DOE/MA-0518 Origins of the Nevada Test Site...Origins of the Nevada Test Site United States...

Origins of theNevada Test Site

United States Department of Energy

DOE/MA-0518

Terrence R. FehnerF. G. Gosling

History DivisionExecutive Secretariat

Management and AdministrationDepartment of Energy

December 2000

Nevada Operations Office

Origins of the Nevada Test Site was written in conjunction with the 50thanniversary commemoration of the Nevada Test Site. The history was releasedat the official celebration held in Las Vegas, Nevada, on December 18, 2000,fifty years after President Harry S. Truman formally designated the site as thelocation for conducting nuclear weapons tests within the continental UnitedStates.

The history represents a unique partnership between a field office and twoheadquarters offices of the U.S. Department of Energy. The Department’sNevada Operations Office provided the initial impetus for the project andoffered support and resources throughout the researching and writing of thehistory. The Office of Defense Programs of the Department’s National NuclearSecurity Administration provided funding for printing the history. The HistoryDivision of the Department’s Executive Secretariat researched and wrote thehistory.

Terrence R. Fehner is a senior historian working in the History Division. F.G.Gosling is the Department’s Chief Historian and Federal Preservation Officer.The authors wish to thank the many individuals who offered comments, sup-port, and assistance. They made this work possible and helped make it a bet-ter and more complete history.

Retta Helling of the Nevada Operations Office and Jim Landers of the Officeof Defense Programs served as the primary points of contact for their respec-tive offices. Troy Wade, former assistant secretary for defense programs, pro-vided the original inspiration for the project and tireless support throughout.

Martha DeMarre at the Department’s Coordination and Information Center inLas Vegas and her staff, especially Kristie Abromowitz and Carole Schoengold,provided the authors with hundreds of unpublished documents, reports, andphotographs that became the core research material used in this study. Theyalso reviewed the manuscript and offered sound advice on further avenues ofresearch.

Others who assisted the authors in obtaining research materials and photo-graphs include Carolyn McKown, Bruce Harwood, Robert Perkins, HannahKing, and Rory Patterson at the U.S. Department of Energy, Germantown,library; Robert Brewer and Roger Meade at the Los Alamos NationalLaboratory; Eric Moody and Lee Brumbaugh at the Nevada Historical Society;Kathy War and Su Kim Chung at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, library;Richard Reed at the Remote Sensing Laboratory; Gary Roush at HistoryAssociates Incorporated; Colleen Beck and Robert Jones at the DesertResearch Institute; Cate Wilman and Timothy Parish at Nellis Air Force Base;Carolyn Cole at the Los Angeles Central Public Library; Gloria Parker at theU.S. Department of State; Lisa Coats at the Institute for Advanced Study in

iii

Acknowledgments

Princeton; Herman Wolk and David Chenoweth at the Air Force History and MuseumsProgram; Mickey Russell at the Air Force Historical Research Agency; Charlotte Heatherly atthe University of Nevada Press; Sharon Theobald at Kirtland Air Force Base; Pauline Testermanat the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library; Elvis Brathwaite at AP Wide World Photos; KathyHopkins at TimePix; Remy Squires at the Hoover Institution. David Myrick and Alvin McLanegave the authors permission to use photographs from their personal collections.

Frank Porcheddu of the Department’s graphics office labored long and hard to turn the manu-script into a printable document. He was ably assisted by Gloria Hill.

Betsy Scroger edited the manuscript and prepared the two montages of newspaper headlinesthat appear in the text. Cliff Scroger assisted the authors in many areas of research. MarieHallion headed the effort to collect photographs, and without her determination to leave nostone unturned the history would be quite different in appearance.

Finally, the authors would like to thank Jim Solit, director of the Executive Secretariat, for hisconstant and unwavering support of the History Division and its staff.

iv

v

Table of Contents

Dropping the Bomb: The Able Shot ..........................................1

Part I: The Nevada Test Site: Descriptionand Early History ....................................................................................5

The Nevada Test Site: What and Where ....................................................5Pre–History and Native Americans..............................................................6Explorers and Forty–Niners ........................................................................7Mining and Grazing......................................................................................8Boom and Bust Towns ................................................................................10Wahmonie ....................................................................................................14Las Vegas ......................................................................................................17The Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery Range............................................20

Part II: The Birth of the Nuclear Age, 1919–1947 ..............23

Neutrons, Fission, and Chain Reactions ....................................................23Albert Einstein and the Atomic Bomb ........................................................24The Manhattan Project ................................................................................26Bomb Design ................................................................................................29The Trinity Test ............................................................................................30War's End ......................................................................................................32Crossroads ....................................................................................................32Postwar Control of the Atom and the Onset of the Cold War..................34

Part III: The Search for aContinental Test Site, 1947–1950 ..................................................37

Sandstone......................................................................................................37Continental Test Site Reconsidered ............................................................39Project Nutmeg ............................................................................................40The Cold War Heats Up ..............................................................................42Renewed Search for a Continental Test Site ..............................................43Fallout and the Continental Test Site ..........................................................44President Truman Hesitates and the Joint Chiefs Decide on Enewetak ..46President Truman Decides on a Continental Test Site ..............................47

Part IV: Preparing to Test,December 1950–January 1951 ........................................................49

The Need for an Immediate Testing Series ................................................49Negotiating with the Air Force on Use of the Test Site ............................50Taking Possession and Initiating Construction Activities ..........................51Public Information........................................................................................52Formal Approval Sought, Debated, and Received ....................................53Going Public ................................................................................................55Public and Press Reaction............................................................................56

Part V: The Ranger Series, January—February 1951 ......61

The Test Site Takes Shape for Ranger ........................................................61Logistics ........................................................................................................65Official Visitors ............................................................................................67Radiological Safety ......................................................................................68On the Eve of Able ......................................................................................69Able's Aftermath ..........................................................................................70Baker Is Bigger ............................................................................................72Easy and Baker–Two ..................................................................................75Fox: The Grand Finale ................................................................................75Roll–Up and Assessment..............................................................................78

Part VI: Legacy of the Nevada Test Site, 1951— ..................81

Permanentization of the Test Site................................................................81Atoms for War and Peace ............................................................................82Battleground of the Cold War ....................................................................86

Endnotes........................................................................................................89

vi

Shortly after midnight on January 27, 1951,personnel from the Los Alamos ScientificLaboratory delivered a “nuclear capsule” to aheavily guarded Air Force B–50D sitting on ataxi strip at Kirtland Air Force Base outsideAlbuquerque, New Mexico. Already on thebomber was an assembled nuclear device,lacking only the nuclear capsule to make itan operative test weapon. Forty–five minuteslater, the B–50D, with a crew of eleven, lift-ed off from the runway and headed westthrough the darkness at an altitude of 14,000feet toward Frenchman Flat, a remote desertvalley located on the newly establishedNevada Test Site approximately sixty–fivemiles northwest of Las Vegas. Accompanyingthe nuclear device–laden aircraft was a sec-ond B–50 equipped with photographicequipment and a C–47 disaster assistance air-craft available in case of emergency.

As the B–50D and its deadly cargo madeits way toward the target, testing personnel

on the ground in Nevada feverishly attendedto last-minute preparations. At Nellis AirForce Base near Las Vegas, officials trackedthe westward progress of the B–50D andordered into the air monitoring aircraft that

would sample and trace the path of theradioactive cloud produced by the impend-ing nuclear test. Following a 3:00 a.m.weather briefing, the test manager gave thefinal go–ahead for the test, codenamed Able.Officials also closed the air space surround-ing the test site so that private and commer-cial pilots would not be blinded by theblast’s fireball. Meanwhile, at the test site,security teams cleared the target area, andworkers and technicians hurried to removethemselves from harm’s way and headed tothe control point nine miles south of groundzero.

The bomber and its two companions flewover Las Vegas and neared the test site atabout 3:50 a.m. Descending to 10,000 feet,

the B–50D proceeded north to ground zerowhere the nuclear capsule was inserted andthe device armed. The aircraft then climbedto its bombing height, 19,700 feet above thedesert floor, entered a holding pattern, and

Page 1The Able ShotThe Able Shot

Dropping the Bomb:The Able Shot

B-50D Bomber. Source: U.S. Air Force.

Ranger shot seen from Nevada Test Site vantagepoint. Source: Los Alamos National Laboratory.

made two practice runs over the lighted tar-get. After approval was radioed from testofficials, the B–50D began its bomb run and,just as the first hint of morning lightappeared in the sky, released the device.

Nine seconds prior to 5:45 a.m., the deviceexploded as planned at a height of 1,060feet, some 100 feet off dead center. A bril-liant ball of fire rose slowly from groundzero and then faded rapidly, dying out in amatter of a few seconds. A bluish-purpleafterglow, visible for several more seconds,itself faded gradually into darkness. Nomushroom head formed, but, as the light ofdawn grew stronger, the fission-productcloud, a dirty yellowish brown, drifted east-ward as it was broken up by the winds. The

blast wave from Able struck the controlpoint as the violet afterglow diminished.Consisting of a single, sharp, loud concus-sion, the blast wave shook the control pointbuilding. This was followed shortly by rever-berating echoes from the surrounding moun-tains. In the target area, the shock waveraised a dust cloud that hung in stratifiedlayers. The dust cloud slowly drifted to thewest and the north into the valleys of thenearby mountains. Only after several hoursdid the dust cloud dissipate under the influ-ence of the sun’s heat and daytime surfacewinds.1

Able had been successfully detonated, andthe Nevada Test Site had been officiallychristened.

Page 2 The Able ShotThe Able Shot

Location of the Nevada Test Site and surrounding communities. Source:REECO, Bechtel Nevada.

Page 3The Able ShotThe Able Shot

Page 5Description and Early HistoryDescription and Early History

The Nevada Test Site: What and Where

Since the Able shot, the primary mission ofthe Nevada Test Site has been the testing ofnuclear weapons. From 1951 to 1992, whena worldwide moratorium on nuclear testingwent into effect, the U.S. Department ofEnergy and its predecessor agencies con-ducted a total of 928 tests at the Nevada TestSite. The tests served a variety of nationalsecurity purposes. These included designtesting for the verification of new weaponsconcepts, proof-testing of existing weapons,effects testing to determine the impact ofnuclear weapons on man-made structuresand the physical environment, and experi-mental testing in the search for possiblepeaceful uses. The Nevada Test Site played avital and central role in the development andmaintenance of the Cold War nuclear arse-nal. Although the site no longer plays hostto nuclear weapons tests, the Department ofEnergy maintains the capability to resumetesting should the necessity arise and contin-ues to use the site for a variety of nationalsecurity and other needs.

The Nevada Test Site consists of approxi-mately 1,375 square miles of remote desertand mountain terrain owned and controlledby the Department of Energy and located inthe southern part of the Great Basin north-west of Las Vegas. Elevations range from3,080 feet at Frenchman Flat, where the Ableshot was detonated, in the southeast cornerof the site and at Jackass Flats in the south-west corner of the site to 7,675 feet on topof Rainier Mesa toward the northern border.The mountain ranges found on the site aregenerally lower in the south and higher inthe north. Water—or the lack thereof—is thedominating climatic characteristic. The lowerelevations have hot, dry summers and mild

winters and average six inches or less ofannual precipitation. Higher elevationsreceive somewhat increased precipitationand have lower temperatures. Temperatureextremes on the site range from below zeroto 110 degrees Fahrenheit.

Despite the harsh climate, the Nevada TestSite is home to a surprising array of plantsand animals. The site is in a transitional zone

between the Great Basin and Mojave deserts.Species from both deserts, including thosenative to one but not the other, are found inthe area. Kit fox and the sidewinder rat-tlesnake, common only in the Mojave desert,live in the southern reaches of the site, andmule deer and the striped whipsnake, favor-ing a Great Basin desert environment, residein the northern parts. Other animals foundonsite include coyotes, golden eagles, wildhorses, mountain lions, and an occasionalbighorn sheep and antelope. The range inelevation also helps provide for a diversity inflora and fauna. Mojave desert plants such as

Part I: The Nevada Test Site: Description and EarlyHistory

Although not native, wild horses roam the higherelevations of the test site. Source: REECO ,Bechtel Nevada.

the creosote bush dominate the lower eleva-tions. Plants of the Great Basin desert prevailabove 5,000 feet, with open piñon–juniperand sagebrush woodland appearing at the6,000–foot level. Between the two elevationextremes, sagebrush is the most commonplant. Springs, the only perennial watersources on the site, sustain the wildlife pop-ulation and are widely, if not abundantly,scattered across the area.

The Nevada Test Site nonetheless is whereit is for good reason. Few areas of the conti-nental United States are more ruggedlysevere and as inhospitable to humans. Thesite and the immediate surrounding areahave always been sparsely populated. Onlyonce prior to 1950, and then very briefly, didmore than a few hundred people call thesite home. In most periods of habitation, farfewer have lived there. Although no localecan be said to be ideal or optimal fornuclear weapons testing, the Nevada TestSite was perhaps the best continental siteavailable for avoiding collateral damage andradiation exposure to plants, animals, and,most importantly, human beings offsite.2

Pre–History and Native Americans

Even with a climate that has varied consid-erably over the last dozen millennia, the area

that is now the Nevada Test Site has neverbeen particularly conducive to human habi-tation and exploitation. The earliest culturalremains discovered on the site date back10,000 to 12,000 years. In an era of coolertemperatures and increased precipitation,

early Native Americans in the Great Basinhunted big game, including now–extinctmegafauna, and exploited marsh areas andpluvial lakes that formed in the valleys. Noevidence indicates that the basins onsite sup-

ported lakes, but nearby valleys immediatelyto the east and to the north apparently did.An increasingly arid climate dried up most ofthe lakes by approximately 8,000 years ago,and the period between 7,500 and 4,500years ago witnessed a climate that was evenhotter and dryer than is currently experi-enced. The harsh conditions resulted inreduced human populations, with evidenceof entire areas of the Mojave and GreatBasin deserts being abandoned.

The southern Great Basin climate has alter-nated between hot and dry and cooler andmore moist periods over the past 4,500years. Between 4,500 and 1,900 years ago,the climate was cooler and wetter thantoday. Notable hot and arid periods occurredbetween 1,900 and 1,000 years ago and 700and 500 years ago, when a pattern of heav-ier winter precipitation began. Since the endof the Little Ice Age about 150 years ago,temperatures have gradually increased.During the cooler, wetter periods, the south-ern Great Basin experienced increasedhuman populations corresponding with anexpanded food supply.

Early explorers and immigrants in themid–1800s encountered widely scatteredgroups of hunter gatherers currently knownas Southern Paiute and Western Shoshone.Lieutenant George M. Wheeler, who headedan army mapping expedition through the

Page 6 Description and Early HistoryDescription and Early History

Native American archaeological site on PahuteMesa. Source: DOE, Nevada Operations Office.

Native American petroglyphs can be found on thetest site. Source: DOE, Nevada Operations Office.

region in 1869, passing immediately southand east of the current test site, noted, in hisown ethnocentric way, that the Native

Americans “roamed at pleasure, eking out apurposeless existence.” Whatever their lackof purpose, the Native Americans practiced asubsistence strategy designed to cope with asevere and unforgiving environment. Duringthe second half of the nineteenth century, acommunal group known as Eso (little hill),composed of members of both the SouthernPaiute and Western Shoshone tribes andcomprising little more than forty people,lived in the area around Rainier Mesa. Theygenerally moved in search of food betweenthe highlands and the lowlands, dependingon the season, within an area with a radiusof about twenty miles. They established win-ter camps at various springs across the site.The camps usually consisted of nuclear fami-lies and, in some instances, of extended fam-ilies. Scarcity of game forced the populationto subsist primarily on seeds and other veg-

etable foods. By the early twentieth century,most of the free–roaming Native Americanshad moved to surrounding towns or relocat-ed to reservations.3

Explorers and Forty–Niners

Not until the mid–1800s did explorers andpioneers first cross the area that became theNevada Test Site. The Old Spanish Trail,which was neither old nor Spanish, passedthrough the Las Vegas Valley south and eastof the site. First traversed in the winter of1829–1830 by Antonio Armijo, a Santa Fetrader heading a commercial caravan of sixtymen en route to Los Angeles, the OldSpanish Trail served as a primary means ofreaching the Pacific Coast until the termina-tion of the war with Mexico in 1848.Lieutenant John C. Frémont’s wide–rangingU.S. Army Topographical Expedition in 1844explored the parts of the trail runningthrough California and Nevada. Frémont’sdetailed map showed a major mountainrange running east and west in the vicinityof the test site but also cautioned that thearea was “unexplored.”4

Scant evidence exists that prior to 1849any travelers ever deviated from the trail intothe area of the site. A stone block inscribedwith the name “F.O. BYOR” and the date“1847” was used in the construction of a fire-place in a stone cabin at Cane Spring locatedin the south central part of the site. The ori-gin of the inscription remains a mystery.One theory is that it was carved by a mem-ber of the Mormon Battalion formed in 1846to protect settlers in southern California dur-ing the Mexican War. In 1847, part of thebattalion passed through the region and pos-sibly through the test site on its way to theSalt Lake Valley in Utah.5

The earliest recorded entry on to the pres-ent test site was by an ill–fated group ofemigrants known as the Death Valley ’49ers.Bound for the California gold fields in fall1849, a party of Mormon families left the SaltLake Valley too late in the season to crossthe Sierra Nevadas on the more direct routeacross northern Nevada. They electedinstead to head first toward southernCalifornia on the Old Spanish Trail.Persuaded by rumors of a shortcut, possibly


Remains of a stone cabin at Cane Spring, top.Inscribed stone block used in the construction ofthe fireplace, bottom. Source: DOE, NevadaOperations Office and Desert Research Inistitute.

inspired by Frémont’s map with its mythicaleast–west mountain range, a splinter groupleft the trail near Enterprise, Utah, and head-ed west into unknown territory. Furthersplits occurred in the wayward group as itbecame clear that there was no easy or read-ily distinguishable way. Although the exactroutes taken remain debatable, all of thesplinter parties clearly passed through thetest site. One group entered the site via NyeCanyon on the eastern boundary, crossedover Frenchman Flat, and camped for ninedays at Cane Spring, where from a nearbysummit one member described the “mostwonderful picture of grand desolation onecould ever see.” Other groups crossed overYucca Flat immediately to the north. Allgroups eventually left the site at Jackass Flatsprior to their rendezvous at Death Valley

where they remained stranded for severalmonths. Fortunately, nearly all of the ’49ers,after enduring extreme hardship, belatedlyreached their destinations in California.6

The travails and general desolation report-ed by the Death Valley ’49ers did little toinspire further explorations of the area. Notuntil April 1866 did a subsequent exploratoryexpedition enter the region, when NevadaGovernor Henry G. Blasdel and a party oftwenty embarked from Carson City in searchof a practicable route from the settlements ofwestern Nevada to the recently discoveredsilver fields in the Pahranagat Valley east of

the test site. Before reaching their destina-tion, one man died of starvation and the restof the party narrowly escaped the same fate.Three years later, Lieutenant Wheeler’s map-ping expedition passed through the IndianSprings Valley immediately south of the site.On a second expedition in 1871, Wheelertraversed from the Pahranagat Valley throughthe northern portion of Yucca Flat on hisway to Death Valley and the eastern slope ofthe Sierras. Describing the area west of thePahranagat Valley as “one of the most deso-late regions upon the face of the earth,” henoted that it had been “almost impossible togain any accurate information of even thechances for grass and water from eitherwhite man or Indian.” He added that the“entire section” was “known in commonparlance among the settlers of the miningand mountain towns of Nevada as ‘DeathValley’,” as opposed to “Death Valley proper”which “at its lowest surface falls beneath thelevel of the ocean.”7

Mining and Grazing

Unofficial exploratory forays on to andthrough the current test site no doubt ante-dated and certainly followed the govern-ment–sponsored expeditions as prospectorsduring the last half of the nineteenth centurycombed through virtually every valley,canyon, and outcropping in the AmericanWest. Already in 1864, mining operationshad begun at the southern end of theTimpahute Range, north of Groom Lake andlocated only a score of miles from the north-east corner of the site. Backed by approxi-mately $80,000 in British investment capital,the Groom District mines produced lead andsilver from what Wheeler described as “onevast deposit of galena.” Similarly, in 1869low–grade silver–bearing ores were discov-ered at the north end of the Spring MountainRange within twenty miles of the southernboundary of the site.8

Few discoveries of precious metals weremade, however, on the site itself. The earli-est known claims were filed in March 1889near Oak Spring, at the south end of theBelted Range in the far northern reaches ofthe site. Mining in this district continued offand on for the next fifty years, with


Nevada Governor Henry G.Blasdel. Source: NevadaHistorical Society.


Probable routes taken through the test site by the Death Valley ‘49ers. Note that on the map the entirety ofwhat is now the Nellis Air Force Range is labeled as the "A.E.C. Test Site." Source: Reprinted from GeorgeKoenig, Beyond This Place There Be Dragons: The Routes of the Tragic Trek of the Death Valley1849ers through Nevada, Death Valley, and on to Southern California (Glendale, CA: The Arthur ClarkCompany, 1984).

turquoise and small amounts of gold and sil-ver being the initial attraction. In 1917, cop-per ore containing some silver was shippedfrom the district as were minor amounts oftungsten. In the 1920s, B.M. Bower, a notedauthor of western novels, took up residenceat the Oak Spring site for six years. Although

she and her family formed a mining compa-ny, her primary occupation continued to bewriting. In the early 1930s, outlaws fromUtah and Arizona used the abandoned campfor a hideout. Their escapades were laterfeatured in a Death Valley Days radio

episode narrated by Ronald Reagan. Laterthat same decade, demand for tungsten,which was used in the production of arma-ments, increased with the approach of theSecond World War, and several mining com-panies conducted sampling operations indeposits near Oak Spring. The site becameknown as the Climax Mine.9

The only other viable economic activity onwhat became the test site was open–rangegrazing. Ranching on the site began in thelate 1800s. Suitable forage grounds existedfor both cattle and sheep, but access towater was a problem. Flow from the widelyscattered springs was often minimal, andranchers, to augment the supply of water,modified some springs and constructedwater storage tanks. The remains of onesuch tank, made from a boiler, are found atTippipah Spring, located near the center ofthe site. While ranchers and their familiestended to live in nearby communities out-side the present site boundaries, they builtand maintained some structures on the site.At Whiterock Spring, in the north centralportion of the site, an abandoned 1928Buick still rests near stone cabins. Remnantsof corrals can be found at a number of thesprings onsite.10

Boom and Bust Towns

Mining and grazing activities on the site,with one brief exception, remained smallscale. This was not the case, however, withseveral nearby mining strikes. To the east,the Pahranagat Valley silver rush in the late1860s never really materialized, but the silverdeposits at Pioche, some forty to fifty milesto the northeast, proved more extensive. Inthe early 1870s, Pioche became the scene ofa wild rush of prospectors and fortune seek-ers, with over $5 million of ore having beenextracted by 1872. The town also gained areputation as one of the toughest and mostlawless in the West. By 1900, Pioche, seat ofLincoln County, was nearly a ghost town. In1950, the town could claim only 1,392 peo-ple and the county 3,837. Further to the eastacross the border in southwestern Utah werethe more settled, mostly Mormon communi-ties of St. George and Cedar City, with popu-lations of 4,562 and 6,458 respectively.11


Mining activity, top, at Oak Spring, 1920s. B.M.Bower's writing cabin, bottom. Source: AlvinMcLane, from the Estate of B.M. Bower.


Tippipah Spring, top, with water storage tankmade from a boiler. Source: DOE, NevadaOperations Office.

Stone cabin at Whiterock Spring, top, with theremains of a corral and abandoned 1928 Buick.Source: DOE, Nevada Operations Office.

Remnants of Ranchers and Miners on the Test Site


Pioche, Nevada, April 1873. Source:Nevada Historical Society.

