DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA OCTOBER 2011 DSI VOLUME 4 ISSUE 2 ` 250 REGION OFFICERS AND BUSINESSMEN Many South Asian militaries are in business – from hotels to bakeries to golf courses I Rahul Bedi AVIATION BROKEN WINGS High peacetime attrition due to accidents continues to be a matter of great concern for the IAF I V.K. Bhatia CHANGES IN THE AIR? MAY BE IT IS TIME TO INSTITUTE AN OVERARCHING AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGY COMMISSION NOW THAT THE SECTOR IS ON THE CUSP OF FAR REACHING CHANGES I AJAI SHUKLA
Transcript
DEFENCE and SECURITYof INDIA
OCTOBER 2011
DSIVOLUME 4 ISSUE 2 ` 250
REGION
OFFICERS AND BUSINESSMEN Many South Asian militaries are in business –from hotels to bakeries to golf courses I Rahul Bedi
AVIATION
BROKEN WINGS High peacetime attrition due to accidents continues to be a matter of great concern for the IAF I V.K. Bhatia
CHANGESIN THEAIR? MAY BE IT IS TIME TO INSTITUTE AN OVERARCHING AEROSPACETECHNOLOGY COMMISSION NOW THAT THE SECTOR IS ON THE CUSP OF FAR REACHING CHANGES I AJAI SHUKLA
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E l e c t r o n i c S y s t e m s • G e o s p a t i a l S y s t e m s • I n f o r m a t i o n S y s t e m s • M i s s i o n S y s t e m s
But while India’scombat aviationstrength will beimpressivelyenhanced, there aredoubts whetherthese development programmes will fully meet theirpotential. A lack ofcoordinationbetween theMinistry of Defenceand the IAF; theabsence of synergybetween the civilaviation anddefence sectorsand various academic anddefence institutionscan hinder India’s airpower capability.
Mannika ChopraEDITOR
Defence & Security of India
ctober 8, and it’s Air Force Day. All over the country, in various air bases, there willbe parades and ceremonies marking the 79th anniversary of the Indian Air Force(IAF), which was established way back in 1932. Anniversaries like these are not inthemselves unusual but they are an appropriate time for the securityestablishment to reflect on the direction that the IAF is taking, especially as anumber of new platforms will soon be entering the aerospace sector.
Over the next decade, the IAF will increase its technological capability dramatically: The longawaited Tejas Light Combat Aircraft being developed by the Aeronautical Development Agency –which is also working on a Fifth Generation medium fighter – is in its production stage finally; then theacquisition of the 126 Multi-Role Medium Combat Aircraft with Dassault’s Rafale and Eurofighters’Typhoon is inching towards the finishing line; the formidable Sukhoi 30MKI is being upgraded evenas the Sukhoi and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited are working together on the Indo-Russian FifthGeneration Fighter Aircraft.
But while India’s combat aviation strength will be impressively enhanced, there are doubts whetherthese development programmes will fully meet their potential. A lack of coordination between theMinistry of Defence and the IAF; the absence of synergy between the civil aviation and defence sectorsand various academic and defence institutions can hinder India’s air power capability. To ensureoptimal use of aerospace technologies, make administration effective, harness resources and makethe best use of managerial strengths, DSI makes a case for creating an overarching AerospaceTechnology Commission.
We also focus at another aspect of the Indian Air Force – safety. Since 1970 to this August, theIAF has lost 1,000 fighter planes to accidents, and the numbers of mishaps don’t seem to be decreasing. Though periodically policies have been outlined to achieve a zero accident rate the results have been slow.Given the spate of accidents, especially of the older Russian-made aircraft, it’s all the more importantto single-mindedly prioritise the modernisation of the IAF and reduce these shameful statistics.
From safety to diplomacy, and, security. Once again, India is again pressing for reform in theUnited Nations. The expansion in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is necessary for it to bean impartial, credible and effective world body. This is the message that Prime Minister ManmohanSingh gave as he addressed the 66th UN General Assembly in September. DSI looks at why India isaggressively reviving its quest to be a permanent-member of the UNSC.
As usual we look forward to your feedback, comments and suggestions. Write to us [email protected]. Should you want to subscribe you can contact us at [email protected] our marketing department will do the rest.
O
Letter from the Editor.qxd:contents-aug.qxd 29/09/11 2:22 PM Page 2
CO
NTE
NTS
AERONAUTICS 6
MOMENT OFOPPORTUNITY
With many new platforms beinginducted into the IAF, creating an
overarching Aerospace TechnologyCommission will integrate
the defence and aviation sectors effectively.
2 3
TECHNOLOGY 24
EYES AT SEAThe Navy is modernising its radarcapability through indigenousdevelopment and a comprehensiveacquisition programme.
REGION 40
ENTER THEDRAGONChina’s recent actions, together withits long term naval production plans,confirm that Beijing intends to‘recover’ sovereignty over majorportions of the South China Sea, thusestablishing its dominance over thismaritime territory.
REGION 32
OFFICERS ANDBUSINESSMENSeveral South Asian militaries arerunning lucrative commercialventures rivalling private businessthat threaten not only to militarisecivil society but corrupt the Services.The Pakistani Army has built aneconomic empire; in Sri Lanka, theadministration is encouraging thearmed forces to get involved incommercial activity; in Bangladesh,the Army is expanding its financialand industrial operations and in Indiathere has been an increase in thecorruption of military officers.
COMBAT AIRCRAFT 14
BROKEN WINGSSince 1970, the Indian Air Force has lost 1,000 planes due to accidents, half ofthem are accounted for by variants of the MiG. Human error and technicaldefects are major reasons for aircraft accidents followed by bird strikes.
DIPLOMACY 46
PUSHING FOR REFORMIn the face of successive defeatsIndia has revived its quest for apermanent seat in the UnitedNations Security Council. Perhapsthis act of — as some say —misplaced bravado could end uphurting the country’s interests andinternational reputation.
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
Contents oct 11_2nd time:contents-feb-R.qxd 29/09/11 6:08 PM Page 2
CO
NTE
NTS
AERONAUTICS 6
MOMENT OFOPPORTUNITY
With many new platforms beinginducted into the IAF, creating an
overarching Aerospace TechnologyCommission will integrate
the defence and aviation sectors effectively.
2 3
TECHNOLOGY 24
EYES AT SEAThe Navy is modernising its radarcapability through indigenousdevelopment and a comprehensiveacquisition programme.
REGION 40
ENTER THEDRAGONChina’s recent actions, together withits long term naval production plans,confirm that Beijing intends to‘recover’ sovereignty over majorportions of the South China Sea, thusestablishing its dominance over thismaritime territory.
REGION 32
OFFICERS ANDBUSINESSMENSeveral South Asian militaries arerunning lucrative commercialventures rivalling private businessthat threaten not only to militarisecivil society but corrupt the Services.The Pakistani Army has built aneconomic empire; in Sri Lanka, theadministration is encouraging thearmed forces to get involved incommercial activity; in Bangladesh,the Army is expanding its financialand industrial operations and in Indiathere has been an increase in thecorruption of military officers.
COMBAT AIRCRAFT 14
BROKEN WINGSSince 1970, the Indian Air Force has lost 1,000 planes due to accidents, half ofthem are accounted for by variants of the MiG. Human error and technicaldefects are major reasons for aircraft accidents followed by bird strikes.
DIPLOMACY 46
PUSHING FOR REFORMIn the face of successive defeatsIndia has revived its quest for apermanent seat in the UnitedNations Security Council. Perhapsthis act of — as some say —misplaced bravado could end uphurting the country’s interests andinternational reputation.
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
Contents oct 11_2nd time:contents-feb-R.qxd 29/09/11 6:08 PM Page 2
Towards the end of 2008, asecret meeting was held in theoffice of the then IAF (IndianAir Force) chief, Air Chief
Marshal Fali Major. Key players in the Indian aeronautical sphere – including Secretary, Defence Production, K.P. Singhand Secretary, Civil Aviation, M. MadhavanNambiar, gathered to discuss how toeffectively invigorate India’s growingaeronautical establishment.
On the table that day was the idea of anAerospace Technology Commission alongthe lines of the Space Commission and theAtomic Energy Commission. But nothingwas to come of it. Even though PrimeMinister Manmohan Singh himself hadbacked the idea of an overarching bodythat would holistically integrate the
development of India’s defence and civilaviation sectors, the Ministry of Defence(MoD) did not want the Ministry of CivilAviation (MoCA) mucking around in itsjealously guarded aerospace sector. Themeeting was fruitless and clearly India’spurchases of military aeronautical assetscontinue to be rivalled only by itsexpenditure on civil aviation.
The aerospace community may now belooking at another moment of opportunity.When Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik handedover the Indian Air Force on July 31 to hissuccessor, N.A.K. ‘Charlie’ Browne, IAFwatchers knew that its heavy focus onRussian equipment will be switching to onethat has substantial space for westernequipment. After all, while Naik flies MiGs,Browne is a Jaguar man in a Service whereloyalty to one’s aircraft is as deeplyingrained as loyalty to one’s country.
Within a month after taking charge, Air Chief Marshal Browne has called for more far-reaching reform, suggestingthat the current aerospace structure — with Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL)monopolising the landscape completely —undermines the IAF as well as theaerospace community at large.
Addressing executives of private sector defence companies in New Delhi on September 1, Browne lamented the
AJAI SHUKLA
KEY POINTSn The IAF will be buying fighteraircraft worth USD 90-100 billion overthe next 20 years.n Air Chief Marshal Browne hasrecently called for far-reachingreforms in the current aerospacestructure.n The current MoD-led systemsuffers from a debilitating lack oftechnological judgement.
With new platforms being inducted into the IAF, creatingan overarching Aerospace Technology Commission willintegrate the defence and aviation sectors effectively
Towards the end of 2008, asecret meeting was held in theoffice of the then IAF (IndianAir Force) chief, Air Chief
Marshal Fali Major. Key players in the Indian aeronautical sphere – including Secretary, Defence Production, K.P. Singhand Secretary, Civil Aviation, M. MadhavanNambiar, gathered to discuss how toeffectively invigorate India’s growingaeronautical establishment.
On the table that day was the idea of anAerospace Technology Commission alongthe lines of the Space Commission and theAtomic Energy Commission. But nothingwas to come of it. Even though PrimeMinister Manmohan Singh himself hadbacked the idea of an overarching bodythat would holistically integrate the
development of India’s defence and civilaviation sectors, the Ministry of Defence(MoD) did not want the Ministry of CivilAviation (MoCA) mucking around in itsjealously guarded aerospace sector. Themeeting was fruitless and clearly India’spurchases of military aeronautical assetscontinue to be rivalled only by itsexpenditure on civil aviation.
The aerospace community may now belooking at another moment of opportunity.When Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik handedover the Indian Air Force on July 31 to hissuccessor, N.A.K. ‘Charlie’ Browne, IAFwatchers knew that its heavy focus onRussian equipment will be switching to onethat has substantial space for westernequipment. After all, while Naik flies MiGs,Browne is a Jaguar man in a Service whereloyalty to one’s aircraft is as deeplyingrained as loyalty to one’s country.
Within a month after taking charge, Air Chief Marshal Browne has called for more far-reaching reform, suggestingthat the current aerospace structure — with Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL)monopolising the landscape completely —undermines the IAF as well as theaerospace community at large.
Addressing executives of private sector defence companies in New Delhi on September 1, Browne lamented the
AJAI SHUKLA
KEY POINTSn The IAF will be buying fighteraircraft worth USD 90-100 billion overthe next 20 years.n Air Chief Marshal Browne hasrecently called for far-reachingreforms in the current aerospacestructure.n The current MoD-led systemsuffers from a debilitating lack oftechnological judgement.
With new platforms being inducted into the IAF, creatingan overarching Aerospace Technology Commission willintegrate the defence and aviation sectors effectively
inadequacy of the existing aerospacestructure and called on the private sector to, in effect, bail out HAL. As thecountry’s lone aerospace manufacturinghub, overhauler, upgrader and systemssupplier, HAL is overwhelmed with workand faces potentially serious problems inkeeping the IAF’s fleet aloft. Although theAir Chief did not explicitly call for radicalrestructuring, he has taken a cautious firststep down that path.
New Platforms Consider the astronomical figures in playhere. Browne revealed that the IAF hadsigned 271 capital acquisition contractsbetween 2006-11, shelling out `1,12,000crore (USD 25 billion). Separately, the top IAF acquisitions managers forecastthat an additional `2,24,000 crore (USD 50 billion) may be spent on some more new aircraft from 2012-2017. These figuresare significantly higher than variousestimations made in the past.
According to the IAF Chief, the newplatforms being inducted during the 11thand 12th Defence Plans (from 2007-2017)
include the Su-30MKI; the new LightCombat Aircraft (LCA); the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) (“If wecan sign that contract it will be a big relieffor us,” he said); the Indo-Russian FifthGeneration Fighter Aircraft (FGFA); theVery Heavy Transport Aircraft (Boeing’sC-17 (Globemaster III); the MediumTransport Aircraft; and a range ofhelicopters that are being developed byHAL. Browne also mentioned new surface-to-air missile systems; air defence systems;and the modernisation of 29 airfields thatwill conclude by 2014.
All this adds up to a hefty sum.Enumerating the costs, Defence MinisterA.K. Antony told Parliament on September7, that the, “total cost of procurement of theSu-30 MKI is over `55,717 crore (USD 12 billion) while the cost of procurement ofthe Tejas is about `8,691 crore (USD 1.9 billion).” Given that this is for just 40Tejas Mark-I fighters (two squadrons) theIAF will pay out at least another `21,727crore (USD 4.7 billion) for the five LCAMark-II squadrons that it plans to buy, thiswithout factoring in cost escalation.
AEROSPACE
Air Chief Marshal NormanAnil Kumar ‘Charlie’Browne with formerAir Chief Marshal Pradeep Vasant Naik
Within a month aftertaking charge, Air Chief
Marshal Browne hascalled for
far-reaching reforms,suggesting that the
current aerospacestructure — with
Hindustan AeronauticsLtd monopolising the
landscape completely —undermines the IAF aswell as the aerospacecommunity at large.
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216X276.indd 1216X276.indd 1 9/23/11 11:07:00 AM9/23/11 11:07:00 AM
Development Organisation) laboratorieshas gained crucial expertise in writing the complex algorithms of fly-by-wire systems; in developing missioncomputers; in radar technologies; and inavionics software. The Centre for MilitaryAirworthiness and Certification is nowthere to assess and certify aerospacecomponents and systems.
A world-class flight-testing agency, theNational Flight Test Centre, is up andrunning. Production agencies, in both thepublic and private sectors, have learned theprecision machining that is needed foraerospace components (like spacecraft andsubmarine parts, aerospace componentshave to be certified as suitable for use inaircraft); the art of fabricating componentsfrom composite materials; and the forgingof technology partnerships with foreigncompanies to quickly import and absorbuseful technologies.
Unfinished Business Creating this complex mosaic of buildingblocks was the difficult challenge increating an aerospace industry. Butstrangely it is the easy part that still remainsto be done — the unfinished business fromthat meeting in the Air Chief’s office in2008. This involves creating anoverarching structure — the AerospaceTechnology Commission — that canintegrate all these crucial building blocksinto a coherent and purposeful effectiveeco-system.
The current MoD-led system, whereapparatchiks make all the key decisions,suffers from a debilitating lack oftechnological judgement. Crucialtechnological and scientific inputs are given short shrift or misevaluated.
The MoD’s other great drawback is itslack of authority over organisations underother ministries, which can play crucialroles in the realm of aerospace design andproduction. One example, the NationalAerospace Laboratories (NAL), a highlyregarded laboratory under the Council ofScientific and Industrial Research (CSIR).NAL has made significant contributions to the Tejas LCA programme with its expertise in composite technologies and is currently engaged in severaltransport aircraft developmentprogrammes. But, with no formalintegration into India’s big militaryaerospace programmes, Dr Satish Dhawan
once famously described NAL as, “abeautiful bride, all dressed up and nowhereto go.”
Particularly, the Aerospace TechnologyCommission will integrate the functioningof research organisations on one side, andproduction organisations on the other.Clear lines of authority will be essential,along with the financial control, to avoidthe pitfalls that held back ADA fromfunctioning effectively in the Tejasprogramme. As a DRDO organisation,ADA was unable to marshal HAL’sresources, with HAL focussing more on thelucrative production lines (for instance, theSu-30MKI line in Nashik) that generate thebulk of its turnover.
For these reasons the AerospaceTechnology Commission needs to be an apex-level, fully empowered organisation.It must be headed by a scientist-manager of the rank of Secretary to the Government (former President, Dr A.P.J.Kalam typifies this breed but there are
many others of almost equal competence who can deliver). Such a profile willassist the commission in marshalling the capabilities of India’s myriad laboratories, agencies, academic researchestablishments and production lines. Each one of them has areas ofspecialisation that can feed into an aircraftdevelopment programme.
The commission should be charged withtapping the expertise available; identifyinggaps in technology; plugging gaps by allocating R&D priorities to aeronautical establishments based on theirspecialisations; and arranging the forming ofjoint ventures and R&D partnerships withglobal players for obtaining crucial, butotherwise difficult to obtain, technologies.The commission will also ensure theexploitation of technological breakthroughsby giving a suitable facility charge ofcontinuing down that research path.
In setting up an Aerospace TechnologyCommission for India it is important to
OCTOBER 2011 DSIAEROSPACE
A more realistic assessment, factoringin escalation due to upgraded systems andinflation, will put the cost of those fivesquadrons at ̀ 27,600 (USD 6 billion). Theimpending purchase of 189 MMRCA,whose initial tender is for 126 aircraft,could cost around ̀ 1,15,000 crore (USD 28billion). Around 250 Fifth-GenerationFighter Aircraft, which will be co-developed with Russia and built in India,will cost about `161,000 crore (USD 35billion); and the development andmanufacture of around 200 AdvancedMedium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) will costat least another USD 20 billion. Totting upthese figures, the IAF will be buying fighteraircraft worth USD 90-100 billion over thenext 20 years.
The expenditure will cross USD 150billion if one also budgets for naval aviationassets; transport, refuelling and earlywarning aircraft; the radar and missileassets needed for upgrading India’s woefulair defence system; and the airfield and airspace control infrastructure.
Going forward from there, things willonly get more expensive as Unmanned
Combat Aircraft — stealthy, pilot-lessdrones that carry tonnes of smart weapons— become the norm. While bayonets andboots will continue to determine successon the ground, technology is rapidlybecoming the key differentiator betweenvictory and defeat in air battles. Some of those technologies will simply not bepurchasable; others will be unaffordable.
India’s need for credible conventionaldeterrence leaves it with little choice but to develop the expertise and theinfrastructure needed for designing and producing the sophisticated, yetaffordable, aerospace assets that can shapethe future battlefield to our advantage.
This involves one simple process andseveral extremely complex ones. Duringthe development of the Tejas fighter, the complex challenges have, to a significant degree, been overcome. Projectmanagement skills, and expertise insystems integration, have been acquired bythe Aeronautical Development Agency(ADA), which also gathered a stable of aeronautical designers. A network of DRDO (Defence Research and
The AerospaceTechnology Commission
will integrate thefunctioning of research
organisations on oneside and productionorganisations on theother. Clear lines of
authority and financialcontrol will be essential,to avoid the pitfalls that
Development Organisation) laboratorieshas gained crucial expertise in writing the complex algorithms of fly-by-wire systems; in developing missioncomputers; in radar technologies; and inavionics software. The Centre for MilitaryAirworthiness and Certification is nowthere to assess and certify aerospacecomponents and systems.
A world-class flight-testing agency, theNational Flight Test Centre, is up andrunning. Production agencies, in both thepublic and private sectors, have learned theprecision machining that is needed foraerospace components (like spacecraft andsubmarine parts, aerospace componentshave to be certified as suitable for use inaircraft); the art of fabricating componentsfrom composite materials; and the forgingof technology partnerships with foreigncompanies to quickly import and absorbuseful technologies.
Unfinished Business Creating this complex mosaic of buildingblocks was the difficult challenge increating an aerospace industry. Butstrangely it is the easy part that still remainsto be done — the unfinished business fromthat meeting in the Air Chief’s office in2008. This involves creating anoverarching structure — the AerospaceTechnology Commission — that canintegrate all these crucial building blocksinto a coherent and purposeful effectiveeco-system.
The current MoD-led system, whereapparatchiks make all the key decisions,suffers from a debilitating lack oftechnological judgement. Crucialtechnological and scientific inputs are given short shrift or misevaluated.
The MoD’s other great drawback is itslack of authority over organisations underother ministries, which can play crucialroles in the realm of aerospace design andproduction. One example, the NationalAerospace Laboratories (NAL), a highlyregarded laboratory under the Council ofScientific and Industrial Research (CSIR).NAL has made significant contributions to the Tejas LCA programme with its expertise in composite technologies and is currently engaged in severaltransport aircraft developmentprogrammes. But, with no formalintegration into India’s big militaryaerospace programmes, Dr Satish Dhawan
once famously described NAL as, “abeautiful bride, all dressed up and nowhereto go.”
Particularly, the Aerospace TechnologyCommission will integrate the functioningof research organisations on one side, andproduction organisations on the other.Clear lines of authority will be essential,along with the financial control, to avoidthe pitfalls that held back ADA fromfunctioning effectively in the Tejasprogramme. As a DRDO organisation,ADA was unable to marshal HAL’sresources, with HAL focussing more on thelucrative production lines (for instance, theSu-30MKI line in Nashik) that generate thebulk of its turnover.
For these reasons the AerospaceTechnology Commission needs to be an apex-level, fully empowered organisation.It must be headed by a scientist-manager of the rank of Secretary to the Government (former President, Dr A.P.J.Kalam typifies this breed but there are
many others of almost equal competence who can deliver). Such a profile willassist the commission in marshalling the capabilities of India’s myriad laboratories, agencies, academic researchestablishments and production lines. Each one of them has areas ofspecialisation that can feed into an aircraftdevelopment programme.
The commission should be charged withtapping the expertise available; identifyinggaps in technology; plugging gaps by allocating R&D priorities to aeronautical establishments based on theirspecialisations; and arranging the forming ofjoint ventures and R&D partnerships withglobal players for obtaining crucial, butotherwise difficult to obtain, technologies.The commission will also ensure theexploitation of technological breakthroughsby giving a suitable facility charge ofcontinuing down that research path.
