Democratic Stress, The Populist Signal and Extremist Threat

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Democratic stress,the poplist signal

and extremist threatA call for a new mainstreamstatecraft and contact democracy

By Anthony Painterwith additional research and contributions from Claudia Chwalisz


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Contents

Executive Summary 7

Introduction 9

1. Stress and crisis 14

2. The underlying causes of democratic stress 16

3. Populist response to democratic stress 19

4. Extremism and populism 25

5. The demand for populism and extremism 27

6. Mainstream party strategies to cope with democratic stress 31

7. Contact democracy as a strategic response 49

Conclusion - a renewed mainstream statecraft and contact democracy 50

Annex 53

Abot the Athor

Anthony Painter is a political researcher and writer. He led the Policy Network/BarrowCadbury Trust project on Populism, Extremism and the Mainstream. He has publishedresearch with the Center for American Progress, Demos, Searchlight Educational Trust andPolicy Network on political economy, public attitudes, and extremism/populism. Anthonyis the author of two books: Barack Obama: The Movement for Change and the forthcomingLeft without a future? Social justice after the crash (I.B Tauris). He is a contributing editor

with Progress magazine and has written for the Guardian, New Statesman, Hungton Post,LabourList, Open Democracy, Left Foot Forward, and Labour Uncut. He is Chairman of HackneyUTC and Vice-chairman of Hackney Community College. The project was supported by PolicyNetwork research assistant Claudia Chwalisz.

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Exective Smmar

The rise of the populist radical right isone of the most signicant features of

western democracies in the last quarterof a century. As a challenger brand

within democracy but against liberaldemocracy, this suggests that thesystem may be under some stress.

Populism is a democratic argument thatseeks to change the way democracyfunctions. It is a threat withindemocracy to the culture and normsof liberal democracy as it functions. Inother words, right wing populism does

not seek to replace democracy; it seeksto change it.

It is not about being popular as the termis commonly (mis)used in the mediaor politics. Margaret Canovandistinguishes the redemptive andpragmatic sides of democracy.Populism reaches more for theformer a pure and non-bounded

will of the people. Populism isexpressive and emotive; it rejectsthe institutional checks and balancesof liberal democracy. The politicalmainstream is ultimately aboutpragmatism, balance and institutionalinterplay.

The rise of the populist radical rightis a signal of the failure of mainstream

democracy to meet the needs anddesires of citizens perturbed by social,cultural, economic and political change.

Populists have gained a footing indemocratic systems in a number ofdierent forms. They include the

Tea Party in US, the Peoples Party inDenmark, PVV in the Netherlands,the Front National in France, Fidesz in

Hungary, the SVP in Switzerland, theFP in Austria, and UKIP in the UK.

Populism as the representation of abody of democratic needs and desiresis entirely legitimate. If needs andanxieties are not expressed within thedemocratic system then there is a threatof greater extremism. Extremism has acasual and periodic engagement withdemocracy, but that is simply one routeit pursues. It values itself as a movementand as a pure expression of an ideology.It is associated with a politics of hateand tolerance of violence.

However, populism is not necessarilybenign. It creates simplicities wherereal outcomes in public policy need

complexities to be acknowledged. It canfurther corrode trust and hamper theability of mainstream parties to formwinning and governing coalitions. Therhetoric of the populist radical right canimpact upon the welfare of minoritiesand may even, in some circumstances,justify extremist thought and action.This report has an ambivalence aboutpopulism at its heart. As two academic

researchers in this eld express,populism is a threat and corrective to(liberal) democracy.

Real demand exists for a populistradical right but the ability to convertthat demand into political powerdepends on the interplay of populistand mainstream forces.

Strategies at the disposal of mainstreamdemocratic parties are numerousand are analysed in the report asfalling into three main categories:hold, defuse and adopt. The rst

involves seeking to avoid the threat ofpopulism, the second aims to minimisethe impact of populist anxieties,and the third moves towards thepopulist position. However, all these

strategies have limitations. Instead,three sequential and concurring

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expectations from democracy vary.The content of the populist right winghas to be separated from its basisform. Nationalism, immigrationconcerns, cultural anxiety, andeconomic protection are attachedto populism in dierent ways in dierent

contexts. These ideas, issues andmotivations can also be pursuedthrough the mainstream oreven the extreme. For example,nationalism has been seen in theparamilitary form within Basqueseparatism, in populist form throughthe Flemish Vlaams Blok or mainstreamform through the Scottish National

Partys civic and plural nationalism.While particular anxieties such as thatsurrounding cultural change do havea magnetic attraction to right-wingpopulism, they nonetheless have to bedistinguished from that particular politicalstyle.

In fact, it is the mainstreams inability tocope with a variety of issues, economic

anxieties and cultural attachments thathas created an opening for a populistargument. This fact is circumstantial: it ismainstream failure.

The moral disdain that populists have forthe mainstream is reciprocated. In fact,moral segregation has been one of theprimary responses of the mainstreamto the populist radical right. There is no

better political strategy than assigningyour threat moral illegitimacy - if it works.The problem is that is has not reallyworked. There is demand for parties thatfocus on culture, immigration, economicchange, nationhood, perceived legal andpolitical favouritism towards minoritygroups, the perceived threat of Islam towestern values, EU threats to nationalsovereignty and Eurozone impositions,

and, as has been seen in the case of the TeaParty in the US, a fear of the intrusive state.The problem that mainstream politicalactors now face is that moral isolation has

mainstream parties might respond - and thenature of the threat that the populist radicalright in particular poses.

The analyses of Paul Taggart, Cas Mudde/Cristbal Rovira Kaltwasser, and MargaretCanovan are important in appreciatingthe core characteristics of populism. Muddeand Kaltwasser denes it as follows:

A thin-centred ideology that considers

society to be ultimately separated into two

homogenous and antagonistic groups, the

pure people and the corrupt elite, and

which argues that politics should be

an expression of the volont gnrale

(general will) of the people.

1

Taggart points to the importance of aconception of heartland in populistpolitics.2 Heartland is essentially anidealised notion of a morally purepeople. The elasticity of this conceptis useful as populism itself isextremely elastic. Margaret Canovandistinguishes the redemptive and

pragmatic sides of democracy.The former is expressive and emotive;the latter is about process, balanceand institutional interplay. Westerndemocracies are pragmatic: representativeand liberal as well as democratic.Populists want a more redemptive politicswhere the will of the morally pure majorityis enacted - without much if any obstacle.

