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Disarmament and International Security London International Model United Nations 18th Session | 2017
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Table of Contents
Introduction letters………………………………………………………..3
Introduction to the committee……………………………………………6
Topic A……………………………………………………………………..7
Topic B……………………………………………………………………..19
Conference Information…………………………………………………..30
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Introduction Letters
Jackson Webster: Director
My name's Jackson Webster, I'm originally from Manhattan Beach, California,
and have spent the last 3 years living and studying in Europe. My bachelors
was in the King's College London Department of War Studies in the United
Kingdom, where I participated in KCL's United Nations Association. I am
currently reading for a masters in International Security in the École des
affaires internationales at Sciences Po Paris. My degree is focused on risk
analysis and Russian studies, particularly the effects of Russia's domestic
politics on the formation of her foreign policy. As such, I look forward to
hearing DISEC's delegates debate some of today's most pressing security
issues. I've been participating in MUN for 7 years now, both in the states in
high school and in Europe during my degrees. Last year, I had the privilege of
serving the KCL UNA as its President, and as Secretary General of our annual
conference held at KCL's Strand Campus: ULMUN. This will be my 4th year
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at LIMUN, and my second time chairing here, and with such an excellent dais I
look forward to making it my best LIMUN yet!
Mélanie Villar: Assistant Director
My name is Mélanie Villar, and I will be one of the Deputy Directors of
DISEC at LIMUN 2017. I am doing a second Master’s in International
Relations, specialty International security and defense at Jean Moulin Lyon 3
University (France). I've been studying intergovernmental organisations and
NGOs last year, and Law and Political science during my BA.
I have participated in about 13 conferences as a delegate (mostly Model United
Nations), then 3 as a member of the Press Team (London MUN 15, Leeds
MUN 15 and Lyon MUN 15), and I am currently the Secretary General of
Lyon Model United Nations 2017. As you can see, I am fond of that kind of
simulations that are fundamental for learning about International Relations and
their institutions, and especially the United Nations. I am very excited to come
back to London for this amazing conference, and to experience chairing there. I
was a delegate last year at the Security Council, and once again I obviously
loved it. Thank you so much to the LIMUN team for organising such a
conference.
Somaan Tariq: Assistant Director
I’m Soman Tariq, originally from Pakistan but living in Germany for more
than a year now. I’m 20, and currently pursuing a BSc in Industrial
Engineering and International Economics at Jacobs University Bremen. I’ve
been an avid public speaker and MUN-ner throughout the course of the past
few years. From someone who could barely speak out a word on his first high
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school conference to participating in over 13 conferences and finally chairing
LIMUN. Yes, I’ll be serving as the Co-Director of DISEC at LIMUN 2017.
I’m also the Secretary-General for Bremen International Model UN 2017, the
President of BRIMUN Society, and along with that I’ve chaired Hamburg
MUN twice, so rest assured you’re in good hands! On a less formal note, I’m
into rowing, lifting weights and House of Cards. Dress like Frank Underwood,
and you’ll surely take the award with you. I’m more than delighted to come
back to my favorite city in the world to chair Europe’s largest conference. I
wish the best of luck to all, and I am very much looking forward being in
London!
Committee email: [email protected]
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General Assembly: First
Committee
The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) was the first
committee established by the United Nations General Assembly, tasked with
the UN’s founding purpose: preventing another world war. DISEC has, over
the 71 years of the existence of the General Assembly, discussed topics
concerning the prevention of the proliferation of arms, the resolution of
regional conflicts, the settlement of border disputes, and much more.
Because of the sensitive nature of DISEC’s purview, it is often considered both
the most influential and the most contentious committee of the General
Assembly.
DISEC is as relevant today as it ever has been. Multiple states are on the verge
of becoming new nuclear powers, and the international norms and statutes
preventing the usage of weapons of mass destruction are being stressed, tested,
and questioned.
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Topic A: The Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction in South Asia
Introduction
Throughout the course of the history the issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMDs)s including Nuclear and Chemical Weapons in South Asia has been a
very significant one. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, which was
the first test of its sort in South Asia. The strong arms race between India and
Pakistan led to Pakistan developing its nuclear weapons and thus conducting
its first nuclear test in 1998.
Initially India also possessed a certain amount of Chemical Weapons but in
1992, after signing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), India started a
dismantling program for its chemical weapons stockpile.