In setting up an Aerospace TechnologyCommission for India it is important to
OCTOBER 2011 DSIAEROSPACE
A more realistic assessment, factoringin escalation due to upgraded systems andinflation, will put the cost of those fivesquadrons at ̀ 27,600 (USD 6 billion). Theimpending purchase of 189 MMRCA,whose initial tender is for 126 aircraft,could cost around ̀ 1,15,000 crore (USD 28billion). Around 250 Fifth-GenerationFighter Aircraft, which will be co-developed with Russia and built in India,will cost about `161,000 crore (USD 35billion); and the development andmanufacture of around 200 AdvancedMedium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) will costat least another USD 20 billion. Totting upthese figures, the IAF will be buying fighteraircraft worth USD 90-100 billion over thenext 20 years.
The expenditure will cross USD 150billion if one also budgets for naval aviationassets; transport, refuelling and earlywarning aircraft; the radar and missileassets needed for upgrading India’s woefulair defence system; and the airfield and airspace control infrastructure.
Going forward from there, things willonly get more expensive as Unmanned
Combat Aircraft — stealthy, pilot-lessdrones that carry tonnes of smart weapons— become the norm. While bayonets andboots will continue to determine successon the ground, technology is rapidlybecoming the key differentiator betweenvictory and defeat in air battles. Some of those technologies will simply not bepurchasable; others will be unaffordable.
India’s need for credible conventionaldeterrence leaves it with little choice but to develop the expertise and theinfrastructure needed for designing and producing the sophisticated, yetaffordable, aerospace assets that can shapethe future battlefield to our advantage.
This involves one simple process andseveral extremely complex ones. Duringthe development of the Tejas fighter, the complex challenges have, to a significant degree, been overcome. Projectmanagement skills, and expertise insystems integration, have been acquired bythe Aeronautical Development Agency(ADA), which also gathered a stable of aeronautical designers. A network of DRDO (Defence Research and
The AerospaceTechnology Commission
will integrate thefunctioning of research
organisations on oneside and productionorganisations on theother. Clear lines of
authority and financialcontrol will be essential,to avoid the pitfalls that
note that, worldwide, civil aviationrequirements tend to overshadow those ofthe military. Even though India isimplementing a major ten-year IAFmodernisation plan, its civil aviationrequirements are enormous. Minister forScience and Technology and EarthSciences, Vilasrao Deshmukh, announcedlast month, that India will need over USD 100 billion worth of civil aircraft by2025, which will include some 1,000airliners of different capacities. But New Delhi has shown little interest indeveloping an indigenous airline industry,the way it has pursued a military aerospace capability.
NAL, which functions under the CSIR,has designed some small civil aircraft overthe last two decades, but not in a concertedmanner. After designing and buildingIndia's first all-composite aircraft, the two-seater Hansa, NAL has pursued thedevelopment of a 14-seat, light transportaircraft, the Saras. This programme suffereda jolt when a Saras prototype crashed in2009, killing three IAF test pilots.
Now NAL is developing the five-seaterNM5 general aviation aircraft along with theMahindra Group. It is also spearheading the
development of a 70-100-seater airlinerunder the `8,300 crore National CivilAircraft Development Programme. Ideally,all of these programmes should be brought under the Aerospace TechnologyCommission and synergised with themilitary aviation programmes.
Not a Novel IdeaThis vertically integrated structure for
the Department of Aerospace is not a novelidea. The advantages of such a structurehave been illustrated already by thesuccesses of the Department of AtomicEnergy and the Department of Space.Vertical integration will provide aerospacewith the same synergies and prevent thedissipation of resources, especially withinthe private sector where companies simplycannot afford to put effort into R&D unlessit is government-funded or directed soprecisely that it will almost certainly yieldcommercial orders.
In consolidating its aerospace resourcesunder a single structure, India will befollowing a global lead. In Russia,individual design houses like Mikoyan andSukhoi once played wastefully with designsthat went nowhere. These have now been
consolidated with the Federal Service forMilitary Technical Cooperation providingoversight while the United AircraftCorporation brings together designbureaus and production agencies. It is timefor India to embrace a similar model.
The high-powered Naresh ChandraCommittee, which is looking at reform ofthe national security set-up and of higherdefence organisation in India, is currentlyexamining proposals like this one. The newAir Chief has confirmed that the committeerecently, “had a session with us in AirHeadquarters just a few days ago”.
Says Browne: “All those issues will bediscussed. We’ve given them our viewpointabout how to amend and reform oursystem. We have a tremendous potentialin the country, both in the ministriesconcerned and the defence forces. I’mhopeful they’ll do an excellent job and,once it is accepted by the Government,hopefully things will improve.”
Even if the Naresh Chandra Committeecomes up with the necessaryrecommendations, it will take completecommitment on the part of New Delhi toimplement them without any further lossof time.
Since Independence in 1947,whenever the air arm of the armedforces was used India never lost awar against its adversaries.
Whether it was the 1947-48 military actionin Kashmir, the India-Pakistan wars of1965 and 1971 or the not too distant Kargiloperation in 1999, participation by theIndian Air Force (IAF) in all its classicalroles including offensive, always ensuredthe successful outcomes of the militarycampaigns. The only time India suffered ahumiliating military debacle was in the1962 Sino-Indian conflict in the Himalayaswhen India chose not to use the IAF
offensively against its adversary – apolitico-military or diplomatic lapseregretted and rued till today.
On the other hand, the IAF’s finest hourperhaps was the rocket attack carried outby a formation of MiG-21 jet fighters on theGovernor’s house in Dacca (now Dhaka)during the Indo-Pak War of 1971. The pin-point accuracy of the air strike resulted inDacca’s immediate capitulation andsurrender by the enemy’s 93,000-strongArmy in East Pakistan – it also gave birth toa brand new nation, Bangladesh. Morerecently, day-night Laser Guided Bombattacks by Mirage 2000 during the 1999Operation Safed Sagar in Kargil againstTiger Hill also greatly hastened Pakistan’sillegal occupation of territory on the Indianside of the Line of Control (LoC).
Undoubtedly, the IAF has not onlycovered itself with glory during wars butalso with excellence during its peace-timeencounters – its participation in a largenumber of international air exercises,including the highly prestigious US RedFlag amply prove the point.
But if there is one unending war whichthe IAF seems to be fighting since itsinception, with victory still nowhere on thehorizon, it is on aviation radars the flightsafety front. The IAF might have won an
15
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
14
COMBAT AVIATION
BROKENWINGS Peacetime attrition due to accidents continues to bea matter of great concern for the IAF
V.K. BHATIA
KEY POINTSn The Indian Air Force has lost ten times more aircraft duringpeacetime than in all the wars it hasfought till now.n In the past 40 years since 1970,out of the nearly 1,000 aircraft lost,half are accounted for by variants ofthe MiG-21.n Induction of 41 ‘Avian’ radars aimto boost the IAF’s ‘prevention of birdstrikes’ campaign.
AFP
The mangled remains of aMiG-27 aircraft whichcrashed at a village inMidnapore District, West Bengal
Since Independence in 1947,whenever the air arm of the armedforces was used India never lost awar against its adversaries.
Whether it was the 1947-48 military actionin Kashmir, the India-Pakistan wars of1965 and 1971 or the not too distant Kargiloperation in 1999, participation by theIndian Air Force (IAF) in all its classicalroles including offensive, always ensuredthe successful outcomes of the militarycampaigns. The only time India suffered ahumiliating military debacle was in the1962 Sino-Indian conflict in the Himalayaswhen India chose not to use the IAF
offensively against its adversary – apolitico-military or diplomatic lapseregretted and rued till today.
On the other hand, the IAF’s finest hourperhaps was the rocket attack carried outby a formation of MiG-21 jet fighters on theGovernor’s house in Dacca (now Dhaka)during the Indo-Pak War of 1971. The pin-point accuracy of the air strike resulted inDacca’s immediate capitulation andsurrender by the enemy’s 93,000-strongArmy in East Pakistan – it also gave birth toa brand new nation, Bangladesh. Morerecently, day-night Laser Guided Bombattacks by Mirage 2000 during the 1999Operation Safed Sagar in Kargil againstTiger Hill also greatly hastened Pakistan’sillegal occupation of territory on the Indianside of the Line of Control (LoC).
Undoubtedly, the IAF has not onlycovered itself with glory during wars butalso with excellence during its peace-timeencounters – its participation in a largenumber of international air exercises,including the highly prestigious US RedFlag amply prove the point.
But if there is one unending war whichthe IAF seems to be fighting since itsinception, with victory still nowhere on thehorizon, it is on aviation radars the flightsafety front. The IAF might have won an
15
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
14
COMBAT AVIATION
BROKENWINGS Peacetime attrition due to accidents continues to bea matter of great concern for the IAF
V.K. BHATIA
KEY POINTSn The Indian Air Force has lost ten times more aircraft duringpeacetime than in all the wars it hasfought till now.n In the past 40 years since 1970,out of the nearly 1,000 aircraft lost,half are accounted for by variants ofthe MiG-21.n Induction of 41 ‘Avian’ radars aimto boost the IAF’s ‘prevention of birdstrikes’ campaign.
AFP
The mangled remains of aMiG-27 aircraft whichcrashed at a village inMidnapore District, West Bengal
odd battle now and then in this area but generally it has been caught on thewrong foot as far as its flight safety record is concerned.
After a comparative lull this year, the IAF has lost three jet fighters in quicksuccession last month: the first on August2, added a bleak statistic of being the1,000th aircraft lost in accidents since1970.This by itself is a dismal record but ifone was to add the number of aircraft lostin the previous 20 years since the 1950s, thetotal could easily cross 1,500. With the totalinventory of all types of fixed and rotarywing aircraft hovering around this figure,the IAF has the dubious distinction ofhaving its peacetime losses being more thanten times of the combined attrition in all thewars it has fought till now.
Peacetime attrition due to accidentscontinues to be a matter of great concernfor an Air Force which is not only thefourth-largest in the world but alsoconsidered to be one of the operationallymost capable. The number of accidents
versus flying hours is considered to be auniversally accepted norm to calculate the aircraft accident rate. If one comparesthe IAF with, say, the US Air Force (USAF),it becomes apparent that the flight safety record of the USAF, at an average of 1.0 per 100,000 hours, is more than ten times better than the IAF which since 1970 maintains an average of around 1.07 per 10,000 hours.
Unfair ComparisonSome flight analysts feel, perhaps rightlyso, that this sort of comparison is not fairto the IAF. The USAF has global operationswith a large proportion of its total flyinghours per annum being devoted to airtransport operations which are inherentlymuch safer than fighter operations.
Secondly, there is the issue of theduration of sorties in fighter flying. In thecase of the USAF this averages more than anhour mostly because of the lengthytransition times required to reach their localflying areas for peacetime training. In
comparison, air transport operations in the IAF, including the hazardous tasks of air maintenance in the high altitudeareas of Ladakh and the Northeast — aremostly confined within Indian territories.Consequently, their contribution, vis-à-visfighters’ with respect to the IAF’s total perannum flying effort, is proportionatelymuch less compared to that of the USAF.
Additionally, much of the IAF’s fighterforce still comprises different types ofMiGs such as the MiG-21 variants, MiG-27and MiG-29 aircraft, which have restrictedendurances due to their lower fuel carryingcapabilities. This necessitates closeproximities of local flying areas to thelaunch bases, resulting in short sorties, theaverage being in the vicinity of 35 to 40minutes. This automatically increases therisk quotient, impinging directly onaccident rates and flight safety records.
Considering these factors, it is highlyunrealistic in the present and foreseeablescenarios for the IAF to try and match theUSAF’s flight safety record. At over 1 per
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
10,000 hours Category-I accident rate —in which the aircraft is totally written off —the IAF is way off the mark in terms ofachievable target rates which requires it toconsiderably increase efforts to improve itsflight safety record.
Though the IAF tom toms that it is one ofthe leading Air Forces in the world at thesame time it is also its own worst enemyprimarily because of the rate it loses aircraftduring peacetime operations.
Typically, every time, an IAF aircraft islost, the media comes down heavily withall kinds of accusations, ranging from lack ofprofessionalism, poor training, flyingunserviceable and non-airworthy aircraft.
As the losses, man and machine, mount,the headlines keep getting more shrill.
However, having served in the IAF formore than four decades with more than5,500 hours on different types of fighters(including the MiG-21), transports andhelicopters, nothing could be further fromtruth. The IAF’s commitment to itsprofessionalism, to its integrity and to the
nation is unquestionable.Only consider the IAF has so structured
itself that apart from the five operationalcommands, it has full-fledged training andmaintenance commands to look after alltypes of requirements. These so-calledsupport commands have been functioningmuch before most of the operationalcommands came into being. In fact, the IAF was also the first Service to put intoplace a robust Inspection and Flight Safety Organisation starting with anindependent branch at Air Headquarterswith flight safety setups down to the lowest field levels. This clearly indicates theseriousness with which the IAF has soughtto provide the best possible training,maintenance and flight safety standards inits quest to be a world class professionaland capable service.
Victim of CircumstancesHaving said that, from the beginning of itsevolutionary journey, the IAF has oftenbeen a victim of circumstances – mostlynot of its own making – which not only ledto a creation of imbalances and deficienciesin its inventories, but, indirectly, also hadadverse effects on its flight safety records.
Starting from the mid-1950s, the IAFhas started acquiring jet fighter andbombers from western sources. Theseincluded the French Dassault MystereIVAs for ground attack role and the Britishmulti-role Hunters and Canberra lightbombers. Then came the light-weight Gnatwhich was also offered by the British forlicense-production in India. The Gnat wasprobably the smallest jet fighter everproduced with attendant design problemsof such magnitude that it was not inductedinto the Royal Air Force (RAF) in its single-seat version. However, mass-produced inIndia, it equipped a large number of IAFsquadrons. And while it proved to be ahighly agile and nimble fighter – earningthe sobriquet of the ‘Sabre Slayer’ duringthe 1965 India-Pakistan War – it alsoturned out to be a highly accident-proneaircraft. These aircraft were lost in drovescausing a big dent in the flight safetystatistics of the IAF in the sixties and early seventies.
The Chinese debacle of 1962 and itsNon-Aligned policies very quickly pushedIndia into the Soviet camp to meet itsdefence needs. The IAF was flooded withRussian aircraft starting with the MiG-21s,
16 17
COMBAT AVIATION
In most Air Forces around the world, the majorcauses of accidents are human error, technicaldefects and those related to environment. This istrue for the IAF as well.
Human error and technical defects are majorreasons for aircraft accidents followed by birdstrikes Human Error (HE) Accidents can further besub-divided into HE (Air Crew), loosely known aspilot error and HE (Servicing) which cover the lapsesby ground crew responsible for aircraft servicing/technical operations. Technical defects dealto systems/components/material failure and design/manufacturing deficiencies and so on.
Pilot error comprises factors such as lack of airmanship which includes lack of situationalawareness, lack of flying skills, disorientation, controlled flight into flight (CFIT), mishandlingof controls, improper emergency handling and, psychological factors such as under/overconfidence and yes each misplaced egos which can also result in accidents. Similarly, HE (S)factors pertain to lapses in servicing and maintenance of the flying machines. On the otherhand technical defects also have a direct relation to the level/vintage of technology of theaircraft in question.
It is natural for all Air Forces in the world to dream of achieving a utopian zero accidentgoal. In reality, the aim is to create conditions to come close to the ideal scenario of zeroaccident by targeting, all or as many as possible factors which causes an accident. The USAFfor example, targets everything which concerns human error, technical defects andenvironmental issues. Some of theEuropean Air Forces concede the fact thatpilot error accidents cannot be completelyeliminated and have concentrated towards zerotolerance in other aspects such as technical defects infurtherance of their flight safety records. Most importantly,sharing a common factor of staying abreast on the technology front has helped allthe leading air forces in the world to reap rewards as regard to their flight safety records.
odd battle now and then in this area but generally it has been caught on thewrong foot as far as its flight safety record is concerned.
After a comparative lull this year, the IAF has lost three jet fighters in quicksuccession last month: the first on August2, added a bleak statistic of being the1,000th aircraft lost in accidents since1970.This by itself is a dismal record but ifone was to add the number of aircraft lostin the previous 20 years since the 1950s, thetotal could easily cross 1,500. With the totalinventory of all types of fixed and rotarywing aircraft hovering around this figure,the IAF has the dubious distinction ofhaving its peacetime losses being more thanten times of the combined attrition in all thewars it has fought till now.
Peacetime attrition due to accidentscontinues to be a matter of great concernfor an Air Force which is not only thefourth-largest in the world but alsoconsidered to be one of the operationallymost capable. The number of accidents
versus flying hours is considered to be auniversally accepted norm to calculate the aircraft accident rate. If one comparesthe IAF with, say, the US Air Force (USAF),it becomes apparent that the flight safety record of the USAF, at an average of 1.0 per 100,000 hours, is more than ten times better than the IAF which since 1970 maintains an average of around 1.07 per 10,000 hours.
Unfair ComparisonSome flight analysts feel, perhaps rightlyso, that this sort of comparison is not fairto the IAF. The USAF has global operationswith a large proportion of its total flyinghours per annum being devoted to airtransport operations which are inherentlymuch safer than fighter operations.
Secondly, there is the issue of theduration of sorties in fighter flying. In thecase of the USAF this averages more than anhour mostly because of the lengthytransition times required to reach their localflying areas for peacetime training. In
comparison, air transport operations in the IAF, including the hazardous tasks of air maintenance in the high altitudeareas of Ladakh and the Northeast — aremostly confined within Indian territories.Consequently, their contribution, vis-à-visfighters’ with respect to the IAF’s total perannum flying effort, is proportionatelymuch less compared to that of the USAF.
Additionally, much of the IAF’s fighterforce still comprises different types ofMiGs such as the MiG-21 variants, MiG-27and MiG-29 aircraft, which have restrictedendurances due to their lower fuel carryingcapabilities. This necessitates closeproximities of local flying areas to thelaunch bases, resulting in short sorties, theaverage being in the vicinity of 35 to 40minutes. This automatically increases therisk quotient, impinging directly onaccident rates and flight safety records.
Considering these factors, it is highlyunrealistic in the present and foreseeablescenarios for the IAF to try and match theUSAF’s flight safety record. At over 1 per
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
10,000 hours Category-I accident rate —in which the aircraft is totally written off —the IAF is way off the mark in terms ofachievable target rates which requires it toconsiderably increase efforts to improve itsflight safety record.
Though the IAF tom toms that it is one ofthe leading Air Forces in the world at thesame time it is also its own worst enemyprimarily because of the rate it loses aircraftduring peacetime operations.
Typically, every time, an IAF aircraft islost, the media comes down heavily withall kinds of accusations, ranging from lack ofprofessionalism, poor training, flyingunserviceable and non-airworthy aircraft.
As the losses, man and machine, mount,the headlines keep getting more shrill.
However, having served in the IAF formore than four decades with more than5,500 hours on different types of fighters(including the MiG-21), transports andhelicopters, nothing could be further fromtruth. The IAF’s commitment to itsprofessionalism, to its integrity and to the
nation is unquestionable.Only consider the IAF has so structured
itself that apart from the five operationalcommands, it has full-fledged training andmaintenance commands to look after alltypes of requirements. These so-calledsupport commands have been functioningmuch before most of the operationalcommands came into being. In fact, the IAF was also the first Service to put intoplace a robust Inspection and Flight Safety Organisation starting with anindependent branch at Air Headquarterswith flight safety setups down to the lowest field levels. This clearly indicates theseriousness with which the IAF has soughtto provide the best possible training,maintenance and flight safety standards inits quest to be a world class professionaland capable service.
Victim of CircumstancesHaving said that, from the beginning of itsevolutionary journey, the IAF has oftenbeen a victim of circumstances – mostlynot of its own making – which not only ledto a creation of imbalances and deficienciesin its inventories, but, indirectly, also hadadverse effects on its flight safety records.
Starting from the mid-1950s, the IAFhas started acquiring jet fighter andbombers from western sources. Theseincluded the French Dassault MystereIVAs for ground attack role and the Britishmulti-role Hunters and Canberra lightbombers. Then came the light-weight Gnatwhich was also offered by the British forlicense-production in India. The Gnat wasprobably the smallest jet fighter everproduced with attendant design problemsof such magnitude that it was not inductedinto the Royal Air Force (RAF) in its single-seat version. However, mass-produced inIndia, it equipped a large number of IAFsquadrons. And while it proved to be ahighly agile and nimble fighter – earningthe sobriquet of the ‘Sabre Slayer’ duringthe 1965 India-Pakistan War – it alsoturned out to be a highly accident-proneaircraft. These aircraft were lost in drovescausing a big dent in the flight safetystatistics of the IAF in the sixties and early seventies.
The Chinese debacle of 1962 and itsNon-Aligned policies very quickly pushedIndia into the Soviet camp to meet itsdefence needs. The IAF was flooded withRussian aircraft starting with the MiG-21s,
16 17
COMBAT AVIATION
In most Air Forces around the world, the majorcauses of accidents are human error, technicaldefects and those related to environment. This istrue for the IAF as well.
Human error and technical defects are majorreasons for aircraft accidents followed by birdstrikes Human Error (HE) Accidents can further besub-divided into HE (Air Crew), loosely known aspilot error and HE (Servicing) which cover the lapsesby ground crew responsible for aircraft servicing/technical operations. Technical defects dealto systems/components/material failure and design/manufacturing deficiencies and so on.
Pilot error comprises factors such as lack of airmanship which includes lack of situationalawareness, lack of flying skills, disorientation, controlled flight into flight (CFIT), mishandlingof controls, improper emergency handling and, psychological factors such as under/overconfidence and yes each misplaced egos which can also result in accidents. Similarly, HE (S)factors pertain to lapses in servicing and maintenance of the flying machines. On the otherhand technical defects also have a direct relation to the level/vintage of technology of theaircraft in question.