While populists seek to make a moralvirtue out of simplicity, the mainstreamacknowledges complexity. The two stylesof politics are connected through theirdemocratic essence. Indeed, Cas Mudderefers to the populist right wing as apathological normalcy.3 However, their

1 Mudde, Cas and Cristbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2012. Populismand (liberal) democracy: a framework for analysis. In Mudde,Cas and Kaltwasser, Cristbal Rovira, eds. Populism in Europeand the Americas: threat or corrective for democracy?

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 82 Taggart, P. 2000. Populism. Buckingham: Open University

Press.3 Mudde, Cas. 2008. The Populist Radial Right: A Pathological

Normalcy. In Malmo University, Willy Brandt Series of WorkingPapers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations. March2007. Malmo, SE.


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not been successful and they are in dangerof seeming disdainful of the real concernsto which the populist radical right responds.

To acknowledge that these issues are realconcerns is not to accept the argumentsproered by the populist radical right

- far from it. It is rather that the moralcondemnation form of politics is inadequateand counter-productive. The mainstreamfurther undermines itself. We are beyondthe initial birth stage of the populistradial right. In some cases it has reachedpuberty.

Moreover, populism serves an important

function. Mainstream parties may dislikethe arguments and style of populismbut the alternative is much worse:extremism. If western democracies cannotcope with expressive as well as pragmaticpolitics then there are less democraticavenues available through whichreal anxieties can be expressed. Thedening strategy of extremism is a

casual and periodic engagement with

democracy, but that is simply one routeit pursues. It values itself as a movementand as a pure expression of an ideology.The ideology is transcendent. Therefore,whatever means to protect andadvance the ideology - whether ethnicnationalism, religious radicalism orrevolutionary communism - is legitimatein the eyes of the extremist. Streetmarches, persecution, hatred, inammatory

pamphleteering, violence and terrorism arejust some of the methods of extremists.This is a highly dangerous and toxic formof political action. It poses a major threatto security and well-being.

Populism may be pluralistic democracysugly sibling; extremism is populismsharmful cousin. To a certain extent, thepopulist radical right and the extreme

right are shing in the same pond of angstand anxiety as academic surveys of theirrespective supporters have shown, but theypursue their cause in a dierent fashion.

However, this does not mean that populismis benign. The populist style of dealingwith contentious issues is, in fact, highlyproblematic.

Democracy in complex societies is not asimple aair. There are trade-os, conicts,

interests, protections, challenges, as wellas the unseen, unforeseen andunforeseeable. Expressive democracyglosses over these challenges.Representative democracy, thoughimperfect, attempts to reconcile them,while populism attempts to ignore them.For example, the UK has a commitment toa European single market. Such a market

requires common regulations. To achievethese common regulations it is necessarynot only to pool sovereignty in EUinstitutions, but to accept that too oftennational vetoes will create insurmountableobstacles to agreeing these commonregulations. As a centre-right mainstreamPrime Minister, Margaret Thatcher,notwithstanding her rhetorical ourishes,

understood these trade-os between

the national interest and formal nationalpower. Anti-EU populism rejects suchcomplexity. As in the case of nationalism,euroscepticism is not intrinsically populist- there are substantive arguments thatacknowledge trade-os but come to a

dierent conclusion.

While content and style are notinextricably linked, style does tend to

inuence content, leading to potentiallysignicant and unacknowledged negative

impacts. Populism has consequencesfor economic well-being, the functionsof democracy, foreign and internationalrelationships, and the relationship ofdierent groups, cultures, regions and

nationhood. The concern is substantive aswell as political.

The impact of the populist radical right onthe mainstream centre-left and centre-right varies in accordance with politicalsystems. In majoritarian democracies such


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5 Habermas, J. 1975. Legitimation Crisis. Translated by ThomasMcCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press.

6 Dahl, Robert A. 2000. A Preface to Democratic Theory(expanded edition). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Stress is a dierent state for a democracy to

nd itself in. It involves challenges to the

system and the elites who are elected togovern it that go beyond simply alternativegoverning choices within the system.It involves the rise of new populistparties or movements and extreme parties,organisations, or forces of protest thatchallenge the rules of the democratic game.Violence may occur but not to a system oreven government-toppling extent. Stressoccurs when the democratic system canstill function but new political, culturaland economic forces create challengesthat mainstream parties nd dicult to

confront. Either they nd it dicult to react

to these forces without sundering theirexisting coalitions of support or they cannotmove towards them without changingtheir own identity: they are pragmaticallyor ideologically constrained. However,they can still govern. Stress is actually thenormal state for democracies - new forcesand challenges continually arise. Whenstress becomes so severe that democraciesbecome ungovernable as is the case in

Greece and Italy, or the UK in the late 1970s,then a country has entered a state of crisis.

Liberal democracy is constrained. It is akinto what Robert Dahl describes aspolyarchy.6 Therefore, it has free, fair,equal and contested elections at itscore, but the ability of the majority toconstrain the rights of a minority is limited.Constraints are institutional: legally

and constitutionally guaranteed basicfreedoms - of expression, association,etc are underpinned by therule of law. Protection of minorities alsomeans that an interested minority canget their way against a disinterestedmajority. Political elites could be seenas one such minority, though onlyone of many. This ensures a pluralistic quality

1. Stress and crisis

Mainstream parties have been the mainstaysof liberal democracy since universal surage.

In fact, they are intrinsically linked to thesystem - when they struggle to maintain

support, it is one signal that there is conictbetween the system and voters. It isperhaps even a tautology that mainstreamparties are intrinsically bound with theinstitutions of liberal democracy. Theycontest policy and ideological positions butthey are not seeking to shift from a system ofrepresentative, liberal democracy to a moremajoritarian, direct, peoples democracy asan alternative.

The notions of crisis and stress areimportant in understanding the degree ofchallenge there is within the system to therules of the democratic game as opposed tothe conict of ideas, leaders and policies.

It is important to understand the distinctionbetween crisis and stress. Crisis occurs whena political system is no longer legitimate. In

other words, it can no longer complete thetasks that are set for it. This is one aspect ofwhat the sociologist Jurgen Habermas callslegitimation crisis.5 Even in the context ofsevere austerity, Eurozone-imposed externalrules and debt unsustainability, Europeandemocracies have avoided this crisis point.There are a couple of near exceptions ofcourse. Greece and Italy, certainly on atemporary basis, have faced democratic

crises or at least extreme stresses. Theirdemocracies have shown to be incapableof responding to the complexitiesinstigated by the Eurozone crisis. Whileboth have moved beyond technocraticadministrations, the degree to which this issustainable remains to be seen. However,in the main, European democracies facestresses rather than crises.


