Page54ELECTION LAW Atty. Gallant Soriano2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015JUAN FRIVALDO VS. COMELECG.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989

DOCTRINE:Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides further that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Filipino citizenship, if previously renounced, may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.FACTS: PetitionerJuan Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of Sorsogon province on January 22, 1988 and assumed office in due time. Respondent Salvador Estuye, president of the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of the election and proclamation of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States in 1983. Frivaldos American citizenship was admitted by him and was reflected in a certification issued by a US District Court. However, he pleaded the defense that the American citizenship was forced on him as a measure of protection from the persecution of the Marcos Dictatorship and that by actively participating in the elections, he automatically forfeited the same under the laws of the United States. He further contends that by filing his certificate of candidacy he had already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship.ISSUE:Whether or notFrivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.HELD:NO. Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. Under CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.Frivaldo did not invoke either of the first two methods and it cannot also be said that he was repatriated because even if he lose his naturalized citizenship by filing a certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC, it did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced.The reason for resolving Frivaldos citizenship at the time of his election is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must beinter aliaa citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides further that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. Hence, Frivaldo is not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.

RAMON L. LABO, JR. VS. COMELECG.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989DOCTRINE:The will of the electorate cannot change the requirement of the Local Government Code and the Constitution as would permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.The probability that many of those who voted for the public official with alleged lack of citizenship may have done so in the belief that he was qualified, only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the qualifications for the office held by him. These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited.FACTS:Petitioner Ramon Labo was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City on January 20, 1988. Questioning Labos citizenship as a qualification for his office, private respondent LuizLardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto on January 26, 1988, but the filing fee was paid only on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his proclamation.Labocontends that the petition should not be given due course as it was filed beyond the reglementary period of ten days under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.Prior to the filing of the petition for quo warranto, two administrative decisions were rendered on the question of the Labos citizenship. The first was rendered by the COMELEC finding Labo to be a citizen of the Philippines on the ground that there was no direct proof that he had been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. The second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, acting upon Labos application for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration.It ruled that he was not a citizen of the Philippines based on the official statement of the Australian Government that Labo was an Australian citizen by reason of his naturalization in 1976. However,Laboclaims that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship, but instead it made him a dual national. He further argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a futile technicality that should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a majority. ISSUE:Whether or not Petitioner Labois eligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City.HELD: NO. Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It did not appear in the record, nor did the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods.For this reason, Labos claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines must be denied. Labo was not a citizen of the Philippines on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988. He was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution because of his alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government Code which provides that An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected Moreover, even if Labo was elected by the majority, the people of that locality could not change the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief that he was qualified, only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELECG.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

DOCTRINE: For the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: (1) An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) Abona fideintention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) Acts which correspond with the purpose.FACTS:Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and Cirilo Roy Montejo were candidates for the Congressional seat in the First District of Leyte. Montejo filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" against Marcos on the ground that the latter did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency, which is not less than one year immediately preceding the election. Marcos declared in her certificate of candidacy that she has been a resident in the constituency where she seeks to be elected for seven months only. Marcos filed an Amended certificate of candidacy changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate but the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte rejected the certificate on the ground that it was filed out of time. Marcos went ahead and filed the same certificate with the COMELECs Head Office in Manila. She contends that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.Thereafter, the 2nd division of the COMELEC granted Montejos petition for disqualification and cancelled Marcos original certificate of candidacy. It held that In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Furthermore, it held that when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, she chose San Juan, Metro Manila as her residence. Thus, heranimus revertendiis pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.After the May 1995 elections, the COMELEC issued two resolutions, the first allowed Marcos proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte, but such resolution was reversed on the same day it was issued and directed that Marcos proclamation be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.Marcos filed a petition averring that she won the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers. ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the ConstitutionSC RULING: YESThe court ruled that Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. However,for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile. The court ruled that it is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. It further held that Marcos merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Marcos held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades but none of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.Lastly, it ruled that domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: (1) An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) Abona fideintention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) Acts which correspond with the purpose. All the three requirements must concur, otherwise, the presumption of continuity of residence cannot be rebutted.

