 2 3

the new institutions, especially between theexecutive and legislative branches; and theneed to establish an independent judiciaryand anti-corruption bodies. The civil serviceneeds rejuvenation and professionalisationafter years of political mismanagement.Nigeria also needs to build credible civil societyinstitutions that will be in a position to pushthe democratic agenda and to play a role aspublic advocates and government watchdogs.Presently, there is also fragmentation with respectto national policy-making functions and anapparent lack of a common national developmentvision and comprehensive policy framework.Nigeria also needs to vitalise its private sectorand to win foreign investor confidence by, amongother things, reforming the legal and regulatoryframework in order to create a more predictableand competitive business environment.

MANAGING ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

As with any ethnically and religiously diversecountry, Nigeria is faced with the challengesof nation-building and upholding the socialand political cohesion of the state. While theneed for a federal constitution is generallyaccepted, many Nigerians tend to feel astronger identification with their ethnic groupand home state than with Nigeria as a whole.There are tensions over the number of states(which have continued to increase over time),and over their autonomy in such matters asthe introduction of Sharia law and over thedistribution of federal funds to the states.To enhance its viability, the democratic systemmust be seen to work for the benefit of thepeople of Nigeria both in political and insocio-economic terms. Nigeria, however, hashad little experience in making democraticinstitutions work or in promoting civil society,which is a necessary component of any functioning democracy. Military rule hastended to strengthen the influence of the federal government at the expense of thestates but, with the restoration of democracy,the states enjoy considerable freedom of action.Since 1999, the Federal Government ofNigeria (FGN) has found it relatively difficult

to obtain consensus on nationwide policies orto promote them throughout the country.Operational activities for development orpoverty alleviation are largely undertaken atthe state level, a factor no donor can ignore.

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN PRACTICE

The new constitution adopted in 1999 guaranteed the rule of law and established athree-tiered autonomous federal system ofgovernment comprised of 36 states plus theAbuja Federal Capital Territory and 774 LocalGovernment Authorities.

This federalism, combined with Nigeria’s wealthand size, means that the country functions ina very different way from other countries.First, as 90% of the federal government’s revenue comes from oil, it is not obliged tomake a major effort to raise direct or evenindirect taxes from the population. As a result,it can avoid making the deals and compromisesthat are necessary in other countries if citizensare to be persuaded to contribute to governmentrevenues. Second, although the federal constitution grants power to the 36 states, thefederal/state relationship is dominated by the fact that virtually all revenue is centrallygenerated and distributed to the states inaccordance with an agreed formula. The current revenue sharing formula is as follows:federal government 48%; state governments24%; and local government authorities 20%.Consequently, states have considerable politicalbut little economic power since they have virtually no local revenue base and are dependenton the FGN for resources. On the other hand,federal influence over the states is limited bythe fact that federal budgetary allocations aremade in accordance with a pre-determinedformula and not on a discretionary basis.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Since coming into power in 1999, the presentNigerian government has adopted a number ofpolicies and strategies to address the country’s


development challenges. The government’sEconomic Policy for 1999-2003 aimed atraising the living standards of the people,creating employment opportunities and making Nigeria an important regional andglobal economic player. To address poverty,the government has launched a NationalPoverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP)and an Interim Poverty Reduction StrategyPaper (I-PRSP) is in the pipeline. A dialogueand partnership forum on poverty eradicationhas also been initiated with donors. An HIV/AIDS Emergency Action Plan (HEAP) anda National Action Committee on AIDS

(NACA) have been instituted as a response tothe HIV/AIDS epidemic.7

Many serious problems remain to be tackled ifNigeria is to improve the standards of livingof all its citizens. These include the need foreconomic growth and economic diversification,particularly the expansion of the non-oil sectorsof the economy and job creation, a reductionof both human and income poverty and areduction in income inequality, a plan to combatrising HIV/AIDS infection rates, diffusion ofreligious-ethnic tensions and consolidation ofthe democratic system of governance.

N I G E R I A’ S D E V E L O P M E N T C O N T E X T 2 5

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. Economic Policy, Government of Nigeria, 1999

This chapter analyses UNDP’s programmes undertaken between 1997-2003 with a view to determining the overall responsiveness and relevanceof these interventions to Nigeria’s human development priorities. The focusis on how UNDP strategically positioned itself to respond to these prioritiesand emerging issues and leveraged its resources and comparative advantageto build strategic partnerships with the government and other developmentpartners to support the country’s development agenda. The key parametersthis evaluation used to assess strategic positioning and relevance of UNDPsupport and its overall contributions to development outcomes were:n Relevance, to gauge whether the most strategic opportunities for

assistance were tapped effectively;n Responsiveness, to review retrospectively the flexibility and timing

of UNDP engagement in what turned out to be major developmentpriorities and turning points in the country;

n Linkages and partnerships, to determine the extent to which UNDPwas able to forge productive and strategic relationships to achieve resultswith both national and international development partners within thewider framework of development cooperation in the country.

3


Strategic positioning andrelevance of UNDPprogrammes

Pho

to:G

alb

e.co

m

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE STRATEGIC POSITIONING OF UNDP SUPPORT

The 1997-2002 CCF was drafted in less thanideal conditions. The military dictatorshipcreated a difficult policy environment, andUNDP was one of the only developmentactors to remain in Nigeria during that time.As has been noted, the UNDP ExecutiveBoard gave instructions that 80 percent of theprogramme resources be directed towardsgrassroots activities, which in practical termsmeant that UNDP mainly initiated operationalprojects at the level of the states or the localgovernment authorities. By 1999, UNDP hada commitment to support projects in all thirty-six states and in the FCT. The restoration ofdemocracy in 1999 meant a sudden shift inthe federal government’s policies and priorities.The new government clearly wanted UNDPto focus more on policy support, especially inthe governance arena. However, at that time,many of the UNDP-supported grassrootsprojects at the state and local levels were justbecoming operational and these absorbed alarge proportion of UNDP’s resources andstaff time. UNDP had also made substantialfinancial commitments to states that had

already allocated cash counterpart contributions(GCCC) to UNDP-supported projects,making it difficult for the organization toimmediately move upstream in line with thenew government’s policy direction. Althoughthere was no policy blue print, as such, theincoming government underlined economicgrowth, poverty reduction, provision of basicsocial services and reducing unemployment asits core priorities. The most pressing challengesfacing the new government were to restoretrust and confidence in government and to revitalise the economy. The EconomicPolicy of 1999-2003 identified a number oftargets related to achieving higher economicgrowth rates and lower inflation, increasedemployment and access to education, safewater and electricity for a larger percentage of the population. While the change in government presented a considerable challengeto UNDP, especially given the inflexibility of its programming cycles, it also createdopportunities for making strategic shifts andbuilding networks with a broad range of new development constituencies, especiallywithin the pro-democracy groups and thedemocratically elected government. UNDPincreased efforts to play a role in advocacy, policyadvice and in networking both with nationalstakeholders and with returning members ofthe international donor community, and supported the following initiatives:n Financing a Macro-Economic Adviser in

the Vice President’s Economic PolicyCoordination Committee;

n Partnering with the Soros Foundationand Africare to support the IndependentPolicy Group (IPG), an advisory body tothe President;

n Supporting the New Economic Partnershipfor Africa’s Development (NEPAD);

n Supporting the HIV/AIDS EmergencyAction Plan (HEAP).

In addition, a UNDP study entitled ‘PeoplesVision of Development – 2010’ that wasundertaken in 2000 at the grassroots levelacross all zones and states articulated some ofthe country’s key development priorities asseen by the general public. (See Box 4.)


B O X 4 : K E Y E L E M E N T S O F P E O P L E ’ S V I S I O N O F D E V E L O P M E N T – 2 0 1 0

n Grassroots people would like to be heard and be a part and parcel ofwhat affects their lives.

n They would like to be involved, as far as is practicable, in the implementation of their own development programmes.

n Capacity building for people’s empowerment should be a major goal ofthe development process.

n The inadequate or total lack of social amenities and infrastructure (e.g.water, electricity, roads, housing, health delivery systems, education, etc.)are recognised as impeding the chances of people attaining meaningfuldevelopment at the community level.

n The continuous reduction of employment opportunities blocks the realisation of improved quality of life and self-fulfillment.

n Poverty is a hindrance and scourge to human development.

n Constraints to agricultural productivity negate the quality of life in therural areas where the majority of the people live.

n Problems of food security due to poor access to agricultural inputs andmarkets as well as post harvest losses impede national development.

n People consider that good governance, as reflected in improved socialjustice, physical safety and security of property, is a necessary conditionfor realising various visions of development.

Source: "People’s Vision of Development – 2010," UNDP, Lagos, Nigeria, 2000

RELEVANCE TO NATIONALDEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

Support to Poverty Reduction Since the restoration of democracy, theFederal Government of Nigeria has revived orcreated several new institutions aimed atstrengthening the federal policy frameworkfor combating poverty. The most prominentof these is the National Poverty EradicationProgramme (NAPEP). In addition, withinthe framework of the World Bank’s PovertyReduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) initiative,the federal government has set up a NationalForum on the PRSP process and adopted aninterim PRSP. The preparation of a fully-fledged PRSP is under way. While UNDPanti-poverty programmes are fully consistentwith the PRSP, the World Bank has clearlybeen the lead agency and UNDP has not beensubstantively involved in the PRSP policy formulation process.

Nigeria has not developed a national strategicplan for meeting the Millennium DevelopmentGoals (MDGs), but the goals and targets set inthe National Poverty Eradication Programmeare aligned with the human development goalsof the MDGs.The UNDP poverty programmeshave strong links with the NAPEP, which targets income, food, shelter, employment,water supply, health and transport, education,gender development and HIV/AIDS.

Nigeria’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papertargets the informal sector and capacity development. UNDP programmes haveaddressed skills enhancement in collaborationwith the National Directorate of Employment(NDE) which coordinates the national skillsacquisition programme, and has been themain implementing agency of the UNDP-supported Skills Development Centres (SDCs).The skills acquisition programme is alsoclosely aligned with UNDP’s job creation andsustainable livelihoods programmes, especiallythe micro-start and micro-credit portfolios.The same is true of UNDP’s SustainableAgriculture, Environment and Rural Develop-ment programme, whose goals coincide with

those of various Nigerian institutions, includingthe Nigerian Agricultural Cooperative andRural Development Bank (NACRDB), theCommunity Banks, the Agricultural DevelopmentProgrammes (ADP), the Federal AgriculturalCoordinating Unit (FACU), the National LandDevelopment Agency (NALDA) and theRiver Basin Development Authority (RBDA)which all aim at improving sustainable agriculture in Nigeria.

UNDP’s Social Development Programme,which places emphasis on mass education and adult literacy, is well-aligned with thenational development priorities, especially thegovernment’s Universal Basic Education programme and the National Commission forMass Literacy. In addition, UNDP’s supportto the National Action Committee on HIV/AIDS (NACA) and the HIV/AIDS activitiesof the Federal Ministry of Health are wellaligned with the country’s HEAP and havestrong links with the programmes of variousgovernment agencies.

Judging from the foregoing, at the institutionallevel, UNDP’s programmes have strong linkswith the public sector institutions charged withpoverty reduction in Nigeria. Nonetheless,while this is impressive, the ADR team’s viewis that, in some cases, the linkages were moreof form than of substance. For example, thesynergies between UNDP’s thematic focal areasand the activities of NEPAD or the MDGsappear to be weak. Perhaps the major obstacleto developing more substantive policy leveland operational links is that the governmentitself has tended to approach poverty reductionfrom what a number of stakeholders havetermed a "fire-fighting" approach.

Since Nigeria lacks a comprehensive, targetedoverarching policy framework for addressingand monitoring poverty reduction, it would beuseful to place the MDGs at the center of anational poverty reduction strategy, so therewould be clear targets and benchmarks and anational rallying point around which domesticand international development partners coulddirect their efforts.

S T R AT E G I C P O S I T I O N I N G A N D R E L E VA N C E O F U N D P P R O G R A M M E S 2 9

Support to GovernanceThere is strong evidence to suggest that underthe circumstances of the military dictatorshipbefore 1998, it was neither possible nor easy forthe first CCF to address issues of governancedirectly. Governance was indirectly addressedthrough capacity building in the federal andstate statistical offices, and advocacy throughthe National Human Development Reports.After 1999, however, UNDP moved quickly tomeet the federal government’s new require-ments in this area. Specific measures includedthe following:n Financing a National Governance Adviser

to support and advise the NationalPlanning Commission (NPC);

n Assistance to the preparation of theNational Programme on Governance whichwas inaugurated on 23 October 2000;

n Initial support to the Independent CorruptPractices Commission;

n Support to the Institute of Peace andConflict Resolution (IPCR);

n Support to capacity building for civiceducation, including voter education.(See Annexes 4 and 5.)

As with its support in the poverty arena,UNDP has linkages with an impressive arrayof national institutions, especially at the locallevel. At the upstream level, UNDP also hasstrong linkages to NEPAP and the NationalPlanning Commission as well as to theIndependent Corrupt Practices Commission.

STRATEGIC POSITIONING AND RESPONSIVENESS TO EMERGING PRIORITIES

The Executive Board’s requirement that thefirst CCF should concentrate at the grassrootslevel may have led to compromises with respectto focusing on the "big picture." While thenine national programmes from the FourthCountry Programme (1992-1996) were indeedconsolidated into four areas of concentrationand CCF-1 did shift its focus to the communitylevel, there was probably too much stress onparticipatory processes and micro level project

outputs without due attention to facilitatingsynergies among the four programmes and todeveloping a clear strategy on how thesegrassroots interventions would contribute tomacro level results. Overall, UNDP’s grassrootsprogrammes have been spread too thin andthis may have jeopardised the possibility ofattaining the requisite depth and concentrationnecessary for realising substantive, replicableand sustainable development results. This factor may also have led to a concentration onmonitoring procedures and processes ratherthan development results.

The projects also suffered from a lack of acoherent and comprehensive policy frame-work at the state and national level whichwould have allowed for strategically scaling upthe results beyond the target communities.

However, given the difficult operational environment and the Executive Board decision regarding the CCF’s grassroots orientation, the evaluation team believes thatthe initial alignment of UNDP’s programmeswas appropriate in the circumstances.UNDP’s readiness to make a shift towardspolicy guidance to the new democratic government showed that it was responsive to the country’s changing circumstances andoperational environment. This notwithstanding,UNDP’s approach to policy and strategyformulation and capacity building in strategicinstitutions has been essentially ad hoc andthe organization has not developed a coherentapproach, particularly with respect to linkingdownstream project successes with policylevel work, either at the state or federal level.With regard to the balance between upstreamand downstream support, UNDP’s inputs toNigeria still remain heavily weighted towardsthe grassroots, and the evaluation team questionswhether this is still relevant, let alone strategic,given the changed political and policy environ-ment and the very high transaction costs thatthe wide geographical coverage entails.To makea difference and to have long-term impact,UNDP will need to rethink the approach ofthe past cycle and select areas where its comparative advantage can yield the best


results in terms of scaling up, replication andsustainability. It should also consider whetherits resources and capabilities are compatiblewith maintaining programmes throughoutthe country.

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS AND RESOURCE MOBILISATION

Resource mobilisation has become an integralpart of UNDP’s partnership building strategy.Because of the country’s vast oil revenues,partnership building for resource mobilisationassumes greater importance in the Nigeriancontext than in most African countries. Thereis considerable potential for tapping thissource of funding and leveraging UNDP’sresources in order to promote a strong humandevelopment agenda at both the state andfederal level.

During the period 1997-2002, UNDP tooksteps to build partnerships with a broad rangeof institutions, with varying degrees of success.These included government agencies, especiallyat the state, local government and communitylevel, bilateral and multilateral donors, theprivate sector, NGOs, and other UN entities.

Partnerships with State GovernmentsState governments have provided additionalresources for UNDP programmes through the Government Cost Contribution in Cash(GCCC) modality. The additional resourcesgarnered in this manner have assisted in augmenting the delivery of social services,especially at the community level. While thishas contributed towards improving the qualityof life of the target beneficiaries, the evaluationteam was not convinced that this has alwaysrespected the need to ensure that core andnon-core funding are applied within a coherentcountry-level policy framework.

The selection of projects or programmes oftenseems to have been driven by the interests ofthe funding partners rather than by establishedUNDP criteria. Projects have been accepted for

funding that fall outside the current thematicfocus of UNDP and cannot be justified withrespect to the CCF orientation. The verybroad interpretation to which the overarchingtheme of Poverty Alleviation lends itself hasin a way encouraged this trend.

