CHAPTER 3
Deterrence and Conflict
In the past two decades, the rapid growth in quantitative research oninternational con›icts has expanded into the area of deterrence stud-ies. The attempts at quantitative testing of deterrence have quicklycome under criticism on the grounds that many elements of deter-rence, such as threat credibility and deterrence success or failure, aredif‹cult to establish, let alone quantify. This chapter addresses sev-eral key conceptual and measurement problems that have oftenweakened the validity of empirical research in this area. The discus-sion starts with the issue of the difference between deterrence andcompellence, then clari‹es the problems resulting from previousambiguities in distinguishing between general and immediate deter-rence. This distinction, in turn, facilitates a better delineation of thegeneric decision structure and stages in deterrence encounters. Thechapter also examines the issue of what can be tested logically indeterrence theory and what has been claimed to have been tested (i.e.,deterrence success), but fails to meet the logical criteria of testabilityin the ‹rst place.
The conceptual discussion should then lead to a re-formula-tion of several analytical elements in deterrence theory, whichallows for a more valid and reliable quantitative analysis of deter-rence encounters. Yet the analysis remains consistent with thesemantics and lexicography of traditional deterrence literature,which has been persistently skeptical about systematic large-Nresearch in this area. The chapter also introduces a new data set ofdeterrence cases between major powers from 1895 to 1985, whichresulted from thorough historical research and guided by the rigor-ous conceptual and operational rules discussed here. This newcomprehensive set of deterrence cases will accordingly provide theempirical grounds for testing the theoretical framework outlined inthe introduction.
47
Conceptual Issues and Deterrence
In general, deterrence refers to a situation in which one side (i.e., thedeterrer) threatens to retaliate if the other side (i.e., the potentialattacker) takes some unacceptable action. Both the unacceptableaction and the threatened retaliation may be undertaken through theuse of military, economic, diplomatic, or other means. This generalde‹nition of deterrence also indicates that the main function of deter-rence is to prevent some action from happening. In the military con-text, its most common purpose is to prevent an adversary from usingforce. In the strategic literature, therefore, deterrence theory stipulatesthe conditions for preventing wars.
The Notions of Deterrence
Although there is a general agreement on what constitutes deterrence,there are variations in understanding of the speci‹c properties of deter-rence as a relational concept. First, some specify that deterrence is dif-ferent from compellence (Schelling 1960, 1966; Snyder 1961). The prob-lem is that it is dif‹cult sometimes to distinguish compellence fromdeterrence, as states often use both strategies simultaneously. AsLebow and Stein conclude from their extensive case studies, “Deter-rence may be used to reinforce compellence, and compellence to deter”(1990, 352). In other words, although they are distinct analytical con-cepts, the difference between them may be blurred in reality. For thisreason, some even de‹ne deterrence in terms of compellence, that is, asa “theory about the ways in which an actor manipulates threats toharm others in order to coerce them into doing what he desires” (Jervis1979, 292). Generally, however, deterrence is rather understood as dis-suasion of an adversary from a speci‹c action rather than as coercioninto an action. The latter situation is more often identi‹ed as “compel-lence,” at least for analytical purposes. In its most elemental form,therefore, “strictly speaking, the word ‘deterrence’ means dissuasionby terror” (Kahn 1965, 280).
It is also typical to think of deterrence as an action that involvesthe threat of sanctions or the promise of rewards (Kaufmann 1956;Snyder 1961; George and Smoke 1974). The latter form is character-ized as deterrence by positive inducements, while the former (which ismore often practiced) is characterized as deterrence by negative sanc-tions. Another common approach to deterrence speci‹es that thedeterrer threatens by convincing the adversary that the costs and risks
48 When the Stakes Are High
of the undesired action would outweigh its potential bene‹ts (Snyder1961), as well as the bene‹ts of inaction (Kaufmann 1956). Conse-quently, it is typical for this approach to imply the classical de‹nitionof deterrence as “simply the persuasion of one’s opponent that thecosts and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh itsbene‹ts” (George and Smoke 1974, 11). In this respect, Snyder (1961,14–16) distinguishes between deterrence by denial (which threatens todecrease the bene‹ts from an undesired action) and deterrence by pun-ishment (which threatens to increase the costs of such an action). Thisis an important distinction since, under the in›uence of Schelling’sclassic statement of the theory of commitments in the nuclear age(1960, 1966), much of the literature has focused on strategies thatmight enhance deterrence success by punishment, i.e., by “manipulat-ing” the adversary’s costs and risks from an undesired action. Boththeoretical and empirical works on “deterrence by denial” throughinducements and via positive incentives are rather scarce in the strate-gic literature and, arguably, are often neglected in the of‹cial foreignpolicies as well (for a similar criticism, see George and Smoke 1974,chap. 21; 1989, 182).
These different de‹nitional angles have greater consequences fortesting a theory of deterrence. As will be seen later, disagreements overidentifying particular historical cases as examples of deterrence orsomething else (e.g., compellence) often result from different concep-tual approaches to deterrence and only secondarily from differentempirical interpretations of historical facts.
Deterrence Success and Failure
Scholars are divided over how to approach deterrence success and fail-ure. According to some, deterrence failed if the threatener had to useforce (e.g., Karsten, Howell, and Allen 1984), while the others considerdeterrence to fail if the threatener either had to use substantial force ordid not attain its policy goals (e.g., Huth and Russett 1988, 1990).Deterrence theorists are sometimes criticized for speaking of deter-rence failure when war breaks out, but the criticism is misplaced. Bothcritics and deterrence proponents sometimes confuse conceptualde‹nitions with causal inference. Quester makes a critical observationthat de‹ning deterrence failure in terms of the outbreak of war is “tau-tological” and furthermore incorrect because “many wars may eruptsimply because of inadequate retaliatory threats” (1989; emphasisadded). This remark is relevant as it points to the perplexing nature of
Deterrence and Con›ict 49
what constitutes deterrence failure. It can also be argued, however, thatde‹ning deterrence failure in terms of the outbreak of war is not neces-sarily tautological unless it implies an exclusive causal linkage betweenthe strategy of deterrence and its failure. Deterrence may fail for manyreasons and not necessarily for those related to the effectiveness ofdeterrent threats. It may fail because of inadequate threats, but it mayalso fail despite threats, because it may be that some other factors havea stronger impact on the attacker’s decision than the deterrer’s behav-ior. Hence, the de‹nition of what constitutes deterrence failure shouldbe treated separately from the question of what caused this failure. Ifthe threat is intended to prevent the use of force, then the use of forcemarks the deterrence failure notwithstanding the reasons for it. Mostrecent empirical research is thus quite correct in identifying deterrencefailure in terms of the use of force as long as no causal inference isimplied.
