-
1
DHS Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment and Desktop Tool
Bethesda, MD - April 29, 2014
George R. Famini Jessica A. Cox Rachel E. Gooding U.S.A
Department of Homeland Security Chemical Security Analysis Center
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003 2
Chemical Security Analysis Center CSAC provides analysis and
scientific assessment of the chemical threat against the American
homeland and American public.
• Integration and Analysis of Chemical Threat Information and
Data
§ Reachback Capability to Provide Expert Analysis Support
§ Fusion of Information from Different Communities
§ Chemical Hazard Awareness, Assessment and Analysis
§ Science-Based Risk Assessment
Basic Science
Chemical Industry
Intelligence Community
Operational Requirements
CSAC
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
DHS Risk Assessments
3
• Are end-to-end assessments focused on a broad range of risks
incorporating hazards, emerging technologies, available
countermeasures and IC/LE input to evaluate the acute risk to human
health due to a chemical biological, radiological or nuclear attack
on the U.S. Homeland.
• Mandated by HSPD-18, Medical Countermeasures against Weapons
of Mass Destructions, and HSPD-22, Domestic Chemical Defense.
• Provides 3 primary outputs needed to examine risk mitigation
strategies
• Critical Vulnerabilities • Critical Data/Knowledge Gaps •
Relative Risk Ranking of compounds, targets,
classes of compounds, scenario, etc.
• Targeted studies put useable information inot the hands of
the end users
• Scenario driven strategies • Local/Regional Risk • Many
Others
-
2
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
Critical Components of the CTRA
4
Each section represents a significant data collection/generation
effort. Input data obtained through interagency coordination.
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
2012 CTRA Compound List
5
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
2012 CTRA Toxidromes
6
A particular toxidrome can be identified with clinical
observations including vital signs, mental status, mucous membrane
irritation, lung exam for wheezing or rales, skin for burns,
moisture, and color. For CSAC purposes, the toxidromes include:
Toxidrome Chemical Examples Upper Pulmonary Allyl alcohol,
Hydrogen fluoride, Nitric oxide Lower Pulmonary Benzene thiol,
Chlorine, Phosgene Vesicant Lewisite, Nitrogen mustard, Sulfur
Mustard Blood Acrylonitrile, Methanethiol, Cyanides
Hemolytic/Metabolic Arsine, Carbon disulfide Anticoagulant
Brodificoum, Bromodialone, Diphacinone Convulsants Picrotoxin,
Strychnine, TETS Cholinergic CWA Cyclosarin, Soman, VX Cholinergic
Other Aldicarb, Disulfoton, Parathion, Phorate Opioid Carfentanil,
Diacetylmorphine
-
3
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
2012 CTRA Target Classes & Targets
7
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
CTRA Event Tree
8
Event 3
Event N
Event 1
Event 2
Scen
ario
1
Scen
ario
2
Scen
ario
N
• CTRA scenarios are defined by an event tree • Provides a
framework for generating a more
than a billion representative attack scenarios from a
distribution of relative frequencies for each branch, and it
considers interdependencies among events
• Each branch encounters the next decision point (event level),
and one of several subsequent courses of action (branches)
• The complete event tree contains multiple events, each having
branches that represent different choices or outcomes
• A path through the event tree is a CTRA scenario. The
likelihood of the various branches at each level are sampled from
distributions.
• The probabilities of each branch along a path through the
tree are multiplied to get the scenario probability
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
2012 CTRA Modeling Overview
9
Dermal
Fail
Exposed
Candidates for Treatment
Appropriate End-State
Symptomatic
Expo
sure
Sym
ptom
Ons
et
Dead
Alive, Saved
Alive, Not Benefited
Alive, Benefited
Worried Well
Multipliers
Succeed
Available Countermeasures
Primary Altern. #1 Altern. #2
Countermeasure Deployment
Gen
eral
Pop
ulat
ion
Col
loca
te w
/ Med
ical
Per
sonn
el
Access to Medical Care
Exam
or D
econ
tam
inat
ion
Exposed Seeking Care
Next Tier
Adm
inis
ter T
reat
men
t
Worry Time
Death
Severe
Worried Well
Life-threat.
Severe
Mild/Mod.
Life-threat.
Severe
Mild/Mod.
Life-threat.
Severe
Mild/Mod.
Life-threat.
Worried Well
Mild/Mod.