Many of the community-based developmentinitiatives seem to have been "supply driven",responding to the availability of UNDPresources and derived from the ability of stategovernments to provide matching funds, insome instances, in order to win votes at election time. Moreover, it is not clear thatUNDP made a considered assessment of themanagerial, technical and leadership capacitiesof the Country Office to backstop the resultanteclectic mix of integrated community develop-ment projects.

The evaluation team also concluded that thelarge number of projects funded from non-core programme resources overstretchedUNDP’s human resources to a point whereissues of ownership and sustainability may havebeen compromised.The Programme MonitoringUnits (PMUs) established by UNDP in everystate were not consistently effective.

UNDP’s presence in every state that could comeup with matching GCCC funds has beenachieved at the expense of strategic focus andpolicy coherence. In some communities, UNDPis perceived as a substitute for the governmentrather than as a catalytic and strategic partnerfor government development programmes.Such direct delivery of projects tends to reducecountry ownership and capacity building.

The change in modality from GCCC to cost-sharing, which is expected to take place in2003, offers the UNDP and its governmentpartners an opportunity to rethink the scope ofUNDP's operational activities at the state level.

Partnerships with the Private Sector: Two Success StoriesUNDP’s effort to build partnerships with theprivate sector stands out as a nascent successstory in strategic partnering and advocacy


for human development and corporateresponsibility. Two initiatives, the NationalPartnership Forum (NPF) and the HumanDevelopment Fund (HDF), launched inDecember 2000, can be cited as cases in point.

National Partnership Forum (NPF) The NPF seeks to promote corporate socialresponsibility in accordance with the aims ofthe Global Compact and the MillenniumDevelopment Goals. In addition, it serves as a vehicle for mobilising non-traditionalresources to support community-based development initiatives. Four subgroups havebeen established on various topics, withUNDP serving as chair and secretariat. As ofDecember 2001, the NPF included as manyas 60 active organizations, including Nigerianas well as transnational corporations such asPrice Waterhouse Coopers, Cadbury, Texaco,Chevron, and Union Bank, among others.

An important initiative of the NPF was the creation of a Learning Bank for sharingand encouraging best practices in socialresponsibility, which used publications,workshops, seminars, and a web site for dissemination of information. Through thisinitiative, UNDP showed its understanding ofhow partnerships can complement UNDP’sadvocacy role in the promotion of its corehuman development messages, rather thaninterpreting partnerships solely in terms ofresource mobilisation.

UNDP should, however, put even greateremphasis on this component of partnershipbuilding in the future.UNDP’s ability to influenceprivate sector programmes so that they reflectand enhance UNDP’s development prioritiesshould be counted as indicator of success.

The Human Development Fund (HDF)The HDF was designed as the resource mobilisation instrument for the NationalPartnership Forum, to implement grassrootscommunity development activities whichbenefit the poor, the marginalised and vulnerable groups. Projects to be supportedunder the HDF include the provision of

basic social infrastructure such as water andsanitation, basic health care, job creationavenues for the youth, functional literacy, andmicro credit. They may also include local governance and capacity building. Anotherrationale of the HDF is to provide smallerprospective financial contributors to povertyalleviation with an opportunity to pool theirresources to avoid the high overhead costs ofsetting up parallel management structures.

The assessment of the evaluation team is that these programmes basically mirror thosesupported under the CCF. A factor in the success so far of the HDF was the personalbacking and involvement of the formerResident Representative himself. One immediateimpetus has been the President’s repeated callon development partners to complementnational efforts in the priority areas of ruraltransformation and universal access to basicsocial services. Many state governments havealso made formal requests to UNDP to augment resources through this modality.

Since the same modalities are used for HDFprogramme delivery as for UNDP programmesfunded from core resources, they are likely toincrease the backstopping pressures on theUNDP Country Office, and to suffer from thesame deficiencies in ownership and capacitybuilding to enable national institutions todeliver the key needs of disadvantaged communities by themselves when UNDPinvolvement is phased out. They are also likely to be deficient in design, in terms of thenumber of lives actually touched, and thepotential for replication and scaling up. Theseweaknesses in the delivery of community levelprogrammes should be addressed seriously ifthese partnership programmes are to realisethe development objectives for which theywere instituted.

Partnerships with oil companiesoperating in NigeriaUNDP has begun to work with the oil companies operating in the Niger Deltaregion, whose activities have led to criticismand unrest, especially among the youth. For


example, in November 2002, UNDP enteredinto a Memorandum of Understanding(MOU) with Chevron Nigeria Limited oncommunity development projects in the NigerDelta region.

Chevron approached UNDP Nigeria becausethey determined that UNDP would have greatercredibility with beneficiary communities.UNDP received this vote of confidence becauseof its neutrality and mandate as a UN agency.The criterion for success of this initiative willbe the degree to which UNDP is able to playa neutral, facilitative and development-orientedrole and not be seen by the community as justan adjunct to a corporate public relationsexercise. If successful, the best practices fromNigeria’s experience could serve as a model formobilisation of non-core resources by UNDPin other countries.

Partnerships with NGOs and CBOsWhile the evaluation team was impressed bysome of the partnerships that have been forgedwith the private sector, it felt that more couldhave been done to establish partnerships withother civil society groups, such as NGOs andCBOs, especially at the grassroots level, wherethey might play a more active and effectiverole in the social programmes that are currentlydirectly managed by UNDP. In particular, thecapacities of NGOs and CBOs should bestrengthened so that they can assume the directdelivery of micro level activities in whichUNDP was involved during the first CCF.At the same time, UNDP should simplify itssystem for accounting and reporting on non-core resources to enable NGOs and CBOs tocollaborate with UNDP in the implementationof micro-projects.

Partnerships within the United Nations System While the resources of individual UN agenciesmay be relatively small, collectively they bringto the table sizeable ODA that could make ahuge difference if joint collaborative approacheswere strengthened. (See Figure 3.) The formalUnited Nations Country Team coordinationmechanisms, specifically the Common Country

Assessment (CCA) and UNDAF, were initiatedwith the first CCA in March 2000. The firstUNDAF, which covers the same period as thesecond CCF, was completed in January 2001.There is coherence and synergy between theCCF’s objectives, strategic areas of supportand intended outcomes and those of theUNDAF, which include promoting good governance and human rights, reducingpoverty and reducing the incidence andimpact of HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosisand other infectious diseases. (See Annex 5.)

Notwithstanding the coincidence of goals,the evaluation team felt that the UN system coordination in Nigeria under UNDAF hasnot been effectively translated into a coherentunified approach to tackling poverty and forstrengthening strategic partnerships withinthe UN family around key development outcomes. For example, while HIV/AIDS is acore priority under both the UNDAF and theUNDP/CCF, there are multiple UN systeminitiatives in this sector.

Partnerships with Nigeria’s bilateral and multilateral donorsSince UNDP has a somewhat different statusfrom that of other donors, this gives it aunique comparative advantage. Elements ofUNDP’s unique status include the following:(a) its neutrality, both among donors andbetween donors and partner governments;(b) the power of the UN flag, which gives itconsiderable convening power and ability to


F I G U R E 3 : O D A D I S B U R S E M E N T S B Y D O N O R S ,1 9 9 9 ( I N T H O U S A N D S O F U S $ )

Source: UNDP Development Cooperation Report, Nigeria, 1998/1999

120,000

100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

0Multilateral

(UN Systems)Multilateral

(Non-UN Systems)Bilateral

20,150

106,591

29,120

work on "sensitive issues"; (c) its access to policy makers; (d) its annual publication ofthe Human Development Report and periodicpublication of the Nigerian National HumanDevelopment Report; (e) its access to global knowledge networks; and (f ) its capacity toprovide independent advice on emerging issues.

In Nigeria it is particularly important to leverageUNDP’s comparative advantage since, because

of the country’s oil wealth, the total level ofdonor contributions to the country representsonly 0.4% of GDP, and the level of donorinfluence over government policy is commen-surately small. (Figures 4 and 5 and Annex 7show the volume of ODA from UNDP andother 10 top donors to Nigeria and the areasto which ODA was generally directed during1998-1999.) In this context, if UNDP is tomake a difference, it must be due to the level oftrust accorded to it by the government and tothe optimal exploitation of its comparativeadvantage in the Nigerian context.

There is a general consensus both amongpartner governments and donors in Nigeria that UNDP is uniquely suited to operating in sensitive fields and heading multi-donorinitiatives, especially in the governance andpoverty alleviation sectors. As Nigeria’s traditional development partners have returnedto the country since 1999 and started to buildup their programmes, it is now increasinglypossible for UNDP to develop partnershipswith these donors and to leverage its resources,as it has done in the areas of governance andHIV/AIDS. UNDP’s neutrality has permittedit to play a strategic and special role in politi-cally sensitive areas such as elections, conflict prevention and the campaign against corruption.For example, UNDP played a key role incoordinating and managing the inputs of various donors, including the European Union(EU), to the 2003 elections for the NationalAssembly and the Presidency. It is also collaborating with NORAD on conflict prevention and has participated in a jointStrategic Conflict Assessment with the WorldBank and DFID led by the government’sInstitute for Peace and Conflict Resolution(IPCR). UNDP’s unique position has also putit in a strong position for convening donors,in an ad hoc manner or in more structuredmeetings. For example, it has taken the lead in sector/thematic groups in such areas as (a) capacity building for economic management,(b) poverty alleviation and job creation, (c) healthand HIV/AIDS, (d) micro-finance and privatesector promotion, (e) environment and naturalresources, and (f ) good governance.


F I G U R E 4 : A N N U A L O D A D I S B U R S E M E N T S ,1 9 8 8 – 2 0 0 0 ( I N M I L L I O N S O F U S $ )

Note: The US $184.8 million translates into US $1.60 per person, which represents only 0.4% ofNigeria's GDP. Source: UNDP Development Cooperation Report, Nigeria, 1998/1999

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

01988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

120

345

250263 259

279

190212

192202 204

152184.8

F I G U R E 5 : T O P T E N D O N O R S B Y D I S B U R S E M E N T S ,1 9 9 9 ( I N T H O U S A N D S O F U S $ )


IBRD

USA

EU UNICEF

UNHCR

Japan

100,000

90,000

80,000

70,000

60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000

20,000

10,000

0

UNDPFAO

Canada

WHO

Donor representatives in Nigeria indicatedthat UNDP could have done more to facilitatea policy dialogue between the government anddonors on developing a national comprehensiveframework for poverty reduction and macro-economic management around which partnerscould rally their support. While donors seemto feel that UNDP could play a stronger rolein convening and coordination, there is a perception among a few partners that,because of its projects focus, UNDP may betoo buried in its micro-projects. The fact thatUNDP is not more substantively involved in the preparation of the PRSP is perhaps aconfirmation of this observation.

UNDP’s relationship with the major multilateraland bilateral donors has undoubtedly beenimpaired by its failure to move to Abuja andthe frequent changes of and relatively long gapsbetween Resident Representatives. However,it should be recognised that UNDP’s effortsat convening and coordination have also beenlimited by the lack of a strong national donorcoordinating body and a clear governmentoverarching policy framework. The NationalPlanning Commission, which is responsiblefor donor coordination, is relatively new andweak. Clearly coordination and partnering forresults are a challenge. There is a thin linebetween doing too little and doing too muchand UNDP could easily end up doing only alittle of everything. There is also the issue ofkeeping the government in the driver’s seat topromote country ownership and sustainability.In order to effectively play the coordination roleexpected of it and promote country ownershipand sustainability, UNDP will have to balancethe sometimes multiple and conflicting demandsof its partners with the country’s interests.

STRATEGIC POSITIONING ANDCOMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF UNDP

During the period 1997-2003, UNDP hasgenerally enjoyed the good will of theNigerian government at both the federal andstate level, and of various local constituencies.Its mandate and its core human development

values have given it comparative advantageand access to government at the highest levels.The UNDP has developed the reputation of atrusted and neutral partner and its role inNigeria goes beyond its relatively meagreresources. The roles of setting the developmentagenda, advocacy, and engendering nationalpolicy dialogue on key development issues haveprobably been its greatest contribution to Nigeriaduring this period. Of particular significanceis UNDP’s global and national flagship product,the Human Development Report whichmeasures human poverty. Nigeria’s firstNational Human Development Report waspublished in 1996 and generated considerabledebate with its comprehensive coverage andanalysis of the poverty situation in the country.In particular, this NHDR helped to highlightand generate debate on one of the country’smost enduring paradoxes: that Nigeria is a resource rich country with unacceptably large numbers of poor people living below the poverty line. The 1996 NHDR was followed by the 1998 and 2000/2001 NHDRs which covered the equally important human development themes of poverty and globalisa-tion, respectively.

In addition to this strategic and catalytic roleon policy dialogue and advocacy on humandevelopment issues, UNDP has also assistedin promoting national dialogue around moreinclusive future development agendas byarticulating a long term strategic vision (for example, Nigeria’s Vision 2010) and by promoting conflict resolution and participatoryplanning processes. UNDP’s perceived neutralityand convening power have also allowed it toplay a coordinating role in these sensitiveareas, especially under the aegis of the UnitedNations Resident Coordinator system. Duringthe period under review, UNDP also sought,through coalition building and fostering partnerships between government and civilsociety, to play a key role as broker and catalystin the area of governance and democracy.

In short, the following conclusions can bereached regarding the strategic positioning ofUNDP and the relevance of its programmes


during the period 1997-2003. In general terms,UNDP has responded to the evolving develop-ment challenges in Nigeria and to the expressedpriorities of its successive governments. Thedownstream orientation required by theExecutive Board at the beginning of CCF-1was appropriate and UNDP positioned itselfaccordingly. After the restoration of democracy,UNDP made a serious effort to respond tothe government’s need for policy and strategyadvice and capacity building in strategic institutions but the approach was not structuredor coherent. UNDP has developed a numberof useful linkages and partnerships with government and non-governmental and donororganizations but, to be strategic, these need tobe anchored within a coherent developmentor policy framework. Partnerships with government, especially at the level of thestates in UNDP’s downstream programmes,have often been driven by resource mobilisationimperatives rather than substantive developmentconcerns. Furthermore, partnerships in grass-roots projects tend to be UNDP-dominatedand there is neither a planned UNDP exitstrategy nor enough national ownership tosignal the potential for scaling up and for longterm sustainability.

Promising partnerships have been developedthrough the National Partnership Forum and the Human Development Fund, and with Chevron Oil Company in Nigeria, andthese might be able to be replicated. Whilepartnerships with other external developmentpartners seem promising, they are at best uneven.Collaboration with the other developmentpartners in the United Nations system is weak,especially in the area of HIV/AIDS and microprojects, and the UNDAF has not provided a framework for synergies and strategic focusof UN efforts.

In assessing how well UNDP has performedor strategically positioned itself to play its rolebetter in the future, there is a need to balanceexpectations against reality. UNDP’s roles ascoordinator, neutral convener and broker,and advocate for human rights and humandevelopment, clearly emerge as UNDP’scomparative advantages.UNDP is well known

and enjoys high visibility in the country,particularly within institutions and among thestates where it has programmes. Domesticconstituencies and external donors alike clearlyrespect UNDP’s role and expect it to play an even stronger facilitator role vis-a-is thegovernment and the human developmentagenda. However, there are a number of constraints that have militated against UNDPtaking full advantage of these positive threads.In a country where domestic resources dwarfthe ODA by a considerable margin, the roleof external aid, and that of the UNDP in particular, should be taken in context. UNDP’sassumed comparative advantage and the traditional role it plays elsewhere must take intoaccount the realities of the Nigerian context.Besides having considerable human and naturalresources of its own, Nigeria also has a three tier federal system of 36 states and 774 localgovernment authorities whose autonomy isguaranteed under the Constitution. Nigeria’spolitical history has ensured that any inter-vention will have to come to terms with constanttensions that are evident at every level of government. It is possible for UNDP to providestrategic upstream support at both the federaland state level, but without a strong institutionaland policy framework, and reforming championsfrom within to carry forward the developmentagenda, coordination and facilitation alonewill not automatically lead to concrete results.This suggests that the Nigeria governmentand UNDP will need to work together on anew or revitalised agenda on this front.The Nigerian development context seems torequire a highly focused and agile role on thepart of the UNDP, yet one that is multifacetedand flexible enough for the organization toremain strategic and relevant to the complexchallenges and opportunities that the countrypresents at this juncture. With the return of most donors to Nigeria following the democratic elections of 1999, UNDP maywell need to build on the federal government’sgood will by focusing sharply on a few criticalthings and doing them well. It should alsowork with the federal government to establisha strong policy framework for promoting astronger development agenda at the federaland state level.


