Document of The World Bankdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/... · Document of The World Bank ......

Document of

The World Bank

Report No: ICR00002553

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(IDA-40730)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 21.0 MILLION

(US$ 31.73 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

FOR A

ROAD SAFETY PROJECT

JUNE 15, 2013

Vietnam Sustainable Development Unit

Sustainable Development Department

East Asia and Pacific Region

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective February 28, 2013)

Currency Unit = Vietnamese Dong (VND)

VND 1.00 = US$ 0.000048

US$ 1.00 = VND 20,806

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 – December 31

ADB Asian Development Bank

CAS Country Assistance Strategy

CPGRS Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy

DCA Development Credit Agreement

DP Displaced person

DRVN Directorate for Roads of Vietnam

EMDP Ethnic Minority Development Plan

EMP Environmental Management Plan

ERR Economic Rate of Return

GOV Government of Vietnam

ICB International Competitive Bidding

IDA International Development Association

IFRs Interim Financial Reports

JBIC Japan Bank for International Cooperation

JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MOET Ministry of Education and Training

MOH Ministry of Health

MOPS Ministry of Public Security

MOT Ministry of Transport

MTR Mid-Term Review

NCB National Competitive Bidding

NPTS National Program for Traffic Safety

NRADS National Road Accident Database System

NTSC National Traffic Safety Committee

PIP Project Implementation Plan

PMU Project Management Unit

QCBS Quality Cost Based Selection

RAP Resettlement Action Plan

TSPMU Traffic Safety Project Management Unit

TSSR Transport Safety Strategy Review

UNDP United Nations Development Program

VRA Vietnam Road Administration

VRSP Vietnam Road Safety Project

Regional Vice President: Axel Van Trotsenburg, EAPVP

Country Director: Victoria Kwakwa, EACVF

Sector Director:

Sector Manager:

John Roome, EASSD

Jennifer Sara, EASVS

Task Team Leader: Van Anh Thi Tran, EASIN

ICR Team Leader: Reda Hamedoun, EASIN

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Vietnam Road Safety Project

CONTENTS

Data Sheet

A. Basic Information……………………………………………………………………..…. . i

B. Key Dates…………………………………………………………………………...……...i

C. Ratings Summary…………………………………………………………………………..i

D. Sector and Theme Codes…………………………………………………………………..ii

E. Bank Staff………………………………………………………………………………….ii

F. Results Framework Analysis……………………………………………………………….ii

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs…………………………………………………..vi

H. Restructuring………………………………...……………………………………………vi

I. Disbursement Graph……………………………………………………………..……….vii

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 4

3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 11

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................... 15

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 16

6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 18

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 20

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 21

Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 22

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 23

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 29

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 31

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................... 32

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 33

Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 37

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 38

MAP…………………………………………………………………………………...39

i

A. Basic Information

Country: Vietnam Project Name: Road Safety Project

Project ID: P085080 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-40730

ICR Date: 10/08/2012 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: MINISTRY OF

TRANSPORT

Original Total

Commitment: SDR 21.00M Disbursed Amount: SDR 15.82M

Revised Amount: SDR 16.50M

Environmental Category: B

Implementing Agencies: National Traffic Safety Committee

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 12/17/2003 Effectiveness: 03/09/2006 03/09/2006

Appraisal: 12/13/2004 Restructuring(s): NA

12/16/2009 and

06/20/2011

(closing date

extensions)

Approval: 06/07/2005 Mid-term Review: 02/23/2009 03/06/2009

Closing: 12/31/2009 12/31/2012

C. Ratings Summary

C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate

Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing

Agency/Agencies: Moderately satisfactory

Overall Bank

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Borrower

Performance: Moderately satisfactory

ii

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation

Performance Indicators

QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project

at any time (Yes/No): No

Quality at Entry

(QEA): None

Problem Project at any

time (Yes/No): Yes

Quality of

Supervision (QSA): None

DO rating before

Closing/Inactive status:

Moderately

Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Central government administration 57 60

General education sector 4 5

Health 5 5

Other social services 12 9

Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 22 21

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Injuries and non-communicable diseases 67 64

Other social development 33 36

E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Axel von Trotsenburg Jemal-ud-din Kassum

Country Director: Victoria Kwakwa Klaus Rohland

Sector Manager: Jennifer Sara Jitendra N. Bajpai

Project Team Leader: Van Anh Thi Tran Jerry A. Lebo

ICR Team Leader: Reda Hamedoun

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project development objective is to reduce the rate of accidents, injury and death

associated with road transport through physical improvement and institutional

development to strengthen the management of road transport safety.

iii

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target

Values (from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised

Target

Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

Indicator 1 : Accident rates per 100 million vehicle-km in project corridors.

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

39 29 25

Date achieved 12/31/2004 09/30/2012 03/31/2012

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved. The original target was a 26% reduction from the baseline, and

the actual target achieved a 36% reduction. The outcome was then

achieved at 138%1.

Indicator 2 : Injury rate per 100 million vehicle-km in project corridors.

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

130 62 107.1

Date achieved 12/31/2004 12/31/2012 09/30/2012

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Partially achieved. The original target was a 52% reduction from the

baseline, and the actual target achieved a18% reduction. The outcome was

then partially achieved at 34%. 2

Indicator 3 : Fatality rate per 100 million vehicle-km in project corridors.

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

13 6 5.1

Date achieved 12/31/2004 12/31/2012 09/30/2012

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved. The original target was a 54% reduction from the baseline, and

the actual target achieved a 61% reduction. The outcome was then

achieved at 113%.3

1 Original baseline for accidents was estimated based on the nationwide ratio of reported accidents by the

Police to reported fatalities. Using a different methodology, the M&E consultant set a baseline of 8.5 per

100m-vkt, based on data collected in 2009, and an end value of 5.4. For the purpose of this ICR, the M&E

end value was converted into the actual end value used above to take into account the methodology used

for the PAD and end up with numbers comparable with the baseline.

2 Original baseline for injuries were estimated at ten times the number of fatalities based on experience in

developed countries and included all types of injuries, even slight injuries. Using a different methodology

(including serious injuries only), the actual data was 2.8 severe injuries per 100m-vkt in 2009, and

collected an end value of 2.5. For the purpose of this ICR, this end value was converted into the actual end

value used above to take into account the methodology used for the PAD.

iv

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target

Values (from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised

Target

Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

Indicator 1 : Performance-based national road safety strategy (phase 2), including

financing plan, developed and approved by Government.

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

N/A

Final strategy

document

approved by

Government

Approved by the

Government

Date achieved 12/31/2004 09/30/2012 03/31/2012

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

This document is more of an overarching policy paper on road safety.

Indicator 2 : Traffic exceeding posted speed limits (%), reduced

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

30

No target

established in the

PAD

18

Date achieved 12/31/2004 12/31/2012 09/30/2012

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

40% reduction from the baseline. The original baseline was

underestimated during project preparation. A new baseline of 64% was

estimated by the B8.1 consultant in April 2011.

Indicator 3 : Motor cycle riders wearing helmets (%), improved

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

25

No target

established in the

PAD

93

Date achieved 01/01/2004 12/31/2012 09/30/2012

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

272% increase from the baseline. The Helmet Law mandated in 2007

constituted a major step in addressing safety and awareness issues and

reflected the growing importance of road safety issues in the national

dialogue.

Indicator 4 : % of motorcycle drivers licensed, improved

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

73

No target

established in the

PAD

93

3 Using a different methodology than the one used during preparation, the actual data was 8.8 fatalities per

100m-vkt in 2009, and collected an end value of 5.1. For the purpose of this ICR, the end value was

converted into the actual end value used above to take into account the methodology used for the PAD.

v

Date achieved 12/31/2008 06/30/2012 09/30/2012

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

27% increase from the revised baseline. The original baseline value (95%)

was overestimated and revised in December 2008.

Indicator 5 : % of commercial vehicle operator licensed, improved

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

95

No target

established in the

PAD

97

Date achieved 12/31/2004 06/30/2012 09/30/2012

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

2% increase from the baseline.

Indicator 6 : % of vehicles in demonstration corridors passing first time inspection,

improved

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

90

No target

established in the

PAD

75.5

Date achieved 11/31/2004 06/30/2012 03/31/2012

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

16% decrease from the baseline. The change is likely due to the

enforcement of more stringent vehicle testing standards

Indicator 7 : Percentage of NRADS completed

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

0 100 95

Date achieved 12/31/2004 06/30/2012 09/30/2012

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved. The equipment has been installed, and testing/training has been

completed.

Indicator 8 : Number of biannual road safety reports prepared in accordance with

project monitoring and evaluation guidelines

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

0 7 7

Date achieved 12/31/2004 06/30/2012 09/30/2012

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Achieved.

Indicator 9 :

Number of annual reports on effectiveness of treatments and

interventions prepared in accordance with project monitoring and

evaluation guidelines

Value

quantitative or

Qualitative)

0 4 3

vi

Date achieved 11/31/2004 06/30/2012 03/31/2012

Comments

(incl. %

achievement)

Partially achieved (75%).

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR

Archived DO IP

Actual

Disbursements

(USD millions)

1 01/05/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00

2 02/26/2007 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.56

3 05/17/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately

Unsatisfactory 2.42


Unsatisfactory 2.42


Unsatisfactory 3.00


Unsatisfactory 3.37

7 01/05/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.99


9 12/24/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 15.50


H. Restructuring (if any)

Extension to the Development Credit Agreement Closing Date (December 16, 2009)

for 18 months

Second extension to the Development Credit Agreement Closing Date (June 29,

2011) for 18 months

vii

I. Disbursement Profile

1

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

Country and Sector background at appraisal

At the time of project preparation, rapid economic growth was accompanied by rapid

traffic growth. From 1990 to 2004, the number of automobiles had increased 2.5 times

and the number of motorcycles had increased more than 8 times. Over 90 percent of the

11-12 million motorized vehicles in Vietnam in 2004 were motorcycles. Yet in

comparison to those of other Asian countries, motorization levels in Vietnam were still

low, indicating that vehicle ownership would continue to increase with economic growth.

Road fatalities had increased 39 percent in 2000/2001 and 22 percent in 2001/2002.

Vietnam had a reported fatality rate of about 12 per 10,000 vehicles and an accident rate of

about 20 per 10,000 vehicles in 2004. These rates were below those of China (about 25-30

fatalities per 10,000 vehicles), but higher than those of Thailand and Malaysia or found in

OECD countries (in the range of 1-2 fatalities per 10,000 vehicles). In Vietnam, as in

many other countries, under-reporting of accidents and fatalities was significant. The

Vietnam Multi-Center Injury Survey of 27,000 households estimated that there were

900,000 road traffic accidents involving injury in 2001, in comparison to reported

accidents of 25,000. Similarly, road-related fatalities were estimated to be underreported

by about 30 percent.