Worried Well
Exit / Restriction
Appropriate End-State
Local Regional National
Countermeasure Stockpiles
Medical Mitigation
SurroundingPopulation
Exposure Footprint
HPAC Batching
Look-‐Up TablesLocation
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
0.00.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
0.00.5
1.01.5
2.02.5
Z
X
Y
Meteorology
Scenario-‐Specific Source Term
HPAC Input
GISBased
HPACBased
GISBased
HPACBased
Illness or Injury
Consumption Consumer Storage
Retail Storage
Storage at the Processing Plant and Distribution
PackagingProcessing
Storage,Separation, Ingredients,
Homogenization, Pasteurization
Farm Tank
Consumer Preparation
Output Storage
Recall and Consumer
Announcements
Tanker Truck
Food Indoor
Water
Outdoor
-
4
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
Inhalation Modeling- Outdoor
10
SurroundingPopulation
Exposure Footprint
HPAC Batching
Look-‐Up TablesLocation
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
0.00.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
0.00.5
1.01.5
2.02.5
Z
X
Y
Meteorology
Scenario-‐Specific Source Term
HPAC Input
GISBased
HPACBased
GISBased
HPACBased
HPAC dispersion, overlaid on a GIS-based population model at GIS
land tag informed locations
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
Synthesis of Multiple Data Sets
11
Time resolved contour overlays
A B C D E F G
0 FREQUENCY
0.8 LOW
2.3 MED
4.1 HIGH
6.7
9.6
12
Wind Spee
d (m
/s)
Stability Class
Provides a comprehensive synthesis and application of location,
meteorology and population density for use in risk analysis.
HSIP Gold ISHD from NCDC
• HSIP Gold – Homeland Security Information Program
• CHIRP – Chemical Hazard information retrieval portal
• ISHD – Integrated Surface Hourly Data • NCDC – National
Climatic Data Center
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
Indoor Inhalation Modeling
12
o Well-mixed zonal model (CONTAM equivalent) integrated with
moving population
o Models a release zone, near zone, and far zone; and either
recirculated air between the zones or within a single zone. There
is a separate model developed for subways.
o Each building type has area and population boundaries. For
example, The Pentagon, Sears Tower, Empire State Building, Chrysler
Building, and Transamerica Building
o Awareness in the Inhalation Models begins after a weighted
number of symptomatic victims is generated by the model.
• Based on chemical concentration, toxicity, and exposure
duration • Considers scenario timing, evacuation time is target
dependent • Model output is the number of injured victims and
their exposure terms
-
5
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
Three Zone Model
13
• Numerical solution • Assumes building is not well-
mixed – 3 well-mixed zones:
• Release zone • Near zone • Far zone
• There are two versions of the three zone model –
Recirculated air between
zones – Recirculated air within a
single zone • Separate model developed for
subways • Comparison for high fidelity 100 zone model was very
favorable
1
2
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
Ingestion Modeling- Food
14
Illness or Injury
Consumption Consumer Storage
Retail Storage
Storage at the Processing Plant and Distribution
PackagingProcessing
Storage,Separation, Ingredients,
Homogenization, Pasteurization
Farm Tank
Consumer Preparation
Output Storage
Recall and Consumer
Announcements
Tanker Truck
Stock-and-Flow model incorporating
• food processing and distribution • chemical stability;
• recalls and timing
Expanded food clusters representing thousands of foods
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
Representative Food Clusters
15
• The National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD)
and the CSAC Decision Analysis Team (DAT) performed a cluster
analysis using a binary scoring system of food and food process
characteristics to identify a set of clusters representative of the
food supply chain
• An exemplar food and contamination point(s) from each cluster
were then selected by SMEs from the food industry and academia as a
representative scenario for that portion of the food industry
Multi-component assembled foods, thermally processed in the
home
Multi-component assembled foods, not thermally processed in the
home
Packaged, processed, cold chain RTE Ready-to-eat, primary
component foods
Assembled companion dishes Main dishes, single component
foods
Beverages Produce Home ingredients Industrial ingredients
-
6
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
Food Recall Model Components
16
Investigation
Information Diffusion
Compliance
Investigation initiated due to a cluster of Illnesses
Recall issued for a specific product
Recall Timeline
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
Ingestion Modeling- Water
17
• Notional Water distribution network model built based on
characteristics from 3 city specific distribution networks
• Compares favorably against EPAnet results from 2 different
cities
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
Dermal Modeling
18
Custom-built model, validated against PTA/MTA scenarios
Incorporates: Hand size Transfer efficiency Absorption
-
7
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
Medical Mitigation Modeling
19
Stock and Flow modeling simulates the progression and time
sensitive nature of the response
• Predicts number of mild to moderate, severe, and life
threatening injuries. • Victims can be exposed at different times
• Accounts for treatment rate limits and burden of worried well
and minor injuries • Different victims can progress at different
rates • First victims initiate response that may save later
victims • Tiered and alternative treatments • Allows for
situational awareness • The size of the attack can trigger release
of additional resources and victim prioritization • Example model
parameters include:
• time to treatment identification • efficacy of treatment •
countermeasure dosage • countermeasure quantities • time for
countermeasures to arrive
• time for symptom onset • co-location time • time to die •
time for symptom mitigation • decontamination time
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
Medical Mitigation Modeling
20
Fail
Exposed
Candidates for Treatment
Symptomatic
Expo
sure
Sym
ptom
Ons
et
Dead
Alive, Saved
Alive, Not Benefited
Alive, Benefited Worried
Well Multipliers
Succeed
Available Countermeasures
Primary Altern. #1
Altern.