India has also ratified the Biological Weapons Convention and pledges to
abide by its obligations. In 1974, Pakistan also ratified the Biological Weapons
Convention. Therefore the issue of Biological Weapons remains of a lesser
significance.
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However, India and Pakistan have not signed the NPT, which enhances the
issue of nuclear proliferation even more in the region. All other states within
the geographical boundaries of South Asia have signed the NPT.
Both India and Pakistan have frequently been through severe tensions since
1947 including three wars. Furthermore the issue of Kashmir and the disputed
territories between both the countries increase the problem even more. At
various instances in the history both of the countries have been at the verge of
a nuclear war.
Both of the countries possess Second Strike capabilities and maintain huge
stockpiles of different types of nuclear weapons. India has declared a ‘no first-
use policy’ whereas Pakistan maintains a ‘no first-attack policy’ which is even
more problematic in this case.
Pakistan refuses to adopt a "no-first-use" doctrine, indicating that it would
launch nuclear weapons even if the other side did not use such weapons first.
Indian officials also say that the main threat to national security comes from
China, not only from Pakistan. Thus, the Pakistani ballistic missile called
Ghauri (1998) was never introduced by India as a significant nuclear power of
its neighbour, even though it was adequate to reach New Delhi for example. It
is clear that diminishing the importance of the nuclear power of Pakistan, India
wants to position itself as the rival power of China. Also, Pakistan and China
maintain close diplomatic ties for a long time.1 Indeed, during the 1962 Sino-
Indian border conflict, China expressed its support for a referendum in
Kashmir, like Pakistan and contrary to what India wanted. Hence, India
continues to be concerned about the emergence of a Chinese threat,
1 http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/06/17/commentary/world-commentary/china-india-battle-nuclear-playing-field/#.WCIa_TdF0qY
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considering the strong military and diplomatic bonds between China and
Pakistan.
Adding the issue, the non-state actors within the region also pose a security
threat. The presence of terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeeda, Taliban and
Harkat-Ul-Mujahideen within the region pose a risk to the security of the
nuclear weapons.
History of the Problem
The history of WMDs in South Asia dates back to 1967, when India started its
nuclear program. It was the very first time any state in South Asia had access
to a WMD program which is why India did not sign the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. In 1974, India tested its first nuclear
device, which was code-named as “Smiling Buddha”. India called it a
“Peaceful nuclear explosion” stating that it was testing its nuclear program for
the purpose of deterrence. India's pursuit of nuclear weapons was first spurred
by a 1962 border clash with China and by Beijing's 1964 nuclear test.
Pakistan's nuclear weapons development was in response to the loss of East
Pakistan in 1971's Bangladesh Liberation War. In 1972, under Prime Minister
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan started its nuclear program. Munir Ahmed Khan,
Ex-President of the Nuclear Reactor division at IAEA Vienna was appointed as
the Chief of Pakistan’s nuclear program, with the initial goal of completing the
bomb by the end of 1976.
In the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Pakistan suffered a very heavy defeat from
India, losing an area of 56,000 sq. miles (Formerly known as East Pakistan.
Now knowns as Bangladesh) This defeat and such huge loss of territory led to
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Pakistan eventually starting its nuclear program enabling it to compete in a
nuclear arms race with its rival India.
Throughout the course of the decade, various Pakistani scientists from all over
the world, particularly from International Research Centre for Physics in Italy
joined the program. The program was highly secretive throughout the time.
In 1998, India conducted its second nuclear test. Around 2 weeks later,
Pakistan successfully conducted its first nuclear test. The map above shows the
Nuclear Test sites throughout South Asia. Pakistan conducted its nuclear test in
Ras Koh hills near its border with Iran. Whereas India conducted its first
nuclear test in Pokhran near its border with Pakistan.
In 1999, Kargil War occurred between both the countries. It was feared that a
nuclear-war may breakaway, as Pakistan had recently conducted its first
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nuclear test. Furthermore, Pakistan doesn’t maintain a “no-first-use” policy,
which increased the threat of a nuclear war even more. During the period,
Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmad made a statement saying that
Pakistan could use any weapon in its arsenal during the war. The situation
worsened when CIA received reports that Pakistan was moving its warheads
closer to the border with India. At that time, the US President Bill Clinton tried
persuading Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif against any such actions.
