Staff Ride: ChickamaugaLeader’s Packet

TAA THOR

ATK POS

CREEP

1 CCP

ABF 1

SBF 1

X

DOA HENDRIX

TimelineTime Location Notes

0730-0930 RTE HANNIBAL I-75 to Battlefield Parkway to Dyer Bridge Rd.

0930-0950 OP 1 Organization, Murfreesboro; (Dispersion and Concentration)

0950-1000 Local Roads Dietz Rd. to Reeds Bridge Rd.

1000-1025 NAI 1 Cavalry Skirmishes; Minty; Forrest; (IPB); (Looking down the Sabre)

1025-1035 Local Roads Reeds Bridge Rd. to Visitors Center

1035-1130 CONTACT POINT X Fiber-optic map, operational map, video; weapons

1130-1140 Local Roads Lafayette Rd. to Alexander's Bridge Rd.

1140-1230 TAA THOR Class I Resupply; Bragg

1230-1235 DOA HENDRIX Brotherton Rd.

1235-1245 ATK POS CREEP Longstreet

1245-1250 DOA HENDRIX Brotherton Rd.

1250-1305 CCP 1 CASEVAC, (Reverse Slope)

1305-1310 DOA HENDRIX Brotherton Farm

1310-1340 DOA HENDRIX, ATTACK BY FIRE 1 (Terrain), (movement); Rosecrans

1340-1350 Local Roads Dyer Rd. to Glenn-Kelly Rd.

1350-1415 SUPPORT BY FIRE 1 Thomas; Snodgrass

1430-1630 RTE HANNIBAL Local Roads to Battlefield Parkway to I-75

Vignettes

“Eli Shields was in the lead when we ran into the rebel army and had the nerve to sing out in a clear voice, ‘Halt!’ To this some thoughtful Johnny replied, “Keep your dam [sic] mouth shut!’ We pulled Shields off and pushed him back into the brush out of the immediate sight and hearing of the enemy, then crept back to the road and picked up one after another, and placed them with Eli to guard, until we had taken twenty-two prisoners. Among the prisoners were several belonging to a band, and their instruments were taken with them. There was also a rebel major, whose horse, a very fine one, we gave to Colonel Cook.‘” (Henry J. Aten, History of the Eighty-Fifth Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Hiawatha, KS, 1901,103.)

“Before the bugle could sound the mount, half of the Brigade was in the saddle-we had dismounted in column-and there was no need to form . . I the notes of the bugle had not died away when came the order Face Right! Head of column to left! Forward! Trot! and away we went for the crest of the hill. The 6th had just about got into the form of an inverted L when the demoralized and panic stricken troopers came down upon us aver the crest with a rush that threatened to swamp us in the wildest confusion. . . . Wild eyed, hatless, horseless, without guns many of them wounded and bleeding, two on one horse, riderless horses by the score, some frenzied by wounds and pain, some on three legs leaping painfully, men yelling at the top of their voice, “Git boys! The woods are full of Yankees.“” (J. W. Minnich to H. V. Boynton, 8 December 1900, Unit Files, Chickamauga andChattanooga National Military Park, Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.)

OBSERVATION POST 1

• Operational Overview

• (Thompson) Organization• (Fontenot) Murfreesboro

• Dispersion and concentration

OP 1

Vignettes“At sunrise we halted by the road long enough to make a cup of coffee. On we went again and by 9 a.m. our skirmishers ran against the enemy-Soon the 2nd Brigade were [sic] in line of battle-We halted in the edge of a wood, very soon our skirmishers came back on the run and a troop of RebeI Cavalry came rushing over the bill close on to our skirmishers-steady boys, wait for the word, was heard from our Cal--on came the cavalry, the advance had raced 150 yds withoutseeing us. One tremendous volley rang along the whole line, at first all was smoke, then dust from struggling steeds, a few riderless horses, were running here and there, save which nothing was seen of thatcavalry troop. Thus began the battle of Chickamauga-I have read of cavalry charges and seen them in print but this was the first reality of the kind I had witnessed and truly it was a grand sight.” (Peter B.Kellenberger, Corporal, Company I, 10th Indiana, Croxton’s brigade, to a friend, 15 November 1863.

“Then the firing broke out again . . .; first the scattering fire of skirmishers--then the terrific file firing of regiments, then the artillery, then the ‘rebel yell,’ and the firing gradually approached us. We stood attentive and expectant for a few minutes, then a straggling line of men in blue appeared coming toward us in wild retreat, their speed accelerated by the firing and yelling of the exultant Confederates who were close behind them. I do not remember any more appalling spectacle than this was for a few minutes; but our men took it with grim composure, lying down until the stampeded brigade had passed over our line, then rising and blazing a volley into the enemy’s faces, which abruptly ended the yelling and the charge. They had not expected such a reception, and all efforts of their officers to get or hold their men in line for a fight, were in vain They promptly retreated in their turn until out of range and out of sight. This was Walthall’s Confederate Brigade of Liddell’s Division.‘”

(POINT) NAMED AREA OF INTEREST 1Refer to Maps 2 and 3

• Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield• (Brown) Minty• (Henry) Forrest• (Thompson) Cavalry Skirmishes• Looking Down the Sabre