#2
Countermeasure Deployment
Gen
eral
Pop
ulat
ion
Col
loca
te w
/ Med
ical
Per
sonn
el
Access to Medical Care
Exam
or D
econ
tam
inat
ion
Next Tier
Adm
inis
ter T
reat
men
t
Worry Time
Severe
Worried Well
Life- threat.
Severe
Mild/ Moderate
Life- threat.
Severe
Mild/ Moderate
Life- threat.
Severe
Mild/ Moderate
Life- threat.
Worried Well
Mild/ Moderate
Worried Well
Local Regional National Countermeasure Stockpiles
Outcome Exposed Symptomatic Treatment Attack
End State
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
• The medical response is parameterized • The response is
divided into a series of discrete events; each
discrete event corresponds to a quantifiable model parameter •
Medical toxicology and emergency medicine SME’s were
enlisted to quantify model parameters and inform model
methodology
• The SME’s were tasked to review and improve data-based values
and estimate/extrapolate from literature as necessary
• Medical response is based on Toxidrome (10 toxidromes) • A
single simulation of the response to a chemical attack can
involve
over 100 parameter values • Example model parameters:
Modeling Approach
21
• time to treatment identification • efficacy of treatment •
countermeasure dosage • countermeasure quantities • time for
countermeasures to arrive
• time for symptom onset • co-location time • time to die •
time for symptom mitigation • decontamination time
-
8
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
§ A combination of models and data drive the CTRA § The best
data are mined from existing sources and through
extensive interaction with SME’s § Models are continually
reviewed and refined, if necessary, to
provide the best possible estimates within the constraints of
the project § Industry standard models are used to validate
against § Stakeholder input and feedback are valued and used as
drivers
for improvement § Comparison with existing assessments, such as
PTA/MTA’s
are performed for benchmarking
CTRA Modeling Summary
22
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
CTRA Desktop Tool
23
- Driven by Stakeholder needs CSAC has developed a desktop tool
to produce quicker response time, create a parameter screening tool
and allow focused follow-up risk studies
- Existing consequence models and data from 2012 CTRA are
incorporated into an easy to use platform
- Real time calculations can be performed outside the parameter
space considered in CTRA enhancing flexibility and allowing very
specific questions to be answered.
- Millisecond run time per simulation
Examples: • What is the impact of
evacuation time in the DC subway during a CK release?
• What is impact if a subset of navigable waterway routes are
used for a particular chemical?
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
CTRA Desktop Tool
24
Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment
Transform into a flexible and fast consequence analysis tool
Standard Laptop Enhanced Capability
• Intuitive • “Explore the Edges” • Beta version ready for
transition to customers
Requested by CSAC’s customers and stakeholders
-
9
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
Permits Detailed Analysis
25
Different Locations • Indoor • Outdoor • Food • Dermal •
Water
Various Mitigation Strategies • Detectors • Enhanced
Evacuation • Shelter in Place • Modifications to HVAC • Medical
CMs • Collective Protection • Individual Protection
And Explore the Effects of:
• Explores the impact of various chemical, device, detection or
response parameters
• Tests the impact of various modeling assumptions and data
estimates
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
Arena Example
26
Attack Scenario Mass [kg]
Exposed Population (gray)
Life Threatening injuries (red) Severe Injuries (blue) P
eopl
e
10,000 Simulations showing the range of life threatening
injuries Mean life threatening injuries: 313±522
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
Arena Example- Countermeasures Consumed
27
Num
ber o
f CM
Life Threatening Injuries
Atropine
Ventilators
-
10
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
How Can the Results Be Used?