The disputed territory of Kashmir has now and then been the cause of hostility
between Pakistan and India. It has also been the reason behind the wars of
1947, 1965 and the Kargil War of 1999. India has maintained control over the
Jammu and Kashmir area, whereas Pakistan maintains control over the Azad
Kashmir region. Thousands of people have died in the Kashmir Conflict, but
no solution was ever reached. The UNSC called for a referendum to be held in
Kashmir, but until the date, it has not been held.
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The Line of Control (LOC) separates the Pakistani administered Kashmir from
the Indian administered Kashmir. Although no official statistics are available
regarding the matter, but it is rumoured that both Pakistan and India maintain
120-130 nuclear warheads each.
Within the region, several non-state organisations are very active, including the
terrorist organisation, Lashkar-e-Taiba, which operates several training camps
for militants all over Kashmir. With the existence of such organisations in such
a hostile region, the threat of security risks increases even more. The security
of the Nuclear Programs of India and Pakistan are also at risk.While Dr. Abdul
Qadeer Khan claimed that Pakistan’s nuclear program is the most secure in the
world, there is always a threat of these non-state actors gaining access to these
weapons.
Statement of the Problem
Proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the most important issue and is at
the very heart of the international political agenda. At the present time and
despite prevention and control arrangements, two regions require debating: the
Middle East and Asia. The United Nations Security Council and IAEA
concerns are numerous: Iranian nuclear weapons development, North Korean
nuclear tests and its consequences in the Sea of Japan, the growing power of
China, and other tensions such as the ones just mentioned between Pakistan
and India. In Asia, theories of deterrence and proliferation effect political
realities: we can call it the “security dilemma”. 2 Indeed, once a country
develops its nuclear arsenal, its neighbour increases its own nuclear capacity as
well: China’s nuclear arsenal is real and is seen by India as a threat, so India
2 http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/solving-the-northeast-asia-security-dilemma/
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acquired nuclear weapons.34 As a consequence, Pakistan developed its nuclear
capabilities. Also, DPRK declared possessing nuclear weapons in 2005.
Even if the nuclear build-up by Pakistan and India is a classic nuclear
dissuasion, the international community feels concerned about this region’s
stability. However, some believe that proliferation in Asia is due to the will of
these countries to strike a better balance of power.5 Therefore, the Chinese,
Indian and Pakistani increasing nuclear arsenal can be seen as stabilising factor
in a region where 40 per cent of the global population live. India and Pakistan
have created a group of experts that meets regularly for the harmonization of
New Delhi and Islamabad positions. Even if this situation is not ideal
especially because they have not signed the NPT, it ensures a certain strategic
stabilization.
Areas of tension are multiple: Pakistan and India had a common history (until
the partition in 1947), the border is close to Pakistani vital centers, and there
are recurring boundary disputes (Kashmir for example).6
The P5 members of the Security Council have attempted to ensure that Article
1 of the NPT will be respected respected, and especially within these Asian
countries. The first article of the Non-Proliferation Treaty states that “each
nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not
in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to
3 https://asialyst.com/fr/2016/08/02/inde-le-programme-nucleaire-cible-contre-la-chine-pas-contre-le-pakistan/ 4 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/indias-mighty-nuclear-weapons-program-aimed-china-pakistan-11956 5 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-co/hotcontent/index.html?section=world/asia/eastasia/northkorea 6 http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/dossiers/inde-pakistan/cachemire.shtml
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manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.”7 However, India
and Pakistan did not sign the treaty, so these countries are under no legal
obligation.
After the 1998 nuclear tests by India, both India and Pakistan rejected the idea
of signing the NPT. Thus, these countries went against the UNSC resolution
taken the same year about international security, demanding in Article 3 of the
resolution to India and Pakistan to “refrain from further nuclear tests and in
this context calls upon all States not to carry out any nuclear weapon test
explosion or any other nuclear explosion in accordance with the provisions of
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty”.8
The international community feels concerned not only about the fact that India
and Pakistan possess an important nuclear arsenal, but also the security
measures of these materials are not sufficient enough, nor satisfactory. Indeed,
even if the NTI index 2016 (Nuclear Threat Initiative index) shows that
improvements have been noticed especially by India, the country still lacks an
independent regulatory agency.9 Even if the IAEA Additional Protocol has
been set up in India, many efforts needs to be done. Also, the unstable
Pakistani political environment is a major regional concern, even if efforts
have been undertaken, particularly to prevent the theft of nuclear materials.
