DIGESTEDANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR) [69 PHIL 635; G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB 1940]

Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.

Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof;(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;(3) The decision must have something to support itself;(4) The evidence must be substantial;(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that Toribios act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Workers Brotherhood. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR.ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are;(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

DIGESTASPREC V ITCHON15 SCRA 921, SANCHEZ, April 30, 1966NATURE Petition for review

FACTS-Private respondent Jacinto Hernandez (Hernandez) filed an administrative complaint against Cleto Asprec for unprofessional conduct with the Respondent Board of Examiners for Surveyors. Allegedly, Hernandez and Asprec entered into an agreement wherein Asprec would survey Hernandez lot in Camarines Sur and would deliver to the latter a plan approved by the Director of Lands w/n 3 months after completion of the survey, and procure the issuance of a CTC to the lot w/n 6 months after the plans approval. However, even if Hernandez paid the agreed amount, Asprec did not deliver the plan, and the alleged plan duly delivered and approved was for one Damian Alhambra, and the plan submitted was merely a certified copy of the plan. It should also be noted that during the proceedings in the Board of Examiners, Asprec/his counsel had many times been absent, late, sickwhich caused the delay of the proceedings.-Respondent Board: For Hernandez: (1) no actual survey of the land made; (2) money was paid; Asprec was guilty of deceit and thus violated the Code of Ethics for surveyors, his certificate of registration as private land surveyor REVOKED and required to be surrendered.-Asprec filed petition with the CFI of Camarines Sur for certiorari to annul the orders revoking his surveyors certificate of registration; mandamus to compel the Board to conduct a formal hearing of the complaint against him; and prohibition, to stop execution of the orders to surrender said certificate. The preliminary injunction prayed for was rejected below-CFI: dismiss with costs

ISSUES1. WON Asprec was denied due process in not being able to participate in the hearing2. WON the proceedings before the Board, being quasi-criminal in nature, was valid granted Asprec absented himself from it3. WON the decision of the Board rendered upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings valid(other issues were more on Civpro than Admin so not included)

HELD1. NORatio. Presence of a party at a trial is not always the essence of due process. Really all that the law requires to satisfy adherence to this Constitutional precept is that the parties be given notice of the trial, an opportunity to be heard.Reasoning. Petitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend himself before the Board. As he and counsel did not appear at the last and stipulated date of hearing, he cannot look to the law or to a judicial tribunal to whipsaw the Board into giving him a new one. He cannot raise his voice in protest against the act of the Board in proceeding in his and his counsel's absence. And this because without cause or reason, without any excuse at all, counsel and client have chosen to shy away from the trial. 2. YESRatio. Where the respondent in a petition for contempt failed to appear on the date set for the hearing, of which he was previously notified, it was held that he was not deprived of his day in court when the judge ordered him arrested unless he pay the support he was adjudged to give, he having been given an opportunity to be heard. Similarly, the defendant's failure to appear with the counsel of his choice at the trial, notwithstanding repeated postponements and the warning that failure to so appear would be deemed a waiver of the right to present evidence in his defense and the case will be submitted for decision on the evidence submitted by the prosecution, was a sufficient justification for the court to proceed and render judgment upon evidence before it. 3. YESRatio. A rule so long respected, because it is buttressed upon reason and authority, is that technical rules of court practice, procedure and evidence are not to be applied with rigidity in administrative proceedings. We should have in mind the nature of administrative bodies, the character of the duties they are required to perform, the purposes for which they are organized, the persons who compose them. Here, we are concerned with members of a board of surveyors technical men but not necessarily trained law men. In this posture, it is quite reasonable to assume that their proceedings may not be conducted with that degree of exactness or with such scrupulous observance of the complex technical rules expected in a legal battle before a court of justice. Their acts should not be measured by the same yardstick exacted of a judge in a court of law. So much leeway is given an investigating administrative body. Reasoning. The plan allegedly made by Asprec was not the plan of an original survey but a mere copy from another plan. Both the plans were submitted to the Board. So it is, that when counsel for Hernandez manifested that all the evidence against petitioner was submitted to the Board and that for that reason he was resting his case, he evidently had in mind the admissions in the pleadings and the plans and decisions and report here noted. And, the motion for judgment on the pleadings was a mere follow-up of the manifestation just adverted to. As the trial court well observed, counsel for respondent Hernandez did not present a motion for judgment on the pleadings in the strict sense of the word, but "a motion which for lack of another expression, he called a motion for judgment on the pleadings." Lack of observance of this technicality which does not quarrel with a fair concept of justice should be overlooked. Disposition. Upon the view we take of this case, the decision is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