Goldfield, 1907, in its heyday. Source:Nevada Historical Society.

Goldfield, Nevada, January 1904, in theearly days of the gold rush. Source: Nevada

Historical Society.

Boom and Bust Towns


Rhyolite, Nevada, January 1908, atits peak. Source: Nevada HistoricalSociety.

Rhyolite, similar view, 1940, a ghosttown. Source: Nevada Historical Society.

Tonopah, Nevada, railroad depot, 1906.Source: Nevada Historical Society.

Boom and Bust Towns

Some of the most significant silver andgold strikes in the American West occurredin the first decade of the twentieth centuryto the west of the site. In the twenty–yearperiod prior to 1900, mining in Nevada hadslumped, sending the entire state into ableak depression and causing the loss ofone–third of the population. A spectacularstrike in May 1900 at Tonopah, some seventymiles northwest of the test site, rapidlychanged the state’s fortunes. Tonopah soonbecame the most important silver and goldproducer in the nation and by 1902 was asprawling city of 3,000. Late that same year,gold was discovered twenty–five miles southof Tonopah. Goldfield, the town thatemerged from the strike, boomed furiouslyand, with a population estimated anywherefrom 10,000 to 40,000, was Nevada’s largestcity for almost two decades. Goldfield minesproduced over $86,000,000 in metals. In1904, gold was discovered someseventy–five miles to the south ofGoldfield—and thirty miles west of the site—in what became known as the BullfrogDistrict. By 1907, the district’s major town,Rhyolite, boasted a population of perhaps12,000.

As whirlwind as was the growth of thesetowns, their decline was inevitable as themines played out. Tonopah and Goldfieldhung on as county seats, with populations in1950 of 1,375 and 336 respectively. Rhyoliteby then had been for years little more than aghost town.12

The rise and fall of the boom towns hadlittle effect on the region of the test siteitself, other than to increase the number ofprospectors scouring the landscape and,more importantly, to lay the framework forthe local transportation system. By the mid-dle of the decade of 1900, competing rail-roads had pushed rail lines to the major goldand silver strike towns west of the site. Thetown of Beatty, a few miles east of Rhyolite,and the locus of three separate lines, billeditself as the “Chicago of the West.” One line,the Las Vegas and Tonopah Railroad, rannorthwest out of Las Vegas, where it tied inwith the recently completed San Pedro, LosAngeles and Salt Lake Railroad, and skirtedwhat is now the southern boundary of the

site before pushing on to Beatty. As theboom towns went bust, however, so did therailroads. The Las Vegas and Tonopah

Railroad ceased operations and removed therails in 1918. The following year, the NevadaDepartment of Highways purchased the rightof way, removed the remaining railroad ties,widened the roadbed, and reconstructedbridges to meet highway standards. The roadeventually became what is now U. S.Highway 95. In the 1950s, the portion of theroad running from Las Vegas to the sitebecame known as the Mercury Highwaybecause it brought workers from their homesin Las Vegas to the test site headquarters atMercury. As for the “Chicago of the West,”the last rails were torn up in 1942, and in1950 Beatty had a population of 487.13

Wahmonie

Nevada’s last major mining rush occurredin the late 1920s at Wahmonie, located onwhat is now the test site west of Cane Springand on the eastern edge of Jackass Flats.Mining operations in the area dated back atleast to 1905, but the area remained quietuntil the discovery of high–grade silver–goldore in 1927. Established in February 1928,the Wahmonie mining camp grew to a popu-lation of some 500 within a month. Someminers arrived hauling small houses ontrucks. Others came in cars loaded with pro-visions or even on foot pushing wheelbar-rows tied down with goods. Many minerslived in small tents, but Wahmonie soon hadboarding houses, tent stores, and cafes.Thirsty miners could avail themselves at theSilver Dollar Saloon or the Northern Club.


Las Vegas & Tonopah Railroad crew laying track,1906. Source: Nevada Historical Society.


Las Vegas & Tonopah Railroad advertisement map. Source: Reprinted from David F. Myrick,Railroads of Nevada and Eastern California, Volume Two - The Southern Roads (Berkeley, CA:Howell-North Books, 1963), p. 454.


Wahmonie, Nevada, 1928: top, in the early days of the strike; middle, land claims office;Outdoor vendor supplying Wahmonie's miners. Source: top and bottom, Nevada HistoricalSociety; middle, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Special Collections.

Wahmonie


For a time, many thought that Wahmoniewould become another Tonopah orGoldfield. Wahmonie’s population peaked,however, in early summer at some 1,000 to1,500, and by the end of the year it wasclear that the strike was not as rich as hadfirst been thought. Optimism faded, peoplebegan leaving, and the town went bust.Deterioration of Wahmonie began soon afterthe mines were abandoned when miningequipment was moved to other locations.The townsite nonetheless still retains someof its original features, including mine shafts,roads, tent pads, discarded lumber, and scat-tered mining debris.14

Las Vegas

One town, Las Vegas, did not follow theboom–to–bust cycle. Except as an entrepôtfor goods and people headed for the goldand silver fields, Las Vegas’s economy didnot depend on mining activities. Originally,Las Vegas was a way station on the OldSpanish Trail. Located in the center of one ofthe more spacious valleys of southernNevada south and east of the site, Las Vegas,which means “the meadows” in Spanish,

possessed free–flowing, perennial springsand extensive, lush meadows. In 1855,Mormon settlers, with the two–fold goal ofproselytizing the local Indians and raisingcrops to provision travelers, established anadobe fort four miles east of the springs.They abandoned the settlement three years

later, and until after the turn of the centurythe Las Vegas Valley contained little morethan a few scattered ranches. This changedwith the coming of the San Pedro, LosAngeles and Salt Lake Railroad in 1905.Taking advantage of the abundant watersupply and the fact that Las Vegas wasroughly midway between Los Angeles andSalt Lake City, the railroad established main-tenance and other facilities, laid out thetown of Las Vegas, and auctioned off lots.

For the next quarter century, Las Vegasremained a relatively sleepy backwater. Notmining but gambling and federal spendingserved as the catalysts that spurred growthand turned Las Vegas into the boom townthat it remains to this day. In 1931, the Stateof Nevada legalized gambling. Although ini-tially serving primarily local clientele, thetown’s resort industry would eventually

become second to none. That same year,construction of the Boulder (later Hoover)Dam began on the nearby Colorado River.When completed, Boulder Dam would bethe largest dam in the world, far exceedingin size and scope all previous dam–buildingprojects. Construction of the dam broughtjobs, growth, and significant federal fundingto Las Vegas. Even greater federal fundingmade its way to the area during the SecondWorld War when the Army Air Corps estab-lished a gunnery training base on the north-east side of Las Vegas and the governmentbuilt a giant magnesium plant south of town.

After the war, the burgeoning resort indus-try became the primary driver for the local

Fremont Street, downtown Las Vegas, looking westfrom 2nd Street, 1948. Source: University ofNevada, Las Vegas, Special Collections.

Hoover Dam. Source: Nevada Historical Society.


Las Vegas, Nevada: top, block 16, 1907; middle, freight team, 1907; bottom, Fremont Street,looking east, 1912. Source: Nevada Historical Society.

Early Las Vegas


Military photograph of Las Vegas, Nevada, 1942. Airfield can be seen in background.Source: University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Special Collections. Document declassified perE.O. 12958, Sec. 3-4.

Las Vegas Army Air Field flightline, 1945. Source: Nellis Air Force Base, History Office.

World War II


economy. During the 1930s, casinos hadbeen limited largely to Fremont Street in arelatively small downtown area. In 1941, theEl Rancho Vegas opened on what becameknown as the Las Vegas Strip. This was fol-lowed by the Flamingo Hotel, built by mob-ster Benjamin “Bugsy” Siegel, a member ofthe Meyer–Lansky crime organization. By1950, the growth of the resort industry,greatly aided by postwar affluence and thecreation of a reliable highway link withsouthern California, had pushed the popula-tion of greater Las Vegas to almost 50,000.15

The rise of Las Vegas had an enormousimpact on the manner in which the NevadaTest Site developed and operated. Initially,in 1951, the town served as a base of opera-tions for scientists, technicians, and militarypersonnel. Later, when the test site became“permanentized,” Las Vegas was the primarybedroom community for workers who dailycommuted to the site. Las Vegas was alsoclose enough to the test site that atmospher-ic blasts in the southeast portions of the sitecould cause collateral damage. Finally, as byfar the largest town in the immediate area,Las Vegas became a potential target to beavoided for wind–blown debris and falloutmoving offsite.

The Las Vegas Bombing and GunneryRange

In the nearly hundred years since the’49ers first rumbled through on their way toDeath Valley, not much interest had beenshown, aside from the occasional prospectorand intermittent grazing, in the area thatwould become the Nevada Test Site. In 1940,however, the precise characteristics that hadmade the region so unattractive—the desola-tion, lack of water, and general uninhabit-ableness—brought it to the attention of thefederal government. With war looming onthe horizon, the United States had begun amajor rearmament program. Part of this pro-gram involved locating bombing and gun-nery training ranges for the Army Air Corps.On October 29, 1940, President Franklin D.Roosevelt established the Las Vegas Bombingand Gunnery Range. Encompassing morethan three–and–a–half–million acres northand west of Las Vegas, the range stretched

almost to Tonopah and included all of whatis now the test site. More than ninety per-cent of the range was in the public domain,but a number of grazing, homestead, andmining claims made it difficult to take pos-session. In August 1941, the governmentbegan condemnation proceedings against theoutstanding parcels of land.

The Army Air Corps decided to use mostof the newly acquired range for an aerialgunnery school. Appropriate conditions forsuch a school existed, as one general put it,“to a superlative degree.” The range offeredexcellent year–round flying weather, a strate-gic inland location, nearby mountains thatcould provide natural backdrops for cannonand machine gun practice, dry lake beds foremergency landings, and an existing airfieldconveniently located on the outskirts of LasVegas. Although the “possible morale andmorals hazard” associated with the legalgambling and prostitution of Las Vegas gavethe military pause, the advantages of thelocation far outweighed the disadvantages.Operations began in October 1941 as thecourts finalized the land condemnations andfederal marshals cleared the remaining strag-glers off the range.

The test site area’s role was to serve as asetting for air–to–air gunnery practice.Gunners on airplanes used “frangible” bulletsthat broke upon impact, spattering paint so

that gunners could see where their bulletshad hit, as well as live fire against targetstowed by other airplanes. This at timesproved hazardous, especially for the planes

B-24 following an emergency landing. Source:Nellis Air Force Base, History Office.


doing the towing, and the site’s backup rolewas to provide emergency landing services.The Army set up four emergency landingstrips on the range. One was on GroomLake east of the site. Another was on PahuteMesa toward the north and west part of thesite. The remaining two landing strips werefurther to the north and west on the range.The dry lake beds at Frenchman and YuccaFlats could also serve as emergency strips. Inaddition, the Army established a forwardbase with a landing strip and other facilitiesat Indian Springs, a small hamlet with a serv-ice station and general store on the highwaysome ten miles southeast of the site.

The end of the Second World War closedout training activities on the bombing andgunnery range. The Las Vegas Army Airfieldbriefly deactivated before reemerging, inresponse to political pressure and the grow-ing Cold War threat, as the Las Vegas AirForce Base in 1948, with a mandate to trainpilots of single–engine airplanes. The follow-ing year, the Air Force expanded the base’sfunctions by adding a gunnery school. InApril 1950, the base was renamed Nellis AirForce Base. As for the bombing and gunneryrange, it stood largely unused throughoutmuch of the late 1940s.16

Page 23Birth of the Nuclear Age, 1919 - 1947Birth of the Nuclear Age, 1919 - 1947

Neutrons, Fission, and Chain Reactions

The Nevada Test Site might have remaineda bombing and gunnery range forever had it

not been for the revolutionary discoveriesand insights of modern physics. In the earlytwentieth century, physicists conceived ofthe atom as a miniature solar system, withextremely light negatively charged particles,called electrons, in orbit around the muchheavier positively charged nucleus. In 1919,the New Zealander Ernest Rutherford, work-ing in the Cavendish Laboratory atCambridge University in England, detected ahigh–energy particle with a positive chargebeing ejected from the nucleus of an atom.The proton, as this subatomic particle wasnamed, joined the electron in the miniature

solar system. The number of protons in thenucleus of the atom determined what ele-ment the atom was. Hydrogen, with oneproton and an atomic number of one, camefirst on the periodic table and uranium, withninety–two protons, last. This simple schemedid not, however, explain everything. Manyelements existed at different weights evenwhile displaying identical chemical proper-ties. In other words, atoms of the same ele-

ment, identical in every other way, couldvary slightly in mass.

The existence of a third subatomic particle,the neutron, so–named because it had nocharge, explained the differences. First iden-tified in 1932 by James Chadwick,Rutherford’s colleague at Cambridge, neu-trons within the nuclei of atoms of a given

Part II:

The Birth of the Nuclear Age, 1919–1947

Ernest Rutherford. Source: ArgonneNational Laboratory.

Lise Meitner and Otto Hahn in their laboratory atthe Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin. Source:Argonne National Laboratory.

element could vary in number. The differenttypes of atoms of the same element but withvarying numbers of neutrons were designat-ed isotopes. The isotopes of uranium, forinstance, all have ninety–two protons in theirnuclei and ninety–two electrons in orbit. Buturanium–238, which accounts for over nine-ty–nine percent of natural uranium, has 146neutrons in its nucleus, compared with 143neutrons in the rare uranium–235, makingup only seven–tenths of one percent of natu-ral uranium.

These insights aided greatly in the under-standing of the building blocks of the ele-mental world, but an unexpected discoveryby researchers in Nazi Germany just beforeChristmas 1938 radically changed the direc-tion of both theoretical and practical nuclearresearch. In their Berlin laboratory, theradiochemists Otto Hahn and Fritz

Strassmann found that when they bombard-ed uranium with neutrons the uraniumnuclei changed greatly and broke into tworoughly equal pieces. The pieces werelighter elements, one of which was aradioactive isotope of barium. Even moresignificantly, the products of the experimentweighed less than that of the original urani-um nucleus. From Albert Einstein’s formula,E=mc2, which states that mass and energyare equivalent, it followed that the loss ofmass resulting from the splitting processmust have converted into energy in the formof kinetic energy that could in turn be con-verted into heat. Calculations made byHahn’s former colleague, Lise Meitner, arefugee from Nazism then staying in

Sweden, and her nephew, Otto Frisch, led tothe conclusion that so much energy hadbeen released that a previously undiscoveredkind of process was at work. Frisch, borrow-ing the term for cell division in biology—binary fission-–named the process fission.

Fission of the uranium atom, it soonbecame apparent, had another importantcharacteristic besides the immediate releaseof enormous amounts of energy. This wasthe emission of neutrons. The energyreleased when fission occurred in uraniumcaused several neutrons to “boil off” the twomain fragments as they flew apart. Given theright set of circumstances, physicists specu-lated, these secondary neutrons might collidewith other atoms and release more neutrons,in turn smashing into other atoms and, atthe same time, continuously emitting energy.Beginning with a single uranium nucleus, fis-sion could not only produce substantialamounts of energy but also lead to a reac-tion creating ever–increasing amounts ofenergy. The possibility of such a “chain reac-tion” completely altered the prospects forreleasing the energy stored in the nucleus. Acontrolled self–sustaining reaction couldmake it possible to generate a large amountof energy for heat and power, while anunchecked reaction could create an explo-sion of huge force.17

Albert Einstein and the Atomic Bomb

The possible military uses that might bederived from the fission of uranium atoms

Page 24 Birth of the Nuclear Age, 1919 - 1947Birth of the Nuclear Age, 1919 - 1947

Uranium-235 fission chain reaction.

Einstein and Szilard. Source: Institute forAdvanced Study.

were not lost on the best and brightest ofthe world’s physicists. In August 1939,Einstein, with the help of Hungarian emigréphysicist Leo Szilard, wrote a letter toPresident Roosevelt, informing him thatrecent research showed that a chain reactionin a large mass of uranium could generatevast amounts of power. This could conceiv-ably lead, Einstein wrote, to the constructionof “extremely powerful bombs.” A singlebomb, the physicist warned, potentiallycould destroy an entire seaport. Einsteincalled for government support of uraniumresearch, noting darkly that Germany hadstopped the sale of uranium and Germanphysicists were engaged in uraniumresearch.18

President Roosevelt responded quickly butcautiously to the Einstein letter. He appoint-

ed an Advisory Committee on Uranium,headed by Lyman J. Briggs, director of theNational Bureau of Standards, and tasked itwith examining the current state of researchon uranium and recommending an appropri-ate role for the federal government. Thecommittee, for good reason, did not urgerushing headlong into an urgent, top prioritybomb building project. No one as yet knewwhether an atomic bomb was even possible

and, if it was, whether a bomb could beproduced in time to affect the outcome ofthe war. Researchers discovered early on thaturanium–238 could not sustain a chain reac-tion required for a bomb. Uranium–235, theyknew, still might be able to, but separatinguranium–235 from uranium–238 would beextremely difficult and expensive. The twoisotopes were chemically identical and couldnot be separated therefore by chemicalmeans. And with their masses differing byless than one percent, other means of sepa-ration would be very difficult. No provenmethod existed for physically separating thetwo in any quantity. The advisory committeethus approved only limited funding for iso-tope separation and chain reaction work.

Not until 1941 did prospects for a bombbrighten. A second possible path to a bombhad gradually emerged. Researchers studyinguranium fission products at the RadiationLaboratory at the University of California inBerkeley discovered another product, a newtransuranium, man–made element, namedneptunium, with an atomic number of 93,created when uranium–238 captured a neu-tron and decayed. Neptunium itself decayedto yet another transuranium element. InFebruary, the chemist Glenn T. Seaborg

identified this as element 94, which he laternamed plutonium. By May he had proventhat plutonium–239 was 1.7 times as likely as


In response to Einstein's letter, President FranklinD. Roosevelt initiated government-sponsoredresearch on uranium and fission. Source:Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library.

Discovery of plutonium by the University ofCalifornia, Berkeley, chemist Glenn T. Seaborgsuggested a second path toward building an atom-ic bomb. Source: Department of Energy.

uranium–235 to fission. The finding suggest-ed the possibility of producing largeamounts of the fissionable plutonium in auranium pile, or reactor, using plentiful ura-nium–238 and then separating it chemically.This might be less expensive and simplerthan building isotope separation plants.

Then in July, British physicists reportedthat uranium–235 would be able to sustain achain reaction required for a bomb. Theyestimated that ten kilograms would be largeenough to produce an enormous explosion.A bomb this size could be loaded on exist-ing aircraft and be ready, the British physi-cists projected, in approximately two years.Vannevar Bush, director of the newly createdOffice of Scientific Research andDevelopment, under whose authority theUranium Committee had been subsumed,took this information to the White Houseand emphasized the continuing uncertaintyinvolving a bomb. Realizing that Germanresearch was ongoing, Roosevelt instructedBush to move as quickly as possible onresearch and development. Following a yearof furious activity, Bush reported to the pres-ident that atomic bombs possibly could beavailable by the first half of 1945. OnDecember 28, 1942, Roosevelt authorized theconstruction of full–scale production plantswith an initial expenditure of $500 million.19

The Manhattan Project

Security requirements suggested placingthe atomic bomb project under the Army

Corps of Engineers. The Corps set up theManhattan Engineer District commanded byBrigadier General Leslie R. Groves. TheManhattan Engineer District operated like alarge construction company, but on a mas-sive scale and with a sense of urgency untilnow unknown. Unique as well was theinvestment of hundreds of millions of dollarsin unproven processes. By the end of thewar, Groves and his staff expended approxi-mately $2.2 billion on production facilities,towns, and research laboratories scatteredacross the nation. Secrecy and fear of amajor accident dictated that the productionfacilities be located at remote sites. Due toongoing uncertainties as to which processeswould work, two distinct paths were chosento obtain a bomb.

One involved isotope separation of urani-um–235. Groves located the production facil-ities for isotope separation at the ClintonEngineer Works, a ninety–square–mile parcelcarved out of the Tennessee hills just west ofKnoxville (the name Oak Ridge did notcome into usage until after the war). Grovesplaced two methods into production: 1)gaseous diffusion, based on the principlethat molecules of the lighter isotope, urani-um–235, would pass more readily through aporous barrier; and 2) electromagnetic,based on the principle that charged particlesof the lighter isotope would be deflectedmore when passing through a magneticfield. Later, in 1944, Groves approved a pro-duction plant using a third method, liquidthermal diffusion, in which the lighter iso-tope concentrated near a heat source withina tall column.

The second path chosen to build the bombfocused on producing large amounts of fis-sionable plutonium in a uranium pile. OnDecember 2, 1942, on a racket court underthe west grandstand at Stagg Field of theUniversity of Chicago, researchers headed bythe Italian-emigré physicist Enrico Fermiachieved the first self–sustaining chain reac-tion in a graphite and uranium pile. Grovesbuilt a pilot pile and plutonium separationfacility at the X–10 area of Clinton. Spaceand power generating limitations, however,precluded building the full–scale production


James Chadwick and General Leslie R. Groves.Source: Department of Energy.


K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plant under construc-tion at Clinton. Source: Department ofEnergy.

K-25 from opposite end. White building incenter of previous picture is discernible at far

end. Source: Department of Energy.

Y-12 Alpha Racetrack, at Clinton, used the elec-tromagnetic method to separate uranium iso-topes. Spare magnets in left foreground.Source: Department of Energy.

Manhattan Project Facilities


Section of S-50 Liquid Thermal Diffusion Plant atClinton. Source: Department of Energy.

Workers loading uranium into face of air-cooledpile at the X-10 area of Clinton. Source:Department of Energy.

Los Alamos Laboratory ca. mid-1940s. Source:Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Pile D at Hanford. Pile in foreground, water treat-ment plant in rear. Source: Department ofEnergy.

Manhattan Project Facilities


facilities at the site. Groves chose an alter-nate site near Hanford, Washington, on theColumbia River, because of its isolation, longconstruction season and access to hydroelec-tric power. Three water–cooled reactors, des-

ignated by the letters B, D, and F, and corre-sponding separation facilities were built atthe Hanford Engineer Works.

Much of the research work on producingplutonium, including design of the piles,took place at the Metallurgical Laboratory(Met Lab) in Chicago. Design and fabricationof the first atomic bombs were the responsi-bility of the newly established Los AlamosScientific Laboratory, located at a virtuallyinaccessible site high on a mesa in northernNew Mexico. The laboratory, headed by J.Robert Oppenheimer, attracted a remarkablearray of scientists from universities across theUnited States.20

Bomb Design

Designing the bomb, or “gadget” as itcame to be known, was not an easytask. Precise calculations and months ofexperimentation were required to obtainthe optimum specifications of size andshape. For the bomb to work, sufficientfissionable material needed to be broughttogether in a critical mass, which wouldignite a chain reaction that would release thegreatest possible amount of energy beforebeing blown apart and dispersed in the

explosion. The simplest way to accomplishthis, which became known as the gunmethod, brought two subcritical masses offissionable material together at high speed toform a supercritical mass. This was doneusing conventional artillery technology tofire one subcritical mass into the other. Thegun method was used for the uranium–235bomb.

Los Alamos scientists discovered, however,that the gun method would not work forplutonium. Impurities in the plutoniumwould set off a predetonation after a criticalmass had been reached but before the opti-mum configuration had been attained. Theresult would be an ineffective, wasteful fiz-zle. As an alternative, scientists turned to therelatively unknown implosion method. Withimplosion, symmetrical shockwaves directedinward would compress a subcritical mass ofplutonium, releasing neutrons and causing achain reaction.