On the other hand, the same argument is not applicable forde‹ning deterrence success. Namely, a potential attacker’s restraintfrom using force because of the deterrer’s threats indicates that deter-rence has succeeded. Analysts of deterrence are therefore correct whenthey de‹ne deterrence success as “a situation in which a state’s leaderswant to resort to force, prepare to do so, but ultimately decide torefrain because of the military capability and demonstrated resolve oftheir adversary” (Lebow and Stein 1987, 24; also Huth and Russett1984, 497). In other words, the term deterrence success implies that theabsence of war should be attributed to the effectiveness of threats. Onthe other hand, nonviolent outcomes of international crises may resultfrom many conditions despite the deterrent threat, rendering theidenti‹cation of cases of deterrence success dif‹cult. Moreover, theabsence of a challenge to a deterrer’s threat against upsetting the statusquo should not necessarily be interpreted as a deterrence success; apotential challenger may restrain itself from upsetting the status quofor many reasons, not all of which are attributable to a deterrent threat(George and Smoke 1989, 178). For instance, the putative Challengermay already be satis‹ed with the status quo.
The following Kissinger quote astutely acknowledges how it canbe misleading to attribute the absence of war to the deployment of aparticular deterrent strategy.
The Nuclear Age turned strategy into deterrence, and deterrenceinto an esoteric intellectual exercise. Since deterrence can only betested negatively, by events that do not take place, and since it isnever possible to demonstrate why something has not occurred, it
50 When the Stakes Are High
became especially dif‹cult to assess whether the existing policywas the best possible policy or a just barely effective one. Perhapsdeterrence was even unnecessary because it was impossible toprove whether the adversary ever intended to attack in the ‹rstplace. (1994, 608)
Only if an analyst controls for all possible conditions except for thedeterrer’s threats, a quite impossible endeavor, may we say that apotential attacker abstained from using force because of the deterrer’sthreats. In addition, the analyst must demonstrate that the attackerindeed intended to use force in the ‹rst place. Since the ‹rst require-ment is impossible to achieve and the second is mostly speculative, it isquestionable whether deterrence success can ever be validly tested.1
On the other hand, Kissinger’s implication that deterrence canonly be tested negatively, that is, via those cases where deterrence didnot fail, does not seem to offer a satisfactory resolution to the method-ological problem. If we are interested in the conditions promotingdeterrence success, then focusing only on cases with a “successful”deterrent outcome would yield results on necessary conditions at best.Furthermore, these same conditions may also precede deterrence fail-ures (Jervis 1989, 193–94). The impossibility of interpreting the nonvi-olent outcome of dispute as a deterrence success does not necessarilyleave us with just the option of considering only those cases wheredeterrence fails. It is, in fact, vital to consider both cases of deterrencefailure and nonfailure, but it is essential not to automatically interpretthe latter as a deterrence success. Some empirical analysts acknowledgethis important analytical issue (e.g., Huth and Russett 1984, 497),though many others, despite its methodological relevance, continue tolabel peaceful resolutions as deterrence success.
Major Types of Deterrence
Several criteria can be used for distinguishing various forms of deter-rence. First, deterrence can be exercised in different areas of foreignpolicy, though the primary concern of scholars and practitioners isoverwhelmingly in the domain of national security, especially nuclearstrategy. In the context of military deterrence, we can further differen-tiate between strategic (nuclear) and substrategic (conventional) levelsof deterrence, and, within the latter category, we can separate thedeterrence of local and limited wars from the deterrence of less violentcon›icts (George and Smoke 1989, 172).
Second, we can make a typology of deterrence cases based on the
Deterrence and Con›ict 51
question of what constitutes a deterrent threat. It is conventional torecognize deterrent threats through public verbal statements issued byof‹cial governments, but deterrent threats have been interpreted, bothby analysts and policymakers, in many other ways. They can also bemanifested through behavioral forms that imply a threat, such as themovement of troops into particular areas, partial or complete mobi-lization, putting forces (nuclear or conventional) on the highest alert,and so forth. Though not accompanied by explicit verbal warnings,these actions constitute unspoken signals of a deterrer’s intent to takeaction unless the other side changes its behavior. That deterrence canbe manifested in diverse ways is important, because it can signi‹cantlyaffect the identi‹cation of deterrence cases in empirical analysis.
Third, most quantitative studies of deterrence follow Morgan’s(1983) distinction between general and immediate deterrence:
Immediate deterrence concerns the relationship between opposingstates where at least one side is seriously considering an attackwhile the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to pre-vent it. General deterrence relates to opponents who maintainarmed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither isanywhere near mounting an attack. (Morgan 1983, 30; emphasisin the original)
The distinction is quite intuitive, though it is apparent that it can bedif‹cult, according to this de‹nition, to distinguish an arms race, forinstance, from “cases” of general deterrence.
Finally, another widely used classi‹cation, relevant especially formajor power relations, makes a distinction between direct and extendeddeterrence. Basic or direct deterrence refers to the prevention of attackon the deterrer’s home territory. In extended deterrence, a stateattempts to deter an attack on a third party, such as an ally (e.g., Weede1983, 234 ; Huth and Russett 1988, 30), a protégé (Stein 1987, 326; Wu1990), a “pawn” (Russett 1963; Zagare and Kilgour 2000), or any otherstate (George and Smoke 1974, 58; Lebow and Stein 1990, 336).