Aquino vs. COMELECG.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995

DOCTRINE:Domicileof origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change ofdomicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change ofdomicile; abona fideintention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.FACTS:Agapito Aquino is a candidate for a congressional post in the the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, he declared that he is a resident in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for a period of 10 months. Thereafter, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify on the ground that latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. The following day, Aquino filed another certificate of candidacy where he declared that he resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13) days. During the hearing of the case against Aquino, the latter presented among others, a lease contract between him & Feliciano. In May 6, 1995, The COMELEC declares Aquino eligible to run for the Office of Representative in the Second Legislative District of Makati City. Move Makati &Bedon filed a motion for reconsideration. After the elections were held, Aquino garnered the highest number of votes as against his two other competitors. Therafter, Move Makati &Bedon filed an Urgent Motion to suspend Aquinos proclamation. On May 15, 1995, the COMELEC issued an Order suspending Aquinos proclamation.Aquino filed a motion to lift the suspension, and on June 2, the COMELEC resolved to proceed with the proclamation. However, on the same day, the COMELEC reversed the May 6 resolution and declared Aquino ineligible to run for office and thus disqualified as a candidate. Hence this present petition.ISSUE: WON petitioner failed to comply with the residency requirement mandated by the Constitution?SC RULING: YESThe Court agreed with the COMELEC that in order that Aquino could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must prove that he has established not just residence butdomicileof choice.It held that the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,"where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain,i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.The Court upheld the COMELECs findings that Aquino is a resident of San Jose, Concepcion Tarlac for 52 years immediately preceding the 1992 elections, that his birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents. It is therefore clear that domicileof originof record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. Furthermore, Aquinos intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City was evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. Domicileof origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change ofdomicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change ofdomicile; abona fideintention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.

Dela Torre vs. Comelec G.R. No. 121592. July 5, 1996Doctrine: In determining whether a criminal act involves moral turpitude the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes in mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes in mala prohibita do not. Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. Actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that property received is stolen displays a degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which by their very nature are crimes of moral turpitude. The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence.Facts:On May 6, 1995, Comelec declared Ronaldo Dela Torre disqualified from running as the Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the last May 8, 1995 citing Sec. 40 (a) of RA 7160 (Local Govt. Code 1991) that a person who is sentenced by final judgement for an offence involving moral turpitude for an offense by 1 year or more of imprisonment within 2 years after serving sentence is disqualified from running for any elective local position. Comelec further held that Dela Torre was found to be guilty of violation of the Anti fencing law by the Municipal Trial Court on June 1, 1990 and the decision was later affirmed on appeal in the RTC and became final by January 18, 1991. Comelec held that there exist a legal ground to disqualify Dela Torre to run as a candidate since the nature of the offence of the Anti Fencing Law certainly involves moral turpitude.Dela Torre claims that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC on December 21, 1994 which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well.Issue: 1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude. 2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40 (a)s applicability.Held:1. Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. From Sec 2 of PD 1612 fencing may be committed when The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft

Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both the fence and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded ones peaceful dominion for gain - thus deliberately reneging in the process private duties they owe their fellowmen or society in a manner contrary to x x x accepted and customary rule of right and duty x x x, justice, honesty x x x or good morals.2. No. Dela Torres conviction of fencing which we have heretofore declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40 (a), subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation

Moreno vs. COMELEC and MejesG.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006DOCTRINE:In harmonizing the LGC and the Probation Law, the Courts deem that the Probation Law is an exception to the LGC. Sec. 40(a) which provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position and this should not include probationers since they do not serve the sentence adjudged to them since probation suspends it and final discharge of probation shall operate to restore him all civil rights lost or suspended.FACTS:In this Petition dated July 6, 2005, Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails the ResolutionCOMELEC which disqualified him from running for the elective office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and SangguniangKabataan Elections. The disqualification was an off shoot of a petition filed by Norma L. Mejes on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998. Moreno filed an answer claiming that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted probation. But the COMELEC since he was only released from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2) years thereafter thus he is still disqualified for the upcoming elections.Petitioner argues that the disqualification applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Further, even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.Hence, this petition.ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running as Punong Barangay.SC RULING: NOThe Probation Law is an exception to the provision of the LGC as the legislature did not intend the inclusion of probationers in the disqualification as it can be gleaned from its act when it can, through its legislative wisdom and power, include Probationers since those covered by the disqualification also covers those who can apply for Probation. Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough at first glance. The phrase service of sentence, understood in itsgeneral and common sense, means the confinement of a convictedperson in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court. COMELEC has broadened the coverage of the law to include even those who did not serve a day of their sentence because they were granted probation.It is to be noted that those who have not served their sentence by reason of the grant of probation which, the Court reiterates, should not be equated with service of sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not even begin to run. Moreover, Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence and during the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.

