digested cases_ eminent domain_consti._.docx

8/14/2019 digested cases_ eminent domain_consti._.docx

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CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESECOMMUNITY [40 Phil 349; No. 14355; 31Oct 1919]Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels:Case Digests,Political Law

Facts:The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayedfor the expropriation of a portion private cemetery forthe conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue.Plaintiff claims that it is necessary thatsuch public improvement be made in the said portion

of the private cemetery and that the said lands are

within their jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the saidexpropriation was not necessary because other routes

were available. They further claimed that theexpropriation of the cemetery would createirreparable loss and injury to them and to all those

persons owing and interested in the gravesand monuments that would have to be destroyed.

The lower court ruled that the

said public improvement was not necessary on theparticular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff hereinassailed that they have the right to exercise the

power of eminent domain and that the courts have noright to inquire and determine the necessity of theexpropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.
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Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into,

and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.

Held: The courts have the power of restrictingthe exercise ofeminent domain to the actualreasonable necessities of the case and for the

purposes designated by the law. The moment the

municipal corporation or entity attemptsto exercise the authority conferred, it must complywith the conditions accompanying the authority. The

necessity for conferring the authority upon amunicipal corporation toexercise the right of eminent

domain is admittedly within the power of thelegislature. But whether or not the municipalcorporation or entity is exercising the right in a

particular case under the conditionsimposed by thegeneral authority, is a question that the courts have

the right to inquire to.

Moday vs Court of AppealsMunicipal Corporation Eminent Domain Disapproval by SP of SB

Resolution

Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the

Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor

to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Modays


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land. Purpose of which is to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings.

The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to

the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling

that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned

by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed

through with the expropriation nonetheless.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by

virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan.

HELD:Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan

exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is

inseparable from sovereignty. It is governments right to appropriate, in

the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property

for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature,

the power of eminent domainmay be validly delegated to local

governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of

private property by thegovernment to be valid, the taking must be

for public use and there must be just compensation. The only ground

upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution,

ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is

beyond the powers conferred uponthe council or president making the

same. This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated

that there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not

even bother to declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the

expropriation case is valid.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT, digested

Posted byPius Morados onNovember 8, 2011

26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Just

Compensation)
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FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying

for the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection

between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that the

Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of thePLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a

contract where no agreement is had between them.

ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government

Telephone System can be a valid object for expropriation.

HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the

Republic may require the telephone company to permit interconnection as theneeds of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just

compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection

between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to

an easement of right of way.

Brgy. San Roque, Talisay, Cebuvs Heirs of Franco Pastor

Municipal Corporation Eminent Domain Expropriation BP 129

In 1997, Brgy. San Roque filed for an expropriationsuit before the MTC of

Talisay. The MTC denied the suit because apparently under BP 129, MTCs

do not have jurisdiction over expropriation cases as it is the RTCs that are

lodged with the power to try such cases. So Brgy. San Roque filed it before

RTC Talisay but then Judge Pastor denied the suit arguing that the action

for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the

property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be

filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the actionshould


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have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was

less than P20,000.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should take cognizance of the

expropriation case.

HELD:Yes. Under Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs

shallexercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which

the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; . . . . .

The present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain,

and that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

What are the two phases of expropriation cases?

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the

plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its

exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an

order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the

plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned,

for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon

the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the

filing of thecomplaint. An order ofdismissal, if this be ordained, would be

a final one, of course, since itfinally disposes of the action and leaves

nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an

order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly

state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, no objection to the

exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be

filed or heard.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the

determination by the court of the justcompensation for the property

sought to be taken. This is done by the Court with the assistance of not

more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the

just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, andfindingsof, the

commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second

stage of the suit, andleave nothing more to be done by the Court

regarding the issue. . . .


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It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit

is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with

the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts

determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the

expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the

subject of an expropriation suit is the governments exercise ofeminent

domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, digested

Posted byPius Morados onNovember 7, 2011

GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974 (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Elements

of Taking)

FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied

by the government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced

expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation,

the government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease

commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the

disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy thesaid land as lessee because the essential elements of the taking of property

under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by

condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period, and (2)

devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of

all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the

condemnor has entered and occupied the property as lesse.

HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation

proceedings commenced in 1959.
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The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private

property, (2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal

authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or

injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner anddeprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government

entered and occupied the property under a contract of lease.

City Government of QC vs JudgeEricta & Himlayang Pilipino

Police Power Not Validly Exercised

Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING

THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF

PRIVATEMEMORIALTYPE CEMETERY ORBURIALGROUND WITHIN THE

JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR

THEVIOLATIONTHEREOF.The lawbasically provides that at least six (6)percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside

forcharityburial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been

residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be

determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking

police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is

no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent

of the total area of all privatecemeteriesfor charity burial grounds of

deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety,

or the generalwelfareof the people. The ordinance is actually a taking

without compensationof a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit


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paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead

of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city

passes the burden to private cemeteries

People vs Fajardo Case DigestTHE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs.JUAN F.FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.104 Phil 443G.R. No. L-12172August 29, 1958

FACTS:It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of

defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality ofBaao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance inquestion providing as follows:

SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair abuilding should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a writtenpermit from the Municipal Mayor.

SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each

building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued.

SEC. 3. PENALTY Any violation of the provisions of the above, thisordinance, shall make the violation liable to pay a fine of not less thanP25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days normore than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If saidbuilding destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any publicproperty, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of thebuilding or house.

SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITY This ordinance shall take effect on itsapproval. (Orig. Recs., P. 3)

Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor hadexpired, he and his son in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a written


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request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct abuilding adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of landregistered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway andseparated from the public plaza by a creek (Exh. D). On January 16,

1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that theproposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza(Exh. E). On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their request fora building permit (Exh. 3), but again the request was turned down bythe mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction ofthe building without a permit, because they needed a place ofresidence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by atyphoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property.

