CRIMPRO 1st set of digest

1.) PEOPLE v. GREY GR. no. 180109 July 26, 2010

Facts: An Information for Murder was filed against respondent Joseph Grey, former Mayor of San Jorge, Samar; his son, respondent Francis Grey; and two others for the death of Rolando Diocton before the RTC of Gandara,Samar. The Information was accompanied by other supporting documents and a motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Meanwhile, Presiding Judge Rosario Bandal denied the motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Judge Bandal found the prosecutions evidence to be insufficient to link respondents to the crime charged. She directed the prosecution to present, within five days, additional evidence. Later, the judge inhibited. Thereafter, the venue was changed and Judge Naviadad continued the proceedings of the case. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari seeking TRO and preliminary injunction alleging that the filing of the murder charge are based on perjured statements since Joseph Grey announced his candidacy for the Congressional election. The CA held that Judge Naviadad failed to abide with the constitutional mandate of personally examining the existence of probable cause. Thus, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Naviadad erred in personally examining for the existence of probable cause.

Ruling: No.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause.

In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. He should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. It is not mandatory in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest.In this case, the judge, upon his personal examination of the complaint and evidence before him, determined that there was probable cause to issue the warrants of arrest after the provincial prosecution, based on the affidavits presented by complainant and her witnesses, found probable cause to file the criminal Information. This finding of the Provincial Prosecutor was affirmed by the Secretary of Justice.

2.) BORLONGAN v. PENAGR.no. 143591 May 5, 2010Facts: Respondent Atty. Pea instituted a civil case for recovery of agents compensation and expenses, damages, and attorneys feesagainst Urban Bank and herein petitioners, before the RTC of Negros Occidental,BagoCity.Atty. Pea anchored his claim for compensation on the Contract of Agency for preventing any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Banks property.Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Atty. Pena claimed that the documents were falsified. The City prosecutor found probable cause for the indictment of petitioners for four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants for the arrest of the petitioners.Petitioners insisted that they were denied due process because of the non-observance of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court.Specifically, they claimed that they were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution and the courta quoproperly observed the required procedure in the instant caseRuling:No. The inclusion of Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. in the complaint was a mistake that is tainted with carelessness in the issuance of the warrant of arrest since he is not a member of the Board.

Although the extent of the judge's personal examination depends on the circumstances of each case, to be sure, hecannot just rely on the bare certification alone but must go beyond it.This is because the warrant of arrest issues not on the strength of the certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it.He should even call for the complainant and the witnesses to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances warrant. An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded by the State.Measured against the constitutional mandate and established rulings, there was here aclear abdication of the judicial function and a clear indication that the judge blindly followed the certification of a city prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest with respect to all of the petitioners.

3.) TAMARGO v. AWINGANGR.no. 177727 Jan. 19, 2010

Facts: Atty. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killedin Binondo, Manila. A witness told that Lucio Columna was ordered by respondent Lloyd Antiporda to facilitate the killing.After conducting a preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutorissued a resolution finding probable cause against Columna. Corresponding Informations for murder were filed against them in RTC Manila, and Columna was arrested in Cagayan. Columna then executed an affidavit admitting that he was the lookout on the said event and a certain Richard Mecate was the Gunman. The defense presented an unsolicited handwritten letter from Columna stating therein that he was only forced to admit to the killing and that all he said was untrue in the affidavit. Respondents further denied involvement in the killings.

The RTC, after a clarificatory hearing initiated granted the withdrawal of the information. The case was re-raffled and presided by Judge Zenaida R. Daguna.She granted the MR of petitioner and ruled that, based on Columnas affidavit which he affirmed before the investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial.The CA ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion because she arbitrarily left out of her assessment and evaluation the substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully taken into account in concluding that there was no probable cause against all the accused.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in finding that Judge Daguna had committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against respondents.Ruling:Yes, Judge Daguna limited herself only to Columnas affidavit. She completely ignored other relevant pieces of evidence.It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information (on the ground of lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial based on a resolution of the DOJ Secretary), the trial court has the duty to make an independent assessment of the merits of the motion.It may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary.Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary would be an abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine aprima faciecase. The court must itself be convinced that there is indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused.Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination,such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason. The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold.