Extended Deterrence as the Prevalent Deterrence Form
Extended deterrence is a common and precarious element of majorpower relationships, but it was not directly addressed in the literatureuntil very recently. In particular, a series of works by Huth and Russettlaid the grounds for quantitative research in this area (Russett 1963;
52 When the Stakes Are High
Huth 1988, 1994; Huth and Russett 1984, 1988, 1990; Huth, Gelpi, andBennett 1993), while formal models of extended deterrence alsoexpanded (Wu, 1990; Kilgour and Zagare 1994; Zagare and Kilgour2000). The relevance of extended deterrence for major power relationsis indicated by the recent attempt to record all deterrence encountersamong great powers from 1816 through 1984: 65 percent of theseencounters were cases of extended deterrence, while only 35 percentrepresented direct deterrence (Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett 1993, table A-1). The list of major power deterrence cases in this book (see tables3.1, 3.2, 3.3) indicates a similar pattern despite slightly different criteriafor their identi‹cation.
The historical record shows that almost all major wars haveoccurred after the failure of extended deterrence, that is, when at leastone major power tried to prevent the other power’s attack on a thirdparty. Since the Congress of Vienna, almost all major power con›ictsresulted from the failure of extended deterrence between powers. Nev-ertheless, there have been some notable and dramatic exceptions, suchas the Franco-Prussian War or the Soviet and U.S. entries into WorldWar II, which were triggered by direct attacks by Germany and Japanrespectively. Notwithstanding these few exceptions, it may be arguedthat major power wars tend to develop from disputes over issuesrelated to minor power(s). Typically, an initial con›ict between amajor power and some minor power(s) would trigger a militaryresponse by another major power in support of its protégé (the minorpower). This dynamic, in turn, highlights the problem of maintainingstable extended deterrence in order to prevent major wars.
In addition, many intricacies of the stability of deterrence primar-ily relate to the credibility problems of extended deterrence. In fact, theentire theory of commitments developed by Schelling (1960, 1966),which dominated most of the strategic literature throughout the ColdWar, was designed to strengthen the effectiveness of extended threats,especially when the “inherent” credibility of defending the third partywas weak. Quester (1989, 63), for instance, argues that “in truth, basicdeterrence is very easy to accomplish, where there is much more doubtcomes in ‘extended deterrence’” (see also George and Smoke 1974;Betts 1987). Like the traditional strategic literature, almost all recentquantitative research in this area primarily examines extended deter-rence between states (Russett 1963; Huth and Russett 1984, 1988,1990; Huth 1988, 1990; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett 1993).
In the evolution of the idea of extended deterrence, Snyder (1961,17) was one of the ‹rst to introduce the distinction between “primary”
Deterrence and Con›ict 53
and “secondary” deterrence, the latter being the “deterrence of enemyattack not against oneself, but against a third party.” Kahn later (1965,281) distinguished between three types of deterrence, depending onwhether the goal of deterrence was to prevent “attacks directed at theUnited States” (i.e., the threatener—Type I), “extreme provocations,such as nuclear or even conventional attack on Europe” (i.e., animportant ally—Type II), or “relatively minor or moderate provoca-tions” (i.e., any third party other than allies—Type III). While Kahn’sType II and Type III deterrence are both incorporated under Snyder’s“secondary” deterrence, later analysts tended to specify extendeddeterrence primarily in terms of Kahn’s Type II deterrence (for anexception, see George and Smoke 1974; Lebow and Stein 1990). Thisrestriction is problematic, however, because it does not differentiatethe issue of a possible condition for successful extended deterrence (i.e.,that the third party is a close protégé or an ally to the deterrer) from thevery de‹nition of extended deterrence. For this reason, it would bemore appropriate to retain the original meaning of Snyder’s “sec-ondary” deterrence. Extended deterrence can then be de‹ned simply asan attempt to deter an attack on a third party, be it an ally, a protégé,or any other state.
The Conceptual and Operational Refinements
Basic Deterrence Stages and Decision Structure
The previous discussion demonstrates that any attempt to identifycases of deterrence success can be only speculative, and any list of suchcases would be spurious at least. This is true for all types of deterrencesituations, whether general (i.e., when there is no challenge to a deter-rer’s threat) or immediate (i.e., the challenger is dissuaded from usingthe force). With this caveat in mind, we can provide a working distinc-tion in both general and immediate types of deterrence between thosesituations that can be perceived as deterrence successes and those ofdeterrence failure. This working distinction is a necessary step towarda more rigorous selection of cases of immediate deterrence. Figure 3.1delineates such situations and also outlines the sequence of events thatdistinguish general from immediate deterrence.
Figure 3.1 is helpful in clarifying which decision choices precedegeneral or immediate deterrence and which decisions indicate the fail-ure of either type of deterrence. Most scholars subscribe to the viewthat any overt or less explicit form of competition for in›uence
54 When the Stakes Are High
between two or more powers, such as maintaining armed forces, canbe interpreted as a case of general deterrence (Morgan 1983, 30). Fig-ure 3.1, however, points to a more restrictive and reliable approach toidentifying general deterrence cases. It indicates that general deter-rence is triggered only if at least one side makes a certain threat, eitherthrough direct of‹cial statements or through any other behavior com-monly understood to imply a threat, such as a substantial troop move-ment or putting armed forces on high alert. If there is no such verbalor behavioral form of threat, then actions such as the intensi‹ed main-tenance of armed forces would be more correctly interpreted as anarms race, which might have different underlying dynamics thandeterrence.
Figure 3.1 identi‹es deterrence successes only in order to draw ananalytical distinction between “successes” and failures, though empiri-cal identi‹cation of deterrence success can be very problematic for thereasons already discussed. Deterrence failure occurs when any other
Deterrence and Con›ict 55
Fig. 3.1. General and immediate deterrence
party challenges the deterrer’s original threat. As a simple genericde‹nition, it applies to both general and immediate deterrence. As‹gure 3.1 shows, the failure of general deterrence does not necessarilylead to immediate deterrence, a point that has been often overlooked inprevious empirical studies. In large part, this oversight is related to therequirement for a Challenger’s intention to attack as a trigger for theonset of immediate deterrence, and the Defender’s commitment toreact. Though widespread, this requirement is problematic.
The obvious empirical problem is in establishing a Challenger’sintention to retaliate. As with any other motivational or cognitive con-struct, intentions escape a replicable empirical identi‹cation.2 Further-more, it is important to specify whether the Defender’s commitment todefend the Protégé precedes or follows the Challenger’s threat ofattack. As indicated in ‹gure 3.1, it is important to recognize that oncegeneral deterrence fails, immediate deterrence does not automaticallystart unless the Defender reacts to the challenge to its general deterringthreat. Any prior Defender’s threat against such a challenge belongs tothe dynamics of general deterrence. If this prior threat is also consid-ered as a de‹nitional requirement for immediate deterrence, then theline between general and immediate dynamics of deterrence is blurred.To remove any possible confusion in this respect, a revised and moreprecise delineation of immediate deterrence is accordingly illustrated in‹gure 3.1. This clari‹cation should provide better conceptual guidancefor a more robust and replicable identi‹cation of historical cases ofdeterrence encounters.
