Luther's Two Kingdoms Revisited

8/12/2019 Luther's Two Kingdoms Revisited

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Luther's Two Kingdoms Revisited: A Response to Reinhold Niebuhr's Criticism of LutherAuthor(s): Brent W. SocknessSource: The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring, 1992), pp. 93-110Published by: on behalf of Journal of Religious Ethics, IncStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40015143 .Accessed: 31/10/2013 04:51

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LUTHER'S TWO KINGDOMS REVISITEDA Response to Reinhold Niebuhr's

Criticism of Luther

Brent W. Sockness

Abstract

A close reading of Luther's reatise on Temporal uthority nd a review ofthe most pertinent Luther scholarship how why Luther's doctrine ofthe two kingdoms remains notoriously difficult o interpret. ReinholdNiebuhr's riticism of Luther n TheNature nd Destiny f Man s repre-sentative of widespread discontent with Luther's argument, butNiebuhr misses the soteriological point of Luther's distinction betweenthe two kingdoms and the significance of salvation or life in society.Ironically, Niebuhr must cite Luther n such a way as to confuse the

kingdomsn order to

supporthis

chargehat Luther's

positioneads to

"quietism" nd "defeatism."

The task of interpreting and evaluating Luther's two kingdomsdoctrine in the twentieth century is notoriously difficult and contro-versial. To begin with, a survey of interpretations of the doctrinesuggests that the term "two kingdoms" lacks a stable referent in Lu-ther's writings. Some interpret two kingdoms in a broad sense andthereby encompass the fundamental distinction in Luther betweenthe human's relation coram deo and the human's relation coramhominibus. Others restrict the notion of two

kingdomsto Luther's

political ethics, i.e., his understanding of the relationship of theChristian vis-a-vis the state. Furthermore, the secondary literaturevacillates between the formulas "two kingdoms" and "two govern-ments," undecided as to which term represents best what Luthermeant. The former term generally denotes a more dualistic under-standing of Luther, while the latter term emphasizes the unity ofGod's rule over creation. Add to this the specter of National Social-ism and the Holocaust which by implication (R. Niebuhr 1943, 195)or argument (McGovern 1941; Wiener 1945) looms in the back-

ground of nearly every attempt to understand not to mention criti-cize, defend, or appropriate Luther's doctrine, and the task ofinterpretation and evaluation becomes overwhelming.

93

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94 The Journal of Religious Ethics

Much of thecontroversy surrounding

the twokingdoms

doctrinehas its basis in Luther's writings themselves. To show that this is so,I will offer my own analysis of the doctrine by carefully examiningLuther's 1523 treatise, Temporal uthority: To What Extent t Should BeObeyed. The point of this analysis is not simply to rehearse what Lu-ther wrote but rather to highlight the complexity of Luther's argu-ment as it is found in a single treatise. Having done this, I willproceed to the broader issue of development in Luther's two king-doms doctrine, drawing upon the differing views of HeinrichBornkamm, Paul Althaus, and F. Edward Cranz. By then it should be

clear why interpretation of Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms isso difficult. The second part of this essay will examine ReinholdNiebuhr's treatment of Luther in The Nature and Destiny of Man as arepresentative twentieth-century criticism of the two kingdoms doc-trine. An attempt will be made to evaluate Niebuhr's criticism on thebasis of historical accuracy and fairness to Luther. In the end we willsee that some of the most damning criticisms of Luther have theirbasis in a fundamental and frequent misunderstanding of Luther'stheology. Specifically, Niebuhr must misrepresent Luther by citinghim in such a way as to confuse the kingdoms in order to make his

case that Luther's theology and ethics lead to "quietism" and"defeatism."

I. The Dynamism of the Two Kingdoms Doctrine

Although the treatise Temporal uthority s not Luther's last wordconcerning the two kingdoms doctrine, it is his most careful, system-atic, and cool-headed attempt to explicate the nature of responsibleChristian existence in a sinful world. Like many of Luther's writings,Temporal uthority was written in response to a critical event in thebirth of the Reformation. After Luther's excommunication in 1521,several rulers issued orders forbidding their subjects to own or readLuther's books. In particular, Luther's translation of the New Testa-ment was banned and its surrender demanded. The particular ques-tion concerning whether a Christian should recognize this decree liesjust beneath the surface of Luther's treatise. More significant, how-ever, are the larger issues that the ban of Luther's writings broughtinto view. Namely, by what right does human government exerciseits authority? What are the limits of this governmental power? Andwhat responsibilities do Christians possess vis-a-vis secular

government?Characteristically, Luther turns to Scripture for guidance. Whathe finds is an exegetical challenge: namely, how is the Christian to