4.) JUDGE ABELITA III v. DORIAGR.no. 170672

Facts:Judge Abelita III filed a complaint for Damages against P/Supt. Doria and SPO3 Ramirez.Petitioner alleged that while he and his family are on their way home, these two officers requested them to proceed to the Provincial PNP Headquarters at Camp Boni Serrano, Masbate, Masbate.He was forcibly taken and was searched without warrant. A shotgun was found in his possession and he was arrested.Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder.The trial court found that petitioner was at the scene of the shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. The trial court ruled that the police officers who conducted the search were of the belief, based on reasonable grounds, that petitioner was involved in the incident and that the firearm used in the commission of the offense was in his possession. The trial court ruled that petitioners warrantless arrest and the warrantless seizure of the firearms were valid and legal, thus, rejecting petitioners claim for frame up.Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were illegal under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure;Ruling: No.For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the offender has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a report about the alleged shooting incident.SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was involved in the incident.They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase.Petitioners act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain view doctrine. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it was reported that petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a crime, hence they were justified in seizing the firearms.

5.) PEOPLE v. REYES GR.no. 178300 Mar. 17, 2009

Facts: Applellants were charged of the complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide after having conspiring to extort money from the Yaos by carrying away and depriving Robert Yao, Yao San, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Raymond Yao, Ronald Matthew Yao, Lennie Yao, Charlene Yao, Jona Abagatnan ang Josephine Ortea against their will and consent on board their Mazda MVP van at the their poultry farm, for the purpose of extorting money in the amount of P5,000,000.00 and that during the detention of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymong Yao, said accused strangled Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao to death. During the arraignment, the appellants pleaded not guilty. Affidavits were presented and the defense contended that it was only a frame- up.

Appellant Arnaldo surrendered to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) at Camp Crame, Quezon City. Thereupon, appellant Arnaldo, with the assistance of Atty. Uminga, executed a written extra-judicial confession narrating his participation in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo identified appellants Reyes and Flores, Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo also described the physical features of his cohorts and revealed their whereabouts.. RTC ruled against the appellants. A reduced penalty was given by the CA. Appellant filed an MR but was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

Ruling: No. In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is guided by the following well-settled principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower court, unless there is a showing that the latter overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the opportunity to examine their demeanor when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear, positive and convincing manner is a credible witness.

After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the foregoing guidelines to this case, we found no cogent reason to overturn the RTCs ruling finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible. The court held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if the following requisites have been satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing

6.) MALACAT v. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 123595 December 12, 1997

Facts: Petitioner was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for having a hand grenade, without first securing the necessary license and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities. He was apprehended by virtue of a warrantless arrest of stop and frisk when the police noticed their suspicious acts. Upon being approached by the police officers, the accused immediately run from different directions and was chased by the police officers. Thereafter, they already arrested the suspects. The said police officers was said to be already trying to apprehend the said accused here, for almost 2 days.

The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to it a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information." Moreover, it ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner "[l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store," concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, due to the loss of his case in the trial court, it was directly appealed to the court of appeals who also affirmed the validity of the warrantless arrest.

Issue: Whether or not the arrest was valid?

Ruling: No.

The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. 5(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped

Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk."Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.

Here, here are at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid: First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yus claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report. Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast an observation which leaves us incredulous. Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside the front waistline of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.

Further, Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest. No lawyer was present and Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then available. Thus, even if petitioner consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in the presence of counsel. Thus, the admission is inadmissible as evidence against the petitioner.

7.) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JESUS NUEVAS, et. al. G.R. No. 170233 February 22, 2007

Facts: Police officer received information that a certain male person a man would make a delivery of marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag, who was Nuevas. They confronted the latter and ask. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Nuevas disclosed where the two (2) other male persons would make the delivery of marijuana weighing more or less five (5) kilos. The police officers together with Nuevas, then proceeded the place where according to Nuevas was where his two (2) companions, Din and Inocencio, could be located. From there, they saw and approached two (2) persons along the National Highway, introducing themselves as police officers. Din was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Officers then took the bag and upon inspection found inside it "marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein." are violated.

All of the said materials are confiscated and the 3 are arrested. The trial court found them guilty with illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended. Nuevas, by manifestation, waived his right of appeal. The appellate court found Fami and Cablings version of how appellants were apprehended to be categorical and clear. However the other 2 filed there recourse in the Court of Appeals base on their allegations that they are not guilty and their constitutional rights against warrantless arrest. However, the appellate court stated that the search in the instant case is exempted from the requirement of a judicial warrant as appellants themselves waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizures. According to the appellate court, both Cabling and Fami testified that Din voluntarily surrendered the bag. Appellants never presented evidence to rebut the same. Thus, in the instant case, the exclusionary rule does not apply. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the arrest was valid?

Ruling: No.

The conviction or acquittal of appellants rests on the validity of the warrantless searches and seizure made by the police officers and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virture thereof.Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.35 The constitutional proscription, however, is not absolute but admits of exceptions, namely:1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;4. Consented warrantless search;5. Customs search;6. Stop and Frisk; and7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.Arrest must preced the search. A search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can make the arrest as the outset of the search. Reliable information alone is not a sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Sec. 5(a), Rule 113. A peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a concent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.