Moreover, Pakistan has not implemented the Additional Protocol of IAEA.
The situation is still more worrying because of the tensions between Pakistan
and India. The NTI index attests that South Asia is the most likely region for
7 http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/text%20of%20the%20treaty.pdf 8 https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/158/60/PDF/N9815860.pdf?OpenElement 9 http://www.ntiindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/NTI_2016-Index_FINAL.pdf
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“the first Post-Second world war use of nuclear weapons”, especially because
of the border conflicts in Kashmir. As History has shown, these two countries
have already gone to war with each other four times (1947, 1965, 1971 and
1999).
Current Situation
While five countries with nuclear weapons are trying to reduce or maintain
their nuclear arsenal, three others continue to increase theirs. Indeed in one of
its reports, the International Peace Research Institute Stockholm (SIPRI)
explained that China has now 250 nuclear warheads whereas they had 240 in
2012, Pakistan 100 to 120 against 90 to 110 and India increased the number of
its warheads by 20%.10
Institutes such as SIPRI judge the peace in South Asia as fragile, and this arms
race is worrying the international community, mainly because of the growing
tensions that persist between India and Pakistan, the two Koreas, or even China
and Japan.11 The signatories of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
like Russia and the United States of America have reduced their arsenals.
France, the United Kingdom and Israel remain at the same level. However,
these are estimations. These statements are more or less reliable depending on
the country. For example, China is now such a total opacity and Russia are
showing less and less transparency.
Also, the reduction of the stockpile of nuclear weapons arms does not mean
reducing the nuclear threat. Shanon Kile, the coordinator of the nuclear
research at SIPRI, explained that "The long-term modernization programs in
10 http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2013/06/03/chine-inde-et-pakistan-continuent-d-accroitre-leur-arsenal-nucleaire_3422592_3210.html 11 https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2016/global-nuclear-weapons-downsizing-modernizing
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ongoing in these states suggest that nuclear weapons are still a sign of the
international status, and show that nuclear weapons are power".12
Pakistan increases its military capabilities depending on what India does, India
increases its military capabilities depending on what China does, China
increases its military capabilities depending on what the United States does,
and the US according to its allies (including South Korea). That is what Greg
Thielmann and David Logan (two researchers at the University of Princetown)
call « arms race vortex », a dangerous chain reaction.
Bloc Positions
Both, Pakistan and India, face continuous pressure from the International
community regarding the issue of Nuclear Proliferation, as both of them are
non-signatories to the NPT. Furthermore, it was believed that Pakistan secretly
assisted North Korea for developing its own nuclear program.
China has always been a supportive ally for Pakistan’s Nuclear and Military
Programs. It can also be explained by China’s rivalry with India and the
territorial disputes between both of the countries. Beijing’s nuclear test was
also one of the reason why India developed a nuclear program in the first
place. Recently, China has also started investing in the nuclear energy
production program in Pakistan.
Russia has also been supportive of India’s nuclear program. There has always
been a historical military and nuclear cooperation between India and Russia. In
2009, another nuclear deal was signed between both of the countries to set up
two more nuclear power plants in India for which Russia provided technical
and financial assistance. Recently in 2016, Russia also conducted a joint
12 http://www.obsarm.org/spip.php?article276
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Military exercise with Pakistan, making it the first time any such cooperation
had occurred between Pakistan and Russia.
However, The US has always been a promoter of non-proliferation. The issue
always been a very controversial topic between both of the countries. In fact, in
1999 after Pakistan’s first nuclear test, the relations between Pakistan and US
were heavily strained.
In 2005, US and India signed a Civil Nuclear Cooperation deal to separate
India’s military and civil nuclear programs and to place its civil nuclear
program under IAEA safeguards, whereas in return the US agreed to cooperate
for the further development of the civil nuclear program.
