Ebeling, Gerhard.The Beginnings of Luther's Hermeneutics 2.pdf

7/29/2019 Ebeling, Gerhard.The Beginnings of Luther's Hermeneutics 2.pdf

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The Beginnings of Luther's Hermeneutics*

by GERHARD EBELING

The Christological Basis of Luther's Understanding ofthe Spirit

I HA VE ONLY BEEN able to indicate hastily the richness of therelationships in Luther's thoughts. Of course his thought, es-pecially with respect to his concept ofGod, demands more preciseinterpretation. For our question concerning the proper understand

ing of the dualism in Luther, however, it will have become very

clear that we cannot stop at the antithesis between creation and

redemption, but rather that the entire problem is concentrated in

christology. For Christ is simultaneously God and man, dead and

alive, mortal and immortal. Certainly, says Luther, "Nearly every

contradiction is here reconciled in Christ."139 That is the marvel,

that here the antitheseswhich are otherwise opposed only dual-istically, and which, in the tension between shadow and truth, only

stand in relation to each other as if they were dividedare simul

taneously united in a paradox. But does that mean that their an-

tithetical nature is taken from them? Now it must be shown how,

in Christ, the antitheses are united. Precisely there, where God is

most present,140 namely as the incarnate God, he is hidden. Why

is he hidden? Because he is Spirit and the Spirit is invisible? Cer

tainly also as the naked God he is the hidden and incomprehensibleGod, who dwells in a light where no one can approach.141 But then,

in what is his hiddenness as the God clothed in flesh distinguished

from his hiddenness as the naked God? Precisely in that here God

makes himself hidden, he before whom all is naked and manifest,

while before men all things are hidden.142 As the Spiritus Separatus

God can certainly not be so hidden as he is hidden under the Abs-

conso Carnis.143

The hiddenness ofthe incarnate God is thus not the

pure hiddenness of the spiritual, invisible, and interior God, butrather the hiddenness under the form of its contrary.144 Precisely

b G d b i ibl i Ch i t i th i hi h th


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316 LUTHERAN QUARTERLY

world itself is visible, he appears to the world as the opposite of

what it expects from God. We fail to understand Luther's thoughts

if we interpret them as ontological assertions. Certainly Luther can

so formulate it that it sounds as if he wanted to characterize twospheres of beings with regard to their knowability in and for them

selves, when he says, "Man is manifest, but God is invisible";145 or

"Flesh is manifest but spirit is secret."146 The distinction that Luther

is attempting to make is between two different, and indeed opposed

and mutually exclusive, possibilities of knowledge and understand

ing. His distinction, however, is drawn, not between two different

objects of knowledge, as it had previously been expressed, but rather

between two different subjects of knowledge. Man is manifest,which means that the knowing and judging of a man is oriented

to how things appear to him, as they are placed at his disposal.

God, however, is invisible, which means that God's knowing and

judging is independent of how things appear in the world-system,

as they are at our disposal within the world. That man is manifest,

therefore, not only signifies that he can be seen, but also that he

sees only what is in front of his eyes. That God is invisible not only

signifies that he cannot be seen, but also that he sees into what ishidden. Hence it is impossible to say of anything that it is knowable

in itself or invisible in itself. Rather, everything is necessarily si

multaneously knowable and hidden, yet in different aspects, and

indeed, such that one aspect conditions the other. For one cannot

simultaneously appear to the world and to God but must be hidden

to one or the other.147 "What is hidden before God is clear before

the world, and vice versa."148 Thus, two judgments stand opposed,

the judgment of God and the judgment of men. What men elect,God condemns; and what men condemn, God elects. And this judg

ment of God is shown to us in the cross of Christ.149 The oneness

of God and man in Christ means, therefore, that God allows it to

happen that his judgment and the judgment of men coincide at this

one point and thereby become evident in their disunity. Therefore

God is not hidden in Christ in the usual sense, but is hidden instead

under the contrary. For only through this oneness of weakness

before the world and strength before God, of foolishness beforethe world and wisdom before God, can God be most present to


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THE BE GI NNI NG S OF LUTHER'S HER MENE UTIC S 317

meaning of the cross of Christ comes to light: it saves the spirit by

condemning the flesh.151 And now the concept of the spiritual re

ceives its clarity. The spiritual is everything, insofar as it is under

stood before God, which is to say, in light of the cross of Christ,in light of God's revelation, hidden under its contrary. Salvation is

spiritual, insofar as it is understood, not as a certainty of being-in-

the-world and as the bestowal of temporal goods, but rather as a

being-crucified-with-Christ, in order to have life in the midst of

death. The believer is spiritual insofar as he understands himself as

hidden in God and therefore affirms his being-hidden before the

world, in order to be hidden in this hiddenness under its contrary.

The church is spiritual insofar as it is understood as hidden in thislife, because she places her trust not in earthly means of power, but

knows, rather, that she must be persecuted and that the most dan

gerous persecution is not to be persecuted but rather to live in

security. But likewise, even sin is spiritual insofar as it is seen before

God in his proper justice, in pious self-assertion in the face of God,

in the flight away from being justified by God toward self-justifi

cation. Thus the spiritual is not a special realm of being, a sphere

of pure spirituality, inwardness, and invisibility. To understand thehidden in that way is not to understand it at all spiritually, but

rather carnally. Instead, the spiritual is a category of understanding.

Whoever exists spiritually exists in the visible realm, but he exists

in it not as manifest but rather as hidden. Something certainly can

be seen, namely its contrary, but it is not spiritual living as such.

To live in the Spirit, therefore, is nothing else than to live in faith.