To avoid all these problems, I de‹ne deterrence as a situation inwhich one side threatens the other side with some punitive retaliation ifthe other side takes a certain action. In direct deterrence, this undesiredaction is aimed at the territory of the deterrer, while in extended deter-rence it is aimed against a third party. I focus on the immediate type ofextended deterrence, which occurs when general deterrence fails and aDefender threatens to retaliate against the challenge (see ‹g. 3.1). Inthe extended form of immediate deterrence, the Challenger’s threat andDefender’s responses are related to a third party, which does not haveto be the Defender’s of‹cial ally.
Deterrence Outcomes
If a general deterrence failure enters the immediate crisis stage—that is,if the Defender demands the Challenger back away from its threatenedor actual attack on a third party—then there are four possible out-
56 When the Stakes Are High
comes: either Challenger or Defender can acquiesce to the other’sdemands, they can reach some sort of compromise, or, if neither is will-ing to concede, the crisis escalates into war (see ‹g. 3.2).
It should be noted that these outcomes are only partially compa-rable to the deterrence success and failure outcomes typically used inquantitative deterrence analyses. A Challenger’s acquiescence is com-parable to a “deterrence success” for the Defender (i.e., deterrer).However, “deterrence failure,” as commonly used, can refer to either asituation where the Defender acquiesces, or war breaks out. Compro-mise outcomes have been routinely neglected in previous quantitativeworks. Unlike “compromise” as de‹ned in the MID data set, whichallows for a substantial use of force as long as disputants agree toaccept or rede‹ne the status quo (see Mousseau 1998), compromisehere simply refers to the absence of an exchange of serious threats, orthe reciprocated use of force between a Challenger and Defender. Inthis regard, it is similar to the “negotiation” outcome in Bueno deMesquita and Lalman’s international interaction game (1992) and“peaceful settlements” in Dixon (1994).
The advantage of this treatment of deterrence outcomes over thesimple dichotomy of success or failure is twofold. First, though some
Deterrence and Con›ict 57
Fig. 3.2. Extended-immediate deterrence (EID)
might argue that the outcomes of Defender’s acquiescence or war canbe viewed as deterrence failure and the outcome of Challenger’s acqui-escence as deterrence success, compromise, as a midpoint between suc-cess and failure, escapes this dichotomy. Consequently, it is importantto include the possibility for an outcome that does not present a clear-cut success or failure for either side.3
Second, it is common for the dichotomized approach to deter-rence outcomes to identify deterrence failure with the use of force anddeterrence success with a peaceful outcome. The classi‹cation of fouroutcomes reveals why such an approach can be misleading. While warundoubtedly represents deterrence failure, peaceful outcomes implythree possibilities in terms of perceived successes: a deterrer’s perceivedsuccess if the Challenger peacefully acquiesces (AcqCh), the Chal-lenger’s success if the deterrer acquiesces without ‹ghting (AcqDef), orcompromise by both. These three peaceful outcomes carry differentpolitical implications for either side in terms of winning or losing thecon›ict, which are all con›ated in the single notion of deterrence suc-cess as a peaceful outcome.
The Historical Cases of Major Power Deterrence,1895–1985
In their search for more robust and rigorous ways to measure and testdeterrence arguments, a number of analysts have made remarkablecontributions. Theoretical arguments on deterrence have been tested inboth qualitative and quantitative research. Among those who use qual-itative methods, comparative case studies ‹gure prominently (Georgeand Smoke 1974; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Organski and Kugler 1980;Lebow 1981; Mearsheimer 1983; Betts 1987), though there were sometheoretically signi‹cant single case studies as well (Russett 1967; Stein1987). On the quantitative side, the pioneering work by Russett (1963)was followed by a series of studies on extended deterrence in the 1980sand later (Weede 1983; Huth 1988, 1995; Huth and Russett 1984, 1988,1990; Wu 1990). In contrast to the empirical studies, attempts toaddress issues of extended deterrence in formal theory have been lesswidespread. In this respect, a series of formal modeling works byZagare and Kilgour (Zagare 1992; Kilgour and Zagare 1994; Zagareand Kilgour 2000) can be singled out for their signi‹cant contributionto our better understanding of theoretical rami‹cations and the logic of
58 When the Stakes Are High
extended deterrence. Regardless of the adopted method, it is clear thatextended-immediate deterrence has received much scholarly attention.
The Operational Rules for Identifying Deterrence Cases
Partly to address several conceptual weaknesses and partly to guide amore robust and replicable empirical analysis, the operational criteriafor selecting the cases of deterrence will be consistent with the rules setout in the previous conceptual section.