In 2008, France also signed a civil nuclear cooperation deal with India for the
development of nuclear energy in India. France provided technical and
financial assistance, according to the deal. In 2009, France signed a deal with
Pakistan known as the France-Pakistan Atomic Energy Framework under
which France promised to provide more security to Pakistan’s nuclear energy
program. Pakistan and France also agreed upon mutual collaboration for
nuclear safety and security. Critics have compared this deal to India-US Civil
Nuclear Cooperation deal. France has also been one of Pakistan’s biggest
military contractor despite its good relations with India.
Questions A Resolution Must Address
• What role can DISEC play in addressing the issue of Nuclear Proliferation
in South Asia?
• How can Pakistan and India ensure the safety and integrity of their
individual nuclear programs from the hands of non-state actors and
organisations within the region?
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• What role should the international community play in addressing the
Kashmir Conflict?
• How can China play a key role in ensuring stability in the South Asian
region?
• What new mechanisms and agreements need to be formulated to promote
nuclear disarmament in South Asia?
Sources
Asialyst, “Le programme nucléaire cible contre la Chine pas contre le
Pakistan”, August 2016, Asialyst
H. PANT Harsh, “China and India battle on nuclear playing field”, June 2017,
The Japan Times
JIMIN Chen, “Solving the Northeast Asia security dilemma”, May 2013, The
Diplomat
Le Monde, “La Chine, l’Inde et le Pakistan continuent d’accroître leur arsenal
nucléaire”, June 2013, Le Monde
SIPRI, “Global nuclear weapons downsizing modernizing”, June 2016, SIPRI
The Washington Post, “North Korea declares itself as a nuclear power”,
February 2005, The Washington Post
NTI 2016 Index, Building a framework for Assurance, Accountability and
Action, January 2016, Nuclear Security Index
Non Proliferation Treaty, July 1968
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Topic B: Combating the Threat of
Islamic State Sleeper Cells
Introduction
Over the past three years, the world has faced an immense security threat from
the Islamic State (IS). Numerous countries in the West and the Middle East
have been significantly affected by this threat.
One of the reasons why the threat is so grave is because of the unique way ISIS
operates. The organisation commands a sizable amount of sleeper cells all over
the world. These sleeper cells are used to carry out attacks far beyond the reach
of IS’s conventionally-held territory. Reports suggest that in Continental
Europe alone, IS operates more than 20 individual sleeper cells comprising of
more than 120 members each.13
During the last years, these sleeper cells have been used to carry out attacks in
Paris, Brussels and other places in the world. The nature of these sleeper cells
makes it very hard for security organisations to cater to this threat. Most of
these cells are only activated a few days prior to the attacks. These sleeper cells
13 http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/16/europe/europe-terrorism-threat/
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only execute the instructions of the masterminds of the attacks. Sleeper cells
have extended to South Asia and Southeast Asia as well. IS has claimed
responsibility for various attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh. In
order to respond to this threat, continuing multilateral security cooperation and
intelligence and is needed.
During the past years, security organisations throughout the world have
focused on defeating IS at its core, which includes destroying its strongholds in
Syria and Iraq, however the issue of sleeper cells is now of increasing
importance.
In Europe, the ongoing refugee crisis has eased the spread of IS sleeper cells
throughout the continent. It has been reported that numerous IS trained fighters
disguised as refugees had been sent to Germany, France, and other European
member-states.14 With such a large influx of refugees to the Continent, it has
become increasingly difficult to screen individuals for potential links with ISIS
and other terrorist organisations. Various IS sleeper cell members crossed
through Turkey into the Balkans and then further into mainland Europe.
Furthermore, the potential visa-free travel deal between Turkey and Brussels
may render controlling the Schengen Zone’s borders a nearly insurmountable
task.
History of the Problem
The so-called Islamic State (IS) was established by ex-members of al-Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI) in 2013 upon the declaration of a new caliphate by self-declared
caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The group’s ideology draws on theological
writings of Salafist-Islamist writers across the Muslim world --mainly Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and from within the al-Qaeda network-- however it also
14 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security-idUSKCN0VE0XL
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represents a new stage in the evolution of jihadist discourse. While al-Qaeda
had never attempted territorial control, IS explicitly sought to establish a Sunni
Salafist caliphate which was territorially contiguous, “remaining and
expanding” to incorporate new ‘Emirates’ across the Greater Middle East. IS
thus differs from other religious extremist organisations in that it has overt
territorial ambitions, and thus more closely resembles a quasi-state. This
assertion is supported by the IS leadership’s actions within their captured
territory: establishing a pseudo-governmental bureaucracy in Raqqa in Syria,
minting a currency, levying taxes, etc.