Los Alamos, working with the Army AirForce, developed two bomb models byspring 1944 and began testing them, withoutthe fissionable materials, with drops from a

B–29 bomber. The plutonium implosion pro-totype was named Fat Man, after WinstonChurchill. The uranium gun prototypebecame Little Boy. Field tests with the urani-um prototype eased remaining doubts aboutthe artillery method. Confidence in the

West end of Stagg Field at the University ofChicago. Location of CP-1, the world's firstnuclear pile or reactor. Source: Argonne NationalLaboratory.

J. Robert Oppenheimer. Source:Reprinted by permission of the J.Robert Oppenheimer MemorialCommittee.


weapon was high enough that a full testprior to combat use was seen as unneces-sary. The plutonium device was more prob-lematic. It would have to be tested beforeuse.21

The Trinity Test

The test shot, dubbed Trinity byOppenheimer, was the most violentman–made explosion in history to that date.

It also posed the most significant hazard ofthe entire Manhattan Project. Test plannerschose a flat, desert scrub region in the north-west corner of the isolated AlamogordoBombing Range in southern New Mexico forthe test. The site was only several hundredmiles from Los Alamos, and the nearest off-site habitation was twenty miles away.Scientists, workers, and other observers, dur-ing the test, would be withdrawn almost sixmiles and sheltered behind barricades. Some

Trinity Test Site. Source: Reprinted from Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan: TheArmy and the Atomic Bomb (Washington, D.C.: Government PrintingOffice, 1985).


apprehension existed that there would be alarge–scale catastrophe. Los Alamos scientistsdiscussed the possibility that the atmospheremight be ignited and the entire earth annihi-lated but dismissed this as extremely remote.

Dangers from blast, fragments, heat, andlight, once one was sufficiently removedfrom ground zero, evoked little concern.

Not so with radiation. Prior to Trinity, sci-entists were well aware that the blast would

create potential radiation hazards. Plutoniumin the device would fission into otherradionuclides. Neutrons would strike variouselements on the ground and turn some intoactive nuclides. This radioactive debriswould be swept with fission products into agrowing fireball and lifted high into the air.Once in the atmosphere, they would form acloud of intense radioactivity. Immediateradiation from the explosion and residualradioactive debris initially caused faint worrybecause of dilution in the air and the isola-tion of the site, but as the test drew closerplanners realized, with some sense ofurgency, that radioactive fallout over localtowns posed a real hazard. Groves, in partic-ular, feared legal culpability if things got outof hand. As a result, Army intelligenceagents located and mapped everyone withina forty–mile radius. Test planners set up anelaborate offsite monitoring system and pre-pared evacuation plans if exposure levelsbecame too high.22

On July 16, 1945, the Trinity device deto-nated over the New Mexico desert andreleased approximately 21 kilotons of explo-sive yield. The predawn blast, which tem-porarily blinded the nearest observers 10,000yards away, created an orange and yellowfireball about 2,000 feet in diameter fromwhich emerged a narrow column that roseand flattened into a mushroom shape. Theblast scoured the desert floor, leaving a shal-low crater, 10 feet deep and some 400 yardsacross, in which radioactivity far exceededpretest estimates. More efficient than expect-ed, the shot dropped little fallout on the testsite beyond 1,200 yards of ground zero.Most radioactivity was contained within thedense white mushroom cloud that toppedout at 25,000 feet. Within an hour, the cloudhad largely dispersed toward the north-northeast, all the while dropping a trail offission products. Offsite fallout was heavy.Several ranch families, missed by the Armysurvey, received significant exposures in thetwo weeks following Trinity. The families,nonetheless, evidenced little external injury.Livestock were not as fortunate, sufferingskin burns, bleeding, and loss of hair. Thetest, as Stafford Warren, the ManhattanDistrict’s chief medical officer, informedGroves, had been something of a near thing.

Tower for Trinity test. Source: Departmentof Energy.

Trinity device being readied. Source: Departmentof Energy.


“While no house area investigated received adangerous amount,” he noted, “the dust out-fall from the various portions of the cloudwas potentially a very dangerous hazardover a band almost 30 miles wide extending

almost 90 miles northeast of the site.” TheAlamogordo site, Warren concluded, was“too small for a repetition of a similar test ofthis magnitude except under very specialconditions.” For any future test, he proposedfinding a larger site, “preferably with a radiusof at least 150 miles without population.”23

War’s End

The Trinity test proved the plutoniumdevice. This meant that a second type ofatomic bomb could be readied for combatuse. Germany would not be the target, hav-ing surrendered in May. The Germans at theend of the war were little nearer to produc-ing atomic weapons than they had been atthe beginning. German scientists pursuedresearch on fission, but the government’sattempts to forge a coherent strategy metwith little success. The United Statesnonetheless had little reliable intelligence onthe German bomb effort until late in thewar. Allied fears were not quelled until late1944 when the ALSOS counterintelligencemission determined that the German pro-gram had not proceeded beyond the labora-tory stage and had foundered by mid–1942.

In the end, Little Boy, the untested urani-um bomb, was dropped first at Hiroshima,Japan, on August 6, 1945, while the plutoni-um weapon, Fat Man, followed three days

later at Nagasaki on August 9. Use of thebombs helped bring an end to the war inthe Pacific, with Japan surrendering onAugust 14.24

Crossroads

Following the Trinity test and the bomb-ings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, militaryofficials still knew very little about theeffects, especially on naval targets, of nuclearweapons. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs ofStaff requested and received presidentialapproval to conduct a test series during sum-mer 1946. Vice Admiral W. H. P. Blandy,head of the test series task force, proposedcalling the series operation Crossroads. “Itwas apparent,” he noted, “that warfare, per-haps civilization itself, had been brought to aturning point by this revolutionary weapon.”Experience with the radiological hazards ofTrinity and the two bombs dropped onJapan strongly influenced the decision tolocate Crossroads at Bikini atoll in theMarshall Islands, which was far from popula-tion centers in the middle of the Pacific.Bikini was a typical coral atoll. With a reefsurrounding a lagoon of well over 200square miles, the atoll offered ample protect-ed anchorage for both a target fleet and sup-port ships. As a test site, Bikini held twodrawbacks. The distance from the continen-tal United States made extraordinary logisti-cal demands, and the humid climate creatednumerous problems for sophisticated elec-tronic and photographic equipment. The mil-itary removed the native population of 162to another atoll and brought in a large, invit-ed audience of journalists, scientists, militaryofficers, congressmen, and foreign observers.

Shot Able, a plutonium bomb droppedfrom a B–29 on July 1, performed as well asthe two previous plutonium devices, atTrinity and Nagasaki. Able nonetheless failedto fulfill its pretest publicity buildup. Partlythis was because expectations had been tooextravagant and observers were so far fromthe test area that they could not see the tar-get array. Partly it was because the drop hadmissed the anticipated ground zero by somedistance and the blast sank only three ships.In any event, the general conclusion reachedby the media at Bikini was that the “atomicbomb was, after all, just another weapon.”

Remains of Trinity tower footings. Oppenheimerand Groves at center. Source: Department ofEnergy.


Oak Ridge workers celebrate the end ofWorld War II. Source: J.E. Westcott.

Model of Little Boy uranium bomb. Source:Department of Energy.

War’s End

Fat Man plutonium bomb being readied atTinian in the Pacific. Source: Los Alamos

National Laboratory.


Baker proved much more impressive.Detonated ninety feet underwater on themorning of July 25, Baker produced a spec-tacular display as it wreaked havoc on a sev-enty–four–vessel fleet of empty ships andspewed thousands of tons of water into theair. As with Able, the test yielded explosionsequivalent to 21,000 tons of TNT. Baker, asone historian notes, “helped restore respectfor the power of the bomb.”

Baker also created a major radiation prob-lem. The test produced a radioactive mistthat deposited active products on the target

fleet in amounts far greater than had beenpredicted. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff evalua-tion board later noted, the contaminatedships “became radioactive stoves, and would

have burned all living things aboard themwith invisible and painless but deadly radia-tion.” Decontamination presented a signifi-cant radiation hazard, and, as a result, over aperiod of several weeks personnel exposurelevels began to climb. A worried StaffordWarren, who headed the testing task force’sradiological safety section, concluded thatthe task force faced “great risks of harm topersonnel engaged in decontamination andsurvey work unless such work ceases withinthe very near future.” With exposure data inhand, Warren prevailed and decontaminationoperations ceased. A planned third shot, tobe detonated on the bottom of the lagoon,was canceled.25

Postwar Control of the Atom and theOnset of the Cold War

The end of the Second World War broughtwith it a whole new set of issues and prob-lems, not least of which revolved around thedilemma of what to do with the nucleargenie now that he had been let out of thebottle. Certainly, there was no getting himback in. The United States could not nowreturn to a simpler time when atomicbombs, let alone the knowledge of thephysics behind atomic bombs, did not exist.The discovery of nuclear energy, asPresident Harry S. Truman told Congress inOctober 1945, “began a new era in the histo-ry of civilization.” And while this new eraheld the promise of perhaps limitless energyfor peaceful purposes, the prospect of everynation with it own bomb was terrifying, tosay the least. Clearly, some sort of controlsover nuclear energy were optimal and neces-sary. In the immediate aftermath of the war,the United States sought with mixed successto implement regimes for controlling andregulating the atom at both the domestic andinternational levels.

On the domestic front, Truman called forthe establishment of an Atomic EnergyCommission to take over the ManhattanProject’s material resources and “to controlall sources of atomic energy and all activitiesconnected with its development.” Followingoften bitter debate over civilian–versus–mili-tary control, Congress passed legislation cre-ating the new agency, and Truman signed itinto law on August 1, 1946. The AtomicEnergy Act of 1946 transferred authority from

Able test of the Crossroads series, July 1, 1946.Note the shock wave sweeping out around thelagoon. Source: Department of Energy.

Baker test of the Crossroads series, July 25, 1946.Source: Department of Energy.


the Army to the new Atomic EnergyCommission (AEC) composed of afive–member civilian board serving full–time.Oppenheimer headed up the GeneralAdvisory Committee to assist theCommission on scientific and technicalissues. The Military Liaison Committee wasorganized to assure input by defense offi-cials. As inheritors of the ManhattanEngineer District’s far–flung scientific andindustrial complex, the Atomic EnergyCommission continued the governmentmonopoly in the field of atomic researchand development.26

Efforts to implement international controlwere less fruitful. As the culmination of dis-cussions that had begun within governmentcircles even before the end of the war,Bernard Baruch, an “elder statesman” whohad served American presidents in variouscapacities since the First World War, unveiledthe United States plan in a speech to theUnited Nations on June 14, 1946. Baruchproposed establishing an international atom-ic development authority that would controlall activities dangerous to world security andpossess the power to license and inspect allother nuclear projects. Once such an author-ity was set up, he declared, no more bombsshould be built and existing bombs shouldbe destroyed. Abolishing atomic weapons,Baruch noted, could lay the groundwork forreducing and subsequently eliminating allweapons, thus outlawing war altogether. Theplan, which Baruch described as “the last,best hope of earth,” set specific penalties forviolations such as illegally owning atomicbombs. The plan also would not allow per-manent members of the United NationsSecurity Council to use the veto to protectthemselves from penalties for violations.

Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union, anon–nuclear power, insisted upon retainingits United Nations veto and argued that theabolition of atomic weapons should precedethe establishment of an international authori-ty. Negotiations could not proceed fairly, theRussians maintained, as long as the UnitedStates could use its atomic monopoly tocoerce other nations into accepting its plan.The Baruch Plan, in essence, proposed thatthe United States reduce its atomic arsenalby carefully defined stages linked to thedegree of international agreement on con-trol. Only after each stage of internationalcontrol was implemented would the UnitedStates take the next step in reducing itsstockpile. In the end, the Soviet Union,unwilling to surrender its veto power,opposed the proposal. The Baruch Planbecame a dead letter by early 1947.

The imbroglio over international control ofthe atom was part of the onset of a newglobal struggle, this time with the SovietUnion. The breathing space between twowars—the Second World War and the ColdWar—was very brief. Already in March 1946,Winston Churchill warned of an “iron cur-tain” that had descended on Eastern Europeas the Soviet Union sought to expand itsinfluence. A year later, President Trumanproclaimed the Truman Doctrine and askedfor funds for overseas military assistance. Onthe issue of control of nuclear weapons, theUnited States, believing that Soviet troopsposed a threat to Western Europe and recog-nizing that American conventional forces hadrapidly demobilized, refused to surrender itsatomic deterrent without adequate controls.In an atmosphere of mutual suspicion, theCold War set in.27

Page 37The Search for a Continential Test Site, 1947 - 1950The Search for a Continential Test Site, 1947 - 1950

Sandstone

As the Cold War intensified, so did thedemand for nuclear weapons. The nation’snuclear stockpile in 1947 consisted of onlythirteen weapons, and, as Atomic EnergyCommission Chairman David E. Lilienthaltold President Truman on April 2, none ofthese were assembled. The paucity of bombswas partly attributable to the scarcity ofweapons–grade fissionable materials.Theoretical advances made by Los Alamosbomb designers suggested ways to use thesematerials more efficiently—and thus providefor more weapons—but confirmation couldonly come from full–scale testing. LosAlamos therefore proposed a three–testseries to the Atomic Energy Commission.Unlike Crossroads, the series would concen-trate on bomb performance and the valida-tion of three new weapon designs and noton weapon effects.

The location for the test series, calledSandstone, fostered some debate. TheMarshall Islands in the Pacific again seemedthe logical choice, but the State Department,for good reason, feared foreign criticism.Administered by Japan between the twoworld wars under a mandate from theLeague of Nations, the Marshall Islands werenow a trust territory of the United Statesunder an agreement with the United Nations.The agreement allowed military use of theislands but also imposed special responsibili-ties for native welfare. It was hard to arguethat relocation of the natives and nuclearweapons testing was to their benefit. TheBikini islanders had been moved to Rongerikatoll, which was too small and barren tosupport them, and the United States appar-ently had done little to help. Indeed, whenthe poor record of American stewardship

became public in fall 1947, it aroused suffi-cient worldwide protest that action by theUnited Nations seemed possible. In any

event, whatever the public and foreign rela-tions ramifications, few alternatives to theMarshall Islands existed. The Joint Chiefs ofStaff strongly opposed a return to the Trinity

Part III:

The Search for a Continental Test Site, 1947–1950

The Central Pacific. Source: Reprinted fromKaman Tempo, Operations Crossroads, 1946, byL.H. Berkhouse, et al., DNA 6032F (SantaBarbara, May 1, 1984), p. 20.

Bikini islanders loading their gear into a trans-port ship in preparation for evacuation prior toCrossroads. Source: DTRA/Navy.

site in New Mexico because, as GeneralDwight D. Eisenhower observed, of the pub-lic fear that a continental site would engen-

der. Lilienthal also noted that testing atTrinity would “require elaboratesuper–atmosphere investigations that taketime.” In the end, the Atomic EnergyCommission favored a Pacific site for techni-cal reasons and, with Truman opposed tocontinental tests, that view prevailed.28

The question of where in the Pacific toconduct Sandstone also was not a given. LosAlamos initially suggested returning toBikini, but the atoll lacked certain featuresneeded for long–term use. Its reef islandswere too small and their land surface toolimited to support the instrumentationdemanded by proof–testing. Further studynarrowed the choice to Kwajalein orEnewetak, similar but larger atolls locatedsouth and west of Bikini respectively.Kwajalein possessed operating air and naval

bases, which implied lower set–up costs butat the same time might be a hindrance toradiological safety. Enewetak, by contrast,offered greater and more widely dispersedland area, greater isolation, and less rain.

Perhaps a decisive factor in choosingEnewetak was that it required the relocationof only 142 native islanders versus five timesthat number at Kwajalein.

The military and the Atomic EnergyCommission, recalling the fanfare atCrossroads, preferred to hold secret tests butrealized that in peacetime this was not possi-ble. They nonetheless held security verytight. The public was informed in December1947 only of the staffing of the provingground and the formation of a joint taskforce. No further notification of nuclear test-ing was given out until the series concludedthe following May. The military, because ofsecurity and logistical needs, headed up thejoint task force while Los Alamos wasresponsible for the actual tests. The task

Page 38 The Search for a Continential Test Site, 1947 - 1950The Search for a Continential Test Site, 1947 - 1950

Enewetak atoll, 1948. Note locations and yields oftests on the atoll's northeast rim. Source: KamanTempo, Operation Sandstone, 1948, by L.H.Berkhouse, et al., DNA 6033F (Santa Barbara,December 19, 1983), p. 20.

Sandstone series tests took place on the islandsmaking up the northeastern rim of EnewetakAtoll. View looks from the northwest to the south-east. Source: REECO, Bechtel Nevada.

force, carrying its precious cargo of fission-able material and most of the nation’s skilledbomb designers, sailed on near–war footing,complete with destroyer screen, constant aircover, zigzag course off the main sea–lanes,and crews on round–the–clock alert.Growing tensions with the Soviet Union fol-lowing the communist coup inCzechoslovakia and the impending crisisover Berlin raised fears of a surprise attack,a possibility that seemed not entirelygroundless after unidentified submarineswere sighted in the area. The task force wasgiven orders to use depth charges againstany undersea intruders. Officials inWashington even discussed postponingSandstone and returning both bombs andscientists to the United States.

Amidst such distractions, the test series,conducted from April 15 to May 15, 1948,proved an overwhelming success. The threetests performed as expected and falloutremained largely localized. The second shot,Yoke, at forty–nine kilotons provided thelargest explosive yield yet achieved, overtwice the size of the Trinity test. Moreimportantly, the new bomb designs translat-ed into more efficient use of fissionablematerials. From 1947’s thirteen weapons, thenuclear stockpile increased to fifty in 1948.As for Enewetak, despite the expressedintent to make it a permanent provingground, the task force left few structuresstanding. For security reasons, work crewssystematically destroyed anything providingevidence of possible test results. Upon leav-ing, the task force arranged to keep the area

closed and secure, guarded by a fifty–mangarrison.29

Continental Test Site Reconsidered

As successful as Sandstone was, logistics,weather, and security and safety concernsduring the operation revived thinking abouta continental test site. The logistical prob-lems associated with transporting, supplying,and housing a nuclear testing task force inthe middle of the Pacific were self–evident.From the viewpoint of a weather expert,Enewetak did not seem “a particularly good[choice] . . . as a permanent atomic weaponsproving ground.” The region was too cloudy,with a complicated wind structure, and therewere few nearby weather stations. Security,with war threatening and the vast, surround-ing ocean veiling unknown dangers, com-manded significant military resources andrequired constant vigilance. Likewise, safetywas made more difficult by the tropicalmarine environment, with its constant heatand humidity. Before Sandstone was evenover, these considerations prompted AdmiralWilliam S. Parsons, who had directed ord-nance development of the wartime weaponsat Los Alamos and was a member of theMilitary Liaison Committee, to recommend toLt. General John E. Hull, head of Armyforces in the Pacific and commander of thejoint task force, that a continental test site beinvestigated. Among the obvious pluses of acontinental site, Parsons also cited the “neb-


Sandstone test at Enewetak. Source: REECO,Bechtel Nevada.

With the completion of Sandstone, temporarystructures were torn down and burned. Source:Reprinted from Clarence H. White, ed., OperationSandstone: The Story of Joint Task Force Seven(Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949), p. 64.


ulous advantage,” as an Air Force officiallater put it, of “educating the public that thebomb was not such a horrible thing that itrequired proof–testing 5,000 miles from theUnited States.” In any event, Hull transmittedthe proposal, along with some of his ownreservations, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whoin turn, in late August 1948, queried theAtomic Energy Commission regarding itsopinion.

In a mid–September meeting with theMilitary Liaison Committee, Lilienthal statedthe Commission was willing to cooperate ina “preliminary survey” but had “one princi-pal reservation.” Both “policy and psycho-logical considerations,” he stated, were“strongly against the possibility of holdingfuture tests of atomic weapons inside theUnited States.” Lilienthal also found it curi-ous that prior to Sandstone the military itselfhad expressed “strong opposition” to conti-nental testing. In his formal written responsea week later, Lilienthal admitted that a conti-nental site might have “certain advantages”over Enewetak for some types of tests. Acontinental site’s “ease of access” wouldallow greater flexibility in preparation forand conduct of the tests. In addition, opera-tions might be logistically less expensive,although these savings could be offset bycosts for increased safety and security meas-ures that would be required at a continentalsite. Despite these advantages, Lilienthal

again stressed the primary disadvantage, thata continental site would “obviously pose dif-ficult domestic and possibly internationalrelations problems.” The “magnitude of theseproblems,” he added, could change “in theevent of a national emergency.” Lilienthalconcluded that the Commission found it“desirable” that an initial study of possiblesites be conducted, but he warned that,given the “dangers inherent in a misunder-standing of the status of this proposal,” thestudy should be “carefully safeguarded bymaintenance of the classification ‘Secret.’”30

Project Nutmeg

The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project(AFSWP, pronounced Af–swop), establishedin early 1947 from the specifically militaryremnants of the Manhattan Project andtasked with overseeing nuclear weaponsdoctrine, training, and logistics for the entiremilitary establishment, codenamed the conti-nental test site study Project Nutmeg. AFSWPselected Navy Captain Howard B.Hutchinson to conduct Nutmeg, which had alimited scope of study. As a “highly qualifiedmeteorologist” who had been at Enewetak,Hutchinson was asked only to assess the“physical feasibility” of conducting nuclearweapons test within the continental UnitedStates. He was to determine “how, when,and where,” as he put it, tests could be con-ducted without radioactive fallout causing”physical or economic detriment to the pop-ulation.” Hutchinson collected data and otherinformation from prior tests and extrapolatedfrom these how radioactive debris wouldbehave, migrate, and fall out in the meteoro-logical environment existing over the UnitedStates. He dedicated fully two–thirds of hisfifty–seven page study to explaining the dataand the methodology he used in interpretingand applying it.31

Hutchinson concluded that at “properlyengineered sites, under proper meteorologi-cal conditions” continental testing would“result in no harm to population, economyor industry.” A properly engineered site con-sisted of a prepared surface and a sufficient-ly high tower from which to detonate thedevices so that “the formation of a crater orthe indraft of sand and soil and water intothe rising column of hot gases” would beprevented. Given these efforts to minimize

David E. Lilienthal, first chairman of the AtomicEnergy Commission, 1947-1950. Source:Department of Energy.


the creation of radioactive products, most ofthe remaining radioactivity would enter thecolumn of hot gases and ascend to the highlevels of the atmosphere where it would be“diffused and dispersed over vast areas,”depending on meteorological conditions. AtEnewetak, he observed, radioactive fallouthad been measured within a radius of 600miles and never exceeded “conservative val-ues of human tolerance” except where rainwater concentrated activity at the groundsurface. Besides precipitation, wind condi-tions and atmospheric stability determinedmeteorological suitability for testing. Undersuitable conditions, Hutchinson stated, it did“not seem probable that harmful concentra-tions of soluble radio isotopes” could resultfrom nuclear testing.

Determining that testing would not beharmful, Hutchinson turned to locating theoptimal continental site. He narrowed hisanalysis down to the arid southwest and thehumid southeast. Of these two areas, hethought the southwest was “more favorable”for “purposes of planning and logistics.”Sites remote from population centers andwith sufficient surrounding uninhabitedspace could be chosen so that tests could beconducted “during two–thirds of the year,fully 40% of the time, in perfect safety.”

Nevada, Arizona, and New Mexico seemedto “offer the optimum conditions as to mete-orology, remote available land and logistics,”with New Mexico as the most logical choicebecause it was “a state conditioned tonuclear work” and home to Los Alamos andthe “center of atomic bomb storage” atSandia outside Albuquerque.