The cases of general deterrence failure include all instances inwhich (1) at least one major power (Challenger) upsets the status quoin general deterrence vis-à-vis another major power (Defender) by get-ting into a con›ict with a third state (Protégé), and (2) the Defenderdemands the Challenger pull out from the con›ict against the Protégé.The ‹rst stage constitutes general deterrence failure as a necessary butnot suf‹cient condition for immediate deterrence. The second stagemarks the onset of immediate deterrence between the powers in theirextended deterrent encounter. The focus here is on those types of crisesand deterrence in which military means are used by either power. Theessential moves marking general deterrence failure and the beginningof immediate deterrence, therefore, are operationally de‹ned in termsof military moves. As deterrent threats can be manifested both verballyand behaviorally, as discussed previously, the range of such movesincludes:4 (1) a threat of force (including the threat to blockade, occupyterritory, declare war, or use force); (2) a display of force (alert, mobi-lization, or show of force); and (3) the use of force (blockade, occupa-tion, seizure, limited use of force, or war).5
A more re‹ned distinction among several possible outcomesshould help us overcome the problematic nature of identifying deter-rence outcomes as a success or failure. Speci‹cally, we need to ‹rstidentify whether general deterrence failed or not. Once general deter-rence between major powers fails, i.e., con›ict breaks out between atleast one major power (Challenger) and a third nation (Protégé), it caneither escalate into immediate deterrence between the Challenger andanother major power (Defender), or not. If there is at least one othermajor power willing to aid the Protégé as its Defender, then the analy-sis differentiates four possible outcomes of extended-immediate deter-rence: (1) the Challenger’s acquiescence to the Defender’s demands topull out from the con›ict against the third party (AcqCh); (2) theDefender’s acquiescence to the Challenger’s perseverance in its con›ict
Deterrence and Con›ict 59
against the Defender’s Protégé (AcqDef); (3) a compromise betweenChallenger and Defender in which each side achieves some goals whileyielding on some other issues without any use of force (compromise);(4) a war in which Challenger and Defender use force against eachother as a means of resolving the dispute (war). The operational rulesfor identifying deterrence outcomes are evidently based on a combina-tion of two factors: the extent to which each side’s demands are metand the degree of escalation in the use of force.6
An Empirical Survey of Major Power Deterrence Cases,1895–1985
Following these operational rules, we can determine the universe ofdeterrence cases between major powers from 1895 to 1985. Table 3.1lists all cases of general deterrence failures that did not escalate intoimmediate deterrence crises (a total of 105 cases), while the cases ofescalation to extended-immediate deterrence (EID) between majorpowers are presented in table 3.2 (a total of 44 cases).7 Five of thesecases contained 2 distinct subcrises, as the threats issued by each sidewere for different targets. Finally, there were only 4 cases of directdeterrence between major powers (see table 3.3), which once againjusti‹es the focus on issues of extended threats. Each table identi‹esmajor actors (Challenger, Defender, Protégé) and lists conventionalnames for con›icts as commonly used in historical surveys. The list ofgeneral deterrence failures that escalated into extended-immediatedeterrence (table 3.2) also identi‹es the outcomes according to theoperational de‹nitions for EID outcomes.8 Brief historical summariesof all listed cases of extended-immediate deterrence are given in appen-dix A along with the sources of information used for developing theentire set of all three types of deterrence cases.
While this is the ‹rst attempt to develop a set of all cases of generaldeterrence failures between major powers, there have been a few simi-lar attempts to collect information on the universe of extended-imme-diate deterrence cases (see Huth and Russett 1990; Huth, Gelpi, andBennett 1993). Despite some degree of overlap between these lists ofcases, there are some signi‹cant differences among all three studies.First, the earlier set developed by Huth and Russett (1990) includedfewer cases of deterrence encounters than the data set introduced hereor that of Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett (1993). About 20 cases included inthis study are not found in Huth and Russett’s list, while 4 cases fromtheir set are ruled out as cases of extended-immediate deterrence here.
60 When the Stakes Are High
On the other hand, Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett (1993) list 17 cases ofextended deterrence that are not found in the present analysis, but theyomit 13 cases that can be found here. The difference in determining theDefenders and the Challengers is relatively small: out of 26 commonlyidenti‹ed cases in my list and that developed by Huth and Russett(1990), only 20 percent have reversed roles for Defenders and Chal-lengers; the difference is even smaller in comparison to the list providedby Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett (1993).
Major differences between this list of extended-immediate deter-rence cases and the previous ones result from several factors, both con-ceptual and empirical. The operational rules for identifying the casesare guided here by the conceptual distinction between general deter-rence failure and the onset of immediate deterrence as presented in‹gure 3.1. This clari‹cation resulted in identifying several cases as gen-eral deterrence failures, but not as immediate deterrence cases as well.Furthermore, at the conceptual level, I do not specify deterrence interms of actors’ intentions, but strictly behaviorally, to avoid (amongother things) the problem of reliability in identifying intentions.Finally, an attempt was made to consult more comprehensive numberof historical sources than those reported in previous studies of deter-rence (e.g., Huth 1988, 26–27; Huth and Russett 1984, 504–5). Thisreanalysis of historical materials explains many differences in the cod-ing of some historical cases.9
There are a few general patterns that can be observed in tables 3.1through 3.3. First, strategic thinkers’ primary interest in issues ofextended deterrence is fully justi‹ed given that there were only 4 casesof direct-immediate deterrence between major powers compared to 44cases of extended-immediate deterrence. Second, the argumentadvanced in the previous conceptual discussion that general deterrencefailure should not be confused with the onset of immediate deterrenceis also proven valid. Out of 153 cases of general deterrence failuresbetween major powers, 105 cases (68.63 percent) never escalated intocrises of immediate deterrence, whether extended or direct (see table3.1). Third, regarding the outcomes of extended-immediate deterrence(see table 3.2), half of the cases (50.0 percent) resulted in the Chal-lenger’s acquiescence to the Defender’s demands without ‹ghting, but32.87 percent led to deterrence failure (i.e., either war or Defender’sacquiescence without ‹ghting), while the remaining 17.1 percent wereresolved through compromise. Almost half of the deterrence failuresescalated to war.
The data set presented here will provide the empirical material for
Deterrence and Con›ict 61
TAB
LE 3
.1.
Gen
eral
Det
erre
nce
Fai
lure
/No
Imm
edia
te D
eter
ren
ce,M
ajo
r Po
wer
s,18
95–1
985
No.
Yea
rM
ajor
Pow
erM
inor
Pow
erC
risi
s N
ame
(1)
1895
–96
Fra
nce
(Mad
agas
car)
Fre
nch
Ann
exat
ion
of M
adag
asca
r(2
)18
95U
KT
urke
yA
rmen
ian
Mas
sacr
es(3
)18
95–9
6It
aly
Eth
iopi
aIt
alo-
Eth
iopi
an W
ar(4
)18
99–1
900
Fra
nce
Mor
occo
Fre
nch
Occ
upat
ion
of T
uat
(5)
1899
–190
2U
KSo
uth
Afr
ica
Boe
r W
ar(6
)19
00R
ussi
aA
fgha
nist
anR
usso
-Afg
han
Fro
ntie
r D
ispu
te(7
)19
00R
ussi
a(M
anch
uria
)R
ussi
an I
nter
vent
ion
in M
anch
uria
(8)
1903
UK
Iran
Per
sian
Gul
f N
aval
Dem
onst
rati
on(9
)19
03U
.S.