Government Strategy

The Government of Vietnam (GOV), at the highest levels and across sectors, was

considering improving road safety a high priority. Vietnam’s 2002-2010 National Policy

on Accident and Injury Prevention noted that injuries related to road accidents were not

just a transport sector issue, but a leading factor in a wider national injury crisis. The

Government strategy was spelled out in the National Program for Traffic Safety (NPTS),

which covered the 2001-2005 periods. The NPTS called for policy and physical

interventions funded by government budgets, driver training and licensing fees, insurance,

as well as official development assistance. Its activities included (i) education and

publicity campaigns, (ii) road safety audits, (iii) identification and treatment of blackspots,

(iv) development of a traffic accident reporting and analysis database, (v) improvement in

the driver training and licensing system, (vi) creation of first-aid stations, and (vii)

modernization of the motor vehicle registration and inspection system.

The National Traffic Safety Committee (NTSC) was already responsible for

coordinating the delivery of NPTS activities and reporting on progress. It had a

secretariat (Executive Office) in MOT. Eleven ministries were represented on the NTSC at

the deputy minister or vice minister level. National government funding for NTSC and

road safety activities carried out by line ministries came from traffic fine receipts. The

majority (60 percent) of these funds was going directly to the Road and Rail Traffic Police

Administration (RRTPA) under the Ministry of Public Security, while other road safety

activities and NTSC received 35 percent. The remainder was used for general budget

support. Local funding for traffic safety activities also came from fines, with the bulk

allocated to traffic police, traffic inspection, and local police departments (52 percent).

The remainder was used to fund vehicle inspection centers, local traffic safety departments,

2

and local government road safety activities. The overall level of funding for road safety in

2003 was about US$45 million, split equally between local and national expenditure.

Rationale for Bank Assistance

The World Bank partnered with the World Health Organization in 2004 to produce the

World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention, demonstrating both organizations’

recognition of road safety as a major world health issue. The Bank, due to this

experience and commitment, and its substantial engagement in the road sector in Vietnam

since 1994, was well positioned to work with GOV on road safety. The design of the

project also took into consideration the findings of the Transport Safety Strategy Review

(TSSR) and was consistent in size and scope with objectives described in the 2004 CAS

Progress Report for Vietnam (2004).

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

The project development objective was to reduce the rate of accidents, injury and death

associated with road transport through physical improvement and institutional

development to strengthen the management of road transport safety.

The key performance indicators were:

Rates of accident, injury, and death on project road corridors reduced;

Development and government approval of a national road safety strategy specifying

achievable performance targets and a financing plan;

Driver behavior and compliance with vehicle and licensing standards on project road

corridors improved; and

Monitoring and evaluation framework implemented in project corridors and used to

prioritize road safety interventions, and national road accident database system

(NRADS) established and updated regularly.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and

reasons/justification

The PDO was not revised.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

The main beneficiaries of VRSP include road users, roadside communities, and

businesses in the three demonstration corridors. The main direct benefits of the project

come from the reductions in social costs resulting from the reduced numbers and severity

of fatalities and injuries caused by road accidents. These benefits include (i) the reduction

in the incidence and severity of road accident injury and death and the associated cost to

individuals and the Vietnamese economy, (ii) the reduction in the public resources wasted

by road accidents, including the temporary or permanent loss and diversion of human

resources, the consumption of medical resources, and the damage or destruction of

property, and (iii) the improved efficiency of road transport due to the reduced economic

inefficiencies resulting from road accident trauma.

Beneficiaries also included government agencies engaged in coordinating road safety,

as well as the institutions (NTSC, MOT, MOH, MOET, MOPS) that benefited from the

implementation support activities and trainings. The benefits include the cost savings

3

from greater effectiveness of road safety interventions, which stemmed from the increased

institutional capacity to monitor, evaluate, and manage road safety and collect data at both

the national and road network levels. Benefits extended to populations in the whole

country through the nationwide awareness campaigns, vehicle inspections, driving

licensing and enforcement.

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

This US$31.7 million project financed by IDA consisted of three components to be

implemented over the 2005-2009 period: (a) The Institutional and Capacity Building

Program, (b) The Road Safety Demonstration and Awareness Program, and (c) Road

Safety Monitoring and Evaluation Program.

Component A - Institutional and capacity building program (US$7.84 million) to

provide technical assistance and project implementation support to strengthen the

management and technical capacity of the NTSC Executive Office, the Traffic Safety

Project Management Unit (TS PMU), the sub-PMUs, and corridor supervision teams. This

component was also to support the preparation of a performance based national road safety

strategy, including a financing plan.

Component B. Road safety demonstration and awareness program (US$20.89 million) to develop and implement comprehensive, integrated safety programs along three high-

risk national road corridors. The three demonstration corridors identified for inclusion

under the project were: (i)National Highway 1 between Hanoi and Vinh (281 km); ( ii)

National Highway 1 between Ho Chi Minh City and Can Tho City (1 5 1 km); and (3)

Highway 51 from Dong Nai province to Vung Tau (80 km). This component had 12

subcomponents.

The component also supported: (i) the Vietnam Register in upgrading its national vehicle

inspection system, computer and communications equipment, software development, and

vehicle inspection equipment, including specialized vehicle inspection equipment at three

primary national vehicle inspection stations (Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and Vinh Long).; (ii) Vietnam Road Administration VRA with equipment to improve the driver training

centers at Chi Linh and in Dong Nai province and related facilities;.(iii) consulting

services for VRA to conduct road safety audits and blackspot or black route identification

and treatment; (iv) the Traffic Police through the provision of vehicles and equipment to

implement a general-deterrence road safety enforcement program in the three

demonstration corridors; (v) a program of road user education (MOET) and public

awareness (NTSC) in the three demonstration corridors, using targeted social marketing

techniques; (vi) Ministry of Education and Training with the provision of school road safety

education materials, equipment, and associated training for a program of primary,

secondary, and tertiary road safety education in the three demonstration corridors; (vii)

Ministry of Health by providing materials, equipment, and training for an emergency

medical services program in the three demonstration corridors; (viii) and operating costs

and local consulting services.

Component C. Road Safety Monitoring and Evaluation Program (US$6.20 million), to

support the development of the National Road Accident Database System (NRADS) and a

comprehensive program of project corridor monitoring and evaluation.

4

1.6 Revised Components

B1: Some blackspots on Highway 51 and NH1 were removed under other projects

(Highway 51 upgrading and NH1 widening).

B5: Purchase of driving license printing system in lieu of equipment in the Dong Nai

driver training center

B7: Purchase of a camera system in lieu of cars and equipment from the police

B4.3: Cancellation of subcomponent B4.3after agreement with GOV that equipment

for vehicle inspection centers would be provided through GOV funding

B8,2: Reduction in the scope of work in education and awareness raising program

under B8.2. Instead of broad based awareness programs, these programs were

redesigned to address specific target groups with specific themes.

Reduction in overseas training under A4.2 reducing the training cost from US$552k to

US$270k.

1.7 Other significant changes

Extension of Closing Dates: The closing date was extended twice: (i) from December 31,

2009 to June 30, 2011 to address the priority time-bound action plan to accelerate

implementation that was set during the midterm review mission; and (ii) for 18 months

from June 30, 2011 to December 31, 2012 to allow for the conclusion of several on-going

training activities and completion of substantial packages critical to the full achievement

of the project development objectives.

Credit Cancellation. Approximately US$6.9 million equivalent would remain unspent

from the credit, due to (i) overlap with other projects and the reduction of number of

blackspots treated under the project, (ii) contingencies amounting to approximately

US$1.3 million would not be required, (iii) close management of consultants generating

saving of up to US$ 1 million and (iv) exchange rate gains between SDR and USD by

about US$1.2 million.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

Project preparation and design were heavily based on a Transport Safety Strategy

Review (TSSR) that the Bank conducted in 2003. This TSSR assessed government

programs and approaches to road safety and set out short to long term strategies to address

deteriorating road safety in Vietnam. In June 2003, the Bank and GOV discussed the

findings of the TSSR and the main issues in the sector and agreed that a road safety

initiative intervention should target the following issues:

Capacity and accountability. Institutionally, the most pressing need in road safety

was to strengthen the capacity, resources, and skills of the agencies responsible for

delivering the government’s program, including NTSC. The legal framework at the

time focused on NTSC’s role in coordination, leaving the responsibility for

implementation with central government agencies, other relevant organizations, and

provincial and municipal People’s Committees. The team concluded that this limited

accountability for overall outcomes and makes coordination difficult. Component A of

VRSP, with its focus on management and operating costs support to NTSC, technical

5

assistance to sub-PMU teams, training and the funding of a performance-based road

safety national strategy, aimed at correcting this.

Knowledge and awareness of road safety. International experience suggested that

projects emphasizing traffic management functions (driver licensing, vehicle

inspection/registration…), only had marginal impact on accident and fatality rates in

the short term. To rapidly curb accident and fatality rates, international experience

suggested that targeted, cost-effective measures such as speed-limit and drunk-driving

enforcement, separation of traffic, and motorcycle helmet law enforcement, were more

effective. This had to be accompanied by measures to raise public awareness of the

importance compliance with road safety laws, in a country where drunk-driving posed

a bigger traffic safety problem than was acknowledged, and where laws requiring

motorcycle helmets were seen by the public as ineffective. Component B, with its

focus on road user awareness, road safety education in schools and vehicle registration

and driver testing, targeted precisely this issue.

The project design also took into consideration the conclusions of the World Report on

Road Traffic Injury prevention. The report recommended to (i) make road safety a

political priority, (ii) appoint a lead agency for road safety, give it adequate resources, and

make it publicly accountable, (iii) develop a multidisciplinary approach to road safety, (iv)

set appropriate road safety targets and establish a national road safety plan to achieve them,

(v) create budgets for road safety and increase investment in demonstrably effective road

safety activities. In line with these guidelines, VRSP was conceived as a stand-alone road

safety project to reflects the high level of political support for this issue in the country,

supported accountability and coordination through NTSC, involved MOT and the

ministries of Public Security, Education and Training, and Health for implementation, and

focused on demonstration corridors to show the effectiveness of road safety initiatives.