In Nuevass case, the Court is convinced that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the incriminating bag to the police officers. Thus, the Court would have affirmed Nuevass conviction had he not withdrawn his appeal.However, with respect to the search conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such consent had actually been given. Thus, their arrest was indeed a violation of their rights. The arrest was an invalid warrantless arrest.

8.) PEOPLE v. IDEL AMINNUDIN G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

Facts: PC officers received a tip from one of their informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana.He was Identified by name.Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him. Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9.They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation."

The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted. In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. The trial court did not believe the appellant.

Issue: Whether or not the arrest was valid?

Ruling: No.

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."

In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him. He must be acquitted.

9.) PEOPLE v. MOLINA352 SCRA 174

Facts: SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their, vehicle and overtook the "trisikad."11SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty meters from where the accused-appellants were accosted.12The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, accused-appellant Mula who was holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the bag.13Molina replied,"Boss, if possible we will settle this."14SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter; accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers.15On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.16The demurrer was denied by the trial court.17A motion for reconsideration was filed by accused-appellants, but this was likewise deniedThe Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and MO1ion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein he prayed for the acquittal of both accused-appellants.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case fall within the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement?

Ruling: No.As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin, it was held that "the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the MN Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension." Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime.Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants. They are acquitted.The law mandates that searches be carried out with a search warrant upon the existence of probable cause. Likewise, the law protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and holds evidence taken from such incidents as inadmissible as evidence. There are exceptions to this, the first being seizure conducted incidental to a lawful arrest For this, there should be a lawful arrest first, before a search can be made.

10.) PEOPLE v. ROGELIO MENGOTE G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992

FACTS: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the police headquarters for investigation.

An information was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.Issue: Whether or not the arrest was valid?

Ruling: No.Section 5 (a) of Rule 113 of the Rules of court requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it." The question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?

11.) PEOPLE vs. BINAD SY CHUAG.R. Nos. 136066-67February 4, 2003

Facts: SPO2 Mario Nulud and PO2 Emmeraldo Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. The informer further reported that accused-appellant distributes illegal drugs in different karaoke bars in Angeles City. On the basis of this lead the PNP Chief of Angeles City immediately formed a team of operatives. At around 11:45 in the evening, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. Afterwards, SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City. The initial field test conducted by SPO2 Danilo Cruz at the PNP Headquarters revealed that the siezed items contained shabu. Accused-appellant narrated a different version of the incident. However, the trial court convicted him guilty as charged with illegal possession of Drugs.

Issue: Whether there is a valid warrantless arrest.

Held: No.

In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and frisk principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant. In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Accordingly, for this exception to apply two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it has been held that reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officers experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.

Considering that the identity, address and activities of the suspected culprit was already ascertained two years previous to the actual arrest, there was indeed no reason why the police officers could not have obtained a judicial warrant before arresting accused-appellant and searching his person.

12.) * refer to no. 09

13.) PEOPLE v. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR. & LAWRENCE WANG

Facts: Police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of the Department of Interior and Local Government, arrested SPO2 de Dios, \Anoble and a certain Arellano, for unlawful possession of shabu. In the course of the investigation of the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment operation was then set after the three were prevailed upon to call their source and pretend to order another supply of shabu. That same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were arrested while they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company.

Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that they were working for Wang. They also disclosed that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning, and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. Police Inspector and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the same under surveillance. Wang, who was described to the operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment and walked towards a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness) together with Captain Margallo and two other police officers approached Wang, introduced themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back compartment of the BMW car. When frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other members of the operatives searched the car and found inside it were the following items: (a) transparent plastic bags of shabu; (b) P650,000.00 cash ; (c) one electronic and one mechanical scales; and (d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine. Then and there, Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search. The trial court held that the warrantless arrest was illegal and that warrantless search incidental to the arrest was also unlawful.

Issue: Whether or not Hon. Laguio erred in acquitting the accused due to the invalid warrantless arrest?

Held: No.

The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provide:Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; andc) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.

Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5.

The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful. The Peoples contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable search and seizure has no factual basis. While we agree in principle that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, however, based on the evidence on record, Wang resisted his arrest and the search on his person and belongings. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Moreover, the continuing objection to the validity of the warrantless arrest made of record during the arraignment bolsters Wangs claim that he resisted the warrantless arrest and search.

14.) PEOPLE v. GABRIEL GERENTE

Facts: Appellant Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is about six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution witness who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing. Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. They were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes,that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito.

The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana.

Issue: Whether or not admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence is a violation of appellants constitutional right as it is an illegal search and seizure.