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Luther's Two Kingdoms Revisited 95

reconcile twoconflicting

sets of commands in theScriptures

con-cerning the Christian use of government and coercion in response toevil? On the one hand, Luther notes, "we must provide a sound ba-sis for the civil law and sword so no one will doubt that it is in theworld by God's will and ordinance" (1523, 85). To support this Lu-ther appeals to Romans 13 and 1 Peter 2:13-14 as clear proof ofGod's institution of the governing authorities. In the Old TestamentLuther finds similar warrants in Genesis 9:6 and in Exodus 21:14 and21:23ff. passages in which retribution is commanded for acts ofmurder. To substantiate further the divine source of secular author-

ity, Luther argues from the silence of John the Baptist when he ex-horts the soldiers to be content with their wages in Luke 3:14.Luther concludes his proof-texting: "Hence, it is certain and clearenough that it is God's will that the temporal sword and law be usedfor the punishment of the wicked and the protection of the upright"(1523, 87). Other biblical passages, however, appear to legislate justthe opposite, especially many verses from Christ's Sermon on theMount. Luther refers specifically to Matthew 5:25, 5:38, 5:40, 5:44;Romans 12:19; and 1 Peter 3:9. These passages call for friendship,self-denial, and passivism in the face of violence and oppression.

Summarizing, Luther writes, "These and similar passages would cer-tainly make it appear as though in the New Testament Christianswere to have no temporal sword" (1523, 87).

Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms is a solution to this biblicaltension. By distinguishing between the kingdom of God and thekingdom of the world, Luther is able to steer a course between Romeand the radical reformers. Luther argues that the Roman positiondoes not take Christ's radical commands in the Sermon on theMount seriously enough. He reproaches Rome for interpretingthese commands merely as counsels of perfection, thus dividingChristians into two classes, the perfect and the imperfect. In con-trast, the "enthusiasts" in a sense take Christ's words too seriously;they demand either a flight from or transformation of this world. Lu-ther's solution is to make a sharp distinction that allows both sets ofbiblical passages to speak with authority. Like the law/gospel dis-tinction, the distinction between two kingdoms serves as a herme-neutical key that allows Luther to harmonize conflicting passages byassigning them to their appropriate function and sphere. For Lu-ther, confusion of the two kingdoms is at best bad theology and atworst the work of the devil.



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luther's complex use of the concept

In Temporal uthority he two kingdoms are first presented as socialaggregates. Luther writes: "We must divide the children of Adamand all mankind into two classes, the first belonging to the kingdomof God, the second to the kingdom of the world" (1523, 88). Themembers of the kingdom of God are the true believers in Christ.These people need no secular sword or law because the Holy Spiritis in their hearts instructing them to suffer every wrong and do everyright. True Christians need no law because, being righteous, theyfreely (like good trees bearing good fruit) do more than the law de-mands. The kingdom of the world, in contrast, is comprised of non-Christians or merely nominal Christians. The vast majority of hu-mankind falls into this second class. Accordingly, God has ordainedthe secular sword in order to restrain their wickedness and maintainorder in the world. Here Luther introduces the notion of two gov-ernments, which corresponds to his idea of two kingdoms: "For thisreason God has ordained two governments: the spiritual, by whichthe Holy Spirit produces Christians and righteous people underChrist; and the temporal, which restrains the un-Christian andwicked so that no thanks to them they are obliged to keep stilland to maintain an outward peace" (1523, 91). As I mentioned ear-lier, there has been considerable debate over which of these terms,two governments or two kingdoms, best represents Luther's posi-tion. I will examine this below. For now, it will suffice to note thatthe language of governments and kingdoms is intermingled andoften interchangeable in Luther's treatise. More important than thisterminological instability is Luther's insistence that both kingdomsor governments are necessary: "For this reason [i.e., peace and or-der] one must carefully distinguish between these two governments.Both must be

permittedto

remain;the one to

produce righteous-ness, the other to bring about external peace and prevent evil deeds.Neither one is sufficient in the world without the other" (1523, 92).

Having made this distinction, Luther can return to his two sets ofscriptural passages with new insight. Christ's words in Matthew 5mean that Christians should not use the law or the sword among hem-selves. Indeed, if the whole world were truly Christian, law and swordwould be superfluous. Interestingly, although the sword was or-dained by God because of the wickedness of those in the kingdom ofthe world, its use is not restricted to members of that kingdom. This

is so because in a sinful world, secular law and the sword becomeinstruments of love which Christians may use to serve their neigh-bors. For the Christian who is freed from self-concern by the justifi-



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cationgranted

ingrace

andgrasped by faith,

life on earth is a lifelived for others. Given the wickedness of the world, Christians areobligated to serve the state as they perform all other works of love -not out of their own need, but solely out of the need of theirneighbors.