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dynamic and interactive nature of onlineand social media can make fears and hatredmore toxic - in a political sense in the caseof certain modes of populism or in a securitysense in the case of extremism.

3. Political change

If the functioning of liberal democracyas a set of constraints on the popular willcontains the seeds of a populist reaction,then further constraints are likely tocreate further opportunities. The majorconstitutional development over the lastfew decades has been the expansion ofthe EUs acquis communautaire and thegrowth of supranational decision-making.

A European level demos and popularlyaccessible democratic system has not andperhaps could not hope to keep up withthese major constitutional changes. Perhapsthe most consequential aspect of this hasbeen the freedom of movement of labourwhich has meant that signicant anxieties

are dicult to respond to in a clear fashion.

It is not simply through the actions of the EUthat national sovereignty has been brought

into question, but through the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights, which has alsosometimes been seen to be against popularnational notions of human rights andjustice. These constraints are often viewedas disempowering and provoke questionsabout national and popular sovereignty.

Changes in the forms and structure of partycompetition also create new openings. The

emergence of the catch all party whichsought to move beyond its traditional basewas an early evolutionary change.11Over timeand in interaction with social and culturalchange, the traditional base can begin to bedetached from the party and either cease tovote or become attracted to other parties.Strategic necessity becomes a weaknessover time. Parties can become cartels, deeplyembedded in the system collusively. This was

the case in Austria, for example, as the SP

forms of political and democratic expressionbecame more signicant. While these

expressions of cultural identity would notnecessarily become attached to the populiststyle of politics or even extremism, given theconstraints inherent in liberal democracy,there was certainly a good chance theywould.

One particularly ugly aspect of thisphenomenon has been the reaction to theUSAs rst African American President,

Barack Obama. The Birther movement,which seeks to deny the Presidentscitizenship and consequent eligibility forpresidential oce, has been one reaction.

This movement ows through right-wingmedia discourse, online blogs and chat-rooms, Tea Party conspiracy theory, butalso into Republican mainstream discourse,most notably through the presidentialnomination candidacy of Donald Trump.Alongside this, research by the SouthernPoverty Law Center has found that thenumber of anti-government Patriot groupshas shot up from 149 in 2008 to 1,274 in

2012.10

Cultural identity anxieties - and theconspiracy theories which can accompanythem - ow through mainstream media and

political discourse into the populist radicalright and into the extremes. In certain formsand discourses they can become a populistchallenge and even a security threat.

Technology interacts with cultural changein a way that can reinforce fear, hatred

and prejudice. The formation of on-linebubbles and tribes reecting and amplifying

anxieties without challenge is becoming afeature across the political spectrum. Thisis a more interactive and extreme versionof what happens when people consumetheir own prejudices (whether left or right)in the particular news media to which theyexpose themselves. Echo chambers can below-level, dip in and out, interest focused or

they can be dangerous and corrosive. The

10 Potok, Mark. 2012. For the Radical Right, ObamaVictory Brings Fury and Fear. Extremis Project. http://extremisproject.org/2012/11/for-the-radical-right-obama-victory-brings-fury-and-fear/.

11 Kirchheimer, O. 1966. The transformation of the WesternEuropean party systems. In LaPalombara, J. and Weiner, M,eds. Political parties and Political Development. Princeton:Princeton University Press.


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tend to challenge, merge and adapt to oneof the two main parties. In majoritariansystems, new parties can form but nd it

dicult to secure a parliamentary footing.

However, in the case of UKIP in the UK forexample, European parliamentary electionshave ironically provided an alternativeroute where the blockages of the domesticpolitical system are considerable for smallerparties.

While populism is not the only plausibleresponse to socio-economic, culturaland political change, it does have certainresources that are to its advantage. Withineach of these stresses on liberal democracy

lies opportunities for a populist political,ideological and rhetorical attack: thegeneral will thwarted; elites mendacity;the people and their heartland jeopardised;the other posing a threat, and arrogant andaloof liberal democracy either incapableor unwilling to respond adequately. Thesearguments can become highly charged, hate-lled and irtatious with threatening and

violent action - extremism feeds o similar

anxieties. The nature of both the populistand extremist responses to democraticstress will now be explored further.

and VP held power continuously, ruling incoalition together for almost two-thirds ofthe post-1945 period. Media-focused parties- so-called electoral professional parties12 -with centralised control and micro-targetedmessages can become hollowed out anddistant from the communities they serve.New organisational forms, strategies, andtechniques can pit the short against the longterm and leave a trail of distrust, disinterestand thin commitment in their wake. Trustin liberal democratic institutions has beeneroded as a consequence. For example, theEdelman Trust Barometer nds seven out

of nine European countries featured havetrust in government levels below 40 percent

and seven have no trust in governmentleaders at all levels of 50 percent or more.13

As we will see, this elite politics combineswith cultural and socio-economic change tocreate new opportunities for populist andextremist actors. The former - in its radicalright form - has been the most successfulnew party of families in Western Europe.Extremists, on the other hand, have the

potential to create a real threat to physicaland emotional well-being.

All of this plays out dierently in varying

systems of liberal democracy - consensual ormajoritarian.14 Consensual systems denedby greater institutional checks and balancesand/or proportional voting systems providemore opportunities for new parties toform and become challengers for oce. In

Austria, the Netherlands and Switzerland,populist parties have not only won seatsin legislative assemblies, but have takenpart in government too. An exceptionamongst consensual democracies is the USwhere the two party system, as a result ofa majoritarian electoral system, has foughto or consumed contenders; new forces

12 Panebianco, A. 1988. Political parties: organisation and

power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.13 2012 Edelman Trust Barometer: Global Deck. Edelman

Insights. http://www.slideshare.net/EdelmanInsights/2012-edelman-trust-barometer-global-deck

14 Lijphart, A. 1984. Democracies: patterns of majoritarian andconsensus government in twenty-one countries. Yale: YaleUniversity Press.


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CASE STuDy

THE POPuLIST RADICAL RIGHT IN THE uK:THE CASE OF THE uKS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE Eu

The conventional political reaction to UKIP has been to interpret its recent successin building greater support through the prism of the UKs European Union (EU)membership. A second place nish for UKIP in the 2009 European elections with 13

seats won only served to emphasise this point. David Camerons decision to committo an in-out referendum on the UKs EU membership in 2017 following renegotiatedTreaty terms is widely, and correctly, seen as a response to euroscepticism both withinhis own party and as a result of recent increases in UKIP support. Intra-party challengeshave made his command of his parliamentary party fraught, while the extra-partychallenge of UKIP threatens a number of Conservative marginal seats without thecorresponding coalition opportunities available in PR systems.