For Spirit and faith are one and the same.152

Luther's Hermeneutical Understanding ofthe

Antithesis of Spirit and Letter

It is overwhelming to see in the first Lectures On The Psalms how

this concept of the Spirit, which is christologically oriented and

yet related to human existence, operates as a disruptive force which

causes the entire structure of traditional theological thinking tototter. We cannot at this point pursue any further the questions of


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far achieved in respect to hermeneutics? Here, indeed, all the threads

come together. For the dualism of the first Lectures On The Psalms,

which makes itself known to us as a dualism of two ways of un

derstanding, or more precisely, of understanding existence, is certainly not an insight achieved by speculation, but rather discloses

itself here only from the knowledge of Christ. But how do we

obtain knowledge of Christ? Certainly through the Scripture! But

how is Scripture to be understood? If the dualism of understanding

proves to be so radical, then it must certainly become acute here

too, and precisely here, because here the source of understanding

itself likewise penetrates into the dualism of mutually exclusive

possibilities of understanding.That for Luther the hermeneutical problem in the first Lectures

On The Psalms moves right to the center, thus hangs on the fact

that for him the Word alone opens access to Christ. It is striking

how seldom Luther mentions the sacraments. That is not accidental.

By the method of allegory he could have expounded a full-length

doctrine of the sacraments. That he did not do so is a clear sign of

how, at the beginning of his hermeneutical development, the sac

raments lay very much at the periphery of his thinking. It couldbe demonstrated that this negative fact is a symptom of his new

theological approach. For the central position, which he accords to

the Word, is affected by his fundamental theological idea of rev

elation in hiddenness. "Quia adeo abscondita est gloria regni christi

potentia, ut nisi perverbum predicationis auditui manifestetur, nonposs

agnosci, cum in conspectu oculorum maxime contrarium appareat. . . ,

Therefore, it is not correct to argue that for Luther the Word moves

to the center, because for him revelation was identical with a doctrine, and therefore the proclamation of the doctrine mediates the

gift of grace itself, just as the sacraments mediate grace itself. It

was not Luther's view that the Word stands in opposition to the

Catholic sacraments, becoming itselfa sacrament by analogy to the

traditional understanding of sacraments.154 Yet if we get to the bot

tom of the matter, the antithesis becomes all the more radical. "In

this life, we do notpossess the thing itself but testimonies of things, for

faith is not the thing, but an argumentofthings not apparent."155 Withthis, the entire Catholic sacramental system is already tacitly turned


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THE BEGINNINGS OF LUTHER'S HERMENEUTICS 319

bestowed upon them the pathos of his theological thinking! But

what Luther said about the Word, that it is only testimonies, "not

. . . an exhibition of present things but only testimonies of future

things,"156

tolerates no correction through the sacraments, whichwould have elevated them above the Word, so that they were the

exhibition of present things. For: "All our good exists only in Word

and Promise."1571 would not maintain that Luther had consciously

formulated these thoughts in contrast to the prevailing doctrine of

the sacraments. But viewed objectively, they stand in the sharpest

antithesis to it. In his boldly executed interpretation of the concept

of testimony, this observation stands out starkly: "Nothing but

words . . . not the things themselves, but the signs of things."158

Certainly one might immediately think of a reference to the ad

oration of the host, when he says: "Heavenly things cannot be

shown like things present but can only be proclaimed by the

Word."159 But no weight should be given to this. What is decisive,

as Luther formulates it positively, is where then the things remain:

"Because things not apparent are hidden in words through faith, the one

who has the words has allthings through faith, even if hidden."160 Faith,

therefore, corresponds to the Word, just as grace corresponds to thesacraments as the sacramental efficacy. But while sacramental grace

is the thing, faith is not the thing itself, but rather the substanceof future things. Now he who has the Word through faith certainly

does not have nothing; but neither does he merely have some specific

consequence of grace; rather, he simply has everything! If we con

sider how firmly the Catholic doctrine of the sacraments is anchored

in christology, we can say that Luther did not understand the pres

ence of Christ sacramentally,161 but rather eschatologically. Thesense in which this was so shall become clear only later; for now

it is enough to allude to the eschatological tension in his expressions:

"Not in actuality but in hope; not in sight but in faith; not the

exhibition of present things but the testimonies of future things."

We could ask: Was the sacrament not the most appropriate objectto which Luther could have applied his thought on hiddenness

under a contrary? I am familiar with only one passage in the Dictata

where he does that: "the Sacrament of the Eucharist where He ismost completely concealed."162 But there, too, in his characteristic


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rather only in the Word in its correlation to faith does the rec

ognition come that the hiddenness under a contrary is not an ob

jective condition but rather hints at the clamping-together of

christology and existential understanding. And therefore the connection between Word and faith signifies that the relationship to

Christ has something to do with the problem of understanding:

That Christ is Lord we have only by hearing in faith."163 "It is the

nature of the Word to be heard."164

So here the whole dualism is further broken open. What kind

of Word is it then? And what kind of hearing is it? Is it an external

Word, proclaimed vocally and heard by the ear? Or is it an internal

and invisible Word, spoken directly in the heart and heard interiorly?165 If it simply happens to us, then it is certainly a human word

and of the letter. For only when it happens in us is it God's Word

and of the Spirit.166 Upon this hangs the question of the "efficacious

Word." For "the Word of God has motive power above all

things,"167 and is thus not only a "teaching power" but also a "mo

tivating power."168 The antithesis between the external Word as

letter and the internal Word as spirit sometimes seems for Luther

to be stretched right to the breaking point. Yet the tension is notbroken. It does not come to the point of rendering God's speaking

interiorly over against the letter of Scripture. "God uses our words

. . . as tools with which He Himself writes living words in our

hearts."169 Luther has nothing to do with the psychological problem

of how, in general, a word which has been perceived with the senses,

read, or heard can penetrate into the heart. In a formal sense, each

word is able to beget living letters in the heart, "since nothing

could be received into a living subject unless it were living."170

Inthis formal sense, the spirit is certainly always hidden in the letters.