This chapter examines the overall performance of UNDP’s programmesduring the period under review. The analysis focuses on assessing thedevelopment results achieved through UNDP support and how UNDPhas contributed to Nigeria’s socio-economic development. Since outcomesare the results of many actors’ efforts, the analysis does not seek to isolate UNDP’s contributions from those of other partners as such,but rather to establish a credible or plausible link between perceived or reported development outcomes and UNDP support.

Given the political changes that have occurred in Nigeria since 1997 andthe time that it will inevitably take for them to have a significant impact on development outcomes, CCF-1 might be considered as a transitional programming period. By 2002, many of UNDP’s projects had only been in operation for about three years and, in some cases, they are only just gathering momentum. (See Table 2.) This country evaluation is therefore essentially a ‘snapshot’ of ‘work in progress’ and the

4


Assessment of UNDP’s contribution todevelopmentresults

Pho

to:G

alb

e.co

m

conclusions reached should be understoodaccordingly.

Figure 6 provides the budget summary for Nigeriaby goals and strategic areas of support (SAS).Table 2 gives Financial Status by TRAC 1997-2002 in terms of expenditure, implementationrate and peak budgets. The rate drops to lowsof 45% and 40% in 1998 and 1999 but peaksat 114% in 2002.

KEY DEVELOPMENTRESULTS ACHIEVED

GOVERNANCE The focus of UNDP’s governance support atthe start of the CCF-1 was on strengthening

development planning and management tools.The most concrete results derived from the sub-programme Decentralisation and CapacityBuilding for Development Planning andImproved Record Keeping and Statistics.Training programmes were organised for statistics officers at the state and local level, andthere is a broad consensus that local capacityfor accurate data collection, collation, processingand analysis has been strengthened. Relativelyreliable statistical yearbooks have been publishedfor the years 1998 to 2001. A SustainableHuman Development (SHD) Data Bank hasbeen established for the 774 local governmentauthorities, which provides data on SHDindicators such as maternal and infant mortality,environmental sanitation, access to safe drinkingwater and school enrolment.Training workshopson monitoring and evaluation were also designedin some states to assist the development process.Nigerian statistics still remain weak, but it maybe assumed that, over time, this improvementin statistics will have a positive impact ondevelopment planning.

After the transition to democracy in 1999, thenew government asked UNDP to play a much


F I G U R E 6 : B U D G E T S U M M A R Y F O R N I G E R I A B Y S A S ( I N M I L L I O N S O F U S $ )

35,000,000

30,000,000

25,000,000

20,000,000

15,000,000

10,000,000

5,000,000

0

Val

ue

of

pro

ject

s in

SA

S

1.1

.1 (M

anag

e g

lob

.)

1.1

.2 (P

olic

y d

ialo

gu

e)

1.2

.1 (I

nst

.Cap

acit

y)

1.2

.2 (E

lect

ora

l cap

.)

1.3

.1 (

Soci

al c

oh

esio

n)

1.3

.2 (D

ecen

t)

1.3

.3 (C

ap.L

oca

l au

th)

1.4

.1 (C

ivil

serv

ice)

1.4

.2 (F

in.m

gm

nt)

2.1

.1 (P

ove

rty

red

.str

at)

2.1

.2 (M

on

ito

rin

g p

ov)

2.1

.3 (H

IV/A

IDS)

2.2

.1 (A

cces

s as

sets

)

2.2

.2 (S

oci

al s

ervi

ces)

2.2

.3 (I

CT

)

3.1

.1 (E

nv.

sus.

vev.

)

3.1

.2 (E

nv.

mg

mn

t)

3.1

.3 (M

on

ito

rin

g e

nv.

)

3.2

.2 (G

lob

al c

on

v))

4.2

.1 (A

dva

nce

wo

men

)

5.1

.3 (S

up

po

rt U

N)

5.2

.2 (C

ap.B

uild

ing

)

Oth

er

TA B L E 2 . F I N A N C I A L S TAT U S – T R A C 1 . 1 . 1 A N D 1 . 1 . 2( 1 9 9 7 - 2 0 0 2 )

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Expenditure 30,940 12,745 3,594 5,901 7,987 12,421

Implementation rate 98% 45% 40% 77% 85% 114%

Peak budgets 31,727 28,322 8,984 7,663 9,397 10,896

more active role in the area of governance andUNDP’s initiatives moved to upstream policysupport. Nigeria’s transition to democracycoincided with the adoption of RBMthroughout UNDP and its governance portfolio in the country was refocusedtowards the following outcomes:n National policies address more effectively

the social impact of economic liberalisation;n Increased use by decision-makers of

sustainable human development conceptsin policy formulation;

n Increased effectiveness of parliament toperform its legislative and oversight functions;

n Improved conformity of the legal andelectoral framework with internationalstandards;

n Financial and human resources mobilisedand allocated in support of decentralisationand local governance in rural and urbanareas. (See the Strategic Results Frameworkin Annexes 5-6.)

The initiatives were, however, launched in anessentially ad hoc manner on the basis ofurgent requests from government and reflectthe fragmented government institutionalframework in which UNDP operated.Notwithstanding this, a number of significantinitiatives were launched which confirm that,in this area,UNDP was flexible enough andready to take up new challenges.

Most significant was UNDP’s assistance tothe National Planning Commission (NPC) inthe preparation of the framework documententitled National Programme on Governance(NPG) for SHD which was approved inAugust 2000. The National Programme onGovernance for SHD provides an importantframework for government interventions,but it has not yet produced a very systematicapproach to supporting governance initiativesin the country. Nevertheless, the process ofpreparing the programme was undoubtedly animportant form of consensus building amongkey national stakeholders about the importanceof promoting good governance initiatives.

The National Planning Commission coordinatesthe National Programme on Governance and

UNDP has provided a Senior Adviser onGovernance to the NPC to support its activities. The federal government showed adegree of political will for supporting theNPC by committing $4 million to it from the2001 federal budget, but the funds had notbeen disbursed as of March 2003 and theNPC has not shown itself able to play thecoordinating role that was expected of it.There is some question whether the NPC shouldbe moved to a more politically powerful bodysuch as the Vice-President’s Office.

The NPG is comprised of ten sub-programmesand UNDP has provided support under severalof them including in particular the following two.

(i) Promoting transparency, accountabilityand integrity in the public and privatesectors. Under a project for capacity buildingfor the National Assembly, UNDP assistedin the organisation of workshops ontransparency and accountability for allelected political officers. A similar work-shop has been held at the level of LagosState. UNDP also supported the creationof the Independent Corrupt PracticesCommission (ICPC) with funding forcapacity building, and especially computers.

(ii) Support to civil society, political partiesand business communities for civiceducation, political participation andconflict management. UNDP supportedthe Transition Monitoring Group inobserving the 1999 elections and hasbeen working with the United NationsElectoral Assistance Division (UNEAD)to sensitise the public on voter education.Together with other donors (DFID,JICA and the EU) UNDP has also contributed to capacity building at theIndependent National Electoral Commission(INEC), especially in the area of publiceducation. Under the 2003-2007 governanceprogrammes, officials at the federal andstate level will be trained to develop manualsfor voter education.

Regarding conflict management, UNDP hasbeen collaborating with NORAD to support

A S S E S S M E N T O F U N D P ’ S C O N T R I B U T I O N T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U LT S 3 9

the newly established Institute for Peace andConflict Resolution. It has also organisedtraining workshops on conflict prevention inthe Niger Delta region, and for traditionalleaders from the oil producing communities.The overall goal is to promote the culture ofdialogue among youths to curb violence,including during elections.

One other UNDP initiative that is not specifically related to the National Programmeon Governance should be added at this point.Together with the Soros Foundation and Africare,UNDP has assisted in the establishment of anIndependent Policy Group, a body of expertsto provide direct advice to the President.The IPG undertakes studies on key policyissues, especially where there is concern thatongoing initiatives are not being adequatelycoordinated. It also organises forums to bringtogether policy makers and academics, such asthe Consultative Forum on Harmonisation ofPoverty Agencies, Policies and Mechanismsin Nigeria which took place in Abuja inMarch 2003.

There is evidence to suggest that theIndependent Policy Group may not be sufficiently institutionalised to have concreteresults. It is difficult to make a substantivejudgment on an institution which is mainlyconcerned with providing ad hoc advice to the Office of the President. However, it isimportant to recognise that the current IPGarrangement may be diverting attention fromthe lack of a permanent mechanism to supportcabinet decision-making and to formulatepolicy and assess or monitor its impact.

UNDP has contributed to several importantgovernance initiatives in Nigeria since 1999.As far as the achievement of outcomes is concerned, support to the consolidation ofdemocracy will take a much longer time thanone or two cycles of UNDP assistance.Sustained partnerships and advocacy will berequired to achieve the intended outcomes, andlong-term sustainability. Although initiativesto stem corruption can only bear fruit where

there is a strong political will, UNDP’s initialsupport is clearly in the right direction. It maybe questioned whether the best entry points havebeen found but this should be monitored closelyon the ground and modified as appropriate.Civic education initiatives and support forelectoral reform are also highly necessary for establishing democracy, and UNDP hascontributed to launching what should be along-term initiative in these areas.

In terms of policy environment, ownership andcapacity building, the following observations canbe made about UNDP’s governance programme.

The transition to democracy has undoubtedlyimproved the enabling policy environment.This has made possible a whole range of initiatives for bringing Nigerians into thepolitical and decision-making process thatwould not have been conceivable in 1997when the CCF-1 was drafted and approved.

Ownership in governance programmes requirespolitical will to make the programmes work.This has not always been in evidence, as forexample in assigning the National GovernanceProgramme to the National PlanningCommission, which seems to lack the capacity and the political backing needed forit to play the role expected of it. This hasundoubtedly weakened the effectiveness ofUNDP support, and the institutional status of UNDP’s inputs may need to be reviewedduring the 2003-2007 CCF if the intendedoutcomes are to be realised.

With perhaps one exception, all the governanceprojects have capacity building componentsand seem to make a contribution in this area.The exception is the Independent Policy Groupwhich is more of a facilitator than an institutionand its role and UNDP’s contribution shouldalso be reviewed during the next cycle. Therecent elections provide a positive directionfor the country and for UNDP’s support in the governance area. There is clearly a window of opportunity for improving the policy environment further as Nigeria seeks toconsolidate its young democracy.


POVERTY REDUCTION

Poverty alleviation programmes require a cleardefinition of poverty in order to determine thetype of anti-poverty activities to be undertakenand to provide a basis for programme evaluation.8

The first CCF did not seem to have a cleardefinition of poverty and its approach wasessentially pragmatic. UNDP approached theissue of poverty alleviation from four angles:(a) policy and strategy formulation and governance, (b) job creation in the smallenterprise and informal sectors, (c) delivery ofsocial services, especially health and education,and (d) agriculture and rural development. Undernational poverty frameworks or strategies, UNDPaimed to achieve the following outcomes:n National anti-poverty strategy/plan/pro-

gramme developed through a participatoryprocess involving, in particular, the poorthemselves; and

n Institutional capacity built to plan andimplement multi-sectoral strategies tolimit the HIV/AIDS and mitigate itssocial and economic impact.

Conclusions regarding overall programmeperformance and development outcomes haveto be viewed in terms of the realities obtainingin the operational environment. Before 1999,even the best-managed donor programme wouldhave had difficulty in achieving significantand concrete results.

UNDP created a vast geographical spread ofgrassroots projects which have undoubtedlybenefited a small number of the poorest of the poor. However, their impact is essentially limited given the fact that 70 percent ofNigerians live below the poverty threshold.Without links to macro policy frameworks,these interventions on their own do not havethe critical mass to create momentum fordevelopment. There are clearly problems ofownership, scaling up, replication and exitstrategies.The lack of a government overarching

framework and a coordinated machinery forpoverty reduction in Nigeria have substantiallyundermined the effectiveness and potentialcontribution of UNDP to poverty reduction,an issue that will need to be squarely addressedin the upcoming cycle if the organization’ssupport is to be strategic and results driven.

Job Creation and Sustainable Livelihoods During the 1980s, employment rates declineddue to structural adjustment type programmesand economic liberalisation. Almost one fifthof the labour force is unemployed and onlythree percent of graduates can expect to findjobs in the formal sector of the economy, whichis dominated by public service employment.At the same time, trade liberalisation has led toa dramatic contraction in the organized privatesector, worsened by Nigeria’s continued failureto attract foreign direct investment (FDI) outside the oil sector. During the second CCFperiod and especially after 1999, the federal andstate political leadership became increasinglyconcerned about the linkage between youthunemployment and growing civil unrest (ashas already happened in the Delta and someparts of the north) and put increasing emphasison promoting sustainable livelihoods, especiallythrough skills promotion and micro-credit.The main practical thrust of UNDP supportin this area is therefore to tackle growingpoverty related to youth unemployment andother disadvantaged groups, such as women,through skills development centres, micro-credit schemes, and the provision of basicsocial services.

The objectives of the job creation and sustainablelivelihoods programme as outlined in theCCF document are: "To promote a market-oriented economy, open trade and investmentopportunities". The relevant SRF outcomesunder the rubric of access to assets are:n Increased access of the poor to finance

(formal, informal and micro); and


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8. There are many ways to approach the problem of poverty and many different definitions of poverty in the literature. For example, Amatya Sen in"Development as Freedom", p. 87, suggests that the emphasis should be on the aspects of poverty, such as ‘capability deprivations’, that areintrinsically significant rather than on those, such as low income, which are only instrumentally significant.These may also be termed ‘humanpoverty’and ‘income poverty’.A similar idea is captured in a more general way in UNDP’s Human Development Index which is based on the ideathat poverty cannot simply be measured in terms of GDP per capita and must include such human aspects as literacy and life expectancy.

n Increased capacity of the poor to sustaintheir livelihoods.

UNDP has supported the creation of SkillsDevelopment Centres (SDCs) in all 36states and the Federal Capital Territory ofAbuja. Depending on their capacity and onlocal needs, the SDCs provide training inareas ranging from motor mechanics, air-conditioning and electronic data processing to shoemaking and sewing.

Findings of the evaluation indicate that someof the SDCs in states such as Lagos, Akwa Ibomand the FCT seem to be working effectively,but in other cases, such as those in Nassarawaand Kano, they seem to have had little impact.Reasons for success include a strong localsense of ownership and political will as well asgood management. In some cases, such as AkwaIbom where the centres have an institutionalhome and are closely associated with localgovernment authorities, efforts are beingmade to replicate the projects outside theoriginal target communities.

In parallel with UNDCF’s MicrostartProgramme, UNDP has also promotedmicro-credit schemes for people withoutassets or collateral. The micro-credit schemesaim to complement the banking sector (whoseservices are generally not available to thepoor) and fill an important gap in the promotion of small and micro enterprises.During the period under review, UNDP hasprovided training to forty micro-finance institutions and micro-finance support to 350communities in the 36 states and the FCT.

At the policy level, UNDP/UNCDF’s advocacyand policy work have born fruit in the decisionby the Central Bank to develop guidelines fora National Micro-Finance Policy. In addition,it should be noted that the Micro-StartAdvisory Board includes representatives fromthe Central Bank, NAPEP and the NationalPlanning Commission. This board is provingto be an effective facilitator of policy linkagesand it is hoped that under the upcomingcycle, NAPEP will use the micro-credit

programme as a vehicle for programming partof its funds and that lessons learned couldinfluence its other programmes.

There are shortcomings in UNDP’s micro-credit interventions, including the smallnessof the micro-credit loans and the cumber-someness of the repayment procedures.Most communities felt that a two-monthrepayment period is far too short. There isalso concern among other donors involvedin micro-credit about the use of interest rates

below the market rates in UNDP micro-credit projects, as this is likely to underminethe potential for sustainability.

In several states, there is concern about theweakness of the linkage between the skillsdevelopment centres and the micro-creditinstitutions. Graduates of the centres needcredit to buy tools so that they can becomeemployed and productive. Some efforts havebeen made to bridge this gap. For example, inNassarawa State, under their Guidelines forEffective Operation of Basic Skills DevelopmentCentres, graduates are provided with a certificatethat can be used for applying for an equipmentloan. In other places, the SDCs or their sponsorsprovide graduating trainees with a modest amountof capital equipment (e.g. sewing machines) sothat they can start their own businesses.

