Effect of Denial of Sleep Attack

8/4/2019 Effect of Denial of Sleep Attack

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER NO. TITLE PAGE NO.

ABSTRACT

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

1 INTRODUCTION

2 SYSTEM STUDY

2.1 EXISTING SYSTEM

2.2 PROPOSED SYSTEM

2.3 FEASABILITY STUDY

2.4 OBJECTIVE

3 SYSTEM SPECIFICATION

3.1 HARDWARE SPECIFICATION

3.2 SOFTWARE SPECIFICATION

4 LANGUAGE DESCRIPTION

5 SYSTEM DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT

5.1 DESCRIPTION

5.2 DATA FLOW DIAGRAM

5.3 PROCESS DIAGRAM

5.4 SCREEN DESIGN


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5.5 SAMPLE CODING

5.6 SAMPLE INPUT AND OUTPUT

6 TESTING AND IMPLEMENTATION

6.1 SYSTEM TESTING

6.2 IMPLEMENTATION TESTING

6.3 SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION

7 FUTURE ENHANCEMENT

8 CONCLUSION


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PROJECT

Effects of Denial-of-Sleep Attacks onWireless

Sensor Network MAC Protocols

Abstract

Wireless platforms are becoming less expensive and more

powerful, enabling the promise of widespread use for

everything from health monitoring to military sensing. Like

other networks, sensor networks are vulnerable to malicious

attack. However, the hardware simplicity of these devices

makes defense mechanisms designed for traditional

networks infeasible. This paper explores the denial-of-sleep

attack, in which a sensor nodes power supply is targeted.

Attacks of this type can reduce the sensor

lifetime from years to days and have a devastating impact

on a sensor network. This paper classifies sensor network

denial-of-sleep attacks in terms of an attackers knowledge

of the medium access control (MAC) layer protocol and

ability to bypass authentication and encryption protocols.

Attacks from each classification are then modeled to show

the impacts on four sensor network MAC protocols, i.e.,


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Sensor MAC (S-MAC), Timeout MAC (T-MAC), Berkeley MAC

(B-MAC), and Gateway MAC (G-MAC). Implementations of

selected attacks on S-MAC, T-MAC, and B-MAC are

described and analyzed in detail to validate their

effectiveness and analyze their efficiency. Our analysis

shows that the most efficient attack on S-MAC can keep a

cluster of nodes awake 100% of the time by an attacker that

sleeps 99% of the time. Attacks on T-MAC can keep victims

awake 100% of the time while the attacker sleeps 92% of

the time. A framework for preventing denial-of-sleep attacksin sensor networks is also introduced. With full protocol

knowledge and an ability to penetrate link-layer encryption,

all wireless sensor network MAC protocols are susceptible to

a full domination attack, which reduces the network lifetime

to the minimum possible by maximizing the power

consumption of the nodes radio subsystem. Even without

the ability to penetrate encryption, subtle attacks can be

launched, which reduce the network lifetime by orders of

magnitude. If sensor networks are to meet current

expectations, they must be robust in the face of network

attacks to include denial-of-sleep.

Index TermsMedium access control (MAC), wireless

security,wireless sensornetworks (WSNs).


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I. INTRODUCTION

WIRELESS sensor networks (WSNs) are becoming

increasingly attractive for a variety of application areas,

including industrial automation, security, weather analysis,

and a broad range of military scenarios. The challenge of

designing these systems to be robust in the face of myriad

security threats

is a priority issue. One such threat is the denial-of-sleep

attack, which is a specific type of denial-of-service (DoS)

attack that targets a battery-powered devices power supply

in an effort to exhaust this constrained resource. If a large

percentage of network nodes, or a few critical nodes, are

attacked this way, the network lifetime can be reduced from

months or years to days.

The impacts of denial-of-sleep attacks on WSN MAC

protocols have not been thoroughly addressed. The only

previous study that focused on denial-of-sleep in WSN is [1],

which models the network lifetime under routine traffic

patterns for a sleep broadcast attackon these protocols on

the Tmote Sky [2] WSN platform. This paper describes a

more potent unauthenticated broadcast attack in which a

back-to-back stream of unauthenticated packets is

transmitted, as opposed to the attack used in [1], which uses

a much lower rate of four attack packets per second. This


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paper also explores the impacts of constant physical-layer

jamming, intelligent replay, and a full domination attack for

each of the protocols considered.We also expand on [1] by

modeling the impact of these attacks on the

Crossbow Mica2 [3] WSN platform in addition to Tmote Sky.