It is natural for all Air Forces in the world to dream of achieving a utopian zero accidentgoal. In reality, the aim is to create conditions to come close to the ideal scenario of zeroaccident by targeting, all or as many as possible factors which causes an accident. The USAFfor example, targets everything which concerns human error, technical defects andenvironmental issues. Some of theEuropean Air Forces concede the fact thatpilot error accidents cannot be completelyeliminated and have concentrated towards zerotolerance in other aspects such as technical defects infurtherance of their flight safety records. Most importantly,sharing a common factor of staying abreast on the technology front has helped allthe leading air forces in the world to reap rewards as regard to their flight safety records.
later followed by the Su-7s, MiG-23variants, MiG-25s, MiG-27s and MiG-29s.The latest to join this long line inventory isthe Su-30MK-Is. In the present context, it isthe MiG-21 variants which have impactedthe IAF’s flight safety record.
MiG StoryThe MiG-21 in its first avatar was designedand developed as the first Mach-2 aircraftby the Soviet bloc to counter the US F-104Star Fighter. It was essentially a supersonicinterceptor to take care of high altitudethreats, including the US U2 spy planes.When it first came to India, the pilots weremade to fly the aircraft clad in partialpressure suits and helmets not verydifferent from the ones used by the Russiancosmonauts on space flights. (A slightdigression: Uri Gagarin, the first person totravel into space, rather sadly, actually diedwhile piloting a MiG-21.)
The IAF very soon realised the futility ofusing this aircraft as a high altitudeinterceptor and quickly converted it to beused for myriad roles such as low-levelground attack for counter-air and, counter-surface force operations in aid of the landand naval forces. MiG-21, in its almost tendifferent variants was also mass-producedby Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)in its Bengaluru facilities, to fill the vacuumcaused by the retirement of jet fighters ofwestern origin and also the earlyretirement of the Su-7 fleets. Till not solong ago, two-thirds of the IAF’s jetvariants fighter squadrons consisted ofMiG-21 flying almost 60 percent of thefighter sorties annually.
The truth is that the MiG-21 has a razor-thin delta wing which because of high-wingloading calls for excessive take-off andlanding speeds. This also makes theaircraft prone to super-stall conditionsduring manoeuvring with the aircraftrapidly losing height in spite of a nose-upattitude – a sure recipe for disaster at lowlevel, especially for the uninitiated.Additionally, its forward visibility is low.The interceptor versions carry big radomesin the nose restricting the air intake areas,which incidentally is low even in the non-radar versions of the type, making allvariants highly vulnerable to bird strikes,which invariably result in engine flameoutsand a certain destruction of the single-engine aircraft. Pilot survivability entirelydepends on timely ejection which may not
be possible in all circumstances. Couple all this with the IAF’s somewhat
flawed earlier policy of encouraging growth of vegetation which brought inunprecedented dangers from increasedbird or animal activity at airfields and onecan anticipate the end result.
With a combination of all these factors itis not surprising that in the past 40 yearssince 1970, out of the nearly 1,000 aircraftlost, half are accounted for by variants ofthe MiG-21. In fact, as can be testified bymost of the fighter fraternity of the IAF,who have mastered the demanding beast– it is still being used in limited way foradvanced jet training of the rookie pilots.
It is time for the IAF to say adieu to theMiG-21 in training roles with increasinginductions of Hawk Advanced Jet Trainer(AJTs) into the IAF. By the same logic,MiG-21 variants need to be phased outfrom the IAF’s operational squadrons aswell except perhaps the avionics-upgradedBison version which would have to servein the IAF till 2020 or so.
The suggestion has nothing to do with theage of the aircraft. Any aircraft is flyable aslong as it is airworthy. An oft cited example of
this is the B-52 bombers which have servedfor more than half-a-century and still goingstrong and, that too with the best flightsafety record in the USAF. But, these aircrafthave been continuously upgraded, re-engined and refurbished and equallyimportantly, used in the comparativelysedentary bomber role. On the other hand,MiG-21s – supersonic interceptors ofyesteryear – have no viable option left forany further upgrade and need to be phasedout on the grounds of old technology.
But the reality is, already depleted tonearly two-thirds of its earlier combat force
levels, the IAF is in no position to retire itsMiG-21 fleet in one go. It will have to wait for a gradual phase-out, which shouldbe linked with the inductions of newaircraft. It is therefore important to quicklycomplete the Medium Multi-Role CombatAircraft (MMRCA) selection process andincreasing the rate at which Su-30MKIsand the Light Combat Aircraft Tejas arebeing built by HAL.
Hopefully, in a few years from now,apart from the five or six Bison squadrons,the IAF will be in a position to re-equip allother MiG-21 squadrons. The infusion of
new technology aircraft with inherentflight safety features, the availability ofHawk AJTs in greater numbers to take onthe entire burden of advanced jet trainingshould have a salutary effect on the IAF’sflight safety statistics.
In addition, the de-vegetation process,started almost 15 years ago to clear thesurrounding environment at the IAFairfields, has started showing results interms of reduced bird activity and lessernumber of total bird strikes. It is imperativethat the concerned State Governments joinhands with the IAF to sanitise the entire
airfield zones to further reduce the birdmenace. A proposed induction of 41 ‘Avian’radars will also boost the IAF’s ‘prevention ofbird strikes’ campaign. The recent releaseof the APF (Accident Probability Factor)Calculator is a small but yet another step inthe right direction.
But these steps alone are not sufficientfor the IAF to win its unending war on theflight safety front. Spearheaded by itsspecialised branch, the IAF as a whole will need to adopt a proactive approach to achieve the desired goals – a zeroaccident rate.
AFP
COMBAT AVIATION
In the past 40 years, since1970, out of the nearly1,000 aircraft lost, half
later followed by the Su-7s, MiG-23variants, MiG-25s, MiG-27s and MiG-29s.The latest to join this long line inventory isthe Su-30MK-Is. In the present context, it isthe MiG-21 variants which have impactedthe IAF’s flight safety record.
MiG StoryThe MiG-21 in its first avatar was designedand developed as the first Mach-2 aircraftby the Soviet bloc to counter the US F-104Star Fighter. It was essentially a supersonicinterceptor to take care of high altitudethreats, including the US U2 spy planes.When it first came to India, the pilots weremade to fly the aircraft clad in partialpressure suits and helmets not verydifferent from the ones used by the Russiancosmonauts on space flights. (A slightdigression: Uri Gagarin, the first person totravel into space, rather sadly, actually diedwhile piloting a MiG-21.)
The IAF very soon realised the futility ofusing this aircraft as a high altitudeinterceptor and quickly converted it to beused for myriad roles such as low-levelground attack for counter-air and, counter-surface force operations in aid of the landand naval forces. MiG-21, in its almost tendifferent variants was also mass-producedby Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)in its Bengaluru facilities, to fill the vacuumcaused by the retirement of jet fighters ofwestern origin and also the earlyretirement of the Su-7 fleets. Till not solong ago, two-thirds of the IAF’s jetvariants fighter squadrons consisted ofMiG-21 flying almost 60 percent of thefighter sorties annually.
The truth is that the MiG-21 has a razor-thin delta wing which because of high-wingloading calls for excessive take-off andlanding speeds. This also makes theaircraft prone to super-stall conditionsduring manoeuvring with the aircraftrapidly losing height in spite of a nose-upattitude – a sure recipe for disaster at lowlevel, especially for the uninitiated.Additionally, its forward visibility is low.The interceptor versions carry big radomesin the nose restricting the air intake areas,which incidentally is low even in the non-radar versions of the type, making allvariants highly vulnerable to bird strikes,which invariably result in engine flameoutsand a certain destruction of the single-engine aircraft. Pilot survivability entirelydepends on timely ejection which may not
be possible in all circumstances. Couple all this with the IAF’s somewhat
flawed earlier policy of encouraging growth of vegetation which brought inunprecedented dangers from increasedbird or animal activity at airfields and onecan anticipate the end result.
With a combination of all these factors itis not surprising that in the past 40 yearssince 1970, out of the nearly 1,000 aircraftlost, half are accounted for by variants ofthe MiG-21. In fact, as can be testified bymost of the fighter fraternity of the IAF,who have mastered the demanding beast– it is still being used in limited way foradvanced jet training of the rookie pilots.
It is time for the IAF to say adieu to theMiG-21 in training roles with increasinginductions of Hawk Advanced Jet Trainer(AJTs) into the IAF. By the same logic,MiG-21 variants need to be phased outfrom the IAF’s operational squadrons aswell except perhaps the avionics-upgradedBison version which would have to servein the IAF till 2020 or so.
The suggestion has nothing to do with theage of the aircraft. Any aircraft is flyable aslong as it is airworthy. An oft cited example of
this is the B-52 bombers which have servedfor more than half-a-century and still goingstrong and, that too with the best flightsafety record in the USAF. But, these aircrafthave been continuously upgraded, re-engined and refurbished and equallyimportantly, used in the comparativelysedentary bomber role. On the other hand,MiG-21s – supersonic interceptors ofyesteryear – have no viable option left forany further upgrade and need to be phasedout on the grounds of old technology.
But the reality is, already depleted tonearly two-thirds of its earlier combat force
levels, the IAF is in no position to retire itsMiG-21 fleet in one go. It will have to wait for a gradual phase-out, which shouldbe linked with the inductions of newaircraft. It is therefore important to quicklycomplete the Medium Multi-Role CombatAircraft (MMRCA) selection process andincreasing the rate at which Su-30MKIsand the Light Combat Aircraft Tejas arebeing built by HAL.
Hopefully, in a few years from now,apart from the five or six Bison squadrons,the IAF will be in a position to re-equip allother MiG-21 squadrons. The infusion of
new technology aircraft with inherentflight safety features, the availability ofHawk AJTs in greater numbers to take onthe entire burden of advanced jet trainingshould have a salutary effect on the IAF’sflight safety statistics.
In addition, the de-vegetation process,started almost 15 years ago to clear thesurrounding environment at the IAFairfields, has started showing results interms of reduced bird activity and lessernumber of total bird strikes. It is imperativethat the concerned State Governments joinhands with the IAF to sanitise the entire
airfield zones to further reduce the birdmenace. A proposed induction of 41 ‘Avian’radars will also boost the IAF’s ‘prevention ofbird strikes’ campaign. The recent releaseof the APF (Accident Probability Factor)Calculator is a small but yet another step inthe right direction.
But these steps alone are not sufficientfor the IAF to win its unending war on theflight safety front. Spearheaded by itsspecialised branch, the IAF as a whole will need to adopt a proactive approach to achieve the desired goals – a zeroaccident rate.
AFP
COMBAT AVIATION
In the past 40 years, since1970, out of the nearly1,000 aircraft lost, half
No country can aspire to attain aplace of influence in the comity ofnations unless it possesses avibrant and technologically
advanced defence industry. As moderndefence systems are highly complex andtechnology intensive, the defence industryis characterised by rapid obsolescence oftechnology. Therefore, regular infusion of the latest defence technologies is essential for the survival and growth of any defence industry.
India has singularly failed to develop itsdefence industry despite repeatedprotestations of self-reliance. And theprimary reason for this is a lack of requiredtechnology. There are only four routesthrough which a country can acquire defencetechnologies – indigenous developmentthrough research and development;purchase from foreign sources; against offsetobligations; and through joint-ventures withforeign companies.
If India continues to import more than70 percent of defence equipment even aftermore than six decades of Independence it isonly due to its inability to exploit the routesto upgrade technologies and modernisedefence production.
While opening the defence industry tothe private sector in May 2001, theGovernment allowed 26 percent ForeignDirect Investment (FDI) in the hope thatforeign investors would rush in with theirbags of money. However, all these hopes
have been belied and the policy has beenacknowledged as a total failure. Mostprospective foreign investors view thepolicy to be highly discouraging in intentand content. There has been a total lack ofenthusiasm on the part of foreigninvestors. According to the data releasedby the Ministry of Commerce andIndustry, total FDI inflows to the Indiandefence sector were a paltry ̀ 7 million upto 2009. As a result, there has been astrong demand for a review of the policy.
Chain Reaction The main reason for the failure of the FDIpolicy has been the Government’s inabilityto differentiate between defence and othersectors. For sectors, like infrastructure andretail trade, it is primarily a question of aninfusion of foreign funds. But in the case ofdefence, the foremost aim of inviting FDI isto get critical technologies. FDI sets inmotion a chain reaction through which theinitial FDI upgrades local technologywhich, in turn, attracts more inflows ofhigher technology and the cycle goes on.Further, the whole process brings in thelatest managerial practices, techniques andskills, thereby upgrading the entiremanagerial environment in the country.
Although FDI pre-supposes a foreignpartner’s long-term commitment, itsintensity is directly proportional to his stakein the venture. No foreign company is goingto part with the latest technology unless ithas a significant interest in the success of theventure. Therefore, foreign companies haveto be offered commercially irresistible termsthrough an enhanced FDI component.
The international arms trade does notfollow the dynamics of an open and freemarket. Most of the major defenceequipment producers follow the ‘GlobalFactory’ concept, through which variousfunctions are spread over a number oflocations in a number of countries. The aimis to draw maximum benefits in terms oftechnological expertise, cheap labour andabundant raw material that differentlocations offer. Therefore, any nation thatcovets FDI in defence has to tailor itspolicies to make itself an incomparable andan indispensable constituent of this world-wide network.
It is recognised by all that India needs toreview its policy on FDI in defence to make it deliver. The Department ofIndustrial Policy and Promotion circulated
21
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
20
POLICY
MRINALSUMAN
KEY POINTSn Since India needs Foreign DirectInvestment (FDI) in defence primarilyfor technology infusion its policyshould be technology-centricn No foreign company will part withits closely guarded technologiesunless it has a controlling stake in ajoint-venture.n India should aim to be a hub forglobal outsourcing of defenceequipment by partnering foreigndefence manufactures.
AFP
ESSENTIAL INFUSIONForeign investors view India’s Foreign DirectInvestment Policy in the defence sector asdiscouraging in intent and content
Armed forces march at the Amar JawanJyoti at India Gate monument on
No country can aspire to attain aplace of influence in the comity ofnations unless it possesses avibrant and technologically
advanced defence industry. As moderndefence systems are highly complex andtechnology intensive, the defence industryis characterised by rapid obsolescence oftechnology. Therefore, regular infusion of the latest defence technologies is essential for the survival and growth of any defence industry.
India has singularly failed to develop itsdefence industry despite repeatedprotestations of self-reliance. And theprimary reason for this is a lack of requiredtechnology. There are only four routesthrough which a country can acquire defencetechnologies – indigenous developmentthrough research and development;purchase from foreign sources; against offsetobligations; and through joint-ventures withforeign companies.
If India continues to import more than70 percent of defence equipment even aftermore than six decades of Independence it isonly due to its inability to exploit the routesto upgrade technologies and modernisedefence production.
While opening the defence industry tothe private sector in May 2001, theGovernment allowed 26 percent ForeignDirect Investment (FDI) in the hope thatforeign investors would rush in with theirbags of money. However, all these hopes
have been belied and the policy has beenacknowledged as a total failure. Mostprospective foreign investors view thepolicy to be highly discouraging in intentand content. There has been a total lack ofenthusiasm on the part of foreigninvestors. According to the data releasedby the Ministry of Commerce andIndustry, total FDI inflows to the Indiandefence sector were a paltry ̀ 7 million upto 2009. As a result, there has been astrong demand for a review of the policy.
Chain Reaction The main reason for the failure of the FDIpolicy has been the Government’s inabilityto differentiate between defence and othersectors. For sectors, like infrastructure andretail trade, it is primarily a question of aninfusion of foreign funds. But in the case ofdefence, the foremost aim of inviting FDI isto get critical technologies. FDI sets inmotion a chain reaction through which theinitial FDI upgrades local technologywhich, in turn, attracts more inflows ofhigher technology and the cycle goes on.Further, the whole process brings in thelatest managerial practices, techniques andskills, thereby upgrading the entiremanagerial environment in the country.
Although FDI pre-supposes a foreignpartner’s long-term commitment, itsintensity is directly proportional to his stakein the venture. No foreign company is goingto part with the latest technology unless ithas a significant interest in the success of theventure. Therefore, foreign companies haveto be offered commercially irresistible termsthrough an enhanced FDI component.
The international arms trade does notfollow the dynamics of an open and freemarket. Most of the major defenceequipment producers follow the ‘GlobalFactory’ concept, through which variousfunctions are spread over a number oflocations in a number of countries. The aimis to draw maximum benefits in terms oftechnological expertise, cheap labour andabundant raw material that differentlocations offer. Therefore, any nation thatcovets FDI in defence has to tailor itspolicies to make itself an incomparable andan indispensable constituent of this world-wide network.
It is recognised by all that India needs toreview its policy on FDI in defence to make it deliver. The Department ofIndustrial Policy and Promotion circulated
21
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
20
POLICY
MRINALSUMAN
KEY POINTSn Since India needs Foreign DirectInvestment (FDI) in defence primarilyfor technology infusion its policyshould be technology-centricn No foreign company will part withits closely guarded technologiesunless it has a controlling stake in ajoint-venture.n India should aim to be a hub forglobal outsourcing of defenceequipment by partnering foreigndefence manufactures.
AFP
ESSENTIAL INFUSIONForeign investors view India’s Foreign DirectInvestment Policy in the defence sector asdiscouraging in intent and content
Armed forces march at the Amar JawanJyoti at India Gate monument on
a discussion paper in May 2010, advocatingraising of the FDI cap to encourage‘established players in the defence industryto set up manufacturing facilities andintegration of systems in India.’Importantly, it argued that the limit shouldbe raised to 74 percent to provide neededincentive to foreign manufacturers to sharetheir technological expertise andproprietary technology.
Unfortunately, the above proposalreceived a somewhat subjective treatment.All stake holders took positions that suitedthem. No consideration was given to thelarger national interests. Although fullyaware of the failures of the current policy,the Ministry of Defence (MoD) tookeveryone by surprise by insisting that the upper cap of 26 percent be retained. It appears that inefficient Public SectorUndertakings, who have been thriving onassembling imported sub-assemblies,under the garb of indigenous production,felt threatened. They conspired and coercedthe Ministry of Defence to stall entry offoreign companies.
More shocking perhaps was the reactionof the Indian industry. For a long timemajor Indian defence industry playerswere clamouring for an increase in the FDI limit. However, at the first signs of the Government considering a cap of 74 percent, all of them developed cold feet.In order to retain their control over jointventures they wanted the FDI to be allowedonly up to 49 percent. As a matter of fact, they feared an entry of foreignmanufacturers and wanted their monopoly
in the private sector to continue. All thethree major industry associations/ chambersforwarded similar recommendations.
Being the ultimate users and the mostaffected party, it was the Services thatadvocated a removal of all caps and wantedthe Government to be flexible in itsapproach. They were supported by smalland medium enterprises who believed thatthe entry of foreign companies even with fullcontrolling rights would throw openenormous opportunities for growth to them.
Much to the detriment of India’ssecurity interests, however, the views of theMoD prevailed and FDI in defencecontinues to be capped at 26 percent.
Understanding the DynamicsFirst of all, the Government has tounderstand the dynamics of a FDI flow.Investable funds are limited in worldcommerce and prospective investors areguided purely by economic considerations.They carry out a comparative appraisal of alllikely destinations to identify the best optionfor optimum returns. Therefore, if India isserious about attracting FDI in the defencesector, it has to position itself as the mostlucrative FDI destination with an improvedFDI Confidence Index. In addition to theavailability of a skilled work force, low cost ofproduction and large market, India mustmake structural adjustment to providefunctional freedom to joint ventures torespond to market dynamics.
As has been the practice in the past, theghost of security concerns is raised by self-seeking entities to defend an indefensible
decision. Opponents of higher FDI cap areexpressing apprehensions that foreigninvestors may close production and deny supplies to the armed forces duringwarlike emergencies.
There cannot be a more speciousargument. No foreign vendor will ever riskhis total investment by such a hostile move.In any case, factories cannot be shut andshifted in a moment. As a matter ofabundant caution, while granting licenses,the Government can reserve the right totake over critical industries under certaincircumstances. The fact that indigenousproduction through joint - ventures isinfinitely more reassuring than importsthat can be cut-off unilaterally by foreignsuppliers is conveniently overlooked.
As stated earlier, India needs FDI in
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
defence primarily for technology infusion.Therefore, its policy should be technology-centric. In a true sense, two points need tobe kept in mind. One, no foreign companywill part with its closely guardedtechnologies unless it has a controllingstake (minimum 51 percent) in a joint-
venture. Two, defence industry covers toovast a spectrum to be branded as a singleentity for the formulation of an FDI policy. Therefore, India should adopt aflexible and proposal-specific approach. All joint-venture proposals should beassessed and categorised on the basis of
nature, level and depth of technologyinvolved for the fixation of FDI cap. A possible formula can be:Tier 1: Low-tech Proposals – up to 26percent.Tier 2: High-tech Proposals – up to 49percent.Tier 3: Proposals with latest technologies– up to 74 percent.Tier 4: Proposals with cutting edgefrontier technologies – up to 100 percent.
Finally, given India’s favourable geo-political position and enormousmarket, India should covet to be a hub forglobal outsourcing of defence equipmentby partnering foreign defence manufactures.
For that, India must carry out an imagemake-over and project itself as anirresistible FDI destination for defenceindustry by simplifying procedures andexpediting decision making. It mustreformulate its policy to address allapprehensions of the prospective investorsas regards functional autonomy to cater tomarket dynamics, albeit within the broadregulatory policy framework.
22
POLICY
FDI: A READY RECKONERDismal Track RecordAs regards indigenous development, the trackrecord of the Defence Research andDevelopment Organisation (DRDO) has beendismal – exaggerated claims, tall promises,unexplained delays and sub-optimal products.
Purchase of technologies under ‘buy andmake’ route has failed to ensure infusion ofmeaningful technologies. Even DefenceMinister A. K. Antony has admitted that Indiahad not benefitted much from thetechnologies transferred to it in the past.
Offsets provide an incomparable leverageto demand critical technologies. India has,most surprisingly, resolved not to accepttechnology against defence offsets, therebydepriving itself of an excellent opportunity toupgrade the industry.
Failure to formulate a well-evolved policyto attract FDI in the defence sector hasdissuaded foreign companies fromparticipating in joint-ventures in India withthe result that a valuable route of infusion oftechnology remains unexploited so far.
Policy MandatesA cap of 26 percent is considered to be highlyunreasonable as foreign investors get nosignificant control over the enterprise. Thepolicy mandates that the Chief Executive hasto be a resident Indian and managementcontrol must remain in Indian hands withmajority representation in the board.