Here I judge that the notion of two kingdoms undergoes its firsttransformation in meaning. Having begun as a distinction betweentwo classes of people, two kingdoms now refers to two modes of be-havior, active in a single Christian, corresponding to the distinctionbetween acts in behalf of oneself (self-denial) and loving acts in be-

half of others (justice). "In what concerns you and yours," Lutherwrites, "you govern yourself by the Gospel and suffer injustice to-ward yourself as a true Christian; in what concerns the person orproperty of others, you govern yourself according to love and toler-ate no injustice toward your neighbor. The gospel does not forbidthis; in fact, in other places it actually commands it" (1523, 96).Thus, the Christian is obligated to satisfy the requirements of bothmodes of action. The term two kingdoms has taken on newmeaning.

In part 2 of Luther's treatise, his examination of the limits of secu-lar authority further transforms the meaning of two kingdoms andtwo governments. The kingdom of God now refers to the humansoul over which God alone rules. The worldly kingdom, in turn, isthe external bodily existence of humans. Luther writes: "The tem-poral government has laws which extend no further than to life andproperty and external affairs on earth, for God cannot and will notpermit anyone but himself to rule over the soul. Therefore, wherethe temporal authority presumes to prescribe laws for the soul, itencroaches upon God's government and only misleads souls and de-stroys them" (1523, 105). Here the two kingdoms come closest tothe fundamental distinction in Luther between one's relationshipcoram deo and one's relationship coram hominibus. Before God, in mat-ters that concern salvation only, the Word of God is authoritative.Salvation is a matter of the inner person, the heart, which only Godcan know, judge, and change. Thus it is folly when the emperor orprinces, prodded by the pope and his bishops, attempt to coercefaith. "For faith is a free act, to which no one can be forced. Indeed,it is a work of God in the spirit, not something which outward au-thority should compel or create" (1523, 108).

Luther charges both the Church of Rome and the princes withoverstepping the limits of their respective kingdoms by, in effect,trading roles in the two governments that God has ordained. Here



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Luther isprotesting

the secularpower

of the medieval church andthe state's illegitimate involvement in spiritual matters, specificallythe ban of the New Testament in many territories. "Thus, theyneatly put the shoe on the wrong foot: they rule the souls with ironand the bodies with letters, so that worldly princes rule in a spiritualway, and spiritual princes rule in a worldly way" (1523, 116). In thiscontext the distinction between the two kingdoms (or between thetwo governments) refers to the proper relationship between churchand state.

We are now in a position to summarize the transformation of the

meaning of two kingdoms that we have traced in the first two parts ofTemporal uthority. In part 3, the two kingdoms fade into the back-ground as Luther turns to the task of giving practical advice toprinces who wish to be Christian.) Luther first uses the term to de-note two antithetical classes of human beings: Christians and non-Christians. At this point Luther shows his strongest affinity to Au-gustine's two cities, insofar as the two kingdoms refer to two types ofpersons, those who live according to God and those who live accord-ing to men (see Bornkamm 1966, 19-28). Next, the differentiation oftwo kingdoms implies the distinction between the passivity of the

Christian concerning his or her own welfare in contrast to the Chris-tian's loving activity on behalf of the neighbor. A third meaningemerges in part 2 of the treatise where two kingdoms refers to thecontrast between inner and external aspects of individuals, betweenthe soul and the bodily, earthly concerns of life, between existencecoram deo and existence coram hominibus. Finally, Luther uses twokingdoms as a way of speaking about the correct relationship be-tween the activities and responsibilities of the church and the state.We can conclude that even in this single treatise, Luther's notion oftwo kingdoms is highly flexible and fluid. It does not permit a simpleand stable definition but, rather, includes a constellation of mean-ings that are dependent on the specific point Luther is trying tomake.

To the fluidity of Luther's terminology we can add another com-plicating factor that has for some time been the subject of contro-versy in the secondary literature: the relation and relativeimportance of the concepts kingdom {Reich) and government (Regi-ment) (Bornkamm 1966, 2-3, 17-18; Cargill Thompson 1984, 39-53).In reaction to dualistic interpretations of Luther's doctrine, in which

the term two kingdoms was employed to imply a complete autonomyof secular affairs from the life of the Christian and the rule of God, anumber of Luther scholars, mostly from Scandinavia, have suggested



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that twogovernments

is the moreappropriate

term forexpressingthe unity and effectiveness of God's will in the secular and spiritual

realms of the world. However, as Heinrich Bornkamm has argued,kingdom and government should neither be separated from norplayed off against each other. Luther employs both terms, some-times with a recognizable difference in meaning, other times almostinterchangeably. When there is a difference in connotations, theterm kingdom expresses the idea of a realm or domain of God's lord-ship, while government conveys the notion of God's mode or meansof lordship. Luther, however, does not pedantically adhere to this

usage, so it is counter-productive for his interpreters to make toomuch of it. Bornkamm states the problem succinctly: "Even in theplaces where one meaning is emphasized, the other is always con-tained in it" (1966, 17).