Furthermore, the impacts of various denial-of-sleep attacks

on current wireless sensor devices are validated through

implementation on the Mica2. A framework for defending

against these potentially devastating attacks is then

presented.To make the nodes small and inexpensive for economical

deployment in large numbers, they generally have very

limited processing capability and memory capacity. Because

the design of these devices usually favors decreased cost

over increased capabilities, we cannot expect Moores law to

lead to enhanced performance. Another challenge unique to

sensor node platforms is their extremely limited and often

nonreplenishable power supply. Mica2 and Tmote Sky are

two examples of widely available sensor node platforms.

Both devices are configured to run for a year or more on a

pair of AA batteries, relying on long periods of sleep to save

power. The dominant source of power loss in these sensor

platforms is the radio

subsystem. Table I shows the instantaneous power

consumption during receive, transmit, and sleep periods for

these devices [2],[3]. The data link layer, specifically the


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medium access control (MAC) protocol, is responsible for

managing the radio. Therefore, the MAC protocol must keep

the radio in a low-power sleep mode as much as possible. As

a result, most research in the area of sensor node power

conservation is focused on MAC protocols.

The MAC protocols considered in this paper include the

slotted carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance

(CSMA/CA) protocols Sensor MAC (S-MAC) [4], Timeout MAC

(T-MAC) [5], and Berkeley MAC (B-MAC) [6]. In addition,

Gateway MAC (G-MAC) [7] is also consideredhere, which is a clustered protocol that combines a

contention-based slot reservation period with a time-division

multiple-access (TDMA) period for data dissemination.

Similar centralized cluster-based WSN protocols include low-

energy adaptive clustering hierarchy (LEACH) [8] and power-

aware

clustered TDMA (PACT) [9].

.

1.1 SCOPE OF THE PROJECT:

The MAC-layer denial-of-sleep attacks on WSNs can be

categorized based on the level of protocol knowledge

required to initiate them and the level of network

penetration achieved by an attacker. Penetration refers to an


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attackers ability to read and send trusted traffic. A network

is easily penetrated if the networking protocols are known

and if cryptographic mechanisms are not used for

communication or are compromised. While

there are mechanisms available for secure communication in

WSN, they are not as robust as those found in traditional

networks due to resource constraints. Any shared medium

can be attacked with physical-layer jamming. Jamming,

however, is a blunt instrument for executing a denial-of-

sleep attack on WSN. Depending on the MAC protocol, thelifetime of a

WSN can be significant, even in the face of jamming,

requiring that an attacker jam the network for an extended

period to render it ineffective. Furthermore, conducting a

jamming attack requires considerable resources. A more

efficient attack strategy is to use knowledge of MAC

protocols to initiate an assault aimed at draining power from

sensor platforms, thereby rendering the network unusable

and nullifying any other security mechanisms. In the ensuing

discussion, the following three classifications of MAC layer

denial-of-sleep attacks are used.


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1) Class 1No Protocol Knowledge, No Ability to Penetrate

Network

2) Class 2Full Protocol Knowledge, No Ability to

Penetrate

Network

3) Class 3Full Protocol Knowledge, Network Penetrated

SYSTEM STUDY

2.SYSTEM STUDY

Existing System:

Existing systems available for defense against Denial-of-Sleep attack were

includes the following problems,

1.Fails in Service availability:

Authentication at higher protocol layers can be effective for

providing data integrity and confidentiality but still fails to

ensure service availability.

2. Disadvantage in Replay Attack:

Existing techniques for protecting against replay attacks at

the link layer have the disadvantage of requiring resource

constrained sensor nodes to maintain a neighbor table of


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packet sequence numbers, a requirement that can become

unwieldy even in moderately sized networks.

3.Problem in jamming attack:

sensor nodes are usually equipped with simple radios that

are not designed to use spread-spectrum techniques to

defend against jamming.

4.Broadcasting Attack:

This type of attack is particularly hard to detect because itdoes not effect legitimate throughput, which might indicate

an ongoing network attack.