FULL CASE Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT ManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-21685 April 30, 1966CLETO ASPREC, petitioner-appellant, vs.VICTORIANO ITCHON, JOSE SUGUITAN, FELIPE P. CRUZ, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NICANOR G. JORGE, ANTONIO NOBLEJAS,1 and JACINTO HERNANDEZ, respondents-appellees.Tabora and Concon for petitioner-appellant.Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General A. G. Ibarra and Solicitor C. P. Padua for respondents-appellees.SANCHEZ, J.:The case on hand had its incipiency in an administrative complaint2 for unprofessional conduct lodged with the Board of Examiners for Surveyors3 by respondent Jacinto Hernandez against petitioner Cleto Asprec. There, Hernandez charged that petitioner undertook to survey Hernandez' lot in Port Junction, Ragay, Camarines Sur; deliver to him a plan approved by the Director of Lands within three months after completion of the survey, and procure the issuance of a certificate of title to the lot thus surveyed within six months after the plan's approval; and that he (Hernandez) paid the consideration agreed upon but that petitioner did not deliver the agreed plan, the lapse of four years notwithstanding. Petitioner Asprec averred compliance by allegedly executing and delivering plan Psu-148774 (Ap-2419) duly approved. But Hernandez' reply asserted that Psu-148774 is the plan of a survey made by Asprec for one Damian Alhambra; that plan Ap-2419 is merely a certified copy of sheet 2 of said plan Psu-148774; and that petitioner's contractual obligation was to deliver to him the plan of an original survey not a mere copy. The Board found for Hernandez and declared; that no actual survey of Hernandez' land was made; but that money was paid on his belief that Asprec really surveyed the land for him; that Asprec was guilty of deceit and thus violated the Code of Ethics for surveyors. The Board's unanimous decision of October 27, 1959 revoked, and required surrender of, Asprec's certificate of registration as a private land surveyor. On December 1, 1959, the Assistant Executive Secretary, by authority of the President of the Philippines, approved the Board's decision. On February 12, 1960, the Board's chairman demanded surrender of said certificate in five days. Petitioner's motion to reconsider of March 16, 1960 was denied by the Office of the President on October 31, 1960. Meanwhile, on March 22, 1960, respondent Jorge directed all offices under the Bureau of Lands to return to petitioner Asprec unacted all surveys executed or corrected by the latter on or after October 27, 1959.Petitioner, charging grave abuse of discretion, came to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur on certiorari to annul the orders revoking his surveyor's certificate of registration; mandamus to compel the Board to conduct a formal hearing of the complaint against him; and prohibition, to stop execution of the orders to surrender said certificate. The preliminary injunction prayed for was rejected below.Upon a stipulations of facts, the Camarines Sur court rendered judgment on August 14, 1962, dismissing the petition, with costs. We are now asked to review said decision.We will now discuss seriatim the questions raised.1. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that he was denied his day in court.4 Resolution of this problem necessitates a considerate examination of the following that transpired before the Board: (a) Hearing of March 31, 1958: Petitioner raised the legal point that the complaint was not under oath. The Board directed Hernandez to submit a verified complaint. Hearing was postponed to May 12, 1958.(b) Hearing of May 12, 1958: Upon the averment that the verified complaint sets forth "new facts", petitioner asked for a 10-day period to answer. On June 6, instead of an answer, petitioner's counsel filed a motion to dismiss.(c) Hearing of August 18, 1958. Petitioner prayed that hearing be held in abeyance until the board shall have resolved his motion to dismiss. The hearing was reset for March 11, 1959.(d) Hearing of March 11, 1959: This did not pull through although both parties and their respective attorneys were present, because Asprec's counsel was not feeling well. They all agreed to transfer the hearing to May 11, 1959.(e) Hearing of May 11, 1959: Hernandez and counsel appeared. But petitioner and counsel were absent. The Board was not apprised by petitioner of the cause of his or his counsel's failure to appear. At this juncture, counsel for Hernandez manifested to the Board that "since all evidence available against the respondent has already been submitted he would now rest his case." He then filed with the Board a motion for judgment on the pleadings.5If the foregoing have any meaning at all, they funnel down to one concrete fact: petitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend himself before the Board. As he and counsel did not appear at the last and stipulated date of bearing, he cannot look to the law or to a judicial tribunal to whipsaw the Board into giving him a new one. He cannot raise his voice in protest against the act of the Board in proceeding in his and his counsel's absence. And this because without cause or reason, without any excuse at all, counsel and client have chosen to shy away from the trial. Presence of a party at a trial, petitioner concedes, is not always of the essence of due process. Really, all that the law requires to satisfy adherence to this constitutional precept is that the parties be given notice of the trial, an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner had notice of the trial of May 11th. More than this, that date of trial (May 11) had been previously agreed upon by the parties and their counsel. Petitioner cannot now charge that he received less-than-a-fair-treatment. He has forfeited his right to be heard in his defense.6On top of all, petitioner did not as much as bother to inquire as to what happened on May 11. He bestirred himself only on April 16 the following year. Surely enough, this patent in attention better termed gross negligence will not carry the day for him. Indeed, no reason exists why the other party should be hard put to realize that he will have to undergo further expense and trouble. After all, due process is merely "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play."72. But petitioner insists that the proceeding before the Board are quasi-criminal in nature. From this he proceeds to draw the conclusion that no valid trial could proceed even if he absented himself therefrom. We do not see eye to eye with this view. It is best answered by a reference to the opinion of the court below, thus:The rule applies even to quasi-criminal or criminal proceedings. So, where the respondent in a petition for contempt failed to appear on the date set for the hearing, of which he was previously notified, it was held that he was not deprived of his day in court when the judge ordered him arrested unless he pay the support he was adjudged to give, he having been given an opportunity to be heard. Embate vs. Penolio, G.R. No. L-4942.8 Similarly, the defendant's failure to appear with the counsel of his choice at the trial, notwithstanding repeated postponements and the warning that failure to appear would be deemed a waiver of the right to present evidence in his defense and the case will be submitted for decision on the evidence submitted by the prosecution, was a sufficient justification for the court to proceed and render judgment upon the evidence before it. People vs. Angco, 54 Off. Gaz. 5703.3. Appellant decries the fact that the Board's decision was rendered upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings presented on the date of trial, May 11, 1959. He claims that there was no basis for such decision.A rule so long respected, because it is buttressed upon reason and authority, is that technical rules of court practice, procedure and evidence are not to be applied with rigidity in administrative proceedings. We should have in mind the nature of administrative bodies, the character of the duties they are required to perform, the purposes for which they are organized and the persons who compose them. Here, we are concerned with members of a board of surveyors technical men but not necessarily trained law men. In this posture, it is quite reasonable to assume that their proceedings may not be conducted with that degree of exactness or with such scrupulous observance of the complex technical rules expected in a legal battle before a court of justice. Their acts should not be measured by the same yardstick exacted of a judge of a court of law. So much leeway is given an investigating administrative body.9With the foregoing legal tenet as guide, let us now examine the facts of this case. There was indeed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. But not without reason. Petitioner admits that he executed the plan, sent it to complainant. But this plan (Ap-2419) is not the plan of an original survey. Because it was merely copied from another plan. Petitioner received compensation 10 on the basis of a plan drawn from a survey, not from a copy. Besides, the plans the original and copied plans were before the Board. So it is, that when counsel for Hernandez manifested at the hearing of May 11, 1959 that all the evidence against petitioner was submitted to the Board and that for that reason he was resting his case, he evidently had in mind the admissions in the pleadings and the plans and decision and report here noted. And, the motion for judgment on the pleadings was a mere follow-up of the manifestation just adverted to. As the trial court well observed, counsel for respondent Hernandez did not present a motion for judgment on the pleadings in the strict sense of the word, 11 but "a motion which for lack of another expression, he called a motion for judgment on the pleadings." Lack of observance of this technicality which does not quarrel with a fair concept of justice should be overlooked. 12 There was evidence before the Board and the Board had acted thereon. The Board's decision was propped up by facts.1wph1.t4. A review of the record fails to elicit any representation on the part of petitioner that if the Board's decision and the decision of the Court below be reversed, a different result may be obtained. He does not advance any fact or circumstance which would constitute a substantial defense. He does not even offer a new matter which would tilt the scales of justice in his favor. The net result is that if error of procedure there was, as he claims, such error is reduced to the level of non-prejudicial. It is because of all of these that we now say that a reversal of the judgment below or a new hearing before the Board would be but an empty ceremony. Courts do not demand or, for that matter, suggest the performance of the unnecessary. If only for this alone, there is no cause or reason why the machinery administrative or judicial should be allowed to grind anew. 135. Petitioner would want to make a point out of Surveyor's Administrative Order No. 1, dated November 26, 1934 (which implemented Act 3626 as amended by Act No. 3889), section 19 (g) of which provides that "Any surveyor who has been suspended three (3) times shall no longer be authorized to practice surveying in the Philippine Islands". Petitioner now asserts that the Board's decision revoking his license is an illegality. This argument overlooks the express statutory provision contained in Section 10 of Act 3626 as amended by Act 3889 aforesaid, as follows:The Board of Examiners may suspend or revoke the license or certificate as practising surveyor granted to any person in case the same has been convicted by any court of a crime involving moral turpitude, if he has been guilty of immoral and dishonest conduct, if he is mentally incapacitated, or for unprofessional conduct. The decision of the Board shall be rendered after an investigation in which the accused shall be heard, and said accused may appeal to the Department head, whose decision shall be final administratively.This law does not state that the surveyor's license may be revoked, only after the said surveyor has been suspended three times. The plain import of the law is that ample discretion is given the Board to suspend or revoke the license. The Board has elected to revoke. It acted within the law. For, a familiar rule is that in a clash between statute and administrative order issued in pursuance thereof, the former prevails.In the end, we say that the proceedings before the Board were not infused with such unfairness or tainted with so grave an abuse of authority as to call for the exercise by this Court of its corrective powers.Upon the view we take of this case, the decision is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner.Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.Footnotes1Respondent Itchon is Chairman and respondents Suguitan and Cruz members of the board of Examiners for Surveyors; Respondent Jorge, formerly Chief Surveyor is Directed of Lands; and respondent Noblejas, the Land Registration Commissioner.2Administrative Case No. 86, Jacinto E. Hernandez, complainant vs. Cleto Asprec, respondent, started December 6, 1956.3Hereinafter referred to as the Board.4Due process is applicable to administrative proceedings. Cornejo vs. Gabriel, 41 Phil. 188, 193, citing authorities; 12 Am. Jur. p. 285, citing cases.5Decision of the Board, Record, p. 106.6Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, 937; Republic vs. Gonzales, G.R. L-17962, April 30, 1965, citing Sandejas vs. Robles, 81 Phil. 421, and Siojo vs. Tecson, 88 Phil. 531; 12 Am. Jur. p. 308, citing Blackmer vs. U.S. 294 U.S. 421, 76 L. ed., 375. See also Collector of Customs vs. Arca, et al., G.R. No. L-21389, July 17, 1964.Surveyor's Administrative Order No. 1 (Section 16, paragraph "g") dated November 26, 1934 also provides that: "The respondent shall be given opportunity to defend himself to produce witnesses in his own behalf, or to be heard by himself or counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice not exceeding ten days the respondent fails to appear without cause satisfactory to the Board, the hearing shall proceed ex parte."7Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, pp. 32-33 cited in Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 4th ed., vol. I, p. 85. See also: Lisenba vs. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 86 L. ed., 166, 180; Galvan vs. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530, 98 L. ed. 911, 921.8Embate vs. Penolio, 93 Phil. 782, 784-785, where this Court said: "One contention of the appellant is that the order of the trial court of April 25, 1951 was issued without due process of law, for the reason that the respondent was not given an opportunity to be heard, and the order was issued without any lawful hearing. It is argued that the request of counsel for plaintiff that his motion be heard did not per se authorize the court to hear the case as prayed for. We find no merit in this argument. First, the appellant was given an opportunity to answer, and he did file one. Then the motion to declare him in contempt was set for hearing by the appellee, notice of the same being made in accordance with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. It is not necessary that the court itself order the motion to be set for hearing, as a prerequisite therefor, because the notice given by the party was sufficient. As the motion was heard after this notice, and strictly in compliance with the above provisions of the Rules of Court, it can not be said that the hearing was held without due process of law. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard."9Rule 143, Rules of Court; I Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 78-79; Sy Chuan, et al. vs. Galang, et al., G.R. L-9793, December 29, 1958.10This was taken by the Board from the decision of Judge Jose P. Narciso in Criminal Case No. 210 of the Justice of the Peace Court of Ragay, Camarines Sur (People vs. Cleto Asprec), which was presented to the Board by counsel for Hernandez, and from the report of Judge Perfecto R. Palacio of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in Adm. Case #41 (entitled Leovegildo Cerilla, complainant, vs. Judge Jose P. Narciso, respondent).11Section 10, Rule 35, Old Rules of Court (effective July 1, 1940).12Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court.13Section 5, Rule 51, Rules of Court; People vs. Francisco, 46 Phil. 403, 404.