Grego v. Comelec and BascoG.R. No. 125955 June 19, 1997

DOCTRINE:Absent any express provision in the Law, a newly enacted statute applies prospectively and not retroactively. There is no provision in the statue which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively. Lexprospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward. Thus, the LGC only applies to instances that occurred on January 1, 1992 and thereafter. FACTS:The instant special civil action for certiorari and prohibition impugns the resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in SPA No. 95-212 dated July 31, 1996, dismissing petitioners motion for reconsideration of an earlier resolution rendered by the COMELECs First Division on October 6, 1995, which also dismissed the petition for disqualificationfiled by petitioner Wilmer Grego against private respondent HumbertoBasco.On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by no less than this Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain NenaTordesillas. The Court held:WHEREFORE, FINDING THE RESPONDENT DEPUTY SHERIFF HUMBERTO BASCO OF THE CITY COURT OF MANILA GUILTY OF SERIOUS MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE FOR THE SECOND TIME, HE IS HEREBY DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS.Basco ran for councilor of the Second District of Manila and won in the three elections he participated in, respectively the Jan. 18, 1988 elections, May 11, 1992 synchronized National Elections and May 8, 1995. His second election was contested due to the Tordesillas ruling but was dismissed. On his third election, Grego filed for his disqualification. The COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case on May 14, 1995, where it ordered the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda.Before the parties could comply with this directive, however, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco on May 17, 1995, as a duly elected councilor for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who vied for the seats. Basco immediately took his oath of office before the Honorable Ma. Ruby Bithao-Camarista, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch I, Manila.Petitioner herein, comes to the Court for relief and anchors his basis for disqualification of Basco on the retroactive effect of the LGC, the irregularity of the implied condonation of the electorate, the invalidity of the proclamation of Basco because it was. He asks thatRomualdoMaranan, the 7th in the elections and next to Basco be proclaimed as the winner of the last slot. ISSUE:Whether or not respondent is disqualified because he was removed from office due to an administrative case which removed him from Office in 1981.SC RULING: NOThe court proclaimed that there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction evinced by COMELEC in dismissing the petition for disqualification of Basco. In answering the contentions of Grego, the Court ruled that in construing Sec. 40 (b) of the LGC, which provides for the disqualification from running in an elective office of people removed from office as a result of an Administrative Case which was promulgated and took effect on January 1, 1992. Absent any express provision in the Law, a newly enacted statute applies prospectively and not retroactively.

REYES vs. COMELECGR No. 120905, March 17, 1996

DOCTRINE: The filing of a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court did not prevent the administrative decision from attaining finality. An original action of certiorari is an independent action and does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in the proceeding; a case shall not be rendered moot and academic if dilatory tactics were employed to render such case moot and academic; the second highest in votes cannot be proclaimed winner if should it appear that the candidate with the highest votes was declared disqualified.FACTS: Petitioner Renato U. Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. An administrative complaint was filed against him with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. After learning that the Sanggunian had terminated the proceedings in the case and WAS ABOUT TO RENDER JUDGMENT, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Regional Trial Court, alleging that the proceedings had been terminated without giving him a chance to be heard. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN found petitoner guilty.A temporary restraining order was issued by the court, enjoining the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from proceeding with the case. As a result, the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan could not be served upon Reyes. Following the expiration of the temporary restraining order and without any injunction being issued by the Regional Trial Court, an attempt was made to serve the decision upon petitioners counsel in Manila. However, the latter refused to accept the decision. Subsequent attempts to serve the decision upon petitioner himself also failed, as he also refused to accept the decision.Petitoner filed a certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC in Bongabong. A complainant sought the disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor, citing the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) which states that persons removed from office as a result of an administrative case are disqualified from running for any elective postition. Nonetheless, because of the absence of any contrary order from the COMELEC, petitioner Reyes was voted for in the elections held on May 8, 1995.COMELECs Second Division issued the questioned resolution, which found the petitioner DISQUALIFIED from running for public office, in conformity with the Local Government Code. Julius M. Garcia, who obtained the second highest number of votes next to petitioner Reyes intervened in the COMELEC, contending that because Reyes was disqualified, he (Garcia) was entitled to be proclaimed mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong, apparently unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the COMELEC, proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor.ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the filing of petition for certiorari prevented the Sangguning Panlalawigan from attaining finality.2. Whether or not Reyes' reelection rendered the administrative complaint against him moot and academic.3. Whether or not Garcia is entitled to be proclamed mayor of Bongabong.RULING:1. No. The filing of a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court did not prevent the administrative decision from attaining finality. An original action of certiorari is an independent action and does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in the proceeding. Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court.In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining order was issued by the Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunction was subsequently issued. The temporary restraining order issued expired after 20 days. From that moment on, there was no more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon petitioner. The net result is that when the elections were held on May 8, 1995, the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final and executory.2. No. Herein respondent Mayor Reyes was given by this Sanggunian a period of sixty one (61) days to file his verified answer however, he resorted to dilatory motions which in the end proved fatal to his cause. Veritably, he neither filed nor furnished the complainant a copy of his answer. Failure of the respondent to file his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the complaint shall be considered a waiver of his rights to present evidence in his behalf (Art. 126 of Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991). All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies (Sec. 16, Art. III of the Contitution).Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file his answer. He failed to do so. Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would be presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner) would then have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. But on the date set, he failed to appear. He would say later that this was because he had filed a motion for postponement and was awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrays the pattern of delay he employed to render the case against him moot by his election.3. No. In the latest ruling on the question, this Court said:To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances.Garcias plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him.

