Facts: IRMA C. ALFONSO, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

In the May 11, 1992 elections, Pedro Alfonso ran for councilor in the First District of Manila, which is entitled to elect six councilors.

On the eve of the elections, Pedro Alfonso died. At about 2:45 A.M. of May 11, 1992, his daughter Irma Alfonso, petitioner herein, filed her certificate of candidacy in substitution for her deceased father.

Apparently, the respondent City Board of Canvassers added the votes of Pedro Alfonso to those of petitioner's thereby placing her in the fourth slot. Consequently, private respondent questioned such action in a petition filed on May 29, 1992. He prayed that the votes cast for Pedro Alfonso be declared as stray votes and that, accordingly, he be proclaimed as the sixth winner for councilor in the First District of Manila.

COMELEC resolved private respondent's petition to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE all votes cast in favor of Pedro Alfonso as stray votes and to CREDIT in favor of respondent Irma Alfonso only those votes cast with the name "ALFONSO” or IRMA ALFONSO; and 3) To DIRECT the City Board of Canvassers for the First District of Manila, to reconvene the canvass and proclaim the winning candidate/s for the position of city councilors for the First District of Manila.

Issue: 1. Won petitioner may still question respondent Comelec ruling that the vote cast in favor of deceased Pedro Alfonzo should be considered as stray votes. 2. WON Comelec committed with garve abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for a recount of the ballots 3.

Ruling:

1. There is, therefore, no merit with the assertion that the votes cast in favor of Pedro Alfonso must be counted in favor of petitioner.

2. Petitioner’s prayer for a reopening of the ballots is not a proper issue for a preproclamation controversy. The issues raised by petitioner should be threshed out in election protest. It is established by the law as well as jurisprudence that errors in the appreciation of ballots by the board of inspectors are proper subject for election protest and not for recount or reappreciation of ballots.

The appreciation of the ballots east in the precincts is not a 'proceeding of the board of canvassers' for purposes of pre-proclamation proceedings under Section 241, Omnibus Election Code, but of the boards of election inspectors who are called upon to count and appreciate the votes in accordance with the rules of appreciation provided in Section 211, Omnibus Election Code.

Otherwise stated, the appreciation of ballots is not part of the proceedings of the board of canvassers. The function of ballots appreciation is performed by the boards of election inspectors at the precinct level.

The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under Sec. 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issued that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy is restrictive and exclusive.

In the absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects (sec. 234), appear to have been tampered with, falsified prepared under duress (sec. 235) and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of which effects the result of the election (sec. 236), which am the only instances where a pre-proclamation recount may be resorted to, granted the preservation of the integrity of the ballot box and its contents, petition must fail. The complete election returns whose authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie considered valid for the purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTION

Court issued a Resolution entitled "Francisco Chavez v. Comelec, et al.," disqualifying Melchor Chavez, private respondent therein, from running for the Office of Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections.

The Comelec issued Resolution which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all "Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates.

Confusion arose, allegedly nationwide, as the "Chavez" votes were either declared stray or invalidated by the Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs).

Petitioner filed an urgent petition before the respondent Comelec praying the latter to (1) implement its May 12, 1992 resolution with costs de officio; (2) to re-open the ballot boxes in 13 provinces including the National Capital Region involving some 80,348 precincts and to scan for the "Chavez" votes for purposes of crediting the same in his favor; (3) make the appropriate entries in the election returns/certificates of canvass; and (4) to suspend the proclamation of the 24 winning candidates.

Issue: WON the petition is meritorious?

Ruling: The Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit. The alleged inaction of respondent Comelec in ordering the deletion of Melchor Chavez's name in the list of qualified candidates does not call for the exercise of the Court's function of judicial review. This Court can review the decisions or orders of the Comelec only in cases of grave abuse of discretion committed by it in the discharge of its quasi-judicial powers and not those arising from the exercise of its administrative functions. Respondent Commission's alleged failure to implement its own resolution is undoubtedly administrative in nature, hence, beyond judicial interference. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, respondent Comelec can administratively undo what it has administratively left undone Moreover, respondent Comelec has in fact, to be exact, ordered the deletion of Melchor Chavez's name not only on the official list of candidates, but also on the election returns, tally sheet and certificate of canvass.

Hence, petitioner's allegation that respondent Comelec failed to implement Resolution does not hold water.

A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no cause of action, the controversy presented being one in the nature of a pre-proclamation. ***

While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective officials, nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives.

Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides:

"Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. - For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it. (underscoring supplied)

What is allowed is the correction of "manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns." To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.

In the case at bar, however, petitioner prays not only for a restraining order enjoining "the proclamation of the 24th highest ranking senatorial candidate without first acting upon petitioner's letter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and urgent petition dated May 22, 1992" but also prays that judgment be rendered requiring the Comelec to re-open the ballot boxes in 80,348 precincts in 13 provinces therein enumerated including Metro Manila, scan the ballots for "Chavez" votes which were invalidated or declared stray and credit said scanned "Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner.

It is quite obvious that petitioner's prayer does not call for the correction of "manifest error's in the certificates of canvass or election returns" before the Comelec but for the re-opening of the ballot boxes and appreciation of the ballots contained therein. Indeed, petitioner has not even pointed to any "manifest error" in the certificates of canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none, petitioner's proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which, under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election ode, exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

It is therefore crystal clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner involving, as it does, contest relating to the election of a member of the Senate. As aforesaid, petitioner's proper recourse is to file a regular election protest before the Senate Electoral Tribunal after the winning senatorial candidates have been proclaimed.

In the case at bar, petitioner's allegation that "Chavez" votes were either invalidated or declared stray has no relation to the correctness or authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Otherwise stated, petitioner has not demonstrated any manifest error in the certificates of canvass or election returns before the Comelec which would warrant their correction. As the authenticity of the certificates of canvass or election returns are not questioned, they must be prima facie considered valid for purposes of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates (Sanchez v. Comelec, supra).

** Pre-proclamation controversy is defined as "any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns." [Sec. 241, Omnibus Election Code).

PERFECTO V. GALIDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SATURNINO R. GALEON, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Galido and private respondent Galeon wore candidates during the 18 January 1988 local elections for the position of mayor in the Municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, Province of Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed duly-elected Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.

On 25 January 1988, private respondent Saturnino R. Galeon filed an election protest before the court. After hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation of petitioner as the duly-elected Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, by a majority of eleven (11) votes.

Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the commission on Elections (COMELEC), the COMELEC reversed the trial court's decision and declared private respondent the duly-elected mayor by a plurality of five (5) votes. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc resolution of 20 September 1990 which affirmed the decision of its First Division.

The COMELEC held that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the initial "C" after the name "Galido" were marked ballots and, therefore, invalid. The COMELEC said:

"On the argument relied upon by the appellee that the settled rule and which controlling is where a word or a letter recurs in a pattern or system to mark and identify ballots, the ballots containing the same should be rejected as marked ballots and the introduction of evidence aliunde is not necessary when the repetition of a word or letter in several ballots in the same precinct constitutes a clear and convincing proof of a design to indentify the voters."

On 25 September 1990, petitioner filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and injunction.

Issue: WON the erroneous initial of the first name which accompanies the correct surname of a candidate, the erroneous initial of the surname accompanying the correct first name of the candidate, or the erroneous middle initial of the candidate shall not annul the vote in favor of the latter?

Ruling: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials and has appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

In the present case, after a review of the trial court's decision, the respondent COMELEC found that fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the letter "C" after the name "Galido" are clearly marked ballots. Under Article IX (A), Section 7 of the Constitution, which petitioner cites in support of this, petition, it is stated: "(U)nless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each (Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

On the other hand, private respondent relies on Article IX, (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the Constitution which provides that decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable. (Emphasis supplied)

We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. The proceedings in the Constitutional Commission on this, matter are enlightening. the amendment is to delete the word inappealable.'

Decisions are always final, as distinguished from interlocutory orders. So, it should read:' However, decisions, final orders or ruling; to distinguish them from intercolutory orders, of the Commission on Elections an municipal and barangay officials shall be final and IMMEDIATELY executory.

MR. REGALADO. It is understood, however, that while these decisions with respect to berangay and municipal officials are final and immediately executory and, therefore, not appealable, that does not rule out the possibility of an original special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, as the case may be, under Rule 66,of the Rules of Court.

We do not, however, believe that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision. It is settled that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court or tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

As correctly argued by public respondent COMELEC, it has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical evidence, equity, law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence, in support of

its findings and conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party.

Finally, the records disclose that private respondent had already assumed the position of Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez as the duly-elected mayor of the municipality by virtue of the COMELEC decision. The main purpose of prohibition is to suspend all action and prevent the further performance of the act complained of. In this light, the petition at bar has become moot and academic.