FULL CASE Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-19850 January 30, 1964VIGAN ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs.THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner.Federico S. Arlos and P. H. del Pilar for respondent. CONCEPCION, J.:This is an original action for certiorari to annul an order of respondent Public Service Commission. Upon the filing of the petition and the submission and approval of the corresponding bond, we issued a writ of injunction restraining said respondent from enforcing the order complained of Republic Act No. 316, approved on June 19, 1948, granted petitioner Vigan Electric Light Company, Inc., a franchise to construct, maintain and operate an electric light, heat and/or power plant for the purpose of generating and distributing light, heat and/or power, for sale within the limits of several municipalities of the province of Ilocos Sur. Accordingly, petitioner secured from respondent on May 31, 1950, a certificate of public convenience to render electric light, heat and/or power services in said municipalities and to charge its customers and/or consumers the following rates:FLAT RATE1 20 watt bulb per month ............................................................ P2.30

1 25 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 3.00

1 40 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 4.50

1 50 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 5.50

1 60 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 6.50

1 75 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 7.50

1 80 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 8.00

1 100 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 9.00

1 150 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 13.00

1 200 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 17.00

METER RATEFor the first 15

For the first 15 Kw. hrs. ............................................................ P0.40

For the next 35 Kw. hrs. ............................................................ .30

For the next 50 Kw. hrs. ............................................................ .25

For all over 100 Kw. hrs. ............................................................ .20

Minimum Charge: P6.00 per month for connection of 200 watts or less; plus P0.01 per watt per month for connection in excess of 200 watts.