MERCADO vs. MANZANO and COMELECGR No. 135083, May 26, 1999

DOCTRINE: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The prohibition in Section 5 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution) was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Eduardo B. Manzano (si Kuya Edu!) obtained the highest votes; followed by Ernesto S. Mercado and Gabriel Daza. The proclamation of private respondent (Kuya Edu) was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. [Born in the US (jus soli), of Filipino parents (jus sanguinis)]In its resolution, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.Kuya Edu filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998. Accordingly, pursuant to the above COMELEC Resolution, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.Petitioner sought to intervene in the case. However, this motion was not resolved by COMELEC. Instead, COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Pursuant this resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati. Petitioner filed certiorari before SC.ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Kuya Edu is disqualified from running for any elective position on the ground of dual citizenship under the LGC. NORULING: 1. No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some POSITIVE ACT, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, Section 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows:. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual allegiance - and I reiterate a dual allegiance - is larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.Clearly, in including Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines.

Lopez vs. ComelecG.R. No. 182701. July 23, 2008

Doctrine: Citizen Retention and Reaquisition Act of 2003 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for public office in the Philippines. i.e. that they make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. Facts:Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007.On October 25, 2007, Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public office.

Lopez argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Thus possessing all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman. After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the winner.

On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition for disqualification of Lopez, ruling that he was not able to regain his Filipino citizenship in the manner provided by law. According to the poll body, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the elections, petitioner should have made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship which he failed to do.Issue: Is Lopez a qualified candidate in the elections?Held:No. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5(2) of the said law states that those who retain or reaquire their citizenship and seek elective public office must meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. While Lopez re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law, the law explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. Lopez failed to comply with this requirement. There is no evidence presented that will show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225. The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopezs failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law. Absent such proof Lopez cannot be allowed respondent to run for Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay.While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.

Case no. 11

Rodriguez v. COMELEC

Doctrine: The Marquez Decision defining "fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. Obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.

Facts:Petitioner won the Gobernatorial post in Quezon City Province during the May, 1992 elections. Respondent Marquez then challenged such victory contending that Rodriguez was a fugitive from justice which is a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code. Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the US where a charge, filed on November 12,1985 is pending against the latter before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property.Petitioner on the other hand contends that long before the felony complaint was allegedly filed, he was already in the Philippines and he did not know of the filing of the same nor was he aware that he was being proceeded against criminally. He cannot be deemed a fugitive from justice, because to be so, one must be aware of the filing of the criminal complaint, and his disappearance in the place where the long arm of the law, thru the warrant of arrest, may reach him is predicated on a clear desire to avoid and evade the warrant.

Issue: Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice as comprehended in the Marquez Decision

Held:No. The Marquez Decision defining "fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution The intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.

Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court, by almost 5 months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time.

Case no. 12

Mateo Caasi v. CA

Doctrine: To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." The waiver of an immigrant status must be manifested by some act/s independent of and done prior to the filing of candidacy for elective office in the country for without such prior waiver, he is disqualified to run for any office.

Facts:Respondent Merito Miguel won as the Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan during the 1988 local elections. Petitioner Caasi sought Meritos disqualification on the ground that the former is a green card holder, hence a permanents resident in US and not Bolinao. Merito contended that although he holds a green card, he is not a permanent resident in US but in Bolinao, that he obtained the green card only for convenience, and that he was able to vote in all previous elections including the plebiscite, ratification of the Constitution and the Congressional elections in 1987.

Issue:W.O.N. Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident/or of immigrant to USA prior to local elections in 1988?

Held:NO. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country", Sec. 68 of BP 881. The waiver of an immigrant status must be manifested by some act/s independent of and done prior to the filing of candidacy for elective office in the country for without such prior waiver, he is disqualified to run for any office.

The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.

CASE TITLE: Villaber V. COMELECGR NO. 148326 DATE: November 15, 2001DOCTRINE: The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. In People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda, we held that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imports deceit and certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano vs. Martinez, through Justice Pedro L. Yap, transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. FACTS:Both petitioner Pablo Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cougas were rival candidate for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao Del Sur dating the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Congressman on Feb. 1, 2001 file Cagas filed his on Feb. 28, 2001. On March 4 ,2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, COMELEC, Davao Del Sur, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latter COC. Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition that on March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by the RTC of Manila for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 and was sentenced to suffer 1 year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum of P100,00.00. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), he is disqualified to run for any public office. In his answer to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that his conviction has not become final and executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial court for promulgation in his presence. Further, even if the judgment of conviction was already final and executory, it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude.ISSUE:WON violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude HELD:Yes, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, because its violation imports deceit and certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person. A drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contract to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or food morals.