CONTROVERSY ABOUT LUTHER'S MATURE POSITION

Having examined one pivotal treatise in which Luther writes oftwo kingdoms, we must now take up the question of the developmentof this doctrine. Interpretations of Luther's two kingdoms are highly

dependent upon the interpreter's judgment concerning which textscontain Luther's "mature position." To demonstrate the complexityof this issue, I will briefly present three different opinions.

According to Bornkamm (1966), much misrepresentation of Lu-ther's two kingdoms doctrine has arisen because it has been con-ceived primarily in an abstract and systematic fashion, withoutregard for the concrete problems to which Luther was responding.Often Luther is unfairly quoted out of the historical and theologicalcontext in which his utterances were imbedded. To correct these un-historical interpretations, Bornkamm places Luther's doctrine of the

two kingdoms within the context of both the particular historical sit-uation that prompted Luther to develop his doctrine and the largerframework of Luther's theology. In doing so, Bornkamm makes animportant historical judgment at the very beginning of his essaynamely, that Temporal uthority epresents Luther's mature positionon the two kingdoms doctrine. He writes:

The concrete historical question which demanded an answer from Lu-ther, and which he answered with the distinction between the two king-doms, is most clearly evident in his treatise, Temporal uthority: To What

Extent t Should Be Obeyed 1523). I believe it will not be without value tosearch out once more the particular point of departure and the innerunity in this mature presentation of his doctrine, in order that from this



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toget away

fromdefining

the twogovernments

in terms of twogroups, Christians and non-Christians. Consequently Luther canstate more precisely how the Christian exists in two realms and isrelated to two governments.

Finally, Paul Althaus (1972) also traces a change in approach inLuther's understanding of kingdoms and governments. The essenceof this change, argues Althaus, is a movement in Luther's thoughttoward a more positive and inclusive notion of secular government.Whereas in Temporal uthority ecular government is understood pri-marily in negative terms as the punitive and coercive power of the

state, Luther later includes under this rubric such things as marriageand ownership of property. No longer can Luther correlate seculargovernment solely with the wicked; rather, secular governmentcomes to be perceived as a blessing of God which preserves theearthly life of Christians and non-Christians alike. "No longer can itbe said that Christians do not need secular government for their ownpersons. And after this time Luther no longer makes this kind ofstatement" (Althaus 1972, 53).

These three different judgments concerning the development andmaturation of Luther's thought about the two kingdoms need not be

understood as completely conflicting accounts. Bornkamm is essen-tially correct when he states that Luther's thought on this matter wasnever modified in its undamentals Indeed, I believe it can be arguedthat the development that Cranz and Althaus trace is simply theworking out of tensions nascent in Temporal uthority. In any case,this controversy provides further evidence of the complexity of Lu-ther's thought and of the complications that beset the task ofinterpretation.

II. Niebuhr's CritiqueReinhold Niebuhr's criticism of Luther is not limited to Luther's

doctrine of two kingdoms but addresses Luther's ethics as a whole.However, since social and political ethics are Niebuhr's primary con-cern, his criticism quickly focuses on the two kingdoms doctrine. Ihave chosen Reinhold Niebuhr's analysis for discussion because hisobjections are representative of the kind of criticism typically aimedat Luther by Christian ethicists whose training and interests lie pri-marily in religious social ethics rather than in historical or systematictheology. The tendency, I think, is to isolate too quickly an ethical

program and thereby overlook the primarily theological thrust of Lu-ther's teaching on the two kingdoms. The result is to undervalueboth the soteriological intent of Luther's distinction between the



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kingdomsand the radical

implicationof salvation for the moral life

that marks the distinctiveness and novelty of Luther's ethics.Niebuhr begins his analysis in The Nature and Destiny f Man by not-

ing some features of Luther's theology and ethics that he finds at-tractive. Luther's understanding of Christian agape is of particularinterest. Niebuhr writes: "Luther comprehends the whole beautyand power of Christian agape, particularly its transcendent freedomover all the prudential considerations of natural ethical attitudes"(1943, 186). He "displays the most profound understanding of themeaning of Christian agape, particularly of its completely disinter-

ested motives" (1943, 187). Nonetheless, Niebuhr quickly goes onthe offensive. His first charge is that there are "quietistic tenden-cies" in Luther's ethics: "Sometimes he lapses into mystic doctrinesof passivity or combines quietism with a legalistic conception of theimputation of righteousness. 'Without works' degenerates into'without action' in some of his strictures against the 'righteousness ofworks' " (1943, 187-88). To substantiate this charge Niebuhr imme-diately cites the following passage from the preface to Luther's 1535Lectures on Galatians:

This most excellent righteousness of faith . . . which God throughChrist mputest o us without works, s neither political nor ceremonial,nor the righteousness f God's aw, nor consisteth n works, but is cleancontrary: hat is to say, a mere assive Niebuhr's mphasis] righteous-ness. . . . For in this we work nothing unto God, but only receive andsuffer another to work n us, that is to say, God. Therefore t seemethgood to me to call this righteousness of faith, or Christian ighteous-ness, the passive righteousness cited 1943, 188].

Niebuhr's charge of quietism is by no means original. It is as oldas the first Catholic rebuttals of Luther's

theologyand is based on

the same faulty inference. From Luther's strong insistence on thepassivity of the believer coram deo, it is inferred that passivity and in-difference characterize the stance of the Christian coram hominibus. fthis is a "tendency" in "the Lutheran position," it cannot find sup-port in the reformer himself. l The careful reader of Luther discov-ers that throughout his "reformed" writings, faith is redefined andunderstood in such a way that while it is indeed passive before God,it is always active in the world. Here one need only recall the jubilantactivism of the Christian depicted in two of Luther's most familiar

writings, The Freedom of Christian (1520) andTwo Kinds

of Righteousness(1519). Both treatises ground an effusive and selfless service of theneighbor (works of love or "active righteousness") in the prior gra-



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ciousforgiveness

of God inJesus

Christ(faith

or"passiverighteousness").

Niebuhr's citation from Luther's Lectures n Galatians, however, issielective and quite misleading. Just two pages after the above-quoted passage, Luther gets around to defending the importance ofgood works: "I am saying this in order that no one may suppose thatwe reject or prohibit good works, as the papists falsely accuse us be-cause they understand neither what they themselves are saying norwhat we are teaching" (Luther 1535, 7). In this instance Luthercould say the same about Niebuhr who has taken Luther's statements

about Christian existence before God and insinuated that a similarpassive relationship is operative in the Christian's commerce withothers in society.2 Ironically, Niebuhr has cited Luther so as to con-fuse the two kingdoms

Niebuhr locates a further weakness in Luther's ethic in Luther'sidea of the relation of grace to the law. He writes:

Luther's vision of the "love, oy and peace" which the redeemed soulhas in Christ, s of an ecstatic ranscendence ver all the contradictionsof history, ncluding he inner contradictions f the "ought," he senseof moral obligation. Agape, as the fulfillment of the law, results in acomplete disappearance f the sense of obligation to the law, and in aconsequent elimination of all the careful discriminations of justicewhich belong to "law" n the broadest sense [1943, 189].

Two objections that are present in this passage surface repeatedly inNiebuhr's critique. First, there is the problem of a premature solaceof the conscience. Second is the charge that Luther's ethic is indis-criminate and indifferent to the relative justice obtainable in thisworld. Judging by the passage from the Galatians lectures that iscited as support (Niebuhr 1943, 189 n. 9), Niebuhr is troubled byLuther's claim that grace in Christ has abolished the power of the lawto accuse or terrify consciences. From Niebuhr's perspective as anethicist, an uneasy conscience is the precondition of justice and mo-rality. "There is no point in historical social achievement where onemay rest with an easy conscience" (1943, 192). The moral import ofan uneasy conscience for Niebuhr can also be seen in the followingstatement:

The conception of the relation of grace to law in Luther need not leadto antinomianism, s is sometimes charged; but it is indifferent o rela-

tive moral discriminations. t does not relax moral tension at the ulti-mate point of moral experience: or there it demands he love which sthe fulfillment, nd not the negation of law. But it relaxes he tension at



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all intermediateoints

and does not dealseriously

with all thepossibleextensions of justice to which men ought to be driven by an uneasy

conscience [1943, 190].