The arid southwest, however, possessedone major drawback. A “certain amount” ofradioactivity, Hutchinson noted, would fallout of the atmosphere to the eastward, off-site, following atomic tests due to prevailingwinds. This would not, he reiterated, “harmthe population, the economy nor the indus-try of the nation.” If “this negligible possibili-ty” of fallout on inhabited areas nonethelesscould not be accepted for sites in the south-west, he reasoned, the eastern coast of theUnited States offered suitable sites whereradioactivity would be harmlessly blown outto sea. A testing site could be located on thecoasts of Maine, Delaware, Maryland, orVirginia, but the relatively denser popula-tions, currents that would keep depositedradioactivity closer to shore, and economi-cally valuable fisheries in these states and offtheir shores favored choosing a site furthersouth on the Carolina coast. Most idealwould be a site somewhere between CapeHatteras and Cape Fear where “the popula-tion is not dense, meteorology is favorableduring two–thirds of the year between 20%and 30% of the time, and the waters of theGulf Stream will remove the waste productsto the open Atlantic with no possibility ofsecond order effects through biologicalprocesses.”32

The Project Nutmeg report proposed nospecific location as a test site. Nor did it con-sider in detail, as one official noted, prob-lems involving “real estate, public relations,soil composition, safety, physical securityand logistics.” Although in agreement withthe general conclusions of the study that, atleast as far as meteorological and oceano-graphic factors were concerned, tests couldbe conducted safely on the Carolina coast,the Atomic Energy Commission remainedwary. As Acting Chairman Sumner T. Pikenoted, flights over the Carolina coast by offi-cers of the Commission’s Division of Military

Apollo 9 photo of Cape Hatteras, North Carolina,jutting far out into the Atlantic. Cape Lookout isat the bottom left. Cape Fear is about the samedistance further to the southwest. Source: NASA.


Application revealed that “almost all landwhich would be useful as a test site isinhabited and improved.” As a result, “a con-siderable number of people would requirerelocation; some permanently, others for theduration of tests.” Pike further pointed outthat “considerable ocean going shipping,”both domestic and foreign, would have tobe controlled during test periods.Considering these factors, the Atomic EnergyCommission in early March 1949 concludedthat, excepting “a national emergency,” acontinental site was “not desirable.”33

The Cold War Heats Up

A national emergency was not long incoming. Relations with the Soviet Union con-tinued to deteriorate, and in late August 1949the Soviets tested their first fission bomb.This was far sooner than most Americansexpected. Although some Manhattan Projectofficials such as Vannevar Bush had con-tended any nation with good scientific andtechnical resources—including the SovietUnion—could produce a bomb within threeor four years, General Groves consideredtwenty years a likelier figure. When airbornesampling, a process that had been provenduring the Sandstone test series, revealed theSoviet bomb test, it surprised even somehigh government officials, with Secretary ofDefense Louis A. Johnson for a while refus-ing to believe the evidence.

The Russian test prompted governmentofficials to look for measures to counter the

newly perceived threat. One response wasto expand production facilities. Inmid–October, President Truman approvedthe construction of another gaseous diffusionfacility, K–31, to be built at Oak Ridge andof a waterworks at Hanford’s new DR reac-tor, which originally was to replace D reac-tor, so that DR could be run simultaneouslywith the D reactor. A second response wasto move to the next generation of nuclearweaponry, making what Commissioner LouisStrauss called a “quantum jump” in nucleartechnology to thermonuclear weapons,which could increase the explosive yield ofthe bomb a hundred or even a thousandfold.Advent of the Soviet bomb had reduced theabsolute advantage of the United States innuclear weaponry to a relative advantagebased strictly on numbers. In Strauss’s view,the thermonuclear weapon, also known asthe hydrogen bomb or the “Super,” wouldrestore the absolute advantage. Following anintense internal governmental debate on thepossibility, wisdom, and morality of theSuper, in which Lilienthal and theOppenheimer–led General AdvisoryCommittee opposed while Strauss, theHungarian–emigré physicist Edward Teller,and key members of Congress favored mov-ing forward, Truman on January 29, 1950,approved accelerating development of thethermonuclear weapon. Although the con-cept, in which a nuclear fission bomb wouldserve as detonator to ignite fusion, datedback to early in the Manhattan Project, noone knew if a thermonuclear weapon couldbe built due to the formidable technical diffi-culties that remained.

Nuclear testing would be essential in deter-mining the feasibility of the Super. Planningfor a new test series in the Pacific hadbegun shortly after Sandstone ended. ByJanuary 1950, test planners envisioned afour–shot series, codenamed Greenhouse, tobe conducted at Enewetak in spring 1951.Greenhouse would not involve the testing ofa thermonuclear device. But two of the fourplanned tests would explore some of theprinciples of fusion. One would demonstratethat small amounts of thermonuclear fuelcould boost the yield of a fission bomb. Thesecond would prove that a fission explosioncould trigger a thermonuclear reaction. As

Edward Teller and Louis Strauss successfullypressed to accelerate the development of the ther-monuclear weapon. Source: Department ofEnergy.

with Sandstone, a joint task force was set upto conduct the series.34

Plans for Greenhouse were almost com-plete when the outbreak of war in Koreathreatened to unravel everything. The loss ofChina to Mao Tse–tung’s forces in fall 1949had been a severe blow to Americanattempts to stem the advance of the commu-nist tide, but the outlook turned even bleak-er when on June 25, 1950, some 75,000communist North Korean troops stormedacross the thirty–eighth parallel into SouthKorea. In a rout, South Korean forces quick-ly collapsed, and Truman decided to commitAmerican ground troops to the struggle.With the armed forces largely unprepared forconflict, the logistics of fighting a war infar–off Korea caused severe strains on themilitary. Greenhouse seemed unlikely to sur-vive as support for testing appeared far lessurgent than the demands of combat. TheAtomic Energy Commission asked LosAlamos to justify Greenhouse “in light of theimmediate shortage of shipping and particu-larly air transport in the Pacific and in lightof uncertainties in predicting the situationwhich may prevail at the scheduled time ofthe tests.” The lab defended both the Pacifictesting site and the test series. Atomic EnergyCommission Chairman Gordon E. Dean, whohad replaced Lilienthal, informed Secretaryof Defense Johnson that Greenhouse wasvital for upgrading the weapons stockpileand acquiring new data on blast and radio-logical effects. More importantly,Greenhouse, Dean observed, was “expectedto make a direct and significant contributionto our understanding of the technical andeconomical feasibility of a thermonuclearweapon, which is now inadequate.”

Prospects for Greenhouse remained bleak.In his response to Dean in early August,Johnson noted that the Joint Chiefs hadrequested a review of Greenhouse costs andschedules. On the basis of the review,Johnson explained, the Joint Chiefs wouldconsider the “necessity for postponement” ofGreenhouse given the “necessity for realloca-tion of both shipping and personnel fromthe tests, as originally scheduled, to the sup-port of operations in the Far East.” The JointChiefs would also examine the possibility of

limiting logistical costs by “a reduction inscope of the tests.” Los Alamos officials weredumfounded. Laboratory Director Norris E.Bradbury exclaimed that it was “almost fan-tastic” that Enewetak might not be availablefor testing “precisely at a time in internation-al relations when the most rapid progressshould be made” in nuclear weaponry. “Justas one wants and needs it the most, and justas the program is accelerated,” he observed,“the chances of using it decrease alarming-ly.”35

Renewed Search for a Continental TestSite

The possible loss of the Pacific test siteand series revived Nutmeg. Less than threeweeks following the outbreak of hostilities in

Korea, the Atomic Energy Commission askedthe Department of Defense to join in arenewed study of a continental test site. “Wenow feel,” Chairman Dean stated, “that anational emergency is, at least, possible.”The Commission did not want to seem“unduly pessimistic,” Dean continued, butbelieved it would be “wise to reexamine thequestion of a continental site with the objec-tive of having available a definite and specif-ic site which could be recommended for useif needed.” Although the Commission was


Gordon Dean, chairman of the Atomic EnergyCommission, 1950-1953, at a press conference.Source: Department of Energy.

not averse to surveying the entire NorthAmerican continent for potential sites, Deanthought that the joint study should recom-mend at least one site in the United Statesfor “emergency atomic test use” and possiblyone alternate site.36

Within a week, the Armed Forces SpecialWeapons Project and the Atomic EnergyCommission had narrowed the list down to ahandful of potential sites. AFSWP rejectedNorth American sites outside of the conti-

nental United States because of “inaccessibil-ity, lack of required harbors or facilities,unsuitability of the physical features, oradverse geographical environment.”Canadian sites possessed the added disad-vantages of “expense, limited working sea-son, and probability of drawn–out interna-tional negotiations beforehand.” Both Alaskaand Canada, AFSWP further observed, pre-sented difficulties in the control of “wander-ing groups” such as trappers and prospec-tors. The North Carolina coast and the Gulfof Mexico coast in Texas made the final fivelist of potential sites but were of lower

“desirability,” as Los Alamos DirectorBradbury put it, because of the “lack ofGovernment–owned land and large distancesfrom Los Alamos.” AFSWP estimated thatobtaining the land would take at least oneyear. The Gulf of Mexico coast held theadded drawback, according to AFSWP, ofprevailing on–shore winds.

The final three candidate sites were undermilitary control. The Dugway ProvingGround–Wendover Bombing Range in west-ern Utah received low marks primarilybecause of the relative proximity of Salt LakeCity. Based on the 1940 census, AFSWPplaced the population downwind within a125–mile radius of the site at over 350,000.This was the area within which a “possibleemergency evacuation” might have to beconducted on ten hours’ notice. Of the tworemaining sites, AFSWP initially favored theAlamogordo–White Sands Guided MissileRange in New Mexico where the Trinitydevice had been tested. Closeness to LosAlamos counted in the site’s favor, but labo-ratory officials were concerned about possi-ble variations in wind directions that mightendanger “major population centers” such asEl Paso, just outside the 125– mile radiusdue south. Instead, Los Alamos leanedtoward the area between Las Vegas andTonopah, Nevada, somewhere on the LasVegas Bombing and Gunnery Range.37

Fallout and the Continental Test Site

Radiological hazards—and the “public rela-tions problem related thereto”—were the pri-mary consideration underlying Los Alamos’spreference for the Nevada location.Assuming that the actual test site would betoward the northwest portion of the bomb-ing and gunnery range, only 4,100 peoplelived downwind from the site within a125–mile radius. This did not include LasVegas, and, as such, the site compared veryfavorably with both the Dugway and WhiteSands sites, with the latter claiming a popu-lation of over 15,000 within a similar radiusdownwind. In addition, the bombing andgunnery range allowed a greater margin forerror than the other two sites, possessing thewidest arc across which winds of an unantic-ipated direction might blow without drop-


Norris E. Bradbury, director of the Los AlamosScientific Laboratory. Source: Department ofEnergy.

ping fallout on any nearby town. These ini-tial considerations led Bradbury in late Julyto confidently predict that tests in Nevadacould be conducted with “a degree of publicradiological safety which would considerablyexceed that of the Alamogordo operation.”38

The Nevada site also held other advan-tages. Immediately to the south of the bomb-ing and gunnery range was agovernment–owned airfield at IndianSprings, with runways 6,600 feet in lengthand housing for about 300 to 500 people.Convinced of the viability of the Nevada site,the Atomic Energy Commission asked

Holmes and Narver, its contractor for opera-tions at Enewetak, to perform a quick surveyto locate a specific testing site within therange and estimate the costs of shiftingGreenhouse to the continental site. The com-pany found “two general areas,” designatedas the “North Site” and the “South Site,”

meeting the general criteria for a provingground. Located in the extreme northwestcorner of the gunnery range approximately35 miles southeast of Tonopah, the NorthSite was situated in a basin known as CactusFlat, at an elevation of about 5,330 feet, withthe Kawich Valley adjoining it on the south-east. The South Site consisted of two large


Holmes and Narver map showing the location of the North andSouth sites. Source: Holmes & Narver, "Report Covering theSelection of Proposed Emergency Proving Ground for the UnitedStates Atomic Energy Commission," August 14, 1950.

valleys, Frenchman Flat and Yucca Flat.Holmes and Narver determined that theSouth Site held “significant advantages” overthe North. The facilities at Indian Springswere much closer. Sources of material sup-plies were nearer, permitting less haulageand more economical construction. Unlikethe North Site, natural barriers screenedviewing from public roads at the South Siteand permitted easier and more effectivesecurity enforcement.

Selection of the South Site, however,would place Las Vegas well within a125–mile radius. Frenchman Flat, at thesoutheast corner of the South Site, was only65 miles from downtown Las Vegas as the

crow flies. This raised concerns about possi-ble radiological hazards, and on August 1 agroup of experts, including Teller and EnricoFermi, met to discuss the issues. The groupconcluded that a “tower–burst bomb havinga yield of 25 kilotons could be detonatedwithout exceeding the allowed emergency

tolerance dose . . . outside a 180o test areasector 100 miles in radius.” The test area sec-tor ran north and east of a line roughly run-ning from Las Vegas to Tonopah. The panelalso assumed that “meteorologists wouldpick the actual shot days.” Wind directionand no rain were the critical factors in mak-ing the decision. Favorable wind directionwas particularly important in the winterwhen prevailing winds from the northwestblew from the site toward Las Vegas.Meteorologists further needed to “predictwithin 99.9% accuracy that there would beno rainfall in the general vicinity of zero fora period of 10 hours following the shot.” Buteven on the best of days, the panel realized,there likely would be measurable offsite fall-out. Fermi suggested that at the upper endof the “emergency tolerance dose,” inhabi-tants subject to exposure should be warnedto stay indoors, take showers, and the like.The panel thought that the risk for exposedoffsite inhabitants was “not a probability thatanyone will be killed, or even hurt . . . but .. . the probability that people will receiveperhaps a little more radiation than medicalauthorities say is absolutely safe.”39

President Truman Hesitates and the JointChiefs Decide on Enewetak

When Secretary of Defense Johnson tookthe issue of a continental test site to theWhite House on August 7, President Trumanpostponed making a decision. Meanwhile,test officials grew increasingly anxious. “Ifwe cannot use Eniwetok in the spring of1951,” Bradbury plaintively asked, “whatthen can we do?” By early September,Colonel George F. Schlatter, chief of theAtomic Energy Commission’s test activitiesbranch, concluded that from a “practicalpoint of view,” it was unlikely that “any sitealternate to Eniwetok could be surveyed,selected, authorized and prepared for use intime for spring 1951.” Part of the problem,officials realized, was the sheer magnitude ofthe proposed tests in Greenhouse. At leastone device, if it performed properly, wouldproduce sufficient explosive yield to make itpotentially unsuitable from a safety perspec-tive for a continental site. With no real alter-native, Schlatter urged that Greenhouse “goforward approximately as scheduled.”


Enrico Fermi at work in the laboratory. Source:Argonne National Laboratory.

Convinced by the Commission’s argumentsfor Greenhouse, the Joint Chiefs inmid–September decided they could spare theresources for the test series.40

Proceeding with Greenhouse as planneddid not, however, end discussions on thecontinental test site. Enewetak’s availabilityhad been a near thing, and test planners,relying on a single, far away test site, hadbeen left with few options. They did notwant to find themselves in such a positionagain. In addition, nuclear weapons testing,with ever–heightening international tensions,appeared on the verge of becoming anongoing, permanent activity. As CommissionChairman Dean told the Military LiaisonCommittee in July 1950, it was impossible toannounce a definitive schedule for futuretests, but it was “obvious that such tests willbe necessary.” The current Los Alamosresearch program and the “interests of theDepartment of Defense,” he continued,would “require continuing field proof testsof laboratory results.” Even as the status ofGreenhouse seemed in doubt, Deaninformed the committee that the AtomicEnergy Commission anticipated a nuclear test“in connection with the thermonuclear pro-gram” subsequent to the Greenhouse series.Such a test, he observed, was tentativelyplanned for early spring 1952. Dean addedthat logistical support from the militarywould be required but the “need for suchassistance would be greatly reduced if a con-tinental site were available.”

The Atomic Energy Commission continuedto press hard for a continental site. Evenwith Greenhouse targeted for Enewetak,Schlatter contended that an “alternate site (orsites—small and large) definitely should beselected as early as possible and authorizedfor use.” Any development decision, headded, could be “made at a later date.” Withthe South Site at the bombing and gunneryrange remaining the preferable site, theAtomic Energy Commission arranged inmid–September for the Army Corps ofEngineers to conduct a thorough topographi-cal survey and investigate sources of watersupply. The Corps was also tasked withlocating a one–mile square “camp area tohouse approximately 1500 men.”41

President Truman Decides on aContinental Test Site

On October 25, 1950, as CommunistChinese forces poised to intervene in theKorean conflict, Dean discussed withPresident Truman the issue of a continentaltest site. With the new test series followingGreenhouse now moved up to fall 1951,

Dean convinced Truman of the need for anappropriate location that was more secureand accessible than Enewetak. The presidentassigned the National Security Council tolead the final search. In mid–November thecouncil asked Dean to head a SpecialCommittee composed of the Atomic EnergyCommission and the Departments of Stateand Defense and tasked with locating a con-tinental test site. The search, however, wasessentially over. The major participants werealready predisposed toward selecting theSouth Site.42

A week later on November 22, Los Alamostest officials recommended the Nevada sitein glowing terms. They noted that the


President Harry S. Truman made the final deci-sion on locating the Nevada Test Site. Source:Harry S. Truman Presidential Library.


Frenchman Flat area, where the initial testseries would be conducted, “is relatively freefrom radiation hazards, has a minimum ofoperational limitations, and offers manyoperational facilities for an atomic provingground.” Within the “sector of safety” to thenorth and east of the site into which aradioactive cloud might move with an“assurance of safety,” population density was“so very small” that suitable controls couldbe established with “very little logisticeffort.” The site offered “no foreseeable radi-ation hazards,” the Los Alamos testersobserved, for shots “possibly as high as 50KT and certainly none for a 25 KT detona-tion.” In addition, the knowledge gainedfrom “small yield weapons” might extend“maximum allowable yield.” Logistics alsoposed “no operational limitations.” NearbyLas Vegas possessed all of the facilitiesrequired for “transient living and generalconstruction,” with a sizeable labor pool,contractors with equipment, and rail and airterminals. A black–topped highway, U.S.Highway 95, passed only seven miles southof the “target area,” allowing easy accessfrom Las Vegas. The government–owned airbase at Indian Springs, eighteen miles fromthe site, would allow “air traffic direct fromLos Alamos” and could accommodate a peakload of over 1000 personnel. “It is recom-mended,” the testers concluded, that “this

area be made available, as soon as possible,for fall 1951 tests.”43

The Atomic Energy Commission concurred.At a Commission meeting on December 12,Division of Military Application DirectorJames McCormack reported that while nosite within the continental United Statescould be considered a “completely satisfacto-ry alternate” to overseas sites, the Nevadalocation “most nearly satisfies all of theestablished criteria.” The “most critical” ofthese criteria, he noted, dealt with radiologi-cal safety. “Not only must high safety factorsbe established in fact,” he observed, “but theacceptance of these factors by the generalpublic must be insured by judicious handlingof the public information program.”McCormack stated that the Nevada sitewould “permit a substantial improvement inpredicted safety over the Trinity shot,” andhe recommended that it be selected for“immediate development and early use as acontinental atomic test site.” TheCommission quickly accepted the recom-mendation, and three days later the SpecialCommittee of the National Security Councilfollowed suit. On December 18, PresidentTruman approved the choice. He directedthat any “publicity attendant on the estab-lishment” of the site be coordinated by theNational Security Council.44

Page 49Preparing to Test, December 1950 - January 1951Preparing to Test, December 1950 - January 1951

The Need for an Immediate TestingSeries

The fast–track decision–making process forselecting a portion of the Las Vegas Bombingand Gunnery Range for the continental testsite was fortunate and perhaps not entirelyinadvertent. Before President Truman evensigned off on the new test site, the LosAlamos laboratory and the Atomic EnergyCommission were laying plans to conductnuclear weapons tests there sooner thananyone imagined or thought possible.

Already in November 1950, Los Alamosbomb designers realized that possible designflaws existed in the implosion devices slatedto be tested during the Greenhouse series.They concluded that several test detonationsneeded to be made, if at all possible, priorto Greenhouse in order to “protect theEniwetok program.” By mid–December,“very intensive planning” was underway atLos Alamos for a series of three to five shotsat the new test area—usually referred to asthe Nevada Test Site, but sometimes as SiteMercury*—to be conducted in mid–Januaryor early February 1951. Insufficient lead timeexisted to prepare for tower shots, so thetests would be “air bursts” dropped from anairplane. As initially envisioned by the LosAlamos test planners, the series would be ofa “secret nature” with no outside agency,other than a small Air Force group, partici-pating. The planners were also aware that an“enormous amount of preparation” was nec-essary in a very short period of time. If thesepreparations could not be completed byearly February, they concluded, the testswould be of no use for Greenhouse andwould be canceled.45

The Atomic Energy Commission movedquickly on the new test series, whichSchlatter dubbed the “Hurry–Up Operation”but officially became Ranger. On December20, Dean informed the Military LiaisonCommittee of the proposed series. Althoughno operational plan yet existed, he assuredthe committee that Ranger would be a “rela-tively simple operation, requiring minimumsupport of a special or critical nature.” Deannoted that the expected explosive yieldsfrom the tests would be relatively low, “inthe range of a few KT, perhaps less that 1KT in some instances.” Ranger, nonetheless,could not be taken lightly. As Schlatterobserved, some concern existed that “a smallshot is not necessarily an equally small radsafety problem compared to former bigshots.” This meant, he continued, that “forcomplete safety (Public Relations) it may bewell to organize a high capability for radsafety despite a low probability of needingsame.”46

The more immediate question, however,was what role the military would play inRanger. Air Force Lt. General Elwood R.Quesada, commander of Joint Task Force 3for the Greenhouse operation, contendedthat the test series should be the responsibil-ity of his task force. The Atomic EnergyCommission disagreed. Schlatter argued thatthe task force was “neither necessary norsufficiently flexible” for the purposes of thetest series. McCormack stated that this was aresponsibility that the Commission could not“appropriately share” through the mechanismof a task force. In the end, with the relativeproximity of Los Alamos and much reducedlogistical and security requirements, task

Part IV:

Preparing to Test, December 1950–January 1951

*The name Mercury predates the test site and is derived from the Mercury Mine, which was located at thesouthern end of the site.

Page 50 Preparing to Test, December 1950 - January 1951Preparing to Test, December 1950 - January 1951

force support was not needed, and the taskforce played no role in Ranger. Individualmembers involved in Joint Task Force 3nonetheless provided some assistance, large-ly in such specialized areas as cloud tracking

and weather forecasting. The Air Force alsoconducted the flight missions that droppedthe test devices over their targets.47

Negotiating with the Air Force on Use ofthe Test Site

Planning for the impending Ranger seriesproceeded at breakneck speed before theAtomic Energy Commission even had cleartitle to the Nevada Test Site. On December19 and 21, 1950, following PresidentTruman’s approval of the continental site,agency officials met with representatives ofthe Air Force to reach an agreement on the“joint use” of the Las Vegas Bombing andGunnery Range. Air Force officials pointedout that continued use of the eastern por-tions of the range for the gunnery training of

fighter pilots for Korea was a “high priority.”In addition, the Strategic Air Command uti-lized the western parts of the range for aerialgunnery and portions to the north for prac-tice bombing. Despite the multiple usesbeing made of the gunnery range, the AirForce was willing to “surrender its lease” tothe South Site to the Atomic EnergyCommission for a “permanent AEC test area.”The new test site consisted of a rectangulartract approximately twelve by thirty miles,enlarged almost immediately to sixteen byforty miles, and included Frenchman Flat,where the Ranger series would be conduct-ed.

Air Force officials warned that the militarydid not have “clear title” to the gunneryrange. Working through the Department ofthe Interior, the Air Force was “co–leaseewith a number of civilian parties (namelyranchers) with the right of joint use of theproperty.” The Atomic Energy Commissionnegotiators stated that the Commissionwould assume responsibility for “legalaction” to acquire full title from the privateparties. The Air Force representatives alsoexpressed interest in using the test site dur-ing periods between tests. Commission offi-cials rebuffed this overture, noting that forthe “foreseeable future” this would not bepossible. Upon conclusion of the Rangerseries, the Commission would “immediatelybegin work on installations of a more per-manent nature for future tests.”