The question, rather, is how, through the literal Word, the Spirit

of God can write such living letters into the heart, letters which

are enlivened by God. Here the idea of hiddenness under a contrary

holds good. In fact: "the spirit is concealed in the letter."171 But,

in this theological sense, the spirit is not concealed in every letter,

but only in the Holy Scripture, because Scripture is the testimony

of Christ. But then the Scripture is not the Word of God in thesense of an objective report. Rather, we can now formulate it suit


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THE BE GI NN ING S OF LUTHER'S HERM ENEU TICS 321

ture whether it becomes letter or spirit for a person. And then it

is obviously the duty of exegesis to disclose the spirit in the letter,

to interpret Scripture not literally but rather spiritually. But does

this not confuse the matter? Is it not so that in the one instance itis a matter of an existential understanding in which the Word of

God encounters me and so the letter becomes the spirit, while in

the other instance the question of exegetical method arises, which

is at the disposal of men? How these two relate to each other, the

understanding in faith (or the non-understanding in faithlessness)

and the method of scriptural exposition, brings the hermeneutical

problem to a crisis.

If we trace the antithesis of spirit and letter to the utter limitsto which Luther takes it, right up to the point where this distinction

meshes with the question of scriptural exposition, the lines threaten

to become inextricably entangled. The concepts of spirit and letter,

along with their parallel concepts, mean for Luther, as we have

made clear, two mutually exclusive ways of understanding exist

ence, namely, existence before God or before the world. What it

means to exist before God (i.e., spiritually) in the hiddenness under

a contrary, is revealed on the Cross and stated through the gospelas the Word of the Cross to the world. Whoever takes offense at

the Word of the Cross falls all the more into living carnally. To

him the Word of the Cross becomes condemnation.172 On the other

hand, the Word of the Cross awakens faith in anyone who bows

before that Word; that is, his existence comes to be one of living

spiritually under the gospel, which is now an acquittal, revealed to

the spiritual but hidden from the carnal.174 That it comes to the

one as well as to the other, namely, that the gospel is understoodeither as folly or as the wisdom of God (which means that the one

stands aloof from the gospel in faithlessness, and from thenceforth

understands himself out of that which is at his own disposal and

seeks his own righteousness; while the other opens himself to the

gospel in faith, understands himself out of that which is not at his

own disposal, and thus allows Christ to be his righteousness; that

to the one the gospel thus becomes a killing letter while to the

other it becomes the life-giving spirit), does not lie in the powerof the one who expounds Scripture.175 So to this extent, the dis


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possibilities, of this Either/Or, which is to say, of the meaning of

the Cross of Christ. To this extent the distinction of spirit and letter

is indeed the diacritical mark which properly orients scriptural ex

position. To the extent that scriptural exposition is not so oriented,such that the Word of the Cross is not illuminated but darkened,

it becomes difficult, if not utterly impossible, for the gospel to

pronounce judgment one way or the other. Or stated more properly,

it reinforces the tendency to remain undisturbed in carnal living;

it suggests that one adapts Scripture to this carnal understanding of

existence and thus places Scripture in the service of his own righ

teousness. Conversely: to the extent that scriptural exposition is

oriented according to this distinction between spirit and letter, andthereby becomes the interpretation of the Word of the Cross, it

expounds the genuinely decisional character of the gospel and serves

(in a way which is entirely beyond the control of the expositor

himself) to arouse either resolute unbelief or faith. There are thus,

in fact, both relevant and irrelevant kinds of scriptural exposition.

And in this sense we seem to be justified in characterizing the

relevant sort (i. e., scriptural exposition which is oriented according

to the distinction between spirit and letter) as spiritual, and theirrelevant sort (i. e., scriptural exposition which obliterates this dis

tinction) as literal or, alternatively, as carnal. But this is providing

that we allow the sense of the words "spiritual" and "literal" (or

"carnal") to be strongly oriented to the Either/Or of these two

understandings of existence which are separated by the Cross of

Christ. Yet we must be careful about the use of these characteri

zations. For they are simply inseparable from other pressing ques

tions which adhere to them. That becomes clear in Luther's

scintillating use of language in the first Lectures On The Psalms. It

is certainly quite instructive to recognize how the problems are

interlinked for Luther, without his yet arriving at a conceptuali

zation which clarifies the problems' connections and guarantees

against a false coalescing. This state of affairs compels us to measure

the infinite fullness of his links of reasoning and formulations

against his manifest intentions. From this I derive the right to distinguish in the way that has already been expounded: Sometimes

th i it l d th lit l h t i ti f t ibiliti


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THE BE GI NNI NG S OF LUTHER'S HERM ENEU TICS 323

ognizing the possibility of these two mutually exclusive under

standings of human existence, the other allowing this knowledge

to go by the board. But now two distinct problems appear.

The Relationship of Faith and Understanding

The first problem is as follows: Can only the person who exists

spiritually know about the possibility of these two mutually exclu

sive understandings of existence? Moreover, can only one who is

himself a believer expound the Scripture rightly? The Dictata offer

rich material for these questions, material which seems to be attunedto a single keynote: Only one who is illumined by the Holy Spirit,

only the believer, can understand and expound the Scripture. Yet

we would make this matter too easy if we felt content with this

information and thereby allowed all further hermeneutical reflec

tions to be truncated. That Luther so interrelates faith and under

standing characterizes the existential thrust of his theological

thought. It is not an inability to draw distinctions, but rather the

power of integration, which impels him not to place theologicalassertions next to each other as separate objects of thought nor to

bring them into a Scholastic system, but rather to lay hold of what

is objectively separated where it all comes together at a single point

and is no longer an object but rather an event, namely in human

existence. And, indeed, in human existence understood as one or

the other of these two ways. And this self-understanding of hu

manity stands, in turn, in an indissoluble correlation to the under

standing of that which encounters humanity. Luther's assertionsabout humanity are chiefly governed by categories of understanding

like sapere (sense), sentire (feeling), cognoscere (knowledge), intelligere

(intelligence), and so forth. But then, if all theological assertions

are understood in their existential thrust, it is a self-evident con

sequence that the anthropological categories in Luther's theological

vocabulary (like caro [flesh], spiritus [spirit], mens [mind], cor[heart],

anima [soul], conscientia [conscience], affectus [affect or emotion], vol

untas [will], intellectus [intellect or understanding], etc.) play a largerole. And therefore, because the theological assertions are set in