Proposed System:

To prevent attacks across WSN we must incorporatefour components in our Proposed System, they are,

1. Strong Link-Layer Authentication2. Anti-Replay Protection3. Jamming Identification and Mitigation4. Broadcast Attack Protection

Strong Link-Layer Authentication:

Strong Link-layer Authentication should be incorporated to ensure Integrity,

Confidentiality and Service availability.

Anti-Replay Protection:


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Using Clustered Anti-replay Protection (CARP), that bounds

the size of the neighbor table according to the maximum

node degree and the number

of clusters, which are user configurable in many clustering

protocols. Anti-replay counters are exchanged during the

periodic reclustering process. This anti-replay counter

exchange is, in turn, protected from replays using a

sequential numbering scheme for clustering events.

Jamming Identification and Mitigation:

Adding jam detection to networks that are vulnerable to

jamming-based denial-of-sleep attacks is quite possible

using this technique.

Broadcast Attack Protection:

A lightweight intrusion-detection mechanism employed at

the MAC layer that classifies each incoming packet as eitherlegitimate (meaning that it passes authentication and anti-

replay checks)or malicious.

2.1FEASIBILITY STUDY

All projects are feasible given unlimited resources and infinite time.

It is both necessary and prudent to evaluate the feasibility of the project at

the earliest possible time. Feasibility and risk analysis is related in many

ways. If project risk is great , the feasibility listed below is equally

important.

The following feasibility techniques has been used in this project


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Operational Feasibility

Technical Feasibility

Economic Feasibility

Operational Feasibility:

Proposed system is beneficial since it turned into information system

analyzing the traffic that will meet the organizations operating

requirements.

IN security, the file is transferred to the destination and the

acknowledgement is given to the server. Bulk of data transfer is sent

without traffic.

Technical Feasibility:

Technical feasibility centers on the existing computer system

(hardware , software, etc..) and to what extent it can support the proposed

addition. For example, if the current computer is operating at 80% capacity.

This involves, additional hardware (RAM and PROCESSOR) will increase

the speed of the process. In software, Open Source language that is JAVA

and is used. We can also use in Linux operating system.

The technical requirement for this project are Java tool kit and

Swing component as software and normal hardware configuration is

enough , so the system is more feasible on this criteria.


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Economic Feasibility:

Economic feasibility is the most frequently used method for

evaluating the effectiveness of a candidate system. More commonly known

as cost / benefit analysis, the procedure is to determine the benefits and

saving that are expected from a candidate and compare them with the costs.

If the benefits outweigh cost. Then the decision is made to design and

implement the system. Otherwise drop the system.

This system has been implemented such that it can be used to

analysis the traffic. So it does not requires any extra equipment or hardware

to implement. So it is economically feasible to use.

2.2OBJECTIVES :

Attacks from each of the three classifications and their

impacts on S-MAC, T-MAC, B-MAC, and G-MAC are analyzed.

This section explores the impacts of constant physical-layer

jamming, unauthorized broadcast, intelligent replay, and a

full domination attack for each of the three protocols

considered. A full domination attack assumes that the

attacker has penetrated the network and has full knowledge

of the MAC protocol. In each case, a full domination attack

can reduce the network lifetime to ten days for the Mica2

platform and six days for the Tmote Sky platform, which is

equivalent to a network lifetime under IEEE 802.11 with no

power saving features.


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SYSTEM SPECIFICATION:

3.1 HARDWARE SPECIFICATION:

Processor : Pentium-IV

Speed : 1.1GHz

RAM : 512MB

Hard Disk : 40GB

General : KeyBoard, Monitor , Mouse

3.2 SOFTWARE SPECIFICATION:

Operating System : Windows XP

Software : JAVA ( JDK 1.6(swing))

IDE : Net Beans 1.6

Back End : SQL Server

LANGUAGE DESCRIPTION

4. LANGUAGE DESCRIPTION

The inventors are java wanted to design a language, which could

offer solution to some of the problems encountered in modern programming.

They wanted the language to be reliable, portable and distributed but also

simple, compact and interactive. Sun Microsystems officially describes java

with following attributes:

Compile and interpreter


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Platform independent and portable

Object-oriented

Distributed

Familiar ,simple and small

Multithreaded and interactive

High performance

Dynamic and extensible

Although the above appears to be a list of buzzwords, they apply describe

the full potential of language. These features have made java the first

application language of the world wide web. Java will also become the

primer language for general-purpose stand-alone applications.