The petition is DIMISSSED. The temporary restraining order earlier issued by the Court is LIFTED.

ALIM BALINDONG, petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and USO DAN AGUAM, respondents.

Alim Balindong,File an original petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction in the decision of the Comelec.

The canvassing did not actually take place in Pindolonan, Ganassi. The actual canvass proceeded in the afternoon of the same day-in Marawi City. The precinct-by-precinct votes the board credited the two candidates follow:

For Mayor Precinct Numbers Total

1 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Uso Dan Aguam 58 95 38 50 125 61 50 89 5 4 0 575

Alim Balindon 39 23 5 130 21 30 25 8 209 51 31 572

Uso Dan Aguam was proclaimed Mayor-elect of Ganassi with 575 votes. His closest rival, Alim Balindong, obtained 572 votes.

The fact that the original entries in the return for Precinct 8 would show that Uso Dan Aguam received "89" votes and Alim Balindong "13" votes, If the votes were to be computed on this basis, Uso Dan Aguam would have obtained 575 votes to Balindong's 577 votes. In which case, Alim Balindong should have been proclaimed Mayor-elect, with a 2-vote margin.

Balindong filed a complaint. The comelec rendered decision pronounced that there is no valid entry of votes cast for petitioner Alim Balindong in the existing copies of the election return for Precinct 8, Ganassi, Lanao del Sur.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue: WON Certificate of votes is evidence not only of tampering, alteration, falsification or any other anomaly in the preparation of the election returns, but also votes obtained by the candidates.

Ruling:The SC ruled in favor of balindong.The municipal treasurer's copy of the return from Precinct 8 used by the board reveals on its face palpable material alterations as to Balindong's votes. The change in, rather subtraction from, Balindong's votes made the difference between victory and defeat. Such alterations were not judicially authorized. Nor were they even initialed by the inspectors. Therefore, as far as the canvassing board was concerned, the election return copy before it, contained unauthorized alterations which are irregularities that could prevent a proper canvass and necessitate an investigation. Yet, the board jumped investigation and canvassed the votes based on returns palpably tampered.

"SEC. 154. AIterations in the statement. - After the announcement of the result of the election in the polling place, the board of inspectors shall not make any alteration or amendment in any of its statements, unless it be so ordered by a competent court."

It must be remembered that these certificates of votes of candidates are only given after the oral and public announcement of the votes polled and after making the returns for the ballot box, the municipal treasurer, the provincial treasurer and Comelec.

This brings to mind the true functions of a certificate of votes. As well expressed in a case, they are: "(a) to prevent or to deter the board of inspectors or treasurers from altering the statements, because they know of the existence of such certificates (b) to advise the candidate (for mayor, in this case) definitely of the number of his votes; so that in case the election statement submitted to the municipal board of canvassers does not tally with the certificate in his hands, he may proceed to the Provincial Treasurer's Office or Commission on Elections and secure official copy of the statement there (if it agrees with his certificate), and then present such copy to the Board of canvassers (and the court) to demand the remedy provided by Sections 163 and 168"; or (c) to serve as "evidence in the protest and in the subsequent prosecution of the inspectors, if any."

Election returns should be maintained inviolate. Once the return is made and the certificates of votes of candidates are issued, no one, not even the inspectors themselves, may make any change without authority. We should not place at the whim of the inspectors, or any person for that matter, the fortunes of the candidates for a given position. Because, the candidates' fate depends in a great measure upon the election return preserved and unsullied, and unspoiled by hands of man. Tampering, falsification, spoliation of returns or making spurious returns must have to be discouraged.

Here, it is conceded that the original entry of votes for Balindong in the election return from Precinct 8 is thirteen. This number should be credited in his favor.

JIMMY S. DE CASTRO vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and AMADO A. MEDRANO

Facts: Petitioner De Castro was proclaimed Mayor of Gloria, Oriental Mindoro during the May 8, 1995 elections.

In the same elections, private respondent Medrano was proclaimed Vice Mayor of the same municipality. On May 19, 1995, petitioner's rival candidate, the late Nicolas M. Jamilla, filed an election protest before the Court .

During the pendency of said contest, Jamilla died. Four days after such death or on December 19, 1995, the trial court dismissed the election protest ruling as it did that "[a]s this case is personal, the death of the protestant extinguishes the case itself.

Petitioner replaced Jamilla as respondent in the election protest. The trial court denied private respondent's Omnibus Petition/Motion and stubbornly held that an election protest being personal to the protestant, is ipso facto terminated by the latter's death .Unable to agree with the trial court's dismissal of the election protest, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); private respondent mainly assailed the trial court orders as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Issue: WON The issue have become moot and academic?