TEMPORARY RATEP0.01 per watt per night.On May 22, 1957, petitioner, acting with respondent's approval, entered into a contract for the purchase of electric power and energy from the National Power Corporation, for resale, in the course of the business of said petitioner, to its customers, to whom, in fact, petitioner resold said electric power and energy, in accordance with the above schedule of rates. About five (5) years later, or on January 16, 1962, respondent advised petitioner of a conference to be held on February 12, 1962 for the purpose of revising its authorized rates. Soon thereafter, petitioner received a letter of respondent informing the former of an alleged letter-petition of "Congressman Floro Crisologo and 107 alleged residents of Vigan Ilocos Sur", charging the following:We also denounce the sale of TWO THOUSAND (2,000) ELECTRIC METERS in blackmarket by the Vigan Electric Light Company to Avegon Co., as anomalous and illegal. Said electric meters were imported from Japan by the Vigan Electric Light Company in behalf of the consumers of electric current from said electric company. The Vigan Electric Light Company has commercialized these privilege which property belong to the people. We also report that the electric meters in Vigan used by the consumers had been installed in bad faith and they register excessive rates much more than the actual consumption.1wph1.tand directing the petitioner to comment on these charges. In reply to said communications, petitioner's counsel wrote to respondent, on February 1, 1962, a letter asking that the conference scheduled for February 12 be postponed to March 12, and another letter stating inter alia: In connection therewith, please be informed that my client, the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc., has not had any dealing with the Avegon Co., Inc., relative to the 2,000 electric meter mentioned in the petition. Attached hereto as Annex "1" and made an integral part thereof is a certification to that effect by Avegon Co., Inc.Furthermore, as counsel for Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc., I wish to inform this Honorable Commission that the charge that said company installed the electric meters in bad faith and that said meters registered excessive rates could have no valid basis because all of these meters have been inspected checked, tested and sealed by your office.On March 15, 1962, petitioner received a communication form the General Auditing Office notifying him that one Mr. Cesar A. Damole had "been instructed to make an audit and examination of the books and other records of account" of said petitioner, "under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 325 and in accordance with the request of the Public Service Commission contained in its letter dated March 12, 1962", and directing petitioner to cooperate with said Mr. Damole "for the successful accomplishment of his work". Subsequently, respondent issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring petitioner to produce before the former, during a conference scheduled for April 10, 1962, certain books of account and financial statements specified in said process. On the date last mentioned petitioner moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. The motion was not acted upon in said conference of April 10, 1962. However, it was then decided that the next conference be held on April 30, 1962, which was later postponed to May 21, 1962. When petitioner's representatives appeared before respondent, on the date last mentioned, they were advised by the latter that the scheduled conference had been cancelled, that the petition to quash the subpoena duces tecum had been granted, and that, on May 17, 1962, respondent had issued an order, from which we quote: We now have the audit report of the General Auditing Office dated May 4, 1962, covering the operation of the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. in Vigan, Bantay and Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, for the period from January 1 to December 31, 1961. We find from the report that the total invested capital of the utility as of December 31, 1961, entitled to return amounted to P118,132.55, and its net operating income for rate purposes of P53,692.34 represents 45.45% of its invested capital; that in order to earn 12% per annum, the utility should have a computed revenue by rates of P182,012.78; and that since it realized an actual revenue by rates of P221,529.17, it had an excess revenue by rates of P39,516.39, which is 17.84% of the actual revenue by rates and 33.45% of the invested capital. In other words, the present rates of the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. may be reduced by 17.84%, or in round figure, by 18%. Upon consideration of the foregoing, and finding that the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is making a net operating profit in excess of the allowable return of 12% on its invested capital, we believe that it is in the public interest and in consonance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 that reduction of its rates to the extent of its excess revenue be put into effect immediately. WHEREFORE, Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is hereby ordered to reduce the present meter rates for its electric service effective upon the billing for the month of June, 1962, to wit:METER RATE 24-HOUR SERVICE For the first 15 kwh per month at P0.328 per kwh For the next 35 kwh per month at P0.246 per kwh For the next 50 kwh per month at P0.205 per kwh For all over 100 kwh per month at P0.164 per kwh Minimum Charge: P4.90 per month for connection of 200 was or less plus P0.01 per watt per month for connection in excess of 200 watts.TEMPORARY LIGHTINGP0.01 per watt per night.Minimum Charge: P1.00Billings to customers shall be made to the nearest multiple of five centavos. The above rates may be revised, modified or altered at anytime for any just cause and/or in the public service.Soon later, or on June 25, 1962, petitioner herein instituted the present action for certiorari to annul said order of May 17, 1962, upon the ground that, since its Corporate inception in 1948, petitioner it "never was able to give and never made a single dividend declaration in favor of its stockholders" because its operation from 1949 to 1961 had resulted in an aggregate loss of P113,351.523; that in the conference above mentioned petitioner had called the attention of respondent to the fact that the latter had not furnished the former a "copy of the alleged letter-petition of Congressman Crisologo and others"; that respondent then expressed the view that there was no necessity of serving copy of said letter to petitioner, because respondent was merely holding informal conferences to ascertain whether petitioner would consent to the reduction of its rates; that petitioner objected to said reduction without a hearing, alleging that its rates could be reduced only if proven by evidence validly adduced to be excessive; that petitioner offered to introduce evidence to show the reasonableness of its aforementioned rates, and even the fairness of its increase; that petitioner was then assured that it would be furnished a copy of the aforementioned letter-petition and that a hearing would be held, if a reduction of its rates could not be agreed upon; that petitioner had not even been served a copy of the auditor's report upon which the order complained of is based; that such order had been issued without notice and hearing; and that, accordingly, petitioner had been denied due process. In its answer respondent admitted some allegations of the complaint and denied other allegations thereof, particularly the conclusions drawn by petitioner. Likewise, respondent alleged that it granted petitioner's motion to quash the aforementioned subpoena duces tecum because the documents therein referred to had already been audited and examined by the General Auditing Office, the report on which was on file with said respondent; that the latter had directed that petitioner be served a copy of said report; and that, although this has not, as yet, been actually done, petitioner could have seen and examined said report had it really wanted to do so. By way of special defenses, respondent, moreover, alleged that the disputed order had been issued under its delegated legislative authority, the exercise of which does not require previous notice and hearing; and that petitioner had not sought a reconsideration of said order, and had, accordingly, failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.In support of its first special defense respondent maintains that rate-fixing is a legislative function; that legislative or rule-making powers may constitutionally be exercised without previous notice of hearing; and that the decision in Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil., 635) in which we held that such notice and hearing are essential to the validity of a decision of the Public Service Commission is not in point because, unlike the order complained of which respondent claims to be legislative in nature the Ang Tibay case referred to a proceeding involving the exercise of judicial functions. At the outset, it should be noted, however, that, consistently with the principle of separation of powers, which underlies our constitutional system, legislative powers may not be delegated except to local governments, and only to matters purely of local concern (Rubi vs. Provincia Board, 39 Phil., 660; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S. 370). However, Congress may delegate to administrative agencies of the government the power to supply the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy laid down by a which is complete in itself (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 70 Phil., 221; People vs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil., 328; People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394; U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil., 1; Schechter vs. U.S., 295 U.S., 495 Mulford vs. Smith, 307 U.S., 38; Bowles vs. Willingham, 321 U.S., 503). Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without requiring another legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in the performance of its duty to implement or enforce said Policy (People vs. Lim Ho, L-12091, January 28, 1960; Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, L-8895, April 30, 1957; Cervantes vs. Auditor General, L-4043, May 26, 1952; Philippine Association of Colleges vs. Secretary of Education, 51 Off. Gaz., 6230; People vs. Arnault, 48 Off. Gaz., 4805; Antamok Gold Fields vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 68 Phil., 340; U.S. vs. Barrias, 11 Phil., 327; Yakus vs. White, 321 U.S., 414; Ammann vs. Mallonce, 332 U.S., 245; U.S. vs. Rock Royal Corp. 307 U.S., 533; Mutual Film Corp. vs. Industrial Commission, 276 U.S., 230). Otherwise, there would be no reasonable means to ascertain whether or not said body has acted within the scope of its authority, and, as a consequence, the power of legislation would eventually be exercised by a branch of the Government other than that in which it is lodged by the Constitution, in violation, not only of the allocation of powers therein made, but, also, of the principle of separation of powers. Hence, Congress his not delegated, and cannot delegate legislative powers to the Public Service Commission. Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing. Indeed, sections 16(c) and 20 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, explicitly require notice Indeed hearing. The pertinent parts thereof provide: SEC. 16. The Commission shall have the power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provision of this Act, subject to the limitations and exception mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:x x x x x x x x x(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, tolls charges, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the Commission may in its discretion approve rates proposed by public services provisionally and without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereof within thirty days thereafter, upon publication and notice to the concerns operating in the territory affected: Provided, further, That in case the public service equipment of an operator is use principally or secondarily for the promotion of a private business the net profits of said private business shall be considered in relation with the public service of such operator for the purpose of fixing the rates.SEC. 20. Acts requiring the approval of the Commission. Subject to established limitations and exception and saving provisions to the contrary, it shall be unlawful for any public service or for the owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the approval and authorization of the Commission previously had (a) To adopt, establish, fix, impose, maintain, collect or carry into effect any individual or joint rates, commutation mileage or other special rate, toll, fare, charge, classification or itinerary. The Commission shall approve only those that are just and reasonable and not any that are unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential, only upon reasonable notice to the public services and other parties concerned, giving them reasonable opportunity to be heard, ... . (Emphasis supplied.) Since compliance with law must be presumed, it should be assumed that petitioner's current rates were fixed by respondent after proper notice and hearing. Hence, modification of such rates cannot be made, over petitioner's objection, without such notice and hearing, particularly considering that the factual basis of the action taken by respondent is assailed by petitioner. The rule applicable is set forth in the American Jurisprudence the following language:Whether notice and a hearing in proceedings before a public service commission are necessary depends chiefly upon statutory or constitutional provisions applicable to such proceedings, which make notice and hearing, prerequisite to action by the commission, and upon the nature and object of such proceedings, that is, whether the proceedings, are, on the one hand, legislative and rule-making in character, or are, on the other hand, determinative and judicial or quasi-judicial, affecting the rights an property of private or specific persons. As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be heard as to the propriety and reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a public service commission.(43 Am. Jur. 716; Emphasis supplied.) Wherefore, we hold that the determination of the issue involved in the order complained of partakes of the nature of a quasi-judicial function and that having been issued without previous notice and hearing said order is clearly violative of the due process clause, and, hence, null and void, so that a motion for reconsideration thereof is not an absolute prerequisite to the institution of the present action for certiorari (Ayson vs. Republic. 50 Off. Gaz., 5810). For this reason considering that said order was being made effective on June 1, 1962, or almost immediately after its issuance (on May 17, 1962), we find that petitioner was justified in commencing this proceedings without first filing said motion (Guerrero vs. Carbonell, L-7180, March 15, 1955). WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and the preliminary injunction issued by this Court hereby made permanent. It is so ordered. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.Barrera, J., took no part.