Here I believe Niebuhr misses the primarily religious or soterio-logical context in which Luther's comfort of consciences operates.For Luther, conscience was more a theological than a moral cate-gory; the conscience is where one encounters the wrath and judg-ment of God. In Luther's experience, an uneasy conscience, far frombeing a spur for moral activity, was morally debilitating. Moreover,as an essentially

theologicalwriter, Luther simply was not interested

in developing criteria for achieving relative justice. On the whole,Luther left issues of relative justice to the right exercise of reasonand natural law, i.e., to the individual, the princes, and the jurists.While Niebuhr judges this to be a dangerous flaw, one must askwhether it does not remind us that we might be expecting somethingfrom Luther that he had little interest in giving us - a completeChristian social ethics. In this regard, Luther's ethics points histori-cally in the direction of a Gesinnungsethik, n ethic of disposition, notan Objektivethik, n ethic which discerns moral goals and purposes,

develops norms and principles, and adjudicates between competinggoods. The significance of the relation of grace to law in Luther isthat the former frees the believer/rww the latter with respect to God'ssalvation and for the latter with respect to the neighbor. The centralethical problem in Luther remains the Augustinian one of a boundand intransigent will turned in upon itself. The substantive problemof what I should do, a problem that vexes modern social life and eth-ics, was given relatively little attention by Luther. The need of theneighbor was thought to be obvious - so just love and serve This isnot, however, to say that Luther's theology has no implications for

social ethics; indeed, the significance of his theology as a resource forsocial ethics has been richly explored by George W. Forell in his clas-sic study Faith Active n Love (1954). Nevertheless, as theologian, Lu-ther's overriding goal and concern, which he pursues relentlessly, isto establish that salvation comes to sinners through justification byfaith alone. This is the context in which Luther's statements about apeaceful conscience must be interpreted.3

Niebuhr, however, proceeds with his critique unaware of or un-sympathetic to Luther's soteriological concern. Not only is Luther'sethic "quietistic," it is also labelled "defeatist." This is so first of allbecause the Reformation "has no interest in the infinite shades andvarieties of the amalgam of truth and falsehood which constitutes the



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stuff of science andphilosophy,

and of all humanstriving

after thetruth" (1943, 191). Apparently Luther's suspicion of human wisdomand reason leads Niebuhr to this conclusion (1943, 197). Again onemust ask in what context and for what interest does Luther deridereason? Luther's rejection of worldly wisdom is not a pessimismabout reason's ability to discern, judge, and discriminate "things be-low." Human reason is competent in the earthly realm. This Lutheris clear about.4 When Luther opposes human reason or wisdom, hedoes so for soteriological, not epistemological reasons. Reason is anally of the law and therefore expects salvation to come through

works (see especially Gerrish 1962).A second instance of "defeatism" is perceived by Niebuhr in Lu-ther's alleged denial that the "Kingdom of God and the demands ofperfect love" are relevant to the claims of others in society (1943,192). This is tantamount to the charge that justification has no rele-vance for ethics. As proof Niebuhr cites the following passage fromthe Galatians lectures:

The way to discern the difference between the law and gospel] is toplace the gospel in heaven and the law on the earth: to call the right-eousness of the gospel heavenly, and the righteousness of the lawearthly and to put as great a difference between [them] as God hathmade between heaven and earth. . . Wherefore f the question be con-cerning he matter of faith and conscience et us utterly exclude the lawand leave it on earth. . . . Contrariwise n civil policy obedience to lawmust be severely required. There nothing must e known Niebuhr's m-phasis] concerning he conscience, he Gospel, grace, remission of sins,heavenly righteousness or Christ himself; but Moses only with the lawand the works hereof [cited from Niebuhr 1943, 192].

Such passages in Luther should not be interpreted to mean that theChristian's faith is irrelevant to life in society. On the contrary, at thecenter of Luther's thinking on morality is the notion that only thosewho have been justified by faith are in a position freely and selflesslyto serve the neighbor's need. Again, and especially in this instance,Luther is insisting on this separation of law and gospel for soterio-logical reasons, "for if the doctrine of justification is lost, the wholeof Christian doctrine is lost" (1535, 9).

Niebuhr understands the two kingdoms doctrine primarily fromthe perspective of Luther's writings on the Peasants' War. This puts

Niebuhr in a strong position rhetorically, for there are very few theo-logians who wish to offer an unqualified defense of Luther on thisissue. Without condoning either Luther's harsh attitude toward the



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peasantsor his

dispositionto

grant nearlyunlimited

powerto the

princes, we can try to understand why he arrived at the position hedid. Two factors seem to account for the uncritical attitude towardthe ruling powers that Luther displays in Against he Robbing nd Mur-dering Hordes of Peasants 1525). Niebuhr correctly perceives both.

First, there is the seriousness with which Luther took the Paulineinjunction in Romans 13, "Let every person be subject to the gov-erning authorities. For there is no authority except from God, andthose that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore he who re-sists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those who

resist will incur judgment." Whereas in Temporal uthority his andpassages like it were used to authorize Christian participation in gov-ernment, here they are employed negatively as absolute prohibitionsof resistance to the powers that be.