HELD: No, it is legal. The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.

Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;""(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .'

The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.

The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."

The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed.

15.) JUDGE FELIMON ABELITA III v. P/SUPT. GERMAN B. DORIA& SPO3 CESAR RAMIREZAugust 14, 2009G.R. No. 170672

Facts: Judge Felimon Abelita III filed a complaint for Damages against P/Supt. Doria and SPO3 Ramirez.He alleged that he was framed up and arrested without any appropriate charged while he parked his car in front of their house. SPO3 Ramirez forcibly took the key of van, barged into the vehicle, and conducted a search without a warrant.The search resulted to the seizure of a licensed shotgun and .45 caliber pistol. On the other hand, P/Supt. Doria alleged that he receive a telephone call about a shooting incident in Barangay Nursery where certain William Sia was wounded while petitioner, who was involved in the incident, and his wife left the place. P/Supt. Doria looked for petitioner and when he found him, he informed him of the incident report. He requested petitioner to go with him, petitioner agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence. P/Supt. Doria and his companions chased petitioner.Upon reaching petitioners residence, they caught up with petitioner as he was about to run towards his house.The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the drivers seat as petitioner opened the door. The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested petitioner.Petitioner alleges that for the warrantless arrest to be lawful, the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of facts that the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.Petitioner alleges that the alleged shooting incident was just relayed to the arresting officers, and thus they have no personal knowledge of facts as required by the Rules.

The trial court ruled that petitioners warrantless arrest and the warrantless seizure of the firearms were valid and legal. The trial court rejected petitioners claim of frame-up as weak and insufficient to overthrow the positive testimonies of the police officers who conducted the arrest and the incidental search. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence this petition. .Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest were illegal under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure

Held: NO.

For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the offender has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a report about the alleged shooting incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase. Petitioners act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.

16.) PEOPLE v. ELVIE EJANDRA et, al.G.R. No. 134203 May 27, 2004Facts: Ed Henderson Tan, a nine-year-old minor child, while in the store was approached by the appellants threatened and forced to take him. Thereafter, appellants called, demanded and negotiated the payment of ransom money from Eddie Tan, father of the child. Subsequently, Ed was released and reunited to his family. Three days after, Eddie Tan gave a sworn statement in the Criminal Investigation Division in Camp Crame. Appellants denied and gave their alibi on the involvement on the alleged kidnapping. On part of Appellants Ejandra and Calunod, they do not dispute that they kidnapped Ed Henderson but merely assert that the prosecution failed to prove that they had a cellular phone, implying that they could not have used it to demand ransom for the victims release. They also assert that they were arrested without any warrant therefor. The Trial Court rendered decision convicting the appellants of the crime charged. Issue: Whether appellants assertion that they were arrested without any warrant may be credited.

Ruling: No.

The Court agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that the appellants Ejandra and Calunod waived any irregularities relating to their warrantless arrest when they failed to file a motion to quash the Information on that ground, or to object to any irregularity in their arrest before they were arraigned. They are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest.

17.) PEOPLE v.ROMEO G. JALOSJOSG.R. Nos. 132875-76February 3, 2000Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. He claim that he has an immunity from arrest. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State

Issue: Whether appellant may invoke the immunity of arrest.

Ruling :No.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement.It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellants arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This cannot be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the States penal system.

18.) PEOPLE v. VASQUEZG.R. No. 200304 January 15, 2014Facts:Initially the case of illegal possession of drugs was raffled but upon motion it was consolidated with the case of illegal sale of drugs. On arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.The pre-trial conference of the cases was held, but the same was terminated without the parties entering into any stipulation of facts. During the trial of the case the prosecution stated the events. There was a confidential informant reported to PO2 Trambulo about the illegal drug activities. Fajardo form a buy-bust team. It was in the buy-bust operation that Don was arrested. RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes charged. The RTC gave more credence to the prosecutions evidence given that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of the police officers was not overcome. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant. Hence this appeal. He argues that the police officers did not have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest at the time he was arrested. This occurred despite the fact that the police officers allegedly had ample time to secure a warrant of arrest against him. Inasmuch as his arrest was illegal, the appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a result thereof was inadmissible in court.Issue: Whether the appellant Don may assail the validity of arrest.Ruling: No.

At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis52 that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial courts jurisdiction."53 Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 11354 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. We held in People v. Cabugatan55 that:This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. (Citation omitted.) Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his arrest and the subsequent search upon his person.