Despite this careful preparation process, the program was over capacity of the involved

agencies in the country which ultimately led to a difficult implementation of the project

and a delay of 36 months in its closing. In particular, the project design could have been

improved in the following two areas:

An overly complex design: Simplicity of design is a key factor of success in

environments where the multiplicity of stakeholders (from NTSC to line ministries,

from the Traffic Safety Project Management Unit (TSPMU) to sub-PMUs, from

contractors to provincial and central authorities), suboptimal administrative processes,

weak institutional capacity, discrepancies in appraisal procedures between ministries,

and a wide geographical project area scope are bound to make implementation

complex. Contrary to this view, VRSP included 18 sub-components for a $US 31

million project, triggered the procurement of more than 60 packages (ranging from

black spot treatment detailed designs and mobile inspection vehicles to the purchase of

helmets and a road user awareness campaign), and involved 63 cities and provinces all

over Vietnam. This design made it extremely challenging to retain the project focus, to

coordinate the preparation of all the components across agencies, and ultimately to

allow for a timely and effective implementation of the project.

The lack of clear and effective institutional arrangements: Under the designed

implementation arrangements, NTSC, with support of its Executive Office (NTSC-

EO), acted as the executive agency responsible for overall project oversight and

created the TSPMU for coordinating day to day implementation (including

procurement, financial management, and monitoring). On top of this, each of the 6

6

participating agencies (the Ministries of Public Security, Education and Training, and

Health, the VRA and the Vietnam Register under the Ministry of Transport, and the

NTSC Executive Office) were to establish and staff a sub-PMU to implement its part

of the project. Sub-PMUs were responsible for technical decisions and management of

their respective subcomponents. The Ministry of Finance, People’s Committees at the

provincial level and provincial traffic safety departments also had supporting roles.

These suboptimal arrangements were compounded by the fact that the agencies

involved did not always have the adequate authority or resources to conduct their

tasks: in particular, NTSC, by mandate an overarching agency for all ministries, had

neither the legal authority nor the adequate resources to carry out its leadership role

and direct participating agencies, which proved a major obstacle towards the smooth

implementation of the project. Moreover, initially tasking the TSPMU (under the

authority of NTSC) of procurement responsibilities for packages to be implemented by

sub-PMUs (under the authority of the ministries and agencies instituting them) would

clearly lead to severe implementation delays.

2.2 Implementation

The implementation of the project went through two very distinct phases: lagging and

ineffective from loan effectiveness to early 2009, timely and satisfactory from early 2009

to the actual closing date. But the complexity of the project implementation arrangements

and design, combined with significant delays in the procurement of activities critical to the

execution of the project, resulted in extremely slow disbursements. As a result, VRSP was

flagged as a problem project in July 2008, and the closing date was extended twice: from

December 31, 2009 to June 30, 2011, and then to December 2012.

From March 2006 to March 2009, the overall progress of the project remained

extremely low. By June 2008, the majority of activities were either at preparation (80%)

or under bidding (12%), with only 8% under actual implementation. By November 2008,

or one year before the original closing date of December 2009, the disbursement rate was

8.7%. At the time of the mid-term review in February 2009 (itself postponed several times

since early 2008), 13% of the activities were under implementation and 3% had been

completed. Three main issues could be identified as being behind the execution setbacks:

Initial procurement delays: The delay in the procurement of the A1 Consultancy

proved to be a major setback for project implementation. This subcomponent was

designed to finance an integrated package of technical assistance to support

capacity building and implementation support across all project components and

implementing agencies. The procurement of this A1 Consultancy started in 2007

bus as a result of complaints received regarding procurement handling and the

selection process, the package was re-bid in the third quarter of 2008 after

experiencing a long delay. The consultant was finally mobilized in November 2009,

but the delay had a significant impact on all the components dependent on its

support.

Institutional issues: The weak institutional capacity and limitation of resources of

NTSC hindered the smooth implementation of VRSP. The NTSC, by mandate, was

the key road safety planning and coordination body of various ministries to

facilitate road safety initiatives. However, it did not have the authority, the staff

7

nor the expertise to exercise its oversight of the project as defined through the

institutional arrangements of the projects. In effect, the NTSC (i) only had advisory

powers and was not positioned at the higher level of decision-making, (ii) its

resources were markedly insufficient in terms of manpower, access to data, and for

conducting studies and analyses, and (iii) its staff did not include a large amount of

traffic safety specialists.

Lack of proactive supervision: During the first two years of project

implementation, and despite the fact that the disbursement rate was below 8%,

official supervision remained extremely limited. Until the project was flagged as a

problem status in July 2008, only three official supervision missions were

conducted after the Credit signing of the Development Credit Agreement (DCA):

in December 2005, in October 2006, and in July 2007. Similarly, only three

Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) were completed and filed from 2006 to 2008.

This, along with a late mid-term review, led VRSP to be delayed due to recurrent

procurement issues and, ultimately, to a delay of three years in project closing.

From March 2009 up until the closing of the project in December 2012, the

implementation of the project progressed smoothly and efficiently. The diagnosis and

recommendations of the mid-term review, as well as the rigorous and proactive follow up

enabled by a tightened supervision process were key elements behind the turnaround of

the project.

The three main factors behind the acceleration of the execution of the project can be

identified as the following:

A vigorous supervision of the project, and agreement on a time bound action

plan: by July 2009, the 19 targets set by the midterm review to upgrade the project to

normal status had been met (with the exception of the award of the A1 consulting

services contract). That contract was signed on September 2009. Following this

approach, a further series of 9 targets were agreed to be completed by October 2009

and were achieved. All in all, 6 official supervision missions were conducted from

March 2009 to the closing of the project. In addition, close daily supervision allowed

to provide timely support to the client, and the task team adopted a proactive approach

The task team always seeked support from Bank management and asked government

leadership to provide timely decisions/responses.

The restructuring of the project, as a significant streamlining effort regarding the

scope of the project subcomponents took place after the midterm review, allowing

the project to regain its focus. Subcomponent B6 (road safety audits/safety

inspections) was added to the contract for the consultant engaged under C2

(demonstration corridors M&E) and there was a reduction in the scope of work in

education and awareness raising program under B8.2 to address specific target groups

with specific themes. Overseas training under A4.2 was also reduced in order to

concentrate efforts on components with the most impact. The Bank and GOV also

agreed to cancel the Vehicle Inspection Equipment (B4.3).

Institutional changes: In order to strengthen the capacity of NTSC, GOV passed the

Decree No.32 to consolidate its structures and decision-making procedures with the

Deputy Prime Minister instated as the Chair of NTSC. Also, a change of leadership

was implemented at TSPMU, which had noticeable effects in terms of project

8

ownership, clearer direction and faster delivery of procurement documents. Staffing

resources were also strengthened in both NTSC and TSPMU

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

The M&E framework was designed based on 4Es (Engineering, Education,

Enforcement, Emergency) approach and the Road Safety Management Pyramid, which

links interventions to intermediate outcomes to primary outcomes in road safety. The

primary outcomes of road safety programs are usually the reduction of number of

accidents, injuries and fatalities that occur, outcomes which were applied to VRSP.

Accidents were classified by severity levels of fatal, severe injury and slight injury.

Intermediate outcomes (such as decrease in traffic exceeding posted speed limits, better

maintained vehicles, increase in motor cycle riders wearing helmets or increase of safety

belt usage) were used to measure compliance with traffic law or standards that are directly

related to the primary outcomes and thus the accident scenarios.

M&E implementation focused on the collection of data for the demonstration corridors,

on the development of a methodology for monitoring road safety improvements and

interventions, and on the training local staff in methods and procedures. VRSP

collected its own data on the three demonstration corridors on traffic volume, speed,

helmet and seatbelt wearing, alcohol usage and vehicle/driver documentation through

surveys carried out by the M&E consultant: in total, starting mid-2008, 9 vehicle speed

surveys were carried out, as well as 18 helmet and seatbelt usage surveys, 8 alcohol and

vehicle/driver licensing surveys in cooperation with the Traffic Police, and traffic volume

8-hour counts each December in cooperation with VRA. Other data were collected from

stakeholders, including registration data, MOH injury records, driver´s licensing, vehicle

inspection statistics and official nationwide accident statistics from the Traffic Police. For

instance, the accident data from the corridors was hand collected by the consultant every

quarter from the responsible police stations along the three corridors.

Six training courses were also conducted on monitoring, evaluating and reporting of

road safety projects and interventions, as well as reporting of primary and intermediate

outcomes: a road safety audit course for TSPMU and VRA staff in May 2008, a blackspot

identification, investigation and treatment Course in September 2008, an information

management course on Project Management for TSPMU and the sub-PMUs in December

2008, two courses for the police on May 2012 to raise awareness of road safety,

enforcement and data collection, and a general M&E course for all stakeholders in

November 2012.

Due to a lack of reliable data at appraisal the M&E framework presented in the PAD

omitted critical targets and some baseline values proved to be inaccurate. Issues with the

quality of road safety data were recognized in the PAD. To address the need for high

quality data the project included the design, development and commissioning of a National

Road Accident Database System (NRADS), the intermediate indicator for this activity was

achieved by the end of the project. To improve the poor quality of the appraisal data the

project included a contract for monitoring and evaluation along the demonstration

corridors. Work under this contract confirmed the problem of significant underreporting of

injuries and attempted to reconcile data from different sources.

9

However, the results of this M&E work were only available at the end of the project and

more attention should have been devoted from the outset to setting up a rigorous M&E

framework. Due to the low quality of the baseline figures estimated during preparation

(and used in the PAD), difficulties were encountered in measuring changes from these

baselines during implementation. Also, key results indicators for Component B

(percentage of traffic exceeding posted speed limits, of motorcycle riders wearing helmets,

of motorcycle drivers licensed, of commercial vehicle operators licensed, of vehicles in

demonstration corridors passing first time inspection) were missing from the PAD and

thus undermined the quality of the M&E framework.

In the PAD baseline estimates for total number of accidents and injuries were estimated

based on factors applied to the number of fatalities as reported by MOPS, the factors

applied were derived from experience in developed countries. This approach assumed (i)

that the MOPS data for number of fatalities was reliable, and (ii) that the factors applied

were appropriate to Vietnam. Both of these assumptions proved to be flawed in that (i) the

MOPS data underreported fatalities, and (ii) the factors used to determine the number of

accidents and injuries were too low, resulting in further underreporting. To address these

issues, the M&E activities developed a revised baseline based on a more rigorous analysis

of available data. In particular, greater use was made of MOH data to compliment MOPS

data. For the purposes of this ICR, and to be able to compare the measurements with the

original baseline, the M&E data reported at the end of the project was converted to be

compatible to the baseline indicators from the PAD, using the factor of injuries reported

by MOH to the amount of serious injuries reported by MOPS. This approach does not

address underreporting of accidents and injuries in the PAD baselines, suggesting that the

actual reduction in accidents and injuries was greater than that reported in this ICR.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

Procurement

Procurement was moderately satisfactory, as procurement issues were the main factor

behind the significant delays experienced in project implementation. The capacity

building and implementation support (A1.1) consultant, who was by design instrumental

for management and procurement assistance, was mobilized in October 2009, after being

delayed by re-bidding. The first contract for blackspot treatment civil works (B1.1) was

signed in April 2010 and the consulting services for the design of the accident database, a

key element for identifying blackspot locations and strategic interventions, was signed in

October 2010. Commencements of these crucial contracts were behind the originally

planned schedule for a minimum of 12 months. This significant delay was mainly caused

by the lack of ownership and adequate capacity of the implementing agencies in charge.