Looking at the nature of populist parties over the last ten years or so, it is dicult

to conclude that David Camerons current position on granting a referendum whilecampaigning positively for continued membership is one that resolves both theintra- and extra-party dilemmas he is facing. Cameron is facing a challenge to shiftto a more eurosceptic position in four main directions: (i) Conservative parliamentaryand wider party eurosceptics; (ii) UKIP; (iii) eurosceptic media; and (iv) voterswho switch allegiance between the Conservatives, UKIP and no voting in responseto a bundle of issues including the EU. Before looking at each of these actors in turn,it is necessary to consider UKIP in the context of the denitions of populism

presented above.

Looking at key elements of populism - the people versus the elite, a sense of crisis,thin ideology, the competition of the general will with the institutional checks andbalances of liberal democracy, and the notion of a heartland - it is easy to see thateuroscepticism could quite easily become a populist cause. Indeed, that is preciselythe mode of discourse adopted by the UK Independence Party. European andnational political elites are seen as conspiring against the will of the people to managetheir own aairs. The sense of crisis in the context of the Eurozone challenges is

palpable. UK membership of the EEC is seen as a historic betrayal of a heartland of

traders, shermen and entrepreneurs with ways of life that were trampled upon byEU regulation and common policies in areas such as sheries and the free movement

of people. Occasionally neo-liberal (on regulation) but other times nationalistic (onimmigration), UKIPs is a thin ideology. Institutional barriers such as qualied majority

voting are seen as impediments to UKIPs view of democracy. This is clearly a populistradical right party.

David Camerons European policy as a mainstream centre-right response - in part tothe populist radical right - is likely to have a particular trajectory over the coming yearsand may end up fortifying UKIP. Here is the potential impact on the dierent groups

identied above:


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antipathy and concerns about nationhood. Faced with a centre-left party which,despite recent attempts to address these issues, still projects a metropolitanimage, and a centre-right party seeking to modernise in many ways on issues ofsocial liberalism and diversity, these voters feel less part of the political mainstream.The question is the degree to which they give up on the mainstream altogether

and seek a populist radical right alternative even though this may benettheir least favoured party in the context of a majoritarian democracy. However, LordAshcrofts research shows clearly that these anxieties are unlikely to be resolvedthrough an in-out EU referendum alone. Indeed, these anxieties may be provokedand exacerbated.

As a strategy to minimise the space for the UKs populist radical right party, DavidCamerons EU referendum pledge is likely to be a misguided one. It may splitaway a portion of his party, threaten his own leadership, give prole to a populist

party that he cannot or will not match, boost the brand image of UKIP in the

eurosceptic media, and fail to address the real underlying anxieties of voters whoare attracted to UKIP. It is a considerable opportunity for UKIP as they are giventhe spotlight in a way they have not been able to secure in their entire history. Theywill appear in the media as equals with the three major parties: Labour, Conservativeand the Liberal Democrats. Whether it can take advantage of the opportunityand hold onto any bounce it secures is another matter and depends on leadership,strategy and organisation. However, there is little reason to suppose that the referendumwill remove some of the underlying demand for a party of UKIPs nature.


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5. The demand for poplismand extremism

Populist radical right and extreme rightparties have been able to tap into apublic appetite for the politics of identity,

concern with the performance and processof representative democracy, and, inmore recent times, anxiety induced byeconomic stress. In explaining the successof the populist radical right in particular, it isnecessary to understand the dimensions ofthis context. None of this is deterministic:it is opportunity rather than destiny.Mainstream parties, for example, mayhave found a way of meeting this demand.

However, when looking at modern Europeanattitudes, it becomes quite clear how it isthat the populist radical right has been ableto become the most successful new partyfamily in the last two decades or so.

A combination of anxiety over change,economic strife, cultural angst, mistrust inthe ability and competence of governments(including in their management of borders),

concerns over free-riding upon generousEuropean welfare states, and, amongst aminority group of voters, a basic displeasureof growing diversity are all evident. As theanalysis of a variety of data will show, thereis perhaps a hardcore minority of votersfor whom there is little that can be doneto persuade them that there is a robustmainstream response to their concerns. Thisproportion varies from country to country.

Beyond this minority, there is a softer

reluctant radical or latent hostile groupthat is open to some persuasion.

However, there are attractions towardsthe populist radical right for this group.Finally, there is a much wider groupwho have a lesser degree of anxietybut who could drift toward the populistright if a successful mainstream responseis lacking - these can be termed identityambivalents. When we analyse mainstreamstrategic responses to these demands for apopulist radical right, the measure of theirsuccess is the degree to which: (1) theymarginalise the outwardly hostile groups; (2)they limit the pool of potential demand for

the populist radical right; and (3) they meetthe anxieties of the mainstream majority -many of which are shared with the soft orhard right.

Zick, Kupper, and Hovermann of theFriedrich Ebert Stiftung looked at crossborder comparisons of attitudes towardsrace, immigration, values and culture.29 Onquestions of immigration and culture, deep

concerns are evident (see table 1 below).

It should be noted that the same data alsoshows some positive attitudes towardsimmigration and Muslims. For example, wellover half of respondents in all the countriesmentioned above agree that immigrantsenrich our culture. In none of the countriesdo more than 30 percent believe thatthe majority of Muslims nd terrorism

justiable. Nonetheless, the data above

TABLE 1

D GB F NL I PT PL Hu

There are too many immigrants in [country] 50 62.2 40.3 46 62.5 59.6 27.1 58.7

Immigrants are a strain on our welfare system 40.8 60.2 54.7 20.3 31.7 42.5 45.8 77.2

There are too many Muslims in [country] 46.1 44.7 36.2 41.5 49.7 27.1 47.1 60.7

The Muslim culture ts well into [country/Europe] 16.6 39 48.8 38.7 27.4 50.1 19 30.2

D= German; GB=uK; F=France; NL=Netherlands; I=Ital; PT=Portgal; PL=Poland; Hu=Hngar.Source: http://library.fes.de/pdf-les/do/07908-20110311.pdf

29 Zick, A. et al. 2011. Intolerance, Prejudice andDiscrimination: A European Report. Berlin: Friedrich EbertStiftung.

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TABLE 2

DEREX Prejdices Anti-

establishment

attitdes

Right-wing

Orientation

Fear

Central/Eastern Europe 8% 26% 25% 28% 16%

Western Europe 4% 20% 16% 14% 9%

Source: Strategies Against Right-Wing Extremism in Western and Eastern Europe - presentation to Policy Network seminar

November 2012.