Compile and Interpreted:

Usually a computer language either compiled or interpreted. Java

combines both the approaches for making java a two-stage system. First,

Java compiler translates source code into what is known as byte code

instructions. Byte codes are not machine instructions is therefore , in the

second stage, java interpreter generates machine code that

can be directly executed by a machine is running the Java program. We

can thus say that a Java is both compiled and an interpreted language.

Platform-Independent and Portable:


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The most significant contribution of Java over other languages

is its portability. Java programs can be easily moved from one computer

system to another, anywhere anytime. Changes and upgrades in operating

systems, processors and system resources will not force any changes in Java

programs. This is the reason why Java has become a popular language for

programming on Internet, which interconnects different kinds of systems

worldwide.We can download a Java applet from a remote computer on to

our local system via Internet an extension of the users basic system

providing practically unlimited number of accessible applets and

applications.

Java ensures the portability in two ways. First Java compiler

generate byte code instructions that can be implemented on any machine.

Secondly, the size of the primitive data types are machine-independent.

Object-Oriented:

Java is a true object oriented language. Almost everything in Java

is an Object. All program code and data reside within objects and classes.

Java comes with an extensive set of classes, arranged in packages, that

we can use in our programs by inheritance. The object model in Java is

simple and easy to extend.

Robust and Secure:


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Java is a robust language. It provides many safeguards to ensure

reliable code. It has strict compiler time and runtime checking for data

types. It is designed as a garbage-collected language relieving the

programmers virtually all memory management problems. Java also

incorporates the concept of exception handling , which captured the

series errors and eliminates any risk of crashing the system.

Security becomes an important issue for a language that is used for

programming in internet. Threat of virus and abuse of resource is

everything. Java systems not only verify all memory access but also

ensure no virus are communicated with an applet. The absence of pointer

in java ensures that programs cannot gain access to memory location

without proper authorization.

Distributed:

Java is designed as a distributed language for creating applications

on networks.It has the ability to share both data programs. Java applications

can open and access remote objects on Internet as easily as they can in a

local system.This enables multiple programmers at multiple remote

locations to collaborate and work together on a single project.

Simple Small and Familiar:


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Java is a small and simple language. Many features of C and C++ that

are either redundant or sources of unreliable code are not part of Java. For

example,

Java does not use pointers,preprocessor header files, go to statement

and many others.It also eliminates operator overloading and multiple

inheritance.

Familiarity is another striking feature of Java .To make the

language look familiar to the existing programmers, it was modeled on C

and C++ and therefore, Java looks like C and C++ code.In fact, Java is a

simplified version of C++.

Mutithreading and Interactive:

Multi threaded means handling multiple tasks simultaneously. Java

supports multi threading programs. This means that we need not wait for the

application to finish one task before beginning another. For example. we can

listen to an audio clip time download an applet from distance computer. The

feature greatly improves the interactive performance of graphical

applications. The Java runtime comes with tools that support multi process

synchronization and construct smoothly running interactive system.

High Performance:

Java performance is impressive for an interpreted language. Mainly

due to the use of intermediate byte code. According to Sun, java speed is

comparable to the native C/C++. Java architecture is also designed to reduce

overhead during runtime. Further, the incorporation of multi threading

enhances the overall execution speed of overall programs.


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Dynamic and Extensible:

Java is a dynamic language . Java is capable of dynamically linking in

new class libraries methods and objects. Java can also determine the type of

class through a query, making it possible to either dynamically link or abort

the program , depending on the response.

Java programs support functions written in other languages such as C

and C++.These functions are known as native methods.This facility enables

The programmers to use the efficient functions available in these

languages.Native methods are linked dynamically at runtime.

SWING:

Swing is a set of classes that provides more powerful and flexible

components than are possible with the AWT. In addition to that the familiar

components such as buttons, check box and labels swings supplies several

exciting additions including tabbed panes, scroll panes, trees and tables.

Even familiar components such as buttons have more capabilities in swing.

For example a button may have both an image and text string associated

with it. Also the image can be changed as the state of button changes. Unlike

AWT components swing components are not implemented by platform

specific code instead they are return entirely in JAVA and, therefore , are

platform- independent. The term lightweight is used to describe such

elements. The number of classes and interfaces in the swing packages is

substantial.