Many policy provisions are perceived to behighly restrictive – a licensee can produceonly the licensed products and in thesanctioned quantity; he can neither diversifynor enhance production; the Government cangive no purchase guarantee; and the licenseewill have no open access to other markets,including exports.
A visitor in thecockpit of Boeing'sF/A-18E/F SuperHornet during adefence exhibition,New Delhi
A paramilitary soldier walks past a muraldepicting the Mumbai 2008 terror attacksat the DefExpo 2010, New Delhi
a discussion paper in May 2010, advocatingraising of the FDI cap to encourage‘established players in the defence industryto set up manufacturing facilities andintegration of systems in India.’Importantly, it argued that the limit shouldbe raised to 74 percent to provide neededincentive to foreign manufacturers to sharetheir technological expertise andproprietary technology.
Unfortunately, the above proposalreceived a somewhat subjective treatment.All stake holders took positions that suitedthem. No consideration was given to thelarger national interests. Although fullyaware of the failures of the current policy,the Ministry of Defence (MoD) tookeveryone by surprise by insisting that the upper cap of 26 percent be retained. It appears that inefficient Public SectorUndertakings, who have been thriving onassembling imported sub-assemblies,under the garb of indigenous production,felt threatened. They conspired and coercedthe Ministry of Defence to stall entry offoreign companies.
More shocking perhaps was the reactionof the Indian industry. For a long timemajor Indian defence industry playerswere clamouring for an increase in the FDI limit. However, at the first signs of the Government considering a cap of 74 percent, all of them developed cold feet.In order to retain their control over jointventures they wanted the FDI to be allowedonly up to 49 percent. As a matter of fact, they feared an entry of foreignmanufacturers and wanted their monopoly
in the private sector to continue. All thethree major industry associations/ chambersforwarded similar recommendations.
Being the ultimate users and the mostaffected party, it was the Services thatadvocated a removal of all caps and wantedthe Government to be flexible in itsapproach. They were supported by smalland medium enterprises who believed thatthe entry of foreign companies even with fullcontrolling rights would throw openenormous opportunities for growth to them.
Much to the detriment of India’ssecurity interests, however, the views of theMoD prevailed and FDI in defencecontinues to be capped at 26 percent.
Understanding the DynamicsFirst of all, the Government has tounderstand the dynamics of a FDI flow.Investable funds are limited in worldcommerce and prospective investors areguided purely by economic considerations.They carry out a comparative appraisal of alllikely destinations to identify the best optionfor optimum returns. Therefore, if India isserious about attracting FDI in the defencesector, it has to position itself as the mostlucrative FDI destination with an improvedFDI Confidence Index. In addition to theavailability of a skilled work force, low cost ofproduction and large market, India mustmake structural adjustment to providefunctional freedom to joint ventures torespond to market dynamics.
As has been the practice in the past, theghost of security concerns is raised by self-seeking entities to defend an indefensible
decision. Opponents of higher FDI cap areexpressing apprehensions that foreigninvestors may close production and deny supplies to the armed forces duringwarlike emergencies.
There cannot be a more speciousargument. No foreign vendor will ever riskhis total investment by such a hostile move.In any case, factories cannot be shut andshifted in a moment. As a matter ofabundant caution, while granting licenses,the Government can reserve the right totake over critical industries under certaincircumstances. The fact that indigenousproduction through joint - ventures isinfinitely more reassuring than importsthat can be cut-off unilaterally by foreignsuppliers is conveniently overlooked.
As stated earlier, India needs FDI in
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
defence primarily for technology infusion.Therefore, its policy should be technology-centric. In a true sense, two points need tobe kept in mind. One, no foreign companywill part with its closely guardedtechnologies unless it has a controllingstake (minimum 51 percent) in a joint-
venture. Two, defence industry covers toovast a spectrum to be branded as a singleentity for the formulation of an FDI policy. Therefore, India should adopt aflexible and proposal-specific approach. All joint-venture proposals should beassessed and categorised on the basis of
nature, level and depth of technologyinvolved for the fixation of FDI cap. A possible formula can be:Tier 1: Low-tech Proposals – up to 26percent.Tier 2: High-tech Proposals – up to 49percent.Tier 3: Proposals with latest technologies– up to 74 percent.Tier 4: Proposals with cutting edgefrontier technologies – up to 100 percent.
Finally, given India’s favourable geo-political position and enormousmarket, India should covet to be a hub forglobal outsourcing of defence equipmentby partnering foreign defence manufactures.
For that, India must carry out an imagemake-over and project itself as anirresistible FDI destination for defenceindustry by simplifying procedures andexpediting decision making. It mustreformulate its policy to address allapprehensions of the prospective investorsas regards functional autonomy to cater tomarket dynamics, albeit within the broadregulatory policy framework.
22
POLICY
FDI: A READY RECKONERDismal Track RecordAs regards indigenous development, the trackrecord of the Defence Research andDevelopment Organisation (DRDO) has beendismal – exaggerated claims, tall promises,unexplained delays and sub-optimal products.
Purchase of technologies under ‘buy andmake’ route has failed to ensure infusion ofmeaningful technologies. Even DefenceMinister A. K. Antony has admitted that Indiahad not benefitted much from thetechnologies transferred to it in the past.
Offsets provide an incomparable leverageto demand critical technologies. India has,most surprisingly, resolved not to accepttechnology against defence offsets, therebydepriving itself of an excellent opportunity toupgrade the industry.
Failure to formulate a well-evolved policyto attract FDI in the defence sector hasdissuaded foreign companies fromparticipating in joint-ventures in India withthe result that a valuable route of infusion oftechnology remains unexploited so far.
Policy MandatesA cap of 26 percent is considered to be highlyunreasonable as foreign investors get nosignificant control over the enterprise. Thepolicy mandates that the Chief Executive hasto be a resident Indian and managementcontrol must remain in Indian hands withmajority representation in the board.
Many policy provisions are perceived to behighly restrictive – a licensee can produceonly the licensed products and in thesanctioned quantity; he can neither diversifynor enhance production; the Government cangive no purchase guarantee; and the licenseewill have no open access to other markets,including exports.
A visitor in thecockpit of Boeing'sF/A-18E/F SuperHornet during adefence exhibition,New Delhi
A paramilitary soldier walks past a muraldepicting the Mumbai 2008 terror attacksat the DefExpo 2010, New Delhi
Radars are probably one of themost significant inventions ofman that have been responsiblefor changing the face of modern
warfare. Coined in 1940, as an acronym forRadio Detection and Ranging by the USNavy, its military application was morethan apparent in World War II by whichtime it was being developed secretly andsimultaneously by many countries.
In the maritime world, radars form the eyes of any ship and the loss of radar capability can result in seriousconsequences for the ship and worse, evenfor the entire flotilla. Ships essentially useradars for measuring the bearing anddistance of other ships and vessels toprevent collision and to navigate in a port orat sea when within coastal range.
In the Navy, however, the uses are much more accented towards militaryapplications, including navigation,surveillance and providing inputs for firecontrol problems of weapons systems andtarget illumination for weapon homing.
25
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
24
NAVAL RADARS
Indian Navy aircraft carrier INSViraat refuels a Sea Harrier in theIndian Ocean
EYES AT SEA
The Navy is modernisingits radar capabilitythrough indigenousdevelopment and acomprehensiveacquisition programme
P.K.GHOSH
KEY POINTSn India has progressed in its ability todesign and manufacture high-powered radar systems.n Bharat Electronics Ltd has beenmanufacturing many Indian versionsof radars after collaborating with theparent company or on the basis ofTransfer of Technology. n Given the mixed bag of successeswith indigenous radar construction –the Navy has gone in for purchasesfrom foreign companies.
Radars are probably one of themost significant inventions ofman that have been responsiblefor changing the face of modern
warfare. Coined in 1940, as an acronym forRadio Detection and Ranging by the USNavy, its military application was morethan apparent in World War II by whichtime it was being developed secretly andsimultaneously by many countries.
In the maritime world, radars form the eyes of any ship and the loss of radar capability can result in seriousconsequences for the ship and worse, evenfor the entire flotilla. Ships essentially useradars for measuring the bearing anddistance of other ships and vessels toprevent collision and to navigate in a port orat sea when within coastal range.
In the Navy, however, the uses are much more accented towards militaryapplications, including navigation,surveillance and providing inputs for firecontrol problems of weapons systems andtarget illumination for weapon homing.
25
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
24
NAVAL RADARS
Indian Navy aircraft carrier INSViraat refuels a Sea Harrier in theIndian Ocean
EYES AT SEA
The Navy is modernisingits radar capabilitythrough indigenousdevelopment and acomprehensiveacquisition programme
P.K.GHOSH
KEY POINTSn India has progressed in its ability todesign and manufacture high-powered radar systems.n Bharat Electronics Ltd has beenmanufacturing many Indian versionsof radars after collaborating with theparent company or on the basis ofTransfer of Technology. n Given the mixed bag of successeswith indigenous radar construction –the Navy has gone in for purchasesfrom foreign companies.
Hence warships are usually equippedwith an entire package of sensors whichmay contain separate long and short rangeradars – depending on the primary role ofthe concerned warship. Since radars play a very significant role in revealing the battlefield scenario to a TacticalCommander at sea or even to a distantshore-based Theatre Commander by data links – considerable efforts are made toavoid detection and minimise the radar reflectivity index by a series ofmethods, including design characteristics.Consequently, Radar Absorbing Material(RAM) containing resistive and sometimesmagnetic substances are used on ships andaircraft to reduce the radar signature andthe reflective properties (index) of the unitin an effort to avoid detection.
Procurement ProcessThe Indian Navy’s (IN) efforts in usingsuch stealth technology holistically can beseen in the commissioning of stealthfrigates, the INS Shivalik and INS Satpuraor Project 17 class frigates which areconsidered the best examples of Indianefforts in mastering this technology.
The IN has followed a singularly unique
approach in fitting radars and othersensors to the ships that were builtindigenously. Commencing as Project 16or the Godavari class, Indian navalarchitects have proceeded to marry the‘rugged’ Soviet-built weapon systems withsensitive sensors of Western origin and atrare times of Indian origin. However, allthis has called for detailed planning andconforming to procurement procedures –Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP) –which have been continuously modifiedsince then.
Radars form a part of the overallsensor package and according to theprocedures immediate purchases can bemet through a Fast Track system. Underthis, the elaborate DPP is bypassed and adirect purchase request is forwarded to theDefence Acquisition Council (DAC) forapproval or in the case of high value to theCabinet Committee for Security (CCS) forfinal approval. However, past trends showthat relatively few equipment is boughtthrough this urgent processing method.
Most sensor packages, and henceradars, follow the entire DPP and itsassociated 11-step programme. In this, the required equipment is normally
26
NAVAL RADARS
AFP
Navy officials carry theCommonwealth Gamesbaton in a boat ashelicopters circle overthe Taj Mahal Hotel
The Navy has followed aunique approach in
fitting radars and othersensors to the ships that
are built indigenously.Commencing as Project
16 or the Godavari class,Indian naval architects
have married the‘rugged’ Soviet-builtweapon systems with
projected for eventual procurement undera 15-year-Long-Term Plan. Later, it getsreflected in the five-year Service CapitalAcquisition Plan and finally if it getsprojected in a one-year Annual AcquisitionPlan it is forwarded to the Chief ofIntegrated Defence Staff from ServiceHeadquarters where it is rationalised and collated for undergoing the entireprocurement procedure.
The last type of acquisition is resortedto in case the equipment is state-of-the-artand more importantly its procurementprovides the Indian Government withconsiderable political, economic andstrategic leverages. Based on an inter-Governmental agreement procurement of such equipment is expected to enhance military cooperation with thecountry concerned.
Indigenous ProgrammeIn its efforts to modernise its force andimproving its inventory, the IN has beenmaking considerable efforts at indigenisingits sensors. Consequently, unlike theIndian Army (IA) and Indian Air Force(IAF) the IN has had many successes withthe Defence Research and DevelopmentOrganisation (DRDO) on various radarprojects. Admittedly, there have been somefailures too like the Trishul Missile Systemsand significant delays in some fields, such asElectronic Warfare Systems. But overall,the success ratio has been significant in thearea of acoustic research and sonars.
In the case of radars there has beensome progress in India’s ability to designand manufacture high-powered radarsystems. Commencing with short range 2Dsystems, DRDO has moved on tomanufacturing 3D Long-Range TrackingRadars and Airborne Early Warning andControl (AEW&C) radars, mainly for theIndian Air Force and the Indian Army.
In the case of radars for the IN, it is theRevathi which the DRDO considers to beits prime success. However, the feedbackfrom end-users has not been so charitable,since this radar faces considerable stabilityproblems because of its excessive weightaccompanied by a design lacuna. Despitethe fact that this radar has yet to prove itsefficacy and performance at sea, the DRDO insists that this radar is a state-of-the-art Central Acquisition Radarpossessing the latest signal processingtechnology with an ability to
Track While Scan (TWS) nearly 150 targets simultaneously.
Operating in the S-band, this radar wasinitially developed for the Akash missileand the Navy ordered its modified navalvariant for its P-28 Corvettes. Currently,one of the radar prototype systems is fittedon board INS Dunagiri and a derivative ofthe Revathi has also been planned forfitment on the Shivalik class frigate.
Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) hasbeen instrumental in manufacturing many Indian versions of radars aftercollaborating with the parent company oron a basis of Transfer of Technology (ToT). Inthis context, PFN 513 (which is a stabilised
version of the DA05) built by BEL is an S-band medium range, surface surveillanceradar having random agility and chip pulsecompression. This radar is scheduled to befitted on board the INS Viraat and theBrahmaputra class in which the currentlyfitted RAWS-03 radar has been upgraded toAMDR (Anti-Missile Defence Radar).
Similarly, the PIN 521 radar, a versionof Signaal/Thales ZW-06, also known asAparna, is an active and passive, medium-range surveillance radar that can be usedfor navigation and attack purposes.Possessing two transmitter receiverchannels and an ability to scan at two
different speeds this radar has been madeon the lines of Garpun by BEL aftercollaborating with Signaal (now Thales) forthe Brahmaputra class of ships.
Another radar that has emerged fromBEL is the PIN 524, or Rashmi, which is anavigational radar that has been fitted onboard the Brahmaputra class with anAutomatic Radar Plotting Aids (ARPA)display. Unfortunately, due to its poorresolution and picture quality, the radarhas found itself redundant and rarely usedon board the ships where it is fitted.
The PLN 517 (a version of the Signaal/ Thales RAWL-02 is an L (D)-band
surveillance radar that has been built byBEL for long-range air warning and targetinterception for the INS Shivalik,Brahmaputra class and INS Viraat. Whileon the Godavari class the earlier RAWL-02Mark-II has been upgraded to Mark-III.
Built by the DRDO, the Super Vision2000 or its more advanced version, XV2004, is a 3D naval air surveillance slottedarray radar that operates in the X-band.Capable of a high level of discrimination it isbeing modified to be fitted into Navy’sDornier (Do-228s) and the Advanced LightHelicopter with variants being fitted on theKa-25s as well. There is also talk of
mounting a slightly modified version of theAshlesha built by the DRDO which is a 3Dshort-range radar for the IAF with a semi-active phased array and a 1 sqm apertureon small ships of the Navy. This navalversion, however has yet to be produced.
Foreign Purchases Given the mixed bag of successes withindigenous radar construction – the Navyhas gone in for purchases from foreigncompanies. However, most of the currentlypurchased radars are in an advanceddevelopmental stage or have been recentlydeveloped which means that their true
efficacy in Indian conditions will take timein being evaluated.
Consequently, the Israeli AerospaceIndustries (IAI) has begun deliveringEL/M-2248 (MF-Star) multi-functionsurveillance and threat alert radar to the Indian Navy. This S-band active-phased array radar using Pulse Doppler techniques, multi-beam formingand advanced High Pulse RepetitionFrequency waveform is being fitted onboard the three Project 15A Kolkata class guided missile destroyers (DDGs)being built by the Mazagon Dock Limitedas well as four of the scheduled 15Bs class
Children wave flags towelcome the INS Tabar
stealth frigate inMumbai
AFP
In the case of radars forthe Navy, it is the Revathi
projected for eventual procurement undera 15-year-Long-Term Plan. Later, it getsreflected in the five-year Service CapitalAcquisition Plan and finally if it getsprojected in a one-year Annual AcquisitionPlan it is forwarded to the Chief ofIntegrated Defence Staff from ServiceHeadquarters where it is rationalised and collated for undergoing the entireprocurement procedure.
The last type of acquisition is resortedto in case the equipment is state-of-the-artand more importantly its procurementprovides the Indian Government withconsiderable political, economic andstrategic leverages. Based on an inter-Governmental agreement procurement of such equipment is expected to enhance military cooperation with thecountry concerned.
Indigenous ProgrammeIn its efforts to modernise its force andimproving its inventory, the IN has beenmaking considerable efforts at indigenisingits sensors. Consequently, unlike theIndian Army (IA) and Indian Air Force(IAF) the IN has had many successes withthe Defence Research and DevelopmentOrganisation (DRDO) on various radarprojects. Admittedly, there have been somefailures too like the Trishul Missile Systemsand significant delays in some fields, such asElectronic Warfare Systems. But overall,the success ratio has been significant in thearea of acoustic research and sonars.
In the case of radars there has beensome progress in India’s ability to designand manufacture high-powered radarsystems. Commencing with short range 2Dsystems, DRDO has moved on tomanufacturing 3D Long-Range TrackingRadars and Airborne Early Warning andControl (AEW&C) radars, mainly for theIndian Air Force and the Indian Army.
In the case of radars for the IN, it is theRevathi which the DRDO considers to beits prime success. However, the feedbackfrom end-users has not been so charitable,since this radar faces considerable stabilityproblems because of its excessive weightaccompanied by a design lacuna. Despitethe fact that this radar has yet to prove itsefficacy and performance at sea, the DRDO insists that this radar is a state-of-the-art Central Acquisition Radarpossessing the latest signal processingtechnology with an ability to
Track While Scan (TWS) nearly 150 targets simultaneously.
Operating in the S-band, this radar wasinitially developed for the Akash missileand the Navy ordered its modified navalvariant for its P-28 Corvettes. Currently,one of the radar prototype systems is fittedon board INS Dunagiri and a derivative ofthe Revathi has also been planned forfitment on the Shivalik class frigate.
Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) hasbeen instrumental in manufacturing many Indian versions of radars aftercollaborating with the parent company oron a basis of Transfer of Technology (ToT). Inthis context, PFN 513 (which is a stabilised
version of the DA05) built by BEL is an S-band medium range, surface surveillanceradar having random agility and chip pulsecompression. This radar is scheduled to befitted on board the INS Viraat and theBrahmaputra class in which the currentlyfitted RAWS-03 radar has been upgraded toAMDR (Anti-Missile Defence Radar).
Similarly, the PIN 521 radar, a versionof Signaal/Thales ZW-06, also known asAparna, is an active and passive, medium-range surveillance radar that can be usedfor navigation and attack purposes.Possessing two transmitter receiverchannels and an ability to scan at two
different speeds this radar has been madeon the lines of Garpun by BEL aftercollaborating with Signaal (now Thales) forthe Brahmaputra class of ships.
Another radar that has emerged fromBEL is the PIN 524, or Rashmi, which is anavigational radar that has been fitted onboard the Brahmaputra class with anAutomatic Radar Plotting Aids (ARPA)display. Unfortunately, due to its poorresolution and picture quality, the radarhas found itself redundant and rarely usedon board the ships where it is fitted.
The PLN 517 (a version of the Signaal/ Thales RAWL-02 is an L (D)-band
surveillance radar that has been built byBEL for long-range air warning and targetinterception for the INS Shivalik,Brahmaputra class and INS Viraat. Whileon the Godavari class the earlier RAWL-02Mark-II has been upgraded to Mark-III.
Built by the DRDO, the Super Vision2000 or its more advanced version, XV2004, is a 3D naval air surveillance slottedarray radar that operates in the X-band.Capable of a high level of discrimination it isbeing modified to be fitted into Navy’sDornier (Do-228s) and the Advanced LightHelicopter with variants being fitted on theKa-25s as well. There is also talk of
mounting a slightly modified version of theAshlesha built by the DRDO which is a 3Dshort-range radar for the IAF with a semi-active phased array and a 1 sqm apertureon small ships of the Navy. This navalversion, however has yet to be produced.
Foreign Purchases Given the mixed bag of successes withindigenous radar construction – the Navyhas gone in for purchases from foreigncompanies. However, most of the currentlypurchased radars are in an advanceddevelopmental stage or have been recentlydeveloped which means that their true
efficacy in Indian conditions will take timein being evaluated.
Consequently, the Israeli AerospaceIndustries (IAI) has begun deliveringEL/M-2248 (MF-Star) multi-functionsurveillance and threat alert radar to the Indian Navy. This S-band active-phased array radar using Pulse Doppler techniques, multi-beam formingand advanced High Pulse RepetitionFrequency waveform is being fitted onboard the three Project 15A Kolkata class guided missile destroyers (DDGs)being built by the Mazagon Dock Limitedas well as four of the scheduled 15Bs class
Children wave flags towelcome the INS Tabar
stealth frigate inMumbai
AFP
In the case of radars forthe Navy, it is the Revathi
and the Vikrant class aircraft carrier beingbuilt at Kochi.
Earlier, IAI’s ELTA had supplied threeS-band EL/M 2282 Ad- Star surveillanceand threat alert radars for the Project 17Shivalik class FFGs, six more for Godavariclass, three for Brahmaputra class FFGs,two for Kashin class DDGs and one for INSViraat. These Air and Missile DefenseRadar (AMDR), essentially, for providinginputs to the Barak systems, were the firstfully digital operational naval ActiveElectronically Scanned Array (AESA)radars in the world, according to the IAI.
Given the heightened coastal security
consciousness in the aftermath of theMumbai attacks and subsequent efforts tostrengthen security, the IN, entrusted withcoastal responsibility, has been planningto purchase two Israeli Aerostat RadarsEL/M 2083 which are be mounted on hotair balloons tethered to the ground. Witha range of approximately 500km, it isestimated that only three radars will berequired to provide the necessary 3D coverage for the entire Western Coast.Unfortunately, the project has got mired inadministrative quagmire and is currentlygathering dust. In 2009, the IN signed a deal to procure
eight US built P-8I Long Range MaritimeReconnaissance aircraft. To be installedwith state-of-the-art AN/APY10 radarsthese will provide ultra-high resolution andbe of help in providing reconnaissance,intelligence and surveillance.