CASE 14 CASE TITLE: De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers of La UnionGR NO. L-24721 DATE: November 3, 1925DOCTRINE:When the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of him who was obligated to observe it, and such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices or for the intimidation of voters, and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the popular will, the law will be held directory and such departure will be considered a harmless irregularity.FACTS: Tomas De Guzman filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court seeking to compel the Board of Canvassers of La Union to annul the votes counted in favor of Juan Lucero and to declare him as the duly elected governor of La Union based on the fact that certificate of candidacy filed by Juan Lucero was not made under oath in violation of Sec. 404 of the Election Law. Lucero filed a motion to dismiss the petition on 3 grounds namely: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction on the subject-matter of the complaint; (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the members of the board of canvassers; and (3) the petition failed to state a cause of action. ISSUE: WON the failure of Lucero in filing his certificate of candidacy under oath was fatal to his proclamation as the duly elected governor of La Union HELD: No. The seeming irregularity in the filing of Luceros certificate of candidacy does not invalidate his election for the fundamental reason that after it was proven by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to. In the case of Gardiner vs. Romulo, it was held that The provisions of the Election Law declaring that a certain irregularity in an election procedure is fatal to the validity of the ballot or of the returns, or when the purpose and spirit of the law would be plainly defeated by a substantial departure from the prescribed method, are mandatory. When the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of him who was obligated to observe it, and such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices or for the intimidation of voters, and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the popular will, the law will be held directory and such departure will be considered a harmless irregularity. And in Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, it was held that he rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the election, they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. The various and numerous provisions of the Election Law were adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the government and not to defeat that object. When the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply because the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of the ballot have not done their duty. The law provides a remedy, by criminal action, against them. They should be prosecuted criminally, and the will of the honest voter, as expressed through his ballot, should be protected and upheld.

CASE 15CASE TITLE: RODILLAS vs. COMELECGR NO. 119055 DATE: July 10, 1995DOCTRINE: The requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement without which the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provision of the law. FACTS: Petitioner (Roy Rodillas) and private respondent (IsabeloDotimas) were both candidates for Punong Barangay in Barangay San Rafael, San Nicolas, Pangasinan in the May 9, 1994 elections. Petitioner obtained 65 votes as against private respondent's 61 votes. An election protest was consequently filed by respondent with the 9th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayug San Nicolas presided by respondent Judge. After due hearing, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered its judgment on May 27, 1994 finding private respondent to have obtained 68 votes as against petitioner's 66 votes. On May 31, 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court and paid P150.00 as appeal fees with the Regional Trial Court, Tayug, Pangasinan. On June 14, 1994, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court forwarded the records of the case to the COMELEC. At the same time, petitioner paid with the COMELEC the amount of P510.00. On July 20, 1994, the First Division of the COMELEC denied the appeal for petitioner's belated filing of the appeal and legal research fees. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal outright when the most it could have done was to refuse to take action on the case until the fees were paid in full HELD: No, The procedure for perfecting an appeal from the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in a barangay election protest case is set forth in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as follows: Sec. 3. Notice of Appeal. Within five (5) days after promulgation of the decision of the court, the aggrieved party may file with said court a notice of appeal, and serve a copy thereof upon the attorney of record of the adverse party (Rule 22). Sec. 3. Appeal fees. The appellant in election cases shall pay an appeal fee as follows: (b) Election cases appealed from courts of limited jurisdiction. . . . P500.00. Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. If the fees above prescribed are not paid, Commission may refuse to take action until they are paid and dismiss the action or proceeding (Rule 40). The mere filing of the notice of appeal was not enough. It should be accompanied by the payment of the correct amount of appeal fee Petitioner had only five days from receipt of the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court or until June 5, 1994 to perfect his appeal. While he timely filed his Amended Notice of Appeal on June 2, 1994, he paid the amount of P510.00 representing the appeal and legal research fees only on June 14, 1994. It is, therefore, evident that petitioner belatedly paid said amount. Besides, the correct amounts of the appeal and the research fees are P500.00 and P20.00 respectively, or P520.00 not P510.00 as paid by petitioner.

PNOC ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MARCELINO TONGCO, petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MANUEL S. PINEDA, respondents.

G.R. No. 100947May 31, 1993

DOCRTINE: Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, even those organized under the general laws on incorporation and therefore not having an original or legislative charter, and even if they do not fall under the Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code. In other words, Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination of employment in addition to those set forth in the Labor Code, as amended.

FACTS: Manuel S. Pineda was employed with the PNOC-EDC (a subsidiary of PNOC) as Geothermal Construction Secretary. Pineda decided to run and eventually proclaimed elected to, the office of councilor. Despite so qualifying as councilor, and assuming his duties as such, he continued working for PNOC-EDC as the latter's Geothermal Construction Secretary.

Upon inquiry by Tongco (Dept Manager PNOC-EDC), the Legal Department rendered an opinion to the effect that Manuel S. Pineda should be considered ipso facto resigned upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy in November, 1987, in accordance with Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Pineda, invoked that while the government-owned or controlled corporations are covered by the Civil Service Law (as is taken to mean in Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code of 1985), the subsidiaries or corporate offsprings are not."