19.) PEOPLE v. NAZARENO VILLAREALG.R. No. 201363 March 18, 2013 Facts:This is an appeal Decision of CA affirming the decision of RTC convicting Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati (appellant) for violation of Illegal possession of dangerous drugs. PO3 Renato de Leon (PO3 de Leon) was driving his motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw appellant from a distance, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. He then alighted from his motorcycle and approached the appellant whom he recognized as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug possession. Appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended. Upon qualitative examination, the plastic sachet, tested positive a dangerous drug. Consequently, appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for illegal possession of dangerous drugs in an Information. Appellant defended himself that he approached PO3 de Leon who frisked him and took his wallet. That he was detained, mauled and forced to answer about stolen cellphone. That the following day he was informed of being charged with resisting arrest.

RTC gave full faith and credit to PO3 de Leons testimony. Moreover, the RTC found the plain view doctrine to be applicable, as the confiscated item was in plain view of PO3 de Leon at the place and time of the arrest. The CA sustained appellants conviction, finding "a clear case of in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest" as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The CA held that appellant "exhibited an overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse suspicion," aggravated by the existence of his past criminal citations and his attempt to flee when PO3 de Leon approached him.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming in toto the RTCs Decision convicting appellant of the offense charged.

Ruling: Yes.

Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act could be properly attributed to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he (appellant) had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, for the acts per se of walking along the street and examining something in ones hands cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange acts, or at the very least appeared suspicious, the same would not have been sufficient in order for PO3 de Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.

The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.

In fine, appellants acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even if they appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-quoted. "Probable cause" has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested, which clearly do not obtain in appellants case.

Thus, while it is true that the legality of an arrest depends upon the reasonable discretion of the officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize the nature of the act or deed of the person for the urgent purpose of suspending his liberty, it cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously exercised without unduly compromising a citizens constitutionally-guaranteed right to liberty

20.) PEOPLE v. SALVADORG.R. No. 201443April 10, 2013

Facts: The charges against the accused-appellants stemmed from the following Information charging them of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for having abducted Pinky, forcing her to abode a Toyota Hi-Ace Van, and she was brought to a undisclosed lplace in Caloocan City; of kidnapping for ransom for having abducted Albert, forcing him to abode the same van, and demanding ransom thereof. The detention of both victims was allegedly lasted for 6 days. During arraignment, the accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges.

The RTC acquitted the appellant s for kidnapping Pinky but they were convicted with the crime charge with regard to Alberts abduction.

Issue:Whether or not the claims of having been subjected to mauling, illegal arrest, intimidation and extortion attempts committed by the police authorities entitles credit for their acquittal.Held:No.It is settled that irregularities attending the arrest of the accused-appellants should have been timely raised in their respective motions to quash the Informations at any time before their arraignment, failing at which they are deemed to have waived their rights to assail the same.No such motions were filed by the accused-appellants.Further, without meaning to downplay or take the allegations of the accused-appellants lightly, we, however, note that these were unsubstantiated as to the identities of the offenders and uncorroborated by other pieces of evidence. To date, no complaints against the supposed abusive police officers had yet been filed by the accused-appellants. If the abuses were indeed committed, we exhort the accused-appellants to initiate the proper administrative and criminal proceedings to make the erring police officers liable. We stress that while the criminal justice system is devised to punish the offenders, it is no less the States duty to ensure that those who administer it do so with clean hands.

21.) RONTOS v. PEOPLEG.R. No. 188024January 5, 2013

Facts: PO2 Masi dispatched PO1 Pacis and PO1 Labaclado of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Task Force to conduct surveillance in Sampaloc St., Camarin, Caloocan City because of reports of illegal drug activity in the said area. Upon coming closer, they saw that the plastic sachets appeared to contain a white crystalline substance similar to shabu.PO1 Pacis approached petitioner and confiscated the plastic sachets. Thereafter, he introduced himself as a police officer and informed petitioner of the offense the latter had committed. The two police officers informed petitioner of his constitutional rights, while he just remained silent. A Complaintfor possession of dangerous drugs, Article II of R.A. 9165, was drawn up and referred to the city prosecutor for the filing of charges before the court.The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the concurrence of all the elements of possession of dangerous drugs. On appeal, The CA ruledthat the question over the legality of the arrest was deemed waived by petitioner when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by entering a plea of "Not Guilty" and participating in the trial of the case. In any case, the CA explained that while the arrest was without a warrant, it was with probable cause since petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto. He committed a crime in plain view of the police officers, as he was spotted in the act of holding and examining plastic sachets containing shabu

Issue:Whether or not the CA erred when it held that the question of legality was deemed waived when petitioner entered a plea of not guilty?

Held:No.