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a simple alternative between the spirit of humanity and the Spirit

of God. Certainly there are passages where Luther uses spiritus uni-

vocally as an anthropological category: "Two things are in a person,

spirit and flesh."176

And conversely, there are obviously passageswhere God's Spirit alone is meant. But in the overwhelming ma

jori ty of cases, spiritus is the human spirit of man as enlightened by

the Spirit of God, that is to say, the self-understanding of humanity

as it is oriented to God, human existence before God understood

as such. For: "We all . .. are poor before God, but we do not all

acknowledge the fact."177 This becomes especially clear in the use

of the concept intellectus and its derivatives. We encounter seemingly

contradictory assertions. Usually Luther sets intellectus in the sharpest antithesis to sensus, intelligible things to perceptible things, and

thus understanding becomes a correlative concept to faith or spirit.

On the other hand, Luther can say: "Faith does not enlighten the

understanding; indeed, it blinds it,"178 and "faith does not require

understanding."179 Luther is well aware of the ambivalence of the

concept of intellect, and indeed, of all concepts, depending on the

understanding of existence on which they are based.180 This am

bivalence is also found in Scripture: "Scripture . . . when itspeaks ofthings as they are before God, andwhen [it does so] as they are before

humans."181 Herein is the reason that in the vocabulary of Scripture,

intellectus means a being-determined-by, and not, as in philosophy,

simply a potency. Thus, in its proper biblical sense, intellectus is not

something obtained through philosophy or nature, but only

through theology and grace, namely the knowledge of the meaning

of Christ; more clearly still, it is "the wisdom of the Cross of

Christ."182

But now because faith is a self-understanding whicharises from the encounter with the Word of Scripture, so it is un

derstandable why faith is so tightly bound up with understanding,

and why the spiritual understanding plays so large a role in Luther's

claims as to how one may arrive at an understanding of Scripture.

This has not the slightest thing to do with intellectualism. For

wherever the misunderstanding of faith as a purely intellectual act

suggests itself, Luther plays off emotion against intellect in the

sharpest terms,183 to express the fact that faith affects one's wholeexistence, and particularly one's will. The bold use of anthropol


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THE BE GI NN IN GS OF LUTHER'S HERM ENEU TICS 325

entirely before God, and even to refer all assertions about God to

human existence before God. That is why the expressions in Scrip

ture such as conspectu dei, coram deo, apuddeum, and ante deum are so

abundant.184

Self-understanding before God and knowledge of Godare one and the same. For self-understanding before God is precisely

the opposite ofthat self-observation by which God's and humanity's

relatedness to one another is torn apart in such a way that one

considers only oneself and God considers only himself. To be "in

conspectu dei" certainly means simultaneously that God sees and

humanity is seen, and that humanity sees and God is seen. The

"sight of God" is simultaneously to be understood actively and

passively. "Because [God] sees us; so he makes himselfseen by us."185If we keep in view this kind of theological thinking in Luther, we

will be able to rightly evaluate his many assertions about the right

disposition for understanding Scripture, the necessity of faith, the

spiritual understanding, the conformity of affect, humility, and so

forth. Although echoes of the heritage of mysticism resonate here

(one thinks of such expressions as "rapture" and "ecstasy"), Luther

inserts them in such a fashion as to accentuate the existential thrust

of all theological statements. It would cast everything into a falselight if we made of this something obvious and at one's disposal,

so that the person who reads or interprets Scripture observes, himself

as to his possession of the Spirit, his own humility, how he is affected

and thus attempts to prove himself before others. "Even if the effi

cacious wordofthe gospel stands with the empassionedsoul, itnevertheless

does not [stand] from the empassionedsoul."186 If one tries to make this

existential understanding into a method of exegesis, he has not

understood what the terms "existential" and "before God" mean,nor that being-spiritual is a being-hidden under a contrary. Here

the hermeneutical circle comes into play, which even Luther knows:

"How are we able to become illumined, unless we become blind? And how

will we become blind, unless we are illumined?"187 Whoever attempts

to understand and expound Scripture should take into account all

that Luther says about the relationship of faith and understanding.

But he should not commit the folly of basing the method of his

exegesis upon some alleged unity of faith and understanding whichhe presumes to have found in himself. For we have God's Word


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end and to another. "189 Human existence is "an advance from act to

act" and therefore also "from understanding to understanding, from

faith to faith."190 And this process is nothing other than a perpetual

beginning.191

What was previously spirit for someone is now letterfor him.192 Thus, the trinitarian dogma was spirit to the fourth

century, while to us it is now letter.193 For the acquired understand

ing is always letter in view of the acquiring understanding.194 The

step on which one finds oneself is always letter in light of that

which lies before him.195 This readiness to leave what lies behind

as letter and to stretch oneself out after the spirit;196 to observe

oneself not as the one who illuminates but as the one who is to be

illuminated;197

to know that "every passage in Scripture is to beinfinitely investigated {infinite intelligentie)198all this means to take

Scripture seriously as a testimony, namely, as a "Testimonia eorum,

que nondum intellexisti."199 The knowledge of this dialectic of un

derstanding is "the fear of the Lord which is the beginning of

wisdom."200 Therefore let no one appeal to Luther in support of

the idea that scriptural exegesis is "spiritual" only if the exegete

himself is in possession of the Spirit. For one can speak of a "spiritual

exposition" only in cases where the exposition is oriented by thedistinction between spirit and letter.