The second factor is what Niebuhr calls Luther's "morbid" and"inordinate" fear of anarchy. This can be seen in some particularlypoignant texts in Luther:

For rebellion s not just simple murder: t is like a great fire, which at-tacks and devastates a whole land. Thus rebellion brings with it a landfilled with murder and bloodshed; t makes widows and

orphans,and

turns everything upside down, like the worst disaster [1525, 50].[It] is better for the tyrants o wrong them a hundred imes than for themob to treat the tyrant unjustly but once. If injustice s to be suffered,then it is better for subjects to suffer t from their rulers than for therulers o suffer t from their subjects. The mob neither has any modera-tion nor even knows what moderation s. And every person in it hasmore than five tyrants hiding in him. Now it is better to suffer wrongfrom one tyrant, hat s, from the ruler, than from unnumbered yrants,that is, from the mob [1526, 106].

Given this perception of insurrection, it is not difficult to understandwhy Luther was "soft on" tyranny and could unequivocally state: "Ihave never known of a case in which [rebellion] was a just action, andeven now I cannot imagine any" (1526, 104). 5

Through the lens of Luther's writings on the Peasants' War,Niebuhr understands Luther's distinction between the two kingdomsto be simply equivalent to the distinction between public and privatemorality.

By thus transposing n "inner" thic into a private one, and making he

"outer" or "earthly" ethic authoritative for government, Lutherachieves a curiously perverse social morality. He places a perfectionistprivate ethic in juxtaposition to a realistic, not to say cynical, official



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ethic. . . . The inevitableonsequence

of such an ethic is toencouragetyranny 1943, 194].

However, as part I of this essay demonstrated, Luther's two king-doms doctrine is surely richer and more nuanced than Niebuhr'sreading allows. Niebuhr misses what David Steinmetz (1986) hascalled the "tight linkage" between the two kingdoms, a linkage that Ijudge can only be seen when this doctrine is viewed in its rich andmany-faceted form. This tight linkage of Luther's two kingdoms hasbeen expressed in various ways by his defenders. Steinmetz, inter-

pretingthe two

kingdomsin their broadest

applicationas the two

relationships in which the Christian stands, writes: "For Luther, thevertical relationship to God and the horizontal relationship to theneighbor are so inseparably joined in the act of faith that one is un-thinkable without the other. . . . Freedom in faith and freedom tolove can only be isolated from each other with disastrous results forboth" (1986, 124). Other interpreters have seen love to be the linch-pin which holds the two kingdoms firmly together. Bornkamm statesit this way: "Among all the contrasts between the two kingdomswhich Luther lists kingdom of God/worldly kingdom, gospel/law,

the faithful/the infidels, spiritual/secular, for one's self/for others,the Word of God/the sword, and so forth he never says 'kingdomof love/kingdom without love.' Love encompasses both" (1966, 9).Althaus makes the same point when he writes:

Thus in the Christian's ctivity he distinction, n terms of whether he isacting as a private person or an official person, s made within he activ-ity of love itself. There is a great difference between direct service toour neighbor and the administration f an office which protects his lifeand serves him as the official authorities do. However, this concerns

onlythe form of the

activitynd describes he broad

varietyhat s

pos-sible. The meaning of this activity including the corresponding per-sonal attitude is the same in both cases: serving the life of the otherperson [1972, 70].

As we saw in part I, at least one meaning of the two kingdoms doc-trine involves this presence of two modes of behavior operative inthe Christian, one active in self-denial, the other active in coercedjustice, both directed toward the good of the neighbor.

The legitimacy of Niebuhr's evaluation is in part dependent upon

the accuracy of his understanding of the doctrine of two kingdomswithin the history and theology of the man, Luther. While I do notwish to deny that Niebuhr raises valid, interesting, and pointed



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questionsfor Luther and those

representinghis

heritage,his conclu-

sions concerning Luther's "quietism," "defeatism," and "perversesocial morality" re not based on as firm a historical or textual basisas his selective quotations would lead his readers to believe. More-over, by concentrating n Luther's writings concerning he Peasants'War, Niebuhr has stressed the duality n Luther's wo kingdoms doc-trine to the detriment of the unity which Luther emphasizes else-where. No better words could express this error than those ofReinhold's brother, H. Richard:

Luther's answer to the Christ-and-Culturequestion

was that of ady-namic, dialectical thinker. Its reproductions by many who called them-

selves his followers were static and undialectical. They substituted twoparallel moralities for his closely related ethics. ... It is a great error toconfuse the parallelistic dualism of separated spiritual and temporal lifewith the interactionism of Luther's gospel of faith in Christ working bylove in the world of culture [1951, 179].