ISSUE: Whether or not an employee in a government-owned or controlled corporations without an original charter (and therefore not covered by Civil Service Law) nevertheless falls within the scope of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.

HELD: YES. Sec. 66. Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

It was no doubt aware that in light of Section 2 (1), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution: (a) government-owned or controlled corporations were of two (2) categories those with original charters, and those organized under the general law and (b) employees of these corporations were of two (2) kinds those covered by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations because employed in corporations having original charters, and those not subject to Civil Service Law but to the Labor Code because employed in said corporations organized under the general law, or the Corporation Code. Yet Congress made no effort to distinguish between these two classes of government-owned or controlled corporations or their employees in the Omnibus Election Code or subsequent related statutes, particularly as regards the rule that any employee "in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy."

What all this imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, even those organized under the general laws on incorporation and therefore not having an original or legislative charter, and even if they do not fall under the Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code. In other words, Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination of employment in addition to those set forth in the Labor Code, as amended.

REP. MA. CATALINA L. GOvs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 147741 May 10, 2001

DOCTRINE: An administrative resolution can not contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law. Such requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional.

FACTS: On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte.On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor of the province of Leyte. Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. However, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor.

At that later hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy or withdrawal thereof, and considering that the travel time from Tacloban to Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner decided to send her affidavit of withdrawal by fax to her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter submitted the same to the office of the election officer of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28 a.m., 01 March 2001.5 On the same day, at 1:15 p.m., the election officer of Baybay Leyte, received the original of the affidavit of withdrawal.

ISSUE: Is there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Baybay, Leyte?

HELD: YES.

The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the requirement of the law.

Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, provides that:

"No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has file more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices."

There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality.

While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20 November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed,such requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative resolution can not contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law. Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy. the COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declare petitioner ineligible for both positions for which she filed certificates of candidacy.

Luna v COMELECG.R. No. 165983 April 24, 2007

Doctrine: If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.Facts: Luna filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of vice-mayor of Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for Hans Roger, who withdrew his certificate of candidacy on the same date. Ruperto Blanco, Election Officer of Lagayan, Abra removed the name of Hans Roger from the list of candidates and placed the name of Luna. Private respondents filed a petition for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy or disqualification of Luna. They alleged that Luna made a false material representation in her certificate of candidacy because Luna is not a registered voter of Lagayan, Abra but a registered voter of Bangued, Abra. They also claimed that Lunas certificate of candidacy was not validly filed because the substitution by Luna for Hans Roger was invalid and that Hans Roger was only 20 years old on Election Day and, therefore, he was disqualified to run for vice-mayor and cannot be substituted by Luna. COMELEC affirmed the finding that Hans Roger, being underage, may not be validly substituted by Luna. It also ruled that Lunas right to due process was not violated because Luna was notified of the petition and was given the opportunity to be heard. However, the COMELEC ruled that Luna was a registered voter of Lagayan, Abra. Hence, this petition.Issue: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that there was no valid substitution by Luna for Hans Roger.Ruling: YES. Section 77 of the Election Code prescribes the rules on substitution of an official candidate of a registered political party who dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy.Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of election day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that Luna complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute for Hans Roger. In this case, there was no petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Hans Roger For if the COMELEC cancelled Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy after the proper proceedings, then he is no candidate at all and there can be no substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course. However, Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy was never cancelled or denied due course by the COMELEC. Moreover, Hans Roger already withdrew his certificate of candidacy before the COMELEC declared that he was not a valid candidate. Therefore, unless Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy was denied due course or cancelled in accordance with Section 78 of the Election Code, Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy was valid and he may be validly substituted by Luna.