The Relationship ofthe Old and New Testaments

The other problem which interlocks with the distinction of spir

itual and literal scriptural exegesis and causes nearly unavoidable

confusion among these concepts is the question of the unity ofScripture. We have established that scriptural exegesis must be ori

ented by the Cross of Christ, and that means by the distinction of

spirit and letter in the sense of two mutually exclusive understand

ings of human existence, if the exegesis wants to be relevant. Yet

is this not begging the question? Is there not something being

imported into the individual scriptural passage which in itself it

does not contain; and if so, is it then still exegesis? Do we not

violate the text if we proceed from the assumption that Scripturehas one and the same perspective in all its parts, namely the Cross


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toward the same thing, however many there are."201 And indeed:

"In Christ all words are one Word, and outside of Christ they are

many and vain."202 It is evidently quite otherwise if we approach

the Scripture and try to prove the accuracy of this thesis exegetically.The issue which traditionally made the unity of Scripture problem

atic and generated the greatest difficulties for Christian exegesis

naturally gave impetus to intensive exegetical efforts in Luther's

exposition of the Psalms as well, namely, the relationship of the

Old and New Testaments. For in the Old Testament, Jews and

Christians struggle against each other, like Esau and Jacob in the

womb of Rebecca.203 If it is said that one must first have the New

Testament in order to understand the Old,204

then it would surelybe conceded to Jewish exegesis that the Old Testament, taken for

itself, leads to this exegesis. But is it not the single correct hermeneutical standpoint to expound the Old Testament purely from

its own contents? How can one justify it hermeneutically to proceed

otherwise in order to prove that Jewish exegesis is a mistaken in

terpretation? Luther even goes so far as to say: "If the Old Testament

could be expounded by human sense without the New Testament,

I would say that the New Testament then is given for nothing."205

This means that the New Testament is the exposition of the Old

Testament; therein its meaning expends itself. Thus, according tothis perspective, which in itself is entirely traditional, the Old and

New Testaments relate to each other like text and exposition. This

means not only that single passages of the Old Testament find their

exposition in the New, but also that the Old Testament as a whole

is text and the New Testament as a whole is exposition. And the

general problem, how text and exposition relate to each other,wherein they are one and wherein they are distinct, is thus the same

as the problem of the unity and the differentiation of the Old and

the New Testaments. Thus, not only does the hermeneutical prob

lem arise for the person who approaches the exposition of the Holy

Scripture, but that problem is inherent in Scripture itself. And indeed, the two-part canon of Scripture, with Old and New Testa

ments, with text and exposition, not only poses the hermeneutical

problem thus, but actually claims according to this understandingto offer the solution to the hermeneutical problem. In the way in


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so to speak, a textbook ofhermeneutics, through the very fact that

the Old and New Testaments stand side by side, appears a peculiar

construction. Certainly, in the history ofscriptural exposition this

at least is confirmed, insofar as the Holy Scripture was taken defacto as a textbook of hermeneutics, but only in the superficial sense

that people saw obliging paradigmatic examples ofexegesis in the

quotation and exposition of Old Testament passages in the New.

Luther, too, in his first Lectures On The Psalms, took every available

opportunity to refer to the exposition which is to be found in the

New Testament of certain passages from the Psalms.206 But this

conception ofScripture as a textbook of hermeneutics was also valid

in the much deeper sense that one employs the categories by whichhe grasps the relationship between the Old and New Testaments

as the controlling hermeneutical categories. Let me connect this

with something said earlier. Already in the New Testament itself,

this relationship of the Old and New was seen according to two

different schemes. The one was that ofprophecy and fulfillment.

It has its widest manifestation in the antithesis between figure (or

shadow) and truth. For not only are the direct prophecies (real or

imagined) grasped, but also the indirect correspondences betweenthe Old and New Testaments (i.e., the allegorical structure of the

Old and New Testaments), that is, that the Old Testament, under

stood as the prophecy of the New Testament, means something

other than what the words say directly. The other scheme is that

of letter and spirit, and primarily signifies the antithesis oflaw and

gospel. Just as the prophecy/fulfillment scheme is based on the idea

of the positive relationship of the Old and New Testaments, though

with a faint antithetical undertone, so the original letter/spiritscheme is based on the very idea of antithesis, and in any case

certainly with a definite synthetic undertone. Now, to the extent

that the main stress was laid upon the positive relationship of the

Old and New Testaments, the prophecy/fulfillment scheme had to

gain the hermeneutical ascendancy, and the letter/spirit scheme

was almost absorbed. That was the case in the ancient church and

the Middle Ages, so that letter and spirit were understood as her

meneutical categories on the basis ofthe figure/fulfillment scheme,but so understood in the sense that "literal" meant literal-historical


15/25


Testament was the allegorical interpretation of the Old. And one

saw a mystery therein, which endowed the Old Testament with a

special halo. We saw that concerning this, Augustine had recog

nized the original sense of letter and spirit, but had not been ableto make it hermeneutically fruitful.

Well, how did Luther deal with this problematic situation? He

worked out the antithesis of the Old and New Testaments much

more rigorously than was done in traditional exegesis, and indeed,

he did so with the concepts of letter/spirit as the characteristics of

two mutually exclusive understandings of human existence. What

we recognized as the core of the great dualism in the first Lectures

On The Psalms, Luther thus saw to be present in the Scripture itself.The relationship of the Old and New Testaments is that of an

tithesis, and indeed, between these two mutually exclusive under

standings of human existence. The people of the Old Testament

and the people of the New Testament relate to each other as flesh

and spirit. The one is due to the birth of the flesh in wrath, the

other to the birth of the spirit in grace.207 Under the Old Testament,

one turned one's face toward earthly things and turned one's back

on Christ.208 While the gospel teaches only spiritual matters, thelaw adapts itself to carnality.209 While the gospel reveals hidden

spiritual sins, the law only worries about the sins which go against

the justice of the flesh.210 And so the antitheses go on. Under the

law man understands himself only before men.211 It mediates only

a worldly sanctity,212 a righteousness of the letter,213 a visible jus

tice.214 One fulfills the law only under compulsion,215 in servile

fear.216 And so, too, only temporal matters are promised.217 The Old

Testament was concerned only with earthly and not spiritualsalvation218 and therefore with a salvation which was granted to the

good and the evil indiscriminately219 and was not at the same time

judgment.220 The Mosaic law writes dead letters in the heart,

namely, a literal salvation and glory.221 Therefore it is the killing

letter.222 Luther uses the sharpest words: "The mandates of Moses

are hateful."223 "In the Law of Moses is neither good word nor

good work."224 Indeed, Moses is merely equated with all the rest

of the lawgivers,225 his law with human laws in general.226 Thereforeit is also transient227 and confined to a definite people.228