The original VRSP implementation plan was based on the assumption that an international

consultant would be available at the start of the project to provide implementation support

(A1.1), particularly for procurement. A large portion of this assistance for management

was intended for the preparation of bidding documents for all packages, work plans and

for on demand assistance. As a result of the delayed arrival of the implementation support

consultant, a large number of packages had to be prepared entirely by the sub-PMUs

without external guidance. The signature of the contract with the consultant in October

2009 streamlined the procurement process significantly, but issues remained as the

consultant did not attend evaluation meetings, restricted to evaluation members selected

by the authorities. Similarly, the consultant could not advise the quality control of the

independent body selected (TCQM), which was involved in every payment pre-approval

10

process of the project. TCQM approved all requests from the NTSC, regardless of the

amounts involved, generating further delays.

The lack of familiarity with WB procurement guidelines and discrepancies in

procedures across agencies slowed down project implementation considerably. The

absence of formally established and fully functional sub-project implementing agencies,

inadequate procurement capacity of the project implementing agencies and inadequate

familiarity of the participating agencies with Bank procurement rules, and the high-risk

procurement environment were not sufficiently mitigated through the several training

activities for the procurement teams. Also, appraisal procedures within GOV remained

complex and lengthy, as they involved specialized ministries with their own procedures

and having to coordinate their activities through Decision no. 387 (2007).

Financial Management

Financial management was generally satisfactory over the course of the implementation

of the project. While the NTSC was the executing agency for VRSP, internal controls,

quarterly financial reports, disbursement progress and follow up with audit issues were

managed by TSPMU. The accounting system of TSPMU was assessed as adequate, after a

new accounting software (ANA) was introduced in June 2010, even though minor

mistakes in general accounting balances persisted. IFRs, expected by the Bank no later

than 45 days after the end of each calendar quarter, were submitted timely and were

generally of acceptable quality (despite recurrent, but later corrected, errors such as not

carrying forward the opening cash balance of Government Counterpart Fund or incorrect

reporting of counterpart expenditures). The internal controls as regulated in the FM

manual were complied with, and bank, cash, fixed assets were satisfactorily maintained.

There were regular occurrences of ineligible expenditures (honorarium fees paid to civil

servants for a training course, financing of “receiving/welcoming guest activities”), but

these were swiftly refunded in accordance with the Project DCA. External audit reports

were submitted to the Bank on time, have unqualified audit opinion and with acceptable

quality.

Social Safeguards

The project triggered the Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12 safeguards), but

safeguards implementation work (under A2) revealed there were no resettlement issues

on the demonstration corridors. The review of potential social impact, based on detailed

designs for the corridors, confirmed there was no land acquisition, resettlement nor

compensation involved for any of the package or corridors.

Environmental safeguards

The project triggered the Environmental Assessment (OP/BP/GP 4.01) safeguards. An

Environmental Management Plan (EMP) was prepared, providing a framework within

VRSP to prevent or mitigate potential environmental impacts. It also provided a

monitoring plan to ensure compliance with the EMP. It assessed potential environmental

impacts and conducted a screening analysis of the 15 proposed blackspot improvements.

The main potential impacts were found to relate to air quality, water quality and noise. It

was considered unlikely that either the direct or indirect impacts of the engineering works

would result in environmental conditions any worse than prevailing situation, and any

environmental impact that is not prevented can be mitigated. The EMP covered the

following five technical areas: materials supply (indirect impacts), soils, hydrology, air

11

quality, noise. The supervision consultants for black-treatment contracts provided

adequate monitoring for the EMP implementation. No petition on the environment issues

was received. The environmental safeguard policies were complied with.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

GOV has been discussing mounting an intervention based on this pilot project. . This

intervention would not only address the lessons learned in VRSP but also lay further

foundation, particularly in the area of road safety and institutional management and

capacity building. The overall goal would converge with VRSP’s: to reduce poverty and

vulnerability in Vietnam by reducing the incidence and severity of road transport injuries

and deaths. The main difference would lie in a greater focus on a select number of

effective road safety improvements and on the simplification of implementation

arrangements, based on lessons learned from VRSP. The objective could therefore be to

reduce the rates of accidents, injury and death associated with road transport through

innovative improvement interventions on high risk corridors and institutional development

to strengthen the management of road safety. This GOV-led intervention would target

quick and improved road safety results in provinces with some innovative Safe System

approach interventions on high-risk corridors. In particular, the Government will allocate

an annual budget to NTSC to sustain the road safety forum and trigger initiatives in road

safety. MOH is preparing a new Master-plan for Ambulance locations; MOET is rolling

out school programs to University Level; Traffic Police is proposing to rollout additional

traffic camera enforcement equipment.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

The project objectives remain relevant to the development priorities of Vietnam at the

time of ICR. By addressing the immediate need to reduce the rates of road accidents,

injuries, and fatalities in the country, the project assisted the FY2012-FY2016 CPS and the

2011-2015 Government’s SEDP objectives of (i) strengthening Vietnam's competitiveness

in the regional and global economy, (ii) increasing the sustainability of its development,

and (iii) broadening access to economic and social opportunity.

Reducing road accident-related health shocks contributes to the productivity of the work

force, and addressing the administrative, legal, and governance arrangements required to

improve road safety and building up cross-sector capacity among transport, health and

education pushes Vietnams towards a more sustainable development model. In addition,

lowering the health costs and economic inefficiencies resulting from road crashes (which

push people into poverty) serves economic opportunity.

VRSP is also consistent with the move towards the Safe System approach to road safety

recommended by the OECD. By recognizing that road systems could be designed to

expect and accommodate human error, by addressing all elements of the road transport

system in an integrated way, by requiring acceptance of shared overall responsibilities and

accountability between system designers and road users, and by implementing innovative

interventions and new partnerships, VRSP helped the country to adopt an approach that is

increasingly implemented adopted in other countries. The Safe System approach (i)

recognizes that prevention efforts notwithstanding, road users will remain fallible and

crashes will occur, (ii) stresses that those involved in the design of the road transport

system need to accept and share responsibility for the safety of the system, and those that

12

use the system need to accept responsibility for complying with the rules, (iii) aligns safety

management decisions with broader transport and planning decisions that meet wider

economic, human and environmental goals, and (iv) relies on innovative rather than

"traditional" interventions.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

Project outcomes indicate that Project Development Objectives have been largely met:

PDO 1: Accident rates per 100 million vehicle-km: the project corridors have

demonstrated reductions in accident rates from 39 to 25 accidents per 100 million

vehicle-km. The original target (29) constituted a 26% reduction from the baseline,

and the actual target achieved a 36% reduction. The outcome was then achieved at

138%.

PDO 2: Injury rate per 100 million vehicle-km: the project corridors have

demonstrated a reduction in injury rates from 130 to 107 severe injuries per 100

million vehicle-km. The original target (62) was a 52% reduction from the baseline,

and the actual target achieved an 18% reduction. The outcome was then partially

achieved at 34% 4.

PDO 3: Fatality rate per 100 million vehicle-km: the project corridors have

demonstrated a reduction in fatality rates from 13 to 5.1 fatalities per 100 million

vehicle-km. The original target (6) was a 54% reduction from the baseline, and the

actual target achieved a 61% reduction. The outcome was then achieved at 113%

The PDO was achieved through the implementation of comprehensive, integrated road

safety programs along selected high risk demonstration corridors. Each project output

contributed to the many factors that cause road accidents along the demonstration

corridors and the effective treatment of accident victims. The combined impact of the

project outputs led to the project outcomes being achieved. Under Component B of the

project sub-components addressed the four ‘E’s of road safety: these being Education,

Engineering, Enforcement and Emergency.

Education addresses the need to reduce unsafe road user behavior that causes, or increases

the severity of, accidents. The project delivered 34,000 safety helmets to 17 schools in 12

provinces along demonstration corridors; provided road safety materials for use in schools;

and completed a comprehensive national road safety campaign, including TV commercials

and flyers.

Engineering addresses the need for roads and road vehicles to be designed, constructed

and maintained in such a way that reduces both the number and severity of accidents. The

4 Prior to the project the number of deaths and injuries from road accidents was significantly under reported.

This was particularly so for injuries as victims would be quickly removed from an accident scene for

treatment and the cause of the injuries were not recorded at the hospital. Hence during the project it became

clear that the baseline for injuries was too low but there was no data with which to correct it. Given the

substantial under reporting before the project the reduction in numbers of injuries was greater than the

measured values suggest and it is likely that a 50% reduction in numbers of injuries was achieved.

13

project removed 40 blackspots on the three demonstration corridors5; trained and certified

150 road engineers as Road Safety Auditors; upgraded vehicle inspection computer

systems are operational in 92 inspection centers; delivered two ‘state-of-the-art’ mobile

inspection vehicles; and designed a National Vehicle Testing Center.

Enforcement addresses the need to establish acceptable road users behavior through the

enforcement of laws and regulations related to roads. The project designed, installed and

commissioned a traffic enforcement camera system on two demonstration corridors;

upgraded equipment for driver licensing system in all 63 Provincial Departments of

Transport nation-wide; upgraded driver training equipment and testing facilities at the Chi

Linh Driving Training Center; and designed, installed and commissioned new National

Road Accident Database System (NRADS).

Emergency addresses the need for ensuring that road accident victims are offered timely,

appropriate and competent care after an accident to reduce the severity of injuries and

number of deaths. The project procured and delivered three ambulances and emergency

equipment to 46 hospitals/clinics along demonstration corridors; and completed first-aid

responder training for traffic policemen and clinic medical staff along the demonstration

corridors.

The following key intermediate outcomes were achieved and contributed to the PDO

achievement: Performance-based national road safety strategy (phase 2), including

financing plan, developed and approved by Government: the strategy was prepared and

approved by Government. Traffic exceeding posted speed limits (%), reduced: the

number of motorcycles and four-wheel vehicles exceeding posted speed limits has

decreased by 40%. Motor cycle riders wearing helmets (%), improved: 94 percent of

males, 92 percent of females, and 63 percent of children now wear motorcycle helmets

(though the current helmet law does not require children to wear helmets, this represents a

significant increase from 34 percent in February 2009). Valid licenses have been issued to

more than 93 percent of both commercial vehicle operators and motorcyclists: 93% of

drivers now hold valid licenses. % of commercial vehicle operator licensed, improved:

97% of operators are licensed. Percentage of NRADS completed: 95% has been completed,

remaining works, mainly maintenance liability, was completed after project closure.