The swing component classes are

SWING COMPONENT CLASSES


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Class Description

Abstract Button Abstract super class for Swing

Buttons

Button Group Encapsulates a mutually exclusive

Set of Buttons

Image Icon Encapsulates an Icon

JApplet The swing version of Applet

JButton The Swing Push Button class

JCheckBox The swing CheckBox class

JComboBox Encapsulates a combobox

JLabel The swing version of a Label

JRadioButton The swing version of a RadioButton

JScrollPane Encapsulates a scrollable window


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JTabbedPane Encapsulates a Tabbed window

JTable Encapsulates a Table-based control

JTextField The swing version of a text-field

5. SYSTEM DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT:

5.1 DESCRIPTION OF A SYSTEM:

A framework for defending against denial-of-sleep attacks is

presented. To prevent attacks across the spectrum of link-

layer vulnerabilities, a defensive framework must

incorporate four key components, i.e., strong link-layer

authentication, anti-replay protection, jamming identification

and mitigation, and broadcast attack defense.

1) Strong Link-Layer Authentication: This is the first andmost important component of denial-of-sleep defense and

must be incorporated into any WSN that might be vulnerable

to attack. Authentication at higher protocol layers can be

effective for providing data integrity and confidentiality but


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still fails to ensure service availability. An attackers ability to

send trusted MAC-layer traffic on the network leaves it open

to the types of full-domination attacks that can reduce the

network lifetime from a year or more to less than a week.

Existing options for implementing link-layer authentication in

WSN include TinySec, which is incorporated into current

releases of TinyOS [20], and the authentication algorithms

built into IEEE 802.15.4-compliant devices.

2) Anti-Replay Protection: An attackers ability to replay

messages, even without being able to read them, can forcenodes to forward old traffic through the network and can

significantly increase power consumption for all nodes on the

path from sender to receiver. Traffic analysis makes it

possible to distinguish control traffic from data traffic.

Replayed control

packets, like S-MAC SYNC packets, can be used to mount an

effective denial-of-sleep attack. Existing techniques for

protecting against replay attacks at the link layer have the

disadvantage of requiring resourceconstrained sensor nodes

to maintain a neighbor table of packet sequence numbers, a

requirement that can become unwieldy even in moderately

sized networks. The neighbor table can also be exploited by

an attacker if packets from other portions of the network are

replayed, thereby increasing the size of a nodes neighbor

table and consuming more resources. Oneway to limit the

size of the neighbor table is to use networklayer neighbor


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information to limit the number of neighbors that must be

tracked to those from which legitimate traffic is expected.

Clustering protocols such as HEED [22] and ACE [23] reduce

the number of potential communication partners to a subset

of a nodes one-hop neighbors. By adding a small amount of

anti-replay information to clustering messages and using

existing authentication techniques, anti-replay protection

can be provided for clustered WSNs at low overheads. One

such technique is Clustered Anti-replay Protection (CARP), as

described in [24]. CARP bounds the size of the neighbortable according to the maximum node degree and the

number of clusters, which are user configurable in many

clustering

protocols. Anti-replay counters are exchanged during the

periodic reclustering process. This anti-replay counter

exchange is, in turn, protected from replays using a

sequential numbering scheme for clustering events. Since

reclustering is, by definition, a network-wide operation, all

nodes know the sequence number of the current clustering

event, and replayed clustering messages from previous

clustering events can be identified and

ignored [24].

3) Jamming Identification and Mitigation: A strong jamming

attack can prevent all sensor nodes access to the wireless

medium and can shut down the network. To reduce costs,

sensor nodes are usually equipped with simple radios that


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are not designed to use spread-spectrum techniques to

defend

against jamming. While IEEE 802.15.4-compliant

transceivers use direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) to

protect against background noise, spreading codes are fixed

according to the ZigBee standard and, therefore, cannot be

used to defend against jamming by a ZigBee-compliant

attacker. A logical reaction to jamming is for nodes to go into

low-power mode,

waking only periodically to sense the medium, thusconserving maximum energy when there is no hope of

successfully using the wireless medium. With techniques

available to reliably identify jamming attacks, such a

mechanism is now feasible. As part of this research, Xu et

al.s proposed jam detection mechanism based on the

relationship between PDR and RSSI values [16] was

implemented and tested on the Mica2 WSN platform. This

implementation effectively detects jamming with a low

probability of false positives. Adding jam detection to

networks that are vulnerable to jamming-based denial-of-

sleep attacks is quite possible using this technique.