Air Force officials further agreed to provide“on a temporary basis only” certain logisticalservices for the Ranger series. TheCommission could use space at Nellis AirForce Base, outside Las Vegas, as a commu-nications center for radiological safety activi-ties. The Air Force consented to a “jointoccupancy” of the Indian Springs “encamp-ment” from January 1 to March 1, 1951.Barracks and a mess building would bemade available for 200 to 250 people. TheAir Force representatives acknowledged thatthe facilities being assigned were of a “tem-porary type only” and in poor condition,with “tar paper torn off [and] roofs blownoff.” The Commission would have to per-form the necessary repairs to “make themhabitable.” The Air Force officials also made

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Atomic EnergyCommission, and Department of Defense officialsconnected with the nuclear weapons program.Front row, left to right: John Manley; Maj. Gen.K.D. Nichols; A.S. Alexander, assistant secretaryof army; Norris E. Bradbury; Lt. Gen. T.B. Larkin,assistant chief of staff, G-4. Back row, left toright: Edward Teller; Alvin C. Graves; WilliamWebster, chairman of the AEC's research anddevelopment board; Brig. Gen. JamesMcCormack, director of military application,AEC; Carroll L. Tyler; James Russell, division ofmilitary application, AEC; Brig. Gen. S.R.Mickelsen, deputy assistant chief of staff, G-4;and Col. A.W. Betts, division of research anddevelopment. Source: Department of Energy.

clear that the Commission would have totake care of all other “housing, necessarytransportation and similar services.” Lookingto the future, they suggested additionalnegotiations as to “conditions of permanentjoint tenancy at Indian Springs.” TheCommission could provide “funds for someitems such as barracks, fuel storage, adminis-trative buildings and a railroad system fromLas Vegas to Indian Springs.”48

Taking Possession and InitiatingConstruction Activities

The Atomic Energy Commission’s initialtask was to take physical possession of thesite. Agency officials quickly determined thatonly “one legitimate property owner” wasinvolved, a rancher residing in Las Cruces,New Mexico, who held a grazing lease cov-ering approximately two–thirds of the testarea. On the leased grazing area, the rancherran some 40 horses and 250 cattle. A “herds-

man and wife” resided at Tippipah Spring,north and west of Frenchman Flat. For test-ing operations, officials decided to relocatethe herdsman and confine the stock to theYucca Flat area to the north. Officials alsosuspected that some “illegal people,” asDivision of Military Application DirectorMcCormack put it, might be on or aroundthe site, such as “a miner who lives in theground that the Air Force has not been ableyet to smoke out of his hole.”49

Commission and Los Alamos officials werenonetheless extremely wary of publicly mak-ing their presence felt either on the site or inLas Vegas. No public release had been madeof President Truman’s approval of the use ofthe gunnery range as a continental test sitefor nuclear weapons. Nor had the presidentor the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy inCongress been informed, let alone had theyapproved, of going forward with the Rangerseries. This severely constricted what theagency could do. The only option was touse the Air Force for cover. Agency officialsauthorized the commanding officer at NellisAir Force Base to “make commitments not toexceed ten thousand dollars” for minor workat Indian Springs and the site. Nellis officialsalso issued a local release concerningincreased construction activities on the gun-nery range. Meanwhile, two of Los Alamos’sbuilding contractors, Robert E. McKeeCompany and Reynold Electrical andEngineering Company, began work at thesite. The McKee Company acquired a vacantgarage building at 817 South Main Street inLas Vegas to serve as an in-town headquar-ters.50

By the end of December, McCormackcheerfully reported that the “MercuryProgram in Washington rolls along as well orbetter than could have been expected.” TheCommission was “on reasonably solidground” with the Air Force and theDepartment of the Interior. Chairman Deanhad “briefly and generally” mentionedRanger to the Joint Committee, with a “defin-itive session” scheduled for the first week ofthe new year. McCormack nonethelessexpressed concern about what he called the“human relationship aspect” of the program.Formal approval still had to be secured fromthe president and the National SecurityCouncil, which, by presidential directive,was in charge of coordinating public infor-mation. The “public problem,” he concluded,“could be the final determinant of success.”

Delay in making a public announcementmade Carroll L. Tyler, manager of the AtomicEnergy Commission’s Santa Fe OperationsOffice and lead Commission official for theconduct of Ranger, uneasy. As long as theentire project remained “Top Secret,” logis-


Ruins of herdsman's cabin at Tippipah Spring.Source: DOE, Nevada Operations Office.

tics and site preparation would be difficult atbest. Determining local response to theimpending test series would be next toimpossible. Tyler wanted to see a pressrelease issued immediately but realized that,given McCormack’s timetable for approval inWashington, it might be mid–January before

the public could be informed of Ranger.Tyler pointed out to McCormack that therecould be “a leak at any time” and theCommission needed to be “ready to jump ifthings start falling down around [our] ears.”51

This was not an idle concern. On January2, 1951, a headline in the Las VegasReview–Journal speculated about theplanned “Big Indian Springs Plant.” Notingthat details had not been revealed becauseof “security regulations,” the newspaperreported that the project would be one ofthe largest ever established in Clark Countyand might involve the building of three sep-arate new town sites. A contract for the proj-ect, the newspaper stated, had been award-ed to the McKee Construction Company,which built the “Los Alamos ‘A’ Plant in NewMexico” and was setting up offices on SouthMain Street. Construction was expected tobegin “within the next couple of weeks.”The Review–Journal said that, according tothe Air Force at Nellis, the project was “clas-sified as Top Secret” and no official informa-tion would be released. The newspaperadded that “for the past two or three weeks,plane loads of Federal officials have been

arriving almost daily, and with each planecame a Security Officer from Washington.”52

Public Information

Even as secrecy hampered test planning,what to tell the public loomed as a majorissue in the upper echelons of government.On December 19, the day after PresidentTruman signed off on the Nevada Test Site,representatives from the Departments ofState and Defense and the Atomic EnergyCommission met to consider a public rela-tions program for continental testing. Twoaspects came to the fore. The American peo-ple needed to be convinced that 1) nuclearweapons testing was a routine activity andnothing out of the ordinary, and 2) radiolog-ical safety was under control and nothing toworry about. The officials agreed that anyrelease to the public should stress that conti-nental testing had already been done, suc-cessfully, with the Trinity test at Alamogordo.The public should be told that “it has beendone before and we can do it again.” TheNevada Test Site needed to be thought of asthe Los Alamos laboratory’s “Aberdeen,” theArmy’s well–known ordnance provingground in Maryland. These arrangements,combined with an emphasis on radiologicalsafety “before, during and after any shot,”would, the agency representatives hoped,“make the atom routine in the continentalUnited States and make the public feel athome with atomic blasts and radiation haz-ards.” The “most important angle to getacross,” they concluded, was the “idea ofmaking the public feel at home with neu-trons trotting around.”

The field had public information ideas ofits own. On January 3, Tyler cabled head-quarters with the operations office and labo-ratory’s views on “national and local Nevadapublic relations.” Tyler noted that the“semi–secrecy” surrounding the Greenhouseseries and other Pacific tests could “not beapplied in this instance.” The close proximityof the Ranger series to populated areas and“the public fear of atomic weapons” wouldlikely give rise to “considerable public con-cern.” This concern, he stated, could becountered and “any national reaction” couldbe “conditioned” by holding all public


Carroll L. Tyler, left, manager of the Santa FeOperations Office, and Norris E. Bradbury, direc-tor of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. Source:Los Alamos National Laboratory.

announcements to certain “primary themes.”These included emphasizing the materialbenefits that nuclear testing would bring tothe “Nation’s defense and safety” and stress-ing the “test program’s history of humansafety.” Tyler warned that Atomic EnergyCommission public relations shouldapproach the tests “rather matter–of–factlyand not stimulate sensational attention byitself making too big a thing of them.” Thiswas especially true for “human safety” where“too much reiteration may come under thecategory of the lady doth protest too much.”Tyler observed that a “certain minority mayvocalize against any continental tests.”Although public relations could probably not“affect that fringe,” he argued, it could“affect the reactions of a majority.” As far aslocal Nevada reaction, this would probablybe “more specialized” in terms of concernfor personal safety and property. Tyler statedthat “individual safety must of course be theimmediate and continuing theme” but thiscould be supplemented by “every effort toeducate the local people and also to satisfytheir normal curiosity.” Noting that Las Vegaswas “highly aware of national publicityangles,” he commented that the AEC shouldplay on “local pride in being in the lime-light.”

The two–page draft press release thatemerged from headquarters heavily empha-sized radiological safety. The release beganby citing President Truman’s approval of thecontinental site and the necessary experi-ments to be performed there. It also notedthe Department of Defense’s concurrence.The release briefly stated that making avail-able to Los Alamos a “readily accessible sitefor periodic test work” would result in a“speed–up” of the weapons developmentprogram that would be of “major importanceto the national defense and security.” Therelease did not state when testing wouldbegin or what would be the makeup of thetesting program. The entire second page ofthe release discussed radiological safetyrequirements for which “full consideration”had been given. Stressing the extensivemonitoring that would be done and the vari-ous committees and panels that had giventhe test site a seal of approval, the releaselisted those individuals, including Fermi and

Teller, who had attended the radiologicalhazards meeting at Los Alamos in August1950 and whose names would lend the mostcachet to the safety of the test program.53

Formal Approval Sought, Debated, andReceived

Following the new year, the Atomic EnergyCommission moved quickly to secureapproval of Ranger. The Military Liaison andGeneral Advisory committees readily assent-ed. On January 3, the Military LiaisonCommittee concluded that there was “no dis-agreement and no need for waiting” on thetesting series. Three days later, Oppenheimerwrote Dean that the General Advisory

Committee members “heartily approve of theplans as formulated.” Securing approval fromthe two other members of the SpecialCommittee of the National Security Council,the Departments of State and Defense,nonetheless proved more difficult. Two sep-arate issues sparked controversy. The firstinvolved the mix of test shots that wouldmake up Ranger and the second the word-ing of the proposed press release.54

On January 4, Dean sent formal requeststo the Special Committee, under separatecover, for approval of the testing programand the press release. In his test approvalrequest, Dean laid out for his fellow commit-tee members the proposed five–shot pro-gram, describing in some detail the nature of


Members of the Atomic Energy Commission,January 1951. Left to right, Thomas E. Murray,Sumner T. Pike, Gordon E. Dean, Chairman, T.Keith Glennan, Henry D. Smyth. Source:Department of Energy.

the shots and what hopefully would beaccomplished. He assured the committeethat the radiological safety program hadreceived “expert approval” and that, from asafety perspective, the test series would “goforward shot by shot, the decision on eachone being based on observations of theresults of the preceding shots.” Dean singledout the fifth shot, “Item F,” for special atten-tion. He stated that the fifth shot presented a“different radiological problem” because itsyield, projected at thirty to forty kilotons,would be significantly higher, by a magni-tude of three or four times, than any of theother four shots. Noting that Item F was“tentative,” he said that its firing would“depend on favorable radiological data frompreceding shots, assuring acceptable radio-logical safety standards.”55

Four days later, Dean learned that thepress release and the test program wereboth in trouble. Two experts on the radio-logical safety panel, one of whom wasFermi, did not want their names listed on

the release. More worrisome, Secretary ofDefense George C. Marshall, who hadreplaced Johnson in September, did not wantto approve the press release without a meet-ing with Dean and Secretary of State DeanAcheson. Marshall questioned the wisdom,in a tense international situation, of revealingthat the United States had small nuclearweapons. In addition, the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, Dean was informed, had “some veryslashing recommendations” on the release.They wanted to eliminate all reference to

both radioactive danger and any “intensive”effort. The Joint Chiefs also opposed the fifthtest in the series, not because of what itwould reveal about small weaponry butbecause it was too big. Apparently they hadpromised Truman that there would be nobig tests at the continental site. They did not,as Dean put it in his diary, “like the big ‘F’test but they did like the little ones.”

Dean was dismayed. On the press release,he believed strongly that “we have a publicrelations problem here . . . that the JCS don’tappreciate.” Fearing a decision for no pressrelease, however, he acquiesced to a rewriteof the release that was “somewhat mislead-ing” in that it contained no reference tointensive tests and eliminated the list ofnames and the radiological safety informa-tion on page two. On Item F, Dean was lesscertain from a technical standpoint—“Whatdoes that 5th shot do?” he askedMcCormack—but willing to fight for it if hisadvisers deemed the “big bang” essential. Helet McCormack document what would hap-pen if the fifth shot was left out of Ranger.Dean, meanwhile, focused on the radiologi-cal safety aspects of the test. He askedCharles L. Dunham, medical branch chief inthe AEC’s Division of Biology and Medicine,if there were any other radioactive hazardsother than potential exposure to sheep.Dunham responded that with “a pretty goodsized burst” there might be trouble if itrained heavily over a populated area withintwo hours of the shot. When Dean asked ifthat would mean minor skin burns, Dunhamreplied that this “would be the worst thingthat could possibly happen to the people.”56

The following day, Dean met with Marshalland Acheson. Dean stated that theCommission felt “very strongly” that theremust be a public announcement. He defend-ed the original two–page draft, noting thatthe “real public relations problem” wouldcome “when we have to admit that we havefired the first of a series of atomic explo-sions.” The “real reason” for these tests is a“speed–up of our weapons program,” Deanobserved, and “we must put it on this basisand the Military should back us in that.”Dean’s argument apparently swayed the mili-tary. The next day, Marshall approved the


Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall andSecretary of State Dean G. Acheson. Source: U.S.Department of State.

release, which excluded the material on radsafety but reinstated the clause on thespeed–up of the weapons development pro-gram. The Special Committee also approvedforwarding to President Truman a Rangerseries proposal that included the fifth shot.On January 11, Truman officially approvedboth the test series, with the fifth shot, andthe press release.57

Going Public

The Atomic Energy Commission went pub-lic with the press release on January 11,1951, at 3:00 p.m., Eastern Standard Time. Inconjunction with the release, the AtomicEnergy Commission initiated a concertedeffort to individually inform—“tipping themoff two or three hours in advance,” as Deanput it—members of Congress and state andlocal officials having special interest in thenew Nevada Test Site and the impendingseries. “We must touch base,” Dean noted,”with many people who, if not taken into

our confidence, would misinterpret thewhole program.”58

In the nation’s capitol, informing theNevada congressional delegation was top

priority. On the morning of January 10,Dean called Senator Pat McCarran (D), sen-ior senator from the state, and asked to meetwith him, and possibly the entire Nevadadelegation, that same day. McCarranresponded that he and Senator GeorgeMalone (R) “didn’t always see eye to eye.”Dean thus saw McCarran alone, reportingthat the meeting was “very pleasant,” andmet with Malone and Nevada’s lone con-gressman, Walter S. Baring (D), the followingmorning.

All eighteen members of the JointCommittee on Atomic Energy had alreadybeen informed by memorandum hand–car-ried to each member. On the afternoon ofJanuary 10, Dean asked William L. Borden,executive director of the Joint Committee, ifany of the committee members hadexpressed reservations concerning the testingissue. Borden replied that some were “gladthat it isn’t where ‘I live’” and there wassome “feeling of concern about the hazardsof it.” He noted that Representative Henry M.Jackson (D–WA) questioned the wisdom ofhaving a pre–test announcement because itcould only compromise security. Bordencommented that the “good briefing” of theinfluential McCarran, eighteen years in theSenate and Chairman of the JudiciaryCommittee, was a “good omen.” Bordenadded that he thought it “amazing” thatnews of the continental tests had “not leakedout yet.”59

In Nevada, informing newly electedGovernor Charles Russell (R) took prece-dence. The AEC organized a special delega-tion consisting of Tyler, Bradbury, and sever-al others to fly to Carson City and inform thegovernor of only one week that his state hadbeen chosen to host a nuclear weapons testsite. This was a somewhat touchy matter. Asone AEC official put it, “it may be advisableto indicate that the project to be discussed isnot a ‘plum’ for the State of Nevada.”Despite the importance of the briefing mis-sion, bad weather prevented the delegationfrom reaching its destination. As a fall–back,Dean called Russell, and Tyler had a “publicrelations man” explain the situation to thegovernor over the phone.


Nevada Senator Pat McCarran. Source:Nevada Historical Society.

With its large population and relative prox-imity to the test site, California was also ofsome concern in terms of exposure to fallout

and contamination of water supplies.Dunham had assured Dean that no hazardswere “likely to occur.” Tests would only beconducted when the wind was from thesouthwest, away from California, Dunhamobserved, and “there couldn’t possibly beany damage” to Colorado River water fromfallout. Dean, in turn, attempted to notifyand reassure California officials. He wasunable to complete a call to Governor EarlWarren (R), but he did talk with Los AngelesMayor Fletcher Bowron. Dean told themayor that the Atomic Energy Commissionwould “perform a few explosions” at thenew Nevada site. Noting that “there might besome rumors to the effect that these explo-sions will contaminate [the] Los Angeleswater supply,” Dean stated that “in fact . . .they will not be harmful.” Bowron thankedDean and assured him that “he would see

from Los Angeles that there is no one whogets the wrong idea.” Dean agreed that thiswas important “so that we will not get anyfalse rumors started.”60

The Atomic Energy Commission alsosought to inform the local officials and pop-ulace of southern Nevada. In Las Vegas, adelegation of top Commission and LosAlamos officials, accompanied by radiologi-cal safety experts from the laboratory, noti-fied city and Clark County officials. Countyofficials in Tonopah and Pioche, countyseats of Nye and Lincoln counties, were alsobriefed in advance of the actual pressrelease. In addition, the Atomic EnergyCommission delegation prepared a localrelease to be given out in response toinquiries. The release stated that the new LasVegas Field Office was a sub–office of theSanta Fe Operations Office, noted that con-struction by the McKee Company wasalready underway at the test site, and listedRalph P. Johnson as the manager of the fieldoffice, Alvin C. Graves, chief of the test divi-sion at Los Alamos, as director of “technicaloperations” at the site, and Thomas L.Shipman, chief of the laboratory’s healthdivision, as director of radiological surveywork. A separate release issued at LosAlamos indicated that the field office wouldbe located at the South Main Street site.Later, when testing began, a room was rent-ed at the El Cortez Hotel on Fremont Streetto serve as a public information office.Finally, the AEC posted warning signs at thesite and issued handbills. The handbills,headlined in big, black lettering with theword WARNING, stated that “NO PUBLICANNOUNCEMENT OF THE TIME OF ANYTEST WILL BE MADE.”61

Public and Press Reaction

On January 12, 1951, the day after goingpublic on the Nevada Test Site, ChairmanDean undoubtedly felt pleased. Not only hadPresident Truman approved in full the test-ing program but there had been “no adversecomments” to speak of from public officialsor the press. Dean’s public relations peoplein Nevada reported overwhelmingly favor-able reaction at the local level. City andcounty officials in Las Vegas “appeared very


Nevada Governor Charles Russell. Source:Nevada Historical Society.

satisfied” with the information supplied tothem, and a two–hour press conference heldat the El Cortez by Tyler, Bradbury, Johnson,Graves, and Shipman was “largely aget–acquainted session.” Officials inTonopah and Pioche who were contacted byphone rather than in person because of the

adverse weather seemed “satisfied and dis-closed no sense of uneasiness about theannouncement.” As for Governor Russell,Tyler and Bradbury offered to come toCarson City as soon as the weather permit-ted, but the governor said he did not thinkthis was necessary and he was “very happy


Warning handbill distributed by the Atomic Energy Commission on theday of the continental test site announcement. Source: REECO,Bechtel Nevada.


with the AEC’s cooperation with him.” AnAtomic Energy Commission public informa-tion official in Carson City did speak with anumber of Nevada legislators and reported“no difficulty . . . nor did there appear to beany sign of uneasiness that might crop up inthe future.”62

The press generally reported the unveilingof the continental test site as a major story.The staid New York Times ran a small head-

line—“Atomic Bomb Testing Ground Will BeCreated in Nevada”—over a two–columnarticle, but other newspapers, especiallythose in the southwest, featured front–pagestories with eye–popping headlines. The SaltLake City Deseret News’s banner headlinedeclared “Atom Blast Site Set Near Vegas.” Inan inch–and–a–quarter type, the Los AngelesTimes announced “U.S. TO SET OFF ATOM-IC BLAST NEAR LAS VEGAS.” The Las VegasReview–Journal headline simply said “TestA–Bombs at Indian Springs.” Most of the arti-cles were basically rewrites of the AtomicEnergy Commission’s press releases, butthere was some speculation that the testingplan heralded “new atomic techniques.” TheWashington Post mentioned the possibility of“small scale atomic explosions,” and JosephMyler, a reporter for United Press, noted thatthe fact that the Atomic Energy Commissionwould continue to use Enewetak, presum-ably for hydrogen bomb weapons tests, indi-cated that the Nevada tests would be “spe-cial purpose” devices that were “more com-

pact and more deliverable,” such as “atomicmissile and atomic artillery warheads” or “anatomic mortar shell.”63

The local press in southern California andNevada, understandably, delved into moredetail on the potential personal impact of thetests on their readers. The Los AngelesEvening Herald Express, citing MayorBowron and Metropolitan Water District offi-cials who had been brought into the AtomicEnergy Commission’s confidence, reportedthat the tests would have no effect on LosAngeles drinking water. The Review–Journal,reporting on the El Cortez press conference,told Las Vegas residents they could “sit backand relax” because the government scientistshad stated that they probably “won’t see orfeel the effects.” The mountains between LasVegas and the testing grounds would, thenewspaper reported, “shield the city and itscitizens.” The Atomic EnergyCommission/laboratory delegation at theconference stressed that a major reason forchoosing southern Nevada for the test sitewas the lack of rain. “Ironically,” observedthe Review–Journal, “hardly had these wordsbeen spoken than the Las Vegas area got itsfirst taste of rain in months.” Shipman thenexplained how “radioactive rain drops” afterthe Trinity test had caused the hides of aherd of cattle to “become mottled” but thatafter over five years of observation the herdwas now “fat and sleek [and] apparentlyunaffected by their atomizing.” “Anotheritem,” commented the Review–Journal, “toassure local residents they need not harborfear of any projected test.”64

Despite the admonition not to worry, theAtomic Energy Commission’s announcementapparently prompted a degree of uneaseamong the local citizenry. On January 15,the Review–Journal editorialized that the“furore occasioned” by the impending atom-ic bomb detonation was “entirely uncalledfor.” So far as Las Vegas was concerned, thenewspaper opined, “the citizens need haveno fears that the explosions will affect themin any way.” Noting that the majority of LasVegas had “welcomed the AEC project withopen arms,” the Review–Journal contendedthat Nevada could “contribute much to thewar effort by having the atomic project with-

Postcard of the El Cortez Hotel on Fremont Streetin Las Vegas. Site of the Atomic EnergyCommission's public information office duringthe Ranger series. Source: University of Nevada,Las Vegas, Special Collections.


in its boundaries.” Nevada had “always beenin the vanguard support of such warfare,”the newspaper concluded, “and the citizenswill be proud of their ability to serve.”Beyond appeals to simple patriotism, thelocal press also readily pointed out the

potential material benefits for the communi-ty. Although most of the initial workforce atthe site consisted of McKee employees withsecurity clearances who had been brought infrom outside the area, the Las VegasMorning Sun reported that local contracts

Announcement of the continental test site made big headlines.


would eventually be let for road constructionand the building of dormitories. The promiseof federal dollars being pumped into thelocal economy appealed to other communi-ties around the test site as well. TheGoldfield News and Beatty Bulletin, forexample, wistfully speculated that the open-ing of the test site presaged the reconstruc-tion of the “vitally–needed” rail line from LasVegas to Goldfield and beyond.65

“Atomic tourists” posed a potentialside–benefit as well. The Review–Journal rana United Press story on the reaction ofAlamogordo, New Mexico, to losing out onbeing the location for the continental testsite. Although most citizens “couldn’t getexcited” about the outcome, they did warnLas Vegas to “be on the lookout” for touristsonly interested in the atomic bomb. “We stillhave people driving here and asking theway to the test site,” a chamber of com-merce official said, “and they still write in forsamples of the glass blown out by thebomb.” The mayor was the only Alamogordoresident to voice some jealousy. “I believeAlamogordo deserves the right to continueto be the testing center for any bomb proj-ect,” he argued, “in view of the fact that thefirst explosive was tested near here.”66

Pulitzer Prize-winning editorial cartoonist BruceRussell's take on the new continental test site.Soviet leader Josef Stalin, lower left, comes upsnake eyes with testing in Nevada. Source: LosAngeles Times, January 13, 1951.