Monsale v. NicoG.R. No. L-2539 May 28, 1949

Doctrine:The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filling of certificates of candidacy and in fixing a time limit therefor are (a) to enable the voter to know, at least sixty days before a regular election the candidate among whom they are to make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast; for if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voter to duly registered candidates, there might be as many person voted for as there were voters, and votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious person as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election.Facts:Monsale withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947, but on November 7, attempted to revive it by withdrawing his withdrawal. The COMELEC, however, rules on November 8 that Monsale could no longer be a candidate in spite of his desire to withdrawal. A canvass of the election returns showed that Paulino M. Nico received 2,291 votes; another candidate, Gregorio Fagutao126, votes; and the protestant Jose F. Monsale, none, evidently because the vote cast in his favor had not been counted for the reason that he was not a registered candidate. Consequently, Nico was proclaimed elected.Issue: Whether a candidate who has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy may revive it, either by withdrawing his letter of withdrawal or by filling a new certificate of candidacy, after the deadline provided by law for the filling of such certificate.Ruling: No. Section 31 of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180) providesthat "no person shall be eligible unless, within the time fixed by law, he files a duty signed and sworn certificate of candidacy." Section 36 provides that "at least sixty days before a regular election and thirty days at least before a special election, the . . . certificates of candidacy for municipal offices shall be filed with the municipal secretary, who shall immediately send copies thereof to the polling place concerned, to the secretary of the provincial board and to the Commission on Elections." Section 38 further that "if, after the expiration of the time limit for filling certificate of candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly filed should die or become disqualified, any legally qualified citizen may file a certificate of candidacy for the office for which the deceased or disqualified person was a candidate in accordance with the preceding section on or before midday of the day of the election, and, if the death or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and the midday of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of inspection of the political division where he is a candidate or in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate, with the Commission on Elections."Therefore, thirty-one days before the election, the protestant ceased to be candidate by his own voluntary act. When he withdrew his withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy, can only be considered as a new certificate of candidacy which, having been filed only four days before the election, could not legally be accepted under the law, which expressly provides that such certificate should be filed at sixty days before the election.The only instance wherein the law permit the filling of a certificate ofcandidacy after the expiration of the time limit for filing it is when a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duty filed dies or becomes disqualified.The Commission on Election was, therefore, right in holding as it did that the protestant "can no longer be a candidate in spite of his desire to withdraw his withdrawal."

CASE TITLE: CIPRIANO VS COMELECG.R. No. 158830 August 10, 2004

DOCTRINE: The denial of due course or cancellation of ones certificate of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.FACTS:Petitioner Ellan Marie Cipriano filed with the COMELEC her certificate of candidacy as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) for the SK elections. On the date of the elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363 adopting the recommendation of the Commissions Law Department to deny due course to or cancel the certificates of candidacy of several candidates for the SK elections, including petitioner. The ruling was based on the findings of the Law Department that petitioner and all the other candidates affected by said resolution were not registered voters in the barangay where they intended to run. Despite this, her name was not deleted on the list and she later on landed as the winner. After learning of Resolution No. 5363, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of said resolution. Petitioner claimed that she was denied due process when her certificate of candidacy was cancelled by the Commission without notice and hearing. The COMELEC asserts that it is authorized to motu proprio deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy based on its broad administrative power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections. ISSUE:Whether the COMELEC, in the exercise of its administrative power erred in disqualifying petitioner.HELD:YES. It was an error on the part of the COMELEC to disqualify a candidate while in the exercise of its administrative power.The COMELEC as an independent Constitutional Commission is clothed with the three powers of government - executive or administrative, legislative, and quasi-judicial powers. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. On the other hand, where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt. While the Commission may look into patent defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body.The denial of due course or cancellation of ones certificate of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The determination whether a material representation in the certificate of candidacy is false or not, or the determination whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may result to a deprivation of ones right to run for public office, or, as in this case, ones right to hold public office, it is only proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified of the proceedings against him and that he be given the opportunity to refute the allegations against him.

CASE TITLE: ABCEDE VS IMPERIALG.R. No. L-13001 March 18, 1958

DOCTRINE:in the absence of clear and positive provision to such effect in the law, the COMELEC cannot pass upon the question as to whether a candidate is qualified to run for the aspired position.FACTS:In anticipation of the upcoming presidential election, petitioner Alfredo Abcede filed before the COMELEC a certificate of candidacy for presidency. After which, the COMELEC celled its attention together with other candidates to appear before the same on "to show cause why their certificates of candidacy should be considered as filed in good faith and to be given due course". After due hearing, at which Abcede appeared and introduced evidence, the Commission issued a resolution, ordering that the certificates of candidacy of including that of said petitioner, "shall not be given due course. The commission reasoned that with petitioners platform of redeeming the Japanese war notes which is in violation of Fraud Order No. 2 issued by Bureau of Posts, his filing of certificate of candidacy was attendant with bad faithas he was engaged in a scheme to obtain money from the public by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. The Commission is convinced that the certificate of candidacy of Alfredo Abcede was filed for motives other than a bona fide desire to obtain a substantial number of votes of the electorate.ISSUE:Whether or not the COMELEC erred in denying the certificate of candidacy of petitioner.HELD: Yes. The COMELEC erred in denying petitioners certificate of candidacy. The Revised Election Code in Section 36 and 37 mandates the commission to accept certificate of candidacy and shall order the preparation and distribution of copies for the same to all the election precincts of the Philippines. The laws give the Commission no discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioner's certificate of candidacy. On the contrary, the Commission has, admittedly, the "ministerial" duty to receive said certificate of candidacy. As the branch of the executive department to which the Constitution has given the "exclusive charge" of the "enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely "administrative questions." (Article X, sec. 2, Constitution of the Philippines.) It cannot therefore rule as to who whether among the individuals who equally possess the minimum requirements of the law can run and pursue its candidacy. The question whether in order to enjoy those benefits a candidate must be capable of "understanding the full meaning of his acts and the true significance of election," and must have over a month prior, to the elections "the tiniest chance to obtain the favorable indorsement of a substantial portion of the electorate," is a matter of policy, not of administration and enforcement of the law, which policy must be determined by Congress in the exercise of its legislative functions. Apart from the absence of specific statutory grant of such general, broad power as the Commission claims to have, it is dubious minate and undefined manner necessary in order that it could pass upon the factors relied upon in said resolution and such grant must not he deemed made, in the absence of clear and positive provision to such effect, which is absent in the case at bar.Hence, it was an error on the part of the COMELEC to deny petitioners certificate of candidacy.