4) Broadcast Attack Protection: Most MAC protocols are

susceptible to a simple unauthenticated broadcast attack.

Long messages can be broadcasted and must be received in

full by all network nodes before the nodes discard them due

to authentication failure. A subtle broadcast attack is one in


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which the attacker obeys MAC-layer rules of collision

avoidance, thereby transmitting attack traffic only when

there is no legitimate traffic in the network. This type of

attack is particularly hard to detect because it does not

effect legitimate throughput, which might indicate an

ongoing network attack. The limited resources available on

most sensor platforms prevent the use of traditional network

intrusion detection techniques, which normally require

capturing and analyzing large amounts of previous network

traffic. Another alternative, however, is a lightweightintrusion-detection mechanism employed at the MAC layer

that classifies each incoming packet as either legitimate

(meaning that it passes authentication and anti-replay

checks)or malicious. Tracking the ratio of legitimate to

malicious traffic, along with the percentage of time that the

device is able to sleep, is enough to identify a denial-of-sleep

broadcast attack [25]. Fig. 7 shows the correlation between

received traffic and power consumption in a simulated Mica2

network. The offered load averages 1 packet-per-second

(pps) with a burst of 4 pps of legitimate traffic from 120 to

240 s. Since this burst is legitimate data, it should be

allowed despite increased power consumption during the

burst. As long as legitimate traffic can be differentiated from

malicious traffic, the spike in energy consumption associated

with the increase in traffic, along with a high ratio of

malicious versus legitimate traffic, identifies the requirement


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to take action to mitigate the energy-draining effects of

malicious traffic.

Experimental setup for denial-of-sleep attacks (d_1.5m).

6. MODULE DESCRIPTION:

6.1 MODULE 1:SENSOR STATUS

Initiate the communication between two nodes named Node1 and

Node2.


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Sense the Communication between those nodes.

Click the sense result Button and view the sense result.

Restart sense or otherwise stop the sense

6.2 MODULE 2: ATTACK EXPLOITATION

Initiate the Communication between two nodes.

Sense the communication between those nodes.

Click the Attack Button.

Now activate the sensor by click Sense Button and view the result After five attacks the sensor will be Expired.

6.3 MODULE 3:ATTACK DEFENSE

Initiate the Communication between two nodes.

Sense the communication between those nodes.

Click the Attack Button.

Now activate the sensor by click Sense Button and view the result

Now Click the Defense Button to interrupt the attack and save the

Sensor from further attacks.

Module diagram

START


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UML Diagrams

SENSE

SENSOR STATUS

NODECOMMUNICATION

SENSOR

WORKING

ATTACK DEFENSE

STOP


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NODE1 NODE2

Class diagram

NODE1

Select file, Displays in

TextArea, Sends to Node2

SenseAttack

Defense

NodeCommunicatio

n

Sense

Attack

Defense


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NODE2

Recieve file from

Node1,Displays file

content in TextArea

SenseAttack

Defense


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Object diagram

Node1

Sense

Attack

Node2

Exit

Defense

Start

Sense Result


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State diagram

Nodes

Sends

Receives

Sensor

Sense the

communicationof nodes

Display thesense result

Attacker

Attack the Sensor

and degrate theperformance of

sensor

Stops the Attacker

and enhance the

performance of

sensor

Defensor


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Activity diagram

Sensor

Sense the

Communication

If there is noattack then

print the result

otherwisedefense and

print the result

Login

Send to

other

node

Node

Start

Browse the

File

Display the File

Content


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Sequence diagram

Node 1 Browse Node 2 Sense Result

Login and getfile

Send to Node 2

Sense

Node 1

Print the

senseresult

SenseNode 2


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Collaboration Diagram

Node 1

Node 2

Result

Sensor

1: Read file and send 2: Receiveand display

3:Sense


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Component Diagram

NODE1

NODE2

DEFENSE

SENSEOUTPUT

ATTACK


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Dataflow diagram

Yes

No

START

Node 1 Node 2

SENSE

Attac

k

Defense

Sense result

END


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Project Flow Diagram

Output

Attack

NODE21

Sense

NODE1


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System Architecture

ATTACK

NODE1

SENSOR

NODE2

DEFENSE

RESULT


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TESTING AND IMPLEMENTATION

6 .TESTING AND IMPLEMENTATION

6.1 TESTING:

Testing is a process of executing a program with a intent of finding

an error.