Page 61The Ranger Series, January - February 1951The Ranger Series, January - February 1951

The Test Site Takes Shape for Ranger

Conducting a nuclear weapons test series,from conception through the final test, inonly two months proved a daunting but notinsurmountable task. Made all the more diffi-cult by the total security and secrecy thatsurrounded the first month of the project,preparations were nonetheless well underway by the time President Truman approvedRanger and the impending use of theNevada Test Site was made public.Following a visit to Los Alamos and the newtest site in mid–January, Atomic EnergyCommission testing chief George Schlatterpronounced the preparations for Ranger“definitely under control.” All major prob-

lems were being met, he noted, and “minorsoft spots” were being quickly corrected. “Isee no reason why,” he stated, “the tentativedates cannot be met very closely.” Schlatterpredicted that the McKee Company wouldcomplete site construction by January 20, atwhich point Los Alamos technicians, assistedby personnel from Edgerton, Germeshausenand Grier, Inc. (EG&G), would arrive forfinal installation of diagnostic and experi-mental equipment.67

Facilities at the test site were primitive atbest. No existing structures were availablefor test personnel to use, so everything hadto be brought in or built from scratch.Workers “re–erected” a surplus frame build-

Part V:

The Ranger Series, January—February 1951

South side of the control point building. Entrance to the control room is at right.Men on porch are looking north toward ground zero. Note braces shoring up thebuilding. Source: Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Page 62 The Ranger Series, January - February 1951The Ranger Series, January - February 1951

Control point area, looking toward thenorth. Source: Los Alamos NationalLaboratory.

Blockhouse under construction. Source:Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Construction near ground zero. Source:Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Preparing the Site for the Ranger Series


Instrument room in interior of block-house. Source: Los Alamos NationalLaboratory.

View toward the south and the control pointfrom the top of the blockhouse at ground

zero. Note the entrance ramp to the shelter.Dry Frenchman Lake is to the distant left.Source: Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Generator building under high tensionwires. Blockhouse is in the distance

toward the very center of the picture.Source: Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Preparing the Site for the Ranger Series

ing from Los Alamos at the “control point,”8.9 miles south of the ground zero droppoint, to serve as a technical command post.This hastily constructed building included acontrol room, administrative office, first aidstation, and shower for personnel decontam-ination. The building was shored up as aprecautionary measure prior to the first blast.

Construction workers and laboratory tech-nicians at the test site devoted most of theirefforts toward preparing the target area. Asall of the drops would be made in the very“first light” of dawn, the target wascross–lighted from northeast to southwestand northwest to southeast at 100–, 300–,and 500–foot intervals. A red reference lightwas placed at ground zero in the center ofthe target. During the drop, all lights wereturned off thirty seconds prior to burst time.Directly under ground zero, workers built ablast–proof alpha–recording shelter or block-house. Two photography stations were locat-ed two miles from zero, one to the southeastand the other to the northeast. To the northand west of zero lay the “field fortificationsarea.” This area was used extensively for sci-

entific experiments. Two miles to the southof zero, workers set up two diesel–drivengenerators located in a wooden shack.Although badly damaged after the first shot,the shack provided shelter for the generatorsthroughout the test series. All cables andelectric lines up to two miles out from zerohad to be buried underground.68

Sixteen experiments were set up and car-ried out during Ranger. Los Alamos directedmost of the experiments, which primarilyinvolved diagnostic measurements to deter-mine yield and other information. Planningand construction time constraints limited theexpansion of the experimental programmuch beyond these fundamental measure-ments. The military nonetheless sponsoredseveral weapons effects experiments. In thefield fortifications area, workers constructedfourteen foxholes, the nearest at zero andthe farthest at approximately 6,000 feet. Theunoccupied foxholes contained film badgesto determine how much radiation would bereceived by dug–in troops suffering anear–direct hit. The Army’s Office of theQuartermaster General conducted a thermal


Map showing control point and target area. Source: Reprinted from John C. Clark, Operation Ranger,Vol. 1, Report of the Deputy Test Director, WT-206, September 1953 (extracted version, Washington:Defense Nuclear Agency, October 1, 1979), p. 32.


effects experiment designed to determine thethermal hazard of nuclear weapons to mili-tary uniforms and equipment of variousmaterials and finishes. Before each shot,

workers placed in the test area, in foxholesand on the ground, forty–eight panels, eachsupporting over 100 samples of textiles, plas-tics, and wood. Finally, the Atomic EnergyCommission’s Division of Biology andMedicine sponsored Operation “Hot Rod” todetermine the effectiveness of automobiles

as shelters during an atomic attack. Five1936 to 1939 sedan–model automobiles—aBuick, Oldsmobile, Chevrolet, Lafayette, and

Plymouth—were variously oriented atone–half mile intervals from one–half totwo–and–a–half miles from ground zero.Operation Hot Rod determined that at thehalf–mile location individuals in an automo-bile would probably be “killed twice,” onceby injury from a combination of blast andfire and a second time by radiation. At twomiles or more, given “an atomic blast ofroughly nominal size,” chances of survivalwithout injury were very good.69

Logistics

Onsite construction could be limited to thebare essentials for the tests themselvesbecause the Atomic Energy Commissionhoused most logistical and support activitiesoffsite. In this, the Air Force proved particu-larly helpful, going beyond the letter of theagreement that had been struck between thetwo agencies in December. The Nellis basecommander turned over a large trainingbuilding, building 926, as a headquarters forthe test staff. The building housed briefingrooms, the telephone and telegraph center,an operations room for aircraft trackers, andheadquarters for the radiological safetyteams. In addition, Nellis made availablespace for the Ranger weather detachment,an open encampment area for the bivouacof the Army personnel assigned for emer-gency duty, motor vehicles to supplementthe Atomic Energy Commission vehicle sup-ply, and housing quarters for a number ofoperating personnel. At Indian Springs, theAir Force, per the agreement, made availablebarracks and a mess hall. The Air Force also,as previously noted, participated in variousaspects of the Ranger tests.

Planning and coordinating the entire oper-ation on such short notice was perhaps thesingle most difficult task of the Rangerseries. John C. Clark, who as deputy testdirector took charge of the Nevada programwhile Graves concentrated on Greenhouse,remarked that it was “not exactly an experi-ence [one] would like to repeat once ortwice each year.” Everything needed to bethought out, precisely coordinated, andimplemented in a matter of weeks. The testgroup, forming the core of Ranger, consistedof the experimental program, radiological

Foxhole at west end of blockhouse. Source: LosAlamos National Laboratory.

Panel two of forty-eight panels with samples ofvarious materials. Source: Los Alamos NationalLaboratory.


Buick four-door sedan placed at one-halfmile from ground zero, with windshieldoriented toward the blast. All windowswere blown out, as was the rear of thecar. The doors away from the blast wereblown off their hinges, and the hood wasblown some 50 to 100 yards from thecar. Burning of the automobile wasextensive. The rear tires were burned,and the car sank into the ground to theaxel level. The front tires were undam-aged and still inflated. The motorappeared to be undamaged. Source: LosAlamos National Laboratory.

Chevrolet two-door sedan placed one-and-a-half miles from ground zerostill burning four hours after the shot.Oriented at about 60 degrees from theblast, the car was completely burned.The glass was destroyed as a result ofthe fire. The headlights were not bro-ken, and the chrome was not charred.The top was warped. The front tiresremained inflated and intact. Source:Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Oldsmobile four-door sedan placed at one milefrom ground zero, oriented at about a 45-degreeangle to the blast. The windows on the blast side

were broken. One was blown in and the otherbadly crushed. The windshield was cracked. The

paint and tires on the blast side were charred, butthe tires remained inflated. The side facing the

blast was bashed in. The hood was lifted but notblown off. Apparently the door on the blast side

had been left open, because there was a sharp lineof demarcation of charred area visible on the

upholstery. The motor seemed undamaged, as wasthe battery, given that the horn still operated.

Source: Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Operation Hot Rod

safety, meteorology, various cloud trackingand other special flights, and weapon prepa-ration and assembly. This core group wassupported by numerous other activities.

Essential administrative services includedhousing, meals, medical facilities, motortransportation, travel arrangements, and thelike. Security involved not only surveillanceand protection of the site but also traffic andaccess control, coordination with local lawenforcement officials, and negotiations withthe Civil Aeronautics Administration to clearall air traffic over and around the site on testdays. Communications, personnel, and pub-lic information were major tasks in and ofthemselves.70

Official Visitors

Handling of official visitors was a relativelyminor component of the test series that con-sumed major amounts of time and effort.Initially, Tyler and Bradbury stressed thatthere would be “no press or other non–tech-nical visitors” during Ranger. This should be,they recommended, “an absolute prohibition,not to be breached.” Although excluding thepress was easy, keeping away important per-sonages from Washington—members ofCongress and top Atomic EnergyCommission and Department of Defenseofficials—simply was not realistic. Not count-

ing the Trinity shot, Ranger was the first testseries that could be reached with relativeease. When the congressional JointCommittee on Atomic Energy learned of thetest series, all eighteen members indicated adesire to go.

Accommodating these visitors requiredpatience and careful consideration. Not theleast of the problems was the uncertaintyinvolved in the timing of the shots. Testplanners did not want to bring high–rankingWashington officials out to the spartan con-ditions of the test site only to have them wit-ness a delay. Consequently, twice a day,Deputy Test Director Clark, after meetingwith his meteorologists, would hold discus-sions as to the probability of having a teston a given date so that it would coincidewith the arrival of visitors. Travel arrange-ments also had to be made. Special aircrafttook visitors from Washington to Kirtland AirForce Base at Albuquerque, where they werebriefed by Bradbury and a military official,and then to Nellis, arriving at 2:00 a.m. onthe morning of the test. Following a securitybriefing, coffee and cake, and the issue of

“heavy flight clothing” and protective glasses,the visitors were bused to a guard postabout one–quarter mile from the controlpoint from which they viewed the test. Theywere not, Clark later noted, “taken to the tar-get area.” Bused back to Indian Springs forbreakfast, the visitors were then taken toNellis. Some complications arose at Nelliswhen certain dignitaries requiring “specialtransportation by aircraft to various destina-tions” could not leave because the aircraft


Deputy Test Director John C. Clark.Source: Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Visitor seating for Frenchman Flat events.Source: DOE, Nevada Operations Office.


were not available due to insufficient leadtime. Many visitors spent the night in LasVegas. This in itself presented “some prob-lems information–wise.” In two instances,“rather important personages” checked intoresort hotels and “all secrecy was of coursedissipated.” In the end, 156 observersviewed at least one of the Ranger tests.71

Radiological Safety

No facet of Ranger other than the perform-ance of the test devices was as critical to thesuccess of the series as radiological safety.Shipman and his rad–safe section were wellaware of the critical role they played. Theywere charged with not only “making provi-

sion” for the radiological safety of all partici-pating personnel as well as the “surroundingpopulation, livestock, crops, and water sup-ply” but also determining, through “facts and

figures produced,” whether the Nevada TestSite “could be utilized as a permanent prov-ing ground.” In fulfilling this role, therad–safe section, numbering about seventy,faced many of the same problems as everyother group involved in Ranger. The tightschedule, Shipman noted, meant that “exten-sive preparations had to be telescoped into avery few weeks.” In addition, the stafflacked experience and had to manage with“makeshift” supplies, materials, facilities, andequipment that were “in most cases inade-quate or at least in part inappropriate for thejobs they were called upon to perform.”

Test planners and radiological safety offi-cials nonetheless believed that there wouldbe few radiological safety problems. Theywere confident that tests similar to Ranger’scould be held at the Nevada Test Site, asShipman put it, “almost at will, with noresulting radiological hazards in the sur-rounding countryside, provided certain basicmeteorological conditions are respected.”Partly this confidence was due to the natureof the devices and the method of detonation.The “models detonated in the Ranger serieswere particularly well suited” to continentaltesting, Clark later observed, and the “factthat all the shots were air detonations greatlysimplified the operations and minimized theradiological fall–out problems.” Partly theconfidence was attributable to the geograph-ical and meteorological conditions existing atthe test site. These conditions were the pri-mary reasons the site was located where itwas, and “hypothetical tests” conducted onDecember 30 and January 8 helped confirmthe belief that safe tests could be conductedunder appropriate weather conditions. Inany event, Shipman felt assured enough toset “permissible levels of exposure to exter-nal radiation” for personnel at less than halfthat allowed in the already completedGreenhouse plans. Greenhouse permittedweekly exposures of up to 0.7 roentgen.**

Ranger allowed only 0.3 roentgen.72

Thomas L. Shipman, chief of the LosAlamos Scientific Laboratory's health divi-sion and director of radiological surveywork for the Ranger series. Source: LosAlamos National Laboratory.

**The roentgen (R) measured exposure and, with some conversion, could be used to determine dose. By1950, scientists had determined that a one–time, whole body dose of up to 25 roentgens would usuallyresult in “no obvious injury.” Doses up to 50 R would result in “possible blood changes but no seriousinjury.” Between 200 and 400 R, injury and disability would be certain, with “death possible.” 400 Rwould be fatal to 50 percent of the population. 600 R would be fatal to all. Higher total doses could be tol-erated if stretched out over a period of time. Barton C. Hacker, Elements of Controversy (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1994), pp. 1–2; Samuel Glasstone, ed., The Effects of Atomic Weapons (LosAlamos, NM: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, September 1950), p. 342.

Shipman anticipated that there would beonly the most minimal exposure to offsitepopulations. Noting the “somewhat delicatepublic–relations aspect of the affair,” hedeclined to set “arbitrary levels [that] couldpossibly result in more harm than good.”The “guiding principle” he used instead wasthe “rather simple desire to assure ourselvesthat no one gets hurt.” Figures “must beused as general guides,” he admitted, but“no drastic action which might disturb thepublic should be taken unless it is clearlyfelt that such action is essential to protectlocal residents from almost certain damage.”In an emergency, Shipman assumed that thegeneral public could receive external expo-sure up to 25 roentgens without danger. Thiswas no greater exposure, he observed, than“many people receive in an only moderatelycomplete X–ray examination.” For exposuresbetween 25 and 50 roentgens, people wouldbe requested to “stay in their houses, changeclothes, take baths, etc.” If exposure levelsthreatened to rise above 50 roentgens,Shipman concluded, “consideration must ofnecessity be given to evacuating person-nel.”73

Shipman regarded the need for any evacu-ation as “highly improbable.” The AtomicEnergy Commission’s Santa Fe OperationsOffice nonetheless devised plans for meetingsuch an eventuality. The plans centered onprotecting people from “undue hazard dueto fallout” by removing them from “suchareas as may be contaminated.” If foundnecessary, removal would be accomplishedby a special Army unit brought in andbivouacked near Nellis. With ten large truckssubstituted for use as personnel carriers, theunit could move 200 people per trip.Evacuees would be brought to Las Vegaswhere they would become the AtomicEnergy Commission’s temporary guests. LasVegas had the “attractive capability of triplingits population overnight, due to its manymotels, hotels, and hospitals,” the evacuationplan stated. “Normally the population of LasVegas doubles on the week–end.”74

On the Eve of Able

As construction workers and technicianscompleted efforts to prepare the Nevada TestSite for nuclear weapons testing, attention

turned increasingly toward Able, the firstshot in the Ranger series. The public contin-ued to be a major concern. “Planned educa-tional activity” to keep the public informedand reassured never materialized due to lackof both time and qualified personnel. Thisdid not prove a problem, however, becausea “minimum of activity,” as Richard Elliott,the Atomic Energy Commission’s publicinformation officer in Las Vegas, put it, “suf-ficed to satisfy test area interest.” More con-certed were efforts to keep the public off thetest site and to “protect the curious—rockhunters and sourdoughs—from wanderingon the Range where they might be hurt.”This was done through handbills, publica-tions of maps and warnings, and securityand military teams. On January 23, the LasVegas Information Office at the El Cortezissued two press and radio releases. The firstwarned all “unauthorized persons” to stay

off the bombing and gunnery range. Thesecond stated that the Atomic EnergyCommission, with the assistance of the CivilAeronautics Administration and the AirForce, would “control air flights” over thetest site.75

Any lack of public interest in test site activ-ity ended when test officials conducted a“complete dry run” in the early morninghours of January 25. Test officials designedthe dry run to provide operational experi-ence to all test personnel and to assurethemselves that all plans had been properly


Blockhouse looking toward the southeast follow-ing the "dry run" on January 25, 1951. Source:Los Alamos National Laboratory.


formulated. They attempted to simulate actu-al test conditions as closely as possible, fromthe Air Force B–50D, manned by the crewthat would fly the real nuclear test missions,that dropped a stockpile bomb, completesave for the “inert nuclear components,” tothe post–test cleanup. The blast of thehigh–explosive component of the dummybomb did “rather more physical damagethan expected,” an observer noted, but“there were, of course, no radiation effects.”Except for tell–tale activity by offsite moni-tors and several cowboys rounding up strayshearing a “rumbling, rolling sound like a bigthunderclap,” the dry run might have goneunnoticed had it not been for GovernorRussell revealing that a “detonation” for test-ing purposes had occurred at the test site. Asa matter of courtesy, Tyler had informed thegovernor about the dry run, stating that hehad no objection to the release of this infor-mation if any inquiries were received. Whena Reno reporter queried Russell, he respond-ed that a “dry run” had taken place but thathe could not say whether the detonationwas nuclear or what magnitude it had been.For certain security reasons connected withlong–range detection, Atomic EnergyCommission officials did not want to indicateany difference between the dry run and theactual tests to follow, and, as a result, theCommission’s Las Vegas Information Officewould only say that it was in agreementwith the governor’s statement. The press wasnot so reticent. The Las VegasReview–Journal ran a banner headline thatdeclared in huge two–inch letters, “VEGASA–BOMB POPS!” The accompanying articlewas less certain, admitting that it wasunclear whether or not the detonation wasnuclear.76

Despite the unwanted publicity, the dryrun, as Clark observed, “proved very usefulto everyone involved” but particularly to theradiological safety group, which was “notwell organized.” Shipman agreed with thisassessment. Communications with field mon-itors were “shown to be unsatisfactory,” andat the control point “complete confusion wasthe order of the day.”77

Lessons learned had to be absorbed quick-ly, however, for Atomic Energy Commissionofficials scheduled the initial actual test, shotAble, for first light of January 27, with thesecond test, Baker, following the very nextday. In the morning of the January 26, theweapons assembly group at Sandia Basenear Kirtland began preparing the Abledevice for loading on the strike airplane. At1:00 p.m., top test officials held a “formalbriefing meeting” at Nellis to review theweather forecast for January 27. Within thehour, Tyler informed Atomic EnergyCommission headquarters that “the weatheroutlook appeared favorable to permit thefirst test to be conducted tomorrow morningon schedule.” He added that a “firm deci-sion” would not be made until a secondweather briefing to be held at 8:00 p.m.When the forecast remained favorable, Tylermade the decision to proceed with Able. Hethen notified Clark at the control point, andthe “execute” order was put into effect.78

Able’s Aftermath

In the early dawn of January 27, Able det-onated on schedule and as planned. Atone–kiloton yield, Able, the world’s tenthnuclear detonation, was much smaller than

any prior shot and, as a result, provided a“lesser show.” The “visual effects,” accordingto one observer, seemed “less spectacularthan those reported for previous detonations,with shorter duration of luminosity of the

Ranger series detonation. Source: Los AlamosNational Laboratory.

fireball, slower rise, faster cooling, no realthermal column formed, no mushroom head,and the fission–product cloud rising only toa fairly low altitude.” Physical damage con-sisted of the breaking of some, but not all,of the target lights as well as two windows

in the generator building and of the scorch-ing of the sagebrush for several hundredyards in the vicinity of ground zero.Although an explosion equivalent to onethousand tons of TNT still demandedrespect, radiological safety hazards were also


Headlines proclaimed the advent of the Ranger series.

minimal. Minutes after the test, the first sur-vey team, riding in a jeep, headed in towardthe target area. At about two miles from thedrop site, they encountered the first traces ofradioactivity, and, arriving at ground zero anhour and a half after the detonation, theyfound only relatively minor levels registeringno higher than 0.75 roentgen per hour.Offsite monitors faired even better, obtainingfew readings above the background level.This might have been “somewhat disappoint-ing to those who were looking for excite-ment,” Shipman noted, “but thoroughly reas-suring to all people with the responsibilityfor the safety of the public and for the con-tinuation of the operation itself.” The radio-logical safety success of Able also allowedofficials to relax the “rather strict meteoro-logical criteria” that a shot could not be firedunless the winds were blowing from a pointsomewhat to the south of due west. Nowplanners were given much greater leewayconcerning wind direction.79

Whatever panache Able might have lackedfor veteran test observers, the news mediaappeared impressed enough. For officialswatching the sky from Nellis sixty–five milesaway, it had been “immediately obvious”that Able was no dud, so there was no hid-ing this test from the public. The Las VegasReview–Journal once more trotted out thetwo–inch type and proclaimed, “VEGANS‘ATOM–IZED’,” with a sub–heading claiming,“Thousands See, Feel Effects Of Detonation.”Convinced by now that the dry run hadbeen non–nuclear, the newspaper reportedthat this was “the real thing.” The “supersolar light” generated by the blast, theReview–Journal noted, “lighted the sky sobrilliantly that residents of southern Utah,scores of miles away, saw the flash.” Thepaper also reported “‘rumblings’—presum-ably the muffled sound of the distant blast”and related the vivid description provided bya truck driver who was at the top of Bakergrade on the highway to Los Angeles asAble detonated. “A brilliant white glare rosehigh in the air and was topped a fewinstants later by a red glow which rose togreat heights,” the truck driver observed.“The bright flash blinded me for a few sec-onds and gave me quite a scare.” In LasVegas, the flash was followed by a mild

earth tremor and a “blast of air like a wind-storm” that was felt in “an irregular pattern”throughout the city.