FULL CASERepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCDECISIONJuly 31, 1964G.R. No. L-16487MANUEL BORJA, petitioner-appellee,vs.HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, ET AL., respondents, HON. FLORENCIO MORENO as Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications, and BENJAMIN YONZON, respondents-appellants.Martin B. Laurea and Associates for petitioner-appellee.Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellants.Makalintal, J.:This is an appeal by respondents Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Benjamin Yonzon from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga dated November 9, 1959 in Civil Case No. 1508 of said Court, which was initiated by a petition of herein appellee, Manuel Borja, for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with preliminary injunction.Borja is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of some 104 hectares in barrio Consuelo, municipality of Macabebe, province of Pampanga. This land, utilized as a fishpond, was acquired by him from Ayala and Company in 1937. On August 15, 1958 an administrative complaint was filed with the office of respondent Secretary by Benigno Musni and others, including then Senator de la Rosa, against a number of landowners, among them petitioner Borja, for abatement of nuisance and demolition of illegally constructed dams, dikes or any other works in the public navigable rivers in Macabebe, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. In the particular case of Borja, he was alleged to have closed the stream called Matlaue supposedly public, which runs through his land. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.Benjamin Yonzon, an attorney in the Department of Public Works and Communications, was designated by the Secretary to investigate the charges in the complaint. A copy of the decision, purportedly signed by the Undersecretary, M. B. Bautista, and dated April 3, 1959, was served upon counsel for Borja on June 12, 1959, ordering the latter as follows: to remove the dams and/or dike found across the channel bordering the properties owned by respondent and Maxima Vda. de Blas, and restore the bed to its original condition within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of this decision; otherwise, the removal thereof shall be effected by this office or its duly authorized representative at the expense of the respondent within ten (10) days after the expiration of the thirty-day (30) period, without prejudice to whatever judicial action that may be instituted against them pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2056.The foregoing decision of respondent Secretary was assailed by petitioner Borja in the latters petition before the court a quo on several grounds; that it was based on erroneous findings of fact; that it was contrary to law; that the investigation constituted a usurpation of judicial power and hence beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Secretary; that the delegation to Benjamin Yonzon of the authority to investigate was illegal and therefore null and void; and that the investigation was conducted with grave abuse of discretion and in violation of due process. Respondents raised a number of defenses in their answer to the petition, and after trial the court rendered the judgment now subject of the present appeal, granting the writs prayed for by petitioner; declaring null and void and of no legal effect all proceedings had by respondents in the administrative investigation, including the decision entered on April 3, 1959; restraining and prohibiting respondent Secretary from enforcing said decision, and declaring the injunction previously issued to be permanent.The issues raised by appellants in this appeal are formulated in the errors assigned in their brief, as follows:IThe lower court erred in holding in effect that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional in that it constitutes an undue delegation of judicial power to an administrative official.IIThe lower court erred in holding that here was no duty on the part of petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies.IIIThe lower Court erred in not finding the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications supported by evidence.IVThe lower Court erred in holding that the Matlaue river is a private stream.VThe lower Court erred in finding that respondent Benjamin Yonzon gravely used his discretion and acted capriciously.The provisions of Republic Act No. 2056 referred to by appellants in their first assignment of error are Sections 1 and 2. Section 1 provides that the construction or building of dams, dikes or any other works which encroaches into any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any other navigable public waters or waterways as well as the construction or building of dams, dikes or any other works in areas declared as communal fishing grounds shall be ordered removed as public nuisances or as prohibited construction, but authorizes the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to allow the construction of any such works when public interest or safety so requires, or when it is absolutely necessary for the protection of private property. Section 2 provides for due notice and hearing to establish the facts mentioned in Section 1, after which the Secretary, upon an affirmative finding as to their existence, is authorized to order the removal of the works declared as nuisances or prohibited constructions, giving the party concerned a period of not more than 30 days to do so, failing which such removal should be carried out by the Secretary within 10 days after the expiration of the period originally allowed. The same section adds that the investigation to be conducted by the Secretary must be terminated and decided, by him within a period not exceeding 90 days from the time a complaint in writing is filed with him by any interested party apprising him of the existence of the illegal works or constructions. Failure on his part, without justifiable reason, to terminate or decide a case or to effect the removal of the works or constructions within the time limit is considered an offense, for which the corresponding penalty is prescribed.With respect to the first error assigned by appellants, it is not true that the trial court ruled the foregoing provisions unconstitutional. On the contrary, it declined to pass upon the constitutional question on the ground that those provisions do not apply to the facts of the instant case. As far as may be gathered from the courts opinion, the particular fact which removes this case from the purview of Republic Act No. 2056 and which it considered duly established by the evidence is that the Matlaue stream which runs through the land of petitioner-appellee is not a public navigable river but his private property. The implication is that the authority of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to proceed under the provisions of said statute covers only cases where there is no dispute as to the public navigable character of the river or waterway alleged to be illegally obstructed, but that when this is precisely a basic fact in contention the matter should be left to the courts for determination.To the writer of this opinion the view thus taken by the court a quo and now urged upon us by petitioner-appellee has cogent reasons behind it. There is a certain danger in leaving the adjudication of a claim of private ownership of property, vis-a-vis the Government, in the hands of an executive official. This danger is demonstrated by the very argument of appellants under their third and fourth assignments of error. They point to the evidence submitted at the administrative investigation and, invoking the substantial evidence rule, assail the lower courts conclusion that the Matlaue stream is privately owned. The said rule, indeed, which has been applied in a number of cases in this jurisdiction, is that if there is substantial evidence to support the findings of an administrative official in matters within his competence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusions (Ang Tibay v. CIR 69 Phil. 635, 642), the courts are bound to look no further, not even to consider contrary evidence of a preponderant nature. If the decision of the administrative official carries with it, as the premise upon which it rests, a finding that certain property claimed by a private party to be his in fact part of the public domain, it does not seem fair to take that finding as conclusive upon the courts just because it is supported by substantial evidence, although there may be evidence to the contrary which, if properly considered and evaluated, would lead them to a different conclusion.The other members of this Court, however, hold that the authority of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to inquire into and decide the question of the public or private character of a river or stream is incidental to the power conferred upon him by the statute to conduct the necessary investigation and to order the removal of any works which constitute obstructions therein. This authority recognized, the next question posed by appellants is with respect to the correctness of the trial courts finding that the Matlaue stream is privately owned by petitioner-appellee. Under the substantial evidence rule (laying aside for the moment the question of whether or not such evidence may properly be considered at all, in view of the manner in which the administrative investigation was conducted) we find appellants third and fourth assignments of error to be well-taken: there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of respondent Secretary that the Matlaue stream is a public navigable river. This evidence consists of the testimony of two witnesses, one a farmer and the other a fisherman, and of the result of the ocular inspection conducted by the investigator, appellant Yonzon, as embodied in the report subsequently submitted by him and depicted in a sketch prepared by the assistant engineer of the Pampanga River Control Project.Nevertheless, we do not feel justified in affirming, for purposes of adjudication, the aforesaid conclusion of respondent Secretary, and reversing that of the trial court, for the investigation wherein the evidence was received was conducted with manifest disregard of the requirements of due process. And it is solely on this ground that the members of this Court are agreed that this decision should be predicated.The administrative complaint was filed with respondent Secretary on August 15, 1958. On October 22, 1958 Yonzon issued a subpoena to Borja ordering him to appear at the hearing of the case on October 24, 1958. That was the first time Borja had notice of the complaint. Acting on his request that the hearing be postponed for at least two weeks, Yonzon deferred it, but only up to October 27, 1958. When that day arrived Attorney Vicente V. Mendoza, a member of the law firm Carlos, Laurea & Associates, in representation of appellee, attended the investigation at Macabebe, Pampanga, but for the sole purpose of delivering to Yonzon appellees motion to quash and dismiss on the grounds that complainants Musni, et al., did not have the capacity to file the complaint and that Republic Act 2056 would be unconstitutional if it should be given retroactive effect. Without acting on the motion Yonzon proceeded with the examination of the two witnesses for the complaints. Attorney Mendoza repeatedly manifested that he was not prepared for the hearing and was not in a position to cross-examine complainants witnesses because the law firm of which he was a member had not had time to confer with appellee on account of the limited time given by Yonzon. Attorney Mendoza, however, sought to reserve his right to cross-examine, but Yonzon ruled that his failure to cross-examine was in effect a waiver of the right.On October 28, 1958 appellant Yonzon, upon a mere oral notice, conducted an ocular inspection of the questioned stream without giving appellee Borja sufficient time to prepare therefor. Furthermore, Yonzon did not limit himself to inspecting the premises but proceeded to conduct a hearing by questioning the witnesses who had testified the day before.On the next hearing date, October 30, 1958, Attorney Clemente Madarang, Jr., of the law firm representing appellee, was present. He asked for reconsideration of Yonzons ruling that Attorney Mendozas request for reservation to cross-examine amounted to a waiver of the right to do so. Yonzon refused to reconsider. When Attorney Madarang reiterated his request, Yonzon relented and agreed to allow him to cross-examine the witnesses who had previously testified, but without waiting for the transcription of the stenographic notes of the hearing previously had. Attorney Madarang agreed to cross-examine even if only on the notes taken by Attorney Mendoza. But when he was about to do so Yonzon again changed his mind and refused to let him cross-examine. On that same day, Attorney Madarang sought to take the stand as witness for appellee in order to identify certain documents which he had secured for the latter, but Yonzon prevented him from doing so. In addition, during that same hearing Yonzon called to the witness stand a certain engineer Manangan of the Pampanga River Control Project, allegedly as witness for the Government, which was not a party to the case. And then Yonzon denied to Attorney Madarang the right to object to any question propounded to Manangan, even if the same were prejudicial to appellees interest.On November 17, 1958 appellant Yonzon, at the request of appellee, issued a subpoena to Eliseo Panopio to attend the hearing the next day. When Yonzon delivered the subpoena he found out that Panopio was in the province. In spite of Attorney Madarangs insistence that Panopios testimony would not be limited to identifying the latters report (Exhibit S) Yonzon refused to grant continuance, reasoning out that Panopios testimony only corroborate that of Valderrama, who had identified certain documents which were in the custody of his office. The Panopio report, it may be mentioned, was prepared by him in 1931 when, as a surveyor of the Bureau of Public Works, he investigated the different streams and rivers situated in Macabebe, Pampanga, and found that Matlaue in particular had been artificially dug, and subsequently increased in width, length and depth by the owner at the time, from whom Borja acquired the land in 1937.On November 18, 1958, Yonzon terminated the hearing without giving counsel for Borja opportunity to present other witnesses and in spite of vigorous objection on his part.Appellant Yonzon clearly abused his discretion in riding roughshod over appellees right to a fair hearing. His acts of (1) proceeding with the hearing without first acting on appellees motion to dismiss; (2) ruling that appellees attempt to reserve his right to cross-examine was a waiver of said right; (3) conducting an ocular inspection motu proprio and interrogating witness during the same; (4) not allowing Attorney Madarang to cross-examine the complainants witnesses during the hearing of October 30, 1958; (5) calling to the witness stand a person who was not a witness for either the complainants or the respondents, and asking him questions to which he refused to entertain any objection from counsel; (6) arbitrarily refusing appellee opportunity to present Eliseo Panopio on the ground that his testimony was merely corroborative, although as it later turned out in court Panopios testimony was important to appellees defense; and (7) terminating the hearing without giving appellee full opportunity to present his other witnesses all these are indicative of the capricious and arbitrary manner in which the administrative investigation was conducted.By way of justification Yonzon repeatedly invoked the ninety-day period prescribed by R.A. 2056 within which an administrative case for abatement of nuisance thereunder must be terminated. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that while the complaint for abatement was filed on August 15, 1958, it was only on October 22, 1958 more than two months later that appellant officials informed appellee thereof and, strangely enough, by means of a subpoena. The latter did not have sufficient time to prepare his defense when appellant Yonzon started rushing the proceedings, evidently to make up for lost time.As it was, even with all that undue haste, the last day of the hearing was still beyond the deadline sought to be met. The decision was dated April 3, 1959, eight months after the complaint was filed; and copy was, served on appellees counsel only on June 12, 1959.The manner the investigation was conducted was a virtual denial of due process. This is one of the exceptions to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case by appeal to the President, if otherwise it was necessary at all before resort to the courts may be had.The judgment appealed from is affirmed in so far as it sets aside the administrative investigation conducted by respondents-appellants and the decision therein against petitioner-appellee, but not in so far as said judgment declares the Matlaue stream or river the private property of said petitioner-appellee, the question of ownership thereof being left for determination in such other proceeding, administrative or judicial, as respondents-appellants may deem proper to initiate. No pronouncement as to costs.