Next year, BEL signed an MoA (Memoof Agreement) with the Danish firm Termafor cooperating on building naval radarsfor surveillance purposes. Since Terma isa niche expert in surveillance and coastalradar technology – it is presumed thatthese radars will eventually be deployed onthe coast to provide security.
In conclusion, we can see that the IN hastaken a multi-pronged approach towardsmodernising its radars and other sensors inan effort to keep up with the demands ofchanging technology, the geo-strategicscenario and security necessities. On the onehand, it is encouraging indigenous design,despite numerous problems like a shortmeantime between failures and designlacunae and on the other it is resorting toforeign purchases to ensure that theoperational profile of the ships do not suffer.Under the circumstances this combination isprobably the best way forward.
30
NAVAL RADARS
AFP
Given the heightenedcoastal security
consciousness in theaftermath of the
Mumbai attacks andsubsequent efforts to
strengthen security, theIndian Navy, entrusted
with coastalresponsibility, has been
planning to purchasetwo Israeli AerostatRadars EL/M 2083
which are be mountedon hot air balloons
tethered to the ground.
”
INS Satpura, theIndian Navy’s secondShivalik class frigate
Of late, several South Asianmilitaries are increasinglyrunning lucrative commercialventures rivalling private
businesses in a move that threatens not onlyto militarise civil society but also corrupt the Services.
The Pakistani military — with its variedcommercial interests worth an estimatedUSD 20 billion that extend from managingbakeries, sugar factories, power plants andindustrial complexes to operating airlines,banks and communication and transportnetworks — tops this list followed by those ofSri Lanka, Bangladesh and to a lesserextent, India.
These countries also routinely appointretired and serving military personnel tosenior Government positions like provincialgovernors and as diplomatic envoys,incrementally but dangerously, eclipsingcivilian control which in some South Asian States remains chimerical. Suchappointments also threaten the establishedaxiom that civilian leaderships whichcannot challenge their militaries by force must also guard against anypotential usurpation of powers invidiously,from within.
Since 1947, three bloodless military coupslasting 30 years occurred in Pakistan andtwice in Bangladesh which also endured astaggering 19 attempts by renegade soldierstrying to overthrow incumbent civilianadministrations in Dhaka (formerly Dacca),since the country’s formation in 1971.
“Over the years, the Pakistani military –the country’s most formidable politicalplayers – has built an economic empire thatstrengthens it institutionally,” writesAyesha Siddiqa in her seminal work on thesubject, Military Inc: Inside Pakistan’sMilitary Economy.
Its commercial stakes, Siddiqa declares,have proliferated across the agriculture,manufacturing and service sectorsincluding banking and insurance. Thisfinancial involvement has significantlyenhanced its assets making it one ofPakistan’s dominant economic players.
Pakistani military business interests fall broadly into three categories: thosecontrolled directly by the Army Chief,formalised military sectors like ordnanceand the State-owned armament factoriesmanaged by the Ministry of Defence (MoD)and the Services, the Department ofMilitary Land and Cantonments and theparamilitary Frontier Force and Rangers.
In addition, there are four subsidiary,ostensibly charitable organisations– the Fauji Foundation, the Army Welfare Trust, Shaheen Foundation and the Bahria Foundation — all of whichoperate autonomously like privatecorporations manned by both serving andformer Servicemen.
This first official group, run by theServices and the MoD, includes the NationalHighway Authority and the Frontier WorksOrganisation each headed by a serving two-star officer; the Special CommunicationsOrganisation (SCO) amply supported by the
33
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
32
REGION
RAHULBEDI
KEY POINTSn The Pakistani Army has built aneconomic empire that strengthens it institutionally.n Instead of downsizing its 300,000-strong defence force, Sri Lanka’sadministration has encouraged itsinvolvement in large-scale commercialactivities.n There has been an alarming rise inthe number of Indian military officerscharged with corruption.
AFP
OFFICERS ANDBUSINESS MEN
Several South Asian militaries are involved incommercial ventures, corrupting the Services andmilitarising civil society
Of late, several South Asianmilitaries are increasinglyrunning lucrative commercialventures rivalling private
businesses in a move that threatens not onlyto militarise civil society but also corrupt the Services.
The Pakistani military — with its variedcommercial interests worth an estimatedUSD 20 billion that extend from managingbakeries, sugar factories, power plants andindustrial complexes to operating airlines,banks and communication and transportnetworks — tops this list followed by those ofSri Lanka, Bangladesh and to a lesserextent, India.
These countries also routinely appointretired and serving military personnel tosenior Government positions like provincialgovernors and as diplomatic envoys,incrementally but dangerously, eclipsingcivilian control which in some South Asian States remains chimerical. Suchappointments also threaten the establishedaxiom that civilian leaderships whichcannot challenge their militaries by force must also guard against anypotential usurpation of powers invidiously,from within.
Since 1947, three bloodless military coupslasting 30 years occurred in Pakistan andtwice in Bangladesh which also endured astaggering 19 attempts by renegade soldierstrying to overthrow incumbent civilianadministrations in Dhaka (formerly Dacca),since the country’s formation in 1971.
“Over the years, the Pakistani military –the country’s most formidable politicalplayers – has built an economic empire thatstrengthens it institutionally,” writesAyesha Siddiqa in her seminal work on thesubject, Military Inc: Inside Pakistan’sMilitary Economy.
Its commercial stakes, Siddiqa declares,have proliferated across the agriculture,manufacturing and service sectorsincluding banking and insurance. Thisfinancial involvement has significantlyenhanced its assets making it one ofPakistan’s dominant economic players.
Pakistani military business interests fall broadly into three categories: thosecontrolled directly by the Army Chief,formalised military sectors like ordnanceand the State-owned armament factoriesmanaged by the Ministry of Defence (MoD)and the Services, the Department ofMilitary Land and Cantonments and theparamilitary Frontier Force and Rangers.
In addition, there are four subsidiary,ostensibly charitable organisations– the Fauji Foundation, the Army Welfare Trust, Shaheen Foundation and the Bahria Foundation — all of whichoperate autonomously like privatecorporations manned by both serving andformer Servicemen.
This first official group, run by theServices and the MoD, includes the NationalHighway Authority and the Frontier WorksOrganisation each headed by a serving two-star officer; the Special CommunicationsOrganisation (SCO) amply supported by the
33
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
32
REGION
RAHULBEDI
KEY POINTSn The Pakistani Army has built aneconomic empire that strengthens it institutionally.n Instead of downsizing its 300,000-strong defence force, Sri Lanka’sadministration has encouraged itsinvolvement in large-scale commercialactivities.n There has been an alarming rise inthe number of Indian military officerscharged with corruption.
AFP
OFFICERS ANDBUSINESS MEN
Several South Asian militaries are involved incommercial ventures, corrupting the Services andmilitarising civil society
Army’s Signal Corps and the NationalLogistics Cell (NLC) that operates asignificant, if seldom discussed, country-wide trucking operation.
Aided by the Army Engineering Corps,the Army's Frontier Works Organisation,founded in 1966 to build the precipitousKarakoram Highway connecting Pakistanto military and nuclear ally China via thedisputed Northern Areas, has emerged asthe largest contractor for roads and tollcollection across the country.
And while the SCO working with theSignals Corps, established in 1976 toprovide connectivity across Pakistan-administered Kashmir and adjoiningNorthern Areas, has, in recent years,teamed up with the federal InformationTechnology Ministry to wire up the country,the NLC is perhaps the Army's mostprofitable operation managing possiblyAsia’s largest public sector trucking fleet.Employing around 2,500 serving and some7,000-odd retired Service officers, the SCOis also involved in constructing roads,bridges and crop storage facilities.
Established by General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq in the late 1970s, the NLC’s massivetrailer trucks will, for years, collectarmaments and ordnance, including assault
rifles and Stinger missiles off-loaded at thesouthern port city of Karachi from shipschartered by America's Central IntelligenceAgency and transport them to north-westPakistan to Mujahideen cadres fighting theSoviet occupation of Afghanistan.
And, more recently NLC-operated trucksand their largely plucky Pashtun driversfrom Pakistan’s restive North West Frontierregion have played a major role inestablishing the Taliban’s control overAfghanistan in the mid-1990s, an accountthat has, sadly been sparsely documentedas it constitutes a fascinating part of theviolent mosaic of the war-torn region.Thereafter, this large fleet of truckscontinued to supply the Taliban regime withweapons, fuel and food till it was toppled bythe US in 2001.
But Pakistan’s 57-year old Fauji orSolider Foundation, the country’s largestindustrial conglomerate, is the 'jewel' in theArmy's crown involved initially in tradingconsumer-related commodities like rice,flour and jute from former East Pakistan,now Bangladesh. Headed by a three-star officer, it provides womb-to-tomb facilities for nearly nine million retiredservicemen that include re-settlement and re-employment schemes, educational
institutions and operates gas, cement,fertiliser and oil storage plants, power units,steel and cement factories and evenconsumer goods units producing electronicitems, sugar and breakfast cereals.
On its part, the Army Welfare Trust set upin 1971 to generate greater employment andprofit making opportunities for Pakistan’slargest Service and controlled by GeneralHeadquarters in Rawalpindi runs some 40stud farms spread over some 16,000 acres,rice mills, cement factories and unitsproducing hosiery, shoes, woollen clothing,pharmaceuticals and even breeds fish. TheTrust also has interests in insurance,banking, power generation, housing andshopping complexes and in providingsecurity guards for private deployment.
The Shaheen Foundation, headed byPakistan’s Air Chief, operates an airline, airfreight services, airport services and not to be outdone by its associated Serviceorganisations, a travel and knitwearbusiness in addition to selling cabletelevision and FM radio services.
On its part, the Pakistan Navy is largely in charge of the Bahria Foundation that manages a host of businesses like deep-sea fishing and dredging, shipbreaking and harbour and coastal servicesalongside civilian activities like town house construction, farming, catering and decoration services for weddings and parties.
Invisible Economy“A large part of the military’s internal
economy remains invisible” writes Siddiqa,its complex financial and operationalstructure swathed in Byzantine proceduresalmost impossible to accurately unravel.And since Pakistan’s socio-political system ispredominantly authoritarian, the rulingclasses are not averse to using military force(and its expanding financial muscle) tofurther their political and economicinterests, she states.
It is often jocularly said that all countrieshave a military, but Pakistan’s military has acountry which it runs at tremendous profit.Pakistani’s also joke that if every servingand retired military officer protects hisproperty, then their country will be one ofthe best defended in the region as theServices continue to appropriate vast tractsof hugely expensive urban land atthrowaway prices for personal use and tobuild grandiose housing colonies.
Satish Kumar who edits India's NationalSecurity Annual Review, which focusses onstrategic challenges, says that the PakistanArmy is not just a defence force but a rulingoligarchy with substantial economicinterests to safeguard. And it is highlyunlikely that it will ever relinquish this role inthe foreseeable future as it has too muchmoney to lose.
Meanwhile, Sri Lanka often described asthe “pearl of the Indian Ocean” is also SouthAsia’s most militarised country with anestimated 8,000 defence personnel for onemillion citizens has, after defeating theTamil Tiger guerillas in May 2009 opted toinvolve its victorious and bloated militaryin a range of commercial activities. Pakistanwith its history of extended military rule hasonly 4,000 military personnel per onemillion of population whilst the figures for the other South Asian states aresignificantly less: Nepal – 2,700, India —1,300 and Bangladesh — 1,000.
Instead of downsizing its 300,000-strongdefence force after the bitter civil war ended, President Mahinda Rajpaksa’sadministration has encouraged theirinvolvement in large-scale commercialactivities like selling vegetables and religiousbric-a-brac, running travel agencies, hotels
and highway restaurants and collectinggarbage in the capital, Colombo.
The Army is even responsible forconstructing houses and has built onecricket stadium and renovated another forlast year’s World Cup. On the northernJaffna peninsula it has converted one of itsmesses into a 22-room luxury resort whilstthe Navy runs ferry services and tours forwhale-watchers.
Disturbingly, the island’s Ministry ofEducation plans on sending fresh graduatesto military camps for three-week leadershipcourses where they will be given instructionin English, leadership skills and socialetiquette. The authorities justify this byclaiming that Army camps are the only placewhere a large body of students can beaccommodated but analysts warn that itwas a move fraught with “militarising theseat of Sri Lanka’s higher education”.
Numerically, too, the Sri Lankan militaryhas worryingly multiplied under Rajapaksawhose administration sees nothing amiss inexpanding its role in civil affairs anddevelopmental work. It looks upon themilitary merely as a more efficientsubstitute for the failing and corrupt publicsector which ironically it fails to set right.
Analysts and NGOs, however, questionthe Services’ involvement in commercialventures claiming that it can ultimately leadto Rajpaksa’s democratically electedadministration using the military toperpetuate its rule as in time it will be toodifficult and ruinous to disentangle it fromnational economic activity.
In nearby Bangladesh, the military’sbusiness empire, estimated at aroundUSD 500 million, is involved in the hospitalitytrade with the ownership of at least two five-star properties in Dhaka and another beingbuilt in the southern port city of Chittagong.
The Dhaka Radisson hotel, which offersguests use of the nearby deluxe Army golf course, is owned by Bangladesh’s Army Welfare Trust (AWT) and was built on dedicated military land giving it a commercial advantage in Dhaka’s sky-rocketing real estate market. TheBangladesh Army also owns the Trust Bankwith around 40 branches nationwide and in 2007 the military-backed caretakerGovernment granted it exclusive rights toreceive fees for passports.
Emulating Pakistan’s Fauji Foundation,Bangladesh’s AWT, founded in 1998, hasalso spawned the Sena Kallyan Sangstha
(SKS) to care for veterans and familymembers of servicemen. Over years, theSKS has expanded its industrial andfinancial operations to include burgeoninginterests in the food industry — especiallyice cream manufacturing, textiles, jute,garments, electronics, real estate and travel.
Analysts in Dhaka maintain that manydefence-owned businesses were “virtuallyindistinguishable” from other commercialenterprises in the way they operated but inrecent years this aspect has impactedadversely on the Bangladeshi military itself.The inquiry into the country’s worst evermutiny by the paramilitary BangladeshRifles (BDR) border guards in 2009 inwhich some 68 senior military officials wereshot dead, revealed that the insurrectionwas partially fuelled by resentment over thecorruption of Army officers engaged incommercial activities.
Growing MisuseThe Indian military, South Asia’s largest,has assiduously and determinedly beendenied all commercial and businessopportunities by successive civiliangovernments fearful since Independence in1947 of coups similar to those in Pakistan.
But last year the country was appalled bythe Adarsh building scandal involving twoformer Army Chiefs, a retired Indian Navy(IN) Chief and several Service officers, all ofwhom allegedly cornered, at low cost,through a web of intrigue and cunning,expensive flats in Mumbai’s spiffy Colabaarea meant originally for families of theKargil martyrs.
Currently under investigation, the caseinvolved Service officers accused ofcolluding with politicians, contractors andcivil servants in flouting security,environmental and building norms inobtaining allotment of luxury flats in thehigh-rise Adarsh building. The scandal has particularly heaped opprobrium upon a former Army Chief who, despitebeing viciously pilloried in military andofficial circles and the media, continuesunashamedly to behave as thoughblameless even though he lobbieddesperately whilst in office to secure a flatin the controversy-ridden apartment block.
However, it is the Indian military’saddiction to golf that has repeatedly earnedit official censure. Earlier this year, the watchdog, Comptroller and AuditorGeneral (CAG) declared that the Army’s
REGION
Last year, the country wasappalled by the Adarsh
building scandalinvolving two former
Army Chiefs, a retiredIndian Navy Chief and
several Service officers,all of whom allegedlycornered, at low cost,
through a web of intrigueand cunning, expensiveflats in Mumbai’s spiffy
institutions and operates gas, cement,fertiliser and oil storage plants, power units,steel and cement factories and evenconsumer goods units producing electronicitems, sugar and breakfast cereals.
On its part, the Army Welfare Trust set upin 1971 to generate greater employment andprofit making opportunities for Pakistan’slargest Service and controlled by GeneralHeadquarters in Rawalpindi runs some 40stud farms spread over some 16,000 acres,rice mills, cement factories and unitsproducing hosiery, shoes, woollen clothing,pharmaceuticals and even breeds fish. TheTrust also has interests in insurance,banking, power generation, housing andshopping complexes and in providingsecurity guards for private deployment.
The Shaheen Foundation, headed byPakistan’s Air Chief, operates an airline, airfreight services, airport services and not to be outdone by its associated Serviceorganisations, a travel and knitwearbusiness in addition to selling cabletelevision and FM radio services.
On its part, the Pakistan Navy is largely in charge of the Bahria Foundation that manages a host of businesses like deep-sea fishing and dredging, shipbreaking and harbour and coastal servicesalongside civilian activities like town house construction, farming, catering and decoration services for weddings and parties.
Invisible Economy“A large part of the military’s internal
economy remains invisible” writes Siddiqa,its complex financial and operationalstructure swathed in Byzantine proceduresalmost impossible to accurately unravel.And since Pakistan’s socio-political system ispredominantly authoritarian, the rulingclasses are not averse to using military force(and its expanding financial muscle) tofurther their political and economicinterests, she states.
It is often jocularly said that all countrieshave a military, but Pakistan’s military has acountry which it runs at tremendous profit.Pakistani’s also joke that if every servingand retired military officer protects hisproperty, then their country will be one ofthe best defended in the region as theServices continue to appropriate vast tractsof hugely expensive urban land atthrowaway prices for personal use and tobuild grandiose housing colonies.
Satish Kumar who edits India's NationalSecurity Annual Review, which focusses onstrategic challenges, says that the PakistanArmy is not just a defence force but a rulingoligarchy with substantial economicinterests to safeguard. And it is highlyunlikely that it will ever relinquish this role inthe foreseeable future as it has too muchmoney to lose.
Meanwhile, Sri Lanka often described asthe “pearl of the Indian Ocean” is also SouthAsia’s most militarised country with anestimated 8,000 defence personnel for onemillion citizens has, after defeating theTamil Tiger guerillas in May 2009 opted toinvolve its victorious and bloated militaryin a range of commercial activities. Pakistanwith its history of extended military rule hasonly 4,000 military personnel per onemillion of population whilst the figures for the other South Asian states aresignificantly less: Nepal – 2,700, India —1,300 and Bangladesh — 1,000.
Instead of downsizing its 300,000-strongdefence force after the bitter civil war ended, President Mahinda Rajpaksa’sadministration has encouraged theirinvolvement in large-scale commercialactivities like selling vegetables and religiousbric-a-brac, running travel agencies, hotels
and highway restaurants and collectinggarbage in the capital, Colombo.
The Army is even responsible forconstructing houses and has built onecricket stadium and renovated another forlast year’s World Cup. On the northernJaffna peninsula it has converted one of itsmesses into a 22-room luxury resort whilstthe Navy runs ferry services and tours forwhale-watchers.
Disturbingly, the island’s Ministry ofEducation plans on sending fresh graduatesto military camps for three-week leadershipcourses where they will be given instructionin English, leadership skills and socialetiquette. The authorities justify this byclaiming that Army camps are the only placewhere a large body of students can beaccommodated but analysts warn that itwas a move fraught with “militarising theseat of Sri Lanka’s higher education”.
Numerically, too, the Sri Lankan militaryhas worryingly multiplied under Rajapaksawhose administration sees nothing amiss inexpanding its role in civil affairs anddevelopmental work. It looks upon themilitary merely as a more efficientsubstitute for the failing and corrupt publicsector which ironically it fails to set right.
Analysts and NGOs, however, questionthe Services’ involvement in commercialventures claiming that it can ultimately leadto Rajpaksa’s democratically electedadministration using the military toperpetuate its rule as in time it will be toodifficult and ruinous to disentangle it fromnational economic activity.
In nearby Bangladesh, the military’sbusiness empire, estimated at aroundUSD 500 million, is involved in the hospitalitytrade with the ownership of at least two five-star properties in Dhaka and another beingbuilt in the southern port city of Chittagong.
The Dhaka Radisson hotel, which offersguests use of the nearby deluxe Army golf course, is owned by Bangladesh’s Army Welfare Trust (AWT) and was built on dedicated military land giving it a commercial advantage in Dhaka’s sky-rocketing real estate market. TheBangladesh Army also owns the Trust Bankwith around 40 branches nationwide and in 2007 the military-backed caretakerGovernment granted it exclusive rights toreceive fees for passports.
Emulating Pakistan’s Fauji Foundation,Bangladesh’s AWT, founded in 1998, hasalso spawned the Sena Kallyan Sangstha
(SKS) to care for veterans and familymembers of servicemen. Over years, theSKS has expanded its industrial andfinancial operations to include burgeoninginterests in the food industry — especiallyice cream manufacturing, textiles, jute,garments, electronics, real estate and travel.
Analysts in Dhaka maintain that manydefence-owned businesses were “virtuallyindistinguishable” from other commercialenterprises in the way they operated but inrecent years this aspect has impactedadversely on the Bangladeshi military itself.The inquiry into the country’s worst evermutiny by the paramilitary BangladeshRifles (BDR) border guards in 2009 inwhich some 68 senior military officials wereshot dead, revealed that the insurrectionwas partially fuelled by resentment over thecorruption of Army officers engaged incommercial activities.
Growing MisuseThe Indian military, South Asia’s largest,has assiduously and determinedly beendenied all commercial and businessopportunities by successive civiliangovernments fearful since Independence in1947 of coups similar to those in Pakistan.
But last year the country was appalled bythe Adarsh building scandal involving twoformer Army Chiefs, a retired Indian Navy(IN) Chief and several Service officers, all ofwhom allegedly cornered, at low cost,through a web of intrigue and cunning,expensive flats in Mumbai’s spiffy Colabaarea meant originally for families of theKargil martyrs.