Las Vegas residents nonetheless evinced lit-tle concern. Most slept through the earlySaturday morning blast, and, although therewas a “half–hour deluge” of calls to the LasVegas police, the test, according to the SaltLake City Deseret News, caused “little stir” inthe town. A “prominent local citizen” statedthat while residents were not exactly “blaseabout it,” there was not “any panic or any-thing like that.” As an example of the gam-bling community’s relaxed attitude, theReview–Journal cited a crap player at theGolden Nugget in downtown Las Vegaswho, upon feeling the shock from Able,paused, looked around, said “Must be anatomic bomb,” turned back to the table, andwent on with the game.80

Baker Is Bigger

With weather conditions cooperating andminimal radiation levels in the target area sothat technicians could “reestablish” experi-

mental and diagnostic equipment, AtomicEnergy Commission and Los Alamos officialsdecided to push ahead with Baker onJanuary 28, only twenty–four hours after theAble test. Detonated, as with Able, at firstlight at a height slightly over a thousandfeet, Baker with a yield of eight kilotons was


View from top of blockhouse on January 27,1951, following Able shot, as workers prepare forBaker. Source: Los Alamos National Laboratory.

a much more powerful device, although stillsmall in comparison to other prior shots. Theresults of the test, noted one radiologicalsafety observer, were “much more spectacu-lar than those of the preceding day andmore nearly approached the appearance ofmotion pictures and descriptions of bombsdetonated previously.” The fireball, “intense-ly brilliant, even through very dark goggles,”rose rapidly while “diminishing in brilliance”over a period of about five seconds. Thissubsided to a “rosy glow which faded into avery brilliant blue–purple luminescence sur-rounding the mushroom head which formedat the top of a long thin column.” The mush-room cloud, with its “dirty brown–yellowtrailer,” topped off at about 35,000 feet anddrifted off to the east where it was brokenup and dissipated by the winds. The blastwave “spanked” the ground beneath the shotand reached the control point, with a “sharpconcussion” immediately followed by a sec-ond shock of “almost equal intensity andsharpness,” some sixty seconds after the det-onation. This was followed by the “reflectedechoings and rumblings of the shock wave”from the surrounding mountains.

Monitors reached ground zero about nine-ty minutes after the detonation and, at six-teen roentgens per hour, found much higherlevels of radiation than they had at the Abletest. Subsequent checks indicated about an

eight-hour half life—that is, levels of activitywere reduced by half every eight hours—forinduced radioactivity on the ground. Despitethe higher intensities of Baker, the size ofthe area showing radioactivity was about thesame. Again, as with Able, mobile monitor-ing teams found only trace readings ofradioactivity beyond the test site boundary.81

Baker nonetheless left a much greaterimpression than Able offsite. The flash andthe shock wave were significantly stronger.“The explosion woke up the whole town,”stated a reporter for the Las VegasReview–Journal, “except for people whowere up in the casinos. A lot of them,” headded, “said they saw flashes like chainlightning, and all the homes and buildingswere jarred by two or three stiff shocks.”One observer reported that the blast seemedlike the “rumble of a monstrous truck” mov-ing through the streets of Las Vegas. Someresidents were “miffed” by the severity of theshocks that shook windows and rattled dish-es. Others appeared fearful, and a fewtalked of moving from the area to escape the“danger.” Las Vegas Morning Sun publisherHank Greenspun, who over the next fourdecades would become something of a localinstitution, sought to quiet the “irresponsibleand hysterical utterances.” He admonishedresidents to “feel proud to be a part of thesehistory–making experiments.” Las Vegas, he


Baker shot, January 28, 1951. Source: DOE, Nevada Operations Office.

noted, had “spent hundreds of thousands ofdollars upon questionable publicity toexploit our area” and had “glorified gam-bling, divorces and doubtful pleasures.” Nowthe city had become “part of the mostimportant work carried on by our countrytoday. We have,” he concluded, “found areason for our existence as a community.”82

Less introspective and more interested inwhat the tests might actually mean in terms

of the nation’s defense, the national pressspeculated that the Atomic EnergyCommission was experimenting with devices“much smaller than those employed hereto-fore.” Smaller devices meant bombs and pro-jectiles that could be used “against limitedtargets and for tactical purposes.” This was,the Washington Post editorialized, “a mosthopeful development.” Bombs the size ofthe one dropped on Hiroshima could beused only for “indiscriminate mass destruc-tion.” Their impact, observed the Post, couldnot be “localized.” Smaller weapons, by con-trast, could be used against combat troopsand might “prove to be a decisive weaponof defense.” As a defensive rather than anoffensive weapon, they could, the Post con-cluded, put a “stop to aggression [and] be . .. an effective deterrent to war.”83

The Atomic Energy Commission soonlearned, however, that the effects of evensmall devices like Able and Baker could not


Time-sequence photos taken of the Easy shot,February 1, 1951, by a Life magazine photogra-pher near U.S. Highway 95, thirty-five milessoutheast of the test. First two photos are withinthe first second of the blast. Third photo is fifteenminutes later in the fuller light of dawn. A "thinwisp" of smoke can be seen rising over the moun-tain ridge. Source: TimePix.

Workers repairing the blockhouse on January 31,1951, following Baker. Note the protective masksand foot coverings. Source: Los Alamos NationalLaboratory.

be entirely localized. One or both of theRanger tests sent lighter radioactive debrisinto high–altitude winds blowing eastward.Lacking any distant monitoring network,Commission officials seemed surprisedwhen, a few days following the tests, theyreceived reports of radioactive snow fallingin the midwestern and northeastern UnitedStates. Despite the widely proclaimed andaccepted absence of any threat to health inthe very low levels of radioactivity detected,Atomic Energy Commission public relationssuffered one of its first serious setbacks.84

Easy and Baker–Two

Following two shots in two days, DeputyTest Director Clark called a time out. Highlevels of radioactivity from Baker thatslowed down recovery efforts in the targetarea, coupled with workers exhausted froma week’s worth of non–stop activity andnearly forty–eight hours without sleep, madenecessary a break. The Ranger timetable hadfixed no dates beyond the first two shots,indicating only that shots were to be accom-plished as quickly as possible and finishedby February 15. Accordingly, Clark sched-uled the next shot, Easy, for earlyWednesday morning on January 31.Unfavorable weather delayed the shot untilthe following day when Easy successfullydetonated. Easy, with a yield of one kiloton,essentially duplicated Able in performance.As with Able, radioactive hazards were mini-mal, although Easy differed in that the windsblew the major part of the cloud to thesoutheast instead of a little north of east-ward. A lower level component of the cloudheaded west over Death Valley and eventu-ally over southern California.

Baker–Two, using exactly the same deviceas Baker, followed at first light on February2. As expected, test results matched closelywith those of Baker. North winds, however,blew the cloud toward the Spring Mountainsimmediately to the west of Las Vegas andthe site of a “newly developed recreationarea.” Airborne radiation was registered at anelevation of 9,000 feet on the slopes ofMount Charleston, the highest peak in therange, but radiation levels quickly fell as thecloud passed. Baker–Two also produced atleast two broken store windows in Las

Vegas. Clark again ordered a break andscheduled the fifth and final test, Fox, forthe morning of February 5.85

Fox: The Grand Finale

The results of Baker–Two gave test offi-cials some pause. Fox would be by far thelargest shot in the Ranger series at an antici-pated yield of as much as thirty–three tothirty–five kilotons. If theeight–kiloton–yielding Baker–Two brokewindows in Las Vegas, officials wondered,what would a test over four times as power-ful do? Deciding that the Baker–Two effectswere an anomaly—“unexplained and freak-ish blast effects,” according to one histori-an—officials pushed ahead with Fox. Just incase, however, they issued a publicannouncement on February 4 urging peopleto stay away from windows at the time ofany subsequent blast.86

Test officials, at the last minute, delayedFox, but not for safety or weather reasons.An engine oil leak forced the B–50D dropaircraft to return to Kirtland Air Force Baseshortly after takeoff in the early morninghours of February 5, and Fox was resched-uled for the following day. Conducted in theearly light of dawn, as were the first fourtests, Fox varied somewhat in its dropdimensions because of its larger size. TheB–50D made the drop from a height of29,500 feet above Frenchman Flat, and thedevice detonated at a height of 1,435 feetabove the target. The target area itself was


Broken plate glass window in downtown LasVegas from the Baker-Two shot. Source: AP/WideWorld Photos.

moved 500 feet to the west. This was doneto minimize damage to the ground zeroblockhouse, so as not to jeopardize diagnos-tics and to “get a better spread of data” formeasuring the effectiveness of the detona-tion. The bomb detonated approximately 300feet south of the new zero point.

Fox produced a somewhat less thanexpected yield of 22 kilotons. The “visualshow” provided by the test was still “veryspectacular” compared to the preceding fourdetonations. Observers at the control point,

8.9 miles to the south, felt a “distinct heatflash” at the instant of the burst. The sur-rounding mountains, from 20 to 50 miles dis-tant, were “illuminated by blinding whitenesswhich was far more intense than noon day-light.” The two “very solid shock waves” feltat the control point less than a second apart“produced about the same sensation asstanding in the open next to a 16–in.coast–defense gun when it is fired.”Although the control building had beenrigidly braced, the blast wave knocked mostof the equipment and clothing off theshelves inside the building. Following the

blast, a dense dust cloud filled the entire val-ley. With visibility reduced to about 100yards, the dust cloud persisted over the tar-

get area until late morning. Due to theincreased height of the burst, induced radia-tion in the target area was somewhat lessthan for Baker and Baker–Two. The top ofthe mushroom cloud soared to 43,000 feetand then drifted south toward the SpringMountains where its lower portion “practical-ly invested Charleston Peak.” Radiation lev-els, again, quickly fell when the cloudpassed.87

Las Vegas escaped with limited damage.The blast wave, arriving not quite six min-utes after the actual detonation, “splintered”big show windows in two automobile deal-erships but did little more than shake build-ings and frighten citizens. Gamblers report-edly ducked under tables in one casino, andsome witnesses said they were temporarilyblinded by the brilliant flash. Indian Springs,however, 25 miles from ground zero andwith a range of intervening hills, was partic-ularly hard hit. More than 100 windows werebroken. Doors were blown open and, in afew cases, were completely off the hinges.All equipment on shelves weighing as muchas 5 pounds was thrown to the floor. A near-by house received an estimated $4,000 worthof damage that included windows broken,doors blown entirely out of casements, androof damage. In the bathroom of the house,the blast wave knocked the plumbing fix-


Fox shot, February 6, 1951. Source: Los AlamosNational Laboratory.

Dust cloud over Frenchman Flat from Fox, twohours after the blast. Source: Los AlamosNational Laboratory.


Fox shot seen from downtown Las Vegas, top, looking west over Fremont Street. Ranger shot seenfrom the roof of the Herald-Examiner building, Los Angeles, California, bottom. Source:AP/Wide World Photos and Los Angeles Public Library.

Lighting the Sky in Las Vegas and Los Angeles


tures loose from the walls, leaving themstanding or hanging on the water pipes.88

By Fox, the tests had become somethingof a news sensation that brought with it,along with the fear and apprehension, analmost festive quality. Reporters flocked intoLas Vegas to catch a glimpse of the detona-tions, with some driving out to IndianSprings to be closer to the action. Visitorsand local residents were caught up in a kindof Fourth of July–type atmosphere, as if thetests were a grander and more spectacularform of fireworks or an added pyrotechnicside of the Las Vegas entertainment scene.After the first test, people from Los Angelesbegan arriving in anticipation of witnessingeither a detonation or some of the imagineddestruction wreaked by the blast. AtomicEnergy Commission Chairman Deanremarked that the detonations, far fromkeeping people away from Las Vegas,accounted for one of the biggest touristinfluxes that the city had ever had.Following Baker, Las Vegas residents startedsetting their alarm clocks so that they wouldbe out watching at the 5:45 a.m. detonationtime. Cars in the early morning hours beganlining the roads at the best vantage points.89

As an added benefit with Fox, Los Angelesresidents did not even have to leave hometo see and feel the show. As early as Baker,the flash could be seen in the Los Angelessky, and the press speculated that a testmight actually be heard. “There’s nothing tobe nervous about,” soothed the Los AngelesTimes. Windows probably would not be bro-ken, and it would be “just excitingly audibleand spine–tingling.” Fox produced thedesired effect. Some twenty–four minutesafter the actual detonation, the concussionrattled windows and doors in several loca-tions in the Los Angeles area. “Atom ShockWave Hits L.A.!” headlined the Los AngelesEvening Herald–Express.90

Roll–Up and Assessment

In a span of ten days, five tests were deto-nated at the Nevada Test Site and thenRanger was over. At noon on February 6,Tyler announced that “we have concludedthe present series of test detonations at oursite.” He thanked the people of Nevada andparticularly the local officials and residents inthe vicinity of the site. They have, he said,“contributed to an important nationaldefense effort.” Declining to comment on thetechnical results of the tests, Tyler stated thatthe Atomic Energy Commission was “com-pletely satisfied with the conduct of the testoperation.” He added that officials were“grateful today to report that there has notbeen a single incident of damage to humanseither to those at the site during the tests orto persons elsewhere as a result of our testdetonations.” Noting that some personnelwould remain to “construct permanent facili-ties and to maintain the test site,” he saidthat most would be leaving Las Vegas soon.91

Roll–up was relatively quick and easy.Surveys around the test site indicated “nohot spots or areas of significant activity.”Monitoring continued in the target areathrough February 9, at which point the areawas fenced even though “levels of activitywere dropping so fast that this seemedalmost unnecessary.” By February 12, the lastmembers of the radiological safety groupwere back in Los Alamos. For workers thatwould be involved with the “construction ofpermanent establishments” at the test site,Atomic Energy Commission officials negotiat-

Political cartoon on front page of WashingtonCounty News, March 1, 1951. "The Thing" refersto the title of a popular song of the time with apercussive effect that went boom, boom, boom.


ed with the Air Force for continued use ofthe Indian Springs facilities as well as thebuilding at Nellis. The Atomic EnergyCommission also had to deal with claims foroffsite damages from the tests. Of the 131claims received, the Atomic EnergyCommission settled the vast majority of these

by May with expenditures of slightly morethan $14,000. Total estimated costs for theentire Ranger series were approximately $2million. This, Clark concluded, was “certainlyonly a fraction of that required for tests con-ducted at the Eniwetok Proving Grounds.”92

Permanentization of the Test Site

Following the Ranger series, the AtomicEnergy Commission swiftly moved to turnthe Nevada Test Site into a permanent prov-ing ground for nuclear weapons. The nextseries, Buster, which had been in the workssince summer 1950 and would have inaugu-rated the new site had it not been for thehastily planned and implemented Ranger,was scheduled for fall 1951. In early spring,two months after the conclusion of Ranger,officials at the Santa Fe Operations Officeand the Los Alamos laboratory arrived at a“minimum construction program consistentwith good operational results.” They estimat-ed that test series would be conducted at thesite two or three times a year, with asix–week expected occupancy of the site foreach series. The construction program con-tained “two main items.” The control pointconsisted of a “system of buildings” housingscientific measurement equipment, weathermonitoring installations, computing andcommunications rooms, and operational con-trol and radiological safety facilities. Thecamp area, designed “minimal to needs”partly because it would be in use at mosteighteen weeks during a year, consisted ofbarracks, a mess hall, and administrationfacilities for a “peak load of 412 men duringoperations.” This provided “fifty square feetper person per room.” Living space could beexpanded by fifty percent with the use ofdouble–deck bunks.

Atomic Energy Commission and laboratoryofficials decided to move the target areanorthward, across an intervening ridge, ontoYucca Flat. They thus sought to avoid theblast effects “noticed” at Las Vegas duringRanger by moving ground zero further away.They located the control point on the north

side of the ridge between the two valleyswith a line of sight overlooking the YuccaFlat testing area. Officials originally planned

the camp area for a site eight miles south ofthe control point in Frenchman Flat. As theAtomic Energy Commission received “addi-tional proposals for operations involvingatomic weapons” from the Department ofDefense, however, they realized this madenecessary the “retention of the Frenchman’sFlat Area for development as an operationaltest area.” They instead located the camparea south of the ridge running along thesouthern edge of Frenchman Flat where itwould be protected from tests. Visible fromU. S. Highway 95, the site became known asMercury base camp.93

The “minimal needs” provided by Mercurysoon proved insufficient. First used in thefall 1950 Buster and newly added, two–testJangle series, the camp accommodated over1,100 residents, including both AtomicEnergy Commission and military personnelas well as a large number of construction

Page 81Legacy of the Nevada Test Site, 1951 - Legacy of the Nevada Test Site, 1951 -

Nevada Test Site gate, 1955. Source: REECO,Bechtel Nevada.

Part VI:

Legacy of the Nevada Test Site, 1951—

workers. Following Buster–Jangle, theAtomic Energy Commission expanded thecamp facilities, adding more barracks, a sec-ond mess hall, a recreation facility, andwarehouse, office, and laboratory space.Eventually, as testing became routine andmore or less year round, Mercury developedmost of the amenities found in a typicalsmall town, including a hospital, fire station,post office, police station, movie theater,bowling alley, and a fine dining establish-ment.94

Atoms for War and Peace

For over four decades, the Nevada TestSite served as the nation’s principal provingground for nuclear weapons. Most of thevery largest tests, those in the megatonrange, took place in the Pacific or, later,underground at Amchitka far out in theAleutian Islands, but almost ninety percent

of the 1,053 tests since Trinity have beenconducted at the Nevada Test Site. Duringthe 1950s, atmospheric testing was the ruleat the site. This made for some spectacularvisual performances but also sent radioactiveclouds beyond the test site boundaries andsometimes over inhabited areas. Increasedconcern regarding radioactive fallout helpedspur international test ban negotiations thateventually culminated in the Limited TestBan Treaty of 1963.

The test ban treaty banned atmospherictesting but legitimized underground testing.During the 1960s, weapons developmentand testing became largely routinized.Underground testing dampened much of theconcern with blast effects and radiologicalsafety. Full–time professional test personnelconstantly occupied themselves with eithertesting or preparing for the next test.

Page 82 Legacy of the Nevada Test Site, 1951 - Legacy of the Nevada Test Site, 1951 -

Mercury, main base camp of the Nevada Test Site. Source: REECO, Bechtel Nevada.


Underground testing also made possible theuse of significantly larger devices at the testsite, with the 1968 Boxcar test registering at1.3 megatons, nearly sixty times the yield ofthe Fox shot in the Ranger series. While thetests got larger, public attention and appre-hension diminished considerably. In starkcontrast to the bold headlines and generalcommotion during Ranger, residents in LasVegas and other communities surroundingthe test site paid scant attention to under-ground testing. Usually, the only reminderthey had of nearby testing activity was whenthe chandeliers began to sway gently backand forth following a detonation. The lastunderground test at the site occurred onSeptember 23, 1992, after which Congressimposed a moratorium on nuclear weaponstesting. In 1996, international negotiationsproduced a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.The Senate has not ratified the treaty, butthe moratorium on testing remains in effect.

At the same time that the primary missionof the Nevada Test Site has historically beenthe testing of nuclear weapons, the site alsohas served as a testing station for other proj-ects, some military oriented and somedesigned to support and promote peacefuluses of the atom. Beginning in the late1950s, the test site played host to the Plutoramjet and the Rover rocket programs forwhich the AEC designed and tested thenuclear reactors. The Pluto program, fundedby the Air Force, sought to produce a system

that could propel a supersonic low–altitudevehicle. At the site, Pluto consisted of tworeactors, with a special heated air storagesystem to permit full power testing, as wellas a control facility, test bunker, and railroadspur line. The Rover program sought todevelop a nuclear–powered rocket for spacetravel. Rover involved the full–scale testingof nuclear rocket reactors and engines. Twomassive maintenance and assembly facilitieswere built at the test site, as well as two testcells and an engine test stand. A railroad lineconnected the various facilities. Both thePluto and Rover programs achieved sometechnical success but were terminated whenno near term missions could be found, Plutoin 1964 and Rover in 1973.

The Plowshare program, begun in 1958,sought to develop peaceful uses for nuclearexplosives. Over the next fifteen years, theAtomic Energy Commission conducted thir-ty–five Plowshare tests. The excavation tests,designed to demonstrate that nuclear devicescould quickly and cheaply move massiveamounts of earth in the digging of canalsand harbors, were conducted at the test site.Most spectacular was the 1962 Sedan test.Buried 635 feet below ground level at a sitein the far north end of Yucca Flat, the104–kiloton blast lifted a huge dome of earth290 feet in the air, moved 6.5 million cubicyards of earth and rock, and left a crater1,200 feet across and 320 feet deep. The lipof the crater towered as high as 100 feet intothe air. Sedan also sent a cloud of radioactiv-ity off in the direction of Salt Lake City, cre-ating a brief scare when radioactiveiodine–131 turned up in the local milk sup-ply. Inability to totally contain the radioactiv-ity coupled with disappointing results even-tually signaled the death knell of the pro-gram in the mid–1970s.

Expanded missions also meant an expand-ed test site. From the original 16– by 40–milerectangular tract, land to the west of the sitewas added to accommodate the Rover pro-gram in the Jackass Flats area. Anirregular–shaped parcel encompassingPahute Mesa at the northwest corner wastaken over in the 1960s and used forhigh–yield underground and Plowshare tests.

Nuclear ramjet engine on its test bed facility, arailroad flatcar. Source: REECO, Bechtel Nevada.


Plumes of sand and dust formed by boulders andclumps of gravel ejected from the desert by theJuly 6, 1962, Sedan Plowshare test. Source:REECO, Bechtel Nevada.

Sedan crater. Note the vehicles on the lip of thecrater to the left. Source: REECO, Bechtel Nevada.

President John F. Kennedy being briefed atthe Nuclear Rocket Development Station atJackass Flats, December 8, 1962. To thePresident's right is Atomic EnergyCommission Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg.Source: REECO, Bechtel Nevada.

Peaceful Uses


Battleground of the Cold War

Time-sequence photos of a house 3,500 feet from ground zero during a March 17, 1953,weapons effects test at Yucca Flat. Shooting 24 frames per second, the time from the first tolast picture was two-and-one-third seconds. The camera was completely enclosed in a two-inch lead sheath as a protection against radiation. The only source of light was that fromthe blast. In frame 1, the house is lighted by the blast. In frame 2, the house is on fire. Inframe 3, the blast blows the fire out, and the building starts to disintegrate. Frames 4through 8 show the complete disintegration of the house. Source: REECO, Bechtel Nevada.


Battleground of the Cold War

One historian has described the nuclearweapon facilities that designed, built, andtested the nation’s nuclear arsenal as the“battlegrounds of the Cold War.” What wasdone at these facilities, in essence, madewinning the Cold War possible. Perhaps thesingle most defining element of the secondhalf of the twentieth century, nuclearweapons certainly shaped the manner inwhich the Cold War was fought. They were,many have argued, the determining factor inkeeping the struggle from becoming, atsome point, an all–out hot war. At the sametime that they visited unprecedented fearand a daily awareness of the nearness ofglobal holocaust and potentially even humanextinction on everyone, nuclear weaponsbought the necessary time—over fourdecades as it turned out—to achieve a suc-

cessful outcome to the Cold War on thebasis of ideology, economics, social struc-ture, and the limited application of militarymight alone.

Victory did not come cheap. Millions diedin Korea, Vietnam, and dozens of “brushfire” wars. Untold treasure, which couldhave been put toward any number of humanand social needs, was expended on militarymanpower and sophisticated weaponry. Norwas victory foreordained. No one knew forcertain whether communism would notprove to be the inevitable wave of the futureor if the ideological struggle would not allend in a massive nuclear exchange.

Government officials in late 1950, from thescientists at Los Alamos to the president ofthe United States, faced what they perceivedas a national emergency. The Soviet Union

Subsidence craters left from underground nuclear testing at the north end of Yucca Flat on the NevadaTest Site. Source: DOE, Nevada Operations Office.

had the bomb; China had been lost; war inKorea strained the nation’s militaryresources; and a seemingly monolithic com-munism threatened to overwhelm the West.Superiority in nuclear weaponry, theybelieved, might be the only political and mil-itary reality that could forestall a third worldwar and possible defeat and descent into anew dark age. They became convinced thata continental testing site was essential formaintaining this superiority, and in a remark-ably short period of time they pushed itthrough and put it to use.

What they did could not have been donelacking a dire threat or, equally important, anational consensus that the nation’s securitytook precedence over personal inconven-ience. What they did could not be donetoday. Successfully locating and using in amatter of weeks, without public knowledgeand referendum, a facility whose activitieswould cause physical damage in nearbycommunities and spread a known harmfulsubstance across vast swaths of the country-side is now simply inconceivable.Environmental laws and advocacy groups,congressional disunity, executive branch pru-dence, and public skepticism guarantee any-thing similar from happening in the absenceof some sort of overriding necessity. Witnessthe decades–long effort to site a nuclearwaste repository at nearby Yucca Mountain.