CASE DIGESTVINTAMARITIMEVNLRC (Basconcillo)284SCRA656PANGANIBAN;January3,1998

NATURESpecial civilactionof certiorari

FACTS-LeonidesC.BASCONCILLO,filedacomplaintwiththePhilippineOverseasEmployment Administration(POEA) WorkersAssistanceandAdjudicationOfficeforillegaldismissalagainstVintaMaritimeCo.,Inc.andElkanoShip Management,Inc.-Theemployersallegedthathewasdismissedforhisgrossnegligenceandincompetent performanceaschiefengineeroftheM/VBoracay.Theyclaimthathewasgivenfairwarningandenoughopportunitytoexplainhis side,nottomentionallthechancesgiventohimtoimprovehis substandardworkperformancebeforehewas dismissed.-Theemployeedeniedtheallegationsagainsthim;contrary tohisemployersclaim,hewasactuallysurprisedwhen hewastoldofhisdismissal.Thisoccurredafterhehadaverbalaltercation withaBritishnational,regardingthelack ofdisciplineof theFilipino crewundertheengineerssupervision. No inquiryorinvestigation,however, regarding hissupposedincompetenceornegligencewaseverconducted;neitherwasprivaterespondentfurnishedwitha noticeormemorandum regardingthecauseofhis dismissal.-POEAconsideredthecasesubmittedforresolution bymutualagreementofthepartiesafter submissionoftheirrespective positionpapers and supporting documents.POEA AdministratorAchacosoruled that private respondentwasillegally dismissed.-Onappeal, the NLRC affirmedthePOEA.

ISSUE/S1. WONtrialisindispensableinadministrativeproceedings2. WONtheemployee wasillegallydismissed

HELD1.NORatio Althoughboundby lawandpractice toobservedueprocess,administrativeagenciesexercisingquasi-judicialpowersarenonetheless freefrom therigidityofcertainproceduralrequirements.DUEPROCESS-Cardinal PrimaryRights-Inlaborcases,thisCourthasconsistentlyheldthatdueprocessdoesnotnecessarilymeanorrequireahearing, butsimplyanopportunityorarighttobeheard. Therequirementsofdueprocess aredeemedtohavebeensatisfiedwhenpartiesaregiventheopportunitytosubmitpositionpapers.Theholdingofanadversarialtrialisdiscretionary on thelaborarbiterandtheparties cannot demanditas amatterofright.-These rulesequallyapply to cases filedwith thePhilippineOverseasEmploymentAdministration AdjudicationOffice.Proceedings before a POEA hearing officer are non-litigious, although they are still subject to the requirements of dueprocess.ReasoningPetitionersweregiventheir chancetobeheard. Theiranswer,positionpaperand supportingdocuments hadbecomepartsof therecords andwereconsideredbythePOEAandbytheNLRC.2.YESRatioWherethereisnoshowingofaclear,valid,andlegalcausefortheterminationof employment,thelaw considersthematteracaseofillegaldismissal.Verily,theburdenisontheemployertoprovethatthetermination was foravalidorauthorized cause.-Dueprocess, the secondelement foravaliddismissal, requiresNOTICEandHEARING.Theemployer must furnish the worker with twowrittennoticesbefore termination canbelegally effected:(1)notice whichapprisestheemployee oftheparticularactsoromissionsforwhichhisdismissalissoughtand (2)subsequentnoticewhichinformsthe employeeoftheemployersdecisiontodismisshim.Disposition PetitionisDISMISSED.