16/25


Old Testament allegorization. The traditional understandings of

"literal" and "spiritual," according to which literal simply means

pertaining to letters and words, and spiritual means allegorical, slip

in everywhere. I forego quoting examples of this familiar fact.Rather, all stress must now be laid on the observation that Luther,

though constrained by the tradition, made a decisive start in break

ing the chains of the customary hermeneutic. Already it is notice

able that he accentuates more strongly the negative ring to the

concepts of shadow and figure. That the law is the shadow of truth

and not the truth itself is not a statement which would eliminate

or temper its other characteristic as the killing letter. On the con

trary, both are identical: as the shadow of truth (i.e., as vanity), thelaw is the killing letter.229 The "shadow" is obviously not the mys

terious twilight from which the right to extract an allegorical mean

ing may be derived; rather, Luther understands this to be real

night.230

We thus realize how, in contrast to the exegetical tradition,

the rightly understood distinction of letter and spirit draws to itself

the figure/fulfillment scheme and gives it a new sense. We can

recognize this also from the fact that the concept of "spiritual,"

even where it apparently still means "allegorical," nevertheless already takes on the genuine sense which results from the theology

of the Cross. The "spiritual" (meaning: allegorical) interpretation

is controlled by a "spiritual" exposition, which is spiritual because

it understands how to distinguish between letter and spirit in the

sense of law and gospel.

When Luther says that with spiritual eyes one should see in the

Mosaic law the law of faith lying hidden and closed, then he ob

viously has in mind the current familiar thought of allegorical hiddenness. And yet, simultaneously connected with this is the entirely

different thought which orients the removal of the veil and the

bringing-to-light of the unveiled toward the distinction of law and

gospel.231 As Luther increasingly brings to center stage the con

nection between the figure/fulfillment scheme and the distinction

between the two mutually exclusive understandings of human ex

istence, he gradually dispels the impression that this scheme pertains

to a mystery which is to be revealed allegorically: "Every law andhuman justice is a shadow and figure of that true justice which is


17/25


to suppose that the thought of hiddenness under a contrary comes

into conflict with the thought of allegorical hiddenness, and ulti

mately even leads to its removal. But in order really to recognize

this, we must still bore one level deeper. The figure/fulfillmentscheme in the ordinary sense understands the distinction of Old

and New Testament as a gradation. There is something present in

the Old Testament which therefore entitles the lines of connection

with the New Testament to be drawn out. This thought is also

found in Luther. "The Law was the beginning of the Gospel, which

perfects the Law."233 And then the allegorical exposition appears as

a legitimate means of making this process visible, as the suitable

method by which to treat the Old Testament so that it thereforebecomes the New Testament. "The law may not be spiritual except

through a transmutation and an exposition offigures."234But Lutheris quite aware that a real transformation of the Old Testament into

the New is not a matter of exegetical method, but rather takes place

through Christ. "Out of the letters of the law, indeed, out of an

informed lump, the Lord shapes and makes the law [into] Spirit:

he reduces the letter into Spirit."235 And therefore the transfor

mation of the Old Testament into the New takes place not just byan allegorical reinterpretation but rather by a conversion into some

thing completely opposite. "Everything which was in glory in terms

ofthe law, he changed into disgrace. "23e Indeed, all this was a figure

of internal and spiritual things. But precisely because it was, it had

to yield before, and become polluted and profaned by, the coming

of what it had signified. Indeed, Luther extends this thought even

further: "Even if today all things which are beautiful, elegant, strong,

and goodin the world mostly aptly signify spiritual things, nevertheless,it will happen that they must be spit out, and their opposites chosen. "

237

Here it becomes clear that the lines from the Old Testament to the

New Testament stretch over the Cross and therefore proceed from

itto put it picturesquelycrosswise. Thus, Christ makes the law

into the gospel. The way from the Old Testament to the New leads

"through the killing anddeath, literally, ofboth shadows and figures."238

The destruction of the body of Christ at his death on the Cross,

the destruction of the synagogue, and the destruction of the carnalman are all one event which spring up from the same root.239 But


18/25


through the death of the old. Thus is the agreement of the Old

and New Testaments to be understood: "the Old and the New Law

come together, just as the old man is slain and the new man is

revived. . . . And so they come together amicably."241

And what is it that is conducive to the correct exposition of the

Old Testament? Luther says repeatedly: "The spiritually understood

Law is identical with the Gospel."242 Now does that mean that the

Old Testament allegorically interpreted is identical with the gospel?