The question, however, must also be askedwhy UNDP has involved itself in the directmanagement of micro-credit projects whenUNCDF, which is a specialised technicalpartner in this area with a presence in Nigeria, could have managed the whole sub-programme. There is also a question ofcost-effectiveness. UNDP’s overheads are relatively high compared with those of NGOsor CBOs, and these organizations can alsoensure closer supervision, especially as they(unlike UNDP) frequently have sub-offices atthe level of state capitals.

The evaluation team is of the opinion thatmicro projects such as SDCs can be of very limited impact in tackling poverty andunemployment, particularly, in the absence of


clear linkages between them and comprehensivemacro level policy frameworks and strategies.Given the size of Nigeria’s population, presentunemployment problems, and the small numbersthat can be reached by SDCs, even the mostsuccessful UNDP supported skills developmentand micro-credit projects can make only amarginal impact on the wider unemploymentproblems of each state.

Social Development Programme The objectives of the Social DevelopmentProgramme were to support the government’spromotion of capacity building in the sectorsof health and functional education. In thehealth sector, the programme sought synergieswith other donors to strengthen the primaryhealth care system, especially in its coverage ofthe poor, women and children, through theestablishment of village health schemes for waterand sanitation, nutrition, the eradication ofguinea worm and the treatment of diarrhoeain selected communities. The programme alsoincludes prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and vocational centres for the disabled.

As of the end of CCF-1, some 750 IntegratedCommunity Development Projects had beenestablished with the aim of bringing basicsocial services to deprived communities.These services included construction or repairof 1250 water points and 850 demonstrationsanitation facilities, renovation and equipmentof 120 health facilities, and training of 2,500village health workers and 1,500 traditionalhealth attendants. In addition, 2574 basicfunctional literacy classes have been organised.Working with the government’s UniversalBasic Education programme, which aims toraise adult functional literacy from the currentlevel of 60 percent to 90 percent by 2010,UNDP has focused on non-formal and adultfunctional education targeted at girls, women,farmers and informal sector operators. Theprogramme also has a component for theempowerment of women through advocacyand strengthening women’s institutions toensure the greater participation of women inthe development process. In addition, 160 publichealth education stands have been established

to provide information on HIV/AIDS andharmful traditional practices against women.

The UNDP Country Office reports that 6.46million people in 29 states are impacted by theseprojects, but it is unclear whether this numberrefers to all the people in the communitiesserved or indicates those whose well-being hasactually been affected by project investmentsor activities.

The ICDP projects are undoubtedly widelyappreciated as they typically target the verypoor at the community or village level for whomany intervention would be welcome. As withthe SDCs and micro-credit programmes, thedevelopment results achieved (observable onlyat the output levels at this stage), and theirpossible impacts, vary greatly from state to stateand depend on such factors as local ownershipand the level of management both by the localauthorities and UNDP.

Overall, the answer as to whether UNDP’s ICDPinterventions are contributing meaningfullyto poverty reduction is mixed, especially whenit comes to the extent of actual developmentoutcomes.The ICDP community-based projectsare an eclectic mix of micro projects that generate high transaction costs and benefit arelatively small number of people, albeit inmany communities. To have significant andwider impact, the activities would have to besubstantially scaled-up through replication at thestate level and around the country and throughinfluence on state and federal governmentpolicies. These are the challenges ahead ifUNDP’s contributions through ICDP are totranslate into sustainable long-term impacts.

On the policy front, UNDP has made significantcontributions in terms of awareness buildingand broadening of policy dialogue throughadvocacy work in connection with theNational Human Development Reports(1996, 1998, 2000/2001), the “People’s Visionof Development – 2010”, and the NationalPartnership Forum (NPF) and HumanDevelopment Network (HDN). The NPFand HDN have initiated a forum for dialogue


which brings together government, the privatesector and civil society organizations. A majorinnovation has been corporate responsibilityinitiatives with Shell and Chevron around issuesof conflict resolution, peace building andresource mobilisation for community-basedpoverty reduction programmes in the affectedstates. UNDP water and sanitation projectsprovided basic information and experience forthe 1998 National Water and Sanitation Policy.The policy is evidence of strategic partnershipbetween government on one hand and theUNDP and UNICEF on the other. Similarly,the vocational rehabilitation for disabled persons in four states influenced the 2002 draftNational Policy on Social Development.UNDP upstream advocacy and its support forthe Mass Literacy Programme led to theinclusion of non-formal education in the 2001Universal Basic Education Programme.UNDP’s health education programmes havealso contributed to the Action Committee onAIDS Council (NACA) and the formulationof the national HIV/AIDS strategic plan.

Since 1999, the poverty programmes have seenincreasing political support as the democraticgovernment struggles to increase its legitimacyby improving the well-being of the population,and to reduce community violence. The policyenvironment, therefore, seems to be relativelyfavourable at the federal level and in at leastsome of the states.

However, the programmes seem to have beendeveloped in an ad hoc manner, without acarefully thought out policy or strategy concerning the substantive or geographiclinkages between projects. In addition, theevaluation team found that there was a senseof dependency in a number of states.Stakeholders (even in large relatively well-endowed states such as Lagos) did not seem toenvisage the possibility of UNDP’s withdrawaland had no contingency plans or concernsabout the project’s sustainability withoutUNDP. One exception is Akwa Ibom Statewhere the state authorities had started to programme with their own budgeted resourcesin anticipation of a possible reduction in

UNDP inputs. Dependency on UNDP hasserious implications for the effectiveness and sustainability of the poverty reductionprogrammes and raises questions about thelevel of state and community ownership and of the principle of partnership with UNDP.

Sustainable Agriculture and Environment UNDP’s work on rural development, sustainableagriculture and environmental protection isclosely linked with its support for poverty reduction. Agriculture remains the mainstayof at least 65-70% of the Nigerian population.The combination of population growth, povertyand the expansion of traditional agriculturalpractices into ecosystems where they are inappropriate is causing serious problems ofenvironmental degradation in virtually allparts of the country. In addition, there is aserious environmental crisis brought on by oilexploitation in the Niger Delta region.

The objective of the Sustainable Agriculture,Environment and Development (SAERD)programme is to increase agricultural productivity and food security, and the statedSRF outcomes are "access to assets" through:n Increased access of the poor to micro-

finance; andn Increased capacity of the poor to sustain

their livelihoods.

UNDP’s strategy focused on: (a) agriculturalproductivity improvement for the small farmerto enhance food security; (b) labour-basedinfrastructure to support government effortsto improve rural roads and the rural transportsystem for the benefit of the agricultural sector,(c) increasing women’s access to land, creditand other facilities, and (d) land/environmentmanagement aimed at instituting projects forsoil conservation.

UNDP’s support to the environment has beensubsumed under the SAERD programme.The stated goal is "to support Governmentefforts in land and environmental managementin 8-15 communities per state". The SRF outcomes, under the rubric of Environment and


Energy for Livelihoods and Instruments forEnvironmentally Sustainable Management are:n increased budget resources for natural

resource management;n improved national capacity to monitor

environmental conditions and assess policy performance; and

n integration of global environmental concernsinto national development policy.

Gender MainstreamingUNDP treats gender as a crosscutting issueand puts the emphasis on mainstreaminggender concerns. The intended SRF outcomefor the country cooperation frameworksregarding implementation of gender-relatedglobal commitments is for an action plan forthe advancement of women to be adopted bythe government and civil society, according totime bound goals. The Social DevelopmentProgramme included "the empowerment ofwomen" as one of its goals, and the SAERDprogramme aimed to increase access of womento agricultural land and credit.The second CCFgoals include a requirement that: "Genderissues will be mainstreamed so that at least50% of target beneficiaries will be women".

With the approval of a Gender PolicyFramework for Nigeria in 2001 and with the passing of legislation concerning HarmfulPractices against Women in a number of states,Nigeria is making considerable progress inproviding a positive policy and regulatoryframework for gender issues. However,improving the lot of women in practice isgreatly complicated by the cultural and religious diversity of the country and by theconsiderable political autonomy of states andlocal government authorities. Traditional andmodern cultural values and instruments ofgovernance continue to exist side by side and there is constantly the risk that fear ofchange will reinforce traditional values andpractices and undermine progress that hasalready been achieved.

Through advocacy, UNDP has been able tomake UN norms and global compacts betterknown, and at the policy level it contributed

to the drafting of the Gender PolicyFramework. In addition, under the Governanceprogramme the National Office of Statisticshas incorporated gender into data collectionand analysis. At the same time, a national databank has been created at the National Centrefor Women in Development. At the level ofthe 774 local government authorities, the HumanDevelopment Data Banks collect statistics onmaternal and infant mortality and other genderspecific areas.

Country Programme activities that are nowyielding results in terms of SRF outcomesinclude: inputs into the development of aNational Policy on Women; capacity buildingfor advocacy through grants to NGOs supportingwomen’s participation in international confer-ences and women’s education; and support toincome generation activities for women in 55local government authorities. The Ministry ofWomen in Development works with NAPEPwith regard to skills development centres. It alsosupports the National Council on Women’sAffairs, and wants each Ministry to have agender desk. The recently drafted Action Planis now with ministries for comment butimplementation will be the main challenge.Differences in cultural, religious and otherpractices regarding women across the countryalso pose a fundamental challenge.

Perhaps one of UNDP’s most significant contributions has been advocacy againstharmful practices to women, which has contributed to a number of legislative changes.Despite cultural difference amongst states, inthe area of female genital mutilation (FGM),the following has been achieved: (a) passageof a federal bill on FGM; (b) passage of FGMrelated legislation and legislative changes inEnugu and Edo States; (c) prohibition ofearly marriage in Kebbi and Niger States;(d) legislation against withdrawal of girls fromschool (Kano, Borno Gombe and BauchiStates); (e) laws against trafficking in womenand children (Edo and Zamfara States) and abill before the Lower House of the NationalAssembly; (f ) various state laws on sexual abuse and prostitution; (g) safe houses for victims of


domestic and sexual violence in three states andthe FCT; and (h) censorship of pornographicand violent films.

As a crosscutting theme, gender is a matter forpartnership across the entire UN system. Thegovernment recognises that the UN system hasa unique role to play in this area, particularlyby providing advocacy for global norms andpractices, but the challenge is how to "domes-ticate" global norms in ways that are sensitiveto local cultural and religious traditions. Whileit is too early to expect full implementation ofglobal agreements, there have been encouragingsteps, and a long-range approach to gendermainstreaming will be necessary.

CONCLUSIONS ON UNDP’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

Given its size and relatively complex adminis-trative structures, Nigeria is not a place whereone can expect "quick results." Nevertheless,the evaluation team’s conclusion is that, whilethe picture is mixed, there have been someimportant contributions during the period of 1997-2003 and that UNDP support has definitely made a difference in Nigeria.

Notable contributions include the awarenessraising and policy dialogue engendered throughadvocacy using the NHDR series (1996, 1998,2000/2001), the Vision 2010 process and theNational Partnership Forum and HumanDevelopment Fund. UNDP’s contributions tolegislation barring harmful practices againstwomen and towards establishing the regulatoryframework for micro-credit are also importantcontributions in the policy arena. In the governance area, UNDP is also starting toprovide capacity building for institutions thatdrive the development agenda.

With regard to poverty, UNDP’s interventionsupstream have been much less significant.

Regarding UNDP’s organizational effectiveness,a majority of respondents and stakeholderspointed out constraints and challenges thatwill need to be addressed if UNDP is to playits role in line with its comparative advantage.Key among the constraints and challengesmost respondents cited were the following:n relatively high staff turn-over at senior

management levels;n UNDP’s continued location in Lagos and

failure to move to Abuja at a time whenmost key partners, including a number ofUN agencies, have already moved;

n "too much bureaucracy" and apparentconcern with processes rather than substanceand content;

n poor internalisation of RBM planningand monitoring tools such as the SRF/ROAR and managing for develop-ment results;

n lack of synergy and interface among and within the four thematic areas ofconcentration that seem to function asseparate discrete clusters of projects ratherthan as strategic conceptual frameworksaround core development outcomes;

n too frequent changes in corporate mandatesand directions, a factor that works against anoutcome focus, especially with programmesspread so thin throughout the country;

n risk of over-commitment and over-extension in a climate of decliningresources and possible failure to matchUNDP’s evident high visibility with concomitant concrete durable results and development effectiveness.

Conclusions regarding overall programmeperformance and development outcomes,nonetheless, have to be counterbalanced againstthe realities obtaining in the operational envi-ronment. Before 1999, even the best-manageddonor programme would have had difficultyin achieving significant and concrete results.With the restoration of democracy, UNDPmoved flexibly, although in an ad hoc andunsystematic way, to support new governmentinitiatives at the policy level in the governancearea and this augurs well for the future.


The evaluation has aimed to highlight UNDP’s contributions and successesin Nigeria during the past six years and to draw attention to some of thechallenges the organization will need to address to enhance its developmenteffectiveness. Overall, if UNDP takes due account of past experience, itwill be well positioned to support Nigeria’s democratic consolidation andcontribute significantly to the country’s development. This final chapterprovides some pointers on how UNDP could enhance its strategic positioningand bring real added value to its role in Nigeria in the future.

LESSONS LEARNED AND EMERGING ISSUES

n Political will and an enabling policy environment are crucial forachieving results. With hindsight it is possible to see areas where UNDPmight have made a more effective contribution through advocacy orpolicy advice. However, it is also important to take into account the

5


Conclusion:Lessons,recommendationsand future directions

Pho

to:G

alb

e.co

m

fact that there was a lack of an overarchingpoverty reduction and macro-economicpolicy framework in Nigeria, and that theFGN policy influence over the states isrelatively weak. It is the view of the evaluation team that, even if UNDP hadintervened more strongly in upstreampolicy support, it is unlikely that it wouldhave been able to have a greater impact,given the reality of federal-state relations.

n Partnerships for resource mobilisationand delivery are critical for achievingdevelopment results, but partnershipsneed not be only about resource mobili-sation. Partnerships can also promoteUNDP’s core mandate messages onhuman rights and human development.Resource mobilisation is not always compatible with coherent programmingand effective delivery. UNDP’s experiencein Nigeria has shown that resourcemobilisation and delivery of UNDPresources within a given timeframe maynot always be compatible with ‘making a difference’. Pressures from UNDPHeadquarters to accelerate resourcemobilisation to justify the high levels oftransaction costs relative to the size of the programme can inadvertently lead to compromising of UNDP’s goals.Resources mobilised usually have some‘strings attached’ and each case should betaken on its merits, and UNDP mustensure that its programmes are not distorted by the need to obtain cost-sharing resources.

n Micro level support should be catalyticand linked to broader policy goals andshould establish clear exit and replicationstrategies in order to minimise the‘dependency syndrome’ and engenderownership and sustainability. Directdelivery of resources, and too strong apresence by UNDP in grassroots levelprojects without the requisite local commitment and clear strategies for scaling up, replication or exiting, can reduceownership and create the impression that

UNDP is a substitute for government. IfUNDP is to work successfully at down-stream levels, projects and programmesneed clear exit strategies and direct linksto broader policy goals that can generatelong-term sustainable results. Whenthere is a formulaic approach (e.g. thatUNDP must support projects in all 36states, as was the case under the CCF-1cycle), programme flexibility will bereduced and there will be uneven levels ofquality and impact. It should, however, benoted that it takes longer to produceresults upstream at the policy level than atthe downstream level and thus modificationis required in the outcomes definitions ofthe SRF to reflect this reality. Externalagencies tend to find it easier to intervenedirectly than to stand on the sidelineswith advice and encouragement. Thisapproach, however, is more suited toachieving outputs than outcomes and is amajor reason why so many projects failonce the donor has withdrawn. This hascertainly been the case with UNDPdownstream projects where issues ofownership, scaling up, replication and exit strategies do not seem to have beensufficiently incorporated at the designstage of the programmes. This has contributed to the phenomenon of ‘micro-successes’ in a sea of ‘macro-failure’, whichcan justifiably be said of many of UNDPgrassroots poverty reduction projects inNigeria, especially as they are not linkedto any macro-level policy framework ateither the state or federal level.