1

Vignette

“There was no position from which my artillery could be served with advantage against the enemy, while two of his batteries immediately in my front and onealmost on my right flank filled the air with grape, canister, shells, and solid shot, while volley after volley of musketry in quick succession swept my men by scores at every discharge. For 400 yards, however,my line steadily advanced without faltering at any point until the enemy had been driven beyond the tangled undergrowth and his first line completely routed. A stubborn resistance from the second line,supported by artillery posted upon a slight acclivity in our front and pouring showers of canister upon us for a few minutes, checked our progress; but again we advanced, driving back his second line up to and beyond the summit of the ridge, until my right rested upon and my center and left had passed the crest. Unfortunately, however, at the moment when the rout of the second line was about being made ascomplete as the disaster to the first a few minutes previous, a force of the enemy appeared on my right flank, and had well nigh turned it, compelling the Eighteenth and Forty-fifth Tennessee Regiments toretire rapidly and in some confusion under a heavy enfilading fire. This necessitated the withdrawal of the center and left, there being no support upon my right for a mile, and none in my rear nearer than 606 yards, and which was then not in motion.” (Brigadier General John C. Brown.)

ATTACK POSITION CREEPRefer to Map 4

• Column and Line

• (Holdridge) Longstreet

OP 1

Vignette

“Having gained some 66 or 70 yards, I ordered double-quick with the yell, which was obeyed to a man, the men almost assuming the run, still keepingan unbroken line. Firing from the enemy’s sharpshooters and batteries was constant in our front, but mare injury was inflicted upon us from the left flank, there seeming to be no support an the left of Bate’s brigade. On emerging [from the] woods into an open, shrubby field we could see our stubborn foe definitely resisting our march across this field. Grape, canister, and musket-shot here greatly decimated mycommand, but swerving not it bare steadily onward. Near the center of this field I was disabled and fell from a wound received just below the knee, which for many minutes paralyzed my left leg. I observed as I fell that both colors were steadily moving forward through this dreadful ordeal of shell, shot and fire. I lay here many minutes entirely conscious, but unable to rise. Many of my companions lay wounded anddead around me. Upon seeing some of my command returning through this same field and reporting orders having been issued to fall back, I, with their assistance, reached the position the regiment formerly held before this murderous charge. . f . After some little time I sent forward a party to bring or to assist in bringing the wounded from the field. I feared they would burn, as the grass and bushes were on fire.“’(Lieutenant Colonel R. Dudley Frayser, 15/37th Tennessee Infantry Regiment, in Q.R., vol. 30, pt. 2,397.)

CASUALTY COLLECTION POINT 1Refer to Map 5

• (Kinnaman) CASEVAC

• Reverse slope defense

OP 1

DOA HENDRIX, ATTACK BY FIRE POSITION 1Refer to Map 5

• Terrain• Movement

• (Lewis) Rosecrans

OP 1

Vignette

“When we had gone about half way we discovered a line of troops moving by the flank in the direction of the left wing of my regiment. Before we could determine who they were the commands ‘halt,’ ‘front,’ were given by the commander of the leading regiment, and they immediately discharged a volley at our men. A general stampede of our men ensued. So sudden and unexpected was the attack from our rear that every man seemed to act for himself, regardless of orders. I was too far from my regiment to give any directions or render any assistance at the time. Major Davis was Eying down behind the left of the regiment, but gave no commands of any kind. Doubtless he thought it was folly to attempt to do anything when the enemy was within 30 yards of him and in his rear. Some of the company officers ordered their men to face about and fire. A number of the men fired onthe enemy. Some of them fired two or three rounds before they got out of reach.

“Immediately after the discharge of the first volley from the enemy I turned to Iook at the fate of my regiment. I saw that a number of the men were making their way out in the only direction by which they could possibly escape, and I saw at once that if I could get back to the line at all, the men who were left there would be prisoners before I could reach them. All of my regiment that escaped moved by the right flank about 209 yards, and then filed to the rear and came out at the right of the brigade.‘* (Lieutenant Colonel Watt W. Floyd, 1’7th Tennessee Infantry Regiment [Fulton’s left unit].

Vignette

“It wil be seen that the right and a part of the center and Van Cleve’s division being completely swept away, our line now reduced and in the form of a crochet [hook], must resist nearly the whole rebelforce in our front, or itself be swept away, and the great Army of the Cumberland-the pride of the nation--be utterly routed. Our brave troops, appreciating the importance of their position, promised to hold to the last. Nobly did they redeem their promise. From about 1 p.m. until nightfall this line was repeatedly attacked, but remained unbroken. . . . It affords me great pleasure to refer to the grand volley firing of the regiments of my brigade on the afternoon of the 20th. I have remarked before that while occupying a part of the ‘key of the position’ they were formed in two lines. ‘They were lying a little below the northern or eastern crest of the hill; the front line fling by volley would retire, when the rear would move forward and execute the same movement. Thus a continuous volley fire was kept up for some length of time. This system was resumed whenever the rebels made their appearance in force, and repulsed them on every occasion. It had never before been my fortune to witness so grand an example of effective musket firing.” (ColonelCharles G. Harker).

SUPPORT BY FIRE POSITION 1Refer to Maps 6 and 7

• (Robinson) Thomas• (Robinson) Defense of Snodgrass Hill

• Rearguard