TABLE 3

D DK FN F Hu NL NO SW

Mainstream 91.2 86.3 81.4 84.2 66.3 80.7 82.9 85.5

Potential radical 8.2 3.6 14 12.3 25.7 8.1 3.4 1.2

Reluctant radical 0.1 5 2.1 0.8 5.4 5.6 6.2 1.4

D=German; DK=Denmark; FN=Finland; F=France; Hu=Hngar; NL=Netherlands; NO-Norwa SW=Sweden

Source: Counterpoint data https://www.smashwords.com/books/download/238093/1/latest/0/0/recapturing-the-reluctant-

radical-how-to-win-back-europes-populist-vote-by-catherine-eschi-marley-morris-and-lila-caballero.pdf

CHART 1

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Activeenmity

Latenthostiles

Culturalintegrationists

Identityambivalents

Mainstreamliberals

Confident

multiculturals

8% 16% 28% 24% 10% 13%

Percent

Source: The New Tribes of British Identity Politics. 2012. Fear and Hope. http://www.fearandhope.org.uk/

CHART 2

Would you be more or less likely to vote for a party that promised to stop all immigration intothe UK?

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

60+

Less likely

60+

More likely

40-59

Less likely

40-59

More likely

25-39

Less likely

25-39

More likely

18-24

Less likely

18-24

More likely

Percent

Source: Extremis Project/YouGov extremism poll 19th-20th August 2012.

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39 Akkerman, T. 2012. Immigration policy and electoralcompetition in Western Europe. A ne-grained analysis ofparty positions over the past two decades. Party Politics19(1): 1-23.

facts and evidence and instead conditionvoters to think in their way.40 In this mode,the way to marginalise populist radicalright parties could be to dramatise theharm they do to minorities and perhaps thewider consequences to human life of morerestrictive policies.

There are draw-backs to both triangulation(meeting voters where they are) and re-framing (bringing voters to your positions).The major issue with triangulation is thaton these populist issues, it is very dicult to

nd a bridging policy between two mutually-

exclusive positions. The following is the UKLabour partys supporters attitudes on two

populist attitude statements:

It is very dicult to see how Labour can

triangulate either to a more populist right ormainstream liberal position given this split in

its own supporters. More widely, it is hopingto win voters who are more concernedabout immigration, welfare, and culture,but it is dicult to know how this can be

achieved without alienating many of itscurrent supporters - and they have becomemore rather than less liberal since the lastGeneral Election. Moreover, the very act ofbeing seen to triangulate in this way wouldplay into the moral accusations of a populist

radical right party. The Conservatives face

to this strategy. First, mainstream parties canonly go so far before they are too removedfrom their comfort zone. The researchreferred to by Tjitske Akkerman shows thatpopulist radical right parties have been ableto shunt right without paying an electoralprice: this applies to both the FP and theSwiss Peoples Party (SVP).39 What she hasalso found is that mainstream parties areuncomfortable with the anti-Islam positionsof the populist radical right. A party can loseto the left what it gains by shifting to theright (and vice versa). It has, in many ways, asimilar drawback to triangulation.

C. Trianglation and re-framing

Triangulation is a strategy that involves takingtraditional solutions to solve an opponentsowned concerns - social democratic endsthrough conservative means or vice versa.It involves adopting a new, synthesised andtranscendent policy approach in order toplease both existing supporters and those ofthe opponent. One example of the centre-left achieving this goal in the debate overidentity and cultural anxiety, for example, is

to re-cast the problem as one of economicpolicy and social investment instead of oneof cultural relations. Additionally, a centre-left party may agree to some tightening ofimmigration rules. The centre-right, as seenin the cases of the Dutch VVD and AustrianVP, have tried triangulation alongsideabsorption as strategies. They can t

comfortably together: it is no coincidencethat triangulation strategy often goes

alongside a big tent approach.

Re-framing as outlined by the psychologistGeorge Lako is in many ways less

substantive in policy terms thantriangulation. It is more concerned withpresenting an argument in a way thathas cognitive appeal. The human mindis conditioned to respond to narrative,metaphor, and empathy. Liberals (in the

American context) should try to rely on

TABLE 5

Labor2010

- morelikel

Labor2010- lesslikel

Labor2012

- morelikel

Labor2012- lesslikel

Stop allimmigration

36 31 32 36

Reducenumber ofMuslims/presenceof Islam insociety

34 25 29 31

Source: Extremis Project/YouGov

40 Lako, G. 2009. The Political Mind: why you cant understand21st Century politics with an 18th Century brain. New York:Penguin.


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44 See YouGov issue tracker http://d25d2506s94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/lxmy8ohv03/YG-Archives-Pol-Trackers-Issues(1)-290113.pdf.

introduction of living wages; and supportboth in and out of work for individuals tohelp them develop and transition skillswhilst also helping smooth the move fromone job to another.

2. Welfare. The contributory principleis one which accords with a reciprocalmoral sense. Linking access to keywelfare resources to work or wider socialcontribution is one means of responding tothis sense. In the context of immigration,including intra-EU migration, there isfurther scope for looking at the rules ofaccess to benets and housing on the

basis of time-based contribution.

3. Hosing. Lack of access to aordable,

high quality housing in good communitiesis one of the issues likely to tip benecial

contact into a situation of conict.

Supply is a fundamental issue but so isdistribution and access based to a greaterextent on contribution. Regulation of theprivate housing market is also importantto give people a greater sense of stability,

improve quality and increase transparencyover costs. Public intervention may benecessary not only to enhance supply ofaordable housing, but to allow people to

accumulate equity in their home over timeto further reinforce the asset security ofthose in marginal situations.

Despite the elite characteristic of thisstrategy, it relies on grassroots action

and organisation to succeed. Just as theObama 08 campaign was top-downand bottom-up, Europes mainstreamparties need to pursue a similar strategicapproach and extend it into a governingethos. Many of the groups that supportthis strategy lie outside of formal partypolitics. Many already exist and areourishing. It is worth reviewing a number

of successful examples of groups that have

provoked positive change in a wide varietyof contexts.

the sources and tensions of democraticstress.