Currently under investigation, the caseinvolved Service officers accused ofcolluding with politicians, contractors andcivil servants in flouting security,environmental and building norms inobtaining allotment of luxury flats in thehigh-rise Adarsh building. The scandal has particularly heaped opprobrium upon a former Army Chief who, despitebeing viciously pilloried in military andofficial circles and the media, continuesunashamedly to behave as thoughblameless even though he lobbieddesperately whilst in office to secure a flatin the controversy-ridden apartment block.
However, it is the Indian military’saddiction to golf that has repeatedly earnedit official censure. Earlier this year, the watchdog, Comptroller and AuditorGeneral (CAG) declared that the Army’s
REGION
Last year, the country wasappalled by the Adarsh
building scandalinvolving two former
Army Chiefs, a retiredIndian Navy Chief and
several Service officers,all of whom allegedlycornered, at low cost,
through a web of intrigueand cunning, expensiveflats in Mumbai’s spiffy
97 golf courses of a total of some 180 acrossthe country were “unauthorised” and werebeing “exploited” to earn revenue.
In its report on the management ofdefence estates, tabled in Parliament inMarch, the CAG has declared that these‘gold’ golf courses spread across 8,000 acresare not authorised and that the Army isdoing wrong in using Government land togenerate profits. “Golf courses andattendant activities can’t be consideredmilitary activities and A-1 land can’t be usedfor golf courses,” it notes.
Heavy amounts of revenues are beingearned, the report adds, without paying anylease rent for use of Government assets,credited presumably to regimental funds,the CAG states. In August 2010, the CAGhas also indicted Army Chief General V. K Singh for diverting some ̀ 7.2 million to illegally construct a grand club house at the Ambala Golf Course during his tenure in the garrison town as 2 Corps Commander.
A year earlier, the CAG had somewhatdrolly stated that for top Indian ArmyGenerals, mobility on the golf course was far more important than operationalpreparedness. It revealed that two three-star commanders had procured 27 golf cartsby passing them off as mechanised wheelchairs for military hospitals and trackalignment reconnaissance vehicles (TARVs)for sapper units deployed along thePakistani frontier.
According to the CAG, two successiveLieutenant Generals, both heading the
strategically sensitive Western Commandat Chandimandir, had misused theirfinancial authority by expending `11.7million on golf carts and worse hadsomewhat, clumsily disguised theiracquisition. The audit declared that the firstlot of five golf buggies had been procured in2006 for `156,000 as ‘motorised carts’ totransport medical patients.
Initially, they were dispatched to variousmilitary hospitals in northern India beforebeing diverted to several Army golf courses inthe area under the officer’s command. Andonce again in 2008, his successor, using his
special financial powers, sanctioned thepurchase of 22 TRAVs for ̀ 10 million whichthe CAG discovered were golf carts too.
The MoD, however, justified the golf cart purchase by declaring, somewhatincredulously, to the CAG that they“facilitated the noiseless reconnaissance inclose proximity to the enemy and helped inthe quick laying of track material”.
The CAG countered by maintaining thatno documents were produced by the Army toshow that these vehicles were ever used fortrack-laying in operational areas.
And whilst this can be dismissed asamusing and relatively tame commercialactivity compared to the business interests ofneighbouring militaries, there is analarming rise in the number of Indianmilitary officers charged with corruption,many of them court court-martialed foroffloading substantially subsidised defencerations and liquor on the open market atgreat profit. Earlier this year, a servingthree-star Army officer was court-martialedfor his involvement in a land scam — a firstfor India’s military.
In a related development, all threeServices have categorically refused the CAGpermission to audit its 4,500 canteens, withan annual turnover of `10,000 crore, thatcater to serving and retired militarypersonnel. In a strongly-worded letter to theMoD, the CAG has declared that since thecanteens were located in Governmentpremises, run by Service personnel, utilisingGovernment transport and receivingsubstantial moneys from the ConsolidatedFund of India, denial of audit permission‘violated’ its rights.
But official sources say that therespective Vice-Chiefs of the armed forceswere vehement in denying the CAG accessto financially appraise the functioning of its canteens claiming that each outlet was individually audited and hence above suspicion, completely ignoring the steady hemorrhaging of goods that iscommon knowledge.
"Standards and values have changed forthe worse and the Services are notimpervious to the overall environment,” aretired Lieutenant General admits. Like therest of society, India’s military too is in theturbulent and unsettling telling throes oftransition which includes large-scalecorruption, he said philosophically,concluding that military personnel too werenot immune to the lure of lucre.
OCTOBER 2011 DSIREGION
Analysts and NGOs,however, question the
Services’ involvement incommercial ventures
claiming that it canultimately lead to
Rajpaksa’s democraticallyelected administration
using the military toperpetuate its rule.
”
AFP
Sri Lankan President MahindaRajapaksa inspects the Guard ofHonour at an Army camp, Diyatalawa
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MODERNISATIONTHE CHALLENGE TO CHANGEThe armed forces need cost effective solutions to enhance
their combat edge I AIR CHIEF MARSHAL FALI H. MAJOR
SECURITY
NEEDED: PERSPECTIVE PLANNING Twelve years down, the office of the NSA is still a
work in progress I SIDDARTH VARADARAJAN
POLICING THE SEAS Despite attacks by terrorists from the
sea, the focus on maritime security
remains inadequate I C. UDAY BHASKAR
COVER STORYCAMOUFLAGED MANOEUVRESThe countries may playdown their strategic andmilitary links but today Israelis India’s second largestarms’ supplier I RAHUL BEDI
b3.qxd 08/02/10 3:47 PM Page 1
APRIL 2010
INSURGENCY
THE NAGA SAGAThere are now possibilties of peace for one of the world’s
oldest insurgencies I B.G. VERGHESE
SECURITY
HOLISTIC RESPONSES
With the changing nature of war democratic nations have
to contend with asymmetrical conflicts I VIJAY OBEROI
OFFICERS AND BUSINESSMEN Many South Asian militaries are in business –from hotels to bakeries to golf courses I Rahul Bedi
AVIATION
BROKEN WINGS High peacetime attrition due to accidents continues to be a matter of great concern for the IAF I V.K. Bhatia
CHANGESIN THEAIR? MAY BE IT IS TIME TO INSTITUTE AN OVERARCHING AEROSPACETECHNOLOGY COMMISSION NOW THAT THE SECTOR IS ON THE CUSP OF FAR REACHING CHANGES I AJAI SHUKLA
DEFENCE and SECURITYof INDIA
AUGUST 2011
DSIVOLUME 4 ISSUE 1 ` 250
INDIA-UK DEFENCE RELATIONS
REACHING OUT
India has become an irresistible strategic partner for
the United Kindgdom I Ajai Shukla
REGION
GROWING APART
With the elimination of Osama Bin Laden, tensions in
US-Pakistan relations are growing I G. Parathasarathy
CAN INDIA
EVER STOP
A TERROR ATTACK?MAJOR CHANGES
ARE URGENTLY
NEEDED IN THE
NATION’S
INTELLIGENCE
APPARATUS BUT
NOTHING WILL EVER
HAPPEN I AJAI SAHNI
DSI Cover final 4.8.qxp:cover-feb3.qxd 05/08/11 12:21 PM Page 1
Amajor portion of almost fivemillion sq km of a maritime area in the Asia-Pacific, whichincludes East China and the
South China Sea, is poised to become acockpit of tension in the current decade.
Only consider, in recent weeks, Beijinghas reasserted its claims to the Spratlysand Paracels archipelagos in the SouthChina Sea, as well as the Diaoyu Islands —called the Senkaku in Japan — disputedwith Tokyo; and India and Vietnam areinsisting on jointly tapping oil resources inthe troubled waters. This reiteration ofChina’s claims comes against a backdropof high levels of tension in the South ChinaSea, with serious clashes remaining a distant possibility as co-claimants,Vietnam and the Philippines, also show nosigns of backing off or in the mood for compromise.
Meanwhile, a strange incident involvingan Indian Navy ship occurred this July.The INS Airavat, after sailing 45 nauticalmiles off Nha Trang Port in Vietnam, hearda broadcast on an open radio channel fromsomeone identified merely as the Chinese
41
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
40
REGION
Former Vice Chief of Staff ofthe South China Sea Fleet ofthe PLA Navy, Rear Admiral
Xiao Xinnian (far left)ENTERTHEDRAGONThe coming decade is likely to witness China asserting its maritime territorial sovereignty possiblyleading to heightened tension in the region
JAYADEVARANADE
AFP
KEY POINTSn Almost five million sq km of Asia-Pacific’s maritime area is poised tobecome a vortex of tension. n Half of the three million sq km ofwaters that should fall under China’sjurisdiction are under demarcationdisputes with peripheral countries.n The US has also chosen todemonstrate its presence in the area and support the countries in the region.
Amajor portion of almost fivemillion sq km of a maritime area in the Asia-Pacific, whichincludes East China and the
South China Sea, is poised to become acockpit of tension in the current decade.
Only consider, in recent weeks, Beijinghas reasserted its claims to the Spratlysand Paracels archipelagos in the SouthChina Sea, as well as the Diaoyu Islands —called the Senkaku in Japan — disputedwith Tokyo; and India and Vietnam areinsisting on jointly tapping oil resources inthe troubled waters. This reiteration ofChina’s claims comes against a backdropof high levels of tension in the South ChinaSea, with serious clashes remaining a distant possibility as co-claimants,Vietnam and the Philippines, also show nosigns of backing off or in the mood for compromise.
Meanwhile, a strange incident involvingan Indian Navy ship occurred this July.The INS Airavat, after sailing 45 nauticalmiles off Nha Trang Port in Vietnam, hearda broadcast on an open radio channel fromsomeone identified merely as the Chinese
41
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
40
REGION
Former Vice Chief of Staff ofthe South China Sea Fleet ofthe PLA Navy, Rear Admiral
Xiao Xinnian (far left)ENTERTHEDRAGONThe coming decade is likely to witness China asserting its maritime territorial sovereignty possiblyleading to heightened tension in the region
JAYADEVARANADE
AFP
KEY POINTSn Almost five million sq km of Asia-Pacific’s maritime area is poised tobecome a vortex of tension. n Half of the three million sq km ofwaters that should fall under China’sjurisdiction are under demarcationdisputes with peripheral countries.n The US has also chosen todemonstrate its presence in the area and support the countries in the region.
Navy. The broadcast informed the ship thatit was entering Chinese waters, andinstructed it to leave. There was, however,no Chinese ship in the vicinity.
Such events cannot be unconnectedwith regional politics. To state their claims,China and Vietnam have both separatelyconducted live fire drills in the area. On itspart, the office of the Philippines Presidentannounced on June 14, 2011 that it willrename the South China Sea as the West
Philipppine Sea. The US has also chosen to demonstrate its presence in the area and support countries in the region. Alongwith Australia, it too has, for the first time,conducted an exercise in these waters. The US has called for ensuring theneutrality and unhindered free passagethrough the sea lanes in this area and urged the various claimants to arrive at apeaceful negotiated settlement.
The implicit US support to the
Philippines and Vietnam, made aroundthis time last year in Hanoi by US Secretaryof State Hillary Clinton and again this year during her tour to Indonesia — after a three-day stop over in India — has clearly annoyed Beijing.
To be sure, Beijing has been periodicallyasserting its claims, but these recentinstances are significant. For example, justbefore Philippines President Aquino’sarrival in Beijing, the official Chinese news
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
agency, Xinhua, warned this August thatbilateral relations cannot be boosted onlythrough trade but are dependent on acommitment to a “proper settlement of themaritime disputes in the South China Sea.”It declared, “China has always made itselfloud and clear that it has indisputablesovereignty over the Sea’s islands andsurrounding waters, which is part ofChina’s core interests. That is based onunambiguous and undeniable historical
facts.” Stating that Beijing is willing to follow the principle of shelvingdifferences and seeking joint development,it, “urged the Philippines to halt its action deemed detrimental to China’s maritimesovereignty and interests in the SouthChina Sea and to cease releasingirresponsible remarks.”
Using History ConsistentlyChina has consistently used history tobolster its claims, pointing out that otherclaimant nations, like Vietnam and thePhilippines, staked no claims till the late1970s when huge reserves of oil andnatural gas were discovered. In July, theofficial English newspaper China Dailydeclared that the Chinese people firstsailed in the waters off the islands over2,000 years ago and discovered and namedmany of them. It claimed that China’s navalforces began to patrol and exercisejurisdiction over the area therebyestablishing China’s maritime boundary inthe South China Sea. Maps published in
April 1935 and February 1948, showed 11 dotted lines encircling the fourarchipelagos with its southernmost pointat Zengmu’ansha. These were the firstmaps to mark the U-shaped maritimeboundary of China in the South China Sea.
A mix of ambition and misinterpretedsignals over the past few years hasseemingly persuaded China’s leadershipthat the US will acquiesce to China’sdominance over large portions of these waters.
Chinese strategists and military officialsbegan referring to the South China Sea asChina’s ‘core interest’. The situationchanged with the unprecedented large-scale US-South Korea naval exercises inMarch 2010, which were correctlyinterpreted in Beijing as being aimed atChina. On February 8, 2011, the USChairperson of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,Admiral Mike Mullen, signed the USNational Security Strategy, a document inwhich China’s influence was implicitthroughout. It stated that the US’s“strategic priorities and interests willincreasingly emanate from the Asia-Pacificregion” and that “for decades to come” theUS military will keep a robust presence inNortheast Asia, across Southeast Asia andthe Pacific. “Assured access to and freedomof maneuver within the global commons —shared areas of sea, air, and space — andglobally connected domains” is declared tobe of enduring interest to the US. It was aslap on China’s wrists and accentuated thestrains in Sino-US relations.
Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit tothe US took place against this backdropand, recognising reality, he deliberatelyavoided categorising the South China Sea asone of China’s ‘core interests,’ along withTaiwan and Tibet. Indeed, China was alsocompelled to acquiesce to the US beingdesignated as an Asia-Pacific power in thejoint communiqué issued in January 2011.China’s Party and military leadershipadditionally publicly asserted that Chinahad no intention of ‘confronting’ or‘challenging’ the US.
China has simultaneously adopted anew negotiating stance intended to bluntUS justification for maintaining a presencein the waters. Beijing has proposed that theneutrality and freedom of international sealanes in these waters should be guaranteedby China, US and other countries while calling on other claimant nations to
42 43
REGION
Filipinos protest inManila condemning analleged incursion by theChinese Navy in theSouth China Sea
China has consistentlyused history to bolster itsclaims, pointing out that
Navy. The broadcast informed the ship thatit was entering Chinese waters, andinstructed it to leave. There was, however,no Chinese ship in the vicinity.
Such events cannot be unconnectedwith regional politics. To state their claims,China and Vietnam have both separatelyconducted live fire drills in the area. On itspart, the office of the Philippines Presidentannounced on June 14, 2011 that it willrename the South China Sea as the West
Philipppine Sea. The US has also chosen to demonstrate its presence in the area and support countries in the region. Alongwith Australia, it too has, for the first time,conducted an exercise in these waters. The US has called for ensuring theneutrality and unhindered free passagethrough the sea lanes in this area and urged the various claimants to arrive at apeaceful negotiated settlement.
The implicit US support to the
Philippines and Vietnam, made aroundthis time last year in Hanoi by US Secretaryof State Hillary Clinton and again this year during her tour to Indonesia — after a three-day stop over in India — has clearly annoyed Beijing.
To be sure, Beijing has been periodicallyasserting its claims, but these recentinstances are significant. For example, justbefore Philippines President Aquino’sarrival in Beijing, the official Chinese news
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
agency, Xinhua, warned this August thatbilateral relations cannot be boosted onlythrough trade but are dependent on acommitment to a “proper settlement of themaritime disputes in the South China Sea.”It declared, “China has always made itselfloud and clear that it has indisputablesovereignty over the Sea’s islands andsurrounding waters, which is part ofChina’s core interests. That is based onunambiguous and undeniable historical
facts.” Stating that Beijing is willing to follow the principle of shelvingdifferences and seeking joint development,it, “urged the Philippines to halt its action deemed detrimental to China’s maritimesovereignty and interests in the SouthChina Sea and to cease releasingirresponsible remarks.”
Using History ConsistentlyChina has consistently used history tobolster its claims, pointing out that otherclaimant nations, like Vietnam and thePhilippines, staked no claims till the late1970s when huge reserves of oil andnatural gas were discovered. In July, theofficial English newspaper China Dailydeclared that the Chinese people firstsailed in the waters off the islands over2,000 years ago and discovered and namedmany of them. It claimed that China’s navalforces began to patrol and exercisejurisdiction over the area therebyestablishing China’s maritime boundary inthe South China Sea. Maps published in
April 1935 and February 1948, showed 11 dotted lines encircling the fourarchipelagos with its southernmost pointat Zengmu’ansha. These were the firstmaps to mark the U-shaped maritimeboundary of China in the South China Sea.
A mix of ambition and misinterpretedsignals over the past few years hasseemingly persuaded China’s leadershipthat the US will acquiesce to China’sdominance over large portions of these waters.
Chinese strategists and military officialsbegan referring to the South China Sea asChina’s ‘core interest’. The situationchanged with the unprecedented large-scale US-South Korea naval exercises inMarch 2010, which were correctlyinterpreted in Beijing as being aimed atChina. On February 8, 2011, the USChairperson of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,Admiral Mike Mullen, signed the USNational Security Strategy, a document inwhich China’s influence was implicitthroughout. It stated that the US’s“strategic priorities and interests willincreasingly emanate from the Asia-Pacificregion” and that “for decades to come” theUS military will keep a robust presence inNortheast Asia, across Southeast Asia andthe Pacific. “Assured access to and freedomof maneuver within the global commons —shared areas of sea, air, and space — andglobally connected domains” is declared tobe of enduring interest to the US. It was aslap on China’s wrists and accentuated thestrains in Sino-US relations.
Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit tothe US took place against this backdropand, recognising reality, he deliberatelyavoided categorising the South China Sea asone of China’s ‘core interests,’ along withTaiwan and Tibet. Indeed, China was alsocompelled to acquiesce to the US beingdesignated as an Asia-Pacific power in thejoint communiqué issued in January 2011.China’s Party and military leadershipadditionally publicly asserted that Chinahad no intention of ‘confronting’ or‘challenging’ the US.
China has simultaneously adopted anew negotiating stance intended to bluntUS justification for maintaining a presencein the waters. Beijing has proposed that theneutrality and freedom of international sealanes in these waters should be guaranteedby China, US and other countries while calling on other claimant nations to
42 43
REGION
Filipinos protest inManila condemning analleged incursion by theChinese Navy in theSouth China Sea
China has consistentlyused history to bolster itsclaims, pointing out that
settle disputes bilaterally. Beijing’s angerat the US was separately reflected in aninterview by Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo inJune when he criticised the US role in theSouth China Sea.
Meanwhile, big power rivalry in thesewaters was stepped up with Russiaannouncing its intention of deployingtroops on the Kurile Islands disputed withJapan. Russian Defense Minister AnatolySerdyukov declared on February 26, 2011,that, to ensure the security of the islands,which are an inalienable part of Russia,Russia will deploy military units on theIturup and Kunashir Islands which are partof the Kurile Island chain. They will havean integrated machine gun-artillerydivision and be reinforced with the newestcommunications systems, electronicwarfare and radar stations. S-400 missiledefense systems could also possibly be deployed.
China has not given up its quest to‘recover’ its ‘lost’ maritime territories.Beijing remains intent on restricting the scope of activity of the US and otherpowers in these waters. China’s ambitionis to dominate at least the area within the ‘first Island chain’, which is boundedbetween the Chinese mainland up tosouthern Japan along the Philippines anddown to Brunei and Vietnam.
Beijing’s determination to ‘recover’these territories was evident even when itfelt under pressure by the US-SouthKorean joint naval exercises. China, whichhad earlier warned that the Yellow Sea wasin close proximity to its vital economic andpolitical centre, responded by conducting aseries of military exercises. The SecondArtillery, China’s strategic missile force,undertook a major exercise in Beijing’svicinity on the eastern seaboard, obviouslyto demonstrate that it had acquired acapability to launch missile attacks againsthostile aircraft carrier groups. The impliedreference was to the DF-21D Anti-ShipBallistic Missile (ASBM), which has anestimated range of 1,500km and is believedto have been first deployed with the SecondArtillery unit created in July, 2010.
China’s unflagging interest in thisregion was evident just days prior to itswarning issued to Manila. On August 29,2011, Xinhua, reminded Japan’s newPrime Minister Yoshihko Noda that he,“Should take concrete and substantialsteps to promote its relations with China,
and respect China’s core interests.” Itaccused Tokyo of managing, “itsrelationship with Beijing without duerespect for China’s core interests” andemphasised that, “Japan needs to showenough respect for China’s nationalsovereignty and territorial integrity,especially when it comes to mattersconcerning Diaoyu Islands, which are anintegral part of China’s territory.” At thesame time, it said China, “would like tosettle its differences with Japan throughcandid dialogue and is willing to shelvedifferences and jointly explore theresources in the surrounding waters of theDiaoyu Islands, on the condition thatTokyo recognised China’s completesovereignty over the archipelago.”
Engaging PLANIn keeping with the overall scenario, thePeople’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)has been enlarging the scope of its activityand received increased prominence. It isclear that the PLAN will continue to receivethe major share of the defence allocations,but its efficacy will be augmented byadditional budgetary infusions to the StateOceanic Administration, provincialmaritime administrations and shipyards.
A Chinese tabloid owned by theCommunist Party of China, The GlobalTimes, disclosed in July 2011, that thenumber of vessels with the State OceanicAdministration will increase to 350 by2015 and 520 by 2020. Meanwhile,Chinese military analysts have called for aunified maritime force.
An article in the Jiefangjun Bao, theofficial daily of the PLA, of July 27, statedthat, “Presently the People’s Republic ofChina is facing a very grim situation in theprotection of its rights and interests of theseas. More than half of the three million sqkm of waters that should fall under China’sjurisdictions according to the UnitedNations Convention on the Law of the Sea are under demarcation disputes withperipheral countries. Large numbers ofChina’s islands have been invaded andoccupied and China’s oil, gas and fisheryresources have often been plundered…”
PLAN’s emphasis continues to be ondeterring and delaying ‘hostile’ foreignnavies stepping in to assist Taiwan or othernations in the South China Sea.