In his arraignment before the trial court, petitioner never raised any issue and instead "freely and voluntarily pleaded Not Guilty to the offense charged."Thus, he was estopped from raising the issue of the legality of his arrest before the trial court, more so on appeal before the CA or this Court. However, on the basis of the non-observance of the rules of procedure for handling illegal drug items, we resolve to acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt.In illegal drugs cases, the identity and integrity of the drugs seized must be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that required to arrive at a finding of guilt. The case against the accused hinges on the ability of the prosecution to prove that the illegal drug presented in court is the same one that was recovered from the accused upon his arrest.

22.) PEOPLE v. VELASCO

Facts:Roberto Velasco, stepfather of Lisa, a minor 14 years of age, raped his stepdaughter [Lisa] for three consecutive time while they were alone in the house. A year thereafter, at midnight, when the other members of the family were asleep, appellant succeeded in touching and kissing Lisas private parts. Appellant was arraigned for the three charges of rape; and one charge of acts of lasciviousness to which he entered a plea of not guilty on all charges. At the conclusion of trial, the trial court convicted appellant on all the charges leveled against him.

Issue:Whether or not the accused should be acquitted because of the irregularities which attended his warrantless arrest?

Held:No.With regard to purported irregularities that attended appellants warrantless arrest, we are of the same persuasion as the Court of Appeals which ruled that such a plea comes too late in the day to be worthy of consideration.Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment, thus, any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.16Nevertheless, even if appellants warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed invalid, such a scenario would still not provide salvation to appellants cause because jurisprudence also instructs us that the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.

23.) VIVENCIO ROALLO v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 198389, December 11, 2013

Facts:This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which calls to annul and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals where it affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) finding Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes (Roallos) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of sexual abuse punished under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 (R.A. No. 7610), otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act." Roallos asserted that his arrest was illegal since the same was effected without any warrant of arrest. He said he was not informed of his rights when he was arrested nor was he made to undergo any preliminary investigation.

Issue: Whether or not Roallos claim that his arrest was illegal for lack of warrant of arrest , non-information of his rights when he was arrested nor was he made to undergo any preliminary investigation tenable.

Held: Roallos claim that he was denied due process since he was arrested without any warrant of arrest and that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation is untenable. An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

At the time of arraignment, Roallos did not raise any objection to the supposed illegality of his arrest and the lack of a proper preliminary investigation. He actively participated in the proceedings before the RTC. Therefore he is deemed to have waived any perceived irregularity in his arrest and has effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. He is likewise deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.

24.) PEOPLE v. REBOTAZO698 SCRA 452Facts: Informant Torremocha went to the NBI office in Dumaguete City to report that appellant was selling several sachets of shabu in his possession. The informant also told the NBI that he was going to meet with appellant later. Hence, NBI planned a buy-bust operation and formed a buy-bust team. Diaz flagged them down, and Torremocha introduced him to appellant. After a brief conversation, Diaz told appellant that he was interested in buying shabu and handed to him theP300 marked money. In exchange, appellant handed to Diaz a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Upon completing the transaction, Diaz executed the pre-arranged signal by removing his cap and the appellant was immediately arrested. Appellant was subjected to a body search, and, in the process, voluntarily informed the NBI agents that he had another sachet of shabu inside one of his socks. However, according to the appellant, the NBI agents pointed at him then searched him but found nothing on him.That he was arrested, but was not informed of his constitutional rights. The accused was brought to the NBI Office and was searched again.In its ruling, the RTC gave more weight to the evidence presented by the prosecution. Thus, the appellant was found guilty of illegal sale and possession of shabu. The appellant questions the NBIs lack of coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Allegedly, the NBI failed to send a filled-out pre-coordination form by facsimile message, as required by R.A. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations. Because of this omission, appellant argues that the buy-bust operation should be considered unauthorized, and his subsequent arrest illegal. The evidence supposedly obtained thereby must be declared inadmissible. Hence, the cases of drug-pushing and possession of prohibited drugs must fall together.

Issue:Whether or not the appellant was illegally arrested?

Held:No.

The arrest of the accused in flagrante during a buy-bust operation is justified under Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court. From the very nature of a buy-bust operation, the absence of a warrant does not make the arrest illegal.

The court heLd in People v. Marcelino, the illegal drug seized was not the fruit of the poisonous tree, as the defense would have this Court believe. The seizure made by the buy-bust team falls under a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Since the buy-bust operation was legitimate, it follows that the search was also valid.