Attacks perpetrated by IS sympathisers have thus far impacted almost every
continent on Earth. In the United States, two attacks by individuals pledging
allegiance to IS have occurred. The first was a shooting at an office complex in
San Bernardino, California in December 2015, which killed 14 individuals and
wounded a number of others. The attack was carried out by a radicalised
husband and wife, who had pledged allegiance to IS on social media before the
shooting. The husband was an American-born citizen and his wife was a lawful
permanent resident of Pakistani origin. The second attack occurred in June
2016 in Orlando, Florida, when a radicalised American citizen, Omar Mateen,
attacked a gay nightclub of which he had frequently been a patron. Prior to the
attack, Mateen declared himself a “fighter of the Islamic State” on social
media.
Europe has seen the three most striking examples of successful IS attacks
outside of conflict zones. Two attacks occurred in Paris, the first on the offices
of satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo and the second on a series of cafes and
concert halls in Paris’s young and diverse 11th district. In both cases, the
French GIGN (armed police) killed the individuals involved, all of whom were
French citizens, both natural-born and naturalised. In Belgium in March 2016,
bombers attacked the capital’s international airport, killing dozens and
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themselves in the process. The country has made serious changes to its internal
security architecture since, as both the attackers in Brussels and Paris used the
western Bruxelloise suburb of Molenbeek as a staging area for their cells.
Since the attacks, residents of Molenbeek have become some of Europe’s
strongest voices against both harsh anti-immigrant sentiment and religious
radicalisation. In Germany, multiple isolated ‘lone-wolf’ attacks have occurred
over the past year, some of which were perpetrated by German citizens and
some by refugees and migrants. Though some attacks have been linked to
sleeper cells, most were isolated incidents more closely associated with mental
illness.
In Africa, IS-associated groups in Mali and Nigeria have been the deadliest
islamist groups outside the Syrian conflict. Though these militants cannot be
accurately described as “sleeper cells”, their existence nonetheless exemplifies
the spread of Salafist ideology across the globe.
In the Middle East, attacks committed by radicalised Syrian refugees and
Kurdish militants associated with multiple groups, including IS, have hit
various locations in Turkey. The most notable incident took place in Ankara in
October 2015, where two IS militants detonated explosive belts in the middle
of a crowd of demonstrators, killing well over 100 Turkish citizens. In a
separate incident, an IS fighter detonated a bomb in Istanbul near the Blue
Mosque, deliberately targeting foreign nationals and killing 13 German
tourists.
In Asia, a pair of IS militants attacked a bakery in the Bangladeshi capital of
Dhaka, in an attack inspired by the attacks on a Jewish supermarket in Paris
which occurred in tandem with the Charlie Hebdo killings of 2015. When
Bangladeshi security forces retook the building, 20 hostages and 8 bystanders
had been killed. In Quetta, Pakistan in August and October 2016, IS militants
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attacked a hospital full of lawyers and a police academy, respectively. The
attacks together killed over 100 Pakistanis and wounded 100 more. In the tribal
areas of Pakistan’s northern provinces, the threat posed by IS cells is often
exacerbated by the ongoing conflict between central authorities in Islamabad
and the Pakistani Taliban.
Statement of the Problem
IS sleeper cells are a unique evolution of the threat posed by religious
extremism for two reasons: its unique organisational structure and its recruiting
methods.
Unlike al-Qaeda, IS operates with an incredibly decentralised network
structure. Al-Qaeda commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan had tight control
over their cells around the world. Conversely, IS-central in Raqqa has only
varying degrees of spotty contact with its cells in other parts of the world. The
organisation operates more like a franchise enterprise than a typical militant
organisation, thus complicating the tasks of internal security agencies more
accustomed to combatting opponents such as the IRA, Tamil Tigers, leftist
militants, or the PLO. In many cases, fighters are not part of any formal
network and may not even be in contact with IS itself. In such cases, ‘lone
wolf’ fighters plan and execute simple attacks, only linking themselves to IS
and its ideology on social media or in suicide notes as part of their
justifications or manifestos. Often these individuals have little-to-no training,
are typically poorly educated on Islam and takfiri ideology, and more than
likely have non-theological motivations. Such was the case in the 2016
Orlando attack, where the gunman was most likely motivated by a combination
of social isolation, marital troubles, and mental illness, and was never an
extraordinarily or demonstrably religious individual according to his associates
interviewed by authorities. In fact, IS fighters, both in and outside the Syrian
theatre, have shown remarkably low levels of familiarity with the Islamic
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religion in general when compared with the leadership of other organisations
such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda, many of whom were educated in theological
discourse to degree-level.