Number of biannual road safety reports prepared in accordance with project monitoring

and evaluation guidelines: all seven reports were prepared and submitted.

Two intermediate indictors were partially achieved or not met: Number of annual reports

on effectiveness of treatments and interventions prepared in accordance with project

monitoring and evaluation guidelines: was partially achieved as three out of four reports

were prepared and submitted. % of vehicles in demonstration corridors passing first time

inspection, improved: was not met as the number of failures increased. It is believed that

this reduction was as a result of testing procedures being improved such that testing

standards were being more strictly applied.

By strengthening institutional organization and capacity under Component A of the

project has led to significant and sustainable institutional outcomes: the Chairman of

5 Of the three demonstration corridors one, National Highway 51, had to be replaced by

the HCMC – Ninh Thuan section of National Highway 1. This change was necessary as a

major highway improvement project was announced for National Highway 51.

14

NTSC is now a Deputy Prime Minister; the project assisted in the development of a

National Road Safety Implementation Program (RSIP) to support the Vietnam Road

Safety Strategy; deployed an information system connecting all provincial traffic safety

committees to the NTSC; and procured and installed IT equipment for NTSC Information

System have been installed in all 63 PTSCs., The relevant agencies are now replicating

project activities in other areas beyond the project corridors. For example, a national

information system for vehicle inspection management is in full operation, training for

accredited road safety audit is continuing, training for traffic police on first aid is being

planned for expressway, new system of driving licensing is now in full operation,

enforcement camera is planned for other national highways etc. and a new road safety

project is proposed by NTSC and MOT.

3.3 Efficiency

The updated Net Present Value (NPV) and Economic Internal Rate of Returns (EIRR) of

the Project, using very conservative accident cost values, the currently reported ratio of

injuries to fatalities and actual effects of the Project interventions at the completion of the

project (presented in Table 9.6 below) show that VRSP is strongly viable.

Summary of Updated Economic Analysis

Indicator At appraisal

At ICR

Using accident costs

as in PAD by ADB

NPV (US$ million) $23.13 $25.89 $20.67

EIRR (%) 34% 77% 59%

By using the same methodology and model to realize projections at appraisal stage with

actual performance of the Project, both updated NPV and EIRR are higher than those at

appraisal phase, indicating that the Project was not only economically viable but also

proved to be an efficient use of Bank resources.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

The overall outcome of the project was moderately satisfactory. Two of the three PDOs

were fully achieved at 138% (PDO 1) and 113 % (PDO 3) where the other one (PDO 2)

was partially achieved at 34%, leading to sharp reduction in the rate of accidents and death,

as well as significant reduction in the rate of injuries in the three VRSP road

demonstration corridors. Implementation issues at the start of the project caused these

results to be delivered three years later than originally intended, but the extremely

effective turnaround of the project starting 2009 ensured that these goals were achieved

while using Bank resources efficiently: at respectively USD 23.7 million and 75%, the

NPV and EIRR of the project were higher at the close of the project than during appraisal,

demonstrating the project’s clear efficiency despite the three years delays. Also, VRSP’s

overall development objectives were closely aligned with both GOV and best practice-

countries strategies on road safety interventions, and this alignment combined with sound

fiduciary and safeguards arrangements, a solid M&E framework, and carefully designed

blackspot treatments. However, due to the significant implementation delay at the start of

15

project, many project activities were implemented at a late implementation stage, such as

installation of cameras, the road safety awareness building campaign, and the NRADS.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

VRSP helped elevate road safety issues in the national dialogue and has some impact at

the institutional level: the helmet law for instance constituted a major step in addressing

safety and awareness issues when it was mandated in 2007. Recently the decision to

remove low-quality helmets from the market was another step in the right direction. This

was also the main driver behind the KPI on helmet usage. Due to the economic losses

linked to traffic accident deaths and injuries, the drop in traffic accidents contributed to the

reduction of poverty in project areas. Direct impact on gender aspects was not reported.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

Capacity has improved significantly for some agencies following VRSP’s investments

and activities. This is most notable for the TSPMU, throughout the wide range of

challenges that have occurred and the implementation support consultant guidance and

training. The planning capacity of the sub-PMUs has also been positively affected, but

remained dependent on the availability of the staff assigned at various phases of VRSP.

This should be addressed in a future road safety project. Moreover, the new NTSC

information system will link the NTSC in Hanoi with the 63 PTSCs in the provinces

(including Hanoi and HCMC) and will provide a server for data exchange, analysis and

knowledge management in addition to a web site. Road safety management training was

also provided to NTSC-EO, PTSCs and PMU.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

N/A

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

N/A

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate

A key risk to the sustainability of VRSP’s outcomes is the lack of capacity within NTSC,

combined with inadequate and single source funding. Lack of funding, especially for the

operation and maintenance on the blackspot interventions, could undermine VRSP’s

achievements as the allocation of adequate human, equipment and budgetary resources

must comply with the functional requirements of the road safety management system.

Capacity could remain weak at the NTSC-EO, mainly due to inadequate staffing and

limited technical knowledge in several areas of road safety (despite the fact that the

implementation support consultant conducted several workshops and discussions on the

NTSC organizational structure and emphasized the need to increase the technical staffing

of the NTSC). Moreover, the country’s institutional framework for road safety still lacks

several critical elements found in good practice countries. For instance, without an

operational / management level committee and sector working groups, the work of the

NTSC will suffer from a lack of sustained and ongoing co-ordination between meetings.

16

Only a policy level committee has been established (NTSC), supported by a secretariat

(NTSC-EO).

On the other hand, ownership of VRSP and its objectives have been strong at all levels of

government, and there is a clear sense that GOV will dedicate an adequate amount of

resources for future road safety initiatives. A follow up project to VRSP, which would

demonstrate GOV’s commitment on these issues, was also being discussed at the time of

this ICR.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Moderately satisfactory

The Bank performance during the lending phase is rated moderately satisfactory. As

noted in section 2.1, the project exhibited weaknesses in two areas at entry: (i) an overly

complex design, which included 18 sub-components for a $US 31 million project,

triggered the procurement of more than 60 packages, involved 63 cities and provinces all

over Vietnam; and (ii) the lack of clear and effective institutional arrangements, with an

implementing agency (NTSC) which had not adequate resources or expertise to carry out

its leadership role and direct participating agencies. In addition TSPMU (under the

authority of NTSC) which had procurement responsibilities for packages to be

implemented by sub-PMUs, was not empowered to carry them. This design made it

extremely challenging to coordinate the preparation of all the components across agencies,

and was a major factor behind implementation delays. The Borrower has characterized the

project design as unreasonable in its own ICR.

Moreover, more attention should have been devoted to setting up a rigorous M&E

framework from the outset. Due to the low quality of the baseline figures estimated during

preparation (and used in the PAD), the M&E activities had to rely on a different baseline.

Also, key results indicators for Component B (percentage of traffic exceeding posted

speed limits, of motorcycle riders wearing helmets, of motorcycle drivers licensed, of

commercial vehicle operators licensed, of vehicles in demonstration corridors passing first

time inspection) were missing from the PAD and thus undermined the quality of the M&E

framework.

(b) Quality of Supervision


The quality of supervision was moderately satisfactory up until the midterm review in

early 2009. During the first two years of project implementation, and despite the fact that

the disbursement rate was below 8%, Bank official supervision of the project remained

limited. Until the project was flagged as a problem status in July 2008, only three

supervision official missions were conducted after the signing of the DCA: in December

2005, in October 2006, and in July 2007. Similarly, only three Implementation Status

Reports (ISRs) were completed and filed: in January 2006, February 2007, and in June

2008 (this ISR was completed almost a year after the last supervision mission, and 1.5

years after the latest ISR). As a result, and due to the complex institutional arrangements

involving a range of agencies and line ministries and to the number of packages in the

17

project design, procurements problems were not thoroughly followed up upon and the

closing date had to be extended twice.

However, the highly satisfactory quality of supervision starting 2009 led to swift

turnaround of the project (as noted by management) and a smoother implementation of

the project until completion. Following the midterm review, a 19-targets time bound

action plan, to which the extension of the project closing date was conditioned, was rolled

out in March 2009 and by July 2009 all 19 targets had been met with the exception of the

award of the A1 consulting services contract. Feedback from GOV agencies showed that

the proactive, problem-solving centered and trust building approach followed by the Bank

supervision team played no small part in the successful turnaround of the project during its

last three years. The team in Hanoi provided hands-on oversight of the project with a

strong emphasis on implementation quality, monitoring and evaluation, financial

management reporting, and, overall, rigorous Aide-Memoire follow up. Comments

provided by line ministries, agencies and local authority’s staff have all indicated deep

appreciation for the respectful working relationship and the constructive approach that was

established, despite the complexity and wide scope of the project.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance


In summary, the Bank was successful in helping VRSP achieve its development

objectives, albeit with moderate shortcomings. As clearly shown through the sharp

reduction in the rate of accidents, injury and death associated with road transport in the

three VRSP demonstration corridors, the project development objective of the World Bank

first stand-alone road safety intervention was met. Bank efforts also ensured that VRSP

stayed highly relevant to the GOV road safety priorities and laid a robust groundwork to

future road safety efforts based on a Safe System approach. The Bank performance did

suffer from quality at entry problems due to an unrealistic design and sub-optimal

institutional arrangements, and supervision efforts in the first three years of the project fell

short of what was required for a project with so many agencies involved and packages to

be procured (spanning areas from road safety education to IT systems to road safety

equipment). However, these issues were identified at the midterm review and the Bank

performed a quick and effective turnaround of the project starting in early 2009. As such,

an overall rating of moderately satisfactory is justified.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

Government performance is assessed as moderately satisfactory. The rating reflects

shortcomings in coordinating efforts across multiple line ministries in the early stage of

implementation, while later recognizing major policy achievements in elevating the

importance of road safety. This includes the appointment of the Deputy Prime Minister to

chair the National Transportation Safety Committee.

(b) Implementing Agency Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

Implementing agency performance is assessed as moderately satisfactory. This reflects

shortcomings in TSPMU management on various aspects of implementation, including

minor issues related to financial management (requiring repayment of ineligible

18

expenditures). While TSPMU was the lead implementing agency for the project,

assessment of the six sub-PMUs is considered as follows:

Sub-PMU Performance

NTSC-EO

Moderately Unsatisfactory – Due to weak capacity, NTSC-EO

delegated much of their responsibilities to other agencies in MOT

resulted in delays in completion of reviews and approvals of

submissions from TSPMU.