Case No. 22Garvida v. SalesG.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997

Doctrine: The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election. The only exception is when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency. The SK official must hot have turned 21 years old before his election. Reading Section 423 (b) together with Section 428 of the Local Government Code, the latest date at which an SK elective official turns 21 years old is on the day of his election. The maximum age of a youth official must therefore be exactly 21 years on election day.

Facts:On April 13, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguning Kabataan, Brgy. San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The election officer disapproved petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that she exceeded the age limit. The COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event that she won. Petitioner garnered 78 votes as against respondents votes of 76. In accordance with the COMELEC order, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition.Issue:Whether or not petitioner was eligible to run as SK Chairman.Held:No.In the case at bar, petitioner was 21 years old, 11 months and 5 days on the day of the election. If the candidate is over the maximum age limit on the day of the election, he is ineligible. In view whereof, petitioner is declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy and is ordered to vacate her position as SK Chairman.

Case No. 23Loong v. ComelecG.R. No. 93986. December 22, 1992.

Doctrine:Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that in case a filing a certificate of candidacy has committed false representation, a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy may be filed within 25 days from the time the certificate was filed. Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure which provides that the petition for disqualification may be filed at any time after the last day for filing a certificate of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation cannot apply.Facts:Petitioner Loong filed his certificate of candidacy on 15 January 1990 (the last day for the filing of the same) for vice-governor of the Muslim Mindanao Autonomous Region. Private respondent filed the petition (SPA 90-006) to disqualify candidate Loong on the ground that petitioner made a false representation as to his age only 49 days from the date Loongs certificate of candidacy was filed, and 16 days after the election itself.Issue:Whether the petition for disqualification was timely filed.Held:No. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that in case a filing a certificate of candidacy has committed false representation, a petition to cancel the certificate of the aforesaid person may be filed within 25 days from the time the certificate was filed. Clearly SPA 90-006 was filed beyond the 25-day period. We do not agree with respondents contention that the petition for disqualification may be filed at any time after the last day for filing a certificate of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, applying Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. The petition filed to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age does not fall under the grounds for disqualification in Rule 25. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission which has no legislative power. Thus, it cannot supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.

Case No. 24Lanot v. ComelecG.R. No. 164858. November 16, 2006.Doctrine: The essential elements of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period. The second element requires the existence of a candidate. Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who has filed a certificate of candidacy to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a candidate.Facts:On 19 March 2004, petitioners filed a petition for disqualification under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against Vicente Eusebio before the Comelec. Petitioners alleged that Eusebio engaged in an election campaign in various forms on various occasions outside the designated campaign period. The Comelec granted the petition, but later on reversed the same with the issuance of another order.Issue:Whether or not respondent was guilty of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.Held:No.Because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for purposes of printing of official ballots, Eusebio filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress, however, never intended the filing of a certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 to make the person filing to become immediately a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots.Under Section 3(b) of the Omnibus Election Code, the campaign period for local officials commences 45 days before election day. For the 2004 local elections, this puts the campaign period on 24 March 2004. This also puts the last day for filing of COCs on 23 March 2004. Eusebio is deemed to have filed his COC on this date for purposes other than the printing of ballots because this is the interpretation of Section 80 most favorable to the one charged with this violation. Thus, Eusebio became a candidate only on 23 March 2004. Acts committed by Eusebio prior to his becoming a candidate even constituting election campaigning or partisan election activities are not punishable under Section 80.

BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSG.R. No. 103956. March 31, 1992DOCTRINE: COMELEC cannot impose prohibitions which will curtail rights enshrined under the Constitution. FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347. Petitioner BloUmparAdiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. Sec 21(f) RA 2134.ISSUE: whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes. RULING: The COMELEC's prohibition is null and void on constitutional grounds. First the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). In the National Press Club, case, the Court had occasion to reiterate the preferred status of freedom of expression even as it validated COMELEC regulation of campaigns through political advertisements. When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. Prohibition did not pass the clear and preset danger rule. Second the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. It is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. Third the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. COMELECG.R. No. 133486. January 28, 2000

DOCTRINE: COMELEC cannot ban exit polls. FACTS: ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to c