Col
ombi
aP
anam
a In
depe
nden
ce(1
0)19
03U
.S.
Dom
inic
an R
epub
licD
omin
ican
Tur
moi
ls(1
1)19
03–4
UK
(Tib
et)
Bri
tish
Inv
asio
n of
Tib
et(1
2)19
06U
KT
urke
y (i
.e.,
Pal
esti
ne/E
gypt
)A
kaba
Aff
air
(13)
1906
–8F
ranc
e(A
lger
ia)/
Mor
occo
Fre
nch
Occ
upat
ion
of S
ahar
a an
d M
aure
tani
a(1
4)19
06–9
U.S
.(C
uba)
Cub
an R
evol
utio
n(1
5)19
09–1
2R
ussi
aIr
anR
ussi
an I
nvas
ion
of N
orth
ern
Per
sia
(16)
1910
–12
U.S
.N
icar
agua
Nic
arag
uan
Rev
olut
ion
(17)
1911
U.S
.H
ondu
ras
Hon
dura
n R
evol
utio
n(1
8)19
11–1
2It
aly
Tur
key
(Lib
ya)
Tri
poli
War
(19)
1911
–14
U.S
.D
omin
ican
Rep
ublic
Occ
upat
ion
of t
he D
omin
ican
Rep
ublic
(20)
1912
U.S
.C
uba
“Neg
ro R
evol
t” in
Cub
a(2
1)19
12It
aly
Tur
key
Ital
ian
Occ
upat
ion
of D
odec
anes
e Is
land
s(2
2)19
12R
ussi
aB
ulga
ria
Con
stan
tino
ple
Issu
e (F
irst
Bal
kan
War
)(2
3)19
13It
aly,
A-H
Gre
ece
Alb
ania
n B
ound
arie
s Is
sue
(Sec
ond
Bal
kan
War
)(2
4)19
13–1
4U
.S.
Mex
ico
Mex
ican
Rev
olut
ion
(25)
1914
U.S
.H
aiti
Am
eric
an I
nter
vent
ion
in H
aiti
(26)
1919
Ital
yG
reec
eSm
yrna
(27)
1919
–21
Fra
nce
Tur
key
Cili
cian
War
(28)
1920
Fra
nce
(Syr
ia)
Fre
nch
Col
oniz
atio
n of
Syr
ia(2
9)19
21U
.S.
Pan
ama
Pan
ama–
Cos
ta R
ica
Bor
der
Dis
pute
(30)
1921
Fra
nce,
UK
Ger
man
yR
epar
atio
ns P
robl
em(3
1)19
22U
KT
urke
yC
hana
k A
ffai
r(3
2)19
22–3
2It
aly
(Lib
ya)
Ital
ian
Rec
olon
izat
ion
of L
ibya
(33)
1923
Ital
yG
reec
eC
orfu
Cri
sis
(34)
1923
–24
U.S
.H
ondu
ras
Hon
dura
n R
evol
utio
n(3
5)19
23–2
5F
ranc
eG
erm
any
Ruh
r O
ccup
atio
n(3
6)19
24U
KE
gypt
Bri
tish
Ult
imat
um t
o E
gypt
(37)
1924
UK
Tur
key
(i.e
., Ir
aq)
Mos
ul L
and
Dis
pute
(38)
1925
–26
Fra
nce
(Mor
occo
)R
iffi
ans
Reb
ellio
n(3
9)19
25U
KC
hina
Shan
ghai
Inc
iden
t(4
0)19
25–2
7U
.S.
Nic
arag
uaSe
cond
U.S
. Int
erve
ntio
n in
Nic
arag
ua(4
1)19
27–2
8Ja
pan
Chi
naSh
antu
ng(4
2)19
28U
KE
gypt
Sina
i Ult
imat
um(4
3)19
29U
SSR
Chi
naC
hine
se E
aste
rn R
ailw
ay(4
4)19
29–3
4U
.S.
(Hai
ti)
U.S
. Wit
hdra
wal
fro
m H
aiti
(45)
1931
–32
Japa
nC
hina
Man
chur
ian
War
(M
ukde
n In
cide
nt)
(46)
1932
–33
Japa
nC
hina
Jeho
l Cam
paig
n(4
7)19
33–3
4U
.S.
Cub
a“S
erge
ants
Rev
olt”
in C
uba
(48)
1934
Ital
yA
lban
iaIt
alo-
Alb
ania
n F
rict
ions
(D
uraz
zo N
aval
Dem
onst
rati
on)
(49)
1934
Ital
yA
ustr
iaD
olfu
ss A
ffai
r (N
azi P
utsc
h in
Aus
tria
)(5
0)19
34It
aly
Eth
iopi
aW
al-W
al(5
1)19
36–3
9G
erm
any,
Ita
lySp
ain
Span
ish
Civ
il W
ar(5
2)19
37F
ranc
eT
urke
y (i
.e.,
Syri
a)A
lexe
ndre
tta
Cri
sis
(53)
1937
–41
Japa
nC
hina
Sino
-Jap
anes
e W
ar(5
4)19
38G
erm
any
Aus
tria
Ans
chlu
ss(5
5)19
39It
aly
Alb
ania
Ital
y’s
Inva
sion
of
Alb
ania
(56)
1939
Ger
man
yC
zech
oslo
vaki
aG
erm
an A
nnex
atio
n of
Cze
chos
lova
kia
(57)
1939
Ger
man
yL
ithu
ania
Mem
el A
nnex
atio
n(5
8)19
39U
SSR
Est
onia
, Lat
via,
Lit
huan
iaSo
viet
Occ
upat
ion
of t
he B
alti
cs
(con
tinu
es)
TAB
LE 3
.1.—
Co
nti
nu
ed
No.
Yea
rM
ajor
Pow
erM
inor
Pow
erC
risi
s N
ame
(59)
1940
USS
RF
inla
ndR
usso
-Fin
nish
War
(60)
1948
–51
USS
RY
ugos
lavi
aSo
viet
-Yug
osla
v R
ift
(61)
1950
–51
Chi
na(T
ibet
)C
hine
se I
nvas
ion
of T
ibet
(62)
1951
–52
UK
Egy
ptC
anal
Zon
e(6
3)19
52C
hina
Por
tuga
lM
acao
(64)
1953
USS
RE
ast
Ger
man
yE
ast
Ber
lin U
pris
ing
(65)
1954
U.S
.G
uate
mal
aU
.S. I
nter
vent
ion
in G
uate
mal
a(6
6)19
55U
.S.