PLAN is engaged in the rapidconstruction of more advanced and new
missiles, ships and submarines. Theaddition of aircraft carriers — the first just completed sea trials in early August2011, and will join the South Sea Fleet —from 2015 onwards will significantlyupgrade its capabilities.
A potentially important, though underplayed, feature has been China’s steadyfocus on the design, development andmanufacture of Unmanned UnderwaterVessels (UUV). This will augment itsalready sizeable submarine fleet and giveit added operational flexibility. The UUVs will be part of China’s asymmetricsubterranean warfare strategy. The UUVprogramme was initiated as part of thesecret 863 Programme. US analyst RichardFisher stated in a report that in 1996China revealed a UUV featuring artificialintelligence and automatic controls which could reach a depth of 6,000 metres.It was developed with Russian assistance. Anew unmanned patrol/surveillance vessel was unveiled by China at the Zhuhai show in 2006. This vessel was described as useful for long-rangereconnaissance, communication relay,electronic interference, target strike,
submarine mines search, anti-submarinecombat and so on.
In 2007, the official Chinese Televisionchannel telecast visuals of a PLANminesweeper using a UUV for counter-mine operations. UUVs have a variety of potential applications and can be used to effectively hamper an adversary’soperations. The possible uses of UUVsenvisage using them in the mode thatChinese military literature favours, namelythe ‘swarming concept.’
Lyle Goldstein of the China MaritimeStudies Institute of the US Naval WarCollege has assessed that the UUVs could beused in ‘swarms’ as part of an undersea
network that could be used for sensing,shooting or as communication relaystations. They would, moreover, be low cost.
A number of specialised institutes areat work in China on UUVs, suggesting thata considerable quantum of funds alongwith the necessary research anddevelopment (R&D) effort has beeninvested in the project. It is probable thatChinese researchers are working onadvanced guidance systems for the UUVsto enhance their effective deployment in maritime undersea warfare. Their usage will initially be in the Taiwan Strait and waters surrounding the Spratlysand Paracels. They could later be deployed
in offensive operational roles in moredistant waters.
China’s recent actions, together with itslong term naval production plans, confirmthat Beijing intends to ‘recover’ sovereigntyover major parts of the South China and East China Seas as also establish itsdominance over this maritime territory of its interest.
China’s efforts, which had become low-key after Chinese President Hu Jintao’svisit to the US, appear to have nowstrengthened. This decade is likely towitness more instances of China assertingits maritime territorial sovereignty leadingto heightened tension in the region.
REGION
The People’s LiberationArmy Navy (PLAN) has
been enlarging the scopeof its activity and receivedincreased prominence. It
is clear that PLAN willcontinue to receive a
major share of defenceallocations; its efficacy
will be augmented byadditional budgetaryinfusions to the State
Oceanic Administration,provincial maritimeadministrations and
shipyards.
”
A US Navy FA-18 SuperHornet refuels during a
US-Japan military exerciseabove the South China Sea
settle disputes bilaterally. Beijing’s angerat the US was separately reflected in aninterview by Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo inJune when he criticised the US role in theSouth China Sea.
Meanwhile, big power rivalry in thesewaters was stepped up with Russiaannouncing its intention of deployingtroops on the Kurile Islands disputed withJapan. Russian Defense Minister AnatolySerdyukov declared on February 26, 2011,that, to ensure the security of the islands,which are an inalienable part of Russia,Russia will deploy military units on theIturup and Kunashir Islands which are partof the Kurile Island chain. They will havean integrated machine gun-artillerydivision and be reinforced with the newestcommunications systems, electronicwarfare and radar stations. S-400 missiledefense systems could also possibly be deployed.
China has not given up its quest to‘recover’ its ‘lost’ maritime territories.Beijing remains intent on restricting the scope of activity of the US and otherpowers in these waters. China’s ambitionis to dominate at least the area within the ‘first Island chain’, which is boundedbetween the Chinese mainland up tosouthern Japan along the Philippines anddown to Brunei and Vietnam.
Beijing’s determination to ‘recover’these territories was evident even when itfelt under pressure by the US-SouthKorean joint naval exercises. China, whichhad earlier warned that the Yellow Sea wasin close proximity to its vital economic andpolitical centre, responded by conducting aseries of military exercises. The SecondArtillery, China’s strategic missile force,undertook a major exercise in Beijing’svicinity on the eastern seaboard, obviouslyto demonstrate that it had acquired acapability to launch missile attacks againsthostile aircraft carrier groups. The impliedreference was to the DF-21D Anti-ShipBallistic Missile (ASBM), which has anestimated range of 1,500km and is believedto have been first deployed with the SecondArtillery unit created in July, 2010.
China’s unflagging interest in thisregion was evident just days prior to itswarning issued to Manila. On August 29,2011, Xinhua, reminded Japan’s newPrime Minister Yoshihko Noda that he,“Should take concrete and substantialsteps to promote its relations with China,
and respect China’s core interests.” Itaccused Tokyo of managing, “itsrelationship with Beijing without duerespect for China’s core interests” andemphasised that, “Japan needs to showenough respect for China’s nationalsovereignty and territorial integrity,especially when it comes to mattersconcerning Diaoyu Islands, which are anintegral part of China’s territory.” At thesame time, it said China, “would like tosettle its differences with Japan throughcandid dialogue and is willing to shelvedifferences and jointly explore theresources in the surrounding waters of theDiaoyu Islands, on the condition thatTokyo recognised China’s completesovereignty over the archipelago.”
Engaging PLANIn keeping with the overall scenario, thePeople’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)has been enlarging the scope of its activityand received increased prominence. It isclear that the PLAN will continue to receivethe major share of the defence allocations,but its efficacy will be augmented byadditional budgetary infusions to the StateOceanic Administration, provincialmaritime administrations and shipyards.
A Chinese tabloid owned by theCommunist Party of China, The GlobalTimes, disclosed in July 2011, that thenumber of vessels with the State OceanicAdministration will increase to 350 by2015 and 520 by 2020. Meanwhile,Chinese military analysts have called for aunified maritime force.
An article in the Jiefangjun Bao, theofficial daily of the PLA, of July 27, statedthat, “Presently the People’s Republic ofChina is facing a very grim situation in theprotection of its rights and interests of theseas. More than half of the three million sqkm of waters that should fall under China’sjurisdictions according to the UnitedNations Convention on the Law of the Sea are under demarcation disputes withperipheral countries. Large numbers ofChina’s islands have been invaded andoccupied and China’s oil, gas and fisheryresources have often been plundered…”
PLAN’s emphasis continues to be ondeterring and delaying ‘hostile’ foreignnavies stepping in to assist Taiwan or othernations in the South China Sea.
PLAN is engaged in the rapidconstruction of more advanced and new
missiles, ships and submarines. Theaddition of aircraft carriers — the first just completed sea trials in early August2011, and will join the South Sea Fleet —from 2015 onwards will significantlyupgrade its capabilities.
A potentially important, though underplayed, feature has been China’s steadyfocus on the design, development andmanufacture of Unmanned UnderwaterVessels (UUV). This will augment itsalready sizeable submarine fleet and giveit added operational flexibility. The UUVs will be part of China’s asymmetricsubterranean warfare strategy. The UUVprogramme was initiated as part of thesecret 863 Programme. US analyst RichardFisher stated in a report that in 1996China revealed a UUV featuring artificialintelligence and automatic controls which could reach a depth of 6,000 metres.It was developed with Russian assistance. Anew unmanned patrol/surveillance vessel was unveiled by China at the Zhuhai show in 2006. This vessel was described as useful for long-rangereconnaissance, communication relay,electronic interference, target strike,
submarine mines search, anti-submarinecombat and so on.
In 2007, the official Chinese Televisionchannel telecast visuals of a PLANminesweeper using a UUV for counter-mine operations. UUVs have a variety of potential applications and can be used to effectively hamper an adversary’soperations. The possible uses of UUVsenvisage using them in the mode thatChinese military literature favours, namelythe ‘swarming concept.’
Lyle Goldstein of the China MaritimeStudies Institute of the US Naval WarCollege has assessed that the UUVs could beused in ‘swarms’ as part of an undersea
network that could be used for sensing,shooting or as communication relaystations. They would, moreover, be low cost.
A number of specialised institutes areat work in China on UUVs, suggesting thata considerable quantum of funds alongwith the necessary research anddevelopment (R&D) effort has beeninvested in the project. It is probable thatChinese researchers are working onadvanced guidance systems for the UUVsto enhance their effective deployment in maritime undersea warfare. Their usage will initially be in the Taiwan Strait and waters surrounding the Spratlysand Paracels. They could later be deployed
in offensive operational roles in moredistant waters.
China’s recent actions, together with itslong term naval production plans, confirmthat Beijing intends to ‘recover’ sovereigntyover major parts of the South China and East China Seas as also establish itsdominance over this maritime territory of its interest.
China’s efforts, which had become low-key after Chinese President Hu Jintao’svisit to the US, appear to have nowstrengthened. This decade is likely towitness more instances of China assertingits maritime territorial sovereignty leadingto heightened tension in the region.
REGION
The People’s LiberationArmy Navy (PLAN) has
been enlarging the scopeof its activity and receivedincreased prominence. It
is clear that PLAN willcontinue to receive a
major share of defenceallocations; its efficacy
will be augmented byadditional budgetaryinfusions to the State
Oceanic Administration,provincial maritimeadministrations and
shipyards.
”
A US Navy FA-18 SuperHornet refuels during a
US-Japan military exerciseabove the South China Sea
India is not a country that knows how totake diplomatic setbacks in its strideand move on. When Tokyo handilydefeated New Delhi's bid to get elected
as a non-permanent member of the UnitedNations Security Council (UNSC) in 1994,it took 16 years for the Indian Government togather courage and run for a seat at the topdecision-making world body again. In theintervening years, India launched twounsuccessful attempts to raise its profile atthe UN. In 2005, along with Brazil, Japanand Germany – known collectively as the G4 – it made a determined push to bring about the reform and an expansionof the UNSC.
The following year, Prime MinisterManmohan Singh took the unprecedentedstep of fielding an Indian candidate, ShashiTharoor, for the post of UN Secretary-
General. The initiative ran aground in theface of active and passive opposition fromChina and the United States, neither ofwhom was ready to countenance thedilution of their own privileged position atthe UN. Though Tharoor ran a creditablerace – coming a respectable second to Ban ki-Moon with only one permanentmember, the US, refusing to back him –many analysts believe India diluted its greatpower claims by competing for a posttraditionally considered the preserve ofsmaller nations and mid-powers and onewhich it had no realistic chance at winning.
Break with the PastWhy then, in the face of earlier defeats at theUN and its own tendency to retreat into itsshell after a major setback, has India revivedits quest for a permanent seat on the UNSC?Does the push being made by India in NewYork amount to a welcome break with atimorous past? Or is it another act ofmisplaced bravado – an equivalent of theTharoor nomination – which will end uphurting the country's interests andreputation? The question is importantbecause considerable diplomatic energy isbeing expended at Turtle Bay, the areawhere the UN is headquartered, to propelthe ongoing text-based negotiations onSecurity Council reform towards theformulation of a short framework resolutionthat can be submitted to the UN GeneralAssembly for a formal vote.
47
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
46
DIPLOMACY
SIDDHARTHVARADARAJAN
KEY POINTSn In 2005, along with Brazil, Japan and Germany, India made adetermined, but unsuccessful, pushto bring about the expansion of the UNSC.n Today, more than 80 countries haveagreed to co-sponsor such a changebut that is still 40 short of a two-thirdsmajority needed to pass a resolution atthe UNGA.n Even if a two-thirds majority does notexist today India can afford to wait.
AFP
India is reviving its quest for a permanent seat in the UnitedNations Security Council
India is not a country that knows how totake diplomatic setbacks in its strideand move on. When Tokyo handilydefeated New Delhi's bid to get elected
as a non-permanent member of the UnitedNations Security Council (UNSC) in 1994,it took 16 years for the Indian Government togather courage and run for a seat at the topdecision-making world body again. In theintervening years, India launched twounsuccessful attempts to raise its profile atthe UN. In 2005, along with Brazil, Japanand Germany – known collectively as the G4 – it made a determined push to bring about the reform and an expansionof the UNSC.
The following year, Prime MinisterManmohan Singh took the unprecedentedstep of fielding an Indian candidate, ShashiTharoor, for the post of UN Secretary-
General. The initiative ran aground in theface of active and passive opposition fromChina and the United States, neither ofwhom was ready to countenance thedilution of their own privileged position atthe UN. Though Tharoor ran a creditablerace – coming a respectable second to Ban ki-Moon with only one permanentmember, the US, refusing to back him –many analysts believe India diluted its greatpower claims by competing for a posttraditionally considered the preserve ofsmaller nations and mid-powers and onewhich it had no realistic chance at winning.
Break with the PastWhy then, in the face of earlier defeats at theUN and its own tendency to retreat into itsshell after a major setback, has India revivedits quest for a permanent seat on the UNSC?Does the push being made by India in NewYork amount to a welcome break with atimorous past? Or is it another act ofmisplaced bravado – an equivalent of theTharoor nomination – which will end uphurting the country's interests andreputation? The question is importantbecause considerable diplomatic energy isbeing expended at Turtle Bay, the areawhere the UN is headquartered, to propelthe ongoing text-based negotiations onSecurity Council reform towards theformulation of a short framework resolutionthat can be submitted to the UN GeneralAssembly for a formal vote.
47
OCTOBER 2011 DSI
46
DIPLOMACY
SIDDHARTHVARADARAJAN
KEY POINTSn In 2005, along with Brazil, Japan and Germany, India made adetermined, but unsuccessful, pushto bring about the expansion of the UNSC.n Today, more than 80 countries haveagreed to co-sponsor such a changebut that is still 40 short of a two-thirdsmajority needed to pass a resolution atthe UNGA.n Even if a two-thirds majority does notexist today India can afford to wait.
AFP
India is reviving its quest for a permanent seat in the UnitedNations Security Council
India and the G4 want the UnitedNations General Assembly (UNGA) toendorse the principle of an increase in thesize of the Council from the current 15 (consisting of five permanent and tennon-permanent members) to 25 or 26, withsix new permanent seats, comprising twoadditional members from Asia and Africaand one each from Latin America andEurope. At present, Asia and NorthAmerica have one permanent seat each,while Europe has three, two from thewestern side – France and Great Britainand one from the eastern – Russia.
Indian officials say more than 80 countries have agreed to co-sponsor sucha framework text. The idea would be to winmore co-sponsors – ideally as close to thetwo-thirds mark required to pass aresolution at the UNGA – before calling for aformal vote that the sponsors would winhandily. After that, it would be up to any andall aspirants for the new permanent seatscreated to secure a two-thirds majority oftheir own in individual balloting.
India expects to sail through that stage,as would Japan and Brazil. Germany, theone member of the G4 nations whose claimto a permanent seat , the European Union'sthird and Europe’s fourth, has the lowestinternational support and is less sure of itsprospects at the General Assembly. The finalstage of the expansion process would be forthe UNSC to approve of the new permanentmembers, which amounts to none of the fiveexisting permanent members using theirveto to block a candidate that has alreadysecured the support of at least two-thirds ofthe world. Despite Chinese opposition to apermanent seat for Japan and its discomfortat sharing space at the high table with India,the use of the veto against either Asianpower is extremely unlikely.
Diluting MonpolyThe United States – which has endorsed theaspirations of Japan and India and to alimited extent, Germany – and China wouldideally like to avoid any dilution of theexisting permanent members' monopolyover international decision-making. Russia,too, is ambivalent, though it cannot affordopenly to question the candidature ofcountries like India, Brazil and Africa. TheUN Charter gives permanent members theright to block the expansion of membershipbut none of the existing five permanentmembers (P-5) would like to bear the
burden of casting a veto. That is why eachwould like the expansion process to getstuck in procedural wrangles. And the way todo that, apart from the usual filibusteringin UN Committees and meetings, is toencourage those countries who have taken astand against the reform process for onereason or the other.
The Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group,also known as the Coffee Club, consists ofnearly two dozen nations, mostly mid-powers, that oppose any expansion inpermanent seats because this would placethem at a strategic disadvantage vis-à-vis thesix larger powers that would gain.
Pakistan opposes a permanent seat forIndia. Argentina and Mexico oppose
Brazil's aspirations. Egypt and Algeria fearthat they will not make the cut for the twoproposed Africa seats (Nigeria and South Africa are seen as the strongestcontenders). European powers like Italyand Spain do not want Germany to get apermanent seat. In Asia, South Korea andIndonesia do not want Japan to gain. TheUS diplomatic cable from May 2009,leaked recently by WikiLeaks, (see box)show how the US and China are trying tocoordinate their positions.
For India, the hardest part of the war isthe first battle – to ensure that the UNGAapproves of a framework resolution for sixnew permanent seats. From there onwards,the sailing, at least for the Indians, is likely tobe easy. But getting to the stage where theUNGA debates, and approves, of the text currently being finalised is not going to
be easy. Eighty-odd co-sponsors lookimpressive but that is some 40 countriesshort of the two-thirds mark.
Part of the problem is a lack of consensusin Africa. Since the adoption of its 2005Ezulwini Consensus where it called for twopermanent seats with full veto powers forAfrica, the African Union (AU) has refrainedfrom adopting a detailed position on theprocess by which the goal of UNSC reformcan be accomplished. If the African debatewere to move ahead quickly or even ifindividual AU members were to concludethat Ezulwini does not prevent them frombacking the nations’ reform text — the text'slanguage is broad enough to include the2005 African position — then theframework resolution would sail throughthe UNGA.
Differing AssessmentsUnfortunately, the G4 nations themselveshave differing assessments of theirprospects before the UNGA. India andBrazil are clear that the tabling of a concretetext calling for six new permanent seats isthe way to proceed. But Germany andJapan feel the current level of internationalsupport for the text does not warrant that.Berlin and Tokyo are anxious to settle theintermediate option – of a freeze inpermanent seats for, say, the next decadeor two, and the creation of a new categoryof semi-permanent members. Such anapproach, they feel, would allow the G4 toremain on the Council for a period longerthan the two-year term non-permanentmembers are entitled to.
India has not erred in pushing thereform agenda again despite the setback of2005. Indeed, the Manmohan SinghGovernment has judged, correctly, that theworld is much more willing to countenancean enlarged role for India today than it has atany time in the past two decades. Even if thetwo-thirds majority does not exist todayIndia can afford to wait. If the leadinginstitutions of global governance deny Indiaits say, this can only affect their credibilityand effectiveness. The longer the delay, thegreater will be India's claims.
In contrast, the claims of Japan andGermany will get weaker with each passingyear. One can understand the reasons whythey see merit in the intermediate option ofa semi-permanent seat. For India, however,settling for an unnecessary compromisewill be self-defeating and demeaning.
48 49
DIPLOMACY
For India, the hardest partof the war is the first
battle — to ensure thatthe UNGA approves of a
framework resolution forsix new permanent seats.
From there onwards thesailing, for India at least,
is likely to be easy.
”
The American and Chinese PositionAccount of a meeting held at the UN on May 18,2009 between Susan Rice, Ambassador of the USto the United Nations, Ambassador AlejandorWolff, Deputy Permanent US Representative to theUN and China’s Vice-Foreign Minister, He Yafei:
Ambassador Rice told He Yafei that the UnitedStates continues to review its policy on SecurityCouncil reform. She stressed that the BarackObama Administration recognises the need forCouncil expansion to reflect the realities of the21st century but commented that expansion mustbe modest in order to maintain the Council'seffectiveness and efficiency. She said the US doesnot agree with adding permanent seatsrepresenting regions without knowing whichcountries would occupy the seats and is notinterested in changing the current configuration ofthe veto. Rice said the US has avoided takingsides between the Group of Four and Uniting forConsensus blocs and is approaching the issuewith genuine open-mindedness...
Ambassador Wolff added that the US andChina have excellent cooperation on this issueand remarked that there is a real risk thatPresident of the General Assembly Migueld’Escoto Brockmann will want to take action todemonstrate progress before he finishes histenure in September. In response to He Yafei'squestion about a solution forced on the Council orrushed through the General Assembly, Riceresponded that the possibility exists, but addedthat intervening prematurely could accelerate theprocess and precipitate a bad decision by the Assembly.
Ambassador Wolff said the dynamicssurrounding the intermediate solution needed tobe watched carefully. Japan and Germany areplaying with the idea and Brazil is approaching itwith caution. If India shows interest in it, however,the situation could turn and reform and couldmove much more quickly...
In response to Ambassador Rice's questionabout China’s bottom line, He Yafei said that Chinabelieves the Council needs to be morerepresentative but should not be too large. Chinadoes not have a specific size in mind for anexpanded Council, he said. Like the US, hecommented, China wants to anchor an expandedCouncil's legitimacy with the widest possibleconsensus, agreeing that the two-thirds majoritywould leave one-third unsatisfied. He also saidthat adding Japan remained an issue for China.Ambassador Rice commented that it would bedifficult to envision an expansion of the Councilwithout the UN's second largest contributor,which He Yafei acknowledged. He said that it istoo early and the conditions are not right for theP-5 to come to any consensus on reform,stressing the need for the United States, Chinaand Russia to reach a consensus before bringingin the UK and France, which have differentobjectives in a reform process — that is, holdingon to their seats.
Prime MinisterManmohan Singhspeaks at the 66thUnited Nations GeneralAssembly, New York
India and the G4 want the UnitedNations General Assembly (UNGA) toendorse the principle of an increase in thesize of the Council from the current 15 (consisting of five permanent and tennon-permanent members) to 25 or 26, withsix new permanent seats, comprising twoadditional members from Asia and Africaand one each from Latin America andEurope. At present, Asia and NorthAmerica have one permanent seat each,while Europe has three, two from thewestern side – France and Great Britainand one from the eastern – Russia.
Indian officials say more than 80 countries have agreed to co-sponsor sucha framework text. The idea would be to winmore co-sponsors – ideally as close to thetwo-thirds mark required to pass aresolution at the UNGA – before calling for aformal vote that the sponsors would winhandily. After that, it would be up to any andall aspirants for the new permanent seatscreated to secure a two-thirds majority oftheir own in individual balloting.