Vietnam Road

Administration

Moderately Satisfactory- the design and procurement of the civil

works for the accident black-spots was delayed. However, once

civil works contracts were awarded the work was completed in a

timely manner.

Vietnam Register Satisfactory – sub-component activities were completed in a

timely manner.

Ministry of Police

Moderately Unsatisfactory - Significant delays in procurement of

the National Road Accident Database and challenges in meeting

the implementation schedule of the pilot enforcement corridors

would impact overall project performance.

Ministry of Education Moderately Satisfactory- the design and printing of school books

was implemented but there were delays in the procurement.

Ministry of Health

Moderately Satisfactory- the training of first-aid responders was

implemented but there were delays in the procurement of the

hospital equipment and ambulances.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

The Borrower’s overall performance is rated as moderately satisfactory. Key investment

and institutional strengthening activities were ultimately delivered, though often behind

schedule.

6. Lessons Learned

A responsible lead organization with effective decision making powers is a prerequisite

to manage an effective road safety program. NTSC does not have any authority to

streamline the implementation management systems in other agencies. Further, NTSC’s

limited capacity prevented NTSC from taking the role of an effective leading road safety

agency. As a result, the implementation arrangements for VRSP’s were not conducive to

quick decision making and the institutional framework for road safety lacked critical

elements found in best-practice countries (no operational / management level committee

nor sector working groups). A framework identifying leadership, collaboration and

accountability of departments within government and non-government road safety

stakeholders needs to be established for future road safety efforts to ensure the

development, effective implementation and delivery of the road safety strategy. Models

used elsewhere in the world vary from having a (i) lead agency that plays a dominant role

in most of the institutional management functions, in addition to taking a lead role in

implementation; and (ii) having a lead agency that is responsibility within government for

the development of the national road safety strategy but coordinates the implementation of

the strategy through the delegation of individual activates to each line agency. Given the

strong independence of government agencies in Vietnam it is likely that the first model

may not be applicable, as demonstrated by the outcomes under VRSP. Given this future

19

interventions need to build on the achievements of VRSP to develop NTSC as the agency

responsible for horizontal inter-governmental coordination, vertical coordination of

national, regional and local activities and the coordination of delivery partnerships

between government, professional, non-governmental and business sectors.

Simplicity of design and implementation arrangements are key for Safe System –

inspired road safety approaches, which put the emphasis at once on road user behaviors,

road designs, institutional capacity and stakeholders awareness. Simplicity of design is a

key factor of success in environments where the multiplicity of stakeholders, suboptimal

administrative processes, weak institutional capacity, discrepancies in appraisal

procedures between ministries, and a wide geographical project area scope were bound to

make implementation complex. Moreover, slow government internal communications,

coordination and approval procedures, internal reorganizations and regulatory changes are

issues that should be anticipated. In the case of VRSP, they became particularly acute in a

context where rigid government control systems were imposed on a multi-sector project

involving several agencies and sub-PMUS. To simplify the implementation arrangements,

the number of PMUs should be minimized, in comparison to one PMU and six sub-PMUs

in VRSP, and responsibility for procurement and quality control should be delegated to a

unique PMU for every contract, avoiding multiple agencies internal control mechanisms.

Sustainable funding and the availability of adequate knowledge and skills are essential

to the delivery of road safety interventions. Without the right mix of adequate funding and

human resources for road safety interventions, institutional structures and processes tend

to be ineffective and national strategies tend to remain a “paper exercise”. The allocation

of appropriate human, equipment and budgetary resources must comply with the

functional requirements of the road safety management system. In the case of VRSP,

resources at several sub PMUs were inadequate, most notably at the NTSC-EO. Similarly,

funding for crucial items such as police resources and equipment was not a high priority.

Therefore, a long term investment strategy, relying on multiple income streams to avoid

the over-dependency on a single source, would be required to implement the desired

results. Additional sources of funding could be considered, as surcharges on traffic fines,

motor fuel, weight-distance charges, compulsory vehicle insurance, vehicle license fees, or

toll fees from roads.

M&E systems need to be based on a comprehensive road safety management

information system, including a national road accident database. For the VRSP

indicator baselines were estimated based on trends observed in developing countries. As

data was collected during the project it became clear that the these trends were not

appropriate for Vietnam. Although a temporary data collection system was set up with the

assistance of the district police on the pilot corridors, health data also could not be used

due to the absence of MOH inputs in the database. The commissioning of NRADS and

the NTSC IT systems under VRSP have the potential to provide a range of data that can be

used to monitor road safety interventions in the future. However, future interventions

should assist NTSC in (i) expanding the use of NRADS to include agencies of MOH and

MOT, and (ii) linking databases on vehicle and driver registration and driver violations to

the NRADS database. The objective would be to create a family of interlinked databases

that allows data on all aspects of each accident to be recorded such that trends in accidents

can be used to identify measures needed to reduce both the number and severity of

accidents. These interventions could include: black-spot road improvements, upgrading of

accident response systems in areas of high accidents, intensified police surveillance to

enforce traffic laws in areas of high accident rates.

20

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies

Editorial comments were provided, ICR text has been revised to address these comments.

(b) Cofinanciers

Not applicable.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

Not applicable.

21

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest

Estimate (USD

millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

Total Baseline Cost 31.24 27.64 88.5

Physical Contingencies 0.38

0.00

0

Price Contingencies 3.30

0.00

0

Total Project Costs 34.92 27.64 79.2

Front-end fee PPF N/A 0.00 0

Front-end fee IBRD N/A 0.00 0

Total Financing Required 31.73 23.74 87.1

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of

Cofinancing

Appraisal

Estimate

(USD

millions)

Actual/Latest

Estimate

(USD

millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

Borrower 3.19 3.90 122

International Development

Association (IDA) 31.73 23.74 75

22

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Annex 2. Outputs by Component (continued)

Component A Institutional and Capacity Building Program Status US$ Amount

A1 Capacity building and implementation support

Package A1.1 Implementation support to NTSC/TSPMU and pre-F/S of the Vehicle Testing Center Completed 5,136,994

Package A1.2 TSPMU Financial Management system Completed 34,789

Package A1.3 Financial Uditing Completed 46,796

Package A1.4 Early Implementation Support to NTSC/TSPMU Completed 47,600

A2 Safeguards implementation support and independent monitoring

Package A2.1 Consulting services for social/envt monitoring of blackspot treatment program Completed 83,076

Package A2.2 Procurement of equipment to support environmental monitoring Completed 35,217

A3 NTSC Equipment to support implementation

4 WD vehicles, computers, office equipment, electrical equipment Completed 379,990

A4 Operating costs and training

Package A4.1 TSPMU operating costs Completed 1,496,000

Package A4.2 Project implementation training Completed 552,000

Component B Road Safety Demonstration and Awareness Program Status US$ Amount

B1 Blackspot treatment program

Package B1.1 Hanoi - Thanh Hoa - 12 blackspots Completed 288,872

Package B1.2 Thanh Hoa - Vinh - 10 blackspots Completed 491,887

Package B1.3 HCMC - Ninh Thuan - 11 blackspots Completed 9,732,111

Package B1.4 HCMC - Can Tho - 7 blackspots Completed 588,330

B2 Resettlement

No land acquistion, resettlement, compensation involved Completed 0

B3 Design and Construction supervision

Package B3.1 Blackspot treatment detailed design Completed 96,695

Package B3.2 Construction supervision Completed 114,006

B4 Vehicle inspection computer systems upgrade

Package B4.1 Computer and communications equipment Completed 448,698

Package B4.2 Software development for vehicle inspection system Completed 158,000

Package B4.3 Inspection equipment Cancelled 0

Package B4.4 Two mobile inspection vehicles Completed 1,479,559

B5 Driver training and testing

Package B5.1 Upgraded licensing equipment Completed 893,238

Package B5.2 Upgraded driver training equipment and testing facilities Completed 110,901

B6 Road safety audits and safety inspection Completed 113648

B7 Demonstration corridor safety enforcement Completed 2749265

B8 Road user education and awareness

Package B8.1 Consulting for coordinated road user education and public awareness campaigns Completed 994,800

Package B8.2.1 Safety helmets for children and teachers Completed 203,805

Package B8.2.2 Printing and dissemination of road safety materials Cancelled 34,561

Package B8.2.3 NTSC information system Completed 313,438

Package B8.2.4 Road safety promotion vehicle Completed 89,528

Package B8.2.5 Road safety management training Completed 180,000

Package B8.2.6 Implementation of road user education and publci awareness campaigns Completed 534,372

B9 Road safety education program

Package B9.1 Teaching materials and books Completed 212,126

Package B9.2.1 Traffic safety teaching facilities Completed 278,918

Package B9.2.2 Other teaching materials and books Completed 212,305

Package B9.3 Design of road safety education materials Completed 460,948

Package B9.4 Teacher training on road safety Completed 100,000

B10 Road accident emergency treatment

Package B10.1 Road accident emergency treatment supplies for hospitals and clinics Completed 856,250

Package B10.2 Three ambulances Completed 158,215

Package B10.3 Training and training material Completed 361,000

B11 Operating costs for the demonstration corridors Completed 2,070,000

B12 Local consulting services Completed 137,500

Component C Road Safety Monitoring and Evaluation Program Status US$ Amount

C1 National Road Accident Database System (NRADS)

Package C1.1 Design and Installation of NRADS Completed 1,840,608

Package A1.2 Supply and Installation of the database hardware and software Completed 1,317,495

C2 Demonstration Corridor Monitoring and Evaluation Completed 2,212,770

23

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

The objective of VRSP was to improve road safety in Vietnam by applying an integrated

set of interventions to three “high-risk” demonstration corridors. The proposed

investments targeted to reduce road user costs and costs to society by reducing the number

and severity of fatalities and injuries that result from road accidents.

In May 2005, as part of the appraisal procedure, an economic analysis of the VRSP was

conducted to justify the economic viability of the project components. This analysis will

update assumptions based on actual performance of the Project by 2012 to reconfirm

economic benefits of the project.

Evaluation Criteria

The update analysis applies the same cost benefit analysis method that used in appraisal

phase. Because of the integrated nature of the Project and the covariance effects between

Project components, the Project has been evaluated as a whole rather than as individual

components.

A model has been developed for road safety on the three demonstration corridors that

takes account of the historic, current and predicted vehicle kilometres travelled, historic,

current and predicted accident rates, and estimates of the effect of project interventions.

Road accidents, fatalities and injuries are modelled for the demonstration corridors “with”

and “without” the Project. The economic evaluation measures the incremental costs and

benefits between these two alternatives.

The economic evaluation uses a 12 percent discount rate and a 20-year analysis period.