Nic
arag
uaN
icar
agua
-Cos
ta R
ican
Dis
pute
(67)
1956
USS
RP
olan
dP
olis
h O
ctob
er(6
8)19
56U
SSR
Hun
gary
Hun
gari
an I
nter
vent
ion
(69)
1957
U.S
., U
KJo
rdan
Jord
ania
n C
ivil
War
(70)
1958
U.S
.L
eban
onL
eban
on U
phea
val
(71)
1958
–61
Fra
nce
Tun
isia
Tun
isia
n M
ilita
ry B
ases
and
Biz
erta
Con
flic
t(7
2)19
59–6
0C
hina
Nep
alSi
no-N
epal
ese
Bor
der
Dis
pute
(73)
1959
–62
Chi
naIn
dia
Sino
-Ind
ian
War
(74)
1961
U.S
.C
uba
Bay
of
Pig
s(7
5)19
61–6
2U
.S.
Lao
s/T
haila
ndL
aos
(76)
1962
Chi
naT
aiw
anT
aiw
an S
trai
t(7
7)19
62U
.S.
Yem
enY
emen
i Civ
il W
ar (
1962
–cur
rent
)(7
8)19
63–6
5U
KIn
done
sia
Bor
neo
(79)
1964
U.S
.P
anam
aP
anam
a C
anal
(80)
1964
Fra
nce
Gab
onM
ilita
ry P
utsc
h in
Gab
on(8
1)19
64–6
6U
KN
orth
Yem
enY
emen
i Civ
il W
ar (
1962
–cur
rent
)(8
2)19
64–7
5U
.S.
Vie
tnam
Vie
tnam
War
(83)
1964
U.S
.C
ongo
Con
go(8
4)19
65C
hina
Indi
aIn
do-P
akis
tani
War
196
4-65
(85)
1965
U.S
.D
omin
ican
Rep
ublic
Dom
inic
an I
nter
vent
ion
(86)
1968
U.S
.N
orth
Kor
eaP
uebl
oSe
izur
e(8
7)19
68U
SSR
Cze
chos
lova
kia
Pra
gue
Spri
ng(8
8)19
69–7
2F
ranc
eC
had
Fir
st C
hadi
an C
ivil
War
(19
65–7
2)(8
9)19
70U
.S.
Cam
bodi
aIn
vasi
on o
f C
ambo
dia
(Vie
tnam
War
)(9
0)19
75U
.S.
Cam
bodi
aM
ayag
uez
Cri
sis
(91)
1978
Fra
nce
Zai
reSh
aba
(92)
1978
–79
Chi
naV
ietn
amSi
no-V
ietn
am W
ar(9
3)19
78–8
2F
ranc
eC
had
Seco
nd C
hadi
an C
ivil
War
(19
78–8
2)(9
4)19
79U
.S.
Yem
enY
emen
i Civ
il W
ar (
1962
–cur
rent
)(9
5)19
79–8
9U
SSR
Afg
hani
stan
Sovi
et I
nvas
ion
of A
fgha
nist
an(9
6)19
79U
SSR
Pak
ista
nSo
viet
Thr
eat
to P
akis
tan
(97)
1979
–80
U.S
.Ir
anU
.S. H
osta
ges
in I
ran
(98)
1980
UK
, Fra
nce
Van
uatu
Esp
irit
u Sa
nto
Sece
ssio
nist
Fig
htin
g(9
9)19
80–8
1U
SSR
Pol
and
Sol
idar
ity
Mov
emen
t in
Pol
and
(100
)19
81U
.S.
Lib
yaG
ulf
of S
yrte
(101
)19
82U
KA
rgen
tina
Fal
klan
ds (
Mal
vina
s) W
ar(1
02)
1983
U.S
.N
icar
agua
Con
tras
(1
03)
1983
U.S
.G
rena
daU
.S. I
nvas
ion
of G
rena
da(1
04)
1983
–84
Fra
nce
Cha
dT
hird
Cha
dian
Civ
il W
ar (
1983
–cur
rent
)(1
05)
1983
–84
Chi
naV
ietn
amSi
no-V
ietn
ames
e C
lash
es
Not
e:P
aren
thes
es a
re u
sed
for
thos
e th
ird
part
ies
that
wer
e no
t cl
assi
fied
as
inde
pend
ent
stat
es in
the
Cor
rela
tes
of W
ar
proj
ect
(Sin
ger
and
Smal
l 198
2).
TAB
LE 3
.2.
Th
e C
ases
of
Ext
end
ed-I
mm
edia
te D
eter
ren
ce a
mo
ng
Maj
or
Pow
ers,
1895
-198
5
No.
Yea
rC
halle
nger
Def
ende
rT
hird
Par
tyO
utco
me
Cri
sis
Nam
e
(1)
1895
–96
Ger
man
yU
K(S
outh
Afr
ica)
Acq
Ger
man
yD
elag
oa B
ay a
nd J
ames
on R
aids
(2)
1897
Ger
man
yR
ussi
aC
hina
Com
prom
ise
Kia
o-C
how
(G
erm
an o
ccup
atio
n)(3
)18
97–9
8F
ranc
eU
K(N
iger
ia)
Com
prom
ise
Nig
er D
ispu
te(4
)18
98–9
9R
ussi
aU
KC
hina
Com
prom
ise
Ang
lo-R
ussi
an c
risi
s(5
)18
98–9
9U
K, U
.S.
Ger
man
y(S
amoa
)C
ompr
omis
eSa
moa
n Is
land
s D
ispu
te(6
)F
ranc
eU
K(S
udan
)A
cqF
ranc
eF
asho
da(7
)18
99–1
900
Rus
sia
Japa
nK
orea
Acq
Rus
sia
Mas
ampo
Epi
sode
(8)
1901
–03
Rus
sia
Japa
n(M
anch
uria
)A
cqJa
pan
Man
chur
ian
Eva
cuat
ion
(9)
1902
UK
, Ger
man
yU
.S.