Obviously not! It means, rather, that the law, understood as the

killing letter, is one with the gospel; and conversely, that the "lit

erally-understoodlaw"243 is the same understanding of the law which

finds the law to be sufficient and does not recognize it as the killingletter. So, are there then two possible ways to understand the old

law? Indeed so! Yet these two possibilities of understanding are not

divided in such a way that, besides the literal sense, the letter still

also has an allegorical sense, but rather in such a way that man can

understand his relationship to one and the same law in two quite

different ways. It is one and the same state of affairs, namely, the

old law as the killing letter, in which two understandings of human

existence part company. The one does not understand himself tobe killed by the law. But precisely then the law is, in fact, the

killing letter. The other does understand himself to be killed by

the law. But precisely then the killing letter points the way to the

life-giving spirit. That the old law is the promise of the new law

is thus not based on the fact that besides being of the killing letter,

it is something different from it. Instead, its character as the killing

letter is its promissory character. For "the Old Law understood

spiritually is nothing but the crucifixion of the flesh."244

Luthertries to make this clear with a very graphic picture. The statement

in Psalm 103:2 (104:2), "You stretch heaven out like a tent," Luther

interprets allegorically of the old law. It divides between the waters

above the firmament and below the firmament, namely between

spirit and letter. The Jews, who stand under the law and therefore

only have its inferior parts, only see its concave side. Conversely,

Christians, who stand above the law and therefore have its superior

parts, recognize its convex side.245 Both possibilities of understanding the law therefore do not fall apart like its literal and allegorical


19/25


because it is the killing letter. One might immediately veil this state

of affairs with allegorical meaning. The insight into the distinction

of letter and spirit in the sense of law and gospel thus has her

meneutical consequences. It compels us to abandon the allegoricalinterpretation of the Old Testament.

But are we not making a gross mistake? Must we not sharply

distinguish between law and Old Testament? As much as Luther

does this later, in the first Lectures On The Psalms the concepts are

still enmeshed for him. Old and New Testaments stand against

each other as old law and new law. And yet, in these very lectures,

the way is paved for the later distinction between law and the Old

Testament in consequence of his correct differentiation betweenspirit and letter. Luther recognizes that already in the time of the

Old Testament itself, both understandings of human existence were

struggling with each other. The Pharisaic understanding of the law

opposed the prophetic.246 The former took the law only as letter;

that is, their understanding of human existence was defined by the

law as something perfect. They had their justification in the law.

The latter, on the contrary, had both the spirit and the letter at

once; that is, their understanding of human existence was definedby the law as something imperfect, and therefore as passing away.

They did not attempt to achieve justification through the law, but

rather prayed for it, "as the letter retreats, the Spirit advances; the

veil is removed, the face appears; Christ comes and Moses leaves."247

So they had not the naked letter, but rather a letter which was

hiding the things of the spirit.248 And yet Luther made a distinction:

they did not have a revealed faith, but rather only a simple literal

faith;249

that is, they did have the Spirit in simple hiddenness, yetstill not in hiddenness under a contrary.250 Furthermore, Luther

begins to understand that the time of the law and the time of grace

are not simply chronologically successive,251 that even the gospel

can become for someone an "impossible law."252 For "until now

the one who is under sin is also under the law."253 This yields a

deep insight into the relationship of the Old and New Testaments

and into the necessity of both Testaments for the church. Psalm

103:10 (104:10) says this: "You cause fountains to spring forth inthe valleys, that water may flow between the mountains." Luther


20/25


of the Old Testament is the glory of the world; the peak of the

New Testament is the glory of heaven. And yet these two come

together in the bottom of the same valley, in one root of truth. In

this valley the church finds itself in this life: "In this life one livesin between two mountains namely, between the corresponding old

and new law."254 Therefore the church is reminded that its existence

is a pilgrimage, an existence between the times, that is, between

the time of the law and the time of grace. For just as the people

of the Old Testament were shadows of the future people, so too,

the present church is the shadow of the future church.255 For "shad

ows" do not signify something static, but rather movement and

even destruction.256

As the way of the Old Testament leads to theNew, so the way of the church also leads toward its fulfillment

only over the Cross of Christ.

Has something therefore changed with respect to Old Testament

exposition? Indeed, in the first Lectures On The Psalms, Luther be

lieves it is necessary to emphasize the prophetic character of the

Old Testament by means of allegorization. And even if he, along

with Faber Stapulensis, understands the prophetic meaning of the

Psalms christologically as the literal sense, this still does not overcome allegory in principle; on the contrary, it is the alleged legi

timation for it. But amid this christological interpretation, which

is so strongly oriented by the Cross, the hermeneutical change

breaks in. For if the decisive connection of the Old and New Tes

taments lies in the Cross of Christ, such that precisely there a

revolutionary change in one's understanding of human existence

takes place, and precisely there the law is brought to light as law,

then one can confidently, and of necessity, expound the Old Testament literally and keep free from all allegorical whitewashing, so

that the Old is really seen to be the Old; and we must leave it only

to the literal understanding to determine to what extent a new

understanding of human existence already announces itself in the

Old Testament which has an inkling that the law is the killing

letter. Thus, Luther's struggle with the relationship of spirit and

letter in the first Lectures On The Psalms had already laid the ground

for the hermeneutical change which first became visible in 1516,and even then, not with all its practical consequences.


21/25

THE BE GI NN IN GS OF LUTHER 'S HER MENE UTI CS 335

N O T E S

139. 55:2.1, 73.13-15 (3:52-

25

f)

140. 55:1.1, 86.7 (3:93.12).

141. 3:i24.3off.

142. 3:4ii.8f.

143. 4:83.i6ff.

144. 4:449.35^

145 y-302.ig{.

146. 3:203.22f.

*47- 3:35

8-

29

f-

148. 3:112.25.

149. 3:463.15fr.

150. CF. 4:82.14fr.

151. 3:166.22.

152. 3:150.16fr. and 270.

53 4539-4:451

26

54 Certainly it is correct that in the Reformation the Word of God takes the place

which in the Roman Church is taken by the sacraments. Luther himselfcan later designate

the effect of the word as sacramental in order to demonstrate the viewpoint of the efficacy

of the Word. But it must not be overlooked that the difference from the Catholic conception

lies already in the understanding of the nature of sacramental efficacy.