n Learning and internalisation of newRBM concepts and innovations takestime, and frequent changes at the corporate level can undermine theprocess. Since 1999, UNDP has developedmany concepts and corporate RBM toolsand procedures (SRF/ROAR), with theresult that Country Office staff seemoverwhelmed by the changes and oftendo not have the time to fully internalisethem, let alone put them into practice. Inthe case of Nigeria, this is evidenced, for


example, by a lack of synergy and inter-face among the four thematic areas ofconcentration of CCF-1, which seem tofunction as separate discrete clusters ofprojects rather than strategic conceptualframeworks around core developmentoutcomes. In addition to new conceptsand procedures, the approach taken byUNDP Headquarters towards theCountry Office has not always been consistent — oscillating from little attentionin "normal" times to concern in times ofpolitical crisis or low delivery. The lasttwo are, of course, not un-connected.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the high transaction costs and risk ofdispersal involved in grassroots support, theADR team recommends narrowing UNDP’sfocus and adopting a judicious mix of microand macro-level interventions that draw onthe organization’s comparative advantage. Todo this effectively, UNDP will need to identifygood practices and seek local partners to scaleup and consolidate the positive outcomes ofits most successful pilots. UNDP has been aresponsive and trusted partner and its futurechallenge is to leverage the lessons learnedfrom its projects, and its organizational assets, to influence policy and agenda settingat the federal and state level. Specific recommendations based on the findings,and emerging lessons, are as follows:

n UNDP’s role should be catalytic and nota substitute for government or localefforts. Due to Nigeria’s size and oil wealth,the total level of donor contributions tothe country is insignificant in relation toGDP, and the level of donor influenceover government policy is commensuratelysmall. In this context, if UNDP is tomake a difference, this must derive fromthe level of trust accorded to it by thegovernment and from the optimalexploitation of its comparative advantage.UNDP’s focus should therefore be on the"big picture", outcome driven, and geared

towards leveraging the organization’sunique comparative advantage to influencepositive policy changes and make a differenceat both the macro and micro level. Inchoosing areas for intervention, UNDPshould pay particular attention to twofactors: (i) the level of political will on thenational side and (ii) UNDP’s comparativeadvantage, including in relation to otherdonors. UNDP should therefore seek to strengthen its advocacy and policy support for poverty reduction and humandevelopment in Nigeria, and concentrateon strengthening the enabling policyenvironment to address the high levels of poverty in the country. NHDRs should be complemented by the launch ofState Human Development Reports tobroaden and deepen national dialogue onpoverty reduction and the MillenniumDevelopment Goals.

n Narrow geographical spread, winnowout ongoing activities and sharpen substantive focus. UNDP should narrowits focus and geographical spread andsharpen the substantive elements of itssupport. The ADR team fully supportsthe 2003-2007 CCF thematic focus ongovernance, poverty and HIV/AIDS, butrecommends that UNDP should not aimto support all three focus areas in all 36states and the FCT. Criteria to narrowthe geographical coverage should beapplied to avoid the risk of dispersal andlimited localised impact experienced during the last cycle. For example, supportto combating HIV/AIDS should only beundertaken in the most affected states;governance support should be in statesgenuinely committed to good governance;and poverty reduction would make the most sense in the poorest states with thelowest HDIs. To achieve an appropriatebalance between UNDP's upstream anddownstream interventions, there should besome judicious winnowing out of ongoingactivities at the state level. This should,however, be done on a pragmatic basisand not on the basis of an ‘ideological’

C O N C L U S I O N : L E S S O N S , R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S A N D F U T U R E D I R E C T I O N S 4 9

imperative to move upstream. At thesame time, a greater effort should bemade to ensure that interventions at thestate level are selected in such a way thatthey provide feedback and can influencefederal and state level policy and strategyformulation processes. Emphasis shouldbe on projects which can produce credibleresults and which others will want toemulate or build upon — whilst takingcare to avoid any particular state feelingneglected. The cost-sharing modalityshould be used to mobilise non-coreresources to strengthen UNDP CountryOffice staff as necessary so that it doesnot commit itself to supervision andmonitoring responsibilities for non-corefunded programmes that it cannot effectively carry out.

n Accord priority to states as strategicentry points for upstream policy support.In Nigeria, states enjoy considerable freedomof action in both policy formulation andproject implementation and, given thesize of the population, can have an impacton relatively large numbers of people.Consequently, strategic and macro-levelpolicy interventions by UNDP at thestate level can be as important as those atthe federal level and should be accordedsome priority. UNDP should thereforeidentify successful interventions for replication in other states and pursueupstream policy support at the state level.

n On poverty reduction,strengthen advocacyand policy support role. UNDP needs to strengthen its advocacy and policy support for poverty reduction and humandevelopment in Nigeria. UNDP shouldconcentrate on strengthening the enablingpolicy environment to address the highlevels of poverty in Nigeria. In particular,it should examine critically government’spre-occupation with reaching the poor by

the creation of poverty alleviationfunds/programmes (such as the NationalProgramme for Eradication of Poverty, theNational Directorate for Employment,and the Human Development Fund)rather than trying to mainstream supportfor the poor.9 UNDP should accord highpriority to reviewing the needs of theNational Poverty Eradication Programmeand to intervening strategically in the formulation of a poverty eradication policywhich takes into account the MDGs, therequirements for a PRSP, and NEPAD.As part of its advocacy role, UNDPshould build upon the successes it has hadwith the NHDRs and actively continuethe regular preparation and publication of the National Human DevelopmentReports. To foster links between micro-level support and upstream activities, andengender policy work at the state level,UNDP should also start producing StateHuman Development Reports.

n Deepen and strengthen support to consolidation of democracy. UNDPshould deepen and continue to strengthenits support for the consolidation ofdemocracy, conflict prevention and anti-corruption initiatives. After thirty years of military rule, and in the absence of aconstructive parliamentary culture, supportto the national and state legislatures at alllevels (electors, elected and the executive)should be broadened and deepened.Support should also be directed atstrengthening civil society and the role ofcivic education throughout the country.Post-electoral assistance leading to civiceducation with other partners has beenimportant and UNDP should continue inthis area. In this process, UNDP shouldalso move towards strengthening thecapacity of NGO and CBO networks totake on some of these roles. This wouldhelp to broaden and extend the political


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9. This approach to funding special programmes is symptomatic of underlying budgetary institutional weaknesses as well as lack of overallpolicy coherence — especially the lack of synergy between Presidential initiatives and line ministries. For example, the channelling of vastsums of public finance via NAPEP to the line ministries for poverty related projects undermines any transparent, accountable budget systemin favour of a handout (or, in the words of one of the national consultants, "pork barrel") system. In turn this reflects the total disconnectbetween the largely oil revenue base of public finance and the relative absence of any tax based sources that would elicit more citizen interest.

space to other actors and hopefully consolidate democracy. This supportshould build on the existing NationalGovernance Programme and the ongoinginitiatives of other partners, and focus on strengthening of key governmentinstitutions such as Parliament, theInstitute for Peace and Conflict Resolutionand the Independent Corrupt PracticesCommission. The approach should bewithin a clear conceptual framework andnot pursued on a purely ad hoc basis.Conflict prevention and promoting peaceand stability remain major challenges forNigeria, and UNDP should, therefore,continue to support the government inimproving peace and stability through the IPCR, an important new nationalinstitution which needs to be nurturedand substantially strengthened if it is tofulfil its role effectively. Similarly, supportto the ICPC should be continued, butthis should above all be results-driven andany initiative should be highly sensitive tothe degree of political will behind anti-corruption measures, and be modified asappropriate.To strengthen Nigeria’s nascentdemocracy, UNDP should continue supportto the Independent Policy Group and theNational Planning Commission. Supportto the IPG should focus on advocatingthe institutionalisation of its role as a thinktank rather than as an ad hoc presidentialadvisory body and on giving it greateraccess to UNDP’s global knowledge networks and best practices. With respectto the NPC, UNDP should examine itspolitical support and the potential of this institution to become effective, andtake a decision accordingly. Any review of the NPC’s role should examine its relationship with other key elements in national economic management — thePresidency and Vice Presidency, FederalExecutive, Cabinet, Finance Ministryand Central Bank.

n Build and expand partnerships with theprivate sector, NGOs and CBOs. Withregard to partnerships, resource mobilisation

and operational modalities, UNDP shouldseek to expand opportunities for costsharing, including in collaboration withthe private sector. The cost-sharingmodality is not always consistent withmaximum programme impact but in thecase of Nigeria where domestic resourcesdwarf ODA by a wide margin, governmentand domestic private sector cost sharingcan offer a positive way to expand UNDP’scapacity to promote a human developmentagenda, and this should be activelyencouraged. Generally, links to the privatesector and to civil society (CBOs/NGOs)should be further developed as they constitute an alternative or complementarydelivery modality to government. UNDPshould also develop stronger partnershipswith NGOs and CBOs at the grassrootslevel so that they can more effectivelytake over from UNDP as its support isreduced and progressively withdrawn.Each case, however, should be taken onits merits and UNDP should ensure thatthe validity of its programmes is notdistorted by the need to obtain extrafunds from other sources. With regard tothe partnership with the NPF and the HDF,the execution modalities are similar tothose of UNDP’s grassroots programmesand are likely to suffer from some of thesame weaknesses. The operation of theseprojects needs to be reviewed and, if necessary, corrected in the same way. Thepartnership with Chevron is an importantinitiative and should be evaluated withina year or two of its inception so that lessonsmay be drawn for other possible partnershipswith oil companies.

n Build substantive capacity within theCountry Office. UNDP should buildsubstantive capacity within the CountryOffice to meet the challenges and com-plexities of Nigeria. In contrast to itsposition in a number of other countries,UNDP’s financial support alone is of relatively little importance to Nigeria.Every effort should be made to avoid the frequent changes of Resident


Representative and the long gaps betweenthe assignments of Resident Representativesas this has tended to weaken UNDP’sleadership role during the past decade. Asregards the staffing of the Country Office,with the transition from the GCCCmodality to cost sharing for the operationalprogrammes in the states, cost sharingresources should be used to strengthenthe number of programme (and possiblyadministrative) staff in the Country Office.In order to strengthen its co-ordination roleand leverage its comparative advantage,UNDP should move immediately toAbuja. The absence of UNDP fromAbuja has undoubtedly weakened itsleadership within the UN system andreduced the opportunities for linkagesand partnerships with both governmentand donor partners. This delay is, ofcourse, partly due to the time taken tocomplete the UN House in Abuja but itis recommended that no further time belost in effecting the transfer.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

During the period under review, there is evi-dence to suggest a strong sense of UNDP’spresence and appreciation of its role, especiallyin the areas of advocacy, policy dialogue,convening power and brokerage. NEPAD,MDGs, consolidation of democracy and goodgovernance, and conflict prevention, wheredomestic and external partners may all havedivergent agendas, are areas where UNDPcould bring its comparative advantages to thefore and support government in setting a different human development agenda. Thesecomparative advantages are not so muchabout the size of resources the UNDP canbring to the table but rather about the organization’s neutrality, advocacy, coordina-tion and convening power and its access toglobal knowledge and good practices. Thesespecial attributes, combined with UNDP’s global reach and its long standing experience in advocacy on human development, its

capacity to raise and work on sensitive issues,and the evident good will of the FederalGovernment of Nigeria place it in a good positionto build on past achievements and forge a newstrategic focus where it could have greaterimpact. Looking ahead, it would seem thatUNDP will need to identify good practices, andseek local partners to replicate and consolidatethe outcomes of its most successful pilots.Given the high transaction costs and risk ofdispersal in supporting a large number ofprojects, it is prudent for UNDP to scaledown and adopt a judicious mix of micro andmacro level interventions that draw on itscomparative advantages.Obvious choices involvedeveloping policy frameworks for povertyreduction, and advocacy and coordinationaround the MDGs, NEPAD and governance,especially conflict prevention, themes withinthe core focal areas that the 2003-2007 CCFis targeting.

Nigeria is a large and rich country still searchingfor a way out of its political and economic difficulties. In financial terms, UNDP’s inputsare extremely modest when compared to the sizeof the Nigerian economy, and the organizationwill only make a difference if it uses itsresources strategically. UNDP seems to bewidely respected in Nigeria for what it is andfor its approach to development (althoughthere is some disagreement about the qualityof what it does) and this provides a good basisfor increasing its impact. Given the return ofmost donors to Nigeria following the electionsof 1999, UNDP will need to build upon itsstrengths and the good will by sharply focusingon a few critical things and doing them well.

Owing to UNDP’s credibility with governmentofficials and other leading Nigerians, there isa sympathetic audience for UNDP’s advocacyin different sectors and at different levels, andthis should be pursued. There are also severalentry points at the level of the FGN whereUNDP can help to influence policy andstrengthen the operations of some key federalinstitutions. At the same time it should berecognised that the states are an extremelyimportant component of the Nigerian polity


and UNDP should not ignore opportunitiesto pursue advocacy and policy support at thelevel of the states. In Nigeria, both the privatesector and civil society are relatively weak. It issuggested that some initiatives be taken inthese areas with a possible view to more activecollaboration and partnerships at a later date.

Nigeria has considerable human and naturalresources of its own. However, as the reporthas underlined, it is still possible for UNDPto carve out a niche and work on key humandevelopment issues if it focuses on its comparative advantage and is selective in itschoice of entry points and maintains flexibilityto meet the challenges. A number of opportunities place UNDP at an advantage as it begins the implementation of the 2003-2007 cycle. UNDP has high-level access to

the government at the federal, state and locallevel. It has also been able to mobilise sizeableadditional resources from both the federal andstate governments and the private sector. Thechallenge is to make the most of these assetsand leverage them to influence policy and agendasetting at both the federal and state level and tobring to bear the full weight of its comparativeadvantage. The re-election of the governmentin April 2003 and the launching of the 2003-2007 Country Programme both offer UNDP anopportunity to reassess where it can make a realdifference. UNDP’s ‘development effectiveness’depends as much on the political will of theNigerian government as on UNDP. On theother hand,UNDP’s ‘organizational effectiveness’could be significantly improved and UNDPHeadquarters and the Country Office shouldwork together to ensure that this is done.


Annexes

1. BACKGROUND

The Evaluation Office (EO) of the United Nations Development Programme(UNDP) launched a series of country evaluations, called Assessments ofDevelopment Results (ADRs), in order to capture and demonstrate evaluativeevidence of UNDP’s contributions to development results at the countrylevel. Undertaken in selected countries, the ADRs focus on outcomes andcritically examine achievements and constraints in the UNDP thematicareas of focus, draw lessons learned and provide recommendations for thefuture.The ADRs will also recommend a strategy for enhancing performanceand strategically positioning UNDP support within national developmentpriorities and UNDP corporate policy directions.

The overall objectives of the Assessments of Development Results are:1. Support the Administrator’s substantive accountability function to the

Executive Board and serve as a vehicle for quality assurance of UNDPinterventions at the country level.

2. Generate lessons from experience to inform current and future programming at the country and corporate level.

3. Provide to the stakeholders in the programme country an objectiveassessment of results (specifically outcomes) that have been achieved


ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

Pho

to:G

alb

e.co

m

through UNDP support and partnershipswith other key actors for a given multi-year period.

An Assessment of Development Results isplanned for Nigeria beginning autumn 2002.It will cover the period 1997 to 2002, i.e. the1997-2002 Country Cooperation Framework(CCF). The assessment will as necessary alsocover preceding periods where there is evidencethat support prior to 1997-2002 has served asfoundation for present developments.

2. NATIONAL CONTEXT

With an area of 923,773 sq km and estimatedpopulation of 115 million people and its richendowment of natural resources, Nigeria is acountry of tremendous potential. Successiveand prolonged military rule, spanning acumulative period of 28 years out of Nigeria’s42 years of independence, led to the supplantingof constitutional provisions by military decreesand severe economic stagnation. The return todemocracy on 29 May 1999 ushered in a newera. A new constitution was introduced andefforts have been directed at reduction ofpoverty and the spread of HIV/AIDS and tocombating corruption and curbing the excessesof the past. The present government has alsomaintained existing market reforms andexpectations of the "democracy dividend"remain high. Notwithstanding these positivesignals and its high resource endowment,Nigeria nonetheless confronts many social,economic and political problems, amongwhich are corruption, poverty, high incomedisparities and the formidable challenges thatattend any transition to democracy. Significantly,Nigeria is ranked low on the HumanDevelopment Index.