The result of these two loosely-constructed frameworks --ideology and control-
- mean that almost any violent act committed around the globe is open to ties
to the Islamic State, a link drawn either before the attack by its perpetrators or
ex post facto by IS media outlets. Many attacks by members of militant groups
not officially affiliated with the Islamic State, such as the Pakistani Taliban,
have been appropriated after the fact by opportunistic IS propagandists. The
effect of this strategy is a sense of relentless panic and despair instilled in
target publics, a sort of apocalyptic feeling that IS’s enemies are under siege
while in reality most attacks have very little to do with central authorities
within the Caliphate’s territory. IS is able to capitalise on domestic criminal
activity in otherwise secure nations for its own branding and narrative
purposes. IS leadership’s repeated open calls for Muslims living in the West to
attack any and all civilian targets thus comes as no surprise, as it gives
terrifying significance to any act of violence of any magnitude committed by
any Muslim citizen of any Western country, adding to the IS narrative of
civilisational conflict between Islam and the West.
Islamic State’s decentralised system of sleeper cells creates an organisation
which is hard to track and defeat, and which is extremely adept at taking
advantage of unrelated attacks for propaganda purposes. Even the world’s most
experienced security agencies --DGSÉ, FSB, CIA, MI5, BND- have struggled
to keep up with the dizzying rate at which IS can contact potential
sympathisers through social media, far from its online operators in Iraq and
Syria. In fact, IS itself has internal security organisations both involved in
recruitment abroad and in control of its foreign-born fighters. Most of the
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members of these intelligence-related organs are former members of the
mukhabarat, Saddam Hussein’s internal security service, and thus were trained
by Warsaw Pact agencies such as the KGB and the Stasi. When confronting the
threat of IS sleeper cells, the international community must adopt an approach
which draws upon methods from the fields of counterinsurgency,
counterterrorism, and counterintelligence.
Current Situation
Reports from IS defectors interviewed by European and American media and
academics over the past year reveal the new evolution of IS strategy, one
which is aware of the group’s likely conventional military defeat by Iraqi and
Kurdish security forces (ISF, KRG). Immediately before the ‘13 novembre’
attacks in Paris in 2015, IS leadership began turning away European recruits,
telling them to leave Syria and instead return to Europe and await instructions
to attack European civilians. A number of recruits, thinking they had come to
Iraq and Syria to fight in the Syrian Civil War, were disturbed by this, and
began to speak with media such as the New York Times, Der Spiegel, and Le
Monde, as well as by academic institutions such as King’s College London’s
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR). These ex-recruits
described a network of IS fighters, deliberately interspersed amongst refugees
transiting over land through Turkey and the Balkans, told to return to Europe
and begin organising attacks. Raqqa likely does not have direct control over
the details of attacks carried out by these cells, instead opting to spread their
assets as thin as possible, hoping that a least a few of the IS cells will succeed,
slip past security agencies, and be able to carry out attacks.
Outside of Europe, IS still relies on its franchise network for global influence.
IS franchises are faring differently from region-to-region. While the Libyan
franchise in Sirte is still the group’s wing largest outside of Syria, its Nigerian
and Afghan affiliates are still in fighting form as well. This state of affairs will,
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however, not last, given recent Nigerian military victories, American drone
strikes in Afghanistan, and the slow formation of alliances amongst Libyan
tribes against their IS-affiliated counterpart.
Bloc Positions
Combined Joint Task Force/Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR):
Beyond geographic blocs, it is worth noting the allegiance of certain states to
the coalition currently fighting IS forces in Iraq and Syria, as these states are
more directly invested in the conflict. By engaging the Islamic State militarily,
these states are also more likely to be targeted for attacks by IS fighters. The
OIR member-states kinetically engaged with IS are as follows: Australia,
Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Kurdistan Regional Government, Latvia, New
Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UAE, United Kingdom, United States.