Ruling: COMELEC granted the petition for certiorari and mandamus. It ruled that an election contest involves both the private interests of the rival candidates and the public interest in the final determination of the real choice of the electorate, and for this reason, an election contest necessarily survives the death of the protestant or the protestee.

It is true that a public office is personal to the public officer and is not a property transmissible to his heirs upon death. Thus, applying the doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum persona, upon the death of the incumbent, no heir of his may be allowed to continue holding his office in his place.

But while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer.

An election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings.

An election contest, after all, involves not merely conflicting private aspirations but is imbued with paramount public interests.

It is axiomatic that an election contest, involving as it does not only the adjudication and settlement of the private interests of the rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling once and for all the uncertainty that beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the offices within their gift, is a proceeding imbued with public interest which raises it onto a plane over and above ordinary civil actions.

For this reason, broad perspectives of public policy impose upon courts the imperative duty to ascertain by all means within their command who is the real candidate elected in as expeditious a manner as possible, without being fettered by technicalities and procedural barriers to the end that the will of the people may not be frustrated.

So inextricably intertwined are the interests of the contestants and those of the public that there can be no gainsaying the logic of the proposition that even the voluntary cessation in office of the protestee not only does not ipso facto divest him of the character of an adversary in the contest inasmuch as he retains a party interest to keep his political opponent out of the office and maintain therein his successor, but also does not in any manner impair or detract from the jurisdiction of the court to pursue the proceeding to its final conclusion.

Upon the same principle, the death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the proceedings in the election protest filed against him, and it may stated as a rule that an election contest survives and must be prosecuted to final judgment despite the death of the protestee."

The asseveration of petitioner that private respondent is not a real party in interest entitled to be substituted in the election protest in place of the late Jamilla, is utterly without legal basis.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.

Facts: People V Bayona

This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Braulio Bejasa in the Court of First Instance of Capiz, finding the defendant guilty of a violation of section 416 of the Election Law and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for thirty clays and to pay a fine of P50, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs,

The defendant was within the fence surrounding the polling place when the representative of interior took possession of the revolver the defendant was carrying.

The Solicitor-General argues that since the Government does not especially construct buildings for electoral precincts but merely utilizes whatever building there may be available, and all election precincts are within fifty meters from some road, a literal application of the law would be absurd, because members of the police force or Constabulary in pursuit of a criminal would be included in that prohibition and could not use the road in question if they were carrying firearms; that people living in the vicinity of electoral precincts would be prohibited from cleaning or handling their firearms within their own residences on registration and election days;

That the object of the Legislature was merely to prohibit the display of firearms with intention to influence in any way the free and voluntary exercise of suffrage;

In the case at bar there is no evidence that the defendant went to the election precinct either to vote or to work for the candidacy of anyone, but on the other hand the evidence shows that the defendant had no intention to go to the electoral precinct; that he was merely passing along the road in front of the building where the election was being held when a friend of his called him; that while in the strict, narrow interpretation of the law the defendant is guilty, it would be inhuman and unreasonable to convict him.

Issue: WON the defendant is guilty.

Ruling: The decision appealed from is affirmed.

The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is immaterial. It may be conceded that the defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the law in any other way, but when he got out of his automobile and carried his revolver inside of the fence surrounding the polling place, he committed the act complained of, and he committed it willfully. The act prohibited by the Election Law was complete. The intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the off ense. Unless such an offender actually makes use of his revolver, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that he intended to intimidate the voters.

The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done.

Facts: BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

This case presents for determination the scope of the constitutional provision barring elective local officials, with the exception of barangay officials, from serving more than three consecutive terms.

Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998. 1

On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco's disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.

Petitioner contends that private respondent Capco's service as mayor from September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992 should be considered as service for one full term, and since he thereafter served from 1992 to 1998 two more terms as mayor, he should be considered to have served three consecutive terms within the contemplation of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution and §43(b) of the Local Government Code. Petitioner stresses the fact that, upon the death of Mayor Cesar Borja on September 2, 1989, private respondent became the mayor and thereafter served the remainder of the term. Petitioner argues that it is irrelevant that private respondent became mayor by succession because the purpose of the constitutional provision in limiting the number of terms elective local officials may serve is to prevent a monopolization of political power.