Testing presents an interesting anomaly for the software engineering.

The goal of the software testing is to convince system developer and

customers that the software is good enough for operational use. Testing is aprocess intended to build confidence in the software.

Testing is a set of activities that can be planned in advance and

conducted

systematically.

Testing is a set of activities that can be planned in advance and

conducted

systematically.

Software testing is often referred to as verification & validation.

TYPE OF TESTING:

The various types of testing are

White Box Testing

Black Box Testing

Alpha Testing

Beta Testing

Win Runner And Load Runner


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Load Runner

WHITE BOX TESTING:

It is also called as glass-box testing. It is a test case design

method that uses the control structure of the procedural design to

derive test cases.Using white box testing methods, the software engineer can

derive test cases that

1. Guarantee that all independent parts within a module have

been exercised at least once,

2. Exercise all logical decisions on their true and false sides.

BLACK BOX TESTING:

Its also called as behavioral testing . It focuses on the

functional requirements of the software.

It is complementary approach that is likely to uncover a .

different class of errors than white box errors.

A black box testing enables a software engineering to derive a

sets of input conditions that will fully exercise all functional

requirements for a program.


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ALPHA TESTING:

Alpha testing is the software prototype stage when the software is first

able to run. It will not have all the intended functionality, but it will

have core functions and will be able to accept inputs and

generate outputs. An alpha test usually takes place in the developer's

offices on a separate system.

BETA TESTING:

The beta test is a live application of the software in an

environment that cannot be controlled by the developer. The beta test is

conducted at one or more customer sites by the end user of the software.

WIN RUNNER & LOAD RUNNER:

We use Win Runner as a load testing tool operating at the GUI layer as it

allows us to record and playback user actions from a vast variety of user

applications as if a real user had manually executed those actions.

LOAD RUNNER TESTING:

With Load Runner , you can Obtain an accurate picture of end-to-end

system performance. Verify that new or upgraded applications meet

specified performance requirements.


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6.1.1 TESTING USED IN THIS PROJECT:

6.1.2 SYSTEM TESTING :

Testing of the debugging programs is one of the most

critical aspects of the computer programming triggers, without programs that

works, the system would never produce the output for which it was

designed. Testing is best performed when user development are asked to

assist in identifying all errors and bugs. The sample data are used for

testing . It is not quantity but quality of the data used the matters of testing.

Testing is aimed at ensuring that the system was accurately an efficiently

before live operation commands.

6.1.3 UNIT TESTING:

In this testing we test each module individually and

integrate with the overall system. Unit testing focuses verification efforts on

the smallest unit of software design in the module. This is also known as

module testing. The module of the system is tested separately . This testing

is carried out during programming stage itself . In this testing step each

module is found to working satisfactorily as regard to the expected output

from the module. There are some validation checks for fields also. It is very

easy to find error debut in the system


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Conclusion and Future Enhancements:

Most current research in WSN security focuses on data

confidentiality and integrity, largely ignoring availability.

Without the ability to secure the physical medium over which

communication takes place, sensor networks are susceptible

to an array of potential attacks focused on rapidly draining

sensor node batteries, thereby rendering the network

unusable. This paper makes three contributions to the area

of sensor network security. First, it classifies denial-of-sleep

attacks on WSN MAC protocols based on an attackers

knowledge of the MAC protocol and ability to penetrate the

network. Second, it explores potential attacks from each

attack classification, both modeling their impacts on sensor

networks running four

leading WSN MAC protocols and analyzing the efficiency of

implementations of these attacks on three of the protocols.

Finally, it proposes a framework for defending against denial-

of-sleep attacks and provides specific techniques that can be


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used against each denial-of-sleep vulnerability. Future work

will involve exploring the defensive framework provided here

and finding ways to apply it to currently available sensor

devices to further develop specific mechanisms to protect

them against these attacks.

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Effect of Denial of Sleep Attack

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