3. UNDP COOPERATION IN NIGERIA

The first Country Cooperation Framework(CCF) for Nigeria, 1997-2002, was precededby and based on the recommendations of theCountry Strategy Note and the Advisory

Note. Due to the difficult political situationprevailing in the country at the time, theExecutive Board approved the CCF on conditionthat 80% of UNDP’s programme resourceswould be directed at community level. TheExecutive Board directive has therefore influenced the strategic focus and mode ofprogramme delivery and it will be importantto assess not only how Nigeria’s recent politicalpast has affected the operational environmentand influenced UNDP contributions but also howthis mode of programme delivery has influencedoutcomes and results. Four thematic areas ofconcentration were identified, with povertyreduction as the overriding objective:(i) Socio-economic management and policy

support for SHDii) Job creation and sustainable livelihoodsiii) Social Developmentiv) Sustainable agriculture and rural

development

Support activities to the four programmeareas adopted a two-pronged approach. Policysupport was aimed at providing assistance tocreate the enabling environment and buildcapacity for human-centred developmentthrough improved macro-economic strategiesand policy frameworks and instruments.Programme support involved assistance atstate and community levels in the areas of jobcreation and sustainable livelihoods, socialdevelopment, and sustainable agriculture andrural development. Gender and environmentwere considered crosscutting themes.

The second CCF will cover the period 2003-2007. In consonance with the priority themesand cooperation strategy of UNDAF,NAPEP, the IPRSP and the MillenniumDevelopment Goals (MDGs), the new CCFwill focus on three major thematic areas:1) Governance and human rights2) Poverty eradication3) HIV/AIDS

Information and communication technology(ITC) will be a crosscutting theme, whilegender issues will be mainstreamed so that atleast 50 percent of the target beneficiaries will


be women. Annex 1 contains an overview of the Strategic Results Framework (SRF)for UNDP’s programmes in Nigeria and articulates the intended outcomes and resultsfor the poverty, governance, environment andgender themes.

The ADR evaluation will look at the resultsachieved for the period of 1997 to 2002. Theevaluation will also take account of envisagedresults under the 2003-2007 CCF as expressedin the SRF. The evaluation will consider thetotality of the key results and goals in thisperiod, as described in Annex 2, with the mainintended objectives described in the variousplanning instruments of UNDP (UNDAF,CCF,SRF) and the UNDP programme portfolio.

4. OBJECTIVES OF THE ASSESSMENT

The purpose of the evaluation is to review theexperience of UNDP in Nigeria, draw lessonslearned and recommend improvements forstrengthening UNDP’s overall performanceand support to the country. The Assessmentof Development Results in Nigeria will:

n Provide an overall assessment of theresults achieved through UNDP supportand in partnership with other key development actors during 1997-2002with specific in-depth assessments withinpoverty and governance which wereidentified during the exploratory missionundertaken in November. (See In-DepthStudies TORs.) The evaluation shouldalso cover preceding periods in order tobring out the historic presence of UNDPin Nigeria and draw links from currentachievements to early UNDP interventionsprior to 1997 as appropriate. The analysisshould focus on how the results wereachieved, identify the factors that accountedfor success or failure and draw lessons,with particular attention to:a. How UNDP support was used to

leverage the Nigeria reform processin the area of governance;

b. How effective UNDP support was in

contributing to poverty alleviation; andc. The contribution of UNDP support

to policy advice and dialogue, aidcoordination and brokerage in delivering development results.

n Provide an analysis of how UNDP haspositioned itself strategically to bringadded value and responded effectively tonational development needs and priorities,and to changes in the national developmentsituation, with special attention to:a. The entry points and strategy selected

by UNDP in support of the nationaldevelopment agenda, especially withinits areas of focus, especially the over-arching goal of poverty reduction;

b. The key current strategies of theCCF: partnerships for development,moving to upstream policy support,results orientation and intendedentry points within the currentframework; and

c. The nature and level of cooperationwith different development partners.

n Based on the analysis of key achieve-ments and overall findings, draw key lessons and provide clear and forward-looking recommendations in order tosuggest optimal strategies for the UNDPin the future.

5. SCOPE OF THE ASSESSMENT

The evaluation will undertake a comprehensivereview of the UNDP programme portfolioand activities during the period under review,with a more in-depth focus on governanceand poverty. Specifically, the ADR will coverthe following:

a. Strategic Positioning

n Ascertain the strategic focus of UNDPsupport and its relevance to nationaldevelopment priorities, including relevanceand linkages with the overarching goal ofreducing poverty and the Millennium

A N N E X 1 : T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E 5 7

Development Goals (MDGs). This mayinclude an analysis of the perceived comparative strengths of the programmeand a review of the major national challenges to development. The evaluationwill assess UNDP support in relation to thegovernment’s macro-economic and socialdevelopment policies and strategies, theNAPEP and Interim Poverty ReductionStrategy Paper (I-PRSP). The aim is toascertain the added value of UNDP supportin effectively contributing to and influencingnational development through strategicpriority setting and intervening at optimalentry points.

n Assess how UNDP has anticipated andresponded to significant changes in thenational development context within itscore areas of focus. In this regard, theADR may, for example, consider keyevents at the national and political levelthat influence and affect the developmentenvironment; the risk management ofUNDP; any missed opportunities forUNDP involvement and contribution; itsefforts at advocacy and policy advice andUNDP’s responsiveness. The evaluationshould bring out the choices made by UNDPin response to government reforms andexplain the rationale behind these choices.

n Review the synergies and alignment ofUNDP support with other initiatives andpartners, including that of the UnitedNations Development Assistance Frame-work (UNDAF), the Global CooperationFramework (GCF) and the RegionalCooperation Framework (RCF). Thismay include examining how UNDP hasleveraged its resources and that of otherstowards the achievement of results, thebalance between upstream and downstreaminitiatives and the work on MDGs.

n The Evaluation should consider theinfluence of systemic issues, i.e. policyand administrative constraints affectingthe programme, on both the donor and

programme country sides, as well as howthe development results achieved and thepartnerships established have contributed toensuring a relevant and strategic positioningof UNDP support.

b. Development Results

n Provide an examination of the effectivenessand sustainability of the UNDP programme,by: (a) highlighting main achievements(outcomes) at the national level in the lastfive years or so (some results have theirorigin in efforts prior to 1997) andUNDP’s contribution to these in terms ofkey outputs; and (b) ascertaining currentprogress made in achieving outcomes inthe given thematic areas of UNDP’s support. The evaluation should qualifythe UNDP contribution to the outcomeswith a fair degree of plausibility, and consider anticipated and unanticipated,positive and negative outcomes. It shouldalso gauge the contribution to capacitydevelopment at the national level as wellas the degree of national ownership andsustainability of these results.The assessmentwill cover the key results and support inall thematic areas (governance, poverty,environment, gender, HIV/AIDS, ICT,and any other areas as appropriate).

n Identify and analyse the main factorsinfluencing results, including the rangeand quality of development partnerships forged and their contribution to outcomes,the provision of upstream assistance andpolicy advice and partnership strategy andhow the positioning of UNDP influencesthe results.

n Assess the anticipated progress in achievingintended outcomes, against the bench-marks and indicators set out under theSRF Outcomes (see Annex 1) and the1997-2002 CCF objectives and proposedfuture programmes and, where this is relevant, against the MDG targets.


n Provide an in-depth analysis of the twothematic areas, governance and poverty,and identify the key challenges andstrategies for future interventions in eacharea. These two subjects have been selectedbased on notable UNDP involvement inthe past, complexity in terms of inter-linkages and synergies with other areas,and the growing challenges expected in the next stage of the country’s development challenges.

c. Lessons Learned and Good Practices

n Identify key lessons in the thematic areasof focus and on strategic positioning thatcan provide a useful basis for strengtheningUNDP support to the country and forimproving programme performance, resultsand effectiveness in the future. Throughin-depth thematic assessment, identify goodpractices for learning and replication anddraw lessons from intended and unintendedresults where possible.

6. METHODOLOGY

The assessment will employ a variety ofmethodologies including desk reviews, stake-holder meetings, client surveys, focus groupinterviews, and selected site visits. (See Annexfor a range of evaluation techniques.) TheEvaluation Team will review national policydocuments (including the National PovertyEradication Plan, the President’s NationalEconomic Policy (1999-2003), the HIV/AIDS Emergency Action Plan (HEAP), theInterim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,etc.) which give an overall picture of thecountry context. The Team will also considerany thematic studies/papers, selected projectdocuments and Programme Support Documents,reports from monitoring and evaluation at thecountry level, as well as available documentationand studies from other development partners.Statistical data will be assessed where useful.Empirical evidence will be gathered throughthree major sources of information: documented

records, interviewee perceptions, and the validation of and cross-referencing of allsources and the information gathered througha process of ‘triangulation’. (See ADRMethodology Guidelines.)

A wide stakeholder consultation and involvementis envisaged. The Evaluation Team will meetwith Government Ministries/institutions at thecentral and province level, research institutions,civil society organizations, NGOs and privatesector representatives, UN Agencies, BrettonWoods institutions, bilateral donors, and beneficiaries.

The Team will visit field/project sites in arepresentative sample of states and communitiesto ensure a balanced coverage of all the country’sregions as will be decided by the EvaluationTeam and the EO in consultation with thecountry office.

In terms of methodology, the ADR will followthe guidance issued by the Evaluation Office,and consist of preparation (with preliminarydesk review, programme mapping, TOR proposal, exploratory mission to the CountryOffice, theme-specific desk research and localstudies and research); conducting the ADR bythe country evaluation mission; and use of theADR and follow-up (dissemination, corporatediscussions, country office management response,stakeholder consultations, learning events).

Preparatory work at the local level will be carried out in advance to provide substantivebackground for the Evaluation Team. These in-depth studies in poverty and governancewill be conducted by local research institute orcompanies. The Nigerian team will also becharged with conducting select surveys of keypartners through questionnaires. The in-depth study work may entail the review of available reports, collecting additional doc-umentation, conducting select interviews,field visits and analysis and focus group discussions. This work will be based on specific TOR in addendum to these genericterms of reference.

A N N E X 1 : T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E 5 9

7. EXPECTED OUTPUTS

The main expected output is the comprehensivefinal report on "Nigeria Country Evaluation:Assessment of Development Results", includingrelevant annexes with detailed data. In addition, supporting studies in poverty andgovernance will be available.

8. EVALUATION TEAM

The composition of the Evaluation Teamshould reflect the independence and the

substantive results focus of the exercise. TheTeam Leader and all the members of thereview Team will be selected by the UNDPEvaluation Office in consultation with theRegional Bureau for Africa (RBA), UNDP,New York and the Country Office. The TeamLeader must have a demonstrated capacity in strategic thinking and policy advice and inthe evaluation and management of complexprogrammes in the field.The Team compositionshould reflect a good knowledge of the countryand region, excellent experience in evaluationand particular expertise in poverty, governance,environment and gender.


African Development Bank, Country Strategy Report for Nigeria, 2002

Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Profile Nigeria, 2000-2001

European Community, Country Support Strategy and Indicative Programme, 2001 – 2007, Abuja, 2003

Federal Republic of Nigeria: Draft National Policy on Social Development, June 2002.

Federal Government of Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, RuralDevelopment Sector Strategy, Main Report, Oct 2001

Federal Republic of Nigeria, Financial Regulations (rev Jan. 2000), Office of the Head of the CivilService of the Federation, The Presidency.

Federal Republic of Nigeria: Framework for Nigeria’s Economic Growth and Development, 2003-7,THIS DAY, Vol.8, No.2735, October 18, 2002, pp. 49-50

Federal Republic of Nigeria, Guides to Administrative Procedures in the Federal Public Service,Federal Government Press, Lagos, n.d.

Federal Republic of Nigeria, Intensive Training Programme for Federal Civil Servants on SalaryGrade Levels 12-14, Aug.- Dec. 2002, Office of the Head of the Civil Service of theFederation, The Presidency.

Federal Republic of Nigeria, Office of Presidency: Code of Conduct Bureau – Public OfficersHandbook, n.d.

Federal Republic of Nigeria, Position Paper on Women’s Human Rights, Violence against Women,the Media and Information and Communications Technology, presented to 47th Sessionof the UN Commission on the Status of Women, March 2003, New York

Federal Republic of Nigeria, Public Service Rules (rev Jan. 2000), Office of the Head of the CivilService of the Federation, The Presidency

Federal Republic of Nigeria, The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000,University Press Ibadan, n.d.

Government HIV/AIDS Emergency Action Plan.

Human Development Fund for Community Development: PATF Concept Paper, typescript, n.d.

Report on National Partnership Forum (NPF), 2001

Human Rights Watch, The Niger-Delta: No Democratic Dividend, October 2002

IMF Working Paper, Poverty in a Wealthy Economy: The Case of Nigeria, July 2002, Paper No.01, 2000

Independent Policy Group, Consultative Forum on Harmonisation of Poverty Agencies, Policiesand Mechanisms in Nigeria, February 2003

Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Democracy in Nigeria: Continuing Dialogue(s) forNation-building, Lagos, Nigeria, 2000

International Fund for Agricultural Development, Country Strategic Opportunities Paper, 2001

J.I. Elaigwu, African Responses to Good Governance, Peace and Security in the Region: TowardsConfidence Building Measures, paper presented to the Seminar on Practical ConfidenceBuilding Measures: does Good Governance of the Security Sector Matter?, NGOCommittee on Disarmament, Peace and Security, UN New York, October 2002.

A N N E X 2 : R E F E R E N C E S A N D D O C U M E N T S C O N S U LT E D 6 1

ANNEX 2: REFERENCES AND DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

J.I. Elaigwu, Good Governance, Peace and Security, typescript

J.I. Elaigwu, Nigeria: A Rebirth for the Twenty-First Century, Institute of Governance and SocialResearch, Jos, Occasional

Jubilee 2000, Drops of Oil in a Sea of Poverty: The Case for a New Debt Deal for Nigeria

Karl Meier, Nigeria: Critical Condition, The World Today, RIIA, London, Feb. 2003, pp.23-5

Memorandum of Understanding between Chevron Nigeria Ltd and UNDP, November 8, 2002.

National Intelligence Council, The Next Wave of HIV/AIDS: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, India, and China,September 2002

NewsWatch, Feb 23 2003: My Plan for Niger Delta, Onyema Ugochukwu, Chair, Niger DeltaCommission

Nigeria: Government of Akwa Ibom State, Life Enhancement Agency (flyer)

Nigeria: Government of Nassarawa State, Guidelines for Effective Operation of Basic SkillsDevelopment Centres, Lafia Basic Skills Development Centre.

Nigeria: Kano State Government, FGN/UNDP assisted development programme, compendiumof activities carried our 1998-2002, typescript, n.d.

Nigeria: Kano State, Joint Partnership between UNDP and Kano State on VVF Repair andRehabilitation, typescript, n.d.

Nigeria: Report on the Second Lagos State Economic Summit, August 2001

Nigeria: IPCR, Strategic Conflict Assessment: Nigeria’s South-South Zone, typescript, n.d.

OECD/DAC, Nigeria Country Evaluation

Outreach Foundation, Socio-Economic Empowerment of Woman and Development of Youths,Brochure

Report on Country Evaluation: Assessment of Development Results Nigeria – In-Depth Study onPoverty, Development Policy Centre, Ibadan February 2003

Report on Country Evaluation: Assessment of Development Results Nigeria – In-Depth Study onGovernance, Institute of Governance and Social Research, Jos.

Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2002

National Development Situation, Nigeria, 2002, typescript, n.d.

Department for International Development, Nigeria Country Strategy Paper 2002-2002

United Nations, United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Nigeria 2002-2007, July 2002

United Nations, United Nations System Coordination Mechanism in Nigeria, June 2002

UN System in Nigeria, Common Country Assessment, March 2001

UN/UNDP, Common Country Assessment, March 2001, n.d.

UN/UNDP, Millenium Development Goal Reports, n.d.

UN/UNDP Resident Coordinator Annual Report: 2000, Feb 2001.

UNDP Audit Reports: (a) Evaluation 1999, 2000 & 2001 NEX; (b) Confidential Report onManagement Audit of CO, Lagos, Nigeria (Aug 1999)


UNDP, Country Cooperation Framework, 1997-2001.

UNDP, Country Cooperation Framework, 2003-7.

UNDP, Development Cooperation Report, 1998/1999

UNDP, Donors’ Profile Nigeria, Lagos September 2002

UNDP Evaluation Office, Country Evaluation: Assessment of Development Results, July 2002

UNDP Evaluation Office, Country Evaluation: India, New York, 2002

UNDP Evaluation Office, Country Evaluation: Sudan, New York, 2002

UNDP: National Partnership Forum,Framework document, typescript, n.d

UNDP Nigeria, Country Programme 2003-2007

UNDP, Nigeria Human Development Report, 1996

UNDP Nigeria, Implementation Modality, Nigeria 5th Country Programme, 1997-2001, n.d.