Issue: WON a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

Ruling: Petition is dismissed. In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected. In the case before the Commission, respondent Capco was not elected to the position of Mayor in the January 18, 1988 local elections. He succeeded to such office by operation of law and served for the unexpired term of his predecessor. Consequently, such succession into office is not counted as one (1) term for purposes of the computation of the three-term limitation under the Constitution and the Local Government Code.

SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

BREN Z. GUIAO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ABER P. CANLAS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF PAMPANGA and MANUEL LUCERO, respondents.

Facts: The canvass of all election returns from all the voting centers of Pampanga had been completed without any objection raised by anyone to any of the canvassed returns. Thereafter, the Board proceeded to tally the total number of votes received by each candidate and the tabulation of the votes disclosed that the four candidates who received the highest number of votes and won in the election for the Batasan Pambansa were the following:

1. Juanita L. Nepomuceno 246,231 votes2. Egmidio L. Lingad 227,111 votes 3. Rafael L. Lazatin ....211,288 votes 4. Aber P. Canlas 203,856 votes 5. Petitioner Bren Z. Guiao garnered fifth place with 195,583 votes.

After the canvass was completed. Petitioner Guiao submit to the Board of Canvassers his written objections to the inclusion in the canvases of election returns from approximately 31 various voting centers of different municipalities. Petitioner based his challenge on the following grounds:

"Incomplete, duress, intimidation, falsified obviously manufactured, threats, coercion, Comelec's copy used not authentic. Statistically improbable, and persons in Saudi Arabia were made to appear as if they had voted."

The Chairman of the Board of Canvassers, Atty. Manuel Lucero also sent to the Commission on Elections a memorandum, stating and informing that the "Objections were raised after the completion of the canvass and requesting that the Provincial Board of Canvassers in Pampanga be authorized to proclaim the winning candidate based on the results of the completed canvass without prejudice to the outcome of the hearing on the objections.

COMELEC granted the foretasted request of the Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers. The petitioner's objections were later dismissed by the Board of Canvassers for failure to substantiate the same.

An urgent petition filed with the COMELEC, petitioner Guiao prayed that the Board of Canvassers be restrained from further proceeding with the hearing in connection with the canvassing of the results of the Batasan election in Pampanga and for the annulment of all proceedings held by said Board on account of its denial of petitioner's motion to identify, mark and introduce documentary evidence and its refusal to issue "subpoenas to summon his witnesses from various municipalities.

Issue: WON the Board of canvasser can proclaimed?

Ruling: The petition for review in this case is hereby dismissed for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner herein. The board of canvassers would have been within its legal prerogatives to have proclaimed the winning candidates without obtaining the authority to proclaim from this Commission.

Petitioner presented his Written objections only after the canvass of all the election returns or after the votes reflected in all returns had been tallied, the belatedness of the submission of petitioner's written objection renders futile its challenge to the canvass already accomplished by the Board. The Board has its legal obligation, after canvass of the returns, to proclaim the elected candidates As a matter of fact, it even appears that Mrs. Sylvia Antonio, daughter of Asserably woman-elect Juanita Nepomuceno, who ran under the UNIDO banner, herself belied the petitioner's claim of alleged irregularities and other illegal acts. Thus the certificate of canvass and proclamation of the Candidates-Elect significantly carried the written and unqualified conformity of the representative of the UNIDO, the party to which petitioner belongs.

It was only after an appreciable length of time after the completion of the canvass that petitioner's counsel interposed his objection to the inclusion of a certain number of the returns. The tardiness of the objection would be reason enough to dismiss said objection and proceed with the proclamation.

The petition failed to establish prima facie the indubitable existence of the fraud, irregularities or circumstances constituting the grounds of his written objections.

Canvass proceedings are primarily administrative and summary in nature, and a strong prima facie case backed up by a specific offer of the evidence and indication of its nature and importance has to be made out to warrant the reception of evidence aliunde and the presentation of witnesses and the delays necessarily entailed thereby.

This Court stated that the function of a Provincial Board of Canvassers is purely ministerial in nature.

First a canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function-that of compiling and adding the results as they appear in the returns transmitted to it. The canvassers are to be satisfied of the genuineness of the returns-namely, that the papers presented to them are not forged and spurious, that they are returns, and that they are signed by the proper officers. When so satisfied, they may not reject any returns because of informalities in them or because of illegal and fraudulent practices in the elections,

Thus, they cannot pass upon the validity of an election return, much less exclude it from the canvass on the ground that the votes cast in the precinct from whence it came are illegal.