Ven
ezue
laA
cqU
K, G
erm
any
Ven
ezue
lan
Cri
sis
(10)
1904
–5R
ussi
aJa
pan
Kor
ea, (
Man
chur
ia)
War
Rus
so-J
apan
ese
War
(11)
1905
–6G
erm
any
Fra
nce
Mor
occo
Acq
Ger
man
yF
irst
Mor
occa
n (T
angi
er)
Cri
sis
(12)
1908
A-H
, Ger
man
yR
ussi
aSe
rbia
Acq
Rus
sia
Ann
exat
ion
of B
osni
a an
d H
erze
govi
na(1
3)19
11G
erm
any
Fra
nce
Mor
occo
Acq
Ger
man
ySe
cond
Mor
occa
n (A
gadi
r) C
risi
s(1
4)19
12A
-H, G
erm
any
Rus
sia
Serb
iaA
cqR
ussi
aF
irst
Bal
kan
War
(15a
)19
14–1
7A
-H, G
erm
any
Rus
sia
Serb
iaW
arW
orld
War
I(1
5b)
1914
–18
Ger
man
yU
K, F
ranc
eB
elgi
um, F
ranc
eW
arW
orld
War
I(1
6)19
20–2
3U
SSR
UK
Iran
, Afg
hani
stan
Com
prom
ise
Ang
lo-R
ussi
an F
rict
ions
in
Cen
tral
Asi
a(1
7)19
32Ja
pan
UK
, U.S
.C
hina
Acq
Japa
nSh
angh
ai I
ncid
ent
(18)
1935
–36
Ital
yU
KE
thio
pia
Acq
UK
Ital
o-E
thio
pian
(A
byss
inia
n) W
ar(1
9)19
35–3
6Ja
pan
USS
R(O
uter
Mon
golia
)A
cqJa
pan
Out
er M
ongo
lian
Fro
ntie
r D
ispu
te(2
0)19
37U
SSR
Japa
n(M
anch
uria
)A
cqU
SSR
Am
ur R
iver
Inc
iden
t(2
1)19
38U
SSR
Japa
n(M
anch
uria
)A
cqJa
pan
Cha
ngku
feng
(22)
1938
Ital
yF
ranc
e(T
unis
ia)
Acq
Ital
yIt
alia
n C
olon
ial C
laim
s(2
3)19
38G
erm
any
UK
, Fra
nce
Cze
chos
lova
kia
Acq
UK
, Fra
nce
Sude
tenl
and
Pro
blem
and
Mun
ich
Cri
sis
(24)
1939
Ital
yU
K, F
ranc
eG
reec
eA
cqIt
aly
Ital
y’s
Inva
sion
of
Alb
ania
(25)
1939
Japa
nU
SSR
Mon
golia
War
Nom
onha
n In
cide
nt(2
6)19
39–4
5G
erm
any
UK
, Fra
nce
Pol
and
War
Wor
ld W
ar I
I(2
7)19
45U
SSR
U.S
., U
KIr
anA
cqU
SSR
Aze
rbai
jan
Issu
e(2
8)19
45–4
6F
ranc
eU
KSy
ria
Acq
Fra
nce
Lev
ant
(29)
1946
USS
RU
.S.
Tur
key
Acq
USS
RT
urki
sh S
trai
ts(3
0)19
48–4
9U
SSR
U.S
., U
K, F
ra.
Wes
t G
erm
any
Acq
USS
RB
erlin
Blo
ckad
e(3
1)19
50C
hina
U.S
.T
aiw
anA
cqC
hina
Tai
wan
Str
ait
(32)
1950
–53
U.S
.C
hina
Nor
th K
orea
War
Kor
ean
War
(33)
1954
–55
Chi
naU
.S.
Tai
wan
Acq
Chi
naC
hine
se O
ffsh
ore
Isla
nds
(34a
)19
56U
K, F
ranc
eU
SSR
Egy
ptA
cqU
K, F
ranc
eSu
ez C
anal
(34b
)19
56U
SSR
U.S
.F
ranc
e, U
KA
cqU
SSR
Suez
Can
al (
Sovi
et r
etal
iato
ry
thre
at)
(35a
)19
57U
.S.
USS
RSy
ria
Acq
U.S
.T
urki
sh-S
yria
n F
ront
ier
Dis
pute
(35b
)19
57U
SSR
U.S
.T
urke
yA
cqU
SSR
Tur
kish
-Syr
ian
Fro
ntie
r D
ispu
te(3
6)19
58C
hina
U.S
.T
aiw
anA
cqC
hina
Que
moy
-Mat
su(3
7)19
58–5
9U
SSR
U.S
.W
est
Ger
man
yA
cqU
SSR
Ber
lin D
eadl
ine
(38)
1961
USS
RU
.S.,
UK
, Fra
.W
est
Ger
man
yC
ompr
omis
eB
erlin
Wal
l(3
9)19
62U
SSR
U.S
.C
uba
Acq
USS
RC
uban
Mis
sile
Cri
sis
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Sing
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2).
68 When the Stakes Are High
testing the role of the explanatory factors (see chap. 1) in accountingfor variations in deterrence outcomes. In cases of immediate deter-rence, where at least one major power acted as the Defender of its Pro-tégé (extended-immediate deterrence), the test will use deterrencedyads as the unit of analysis. Some of the cases had more than oneChallenger, Defender, or Protégé, which results in a total of 70 cases ofEID dyads as the unit of analysis of this empirical test. In next part ofthe book, each chapter examines the individual effect of a speci‹cexplanatory factor on deterrence outcomes. This includes the key vari-ables of relative capabilities (chap. 4) and inherent credibility, the lat-ter being examined in terms of the interests at stake, either external(chap. 5) or internal (chap. 6). Chapter 7 tests their joint interactiveeffect and, most important, compares the explanatory power of twobasic models of deterrence—inherent credibility and interdependentcommitments—as outlined in the introduction.
TABLE 3.3. The Cases of Direct-Immediate Deterrence between Major Powers,1895–1985
No. Year Challenger Defender Outcome Crisis Name
(1) 1936 Germany France AcqFrance Remilitarization of Rhineland(2) 1941 Germany USSR War World War II (Barbarossa)(3) 1941 Japan U.S. War World War II (Pearl Harbor)(4) 1969 China USSR Compromise Sino-Soviet Border Dispute
(Ussuri River)