Europe: European states are particularly vulnerable to infiltration by sleeper
cells for a number of political, geographic, and socioeconomic reasons.
Equally, the large Muslim minorities present in many European states are
particularly vulnerable to radicalisation, especially in states where these
minorities are socioeconomically marginalised. European states currently face
a dual security threat both from the violence of IS sleeper cells and nationalist
hate crimes in response to high numbers of migrants. These problems are
further complicated by Continental European states’ open borders. The EU has
thus focused on common border security agencies --lead by Italy-- and
intelligence sharing mechanisms --lead by France and Belgium--.
Middle Eastern States: By proximity, these states are the most vulnerable to
IS sleeper cell formation, and man states such as Libya and Afghanistan have
seen organisations which started as small cells metastasize into fully-fledged
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‘emirates’. These states pursued highly varied approaches to the crisis,
depending largely on domestic factors such as the level of authoritarianism in
government, the religious sect of the state, the state’s religious plurality, the
number of refugees accepted, and the sympathies of the given state’s
population for Salafist ideology. Middle Eastern states, even those within the
Arab League, do not form a contiguous bloc on such issues relating to the
Syrian Civil War. Notable divisions exist particularly in the power struggle
between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.
Russia and Central Asian States: Moscow and the Central Asian republics
which rely on her for military assistance are highly concerned by infiltration
from sleeper cells given their large Muslim populations and histories of inter-
religious violence in the region. These states have taken hardline stances on
internal security in an attempt to combat ‘homegrown terrorism’ since the First
Chechen War of the 1990s.
East Asia: Only China has become truly concerned by the prospect of
domestic terrorism resulting from allegiances to global jihadist movements,
and with good reason, given Beijing’s complicated relationship with its
western provinces. China has relied upon a combination of a security
crackdown in western provinces and an informational campaign to create a
Han Chinese ethnic identity which transcends the country’s diverse religious
composition.
South Asia: All three major South Asian states --India, Bangladesh, and
Pakistan, are gravely threatened by IS sleeper cells. All three states have strong
nationalist, separatist, and irredentist political factions, which when combined
with allegiances to a terrorist organisation such as IS could prove threatening.
Bangladesh was the victim of an IS-aligned terrorist attack in 2016 in its
capital which specifically targeted foreign nationals.
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Questions A Resolution Must Address
• What role can the General Assembly play in international coordination on
counterterrorism writ large?
• How will the international community address the diffusion of ISIS be
affected by the impending defeat of the group’s bases of operations in Syria
and Iraq? Will the nature of the group change moving forward?
• How do the solutions to combating radicalisation differ from region-to-
region?
• How should states treat citizens who travelled to fight for the Islamic State?
Sources
Aubenas, Florence. “Attentats de Paris : la bande de Molenbeek”. Le Monde
(Bruxelles). 4 May 2016.
Callimachi, Rukmini. “How a Secretive Branch of ISIS Built a Global
Network of Killers”. New York Times (New York). 3 August 2016.
Cronin, Audrey. “The Islamic State is Not a Terrorist Group”. Foreign Affairs
(New York), March 2015.
Damgé, Mathilde. “Origine, puissance, financement : les clefs pour
comprendre l’Etat islamique”. Le Monde (Paris), November 2015.
Filiu, Jean-Pierre. Un si proche orient (blog, various entries), Le Monde (Paris).
Filiu, Jean-Pierre. “L’Amérique en déni de l’État islamique”, Le Monde
(Paris). 25 January 2016.
Laumonier, Alexandre. “Molenbeek-Saint-Jean n’est pas un ghetto”. Le Monde
(Bruxelles). 23 November 2015.
Lebovich, Andrew. “How ‘religious’ are ISIS fighters? The relationship
between religious literacy and religious motivation”. Brookings Institute
(Washington). 13 April 2016.
Sèbe, Berny. “Sousse shows the deadly potential of the Isis franchise”. The
Guardian (London). 28 June 2015.
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Shavit, Uriya. “Al-Qaeda's Saudi Origins”. Middle East Quarterly. Fall 2006.
Pg. 3-13.
Weiss, Michael. “How ISIS Picks its Suicide Bombers”. The Daily Beast (New
York). 16 November 2015.
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Conference Information
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