CASE DIGESTBACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC. V CIR (RURAL TRANSIT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION)86 SCRA 27; MUOZ-PALMA; October 30, 1978

NATURE Petition for certiorari

FACTS-In 1958 the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. was in the transportation business and operated what was then known as the "Rural Transit". -In that year, the Rural Transit Employees Association went on strike and the dispute between the management and the union reached the Court of Industrial Relations, which immediately ordered the strikers to return to work and the management to take them back under the terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose. -While the labor dispute was pending with the CIR, Bachrach filed a "Petition for Authority to discharge driver Maximo Jacob from the service for alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Law resulting in damage to property and injuries to third parties, the latest of which resulted in the "total destruction of bus 170" of the company. -The Rural Transit Employees Association denied the charges and alleged that the last incident was due to a mechanical defect of the bus which was beyond the control of the driver Jacob-During the hearing of Bachrachs petition, Mr. Joseph Kaplin, general manager of Rural Transit, was presented as the lone witness -After Mr. Kaplin concluded his direct testimony, the hearing was scheduled for another date for purposes of cross-examination of the witness. The case was reset on various dates but Mr. Kaplin failed to appear because he had left for abroad. -The employee's association filed a motion praying that: (a) the testimony of Mr. Joseph Kaplin be stricken from the records (b) the petition of the Company for authority to dismiss Maximo Jacob from the service be denied: and (c) the Company be ordered to reinstate Maximo Jacob immediately with backwages from June 9, 1961 up to the date of his actual reinstatement. -The CIR dismissed the company's petition, lifted the suspension of driver Jacob, and ordered his reinstatement with backwages-Bachrach's motion for reconsideration having been denied, it filed the instant Petition for certiorari

ISSUE WON the CIR erred in ordering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob

HELD NORatioThe right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process.Reasoning-CIR did not err in ordering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob. Petitioner presented only one witness, Joseph Kaplin, to prove its case against driver Jacob. The witness failed however to appear at the scheduled hearings for his cross-examination for the simple reason that he left for abroad. Having been deprived, without fault on its part, of its right to cross-examine Kaplin, respondent association was entitled to have the direct testimony of the witness stricken off the record. -In Ortigas Jr. v. Luftansa German Airlines, 1975, this Court held inter alia: Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent. -The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. ... Until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case. -Inasmuch as the testimony of Joseph Kaplin is stricken off the record and the contents of Exhibits "1" to "8-F" are hearsay, and there is no other evidence which substantiates the charges against Maximo Jacob, the dismissal of the company's petition to discharge Jacob from its service is in order. Disposition Petition is dismissed.

FULL CASERepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-26136 October 30, 1978THE BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC. and/or "BACHRACH TRANSPORTATION CO., INC", as operator of the RURAL TRANSIT, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and RURAL TRANSIT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, respondents. Flores, Macapagal Ocampo & Balbastro for petitioners. Carlos Santiago for private respondent. MUOZ PALMA, J.:In 1958 the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. and/or the "Bachrach Transportation Co., Inc.", now petitioner in this case, was in the transportation business and operated what was then known as the "Rural Transit". In that year the Rural Transit Employees Association went on strike and the dispute between the management and the union reached the Court of Industrial Relations for compulsory arbitration. The case was docketed as Case No. 22- IPA entitled: Rural Transit Employees Association vs. Bachrach Motor Co., and Bachrach Transportation Co. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR for short) immediately issued an order on August 7, 1958 by which the strikers were ordered to return to work and the management to take them back under the terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose. 1 While this labor dispute was pending with the CIR Bachrach filed a "Petition for Authority to discharge driver Maximo Jacob from the service", dated July 24, 1961. The reasons given for the petition were alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Law by Maximo Jacob resulting in damage to property and injuries to third parties, the latest of which occurred on June 9, 1961 resulting in the "total destruction of bus 170" of the company. An "Answer and Counter-Petition" was filed in behalf of Maximo Jacob by the Rural Transit Employees Association whereby it denied the charges and alleged that the June 9, 1961 accident was due to a mechanical defect of the bus which was beyond the control of the driver Jacob, hence, the latter's suspension from the service was not justified. The petition of Bachrach docketed as Case No. 22-IPA (11) was heard on January 23, 1963, during which petitioner presented its one and only witness, Mr. Joseph Kaplin, general manager of Rural Transit, and various documents marked as Exhibits "1" to "8-F" inclusive. After Mr. Kaplin, concluded his direct testimony, with agreement of the parties, the hearing was scheduled for another date for purposes of cross-examination of the witness. The case was reset on various dates but Mr. Kaplin failed to appear because he had left for abroad. Sometime on March 8 1965, the employee's association filed a motion praying that: (a) the testimony of Mr. Joseph Kaplin be stricken from the records (b) the petition of the Company for authority to dismiss Maximo Jacob from the service be denied: and (c) the Company be ordered to reinstate Maximo Jacob immediately with backwages from June 9, 1961 up to the date of his actual reinstatement. 2 In an order dated March 1, 1966, the CIR through then Presiding Judge Arsenio I. Martinez dismissed the company's petition, lifted the suspension of driver Jacob, and ordered his reinstatement with backwages from the date of his suspension up to his actual reinstatement. 3 Bachrach's motion for reconsideration 4 having been denied 5, it filed the instant Petition for certiorari on June 15, 1966 which in the Court's Resolution of July 18,1966 was given due course. 6 The following errors are now assigned by petitioner, viz: 7 I The respondent court erred in dismissing the petition of the herein petitioner, after ordering the testimony of Joseph Kaplin to be stricken off the record, notwithstanding the fact that the service records of Maximo Jacob, upon the basis of which his dismissal could be justified were admitted by it. IIThe respondent court erred in not admitting the petitioner's exhibits unqualifiedly and in admitting them "for whatever worth they may have" only to disregard them entirely thereafter on the alleged ground that "the contents of the same were not proven. IIIThe respondent court erred in not ordering the dismissal of Maximo Jacob. IVThe respondent court erred in granting the respondent union's counter-petition without reception of evidence, especially after it earlier dismissed the petitioner's petition on the technical ground that Joseph Kaplin was not cross-examined by the respondent union. VThe respondent court erred in granting backwages to Maximo Jacob from the date of his suspension up to actual reinstatement without evidence to prove that he has exercised reasonable diligence to secure other employment during the time of his alleged suspension. VIThe respondent court erred in not holding that the union has the burden to prove that Maximo Jacob is entitled to backwages. VIIThe respondent court erred in not holding that, if at all, Maximo Jacob is only entitled to three months backwages according to the Sta. Cecilia Sawmill case. 1. Respondent court did not err in ordering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob. Petitioner presented only one witness, Joseph Kaplin to prove its case against driver Jacob. The witness failed however to appear at the scheduled hearings for his cross-examination for the simple reason that he left for abroad. Having been deprived, without fault on its part, of its right to cross-examine Kaplin, respondent association was entitled to have the direct testimony of the witness stricken off the record. The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is fundamental right which is part of due process. (Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., 1975, 62 SCRA 258) In Ortigas Jr. v. Luftansa German Airlines, 1975, defendant's witness failed to appear at the continuation of hearing during which the witness was to be cross-examined by plaintiff's counsel. The trial court denied defendant's motion for postponement and ordered the unfinished testimony of the witness Lazzari stricken off the record. In sustaining said order, this Court held inter alia: Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent. The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. ... Until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case. (64 SCRA 610, 636- 637; emphasis supplied) Parenthetically, the situation in Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., supra, was different. There, the witness, Atty. Morabe, had finished his direct testimony and he was ready and available for cross-examination. Motions for postponement of the cross-examination were made however by the adverse counsel from time to time until one day Atty. Morabe succumbed to a fatal heart attack without the cross-examination having been accomplished. On motion of the respondents the Court of Industrial Relations ordered the testimony of Atty. Morabe deleted from the record. On a petition for certiorari by Savory Luncheonette, this Court set aside the order and held that by their own actuations, respondents were considered to have impliedly waived and thereupon lost their right to cross-examine the witness, for such a right may be forfeited by a party litigant through his own conduct. Petitioner contends however that it was ready to present another witness, Mrs. Ursula Silva, to Identify the documents, Exhibits "1" to "8-F", but it did not proceed to call the witness for the reason that during the hearing of January 16, 1965, respondent's counsel, Atty. Santiago, manifested that he was admitting the signatures of Joseph Kaplin on the aforesaid documents. 8 However true that may be, what Atty. Santiago admitted merely was the signature of Mr. Kaplin and not the truth of the contents of the documents. 9 The opposing party was still entitled to cross-examine the witness on the matters written on Exhibits "1" to "8-F" especially if they adversely affected the substantial rights of the party against whom they were being presented, namely, driver Maximo Jacob. When Atty. Santiago admitted that the signature appearing in Exhibits "1" to "8-F" was that of witness Kaplin, the counsel of petitioner then, Atty. Joven Enrile, should have inquired if the party was admitting likewise the veracity of the contents of the documents; not having done so, petitioner must now suffer the consequences. Exhibits "1" to "8-F" were admitted by respondent court only for "whatever they may be worth." Evaluating them, however, it did not consider said documents, and rightly so, as competent proof of the truthfulness of their contents without the supporting testimony of witness Kaplin. As stated in the order under review "(N)o other witness was presented by respondent company (now petitioner) to testify on the intrinsic value of those exhibits"; consequently, they are hearsay. Inasmuch as the testimony of Joseph Kaplin is stricken off the record and the contents of Exhibits "1" to "8-F" are hearsay, and there is no other evidence which substantiates the charges against Maximo Jacob, the dismissal of the company's petition to discharge Jacob from its service is in order. 2. No error was committed when the CIR, without receiving evidence, granted relief to private respondent herein on its counter-petition. At the time Bachrach filed its petition to discharge Maximo Jacob, there was a pending labor dispute in the CIR between the company and the employee's union. The CIR ordered the strikers to return to work. The company in the meantime suspended its driver Maximo Jacob after the alleged June 9, 1961 accident. 10 Considering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob, the lifting of the latter's suspension and his reinstatement in the service were but a necessary consequence thereof. For obvious reasons, the relief could be granted without need of evidence. The onus probandi was on the company, now petitioner, to justify the suspension of Jacob and his eventual separation from the service. Having failed to discharge that burden, there were no valid grounds for it to keep its employee away from his work. 3. On the matter of backwages, We agree with petitioner's counsel that the judicial trend is to fix a reasonable period for the payment of backwages, the philosophy being to avoid protracted delay in post-judgment hearings to prove or disprove earnings of the worker elsewhere during the period he had not been reinstated to his employment." 11 Following this principle, We hold that payment of backwages for a period of three (3) years is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of the case. WHEREFORE, We hereby render judgment affirming the order of respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated March 1, 1966, now under review, with the sole modification that petitioner shall pay its driver Maximo Jacob three (3) years backwages at the rate of the last salary received before he was suspended, without qualification and deduction. With costs against petitioner. Order modified. SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ, concur.