25.) PEOPLE v. COLLADOSCRA 698 v. 628

Facts:PO2 Noble received information from a civilian asset that spouses Marcelino and Myra were engaged in selling shabu. After recording the report in the police blotter, PO2 Noble relayed the information to his superior, P/Insp. Castillo, who in turn ordered the conduct of a surveillance operation. PO2 Noble, et al., conducted surveillance on the couples residence. A buy-bust operation team was thereafter formed, and the team proceeded to Marcelinos and Myras residence. Upon reaching the target area, the asset introduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as a regular buyer of shabu. During the negotiation regarding the price, Marcelino then took from his pocket a small metal container from which he brought out a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and gave the same to PO2 Noble. While PO2 Noble was inspecting its contents, he noticed smoke coming from a table inside the house of the couple around which were seven persons. When PO2 Noble gave the pre-arranged signal, the backup team rushed to the scene. The appellate court found the warrantless arrest of the appellants to be lawful considering that they were caught in the act of committing a crime.22Thus, the CA affirmed the conviction of Marcelino and Myra for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 (sale of dangerous drugs), as well as the conviction of Marcelino for violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs). It therefore affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court.

Issue:Whether or not there were irregularities in the arrest of the appellant-spouses?

Held:No, the arrest was valid.Section 5(a) is what is known as arrest in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur: "(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and, (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." A common example of an arrest in flagrante delicto is one made after conducting a buy-bust operation.

The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was effected after Marcelino and Myra performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble the sachet of shabu and Ranada of having in his control and custody illegal drug paraphernalia.

Moreover, assuming that irregularities indeed attended the arrest of appellants, they can no longer question the validity thereof as there is no showing that they objected to the same before their arraignment. Neither did they take steps to quash the Informations on such ground. They only raised this issue upon their appeal to the appellate court. By this omission, any objections on the legality of their arrest are deemed to have been waived by them.

Anent their claim of unreasonable search and seizure, it is true that under the Constitution, "a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."This proscription, however, admits of exceptions, one of which is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest.

The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, "[a] person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant." The factual milieu of this case clearly shows that the search was made after appellants were lawfully arrested.

26.) DELOS SANTOS-DIO v. COURT OF APPEALS699 SCRA 614

Facts: Dio, the majority stockholder of H.S. Equities, Ltd. (HS Equities) and authorized representative of Westdale Assets, Ltd. (Westdale), was introduced to Desmond, the Chairman and CEO of the Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBMEI), and the authorized representative of Active Environments, Inc. and JV China, Inc. Dio, on behalf of HS Equities, decided to invest a total of US$1,150,000.006in SBMEIs Ocean Adventure. Dio claimed that Desmond led her to believe that SBMEI had a capital of US$5,500,000.00, inclusive of the value of the marine mammals to be used in Ocean Adventure,7and also guaranteed substantial returns on investment. Desmond even presented a Business Plan. Dio claimed that she SBMEI actually had no capacity to deliver on its guarantees, and that in fact, as of 2001, it was incurring losses.She likewise claimed to have discovered false entries in the companys books and financial statements specifically, its overvaluation of the marine animals and its non-disclosure of the true amount of JV Chinas investment which prompted her to call for an audit investigation. Consequently, Dio discovered that, without her knowledge and consent, Desmond made certain disbursements from Westdales special account, meant only for Miracle Beach expenditures (special account), and diverted a total of US$72,362.78 therein for the operating expenses of Ocean Adventure. Eventually, she filed a two criminal complaint for estafa against Desmond. After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor issued a Resolutiondated August 26, 2004, finding probable cause against Desmond for the abovementioned crimes. However, the RTC ruled in favor of Desmond and declared that no probable cause exists for the crimes charged against him since the elements of estafa were not all present. Consequently, the RTC denied the issuance of a warrant of arrest and hold departure order against Desmond and ordered the dismissal of the cases against him. The CA affirmed the RTCs ruling.Issue: whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it dismissed the subject information for lack of probable cause.

Held:Yes.Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial. The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is given broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a criminal information in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.

The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. In this respect, the judge must satisfy himself that, on the basis of the evidence submitted, there is a necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge, therefore, finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. Notably, since the judge is already duty-bound to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused immediately upon the filing of the information, the filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause becomes a mere superfluity,if not a deliberate attempt to cut short the process by asking the judge to weigh in on the evidence without a full-blown trial.

In the case of Co v. Republic, the Court emphasized the settled distinction between an executive and a judicial determination of probable cause, viz: We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job.1wphi1The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.On this score, it bears to stress that a judge is not bound by the resolution of the public prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation and must himself ascertain from the latters findings and supporting documents whether probable cause exists for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. This prerogative is granted by no less than the Constitution which provides that "no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."

In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable cause. Applying these principles, the Court finds that the RTCs immediate dismissal, as affirmed by the CA, was improper as the standard of clear lack of probable cause was not observed.