*55 3: 2

793-32

156. 4:310.29. E. Iserloh (see above n. 31) 78 in his critique of my explanation objects:

"But does in the sacraments an exhibition of the present things take place?" I cannot enterhere into the history of Catholic sacramental terminology. But that the term "exhibit"occurs exactly in the context of the doctrine of the eucharist and a justification of the adorationof the Host and of the Corpus Christi Procession can be attested by mag Tri. Sess. XIII can.8 (it is not important that this text is of a later date than the passages in Luther underdiscussion). It speaks explicitly of Christ as exhibited in the eucharist (Denz. 1658 [890]).In can. 6 it sayscompare this with my remark below at n. 159: If someone should saythat in the holy sacrament of the eucharist Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, is not tobe adored also in the external cult of worship, and is not to be venerated with an appropriatefestive celebrity, and is not to be carried around in the processions according to the praise

worthy and universal rite and custom of the Holy Church, or not publicly to be presentedto the people so that he should be adored, and that those who adore him are idolaters: lethim be condemned. (Denz. 1656 [888]). Unfortunately Iserloh does not discuss my contrasting of the statements of Luther with the piety and theology of the sacraments whichstand behind the text quoted. But in my opinion, it cannot be set aside with the rhetoricalquestion, "But does in the sacraments an exhibition of the present things take place?"

157. 4:272.i6f.158. 4:376.13^159. 4:272.17^160. 4:376.15^

161. Here it must be emphasized, in harmony with n. 154, that it is not in contradictionwith this when Luther following Augustinian terminology, calls Christ a sacrament.162. 3:124.37^


22/25

336 L U T H E R A N Q U A R T E R L Y

167. 4:32 I

-35f-

168. 4:284.32^

169. 3:256.10^ A Br an de nb ur g (see above n. 31) 146, in his refer ence to th e scho lion on

Ps . 44, misses the fact that Luther exactly also in this passage does not surrender the necessary

connection between letter or the outwardly proclaimed word and spirit or the living wordsin the heart. This is so despite the theological critique against being satisfied with the mere

letter. To characterize Luther's conception as "distrust of the biblical letter" distorts the

matter completely.

17 3:4 5

6-

23

f-

171. 3:256.28.

172. C F . 3:266.33^ and 4:354.32^

173. Cf. 4:115.4.J74 4:3974

1"

75 3

:255-4iff.

176. 4:109.i3f.77 3

:393-3

2 f-

178 4:35

6-

23

f-

9 4:356

4

i8o. 3:400.16fr.

181. 4:490.if.

182. 3:176.36., 507.360.; 4:324.16.

183. 4:356.106.

184. 3:4797~9

185. 4:

3 ^ ~1 1 2

^

86. 4:233-4 - Sc hw ar z (see above . 6) 184 . 33o correctly has directed attention to

the fact that Luther uses the term "passio" only in the negative qualification of the sinful

passions and that in the context in which the above quotation is cited the term "anima

passionata" is interpreted erroneously in the good sense. Although the understanding is to

be co rrec te d in su ch a wa y that there is here no al lu si on to t he sp ir it ual pass ions in Gerson's

linguistic usage, one must consider the followi ng: Lut her contrasts in the entire context ,

beginning at 230 .8, t he virtue of Go d wh i c h as such is sp ir itu al and t he virtue of humans

wh i ch as su ch is ca rn al (especia lly 231.116.) so that even a religiosity which is autonomous

toward God would be carnal and not be derived from Zion (this is in the interpretation of

Ps . 109 [uo]:2i) but from the confusion, i.e., from Babylon, which comes about through the

passions of wrath and others (233.3^).

187. 4:84.29^188. 4:283.26.

189. 4:362.36-38.

190. 4:39

8^

I91 4:35

5"> 246.38^; 4:342.iif.

192. 4:3I9-3

f f-

*93 4365

-

3

194 4:3924^

95 4 : 32

2 6

4:345-33^ 4:3I9-

I o f f -

196. 4:32 0

- 3f f

-

197. 4:320.146e.

198. 4:3i8.4of., 365.27^

199. 4:319.34-320.1.


23/25

T H E B E G I N N I N G S O F L U T H E R ' S H E R M E N E U T I C S

24- 3

:373-3

of-

205. 55:1.1, 6.26f. (3-.12.29f.).

206. 55:1.1,100.116. (3:99.236.). 3:119.356, 224.25., 245.29., 432-

I5

ff-> 435-

27

f 44

560.46., 564.76; 4:141.i6f., 167.366, 433.4if., 468.226, 469.296, 492.26., 507.216.

2 0 7 3 : 5 9 o 1 - 1 2

208. 3:608.36

209. 55:2.1, 115.96. (3:97.186.).

210. 4:1.246., 51.31.

211. 3:116.56

212. 3:286.3.

213. 3:285.22.

214 3:455-

29

f-

215 4:233.226

216. 4:69.256

217. 3:561.66.

218. 3:3 3

6- 3 3

f' 4:164.186.

219 3:34i-i3

f f-

220. 4:245.236.

221. 3:456.14-16.

222. 4:285.39.

223. 4:286.27.

224. 3:257.146

225. 4:2.286

226. 4:1.246.

227. 4:237-216

228. 4:323.216.

229. 3:164.22-26.

23 3: 2

4 3 - 38

231. 4:35-I9

f f-

232. 3:129.206

233 3: 6 o

5 2 1

234 4:354

23 5 4:97-35

f-

236 4:452

23 7 4 : 4 5 4 - 6 .

238. 4 4732^

23 9 4 : 4 7 -

2 l f f ' 49-

24ff.

240. 4:4739

241. 4:176.28-30 (emphasis mine).

242. 55:1.1, 92.196 (3:96.266).

243- 5 5

: i I> 9

2-

I7

f- (3:96-25).

244. 4:174.176

245. 4:174.296.

246. 55:1.1, 92.2ofF. (3:96.2 76e.) .

247. 4:310.386

248. 4:251.4.
http://3-.12.29f/http://3-.12.29f/


24/25

338 LU TH ER AN QUARTER LY

253. 4:61.13.

254. 4:179.306., 180.66

255. 3:608.286

256. 3:638.166.


25/25

^ s

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