CASE DIGESTUPBOARD OF REGENTSV.CA(AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARETCELINE) G.R.No.134625.MENDOZA;August31,1999

NATUREPetitionforreview

FACTS

-PrivaterespondentArokiaswamyWilliamMargaretCelineisa citizenofIndiaandholderofaPhilippine visitors visa. sheenrolledinthedoctoralprograminAnthropologyoftheUniversityofthePhilippinesCollegeofSocialSciences andPhilosophy(CSSP)inDiliman,QuezonCity.-Aftercompletingtheunitsofcourseworkrequiredinherdoctoralprogram,privaterespondentwentonatwo-year leaveofabsencetoworkasTamilProgrammeProduceroftheVaticanRadiointheVaticanandasGeneralOffice AssistantattheInternationalRighttoLifeFederationinRome.Shereturned tothePhilippinestoworkonher dissertationentitled,"Tamil Influencesin Malaysia,Indonesiaand thePhilippines."-Dr.RealidadS.Rolda,chairpersonoftheU.P.DepartmentofAnthropology,wrotealettertoDr. MariaSerena Diokno,CSSPAssociateDeanandGraduateProgramDirector,certifyingthatprivaterespondenthadfinishedher dissertationandwasreadyforheroraldefense. She was allowedtogiveanoraldefense.-Aftergoingoverprivaterespondentsdissertation,Dr.MedinainformedCSSPDeanConsuelo Joaquin-Pazthatthere was a portionin private respondents dissertationthat was lifted, without proper acknowledgment, from Balfours Cyclopaediaof India and Eastern and Southern Asia (1967) and from John Edyesarticle entitled "Description of the Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed by the Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel,Malabar,andtheIslandofCeylonfortheirCoastingNavigation"intheRoyalAsiaticSocietyofGreat BritainandIrelandJournal.-Nonetheless,private respondent wasallowed to defend her dissertation.Four (4) outof the five (5)panelistsgave privaterespondentapassingmarkforheroraldefensebyaffixing theirsignatures ontheapprovalform.-TheCSSPCollegeFaculty Assembly approvedprivaterespondentsgraduationpendingsubmissionoffinalcopiesof herdissertation.-TheUniversity Councilmettoapprove thelistofcandidatesforgraduation forthe second semesterofschoolyear1992-1993.Thelist, which wasendorsed to theBoardofRegentsforfinalapproval,includedprivaterespondentsname.-DeanPazsentalettertoDr.MilagrosIbe,ViceChancellorforAcademicAffairs,requestingtheexclusionofprivate respondentsnamefromthelistofcandidatesforgraduation,pendingclarification oftheproblemsregardingher dissertation.-DeanPazsletterdidnotreachtheBoardofRegentsontime,becausethenextday,theBoard approvedtheUniversity Councilsrecommendation for thegraduationofqualified students,includingprivaterespondent.Twodays later,privaterespondentgraduatedwiththedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophyinAnthropology.-Dr.Medinaformally chargedprivaterespondentwithplagiarismandrecommendedthatthedoctorategrantedtoher be withdrawn.-DeanPaz formedan adhoccommittee toinvestigate theplagiarismchargeagainstprivaterespondent.Meanwhile, sherecommendedtoU.P.DilimanChancellor,Dr.EmerlindaRoman,thatthePh.D. degreeconferredonprivate respondentbewithdrawn.-Inaletter DeanPaz informedprivaterespondentofthechargesagainst her.-TheCSSPCollegeAssembly unanimously approvedtherecommendation towithdrawprivate respondents doctoratedegreeandforwardeditsrecommendationtotheUniversityCouncil.The UniversityCouncil,inturn, approvedandendorsedthesamerecommendationtotheBoardof Regents onAugust 16,1993.-Meanwhile,inaletter,U.P.DilimanChancellorEmerlindaRoman summonedprivaterespondenttoa meetingonthesamedayandaskedhertosubmit herwrittenexplanation tothechargesagainst her.-Duringthemeeting,ChancellorRomaninformed privaterespondentofthe chargesandprovidedheracopyofthe findingsoftheinvestigating committee. Privaterespondent,on theotherhand,submittedher writtenexplanationina letter.-Another meetingwasheldbetweenChancellorRomanandprivaterespondenttodiscussheranswerto thecharges. Athirdmeetingwasscheduledbutprivaterespondentdidnotattendit,allegingthattheBoardofRegents had alreadydecided hercasebeforeshecouldbefullyheard.-BOR withdrew degree-TCdismissedpetitionformandamusfiledbyArokiaswamy.CAreversedorderingBORtorestore herdoctoral degree.

ISSUEWON Arokiaswamywas denieddueprocess

HELD NO.Reasoning Inthiscase,thetrialcourtdismissedprivaterespondentspetitionpreciselyongrounds ofacademicfreedombut theCourt of Appeals reversedholdingthatprivaterespondent was denieddueprocess. It said:Itisworthy tonotethatduring theproceedingstakenby theColleg