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Ehip4 caring through sharing privacy and-security-technical-aspects riccardo scandariato

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eHIP: Health Information Platform Security & Privacy Riccardo Scandariato IBBT-DistriNet Caring through Sharing 2 K.U.Leuven K.U.Leuven Problem Architectural solution based on XDS reference model No out-of-the-box security&privacy solution Patient data is the asset to protect Sensitivity of information Laws and regulations
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Page 1: Ehip4 caring through sharing privacy and-security-technical-aspects riccardo scandariato

eHIP: Health Information Platform

Security & Privacy

Riccardo Scandariato

IBBT-DistriNet

Caring through Sharing

2

K.U.LeuvenK.U.Leuven

Problem

Architectural solution based on XDS reference model

No out-of-the-box security&privacy solution

Patient data is the asset to protectSensitivity of informationLaws and regulations

Page 2: Ehip4 caring through sharing privacy and-security-technical-aspects riccardo scandariato

3

K.U.LeuvenK.U.Leuven

Security analysisBusiness level

Analyzing the functionality and how it can be misused

Search, View, Upload, Notify

Abusing the functionality (out-of-the-box thinking)

Adding fake data or removing correct data

Exploiting unplanned information paths

Abusing privileges

EXAMPLE: Hiding errors by overwriting documents

4

K.U.LeuvenK.U.Leuven

Security analysisTechnical level

Identify assets in E-HIP architecture

Data flow diagram (DFD)

Determine threats

Spoofing identity

Tampering with data

Repudiation

Information disclosure

Denial of service

Elevation of privilege

EXAMPLE: Tampering with communication

Page 3: Ehip4 caring through sharing privacy and-security-technical-aspects riccardo scandariato

5

K.U.LeuvenK.U.Leuven

Security solutionIn a nutshell

Enforce rules to limit who can access what

Centralized for ease of management

Per-resource rules

Establish identities

Decentralized due to scale and admin constraints

6

K.U.LeuvenK.U.Leuven

Security solutionWhat rules?

Analyzed the type of rulesIdentityRoles and affiliation Data sensitivityLocationData originPatient historyTreatment or long-lasting relationship

Rule

Condition EffectTarget

Subject Resource Action Environment

XACMLeXtensible

Access Control Markup Language

Page 4: Ehip4 caring through sharing privacy and-security-technical-aspects riccardo scandariato

7

K.U.LeuvenK.U.Leuven

Security solutionEstablishing identities

Federation of ID providers

Providers generates a tokenProofs identityAttributes of subject

Security service trusts providers

SAMLAttribute Assertion

subjectissuersignaturetimestampversionid

role...

SAMLAttribute

Statements

SAMLSecurity Assertions Markup Language

8

K.U.LeuvenK.U.Leuven

SecurityImplementation

ID provider(SAML)

Security service(XACML)

Repository

usr/pwd

view doc

ok?

permit

Page 5: Ehip4 caring through sharing privacy and-security-technical-aspects riccardo scandariato

9

K.U.LeuvenK.U.Leuven

PrivacyIn a nutshell

Avoid linkability of data when communicated across contexts

Identifiers must be pseudonymized in cross context communication

In some applications process must be reversible

Ric’sblood count

is low

Ricis buyingvitamins

Ric is workingtoo hard

10

K.U.LeuvenK.U.Leuven

PrivacyReversible IDs

Context‐Specific References

Prefix Global ID 

Reversible ID

study_83547

0100110011 820908 324 56 

!@#$%^@# *&#$!@

Page 6: Ehip4 caring through sharing privacy and-security-technical-aspects riccardo scandariato

11

K.U.LeuvenK.U.Leuven

PrivacyImplementation

ID provider

Security service

Repository

usr/pwd

view doc

ok?

permit

Anonymizer

12

K.U.LeuvenK.U.Leuven

CreditsSuccessful results come from good teamwork

IBBT-DistriNet team

Kim Wuyts, Eryk Kulikowski, Kris Verlaenen, Ric

IBBT-COSIC team

Mina Deng, Claudia Diaz, Danny De Cock


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