Notes

1. It is telling how frequently Niebuhr must turn from Luther to EmilBrunner (ironically, a Reformed theologian ) when he seeks evidence for hiscriticisms of the Lutheran position (Niebuhr 1943, 188, 189, 190-91, 196,197).

2. "Insinuation" is a term used advisedly here since Niebuhr quotes Lu-ther selectively and moves on in his argument as if the citation speaks foritself and clearly supports his case.

3. Heiko Oberman (1963) and others have in recent years specified andclarified the historical context of Luther's solace of conscience and doctrineof justification. Viewed within the context of late medieval nominalist theo-ries of justification and the general spiritual anxiety of the period, Luther'sconcern is primarily theological-soteriological, not social-ethical.

4. See, for instance, Luther's discussion of natural law m part 3 of Tem-poral Authority (1523) and his discussion of epieikeia in Whether Soldiers, Too,Can Be Saved (1526).

5. The issue of resistance to governmental authority in Luther under-went significant, if subtle, development as political pressures (e.g. threat ofarmed suppression of the Lutheran movement) impinged upon Luther's ba-sic principle that active resistance is forbidden by God on the basis of

Romans 13:1. W. D.J. Cargill Thompson (1984, 92-93, 102-1 11) is particu-larly helpful in tracing the complex shifts in Luther's position and rationalethat occurred mainly in 1530 and 1539.



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REFERENCES

Althaus, Paul1972 The Ethics of Martin Luther. Trans. Robert C. Schultz. Philadel-

phia: Fortress Press.Bornkamm, Heinrich

1966 Luther's Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms in the Context of His Theology.Trans. Karl H. Hertz. Philadelphia: Fortress Press.

Cargill Thompson, W. D. J.1984 The Political Thought of Martin Luther. Sussex, U.K.: The Harvest-

er Press.

Cranz, F. Edward1959 An Essay on the Development of Luther's Thought on Justice, Law and

Society. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Forell, George Wolfgang

1954 Faith Active in Love: An Investigation of the Principles Underlying Lu-ther's Social Ethics. New York: The American Press.

Gerrish, B. A.1962 Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology of Martin Luther. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.Luther, Martin

1519 Two Kinds of Righteousness In vol. 31 of Luther's Works (AmericanEdition), edited by J. Pelikan and H. Lehmann, 297-306. Phila-delphia and St. Louis: Fortress Press and Concordia PublishingHouse, 1957-76.

1520 The Freedom of a Christian. In vol. 31 of Luther's Works (AmericanEdition), edited by J. Pelikan and H. Lehmann, 333-77. Phila-

delphia and St. Louis: Fortress Press and Concordia PublishingHouse, 1957-76.

1523 Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed. In vol. 45of Luther's Works American Edition), edited by J. Pelikan and H.Lehmann, 81-129. Philadelphia and St. Louis: Fortress Pressand Concordia Publishing House, 1957-76.

1525 Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants. In vol. 46 ofLuther's Works (American Edition), edited by J. Pelikan and H.Lehmann, 49-55. Philadelphia and St. Louis: Fortress Pressand Concordia Publishing House, 1957-76.

1526 Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved. In vol. 46 of Luther's Works(American Edition), edited by J. Pelikan and H. Lehmann, 93-127. Philadelphia and St. Louis: Fortress Press and ConcordiaPublishing House, 1957-76.

1532 Commentary n the Sermon on Mount. In vol. 21 of Luther's Works

(American Edition), edited by J. Pelikan and H. Lehmann, 3-294. Philadelphia and St. Louis: Fortress Press and ConcordiaPublishing House, 1957-76.



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1535 Lectures on Galatians(Chapters

1-4). Vol. 26 of Luther's Works(American Edition), edited byj. Pelikan and H. Lehmann. Phil-

adelphia and St. Louis: Fortress Press and Concordia Publish-

ing House, 1957-76.McGovern, William

1941 From Luther to Hitler: The History of the Fascist-Nazi Political Philoso-

phy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.Niebuhr, H. Richard

1951 Christ and Culture. New York: Harper and Row.Niebuhr, Reinhold

1943 Human Destiny. Vol. 2 of The Nature and Destiny of Man. New

York: Charles Scribner's Sons.Oberman, Heiko Augustinius1963 The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval

Nominalism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Steinmetz, David C.

1986 Luther in Context. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.Wiener, Peter F.

1945 Martin Luther, Hitler's Spiritual Ancestor. London: Hutchinson &Co.

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Luther's Two Kingdoms Revisited

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