28
• Public health and fatality risk may be obtained by chemical,
by target, by toxidrome, or any modeled result and depicted in a
variety of ways (whisker plot, probability vs. consequence, scatter
plot, pie, bar) to help aid policymakers and develop
strategies.
• Detailed analysis helps to understand the risk. • Is it
driven by consequences or frequency? Weighted Average Consequences
per
Attack (WACPA) or Frequency of Successful Attack (FOSA) for
table top exercises
• CSC scenarios can be segregated by commodity, availability or
chemical class to aid in planning and preparedness
• Input parameters/assumptions can be tested. Observations of
results can drive research, operations and planning
• Sensitivity of risk can be analyzed and weighted: o
Detection o Security or mitigation o Medical response
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
CSC- Mean Risk by Target
29
- Identify key risk drivers by target/chemical combination to
help refine strategies
Target 1
Target 2
Target 3
Target 4
Target 5
Target 6
Mean Public Health Risk by Target Mean Fatality Risk by
Target
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
Notional Results
30
• Understanding of risk drivers-consequence or frequency
• Appreciation of uncertainty and expected range
Narrow uncertainty in consequences, significant uncertainty in
frequency
-
11
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
Notional Results
31
Understanding of main contributors to overall risk will guide
strategy in buying down risk Inventory control is very different
than securing facility assets
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
Notional Results
32
Chemical
Rel
ativ
e R
isk
Basic Security and Mitigation Advanced Security and
Mitigation
Chemical
Rel
ativ
e R
isk
§ Sensitivity studies § Impact of security and mitigation
posture § Estimate of the impact of CFATS–like regulation
comparing the risk of
facilities from pre- and post-9/11 environments
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
§ It is the first end-to-end probabilistic risk assessment that
is all inclusive and provides a detailed look at the entire
chemical risk space including threat, vulnerability and
consequences.
§ The risk assessment provides: § Relative risk ranking of
chemicals, targets, toxidromes, etc
§ Provides focus and allows resources to be prioritized based
on quantitative risk
§ Parsing of the main contributor to risk by chemical, targets,
toxidromes, etc. § Provides the ability to determine
data/knowledge gaps as well as
sensitivities in which risk may be able to be reduced §
Prediction of impact of a vast array of scenarios
§ Provides the ability to vary pre-event measures (e.g.
security posture, forward placement and stockpiling of medical
countermeasures) and post-event responses (mitigation, medical
response) to determine impact
§ Allows pre-operational decisions to be made based on
risk.
What is the Value of the CTRA?
33
-
12
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
• CTRA – Three iterations completed; 2008, 2010 and 2012 –
2012 completed in February 2012 – Assesses 125 representative
chemicals, 37
representative targets – Major upgrade to food, water & med
mit methodologies
• Desktop Calculator – Specifically requested by stakeholders
– Currently focused on consequences, but incorporation
of risk is planned – Has been used to address 35 specific
questions
regarding chemical attacks
• Tailored Assessments – Detailed analysis of “what if”
scenarios – 35 tailored assessments have been completed and 5
more are underway or are planned – Meet stakeholder requests
& assist them to fulfill their
mission requirements, provide operational guidance & make
risk informed decisions.
CTRA Accomplishments
34
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
§ Valuable tools for assessing Public Health risk from a
terrorist attack
§ Three primary outputs 1. Critical Vulnerabilities 2.
Critical Data Gaps 3. Intelligence informed relative risk-based
ranking and
consequences of compounds, targets and scenarios for a wide
range of chemical threats
§ Numerous secondary outputs (Tailored Assessments/Sensitivity
Studies)
Together these products allow decision makers and risk managers
to inform policy and examine risk mitigation strategies from
terrorism risk and impact
What the CTRA Provides
35
Presenter’s Name June 17, 2003
Access to CSAC Information
36
Jessica Cox [email protected]
202-658-8221
Rachel Gooding [email protected]
410-436-0018
Lars Skinner [email protected]
410-436-5969
Reachback (24/7/365) • [email protected] •
410-417-0910
HSDN Website • http://www.dhs.sgov.gov/csac • All published
reports/presentations
for download
Unclassified Webpage under construction
HSIN & HSLIC Webpage • FOUO documents only
• Bulletins/reports shared with state
and local authorities
-
13