India expects to sail through that stage,as would Japan and Brazil. Germany, theone member of the G4 nations whose claimto a permanent seat , the European Union'sthird and Europe’s fourth, has the lowestinternational support and is less sure of itsprospects at the General Assembly. The finalstage of the expansion process would be forthe UNSC to approve of the new permanentmembers, which amounts to none of the fiveexisting permanent members using theirveto to block a candidate that has alreadysecured the support of at least two-thirds ofthe world. Despite Chinese opposition to apermanent seat for Japan and its discomfortat sharing space at the high table with India,the use of the veto against either Asianpower is extremely unlikely.
Diluting MonpolyThe United States – which has endorsed theaspirations of Japan and India and to alimited extent, Germany – and China wouldideally like to avoid any dilution of theexisting permanent members' monopolyover international decision-making. Russia,too, is ambivalent, though it cannot affordopenly to question the candidature ofcountries like India, Brazil and Africa. TheUN Charter gives permanent members theright to block the expansion of membershipbut none of the existing five permanentmembers (P-5) would like to bear the
burden of casting a veto. That is why eachwould like the expansion process to getstuck in procedural wrangles. And the way todo that, apart from the usual filibusteringin UN Committees and meetings, is toencourage those countries who have taken astand against the reform process for onereason or the other.
The Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group,also known as the Coffee Club, consists ofnearly two dozen nations, mostly mid-powers, that oppose any expansion inpermanent seats because this would placethem at a strategic disadvantage vis-à-vis thesix larger powers that would gain.
Pakistan opposes a permanent seat forIndia. Argentina and Mexico oppose
Brazil's aspirations. Egypt and Algeria fearthat they will not make the cut for the twoproposed Africa seats (Nigeria and South Africa are seen as the strongestcontenders). European powers like Italyand Spain do not want Germany to get apermanent seat. In Asia, South Korea andIndonesia do not want Japan to gain. TheUS diplomatic cable from May 2009,leaked recently by WikiLeaks, (see box)show how the US and China are trying tocoordinate their positions.
For India, the hardest part of the war isthe first battle – to ensure that the UNGAapproves of a framework resolution for sixnew permanent seats. From there onwards,the sailing, at least for the Indians, is likely tobe easy. But getting to the stage where theUNGA debates, and approves, of the text currently being finalised is not going to
be easy. Eighty-odd co-sponsors lookimpressive but that is some 40 countriesshort of the two-thirds mark.
Part of the problem is a lack of consensusin Africa. Since the adoption of its 2005Ezulwini Consensus where it called for twopermanent seats with full veto powers forAfrica, the African Union (AU) has refrainedfrom adopting a detailed position on theprocess by which the goal of UNSC reformcan be accomplished. If the African debatewere to move ahead quickly or even ifindividual AU members were to concludethat Ezulwini does not prevent them frombacking the nations’ reform text — the text'slanguage is broad enough to include the2005 African position — then theframework resolution would sail throughthe UNGA.
Differing AssessmentsUnfortunately, the G4 nations themselveshave differing assessments of theirprospects before the UNGA. India andBrazil are clear that the tabling of a concretetext calling for six new permanent seats isthe way to proceed. But Germany andJapan feel the current level of internationalsupport for the text does not warrant that.Berlin and Tokyo are anxious to settle theintermediate option – of a freeze inpermanent seats for, say, the next decadeor two, and the creation of a new categoryof semi-permanent members. Such anapproach, they feel, would allow the G4 toremain on the Council for a period longerthan the two-year term non-permanentmembers are entitled to.
India has not erred in pushing thereform agenda again despite the setback of2005. Indeed, the Manmohan SinghGovernment has judged, correctly, that theworld is much more willing to countenancean enlarged role for India today than it has atany time in the past two decades. Even if thetwo-thirds majority does not exist todayIndia can afford to wait. If the leadinginstitutions of global governance deny Indiaits say, this can only affect their credibilityand effectiveness. The longer the delay, thegreater will be India's claims.
In contrast, the claims of Japan andGermany will get weaker with each passingyear. One can understand the reasons whythey see merit in the intermediate option ofa semi-permanent seat. For India, however,settling for an unnecessary compromisewill be self-defeating and demeaning.
48 49
DIPLOMACY
For India, the hardest partof the war is the first
battle — to ensure thatthe UNGA approves of a
framework resolution forsix new permanent seats.
From there onwards thesailing, for India at least,
is likely to be easy.
”
The American and Chinese PositionAccount of a meeting held at the UN on May 18,2009 between Susan Rice, Ambassador of the USto the United Nations, Ambassador AlejandorWolff, Deputy Permanent US Representative to theUN and China’s Vice-Foreign Minister, He Yafei:
Ambassador Rice told He Yafei that the UnitedStates continues to review its policy on SecurityCouncil reform. She stressed that the BarackObama Administration recognises the need forCouncil expansion to reflect the realities of the21st century but commented that expansion mustbe modest in order to maintain the Council'seffectiveness and efficiency. She said the US doesnot agree with adding permanent seatsrepresenting regions without knowing whichcountries would occupy the seats and is notinterested in changing the current configuration ofthe veto. Rice said the US has avoided takingsides between the Group of Four and Uniting forConsensus blocs and is approaching the issuewith genuine open-mindedness...
Ambassador Wolff added that the US andChina have excellent cooperation on this issueand remarked that there is a real risk thatPresident of the General Assembly Migueld’Escoto Brockmann will want to take action todemonstrate progress before he finishes histenure in September. In response to He Yafei'squestion about a solution forced on the Council orrushed through the General Assembly, Riceresponded that the possibility exists, but addedthat intervening prematurely could accelerate theprocess and precipitate a bad decision by the Assembly.
Ambassador Wolff said the dynamicssurrounding the intermediate solution needed tobe watched carefully. Japan and Germany areplaying with the idea and Brazil is approaching itwith caution. If India shows interest in it, however,the situation could turn and reform and couldmove much more quickly...
In response to Ambassador Rice's questionabout China’s bottom line, He Yafei said that Chinabelieves the Council needs to be morerepresentative but should not be too large. Chinadoes not have a specific size in mind for anexpanded Council, he said. Like the US, hecommented, China wants to anchor an expandedCouncil's legitimacy with the widest possibleconsensus, agreeing that the two-thirds majoritywould leave one-third unsatisfied. He also saidthat adding Japan remained an issue for China.Ambassador Rice commented that it would bedifficult to envision an expansion of the Councilwithout the UN's second largest contributor,which He Yafei acknowledged. He said that it istoo early and the conditions are not right for theP-5 to come to any consensus on reform,stressing the need for the United States, Chinaand Russia to reach a consensus before bringingin the UK and France, which have differentobjectives in a reform process — that is, holdingon to their seats.
Prime MinisterManmohan Singhspeaks at the 66thUnited Nations GeneralAssembly, New York
Nearly 40 Years Later Still a Work-In-ProgressThe upgraded version of India’s locally designedArjun Mk-II Main Battle Tank (MBT) – of which theArmy is expected to eventually order around 250 – will cost an astronomical ` 37 crore (USD8.22 million) each: once completed, it will possiblybe the world’s most expensive tank ever.
Defence Minister A.K. Antony told Parliamentin August 2011, that production of the DefenceResearch and Development Organisation(DRDO)-designed Arjun Mk-II – presentlyundergoing limited, technical trials in Rajasthanwith ‘major and minor improvements’ – will beginat the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) at Avadi nearChennai by 2015. Armament industry sources saythat the Arjun Mk-IIs’ astronomical cost exposesDRDO claims that around 90 percent of itscomponents are indigenous consequently makingthe MBT cheaper.
In contrast, the Arjun Mk-I, with around 60 percent of imported components, including itsengine and transmission system, is priced at `15-17 crore (USD 3.3-USD 3.7 million.) Thismakes it less than half the estimated cost of the under-development Arjun Mk-II which, in all likelihood, will escalate further onceproduction begins.
Alongside, the 647 Russian T-90S MBTs —which the Indian Army (IA) imported in
completed and kit form from 2001 onwards andplans to build another 1,000 locally, under licence,to equip the bulk of the 59 armoured formations— were procured for USD 2.2-2.5 million per unit.
The DRDO plans on completing trials of ArjunMk-II with 93 improvements – including 13 majorones – over the Arjun Mk-I by October 2012 afterwhich it anticipates orders for at least 250 of theupgraded tanks.
The retrofit includes providing Arjun Mk-IIsthe capability to fire the Israeli Laser HomingAnti-Tank Missiles through its 120 mm rifled gun.Other improvements include fitment with locallydeveloped Kanchan explosive reactive armourand thermal imaging panoramic sights.
The DRDO also plans on replacing Arjun Mk-I’s German MTU 838Ka-501 dieselengine and semi-automatic RENK RK-304Atransmission a combination with a locallydesigned amalgamation through collaborativeventures with overseas manufacturers. This willreduce its weight from around 60 tonnes forenhanced mobility and logistic efficiency andmodify its hull to provide it a lower silhouette forgreater battlefield survival. The upgraded MBTwill also be airconditioned and fitted withsuperior communication systems.
Official sources say that Israel MilitaryIndustries and Israel’s Elbit Systems will in all likelihood be involved in the Arjun
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Mk-II’s retrofit and in enhancing itsproduction-line processes whilst US’Cummins and France’s SESM areexpected to design its engine andtransmission system respectively.
Whilst analysts concede that tankdevelopment remains a complex process,the Arjun is the world’s longest runningMBT developmental programme havingstarted in 1972. Producing the MBT hasbeen problematic, beset with technologicalover-reach and turf battles between theArmy and DRDO and the Ministry ofDefence (MoD) delaying the Arjun’sdevelopmental process and eventualoperational acceptance.
In July 2008, for instance, the Armycategorically declared that it will not placeadditional orders for the Arjun beyond theoriginal 124 MBTs ordered in 2000 becauseof its poor overall performance andtechnological shortcomings. “Arjun is acontemporary tank and may be used in the next decade or so but not for next generation warfare,” Lt Gen DalipBhardwaj, then heading the Directorate-General Mechanised Forces (DGMF) has declared.
But after the locally developed tankoutperformed the T-90S in comparativeuser trials in Rajasthan last year, the Armyhas been embarrassed into placing anorder for 124 more Arjuns. Antony recentlysaid that the Defence Acquisition Councilhe heads cleared the add-on order for 124Arjun Mk-Is for the Army to be built at the HVF which had handed over to it anequal number of MBTs ordered over adecade ago.
Delivery of the additional Arjun Mk-Is isexpected to be completed by 2016. Andnow with Arjun Mk-II under developmentand testing and an order for another 250 MBTs likely after October 2012, theArmy will operate some 500 of theindigenously designed tanks to equip ninearmoured regiments.
Additionally, the DGMF and the DRDOare struggling to finalise the 50-odd tonneFuture Main Battle Tank (F-MBT) poweredby a locally designed 1,500 hp engine whichby 2020 is expected to replace the fleet ofRussian T-72M1 Ajeya MBTs that constitutethe bulk of the Army’s armoured units.
The DRDO is fielding a team ofacademics, technicians and armouredcorps officers to develop the F-MBT’stransmission and engine called the Bharat
Power Pack. “We are confident that we willbe ready with the F-MBT prototype in fiveto seven years,” S.Sundaresh, DRDO’schief controller of armaments and combatengineering division, declared last year. Thefirst prototype of the indigenous engine willbe ready in four to five years, he said.
Major RetrofitThe Indian Air Force’s (IAF) Su-30MKI’scombat fleet will shortly get a major make-over by equipping it with Fifth GenerationFighter features upgrading it to 'SuperSukhois' standards.
The proposed retrofit of the Su-30MKIs, of which the IAF will ultimately
operate around 272, will include a newcockpit, radar and varied stealth features,Irkut head Alexei Fedorov stated at theMoscow Air Show in mid-August 2011.“The upgrade will apply not only to theaircraft in service with the IAF but also tothose yet to be delivered to India and thosebeing licence-manufactured by HindustanAeronautics Limited (HAL),” Fedorov said.
The Su-30MKIs are likely to be fittedwith the Zhuk (Beetle) X-Band Pulse-Doppler radars providing the fighters withair-to-air and air-to-surface capability. TheZhuk air-to-air mode is capable of detecting
targets and measuring their coordinates,range and speed in addition to providingplatforms with look-down/shoot-downcapability for air targets against a clutteredor water background. The advanced radarcan also track and engage multiple targetswhilst searching for new ones in track-while-scan mode.
Fedorov announced that in addition toupgraded cockpit avionics and radarenhancement, these 'Super Sukhoi' willalso receive modifications aimed atimproving their stealth capabilities. Whilethe exact nature of these stealthmodifications remains unclear, reportssuggest the work will specifically focus onreducing the aircraft's radar signature.
These retrofitted ‘Super Sukhoi’s’ willalso be able to carry a heavier weapons’load including the Indo-Russian BrahMoscruise missile with a 292-km strike range. Industry sources say that the firstfew BrahMos missiles configured onRussia’s 3M55 Oniks/Yakhont system(NATO designation:SS-NZX-26) havealready been built for factory tests atRussia’s Strela production facility in theOrenburg region.
Once these are completed, the plant willlaunch a series production of the BrahMosbut with its weight of 2.55 tonnes reducedby some 500kg alongside a new ignitionengine to enable it to fire at high altitudes.Irkut also plans on strengthening the Su-30MKI’s wings to enable them to carrytwo additional missiles on their flanks.
Military planners say that the BrahMostravelling at a top speed of 2.8M, some 3-4m above the sea surface, for nowcannot be intercepted by any knownweapon system and will provide the IAF‘game-changing’ capability in the IndianOcean Region.
Antony also disclosed that the recentlyinked $2.4 billion contract to upgrade theIAF’s 51 Mirage-2000H fighters will take a decade to be completed. The first two Mirage-2000Hs to be upgraded withadvanced avionics, fully integratedelectronic-warfare suites, advanced beyondvisual range (BVR) capability and missioncomputers, will be retrofitted in France. Theremaining 49 fighters will be upgraded byHAL in Bengaluru by 2021, he added.
In a related development, the IAF willretire all its 200-odd MiG-21 variants by2017 – two of which crashed recently –replacing them with Su-30MKIs, the
indigenous Light Combat Aircraft Tejas andthe under acquisition 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft.
Since 1964, the IAF has inducted 946MiG-21 variants – 658 of which were builtlocally under licence by HAL in Bengaluru–that formed the backbone of its fightersquadrons. But over decades, 476 of themwere lost in accidents and at present theIAF operates around 200 MiG-21s, of which121 have been upgraded to MiG-21 ‘Bis’standards equipped with lightweightRussian Super Kopyo multi-mode radarand French Totem 221 G ring-laser gyroinertial navigations systems. And thoughtheir endurance and payload restrictionshave remained unchanged, they deployed awider range of ordnance like the short-range, air-to-air R-73, beyond-visual-rangeR-77 EW-AE and Kh-31 Medium Range Air-to-Surface Missiles respectively.
Heavy Duty ShoppingIndia has concluded military contractsworth ` 37,181 crore (USD 8.26 billion) withthe US since 2004, Defence Minister A.K.Antony declared in Parliament. He said the procurements included six Super Hercules C-130J transport aircraft, three wide-bodied Boeing 737 business jets for the IAFs’ VVIP squadron to transportimportant officials and dignitaries, ten Boeing C-17 Globemaster-III Very HeavyLift Transport Aircraft and eight Boeing P-8I Poseidon multi-mission maritimereconnaissance aircraft.
Other US-sourced equipment includedthe INS Jalashwa (ex-USS Trenton), the 16,900-tonne refurbished Austin classlanding platform dock and six embarkedsecond-hand UH-3H Sea King helicopters,Harpoon missiles and sensor-fusedweapons. And in 2007, the DefenceResearch and Development Organisationacquired 24 General Electric F404-GE-IN20after burner engines to power the firstsquadron of 20 locally designed LightCombat Aircraft for the IAF — a follow-onto 17 similar engines procured three yearsearlier. Varied other US materiel –additional C-30Js, attack and heavy lifthelicopters, aircraft engines and assortedordnance and missile systems were either under testing, evaluation or pricenegotiation worth a far larger amount.
In a related disclosure, Air ChiefMarshal Norman Anil Kumar ‘Charlie’Browne said the IAF had signed 271
contracts worth `1,12,000 crore (USD 25billion) over the past five years. Other thanUS transport aircraft the IAF has acquired42 additional Su-30MKI multi-role fighters,inked an agreement with Russia to jointlydevelop a Fifth Generation Fighter andacquired the Israeli Sypder surface-to-airlow-level-quick-reaction missile system.
Browne has said that the IAF willembark on additional acquisitions duringthe 12th Five Year Plan (2012-17) that willinclude 126 Medium Multi-Role CombatAircraft, helicopters, air defence systemsand the upgrade of 39 of its airfields. Overallmodernisation plans, he added, will includeprivate sector involvement in developingcrucial systems and spares and in helpingthe IAF maintain its older aircraft.
Submarine TrialsSea trials of the Russian Akula-II (Bars)-class nuclear-powered submarine (SSN)
being acquired on a ten-year lease by theIndian Navy (IN) are nearing completion inthe Sea of Japan ahead of its transfer toIndia. Christened the INS Chakra, the12,000-tonne low acoustic K152 Nerp SSN,being leased for USD 650-700 million undera secret agreement concluded seven yearsago is presently being operated by an INcrew under Russian supervision.
Thereafter, the SSN is to begin itsjourney to a special nuclear submarinefacility under construction at Rambilli onIndia’s east coast arriving sometime aroundNovember before being commissioned intoservice by the year-end. This will make theIN the world’s sixth Navy, after those of thefive nuclear weapon states of Britain,China, France, Russia and the USA, tooperate such an SSN.
International treaties forbid the sale ofSSN, but leases were permitted providedthey were not armed with missiles withranges of over 300km. The complement of weaponry being provided aboard the INS Chakra however is for now unknownalthough it is equipped with four 650 mmtorpedo tubes with 12 torpedoes and four 533mm tubes with 28 torpedoes. Under a highly classified programme, theDefence Research and DevelopmentOrganisation is known to be developing1000-km range cruise missiles for fitmentonto submarines.
The Akula SSN lease will be the IN’ssecond from Moscow. The first in 1998 wasa Soviet Charlie I 670 Skat series class boat– also named the INS Chakra – leased forthree years to gain operational experience
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DEFENCE BUZZ
on SSNs. Plans for subsequent SSN leaseswere abandoned after the Soviet Union’sbreak-up.
Then in 2004, the IN signed anagreement to lease two Akula class SSNsas part of a secret agreement inkedalongside the one to acquire therefurbished INS Vikramaditya (ex-AdmiralGorshkov), the 44,750 tonne Kiev-classaircraft carrier and 16 MiG-29K fighters.
But soon after the IN decided to leasejust one SSN that will form an ‘instructionand familiarisation’ platform for it to‘validate’ the third leg of India’s strategicdeterrence which encompasses a triad of nuclear weapons deliverable by air, mobile, land-based platforms and sea-based assets.
The INS Chakra will also serve as atraining base to operate the INS Arihant,the Navy’s first locally designed and built nuclear-powered, ballistic submarine(SSBN) that is expected to be on sea patrolby late-2012 with its full complement oflong range weapons. The IN plans onlocally building 3-5 additional SSBNs withassistance from private contractors.
Earlier scheduled to be delivered to the IN in 2009, INS Chakra’s induction was delayed following an onboard Freongas leak from the submarine’s fireextinguishers in late 2008 during sea trialsin which 20 people including sailors and technicians died and 21 others were injured.
Russian ConnectionRussia has supplied the Indian Navy (IN) 11 of 16 MiG-29KuB fighters procured in2004 for `3,405.61 crore to constitute the airarm of the second-hand INS Vikramadityascheduled to be delivered to India in late2012. RAC-MiG corporation head SergeiKorotkov recently declared that theremaining five fighters will be delivered byend 2011.
The induction of the 16 Mig-29K fighters— including four, twin-seat trainers-equipped with multi-functional Dopplerradar and advanced optic electronics –began in February 2010 at the IN’s Dabolimbase at Goa where they will be based till the INS Vikramadtiya’s arrival. In March 2010, India inked an additional order for 29 MiG-29 KuBs for the Indigenous AircraftCarrier-I under construction in Kochi.
RAC-MiG has begun work on thefollow-on MiG 29KuB order and the first jet
was presented to an Indian representativein the assembly workshop with deliveriesbeginning by late 2012.
Russia remains India’s principalmateriel supplier with annual sales ofaround USD1.5 billion: since the early1960s, New Delhi has acquired militarygoods worth over USD40 billion fromMoscow. More recently, however, India is turning to Israel and the US as potentialweapon suppliers prompting Moscow to consider selling Delhi strategic defencetechnologies to thwart this emergingcompetition, further spearheading thedebilitating arms race in South Asia.
No Surprises HereIndia’s defence Public Sector Units nevercease to surprise either with regard todelayed delivery schedules or massive cost escalation or both — the IndianNavy’s (IN) three ongoing warship buildingprogrammes are no exception. The Ministryof Defence (MoD) has informed Parliamentrecently that the cost escalation for threeProject 15A Kolkata class guided missiledestroyers and an equal number of Project17 Shivalik class stealth frigates, bothunder construction at the State-ownedMazagaon Dockyard Limited (MDL) were225 percent and 260 percent respectively.
The outlay for the four Project 28 Kamorta class Anti-Submarine Warfare(ASW) Corvettes being built at Garden
Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers (GRSE) inKolkata, however, has risen a ‘modest’ 157 percent — all of it due to what the MoD euphemistically terms as the,“uncertainties associated with complexwarship building process”.
The MoD goes on to elaborate that theprice escalation – and consequent delays –in all three projects were triggered byRussia enhancing the price of warshipbuilding quality steel and the hiring of itsnaval specialists and consultants. Holdupsby the IN and the MoD in identifyingpropulsion packages to meet stealthrequirements and weapons and sensorswere additional causes for the delays andspiraling costs.
Little wonder that the Indian Navy’smodernisation plans, like the otherServices, were not only skewered but expensive, postponed and importdependent even as the Navy aims to induct16 stealth frigates over the next decade,ten of which are to be built locally. Theseinclude seven to be constructed underProject 17A – the follow-on programme to the Shivalik class boats – to be divided between MDL and GRSE. Theremaining six include three RussianKrivak-III class frigates (Project 1135.6)presently under construction followed by a repeat order for another three inaddition to eight more ASW Corvettesunder Project 28.
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