Costs and benefits are discounted to 2004 values. The exchange rate in 2004 was 15,500

VND to US$1.00. Project costs and benefits have been expressed in economic terms,

rather than using actual market/financial prices.

Costs

The main costs of the project are the costs of civil works (blackspot treatments) and

purchase of vehicles, equipment and materials. These originally were estimated based on

historical cost data for similar works and purchases in Vietnam, and are updated with

actual annual disbursements.

Table 9.1. Economic Project Costs (US$ million)

Year PAD Projection Actual Disbursement

2005 10.46 -

2006 6.54 1.38

2007 4.91 0.23

2008 4.86 0.62

2009 0.79

2010 2.97

2011 4.93

2012 5.22

2013 6.23

Total 26.77 22.35

Benefits

24

The main economic benefits of the Project are reductions in social costs resulting from

reduced numbers and severity of fatalities and injuries that result from road accidents.

There are some time savings to road users from better availability of medical services but

these have not been included in the analysis. Environmental effects of the Project are small

and mitigation measures are included as part of construction, therefore, environmental

benefits or dis-benefits have been excluded.

Accident Costs

Accident costs used in the Project economic analysis during appraisal phase in 2005 were

those documented in Technical Note No. 6 “Road Accident Costing in Vietnam” from the

Vietnam Road Safety Improvement Study carried out by Ross Silcock, et al in March 1999

and updated to March 2004 values.

Internationally, willingness-to-pay has become the accepted method to measure the value

of life. This approach for developed countries gives a value (usually termed the “value of a

statistical life”, or the “value of a statistical fatality avoided”) many times higher than the

human capital approach. A recent study suggests that a reasonable range for a country’s

value of statistical life appears to be 100-200 times GDP per capita.

Using the low end of this range for Vietnam would still substantially scale-up the estimate

of project benefits and this underscores the conservative nature of the estimates made

using the values provided by Technical Note No. 6.

Since then there were two other studies on accident costs in Vietnam:

VietnamRoad Traffic Accident Costing as part of the Regional Road Safety Program

carried out by Asian Development Bank in association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2004

using the gross output or human capital methodology.

Costing road accidents, a National Research Study conducted by the Transport

Development and Strategy Institute (TDSI) in 2006. The study has collected a relatively

comprehensive record of accidents from major hospitals, insurance agencies, traffic

polices, etc in order to estimate economic value of road accidents.

Table 9.2. Accident Costs in Vietnam (2004 price, US$)

Type of accident PAD ADB TDSI*

Fatality 14,000 11,393 27,006

Injury 400 2,003 10,450

* The costs were calculated in 2006 and adjusted back to 2004

Injury costs were calculated for serious injuries

The above injury accident costs include an adjustment for damage only accidents

and assume that injuries are 25 percent serious and 75 percent minor. If only

serious injuries are being considered, then the injury cost should be increased.

This updated analysis keeps using the conservative accident costs as in PAD, but

also calculate benefits of the Project using accident costs of the ADB studies for

references.

25

Traffic Data

The GOV Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy is based on high

growth, which will be accompanied by high growth in traffic and exposure to risk on the

road network. Traffic growth in Vietnam has been very high over the past decade and,

given the GOV strategy, it is assumed that this trend will continue.

At appraisal phase in 2005, limited traffic count information from 1997 to 2003 was

obtained from VRA for the demonstration corridors. This was extrapolated to give vehicle

kilometers of travel (VKT) for each section of the corridors. The weighted average annual

traffic growth (linear) for the corridors using this data, based on linear regression, was 8.6

% (percent of 2003 values).

During project implementation, traffic counts have been done regularly under the Package

Consulting Services for Demonstration Corridors Monitoring and Evaluation of the

Component C2 by Consia Consultant. These data are cross checked with available traffic

counts carried out by DVRN. An assessment has been done to estimate impacts of the

open of the HCMC - Trung Luong Expressway in 2010 and Cau Gie - Ninh Binh

Expressway in November 2011 and to define the average annual traffic growth rate of

8.7% on the demonstration corridors. The actual growth rate is 8.7%, which is very close

to the rate assumed in the analysis in PAD. Details on traffic counts are in the Table 9.3.

Accident Data

The baseline data in 2004 was based on accident data for 2000 to 2003 for the

demonstration corridors obtained from RRMU2, RRMU7 and Traffic Police.

The ratios of accidents/fatalities and injuries/fatalities obtained from both Traffic Police

and NTSC are around 1.6 and 1.5 respectively. This means that, in effect, the Traffic

Police are only reporting fatal accidents and a very small proportion of serious injury

accidents. There is some indication that even fatal accidents are not all reported. An

accident costing study in Indonesia found that fatalities were some 40% greater than

reported by Police. The assumed ratio of accidents/fatalities used in Technical Note No. 6

was 6.9 and the ratio of injuries/fatalities was 10.0. These ratios are very conservative

compared with the ratios for countries with reasonably good reporting regimes. For

example, in New Zealand, recent improvements in reporting of road accidents by the

Police gives a ratio of reported accidents/fatalities of nearly 100, a ratio of serious

injuries/fatalities of about 5, and a ratio of serious plus minor injuries/fatalities of about

25. The analysis model assumed that the ratio of accidents/fatalities was 3.0 and that of

injuries/fatalities was 10.0 in the baseline year of 2004.

The combined baseline, prediction and actual accident rates for the demonstration

corridors, together with the associated social cost, are given in Table 9.4.

26

Table 9.3. Traffic Data

NR Chainage Count Station City/Town AADT (Total motorized vehicles)

1997 2000 2003 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

1 Km 192 + 500 Phap Van - Cau Gie Thuong Tin 17,650 21,938 24,957 26,660 32,336

1 Km 221 + 000 Dong Van Phu Ly 12,000 15,867 20,946 21,789 20,165 21,863

1 Km251 + 000 Doan Vy Bridge Ha Nam/Ninh Binh 4,062 5,475 7,990 8,831 10,976 11,847 13,218 15,087

1 Km 253 + 700 KCN Gian Khau Gia Vien 8,571 12,000 12,763 12,074 15,662

1 Km 270 + 000 Yen Bridge Ninh Binh 4,930 5,559 9,207 12,616 13,143 14,454 15,928 18,097

1 Km 291 + 100 Bim Son Bim Son 8,000 12,869 19,178 20,044 15,806 18,291

1 Km 299 + 260 Hà Trung Ha Trung 8,188 7,612 12,829 19,596 20,473 15,894 16,579

1 Km 323 + 000 Thanh Hoa Thanh Hoa 8,000 15,259 17,031 17,844 15,329 27,200

1 Km 366 + 300 Tinh Gia Town Tinh Gia 5,934 8,426 9,561 9,519 11,074

1 Km 447 + 300 Quan Hanh Nghi Loc 5,388 7,985 6,123 6,513 7,699 6,991 7,661

1 Km 467 + 300 Ben Thuy Vinh 1,420 10,328 12,432 13,598 15,675 11,334 19,123

1 Km 1925 + 000 HCMC HCMC 80,000 26,439 26,828 14,792 13,542 18,444

1 Km 1945 + 000 Tan An Town Tan An 41,432 33,210 34,776 18,750 13,547 17,926

1 Km 1967 + 500 Trung Luong T-junction My Tho 36,988 26,705 35,619 18,925 12,184 12,956

1 Km 1968 + 700 Trung Luong T-junction My Tho 22,167 40,955 59,998 23,561 25,449 12,783 11,478 10,089

1 Km 2031 + 100 Vinh Long Vinh Long 17,128 9,981 9,973 13,135 16,070 18,019

1 Km 2040 + 100 Vinh Long Vinh Long 17,005 8,487 9,508 11,737 14,304 17,445

1 Km 2068 + 000 Can Tho Can Tho 20,000 9,213 9,622 11,512 9,601 9,554

51 Km 11 + 000 Toll Gate T1 Dong Nai 18,229 19,198 22,565 21,637 24,705

51 Km 16 + 000 Nuoc Trong Bridge Dong Nai 11,227 13,005 19,704 16,617 23,845 27,472 20,405 22,752

51 Km 61 +800 Long Huong Vung Tau 8,037 11,987 15,993 11,365 12,207 14,596 15,552 13,816

51 Km 74 +000 Vung Tau Vung Tau 14,930 13,539 16,451 18,929 8,531

Source: PAD, VRSP-C2: Consulting Services for Demonstration Corridors: Monitoring and Evaluation, CONSIA Consultants

* HCMC - Trung Luong Expressway opened in 2010 and Cau Gie – Ninh Binh Expressway opened in Nov 2011.

27

Table 9.4. Accident Rates

2001-2003

Average

2004

Baseline

2012

Targeted

2012

Achieved

Social Cost

Total (US$ million)

8.1

11.0

6.4

7.7

Cents per VKM 19 23 11 11

Accidents Total 917 1,837 1,692 1,028

Rate per 100 million VKT 22 39 29 25

Fatalities Total 553 603 358 343


Injuries Total 836 6,125 3,582 7,196


Source: PAD, VRSP-C2: Consulting Services for Demonstration Corridors: Monitoring and Evaluation,

CONSIA Consultants

Effect of Project Interventions

It is common practice to estimate rates of accidents of differing degrees of severity by

road type and traffic conditions. The impact of a project is then forecast on the basis of

the expected changes to road conditions and traffic volumes. However, accident

incidence on a section of road or road network, like the demonstration corridors, is very

sensitive to local conditions and design and a relatively high variability of accident

outcome from forecast is not unusual. This is partly due to the random nature of

accidents. At the appraisal stage, while there was no formal research available to show

the effect in the Vietnam environment of the interventions proposed for the Project,

estimates were made of the likely accident reduction effect based on the incidence of the

accident cause factors being addressed by the Project interventions together with

international experience of typical responses.

Table 9.5. Best Estimated Intervention Effects Assumed in PAD

Effect of New Interventions Year

1 2 3 4

1. Blackspot treatments 3% 6% 9% 12%

2. Driver Licensing - Training/Testing/Enforcement 3% 3% 3% 3%

3. Vehicle Road - Worthiness -

Inspection/Enforcement

2% 2% 2% 2%

4. Cycle helmet enforcement 10% 15% 20% 22%

5. Speed enforcement 10% 10% 10% 10%

6. Drink-driving 3% 3% 5% 5%

7. Encroachment 1% 1% 1% 1%

8. School Road Safety Education 1% 1% 1% 1%

9. Emergency Medical Services 2% 2% 3% 4%

28

In this updated analysis, the actual effects of the Project interventions measured by the

M&E Consultants are used instead of the above assumptions. Key indicators featuring the

baseline of the Project in 2004 and actual achievement of the Project in 2012 (presented

in Table 9.4) enable interpolations of data for intermediate year during project

implementation in accordance to progress of work and reimbursement.