UNDP Nigeria: MicroStart Project, An Overview of Project Accomplishment, Sept. 2002.

UNDP Nigeria: MicroStart Project, Activity Report, Sept. 2002

UNDP Nigeria: MicroStart Project, Expansion Plan, Jan. 2003 – Dec. 2005, n.d.

UNDP, Nigeria National Human Development Report, 2000/1, UNDP, Lagos, 2001

UNDP, Notes on First and Second Global Cooperation Frameworks (1997-2000 & 2001-3),typescript, n.d.

UNDP, Notes on First and Second Regional Cooperation Framework for Africa (1997-2001 &2002-6 respectively), n.d.

UNDP Nigeria, Peoples Vision of Development, 2010, October 1997.

UNDP Nigeria: Programme Support Documents of NIR/98/100, NIR/98/400, NIR/98/200,NIR/98/300 on NMESD, Sustainable Agriculture, Environment and RuralDevelopment, Job Creation and Sustainable Livelihood and Social DevelopmentProgrammes respectively.

UNDP, SRF/ROAR (NIR): Reporting Year 2000.

UNDP, SRF/R0AR for 2001 and 2002.

UNDP, Terminal Review of UNDP Supported Programmes in Nigeria, Kaduna, February 1998

UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board Decision : UNDP Country Cooperation Frameworks andRelated Matters – First Country Cooperation Framework for Nigeria 1997-2001,DP/CCF/NIR/1 29 July 1997.

UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board, Organisational Matters. 97/24 First country cooperationframework for Nigeria, decision adopted 19 September 1997, DP/1998/2 8 October 1997

USAID, Down to Earth: Changes in Attitudes Toward Democracy and Markets in Nigeria, December 2001

USAID/Nigeria: Concept Paper FY2004-FY2009, November 2002.

U.S. Department of State, Nigeria: Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 2001

World Bank, Nigeria at a Glance

World Bank, Aid and Policy Reform in Nigeria

World Bank, Applied Poverty-Environment Indicators: The Case of Nigeria, March 2002

A N N E X 2 : R E F E R E N C E S A N D D O C U M E N T S C O N S U LT E D 6 3

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA

Obiageli Ezekwesili, The PresidencyDr. Magnus Kpakol, Chief Economic

Adviser to the PresidentF.L. Osunsade, Macro-Economic Adviser

and Secretary, Economic PolicyCoordination Committee

Chief O.F. Okusami, Director of StateAffairs, Office of Vice President, Officeof State and Local Government Affairs

A. Brossa, Director (PRS)F.O. Fatokun, Dep. Director (LGA)Fafowora, Dep. Director (Planning)Chief R.N. Oriyeabo, Dep. Director (LGA)P.A. Ogunniyi, Asst. Chief

Administrative OfficerDr. Israel Igwe, Principal

Administrative OfficerT. Iremiren, Permanent Secretary (MFR),

Federal Ministry of FinanceProf. Mike Kwanashie, Director,

Independent Policy Group (IPG)Dr. G.T. Irale, Director, Planning,

Research and Statistics,Federal Ministry of Finance

Olu Adeyemi, Dep. Director (Planning),Federal Ministry of Finance

Prof. Babatunde Osotimehin, ChairmanNational Committee on AIDS (NACA)

Dr. T. Adeboye, Hon. Commissioner (NPC),National Governance Programme

Chief Auther C.I. Mbanefo, PermanentRepresentative Nigeria Mission to the UN

NATIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION(NPC)

M.B. Aliyu, Special Assistant to ChiefEconomic Adviser, NPC

Titus Adegboye, Hon. Commissioner (PLS)I.O. Adegun, Acting Director, International

Cooperation DeptW. Aluko, Assistant Director, UNDSDaba Bob-Manuel, Coordinator

CEAs Officer

N.A. Lawal, Assistant Chief AdministrativeOfficer, UNDP

A.M. Sambo, Principal AdministrativeOfficer, UNDP

George Nwalupwe, Chief Admin. OfficerUgbeda V. Bello, CAOJohnson Adeyeye, Federal

Programme AccountantKenneth Kwijelli, POI, PA to DirectorT.O.Oyakede, Permanent Secretary, Federal

Ministry of Women’s AffairsM. Nwordu, PMD Desk OfficerBinta Hassan, Director, Women’s AffairsG.O. Ugbebor, DDCD (Child Development)Musa Shafi (MDN), Director of

Personnel ManagementOtaki M. Oygbenu, Director,

Personnel DeptEdem Archibong, PRSDV.A. Adeguniweh, AD (Child Dev.)C.F. Oladipo, Women’s Affairs Dept.Capt. E.E Nasa NN(Rtd), Chairman,

Code of Conduct BureauS.I. Saba, SecretaryHerman Jinnoh, HOD Education and

Advisory ServiceIbrahim T. Adamu, Director (A&F)M.G. Buba, Director (Asszis)Dr. Uyin Algsebio, Director, Investigation

and MonitoringG.R. Ebosere, Board Member

FEDERAL OFFICE OF STATISTICS

F.O. Obikudu, Senior StatisticianJ.K. Balogun, Director (FS&M)S.B. Harry, Senior StatisticianJ.O. Oladaye, DCCP

NATIONAL DIRECTORATEOF EMPLOYMENT

S.O. Adejodun, Director-GeneralJohn Ojo, Director (Inspectorate)Ismaila Umar, Information & PRA.G. Abubakar, Dep. Director


ANNEX 3: LIST OF KEY PERSONS MET

A N N E X 3 : L I S T O F K E Y P E R S O N S M E T 6 5

Nasiru Isa Yakasai, Director (F&S)M. Kolo, Director - SPWAbu Baba-Ara, Director, Personnel

Management Dept.A.G. Abubakar, Dep. DirectorBabayo Bello, Asst. Director (Int.)

NATIONAL POVERTY ERADICATION PROGRAMME (NAPEP)

Olusade Adesolu, Secretary, NAPEP - MTBJuliet Amego, Director (Programmes)Anne Sambo, Dep. Director (Outreach Services)Nike Salan, Asst. Chief (Finance)N.Y. Longmint, Dep. Director (Monitoring)El-baff Mahdi, Asst. Director (Budget)

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Ibrahim Salim, Clerk to National Assembly,National Assembly

N.J. Arab, Deputy ClerkOluyemi Ogunyomi, Clerk to House

of RepresentativesAminu Umar, Acting Clerk to SenateKabir Suleiman, Director of Planning,

Research and StatisticsU.N. Mbanefo, Deputy DirectorRahila Admadu, Sec. NSNL

STATE GOVERNMENTS AND FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY

Federal Capital TerritoryFarakuti Community, Kwali Area Council and

local leaders and community stakeholders

Akwa Ibom State GovernmentH. E. Governor of Akwa IbomDr. Val Attah, SPMAGrace Ekong Obongamwari, Secretary

to State GovernmentBassey Uwe Bassey, Permanent

Secretary, Bureau for CooperativeDevelopment (BCD)

Edna Umoete, Special Advisor, BCDSimon Etim, Permanent Secretary,

Ministry of Education

Mary A. Ebong, Permanent Secretary,Ministry of Finance

Chief Eskiett Orutwiyag, Hon.Commissioner Local Government

Grace Anwana, Permanent Secretary,Ministry of Women’s Affairs

29 representatives of communities participating in Integrated Community Development projects

Kano StateH.E. Deputy Governor,

Kano State Government

Stakeholders BoardAisha Mande, MWSDHabibu Ibrahim Yakasai, MAWRBaballe Ammani, SPBCAdamu Sani, MANRYahaya Bala, MANRYahaya Lawal Khalegl, MANRYusuf Umar Yakasai, ZesmisaltaUmaru Lawan, SPBCGarba Baba Bebeji, M.D.HAuwalu S. Umar, Ministry of CommerceAbdullahu Bashir, Manufacturers AssociationAliyu Tukur Rogo, Sustainable Kano ProjectMohammed Sanusi Sharfadi,

SP & B CommissionerMuhammad A. Yaro, Acting SPMAUsman Isiyaka, Fagge Local

Government CouncilAbolu Balarabe, Kano Chamber of CommerceKwalli CCF Centre, project staff

and beneficiariesGoron Dutse Vocational Training Centre,

project staff and beneficiaries

Lagos State GovernmentOlayemi Cardoso, Commissioner for

Economic Planning and Budget (MEPB)S.0. Aluko, SPMAShola Adegbesan, Outreach Foundation

Agege Local GovernmentA.A. Awokulehan, Chairperson,

Agriculture, Environment and Rural Development Programme

O.I. Emokpai, Programme OfficeT. Oyebanjo, Council EngineerE.A. Adewole, Council Auditor

D.K. Oyetayo, Chief Executive OfficerC.O. Asimbole, Acting H.O.D (Education)O.I. Akwosi, SPCC SecretaryT.O. Ambali, Programme Officer, JCSLY.A. Odejayi, Technical Aid Dept (SPCC)E.O. Oyegoke, Chairman, JCSL ProgrammeB.L. Ugunde, Chief Administrative OfficerO.A. Gbadamosi, Head of

Personnel Management

Nasarawa StateH.E. Governor of Nasarawa StateCouncillors to HRH the Emir of LafiaMallam Maiwanda M. Idris, SPMAPermanent Secretary, Ministry of FinancePhoebe D. AyenajehE Abririku, Chairman JCSLNaomi Barra, Social DevelopmentDaniel AgyenoMall A.A. Ibrahim, WHOPhilip Obed, JCSLDanny D. Maikasuwa, Sec. JCSLStephen Y. Azizi, Accountant

Lafia Skills Centre, project staff and community stakeholders

Obi Skills Centre, project staff and stakeholders

Wamba Kurmi sites, staff and stakeholdersof Integrated Community Projects

INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION (IPCR)

Dr. Sunday Ochoche, Director-GeneralChief F.O.Kokumo, DFAUdenta O. Udenta, DirectorDayo Oluyemi-Kusa, DirectorAmbassador F.O. Iheme, Acting

Director R&PADr. Joseph Golwa, Director, Defence and

Security StudiesProf. Osile C. Eze, Director, Democracy and

Development Studies

INDEPENDENT CORRUPTPRACTICES COMMISSION (ICPC)

Asikpo Essien-Ibok, MemberAduda Gabriel Tanimu, MemberSen. A.A.Ohiri, Member

Alh. M. Maishanu, MemberProf. Sayed Malik, MemberAli Aku, Special Assistant to Chairman

UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND DONORS

Dr. Constantinos, UNAIDS Programme Advisor

Joseph S. Johnson, FAO RepresentativeLeonidas Tezapaidis, EU DelegateFelice Zaccheo, First Secretary

(Development), EUMax Bjork, Economic Reform AdvisorNick Costello, Head of OperationsManga Kuoh, Senior Public Sector

Management Specialist, World BankVictoria Kwakwa, Senior Economist,

World BankMaggie Kilo, Africa Development BankWilliam Kingsmill, Head of DFIDAndrew Kidd, Rural Livelihoods

Adviser, DFIDChris. Pycroft, Governance Advisor, DFIDSimon Foot, Programme Coordinator, State

and Local Government ProgrammeEvelyn Lee, CIDAWolfgang Erdmannsdoerfer, German EmbassyAngelika Paake, German EmbassyFrench Embassy, Lucien Lamarque, Attache

for Scientific and Technical CooperationDawn Liberi, Director, USAIDDenise Rollins, Director, Office

of Programme and ProjectDevelopment, USAID

NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS (NGOS)

Dr. Arigbede, Human Development Network Rob N. Ezeife, Secretary-General, ALGONEvon Erekwe, Head of Legal Dept., ALGONNana Tanko, Open Society Initiative for

West AfricaEdward Osenyi, Network of PLWHAPrincess Adeyinka Arobote, NCWS (Nig),

Ogun StateAbdullahi Mijinyaina, Programme Officer,

Community Action for PopularParticipation (CAPP)

Hauwa Ibrahim, Aries Law Firm, Abuja


A N N E X 3 : L I S T O F K E Y P E R S O N S M E T 6 7

UNDP

Zephirin Diabre, Associate AdministratorRavi Rajan, Director, Operations

Support GroupKhalid Malik, Director, Evaluation OfficeNurul Alam, Deputy Director,

Evaluation OfficeAbdoulie Janneh, Assistant Administrator

and Regional Director, Regional Bureaufor Africa (RBA)

Jacques Loup, Deputy Regional Director, RBAMar Dieye, Country Director, West Africa

Region, RBAPascal Karorero, Country Programme

Advisor, NigeriaMbaya Kakwenda, former Nigeria Resident

Coordinator Wandia Gichuri, Policy Adviser Strategic

Planning Unit, Bureau for CrisisPrevention and Recovery

Simon Munzu, Human Rights Adviser,Institutional Development Group,Bureau for Development Policy (BDP)

Pauline Tamesis, Anti-Corruption,Accountability and TransparencyAdviser, BDP

Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Director, UNDPCentre for Governance, Oslo

Diane Keppler, Chief, Internal AuditSection, Office for Audit andPerformance Review (OAPR)

John Tucker, SUM Manager, United NationsCapital Development Fund (UNCDF)

Yee Woo Guo, Chief, Evaluation Unit, UNCDF

UNDP NIGERIA

Jules Frippiat, Officer-in-ChargeNancy Assanga, Deputy Resident

Representative ProgrammeElhadj Moussa Adam, Deputy Resident

Representative OperationsSamuel Harbor, Assistant Resident

Representative (Governance Unit)

Avril Roy-Macauley, Programme Associate,Programme Support Unit

Kabiru Nasidi, Assistant ResidentRepresentative (PMSU)

Taiwa Agbe, Programme Analyst, (PMSU)Bishal Khana, UNV (Governance Unit)James Landi, Programme Analyst

(Economic Unit)Johnson Falade, Programme Analyst

(Governance Unit)Emmanuel Oladipo, Assistant

Resident Representative (Agriculture & Environment)

Ogonnaya Okoro, ProgrammeAnalyst(Agriculture & Environment)

Liliane Adiele, Programme Associate,(Agriculture & Environment)

Priscilla Ogwilali, Programme Assistant(Agriculture & Environment)

Bertram Egwuatu, Assistant ResidentRepresentative (Poverty Unit)

Olukemi Oyegbile, Programme Analyst(Social Development/HIV Focal Point)

Shuaibu Musa, Programme Analyst (Poverty Unit)

Maureen Chukwura, Programme Associate(Poverty Unit)

Emmanuel Evbodaghe, Head ofInformation, Communication &Resource Mobilization

STATE PROGRAMME MONITORING ADVISORS

Dan Onyishi, State Programme MonitoringAdvisor Enugu State

Stella Kolawole, State ProgrammeMonitoring Advisor Ondo State

Marcus B. Kwaghe, State ProgrammeMonitoring Advisor Adamawa State

Val Attah, State Programme MonitoringAdvisor, Akwa Ibom

Mahammed Yaro, Acting State ProgrammeMonitoring Advisor, Kano


OUTCOMES

G1 - GOVERNANCE

SGN1 - Dialogue that Widens Development ChoicesSASN1 – Globalisation: National policies addressmore effectively the social impact of economic liberalisation

SASN2 – Policy Dialogue: Increased use by deci-sion-makers of sustainable human developmentconcepts in policy formulation and implementa-tion

SGN2 - Key Governance InstitutionsSASN1 – Parliament: Increased effectiveness of parliament to perform its legislative and oversight functions

SASN2 – Electoral Systems: Improved conformityof the legal and electoral framework with international standards

SGN3 - Local GovernanceSASN2 – Decentralisation policies: Financial and human resources mobilised and allocated insupport of decentralisation and local governancein rural and urban areas

G2 – POVERTY REDUCTION

SGN1 - National Poverty FrameworksSASN1 - Poverty Reduction Strategies: Nationalanti-poverty strategy/plan/programme developedthrough a participatory process involving, in particular, the poor themselves

SASN3 – HIV/AIDS: Institutional capacity built toplan and implement multi-sectoral strategies tolimit the spread of HIV/AIDS and mitigate its socialand economic impact

SGN2- Access to AssetsSASN1 - Productive Resources and Assets:Increased access of the poor to finance (formal,informal, micro)