An important element of statecraft ispublic policy. It should be said that whilethe anger, sense of betrayal, feelingof unfairness, frustration at the lackof transparency and apparent lack ofstrong management competence onborder control in response to culturaland economic change is signicant, the

policy levers can at rst glance seem

weak. For example, complete bordermanagement requires withdrawal fromthe EU. The notion that one nation cancontrol not only its comparative

economic advantage, but also itsdistribution within the nation, is fancifulto say the least. Equally, control ofthe internal movement and settlementof people takes the state in anauthoritarian direction. Modernstatecraft is clear and transparent aboutits limitations as well as its potentiallyimpactful interventions. These caveats areimportant. If they are not acknowledged,

then trust is undermined and statecraftis fatally wounded early in its lifespan.The commitment of David CameronsConservatives to reducing net migrationto the tens of thousands without thesignicant ability to control that ow is

one example of how trust can be hamperedfrom the outset. As a consequence, theConservative lead on immigration hasalready declined from 28 percent when

the party came into oce, to 13 percent bythe end of January 2013.44

However, three potential areas of note dopresent opportunities to pull levers bothin a local and national context in ways thataddress some of the underlying concernsabout change, fairness and opportunity:

1. Jobs. The rules of access here are

critical: enforcement of minimum wages;


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7. Contact democracas a strategic response

As previously mentioned, Sturgis, Jackson,and Brunton-Smiths study on ethnicdiversity and social cohesion in London

neighbourhoods45

presents a compellingempirical case countering conict theory,46suggesting that racial and ethnic diversitydecreases prejudice and stereotyping whenindividuals of dierent ethnic groups are

brought into direct contact with one another.

Another recent study by Clive Lennoxhas similar ndings, concluding that the

formation of ethnically diverse and racially

integrated neighbourhoods would makeit more dicult for far-right parties to gain

support as white individuals seem to bemore tolerant of minorities when they havemore exposure to them.47 It has also beenfound that contact with one group, such asimmigrants, reduces a persons prejudicesnot only to that group, but to others as well,such as religious minorities or homosexuals48 two other groups that tend to be the

victims of far right and extremist persecution.Zick, Kupper and Hovermann alsoconclude that there is a relationshipbetween contact with immigrants andlevels of prejudice, nding that prejudices

are more widespread amongst those whohave little contact with immigrants.49 It isthe notion of positive contactthat lies at theheart of attempts to reduce conict through

community level campaigns and organising

- with some notable successes.

We will consider eight case studies fromdierent countries to suggest that there is

more than one specic method of contact

democracy that can be successful atcombating populists and extremists - whilstgenerating greater trust been individuals indierent perceived groups. Although there

is variation in the objectives and strategiespursued by these grassroots movements,campaigns, and groups, the commonthread is that they have all succeeded inengaging citizens in political dialogue andparticipation.

Furthermore, they have encouraged aunifying identity politics to counteract the

false divisions between groups exacerbatedby us versus them rhetoric, which can breedhate and violence and potentially lead toextremism. Building trust amongst membersin civil society to enhance social relationsis one of the ways that these organisationsare helping relieve some of the stressescurrently imposed on liberal democracy.Mainstream parties need to engage moredirectly with an increasingly fragmented

electorate. Democratic structures have beenslow to respond to the challenge as HarrisBeider has found in his research into whiteworking-class communities. He nds:

There was a sense that government was not

listening to the concerns of white working-

class communities and not interested in

engagement.50

As argued in the section on statecraft,democratic institutions have to be devolvedand responsive to local communities iftrust is to be restored. Equally, there is animportant role for organisations that workwithin those communities to bring them intocloser contact. Mainstream parties need tosupport and work alongside them if they areto drain some demand for the populist radicalright and extremism whilst restoring trust in

public institutions: working with the people,not just for the people. The following are

45 Sturgis, P., J. Jackson, and I. Brunton-Smith. 2011. Ethnicdiversity and the social cohesion of neighbourhoods: The caseof London. In 6th ECPR General Conference. Reykjavik.

46 Hewstone, M. 2009. Living apart, living together? The roleof intergroup contact in social integration. Proceedings ofthe British Academy 162: 243-300. As cited in Sturgis, P., J.Jackson, and I. Brunton-Smith. 2011. Ethnic diversity and thesocial cohesion of neighbourhoods: The case of London. In6th ECPR General Conference, Reykjavik.

47 Lennox, Clive. 2012. Racial integration, ethnic diversity,and prejudice: empirical evidence from a study of the BritishNational Party. Oxford Economic Papers 64(3): 395-416.

48 Pettigrew, T. F. 2009. Secondary Transfer Eect of Contact:Do Intergroup Contact Eects Spread to NoncontactedOutgroups? Social Psychology 40: 55-65. As cited in Zick,Andreas, Beate Kupper and Andreas Hovermann. 2011.Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination: A EuropeanReport. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

49 Ibid.50 Beider, H. 2011. Community Cohesion: the views of white

working-class communities. Joseph Rowntree Foundation.


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activists. They often target their materials atparticular groups such as women voters whohave a greater aversion to hate literature.Given that many BNP supporters tend tohave little direct contact with individualsof dierent ethnic backgrounds and little

knowledge about ethnic minorities, HopeNot Hates focus on education has beeneective at directly lowering the partys level

of support.

In the recent 2012 Manchester Central, Corby,and Rotherham parliamentary by-elections,Hope Not Hate was the leading anti-far rightcampaign group. They distributed 16,800leaets in Manchester Central, where the

BNP ended up polling only 2.7 per cent. Theby-election campaign was also a chance forthe group to activate their network inpreparation for the 2014 European elections 76 individuals indicated that they wantedto join the Hope Not Hate campaign. InCorby, the group distributed 5,000 leaets,

concentrating their eorts in a ward where

the BNP has been particularly active. TheBNP polled a mere 2.7 per cent in Corby as

well. In Rotherham, the far right had their bestchances of doing well the BNP recently hadtwo councillors in the constituency, polled10.3 per cent in the 2010 General Election.Hope Not Hate printed and distributed20,000 copies of a tabloid newspaper thatconfronted the issues of the far right andoered a positive alternative to them. The

BNP ended up polling 8.5 per cent higherthan in the other constituencies but still

lower than their result at the last GeneralElection. The Hope Not Hate campaigns inall three areas undoubtedly had an impacton the BNPs election results. Additionally,the group has also helped establish localactivist networks that can campaign atfuture elections and ensure that these sortsof results remain the norm.

Although the BNP has been in decline in

recent years, Hope Not Hate emphasises theimportance of not becoming complacent,as the factors underlying the partys rise(high levels of immigration, increasing

examples of campaigns and organisationsthat have put this into practice.