Updated Economic Analysis Results

The updated Net Present Value (NPV) and Economic Internal Rate of Returns (EIRR) of

the Project, using very conservative accident cost values, the currently reported ratio of

injuries to fatalities and actual effects of the Project interventions at the completion of the

project (presented in Table 9.6 below) prove that VRSP is strongly viable.

Table 9.6. Summary of Updated Economic Analysis

Indicator At appraisal

At ICR

Using accident costs

as in PAD by ADB

NPV (US$ million) $23.13 $25.89 $20.67

EIRR (%) 34% 77% 59%

By using the same methodology and model to realise projections at appraisal stage with

actual performance of the Project, both updated NPV and EIRR are higher than those at

appraisal phase, indicating that the Project is not only economically feasible but also

better than it was predicted.

By using other sources of accident costs produced by the ADB via their studies

specialised in costing accidents in Vietnam, the updated analysis confirms the robustness

of the Project.

29

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty

Lending

Anthony G. Bliss Consultant SASDT

Jerry Lebo Sr Operations Officer CFPTO

Nga Thi Quynh Dang Trust Fund Coordinator EACVF

Christopher J. De Serio Operations Analyst EASIN

Vinh Quoc Duong Consultant EASVS

Eva Jarawan Lead Health Specialist EASHH

Hung Viet Le Sr Financial Management Specia EASOS

Irina Luca Lead Procurement Specialist AFTPW

Aurelio Menendez Sector Manager LCSTR

Behdad M. H. Nowroozi Sr Financial Management Specia MNAFM

Maria Margarita Nunez Sr Highway Engineer LCSTR

Richard G. Scurfield Consultant SASSP

Anil H. Somani Consultant EASNS

Kien Trung Tran Senior Procurement Specialist EASR2

Phuong Thi Minh Tran Sr Transport. Spec. EASVS

Hong Vu Sr Operations Off. EASSO -

HIS

Mei Wang Senior Counsel LEGAM

Chaohua Zhang Lead Social Development Specialist SASDS

Supervision/ICR

Andre A. Bald Sr Urban Spec. AFTU1

Paul Vallely Sr Transport Specialist EASVS

Hanh Thi Huu Nguyen Financial Management Specialist EASFM

Reda Hamedoun Transport Specialist EASIN

Anthony G. Bliss Consultant SASDT

Christopher J. De Serio Operations Analyst EASIN

Fei Deng Sr Transport. Spec. EASIN

Vinh Quoc Duong Consultant EASVS

Dung Anh Hoang Sr Transport. Spec. EASVS

Hung Viet Le Sr Financial Management Specia EASOS

Irina Luca Lead Procurement Specialist AFTPW

Simon Lucas Sr Transport. Spec. EASTE -

HIS

Lan Thi Thu Nguyen Natural Resources Economist EASVS

Hoang Xuan Nguyen Procurement Specialist EASR2

Trang Phuong Thi Nguyen E T Consultant EASVS

Thuy Thi Bich Nguyen Team Assistant EACVF

Anna R. Okola Transport. Engineer LCSTR

William D. O. Paterson Consultant EASNS

Cung Van Pham Sr Financial Management Specia EASFM

30

Emmanuel Py Infrastructure Specialist EASWE

Nguyen Chien Thang Senior Procurement Specialist EASRP

Phuong Thi Minh Tran Sr Transport. Spec. EASVS

Van Anh Thi Tran Sr Transport. Spec. EASVS

Ha Thuy Tran Financial Management Specialis EASFM

Thao Phuong Tuong Team Assistant EACVF

Hong Vu Sr Operations Off. EASSO -

HIS

Ly Thi Dieu Vu Consultant EASNS

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including

travel and consultant costs)

Lending

FY04 27.79 75.50

FY05 40.15 106.36

Total: 67.94 181.86

Supervision/ICR

FY06 17.85 25.95

FY07 19.4 38.83

FY08 18.12 50.52

FY09 22.31 47.92

FY10 21.24 39.54

FY11 25.65 51.41

FY12 20.63 45.88

FY13 21.61 53.01

Total: 166.81 397.41

31

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results (if any)

32

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any)

33

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

I. Summary of Borrower’s ICR

1. Performance Indicators:

The key performance indicators served to monitor the outcome of the VRSP. Most of

these factors were calculated according to international standards to be able to compare

the road safety situation between different countries. In Vietnam the key indicators for

the road victims were collected from the Traffic Police. At the end of the project the

accident situation on the corridors had improved.

The accident risk has gone down to 63% of the initial value as a result of fewer accidents

despite increasing traffic. The risks of severe injury went initially up but are now at 89%

of the initial value. This figure is also a result of better reporting of accidents. The risk of

being killed in traffic on the corridors declined to 58% of the initial value.

This is a strong indication that there is a better reporting of injuries in accidents, a

number that had been severely under reported. In the future, the introduction of NRADS

will improve the monitoring of the data collection as part of the VRSP2.

2. Evaluation of interventions on the pilot corridors:

Implementation should carried out carefully. The preparation took a lot of time due to the

combination of different agencies. The coordination mechanism of the project should

have been clear and specific. The staffs of the management agencies should be trained

before implementing projects to ensure capacity building. The differences in

implementation procedures need to be clarified and showed clearly in the credit

agreement to avoid delays in implementation.

3. Lessons learned

Project design:

VRSP is the first large scale standalone road safety project to be prepared in Vietnam and

elsewhere in the world. It was complicated by too many coordination activities of

different agencies, which led to inconsistencies. There was a lack of leadership with has

enough capacity and power. The project was a problem project according to the World

Bank.

In order to be restored to normal status, to improve the project progress NTSC

restructured the project by changing the project leader, delegation of authority of

subPMU, changes in TSPMU. Capacity of NTSC was strengthened by the decree No. 32.

34

The splitting of components and resources was not reasonable (consulting

services, goods, training...), which led to the lack of the flexibility and harmony in

the coordination of the project funds.

The provisions on local tax, domestic spending and foreign spending was not

clear and should be defined before bidding to impact the preparation of

counterpart funding for the project.

The project design did not perfectly assess the typical agenices specialization in

Vietnam.

Implementation:

The implementation agency did not assign enough staff for project management,

which led to the long preparation of procedures due to the lack of knowledge of

WB requirements.

The sub-PMU staffs did not work full time on the project and lacked knowledge

of WB procedures for procurement and approval.

The evaluation procedures of both Vietnam and WB are long due to the

discrepancies in procedures. The project was implemented on some pilot corridors,

but the intervention specifications were minimal.

The procedures, packages splits and bidding methods were not appropriate,

leading to implementation delays.

4. Evaluation of the effectiveness of the borrower in the preparation and

implementation of activities:

Capacity building:

NTSC restructured the project to change the project leader and delegated

authority to the sub PMU.

A road traffic safety strategy was formulated.

Mechanisms, procedures, and equipment for NTSC were provided to ensure

coordination activities in traffic safety.

Staffs were trained to implement Traffic Safety activities for NTSC, study tours in

Europe were organized to get meaningful experience for committee staffs and

members of the Committee.

More than 300 Traffic Safety Auditors for the Directorate for Road of Vietnam in

the technical audit of traffic safety on the Highways were trained. Training

materials and training teachers were developed to pursue auditor training courses

in the future.

Approximately 1400 staffs of MOH and traffic police were trained in first-aid for

traffic accidents.

900 teachers at all levels were trained on teaching road safety in schools.

The Road Accident database system was established over the country, including

63 provinces, and 508 district Police station with nearly 2,000 police officers and

soldiers.

35

A monitoring system to test motor vehicle and register them nationwide was

established.

Driving license management system for DRVN was developed in 63 provinces

over the country.

The interventions in Traffic Safety:

Black spots treatment on 3 demonstration corridors (Ha Noi - Vinh; Ho Chi Minh

City - Can Tho; Dong Nai - Ninh Thuan), including 38 black spots. At the end of

the project, after all the black spots on 3 demonstration corridors were treated, the

number of traffic accidents reduced so much that there were not any serious

traffic accidents. Specifically, the number of traffic accidents before treatment

(2005 - 2007) was 319; traffic accident after treatment (3/2011- so far) was26

cases.

Pilot training support system equipment for driving & testing schools in Chi Linh

District, Hai Duong Province. The system supported training centers for drivers

training.

Equipment to address data, vehicle management, and pilot technical standard

testing equipment of the mobile vehicle to support monitoring the situation of

vehicles in use after registration. The system has been piloted in the main bus

stations in Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City (My Dinh, Mien Tay) and the 3

demonstration corridors of the project to check the status of vehicles.

Raising awareness for road users by different methods to consider and review the

effectiveness of each method.

Teaching facilities for schools on the 3 demonstration corridors including books

and documentation for teachers and other teaching facilities for teaching traffic

safety for all educational levels (159.620 material books and 5.040 posters for

preschool, 1.321.260 books for primary school level, 138.130 books for

secondary school level, 51.040 books for high school level, 34.520 books for

tertiary education level). These documents have been delivered to 12 Departments

of Education and Training (DOET) and 46 Divisions of Education and MOET.

467 emergency materials were provided in the 3 demonstration to 76 institutions,

including: 12 hospitals, 9 province general hospitals, 3 emergency centers, 27

district hospitals and 14 municipal medical stations.

5. Implementation:

During the first stage of project implementation (2006 - 2008), the

implementation was very slow due to lack of resources, leadership and

management mechanisms. However, in 2009, NTSC had strong organization

adjustments. The project was put on normal project status afterwards and could be

successfully implemented.

The borrower was very active and tried to coordinate all the activities of many

different agencies. Need to continue to enhance the capacity of staffs for traffic

safety implementation.

36

The awareness campaigns and teachings on traffic safety were very effective, and

should be expanded and developed in the future.

6. Bank performance:

The World Bank had an effective team with regards to the coordination,

preparation and supervision of project implementation. However, the

implementation still faced to difficulties due to unreasonable project design.

The review of submitted documents took a long time due to project design, and

complexity of procedure.

Procedures should be adjusted and comments should be given in a timely manner.

Better define project evaluation indicators in the future: the indicators could not

be measured and surveyed, therefore it was very difficult to evaluate the

effectiveness of the implementation of the project.

II. Comments on Draft ICR

Editorial comments were provided; ICR text has been revised to address these comments.

37

Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

38

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

1. VRSP Project Appraisal Document

2. VRSP Development Credit Agreement

3. Mission Aide Memoires

4. Implementation Status Reports

5. Midterm Review

6. Borrower Implementation Completion Report

39

MAP

Date post:	14-Mar-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	voque
View:	217 times
Download:	2 times