27.) PEOPLE v. MENDOZA700 SCRA 42

Facts: PO2 dela Cruz testified that on May 15, 2004 at about 8:15 in the evening, their confidential informant arrrived at their office reporting that a certain alias Monica, who turned out to be accused-appellant, was involved in the rampant sale of illegal drugs. Their Action Officer, SPO4 Arsenio Mangulabnan formed a buy-bust team led by SPO1 Jose Magallanes to effect the arrest of accused-appellant. A briefing was conducted regarding the anti-narcotics operation and PO2 dela Cruz was designated as poseur-buyer. He was tasked to buy Php200.00 worth of shabu from accused-appellant. Two (2) pieces of one hundred peso bills were provided and marked with "AMM" for use in the buy-bust operation. After the transaction between PO2 dela Cruz and accused-appellant having been consummated, he then made a motion of giving a high five to accused-appellant which was the pre-arranged signal for the rest of the back-up team. Operations back-up PO2 Sangel then approached the area of transaction, introduced himself as a police officer and placed accused-appellant under arrest. Accused-appellant was apprised of the nature of the arrest and of her constitutional rights.

Accused-appellant for her part, denied the charges against her. She denied that she was caught selling shabu and that she was caught in possession of the same. The RTC, found the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to prove the guilt of accused-appellant for the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed the decision and dismissed the appeal. Hence, the petition.

Issue:Whether or not a valid warrant should have been secured first before they proceeded to arrest her.

Held:No. Section 5(a) of Rule 113 is commonly known as in flagrante delicto arrest. For a warrantless arrest of an accussed caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: 1) person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; 2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.In the instant case, the prosecution completely and fully established that accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto.At any rate, accused-appellant failed to raise any objection to the manner of her arrest before arraignment.1wphi1In fact, she participated in the trial. She even took the witness stand and testified in her own behalf. She is now estopped from assailing the legality of her arrest as she waived any irregularity, if any, that may have tainted her arrest.Significantly, the proof of an in flagrante delicto an-est, removes whatever credibility there may have been about the testimony of the accused-appellant of the alleged circumstances that made her go with the police to the DEU unit. Her version that she was a frame-up victim cannot stand against the testimony of the police, supported by evidence of corpus delicti.28) ESPINO vs PEOPLE

Facts:The accused was a senior sales executive in charge of liaising with import coordinators of the company Kuehne and Nagel, Inc. (KN Inc.). His duties included the delivery of its commissions to the import coordinators.On 14 October 2002, the Fiscals Office of Paranaque charged the accused with six (6) counts of estafaunder Article 315, paragraph 1(b) for allegedly rediscounting checks that were meant to be paid to the companys import coordinators. After trial, the RTC convicted the accused ofestafaunder Article 315, paragraph 2(a).17In response, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the trial court committed a grave error in convicting him ofestafaunder paragraph 2(a), which was different from paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 under which he had been charged. He also alleged that there was no evidence to support his conviction. Thus, he contended that his right to due process of law was thereby violated.

In turn, the prosecution argued that jurisprudence had established that the nature and character of the crime charged are determined by the facts alleged in the information, and not by a reference to any particular section of the law.Subsequently, the RTC denied the Motion. In the present Petition, the accused raises his right to due process.26Specifically, he claims that he was denied due process when he was convicted ofestafaunder Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) despite being charged withestafaunder Article 315, paragraph 1(b).27He argues that the elements constituting both modes ofestafaare different, and that this difference should be reflected in the Information.28According to him, a charge under paragraph 1(b) would not merit a conviction under paragraph 2(a).

Issue: WON Espino was denied of his right of due process because of his conviction of Estafa under Art 315 par 2(a) instead of Art 315 par 1(b) of Revised Penal Code? Held:NO.

It is hornbook doctrine, however, thatwhat determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the informationor complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)This doctrine negates the due process argument of the accused, because he was sufficiently apprised of the facts that pertained to the charge and conviction forestafa.

The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an information shall be deemed sufficient if it states, among others, the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts of omissions complained of as constituting the offense. However, the Court has clarified in several cases thatthe designation of the offense, by making reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing, it [sic] is not controlling; what actually determines the nature and character of the crime charged are the facts alleged in the information

Clearly, the fiscals statement in the Informations specifying the charges asestafaunder Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, did not bind the trial court insofar as the characterization of the nature of the accusation was concerned. The statement never limited the RTCs discretion to read the Information in the context of the facts alleged.

Every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information by making reference to the definition and the essentials of the specific crimes. This is so in order to fully apprise the accused of the charge against him and for him to suitably prepare his defense since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. It is not necessary, however, that the imputations be in the language of the statute.What is important is that the crime is described in intelligible and reasonable certainty.

29) MANGILA v. PANGILINAN

Facts:Seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four others with syndicated estafa in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689,and with violations of Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) were filed. The complaints arose from the recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila and the others to the private complainants as overseas contract wor