Hope Not Hate, united Kingdom -

mobilising anti-hate forces, edcation and

creating commnit resilience and nit

The aforementioned Lennox study on racialintegration, ethnic diversity and prejudice isbased on empirical evidence from the BritishNational Party (BNP). One of its conclusionsis that whites were more likely to sign upto the far right party when living in areassparsely populated by non-whites, leadingto the argument that as a result of lessinteraction with individuals of diverse ethnic

backgrounds, whites living in these areas areless informed about ethnic minorities.51 Thestudy also found evidence that the BNP hasfewer members in communities where thenon-white population is equally dispersedbetween numerous ethnic groups, wherethere is a higher incidence of mixed-racerelationships, and where levels of educationtend to be higher. There is therefore anargument that BNP support is based upon

stereotyping and misunderstanding, as itsmembers believe the BNPs hate-creatingstories due to lack information about ordirect contact with, other ethnic groups.

Hope Not Hate is a campaigning organisationghting against the racism and fascism

espoused by the BNP and the EnglishDefence League (EDL) amongst others.The non-partisan group works on a local

level to campaign against these and otherfar-right groups. They focus their eorts

in neighbourhoods where these far-rightparties are gaining support, challengingtheir claims, as well as positively mobilisingindividuals opposed to racism to provide apositive alternative. In these constituencies,Hope Not Hate produces and distributesinformative leaets and community

newspapers, opposing the BNP on the

doorstep and building local networks of

51 Lennox, C. 2012. Racial integration, ethnic diversity, andprejudice: empirical evidence from a study of the BritishNational Party. Oxford Economic Papers 64(3): 395-416.


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53 Preston, Julia. Young Immigrants Say Its Obamas Time toAct. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/us/dream-act-gives-young-immigrants-a-political-voice.html.

Despite being a nation-wide campaign, it isa great example of community organisingas many eorts are still made on a local

level, and the campaign uses the power ofpersonal stories to build a notion of sharedidentity. The United We Dream movementhas demonstrated the success of combiningtargeted action at ocials, demonstrations

to raise awareness, mobilisation campaignsto get out the vote, and a strong onlinepresence for pursuing and achieving theirgoals. Furthermore, it has engaged andempowered a community of Dreamers Latino immigrants that had for years beendisenfranchised from the political process inthe United States.

Bnt Statt Bran, German - Dismantling

and dilting prejdice

Anti-immigrant and racist attitudes remaina prevalent problem in Germany. A long-term study on intolerance, prejudice anddiscrimination by Zick et al. found that 50per cent of respondents in Germany believethat there are too many foreigners living in

the country, with just under 30 cent holdingthe view that foreigners should be sentback to their home countries in times ofjob scarcity. 51.9 per cent of respondentsalso agreed with the notion that it isnecessary to protect their culture from theinuence of other cultures.54 Bunt StattBraun (colourful instead of brown) is anon-partisan, community-based citizensinitiative in the town of Rostock, working

actively to counter these tendenciesthat can lead to populist far right andextremist support in society. Having arisenas a reaction to a Neo-Nazi arson attackon a house hosting Roma asylum seekersand Vietnamese contract workers in aRostock suburb in 1992, the organisationhas since sought to promote culturaland political tolerance of all nationsand ideologies and ghts the use of

violence.

the presidential elections in battlegroundstates.53

Their strategies have been eective at

gaining momentum for the movement,increasing participation numbers andencouraging individuals towards activism.This is grassroots contact democracy atits best. The public events where migrantsreveal their status have also removed someof the fear of deportation, and have drawnthe Dreamers even closer. The group alsooperates on an individual, grassroots levelby telling their personal stories to anyoneand everyone. This was one of the mosteective methods for voter mobilising this

past November. Additionally, peaceful sit-insand demonstrations have helped United WeDream generate publicity for the movement,increasing their support and in the processhave placed mounting pressure for theDream Act to be pushed through Congress.Results have also been seen at the state level,where Republican Senator Marco Rubio inFlorida has prepared a new bill that will allowyoung migrants to gain visas in response to

the organisations campaign.

United We Dream has recognised theimportance of having a strong onlinepresence, with a well-designed websitethat is easy to access and an active socialmedia presence on both Twitter andFacebook. Since they target young peoplein particular, it is undoubtedly an eective

way of engaging and mobilising their core

demographic who are more attuned to thepotential power of online campaigning,as was also evidenced in both of Obamaspresidential election campaigns. Thetheme of individuals with personal storiescoming together to form a larger narrativeis reected on their site as well, and the

group also hosts events to help immigrantswith their applications as well as a webinarseries that has a more educative element,

explaining the new immigration policy.

54 Zick, Andreas et al. 2011. Intolerance, Prejudice andDiscrimination: A European Report. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

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of projects and campaigns to engagecitizens directly. By taking on these dierent

approaches to address the challenge frommore than one angle, Never Again showshow eective a grassroots organisation can

be at engaging the community and workingto combat some of the underlying causesthat lead to extreme right party support.Coalition-building with other groups ofsimilar goals and interests has shown to be asuccessful model.

It is worth considering some of Never Againsinitiatives in greater detail. The groupmonitors racism and discrimination on theground via the Brown Book, a document

of racist and xenophobic incidences andcrimes committed in Poland. More than 400entries were published in 2010 alone, suchas unidentied perpetrators attempting

to rebomb a synagogue, or football fans

throwing bananas at a black player ofCzarni Zagan FC. Racism and anti-Semitismremain to be serious problems in Poland, asevidenced by the sheer number of incidencesthat were documented.

Furthermore, by providing information tojournalists and researchers covering issuesrelated to extremism, Never Again hasassisted in writing more than 3,000 nationaland international press articles and books,as well as TV and radio broadcasts. In doingso, it has undoubtedly had an impact oninforming the public and helping raiseawareness. Additionally, the organisations

cooperation with the ParliamentaryCommittee on Ethnic Minorities has helpedinuence legislation on topics of racism and

xenophobia, such as incorporating a ban onracist and neo-Nazi activities into Polandsconstitution.

Besides working together with the mediaand parliamentary groups, Never Again hasalso been collaborating on a research project

with a Potsdam-based association calledVictims Perspective since 2008. Togetherthey have been exploring dierent methods

for monitoring violence based on extremist

On the level of community engagement, BuntStatt Brauns projects have been numerousand diverse, with the dual objective ofeducation and cohesion-building. They haverun culture nights, executed educationalprogrammes such as Youth for Toleranceand Democracy against extremism,xenophobia and anti-Semitism, developedan SOS sticker system, whereby communitymembers can put stickers on their doorsto signal to others that they are willing tooer emergency aid, and they have

organised lm nights, podium discussions,

international cooking courses in localschools, as well as various exhibitions.These initiatives have encouraged youth

and adolescents to learn about othercultures, building social cohesion from ayoung age. The sticker programme hasshown solidarity with the victims of racistattacks, demonstrating that they are nottolerated by society. As an aggregate,Bunt Statt Braun have organised the sortsof events that encourage inclusivecommunity-building. They have thereforebeen able to have meaningful political

impact in Rostock. The tensions surroundingthe idea of multiculturalism and changeare one of the political driving forces ofthe extreme right; by focusing onembracing multicultural diversity andbuilding a strong civil society on a local level,an organisation such as Bunt Statt Braunis able to counteract the negativityemanating from the far right.