On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convictedby the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violationof the ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the Court of FirstInstance, which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced appellants topay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as well as to demolish thebuilding in question because it destroys the view of the public plaza ofBaao, in that "it hinders the view of travelers from the NationalHighway to the said public plaza." From this decision, the accusedappealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records

to us because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinancein question.

ISSUE:Whether or not ordinance no. 7, series of 1950 is a validexercise of police power?

HELD:the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that itoperates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use theirown property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and

amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation.We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard thebeautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort andhappiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in theinterest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State mayprohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs.


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Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not, under the guise of policepower, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of theirproperty and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assurethe aesthetic appearance of the community. As the case now stands,

every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless ofits own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question,because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from thehighway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let theirland remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it isbest suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result,the municipality must give appellants just compensation and anopportunity to be heard.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that itcan not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyondregulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property. Theonly substantial difference, in such case, between restriction andactual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to theburden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation wouldrelieve him of that burden.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. YUNITA TUAZON,ROSAURO TUAZON AND MARIA TERESA TUAZON G.R.NO. 193023, 22 JUNE 2011, BRION, J.) SUBJECT:DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION. BRIEF TITLE:NAPOCOR VS. TUAZON)============================SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGESTDIGEST:


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NAPOCORS TRANSMISSION LINE TRAVERSED ONRESPONDENTS PROPERTY RESPONDENTS DEMANDSTHAT THEY BE PAID FULL VALUE OF THEIR LAND ASJUST COMPENSATION. NAPOCOR ARGUES THAT ITSHALL ONLY PAY EASEMENT FEE PURSUANT TO SECTION3-A B) ITS CHARTER, R.A. 6395, WHICH PRESCRIBES AFORMULA FOR EASEMENT FEE. IS NAPOCOR CORRECT?NO. THE DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION IS AJUDICIAL FUNCTION. THE FORMULA PROVIDED INN PO ORSCHARTER IS NOT BINDING ON THE COURT.IT IS ONLY A GUIDE.NAPOCORs protest against the relevancy ofGutierrez,

heavily relying as it does on the supposed

conclusiveness of Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 on justcompensation due for properties traversed by

transmission lines, has no merit. We have held in

numerous cases that Section 3-A(b) is not conclusive

upon the courts.[1][33]In National Power Corporation v.

Maria Bagui, et al.,[2][34]we categorically held:

Moreover, Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, asamended, is not binding on the Court. It has been

repeatedly emphasized that the determination of just

compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial
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function and that any valuation for just compensation

laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding

principle or one of the factors in determining just

compensation but it may not substitute the courts own

judgment as to what amount should be awarded and

how to arrive at such amount. (Citations omitted.)

The determination of just compensation in

expropriation cases is a function addressed to the

discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by anyother branch or official of the government.[3][35]This

judicial function has constitutional raison dtre; Article

III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no private

property shall be taken for public use without payment

of just compensation. In National Power Corporation v.

Santa Loro Vda. de Capin, et al.,[4][36]we noted withapproval the disquisition of the CA in this matter:

The [herein petitioner] vehemently insists that its

Charter [Section 3A (b) of R.A. 6395] obliges it to pay

only a maximum of 10% of the market value declared by

the owner or administrator or anyone having legal

interest in the property, or such market value asdetermined by the assessor, whichever is lower. To

uphold such a contention would not only interfere with

a judicial function but would also render as useless the
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protection guaranteed by our Constitution in Section 9,

Article III of our Constitution that no private property

shall be taken for public use without payment of just

compensation.

SUBJECT: NAPOCOR ARGUES THAT RESPONDENTS MAYBE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO SUCHVALUATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BECAUSE THEY DIDNOT OPPOSE THE INSTALLATION OF THE TRANSMISSIONLINE ON THEIR PROPERTY IS NAPOCORS CONTENTIONCORRECT?NO. HIS PRESUMED WAIVER IS A BAR TO HIS ACTION TODISPOSSESS THE COMPANY HE IS NOT DEPRIVED OF HISACTION FOR DAMAGES FOR THE VALUE OF THE LANDOR FOR INJURIES DONE HIM.That the respondents predecessor-in-interest did not

oppose the installation of transmission lines on their

land is irrelevant. In the present petition, NAPOCOR

insinuates that Mr. Tuazons failure to oppose the

instillation now estops the respondents from their

present claim.[5][38]This insinuation has no legalbasis. Mr. Tuazons failure to oppose cannot have the

effect of thwarting the respondents right to just
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compensation. In Rafael C.de Ynchausti v. Manila

Electric Railroad & Light Co., et al.,[6][39]we ruled:

The owner of land, who stands by, without objection,

and sees a public railroad constructed over it, can not,

after the road is completed, or large expenditures have

been made thereon upon the faith of his apparent

acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use by the

railroad company. In such case there can only remain to

the owner a right of compensation. (Goodin v. Cin. AndWhitewater Canal Co.,18 Ohio St., 169.)

One who permits a railroad company to occupy and use

his land and construct its road thereon without

remonstrance or complaint, cannot afterwards reclaim it

free from the servitude he has permitted to be imposed

upon it. His acquiescence in the companys takingpossession and constructing its works under

circumstances which made imperative his resistance, if

he ever intended to set up illegality, will be considered a

waiver. But while this presumed waiver is a bar to his

action to dispossess the company, he is not deprived of

his action for damages for the value of the land, or forinjuries done him by the construction or operation of

the road. (St. Julien v. Morgan etc., Railroad Co.,

35La.Ann., 924.)
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