The Nevada Test Site, of all the nation’snuclear weapons facilities, most resemblesan actual battleground. Weapons effectsexperiments have left behind all sorts of“atmospheric test relics,” including damagedor demolished military hardware and theeveryday structures and artifacts of domesticlife such as a bank vault, a train trestle, anunderground parking garage, and housesbuilt of various materials. Hundreds ofsaucer–like craters, formed by the subsi-dence of the ground above an undergroundtest shot, pock the test site, creating analmost moon–like landscape. Although mas-sive amounts of high–level radioactivity werelocked into the earth in the contained blasts,plutonium and other radioactive substancesare still detectable above ground. This is thedetritus of combat. This is where the ColdWar was fought. Here clear–eyed andsteel–nerved officials, with the acquiescenceand sacrifice of a local population willingand even eager to do its part, conductedsome of the most spectacular, politically andmilitarily important, and potentially haz-ardous experiments ever seen, felt, andheard by humankind. The Nevada TestSite—still active and serving the nation—stands as a monument to what they did andhow they made the world as we know ittoday.


All unpublished documents and most reports cited can be found at the U.S. Department ofEnergy’s Coordination and Information Center in Las Vegas, Nevada.

1. Carl Maag, Stephen Rohrer, Robert Shepanek, Operation Ranger: Shots Able, Baker, Easy,Baker-2, Fox, 25 January-6 February 1951, DNA 6022F (Washington: Defense Nuclear Agency,February 26, 1982), pp. 51-55; 4925 Special Weapons Group, Kirtland Air Force Base, NewMexico, “Operation Ranger,” January 16, 1951, pp. 4-8; Carroll L. Tyler, “Report on OperationRanger, January-February, 1951,” pp. 11-12; John C. Clark, Operation Ranger, Vol. 1, Report ofthe Deputy Test Director, WT-206, September 1953 (extracted version, Washington: DefenseNuclear Agency, October 1, 1979), p. 59; Richard D. Wolfe, “Radiological Safety: InformalReport,” in Operation Ranger, Vol. 4, Program Reports—Gross Weapons Measurements, WT-201(Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, June 1952), p. 217.

2. Harold Drollinger, Colleen M. Beck, Robert Furlow, Cultural Resources Management Planfor the Nevada Test Site, DOE/NV11508–47, June 1999, pp. 7–15.

3. Ibid., pp. 17–22; George M. Wheeler, Report upon United States Geographical Surveys Westof the One Hundredth Meridian, Volume I, Geographical Report (Washington: GovernmentPrinting Office [GPO], 1889), p. 24; Julian H. Steward, Basin–Plateau Aboriginal SociopoliticalGroups, Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 120 (Washington:GPO, 1938 [reprinted University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 1970]), pp. 94–95, 233, 253. Seealso Richard W. Stoffle, David B. Halmo, John E. Olmsted, Michael J. Evans, Native AmericanCultural Resource Studies at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for SocialResearch, University of Michigan, 1990).

4. For the history of the Old Spanish Trail, see Le Roy R. Hafen and Ann W. Hafen, OldSpanish Trail: Santa Fe to Los Angeles (Glendale, CA: A.H. Clark Co., 1954), and HaroldSteiner, The Old Spanish Trail Across the Mojave Desert: A History and Guide (Las Vegas, NV:Haldor Co., 1999). Frémont’s second Topographical Expedition of 1843–1844 is detailed in hisclassic work Brevet Captain J.C. Frémont, Report of the Exploring Expedition to the RockyMountains in the Year 1842 and to Oregon and Northern California in the Years 1843–’44(Washington: Gales and Seaton, Printers, 1845).

5. Frederick C.V. Worman, Archeological Investigations at the U.S. Atomic EnergyCommission’s Nevada Test Site and Nuclear Rocket Development Station, LA–4125 (Los Alamos,New Mexico: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 1969), pp. 5–6.

6. For a detailed analysis of the routes taken by the ‘49ers, see George Koenig, Beyond ThisPlace There Be Dragon: The Routes of the Tragic Trek of the Death Valley 1849ers throughNevada, Death Valley, and on to Southern California (Glendale, CA: The Arthur H. ClarkCompany, 1984).

7. Russell R. Elliott, History of Nevada, 2nd edition, revised (Lincoln, NE: University ofNebraska Press, 1987), p. 108; Wheeler, Preliminary Report Concerning Explorations andSurveys Principally in Nevada and Arizona (Washington: GPO, 1872), pp. 15–16.

Page 89EndnotesEndnotes

Endnotes

8. Gary Paine, “A Mine, the Military, and a Dry Lake: National Security and the GroomDistrict, Lincoln County, Nevada,” Nevada Historical Society Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Spring1996), pp. 23–24; Wheeler, Preliminary Report, pp. 44–45, 52; Wheeler, Preliminary ReportUpon a Reconnaissance through Southern and Southeastern Nevada (Washington: GPO, 1875),p. 23.

9. Alvin R. McLane, “El Picacho, the Writing Cabin of B.M. Bower,” Nevada Historical SocietyQuarterly, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 137–39; Drollinger, Beck, and Furlow, CulturalResources Management Plan, DOE/NV11508–47, June 1999, pp. 22–23.

10. Colleen M. Beck, Nancy Goldenberg, William Gray Johnson, and Clayton Sellers, NevadaTest Site Historic Structures Survey, Technical Report No. 87, DOE/NV/95NV11508–05, March1996, pp. 10–11.

11. For the boom and bust towns, see Stanley W. Paher, Nevada Ghost Towns & Mining Camps(Berkeley, CA: Howell–North Books, 1970). Population figures for 1950 are from U.S.Department of Commerce, A Report of the Seventeenth Decennial Census of the United States,Census of Population: 1950, Volume I, Number of Inhabitants (Washington: GPO, 1952).

12. For the mining strikes of the early 1900s, see Elliott, Nevada’s Twentieth–Century MiningBoom: Tonopah, Goldfield, Ely (Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 1988).

13. David F. Myrick, Railroads of Nevada and Eastern California: Volume Two—The SouthernRoads (Berkeley, CA: Howell–North Books, 1963), pp. 454–503.

14. Paher, Nevada Ghost Towns & Mining Camps, pp. 322–24; Drollinger, Beck, and Furlow,Cultural Resources Management Plan, DOE/NV11508–47, June 1999, pp. 23–24; MargaretLong, The Shadow of the Arrow (Caldwell, ID: The Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1950), pp. 103–4;Robert Jones, Colleen Beck, Nancy Goldenberg, Anne DuBarton, Susan Edwards, and JoniCarroll, “A Class III Cultural Resources Reconnaissance of the Proposed Reentry Body ImpactFuze Flights (RBIFF), Area 26, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada,” Short ReportSR121395–2, NTS Project #961026, May 1996, p. 14.

15. For a history of the growth of Las Vegas, see Eugene P. Moehring, Resort City in theSunbelt: Las Vegas, 1930–1970 (Reno and Las Vegas, NV: University of Nevada Press, 1989).

16. Office of History, Headquarters Air Warfare Center, Nellis Air Force Base, A Concise Historyof Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada (Air Combat Command), March 15, 1997, pp. 4–6, 12–15; LasVegas Army Airfield, History of Army Air Forces Flexible Gunnery School, 1st Section...1st Jan1939–7th Dec 1941, ca. 1943, pp. 1–4, 65–66; Moehring, Resort City in the Sun Belt, pp. 32–33,61–63; Office of History, Headquarters Air Warfare Center, Nellis Air Force Base, A BriefHistory of the Nellis Air Force Range, April 1997, pamphlet–not paginated; Office of History,Headquarters Air Warfare Center, Nellis Air Force Base, A Brief History of Indian Springs AirForce Auxiliary Field, January 1999, pp. 8–10. See also, J. Catherene Wilman and James D.Reinhardt, A Pictorial History of Nellis Air Force Base, 1941–1996 (Las Vegas, NV: Office ofHistory, Headquarters Air Warfare Center, Nellis Air Force Base, 1997).

17. This overview of early nuclear physics is necessarily brief and simplistic. A fuller treatmentof these discoveries and their implications can be found in F.G. Gosling, The ManhattanProject: Making the Atomic Bomb, DOE/MA–0001 (Washington: U.S. Department of Energy[DOE], January 1999 edition); Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New World,1939–1946, Volume I, A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (UniversityPark, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962); Richard Rhodes, The Making of the AtomicBomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).

18. The Einstein letter is reprinted in Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the AtomicBomb (Washington: GPO, 1985), pp. 609–10.

Page 90 EndnotesEndnotes

19. Gosling, The Manhattan Project, pp. 1–17.

20. Ibid., pp. 5–43.

21. Ibid., pp. 38–43; Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 234–35, 244–52.

22. Barton C. Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project,1942–1946 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 75–78, 84–86, 89–93.

23. Ibid., pp. 75–78, 84–86, 89–93 98–108; Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, pp.664–65; Gosling, The Manhattan Project, pp. 48–49.

24. Gosling, The Manhattan Project, pp. vii, 49–54, 59.

25. Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail, pp. 116–53; Gosling, The Manhattan Project, p. 55; Hewlettand Anderson, New World, pp. 580–81.

26. “Special Message to the Congress on Atomic Energy,” October 3, 1945, Public Papers of thePresidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1945 (Washington: GPO, 1961), pp. 362–65;Gosling, The Manhattan Project, p. 57.

27. Gosling, The Manhattan Project, pp. 55–57.

28. Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield, 1947–1952, Volume II of A Historyof the United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania StateUniversity Press, 1969), pp. 47–48, 85; Barton C. Hacker, Elements of Controversy: The AtomicEnergy Commission and Radiation Safety in Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1947–1974 (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1994), pp. 10–18; David E. Lilienthal, Journals, Volume II, TheAtomic Energy Years, 1945–1950 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 212–13; Paul T. Preussto James S. Russell, February 10, 1949.

29. Hacker, Elements of Controversy, pp. 14–35.

30. Hacker, Elements of Controversy, pp. 26–27, 40; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, pp.75, 130; Preuss to Russell, February 10, 1949; AEC 141, Location of Proving Ground for AtomicWeapons, September 15, 1948; 30th AEC–MLC Meeting, September 16, 1948; Lilienthal toChairman, Military Liaison Committee, September 24, 1948.

31. Hacker, Elements of Controversy, pp. 13, 40; W.S. Parsons to Director, AEC Division ofMilitary Application, August 17, 1948; Howard B. Hutchinson, “Project Nutmeg,” January 28,1949.

32. Hutchinson, “Project Nutmeg.”

33. Hacker, Elements of Controversy, p. 40; Preuss to Russell, February 10, 1949; Sumner T.Pike to Chairman, Military Liaison Committee, March 8, 1949.

34. Hewlett and Anderson, New World, pp. 329, 354; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, pp.146, 180, 182, 362–409; Hacker, Elements of Controversy, pp. 36–39.

35. Hacker, Elements of Controversy, p. 39; James McCormack, Jr., to Carroll L. Tyler, July 20,1950; N.E. Bradbury to Tyler, July 21, 1950; AEC 141/3, Atomic Weapons Tests–Letter to theSecretary of Defense, August 1, 1950; AEC 141/4, Atomic Weapons Tests–Letter from theSecretary of Defense, August 7, 1950; Bradbury to McCormack, August 22, 1950.

36. Roy B. Snapp to McCormack, July 7 and 13, 1950; Hacker, Elements of Controversy, p. 40;AEC 141/2, Location of Proving Ground for Atomic Weapons–Draft Letter to MLC, July 11,1950; AEC Meeting 436, July 12, 1950; Gordon E. Dean to Robert LeBaron, July 13, 1950.

37. McCormack to Tyler, July 20, 1950; Air Force Special Weapons Project, untitled continentaltest site review, no date (ca. July–August 1950); George F. Schlatter, Memorandums for Record,July 17 and 25, 1950; Bradbury to Tyler, July 21, 1950.


38. Schlatter, Memorandum for Record, July 25, 1950; Kurt M. Landon to James P. Cooney, July28, 1950; Hacker, Elements of Controversy, pp. 40–41; Bradbury to Tyler, July 21, 1950 (empha-sis Bradbury’s).

39. Schlatter, Memorandum for Record, July 25, 1950; Holmes & Narver, “Report Covering theSelection of Proposed Emergency Proving Ground for the United States Atomic EnergyCommission,” August 14, 1950, pp. 1, 9–11, 57–58; Hacker, Elements of Controversy, pp. 41–42;Frederick Reines, “Discussion of Radiological Hazards Associated with a Continental Test Sitefor Atomic Bombs, Based on Meetings Held at Los Alamos, 1 August 1950,” LAMS–1173,September 1, 1950, pp. 5, 11–13, 21, 23–24.

40. Roger M. Anders, ed., Forging the Atomic Shield: Excerpts from the Office Diary of GordonE. Dean (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1987), pp. 65–66, 88;Bradbury to McCormack, August 22, 1950; Schlatter to McCormack, September 5, 1950.

41. Dean to Military Liaison Committee, July 17, 1950; Dean to Truman, July 17, 1950; Schlatterto McCormack, September 5, 1950; Clark, Report of the Deputy Test Director, p. 14; Tyler toMcCormack, September 15, 1950.

42. Anders, ed., Diary of Gordon E. Dean, pp. 68, 89; Snapp to McCormack, November 10,1950; AEC 141/6, Location of Proving Ground for Atomic Weapons—Memo from NationalSecurity Council, November 16, 1950; Hacker, Elements of Controversy, p. 42.

43. Bradbury to Tyler, November 21, 1950, with enclosed J–Division memorandum datedNovember 22, 1950.

44. AEC 141/7, Location of Proving Ground for Atomic Weapons, December 13, 1950; Hacker,Elements of Controversy, p. 42; James S. Lay to Dean, et al., December 14 and 19, 1950; AEC141/8, Location of Proving Ground for Atomic Weapons, December 20, 1950.

45. Clark, p. 18; Reines, “A Summary of Test Results Operation Ranger,” LAMS–1240, March 9,1951, p. 7; Hacker, Elements of Controversy, pp. 42–43; Thomas L. Shipman to H–DivisionFiles, December 12, 1950.

46. Dean to LeBaron, December 20, 1950; Schlatter, Memorandum for Record, December 19,1950.

47. Schlatter, Memorandum for Record, December 19, 1950; McCormack cable to Tyler,December 28, 1950; Hacker, Elements of Controversy, p. 43.

48. Jay D. Rutledge, Jr., Memorandum for the Record, December 22, 1950.

49. Tyler cable to McCormack, January 2, 1951; McCormack to Schlatter, December 28, 1950.

50. Tyler cable to Schlatter, December 29, 1950; McCormack to Schlatter, December 28, 1950;Hacker, Elements of Controversy, p. 44; Tyler, “Report on Operation Ranger, January–February,1951,” pp. 3, 7.

51. McCormack cable to Tyler, December 28, 1950; McCormack to Schlatter, December 28,1950.

52. Las Vegas Review–Journal, January 2, 1951.

53. Hacker, Elements of Controversy, pp. 43, 307; William R. Sturges, Jr., to Schlatter, December20, 1950; Tyler cable to McCormack, January 3, 1951; Lay to Dean, et al., January 5, 1951, withattached “Proposed Press Release: Project Mercury.”

54. AEC Meeting 513, January 2, 1951; AEC–Military Liaison Meeting 52, January 3, 1951;Anders, ed., Diary of Gordon E. Dean, pp. 69, 93; J. Robert Oppenheimer to Dean, January 6,1951.


55. Dean to the Special Committee of the National Security Council for Atomic Energy Matters,January 4, 1951.

56. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, p. 535; Anders, ed., Diary of Gordon E. Dean, pp.93–97.

57. Dean to files, January 9, 1951; Rodney L. Southwick to Joseph Short, January 10, 1951;Anders, ed., Diary of Gordon E. Dean, pp. 100–1; AEC 388/4, Tests at the Las Vegas, NevadaSite, January 12, 1951.

58. K. Salisbury to Dean, January 8, 1951; Anders, ed., Diary of Gordon E. Dean, p. 98; Deanto files, January 9, 1951.

59. Salisbury to Dean, January 8, 1951; Anders, ed., Diary of Gordon E. Dean, pp. 98–100.

60. Anders, ed., Diary of Gordon E. Dean, pp. 94, 98, 101–4; Salisbury to Dean, January 8,1951; Charles L. Dunham and Walter D. Claus to McCormack, January 9, 1951.

61. Salisbury to Dean, January 8, 1951; Southwick to Schlatter, January 11, 1951; Santa FeOperations Office, Press Release: Background Information Regarding the Test Base at the LasVegas Bombing and Gunnery Range, January 11, 1951; Tyler, “Report on Operation Ranger,January–February 1951,” no date, p. 7; Hacker, Elements of Controversy, p. 43; AEC, handbillissued January 11, 1951.

62. Anders, ed., Diary of Gordon E. Dean, pp. 103–4; Southwick to Salisbury, January 12,1951.

63. New York Times, January 12, 1951; Salt Lake City Deseret News, January 12, 1951; LosAngeles Times, January 12, 1951; Las Vegas Review–Journal, January 11 and 12, 1951;Albuquerque Journal, January 12, 1951.

64. Los Angeles Evening Herald Express, January 12, 1951; Las Vegas Review–Journal, January12, 1951.

65. Las Vegas Review–Journal, January 15, 1951; Las Vegas Morning Sun, January 17, 1951;Goldfield News and Beatty Bulletin, January 12, 1951.

66. Las Vegas Review–Journal, January 12, 1951.

67. Schlatter, Memorandum for Record, January 18, 1951.

68. Tyler, “Operation Ranger,” pp. 7–8; Carl Maag, Stephen Rohrer, Robert Shepanek,Operation Ranger: Shots Able, Baker, Easy, Baker–2, Fox, 25 January–6 February 1951, DNA6022F (Washington: Defense Nuclear Agency, February 26, 1982), pp. 22–25, 44, 46; E.J. Klinkand R.I. Liebman, “Ground Instrumentation Provided by Sandia Corporation for Use DuringOperation Ranger,” in Operation Ranger, Vol. 4, Program Reports—Gross WeaponsMeasurements, WT–201 (Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, June 1952), p. 30;4925 Special Weapons Group, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, “Operation Ranger,”January 16, 1951, p. 2; Clark, Report of the Deputy Test Director, pp. 27, 56; Schlatter,Memorandum for Record, January 17, 1951.

69. Clark, Report of the Deputy Test Director, pp. 25–26; Maag, et al., Operation Ranger, pp.42–49; Walter Claus and Joe Deal, “Operation ‘Hot Rod’,” in Operation Ranger, Vol. 4, pp.249–50.

70. Tyler, “Operation Ranger,” pp. 7–8; Clark, Report of the Deputy Test Director, p. 68; Paul T.Preuss to Tyler, January 14, 1951, in Tyler, “Operation Ranger,” exhibit B.


71. Tyler cable to McCormack, January 3, 1951; Anders, ed., Diary of Gordon E. Dean, p. 100;“Action Taken by Washington on Official Observers” and Richard G. Elliott to Tyler, June 15,1951, both in Tyler, “Operation Ranger”; Maag, et al., Operation Ranger, p. 64.

72. Shipman, “Report of Rad–Safe Group,” in Operation Ranger, Volume 5, Program Reports—Operational, WT–204 (Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, July 1952), pp.54–55, 61, 69; Clark, Report of the Deputy Test Director, p. 69; Robert E. Heft to Shipman,January 5 and 15, 1951; Hacker, Elements of Controversy, pp. 44–46.

73. Shipman, “Report of Rad–Safe Group,” p. 69. See also, Shipman to Distribution, January 5,1951.

74. Shipman, “Report of Rad–Safe Group,” p. 69; Hacker, Elements of Controversy, p. 47;Evacuation Plan for Ranger Operation, no date.

75. Elliott to Tyler, June 15, 1951, in Tyler, “Operation Ranger”; Robert Tumbleson to ChetSmith, January 20, 1951; AEC, Las Vegas Information Office, Information for Press and Radio,January 23, 1951 (2 releases).

76. Clark, Report of the Deputy Test Director, p. 58; Hacker, Elements of Controversy, pp. 48,50; Shipman, “Report of Rad–Safe Group,” p. 103; Wolfe, “Radiological Safety,” p. 217; Smith toShelby Thompson, January 31, 1951; Southwick to Joseph H. Short, January 25, 1951; AEC, LasVegas Information Office, Replies made to press inquiries, January 31, 1951; Las VegasReview–Journal, January 26 and 27, 1951.

77. Clark, Report of the Deputy Test Director, pp. 58–59; Shipman, “Report of Rad–Safe Group,”p. 103.

78. Tyler, “Operation Ranger,” pp. 10–11; Captain Jackson to McCormack, January 26, 1951;Clark, Report of the Deputy Test Director, pp. 57–58.

79. Hacker, Elements of Controversy, p. 50; Wolfe, “Radiological Safety,” p. 221; Shipman,“Report of Rad–Safe Group,” p. 103.

80. Shipman, “Report of Rad–Safe Group,” p. 103; Las Vegas Review–Journal, January 28, 1951;Los Angeles Examiner, January 29, 1951; New York Times, January 29, 1951; Salt Lake CityDeseret News, January 28, 1951.

81.Hacker, Elements of Controversy, p. 50; Clark, Report of the Deputy Test Director, p. 59;Wolfe, “Radiological Safety,” p. 221; Shipman, “Report of Rad–Safe Group,” p. 103.

82. Washington Daily News, January 30, 1951; Albuquerque Journal, January 28 and 29, 1951;Las Vegas Morning Sun, January 30, 1951.

83. Washington Post, January 30, 1951. See also, New York Times, January 30, 1951, andBaltimore Sun, January 31, 1951.

84. Hacker, Elements of Controversy, pp. 50–51.

85. Ibid., pp. 51–52; Clark, Report of the Deputy Test Director, pp. 59, 62; Shipman, “Report ofRad–Safe Group,” pp. 103–4.

86. Wolfe, “Radiological Safety,” p. 222; Clark, Report of the Deputy Test Director, p. 65;Hacker, Elements of Controversy, pp. 51–52; Shipman, “Report of Rad–Safe Group,” p. 104;AEC, Las Vegas Information Office, Information for Press and Radio, February 4, 1951.

87. Clark, Report of the Deputy Test Director, pp. 62, 65; Wolfe, “Radiological Safety,” pp. 222,225; Shipman, “Report of Rad–Safe Group,” p. 104.

88. Los Angeles Mirror, February 6, 1951; Wolfe, “Radiological Safety,” p. 225.


89. New York Times, January 29 and 31, 1951; Boulder City News, February 2, 1951; AmarilloDaily Times, February 6, 1951; The Christian Science Monitor, February 10, 1951.

90. Los Angeles Examiner, January 29, 1951; Los Angeles Times, February 2, 1951; Los AngelesEvening Herald–Express, February 7, 1951.

91. AEC, Santa Fe Operations Office, Press Release, SFPR–410, February 5, 1951.

92. Shipman, “Report of Rad–Safe Group,” p. 104; Tyler, “Operation Ranger,” pp. 14–18; Clark,Report of the Deputy Test Director, p. 70.

93. Hacker, Elements of Controversy, p. 60; AEC 141/10, The Las Vegas Test Site ConstructionProgram, April 24, 1951; M.W. Boyer to Frederick J. Lawton, June 14, 1951.

94. AEC 141/17, Expansion of Permanent Camp–Nevada Test Site, November 30, 1951.Information on Mercury and the current status of the Nevada Test Site can be found at theNevada Operation Office’s website at www.nv.doe.gov/nts.


Date post:	21-Apr-2020
Category:	Documents
Upload:	others
View:	3 times
Download:	0 times

DOE/MA-0518 Origins of the Nevada Test Site...Origins of the Nevada Test Site United States...

Documents