Never Again, Poland - tracking andedcation abot extremism and bilding

awareness of prejdice throgh cltre,

sport and political engagement

The Never Again association in Polanddemonstrates the success of communityorganising focused on education to preventand dismantle ethnic and racial prejudices.Its objectives are met through a number of

strategies: the publication of a magazine;cooperation with the media, researchers,parliamentary groups, and other internationalorganisations, as well as leading a number


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56 http://www.newham.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/835AAB4A-E651-4497-AAD8-D40D4A9934AB/0/Whyweneedawelfarestatethatbuildsresilience.pdf

community and not for particular groups. Inorder to facilitate better contact democracy,power has been devolved to local councillorsand community hubs - in an echo ofAmsterdam West.

The outcome of this approach - one thatcould be replicated elsewhere - is to alignlocal services and housing with reciprocalnotions of welfare and to facilitatecommunity resilience and responsiveness.In many ways, Newham serves not simplyas a model for other local authorities butfor a national party too. When consideringstatecraft, it is about aligning publicpolicy with improving real outcomes in

housing, jobs, integration and democraticresponsiveness as well meetingpeoples expectations and contributorynotions of fairness and justice. It is acomprehensive approach that is makinga dierence to peoples lives but also

hints on how the political mainstream candeploy statecraft and contact democracyto buttress mainstream resilience againstpopulism and even extremism.

These case studies highlight the necessityof mainstream parties incorporatingcontact democracy into their agendas.Their objectives of education, politicalmobilisation/activism, improving servicesand policy outcomes, and building socialcohesion should be the shared goals ofmainstream parties. The strategies usedto achieve these goals should also overlap:

informative magazines and publications;active campaigns (both directly inthe political sphere such as HopeNot Hates campaign against the BNP,as well as educational campaigns targetingyouth such as Expos Stop racismin schools), and events including lectures,workshops, and community gatheringsthat bridge ethnic and cultural divisionsand create inclusive bonds between

groups. Finally, the positive outcomes ofthe grassroots groups, movements, andcampaigns discussed should encouragemainstream parties to follow or encourage

have a very positive eect on community

engagement and can oer a viable response

to the populist agenda. The critical thingis to engage on issues in order to developwider political trust in mainstream partiesto meet the needs of citizens and their localcommunities.

Newham Borogh Concil, London - Local

statecraft - sing local powers to bild

commnit resilience

In its strategy paper, Quid pro Quo notstatus quo, Newham Borough Council, thesecond most deprived local authority in theUK, has presented a bold new agenda to

build what it terms community resilience.This has a number of substantive strands.It involves direct interventions in thehousing and jobs markets by the localauthority. It has established welfare towork programmes, strong enforcementof the minimum wage and a partnershipwith the local further education collegeto establish a skills centre to provide localresidents with market-ready capabilities.

In the housing market, it is investing innew high-quality housing, it regulatesprivate landlords to enforce standards, andhas introduced the contributory principleinto housing allocations. It expresses thislatter policy as follows:

We will now give priority for social housing

to those in work or contributing through

activity like foster caring, creating the right

incentives for people to improve their personalsituation.56

These polices help address fairnessconcerns with the borough. It supports theintegration of the local community throughthe promotion of an English language rst

policy. It supported scores of street partiesto coincide with the Queens DiamondJubilee in 2012 with one condition: they

had to be parties organised for the whole


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similar pursuits. They include thedevelopment of activist networks, theinvolvement of new groups in politicaldialogue and participatory politics, as wellas the rebuilding of trust in politicians,public institutions, and representativeliberal democracy more generally. Overall,they also work at establishing a unifyingpolitics to counteract the antagonism of thepopulist radical or extreme right; responsiblefor creating divides, breeding hate, andleaving open the potential for violence ifexploited by extremists.

In addition to acknowledging the issuesarticulated by the populist radical right

parties, tentatively engaging with them,and developing a comprehensive policy,governance, and political response for thelong-term, mainstream parties need toalso organise and engage at the localcommunity level. By doing so, they willbe able to combat some of the underlyingcauses of support for the populist radicalright and extremist forces and help relievesome of the tensions causing stress on

liberal democracy.


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migration ows while providing for

a vibrant yet coherent society. Themainstream has to both connectwith society and demonstrategoverning capacity. Populists are lesslikely to face this latter challenge.So for the political mainstream it isa matter of statecraft and contactdemocracy. Perhaps another Italianpolitician points a way forward. The youngDemocratic Party Mayor of Florence,Matteo Renzi, almost stole his partysleadership in primaries ahead of the Italianelection. He traveled around Italy in acamper van plugging his programme ofpolitical, state, educational, healthcare, and

scal reform and pushed a socially liberalagenda. Again, at the time of writing, he isthe most popular choice for Italian PrimeMinister 28 percent favour him with14 percent favouring his party leader,Pier Luigi Bersani, and Beppe Grillo is inthird place with 13 percent. Perhapshis youth is part of this phenomenonin a country that is in desperate needof economic and political renewal.

Whatever becomes of Renzi he is justone individual it underlines a broadermessage to Europes mainstream politicalparties change or risk your mainstreamstatus.

Britains majoritarian democracy perhapsprotects the mainstream to a greaterextent than elsewhere. There we canexpect disengagement instead of defection

if there is no change. It is not improbablethat the next election could be won witha party securing only 35 percent of thevote or so. That will be a very unstablesituation indeed as the mandate to governwill be weak and anger is likely to swell.Dierent political systems create dierent

incentives and impacts, but the underlyingforces of political change recur.

A rethink is necessary, and soon. The riskis that deeply damaging political partiesand movements can gain traction ina situation of democratic stress. A

complacent response could mean thatstress becomes intensied. That is a

wholly irresponsible response. The populistsignal is clear. The extremist threat ismostly contained for now. And yet,democratic stress is evident. The problemis that if this situation persists, or indeedworsens, then the social, cultural andeconomic consequences could be severe.Mainstream parties face a huge burden ofresponsibility to change.


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Democratic Stress, The Populist Signal and Extremist Threat

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