SASN2 – Basic Social Services: Increased capacityof the poor to sustain their livelihoods

G3 – ENVIRONMENT

SGN1 - Environment and Energy for LivelihoodsSASN1 – Policy Framework: Increased devolutionof decision-making and budgetary resources fornatural resource management and provision ofenvironmental energy services

SASN3 – Monitoring Assessment: Improvednational capacity to monitor environmental conditionsand trends and to assess policy performance inpromoting environmental sustainability

OUTPUTS

n UNDP will prepare National Human Development Reports as a basis forpolicy advice, dialogue and advocacy. UNDP will also organise the Donorand Stakeholders Conference on the Niger-Delta and on the GovernanceProgramme.

n Aid Coordination framework for overall donor assistance put in place.

n Formulation of a comprehensive National Governance Programme forSustainable Human Development. This is a framework that will coveractivities related to 9 areas plus cross-cutting issues.

n Capacity building to enhance the performance of legislators and Judiciaryat the Federal and State levels.

n The capacity of the Independent National Electoral Commission to trainelectoral officers and the current outreach of its voter and civic educationprogrammes strengthened.

n Under National Management for Socio-Economic Development programme provides capacity enhancement for financial management at the State and local level.

n The 1998 Draft National Policy on Poverty Alleviation Document approvedand published; the State Statistical Year books published and disseminated.

n The strategy for the implementation of the National Policy on PovertyAlleviation in place by the end of the year.

n Strategy to mainstream Information Education and Communication (IEC)on HIV/AIDS in all programmes designed in 2000

n Support NACA to develop state specific action plans to combat HIV/AIDSin the year 2001.

n Microfinance institutions operational in 36 States and the Federal Capital Territory.

n Design and implementation of Integrated Community Development projects in 300 communities

n Establishment of skills development centres will contribute to providejobs to poor people

n ZERI principles adopted as modality for sustainable development by Government.

n The development and production of key aggregate indicators for theenvironment sector to be defined

ANNEX 4: NIGERIA STRATEGIC RESULTS FRAMEWORK – LIST OF OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES

A N N E X 4 : N I G E R I A S T R AT E G I C R E S U LT S F R A M E W O R K – L I S T O F O U T P U T S A N D O U T C O M E S 6 9

OUTCOMES

SGN2 - Instruments for Environmentally Sustainable Management

SASN2 - Global Conventions and funding mechanisms: Global Environment concerns andcommitments integrtated in national developmentplanning and policy

G4 – GENDER

SGN2 - Implementation of Global Commitments:SASN1 – National Action Plans: National actionplan for the advancement of women, jointly adopted,implemented and monitored by government,legislature and civil society, according to time-bound goals

G6 - UNDP SUPPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS

SGN2 - Effective Operational Activities:SASN2 – Resident Coordinator System:Mobilisation of UN partners to adopt commonpositions on development issues and achieve concrete development outcomes through the UNDAF.

OUTPUTS

n National Action Plan to combat desertification available by the year 2000.Integrated pilot projects to combat desertification with policy input.

n National strategy to address issues of climate change and biodiversityavailable by the year 2002. National Communications on Climate changeand Biodiversity regularised.

n National Policy on Women approved.n Put in place an effective mechanism for monitoring the implementation

of national policy on women.

n Finalise CCA and prepare UNDAF. Design and implement joint projects inidentified communities.

n Increase in the number of projects that are jointly formulated, funded andmanaged by the UN System to combat poverty in Nigeria.

Source: Nigeria SRF List of Outcomes and SRF/ROAR Outcomes and Outputs, 2001


UNDP THEMES

Governance

PovertyReduction

Environment

Gender

CCF 1997-2002OBJECTIVES:RMT: US$ 76 797 000

Socio-economic management and policysupport for SHD:n National institutional

capacity to formulatesocial, economic anddebt managementpolicies.

n Improve public sector’scapacity to manageresources

n National institutions’capacity to underpingovernment’s transitionto democracy.

n Promote sustainableurban growth bystrengthening local governments.

Job creation andSustainable Livelihoods:n Market-oriented economy,

open trade and invest-ment opportunities.

Social Development:n Control of HIV/AIDS.n Improve nutritional status.n Increase adult literacy.n Harmonize UN

programming for targeted poverty reduction.

Sustainable Agricultureand Rural Development:n Agricultural productivity,

food security.

Sustainable Agricultureand Rural Development:n Improved land/

environment management.

Social development:n Empowerment of women.Sustainable Agricultureand Rural Development:n Increase women’s access

to agricultural land and credit.

CCF 2003-2007OBJECTIVES*RMT: US$ 62 812 000

Governance and Human Rights:n Strengthen national

capacities to coordinategovernance policies

n Strengthen anti-corrup-tion agencies and civilsociety to improve trans-parency.

n Enhance judiciary’scapacity to dispense jus-tice expeditiously.

n Improve awareness ofhuman rights; strength-en institutions to upholdhuman rights, rule of law.

n Skills for the prevention,management and resolu-tion of conflicts.

Poverty Eradication:n Support capacity-build-

ing of national institu-tions responsible forpoverty eradication.

n Skills development pro-gramme.

n Strengthen micro-finance institutions anduse them for developmentof micro, small and medium enterprises.

HIV/AIDS: **n Enhance awareness of

HIV/AIDS.n Preventive interventions

targeted at high riskpopulations and reduceHIV/AIDS rate.

n Improved coping mechanisms for peopleaffected by HIV/AIDS.

Poverty Eradication:n Provide advisory services

and capacity-building forsustainable environmentalmanagement.

n Promote adoption ofalternative renewableenergies.

n At least three ZeroEmissions ResearchInitiatives pilot projects.

Gender issues will bemainstreamed so that atleast 50 percent of the target beneficiaries will be women.

UNDAF 2002-2007: FOCUSAREAS*

Good Governance andHuman Rights:n Build capacity of national

institutions to protecthuman rights.

n Harmonize national laws with internationalinstruments.

n Strengthen nationalcapacity for economicmanagement and thereduction of corruption.

n Strengthen nationalcapacity for emergencypreparedness.

n Promote partnerships for the formulation,implementation andassessment of nationalsectoral policies.

Reducing Poverty:n Enhanced food security.n Increase social services

by 20 percent.n Support National

Population Policy,Millennium DeclarationCommitments.

n Employment preservationand generation.

Reducing the Incidence ofHIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB andother infectious diseases:**n National programmes

to reduce HIV/AIDS andother infectious diseases.

n Reduce impact ofHIV/AIDS on PLWHAs;National Policy for givinganti-retroviral drugs tovulnerable groups.

n Anti-discriminatory policies and practicestowards PLWHAs.

Reducing Poverty:n Promote resource

conservation and sustainable environmental management.

n Transfer appropriatetechnology for environ-mental management.

Good Governance andHuman Rights:n Gender equity, females in

governance.Reducing Povertyn Women in development

processes.HIV/AIDSn Mainstream gender-related

issues in all HIV/AIDS policies.

NIGERIA SRF OUTCOMES(CCF 1997-2002,CCF 2003-7)

Dialogue that widensdevelopment choices:n Address social impact of

economic liberalisation.n Use SHD concepts in

policy formulation.Key GovernanceInstitutions:n Effectiveness of

parliament.n Conform legal,

electoral frameworkwith international standards.

Local Governance:n Decentralisation

National PovertyFrameworks:n National anti-poverty

strategy developedthrough a participatoryprocess.

n Built institutional capacityto implement strategiesto limit spread of HIV/AIDS and mitigate itssocial and economicimpact.

Access to Assets:n Increase the poor’s

access to finance.n Increase capacity of

poor to sustain theirlivelihoods.

Environment and Energyfor Livelihoods:n Budgetary resources for

natural resource man-agement

n Monitor environmentalconditions.

Instruments for Environ-mentally SustainableManagement:n Global environment

concerns in nationaldevelopment policy.

Implementation of Global Commitments:n National action plan foradvancement of womenadopted by governmentand civil society.

ANNEX 5: NIGERIA MAP OF INTENDED DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

Sources: Country Cooperation Frameworks and Related Matter for Nigeria, 1997-2002; Country Cooperation Frameworks and Related Matters for Nigeria, 2003-2007; UnitedNations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Nigeria, 2002-2007; Nigeria SRF/ROAR Outcomes and Outputs, 2001.

*Note: Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is a cross-cutting theme in the CCF 2003-2007 and UNDAF 2002-2007.**Note: There is not a specific UNDP theme for HIV/AIDS. In following the ROAR schema of SRF goals, HIV/AIDS was placed under ‘Poverty Reduction’.

A N N E X 6 : U N D P S H A R E O F G R O S S B U D G E T 7 1

GROSS BUDGET = US$175,953,835

UNDP – 94%(US$164,973,574)

Cost-sharing – 6%(US$10,980,261)

ANNEX 6: UNDP SHARE OF GROSS BUDGET


ANNEX 7: DATA ON ODA ENVIRONMENT IN NIGERIA

A N N U A L O D A D I S B U R S E M E N T S , 1 9 8 8 – 2 0 0 0 ( I N M I L L I O N S O F U S $ )

Note: The US $184.8 million translates into US $1.60 per person, which represents only 0.4% of Nigeria's GDP.Source: UNDP Development Cooperation Report, Nigeria, 1998/1999

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

01988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

120

345

250263 259

279

190212

192202 204

152

184.8

T O P T E N D O N O R S O F N E T O D A A C C O R D I N G T O O E C D / D A C ( 1 9 9 8 – 1 9 9 9 AV E R A G E ) ( I N M I L L I O N S O F U S $ )

Source: OECD DAC

120

100

80

60

40

20

0IDA UK UNICEF Germany Africa

Dev.UNDP USA France UNFPA UNTA

103

1913 11 9 8 6 4 3 3

A N N E X 6 : D ATA O N O D A E N V I R O N M E N T I N N I G E R I A 7 3

O D A D I S B U R S E M E N T S B Y U N S Y S T E M ,1 9 9 9 ( I N T H O U S A N D S O F U S $ )


10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0FAO UNDP ILO UNESCO UNICEF WHO UNHCR

453

3,971

50 307

8,727

6,378

360

T O P T E N O D A S E C T O R S , 1 9 9 9 ( P E R C E N TA G E )


0 5 10 15 20 25

19.8

17.9

16.6

12.5

12

10.3

2.1

1.2

1.2

1

O D A D I S B U R S E M E N T S B Y T E R M S , 1 9 9 9

Source: UNDP Development Cooperation Report,Nigeria,1998/1999

Loans53%

Grants47%

Health sector

TransportNatural

resources

Governance

Social development

Agriculture

Economic management

Energy sector

EducationIndustrial

sector

O D A D I S B U R S E M E N T S B Y T Y P E , 1 9 9 9

Source: UNDP Development Cooperation Report,Nigeria,1998/1999

Investment Project

Assistance58% Free-Standing

TechnicalCooperation

40%

Investment-Related

TechnicalCooperation

1%Programme/

Budgetary Aid orBOP Support

1%

Emergency and ReliefAssistance

0%


Country

Nigeria

Bangladesh

Benin

Botswana

Brazil

Cote d'Ivoire

Ghana

India

Indonesia

South Africa

Tanzania

Uganda

HDIRank

148

145

158

126

73

156

129

124

110

107

151

150

Population(in millions)

113.9

137.4

6.3

1.5

170.4

16

19.3

1,008.9

212.1

43.3

35.1

23.3

Area (insq kms)

923,773

144,000

112,620

600,370

8,511,965

322,460

239,460

3,287,590

1,919,440

1,219,912

945,087

236,040

GDP percapita (inPPP US$)

896

1,602

990

7,184

7,625

1,630

1,964

2,358

3,043

9,401

523

1,208

LifeExpectancy

51.7

59.4

53.8

40.3

67.7

47.8

56.8

63.3

66.2

52.1

51.1

44.0

AdultLiteracy

(%)

63.9

41.3

37.4

77.2

85.2

46.8

71.5

57.2

86.9

85.3

75.1

67.1

GDIRank

124

121

134

104

64

132

108

105

91

88

126

125

AdultHIV/AIDS

PrevalenceRate

5.80

<0.10

3.61

38.80

0.65

9.65

3.00

0.79

0.10

20.10

7.83

5.00

Populationbelow

$1/day (inmillions)

70.2

29.1

n/a

33.3

11.6

12.3

44.8

44.2

7.7

11.5

19.9

26.0

CorruptionPerception

IndexRank/102

101

102

n/a

24

45

71

50

71

96

36

n/a

93

ANNEX 8: COMPARISON OF KEY INDICATORS BETWEEN NIGERIA AND OTHERCOUNTRIES 2001-2002

A N N E X 9 : S E L E C T E D S O C I A L A N D E C O N O M I C I N D I C AT O R S I N N I G E R I A 7 5

Life Expectancy (number of years)

Infant mortality Rate (per 1,000 births)

Real GDP growth Rate (%)

Manufacturing Capacity Utilization (%)

Credit to the Private Sector (growth rate)

Credit to the Government (Million Naira)

Inflation Rate

Government Expenditure of Health (% of total expenditure)

Interest Rate differentials (%)

Overall Balance of payment as % of GDP

1995

52

114

2.2

29.3

23.7

82.5

72.8

6.33

7.57

-3.1

1996

53

114

3.3

32.5

34.7

109.6

29.3

8.12

8.03

-5.6

1997

53

114

3.2

30.4

-23.9

-53.5

8.5

3.92

12.3

0.04

1998

54

75.1

2.4

32.4

27.4

144.9

10.0

5.05

11.6

-7.7

1999

54

75.1

2.8

35.9

29.2

32.0

6.6

3.33

17.7

-9.7

2000

54

75.1

3.8

36.1

30.9

-170.1

6.9

7.07

16.0

6.3

2001

54

75.1

3.9

39.6

43.5

79.7

18.9

5.87

19.2

0.5

ANNEX 9: SELECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN NIGERIA

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report and Statement of Account, Various Issues

ADR Assessment of DevelopmentResults

ADP Agricultural DevelopmentProgramme

CBO Community BasedOrganization

CCA Common Country AssessmentCCF Country Cooperation FrameworkCO Country OfficeDAC Development Assistance

CommitteeDFID Department for International

Development of the United Kingdom

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EO Evaluation Office (of UNDP)FACU Federal Agricultural

Coordinating UnitFCT Federal Capital TerritoryFGN Federal Government of NigeriaGDI Gender Development IndexHEAP HIV/AIDS Emergency

Action PlanHDF Human Development Trust FundHDI Human Development IndexHDN Human Development NetworkHDR Human Development ReportGDP Gross Domestic ProductGCCC Government Cash Counterpart

ContributionICDP Integrated Community

Development ProgrammeICPC Independent Corrupt

Practices CommissionINEC Independent National Electoral

CommissionIPCR Institute for Peace and

Conflict ResolutionIPG Independent Policy GroupMDG Millennium Development GoalsMOU Memorandum of UnderstandingNACA National Action Committee

on AIDSNACRDB Nigeria Agricultural

Cooperative and RuralDevelopment Bank

NALDA National Land Development Agency

NCML National Commission for Mass Literacy

NDE National Directorate of Employment

NHDR National Human Development Report

NAPEP National Poverty EradicationProgramme

NGO Non Government OrganizationNPF National Partnership ForumNMESD National Management of Socio-

Economic DevelopmentNORAD Norwegian AidNPC National Planning CommissionNEPAD New Partnership for

African DevelopmentODA Official Development AssistanceOECD Organization for

Economic Cooperation and Development

PAP Poverty Alleviation ProgrammePPP Purchasing Power ParityPRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy PaperRBDA River Basin Development

AuthorityRBM Results Based ManagementRMT Resource Mobilization TargetROAR Results Oriented Annual ReportSAERD Sustainable Agriculture,

Environment and Rural Development

SAS Strategic Areas of SupportSDC Skills Development CentreSHD Sustainable Human DevelopmentSPCC State Programme Coordinating

CommitteeSPMA State Programme

Monitoring AdviserSRF Strategic Results FrameworkTRAC Target of Resources

Allocated to the CoreUBE Universal Basic EducationUN United NationsUNCDF United Nations Capital

Development FundUNDAF United Nations Development

Assistance FrameworkUNDP United Nations Development

ProgrammeUNFPA United Nations Fund for

Population ActivitiesUNICEF United Nations Children’s FundWB World Bank


ANNEX 10: ABBREVIATIONS

Date post:	09-Aug-2020
Category:	Documents
Upload:	others
View:	3 times
Download:	0 times