Election Law Case Digest

8/8/2019 Election Law Case Digest

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ELECTION LAW CASE DIGESTS (FROM ELECTION CONTEST)

ELECTION CONTESTS

16 TOMARONG V. LUBGUBAN269 SCRA 624

(TAN, L.)

FACTS:Several candidates including Tomarong were defeated in the 1994Barangay Elections in Siquijor. They all filed an election protestbefore the respective MCTCs. The winning candidates filed theiranswers praying that the petitions be dismissed based on theaffirmative defense that the protestants failed to attach to theirpetitions the required certification on non-forum shopping asprovided for in SC-AC No. 04-94.

The MCTC initially ruled to dismiss but deferred t o the Secretary ofJustice who then deferred to the Court Administrator who ruled that

the certification on non-forum shopping should be required inelections contests before the MTCs. Thus this petition under Rule65.

HELD: The requirement of the certification of non-forum shopping isrequired for election contests.

Yes. The Court, citing Loyola v. Court of Appeals, said that: We donot agree that SC-AC No. 04-94 is not applicable to election cases.There is nothing in the Circular that indicates that it does not applyto election cases. On the contrary, it expressly provides that therequirements therein, which are in addition to those in pertinentprovisions of the Rules of Court and existing circulars, shall bestrictly complied with in the filing of complaints, petitions,applications or other initiatory pleadings in all courts and agenciesother the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. Ubi lex nondistinguit nec nos distinguire debemus.

In this case, the petitioners filed the required certification 18 daysafter filing their petitions. It cannot be considered substantialcompliance with the requirements of the Circular. Quite obviously,the reglementary period for filing the protest had, by then, alreadyexpired. Petition dismissed.

Note: There can be substantial compliance even after a motion todismiss has been filed on the ground of lack of certificate of non-forum shopping but it must be done asap (the next day) otherwise

the value of the SC Circular would lose its value.

17 BEAGAN V. BORJA261 SCRA 474(TEEHANKEE)

FACTS:W May 1994. Barangay Elections in Bislig, Tanauan, LeyteW Election protest filed by Arnulfo Santillano, Egonio as

protestee, Beegan as intervenorW About revision of three ballot boxes completed in October

1994, Revision Committee presented its report to the CourtNovember 3, 1994

WProblem arises when the abovementioned ballots werereopened for Xeroxing purposes for the perusal of theprotestees counsel

W Office and Court Administrator viewed acts of respondentsin effecting the reopening of the ballot boxes and copyingtantamount to misconduct in office

W Balano (clerk of court) and Borja believed in good faith thatthey had the authority to allow such.

HELD:Photocopying of ballots is not tantamount to misconduct in office.

W As long as no tampering or alteration was manifest inXeroxing/photocopying of court records, no liabilityattaches to anyone.

W Respondents are exonerated.

18 FERMO V. COMELEC328 SCRA 52(VALDEZ)

FACTS:W LAXINA and FERMO- candidates for the position of Punong

Through the joint efforts of the students of Ateneo Law 2D AY07-08

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Brgy. in QC. (1997 elections) LAXINA was proclaimed

winner

W FERMO- filed election protest question results in 4 clustered

precincts on ground of massive fraud and serious

irregularities.

W MTC: ruled FERMO won the contested post (in 1999) and

granted a motion for execution pending appeal. COMELEC

reversed on ground that the possibility that the term of

contested seat might expire by the time appeal is decided

not a good reason to warrant execution pending

appeal.

HELD:A motion for executing pending appeal on ground of termexpiration is not good reason for issuance.

Sec. 2, Rule 39 Rules of Court: court while it has jurisdiction andpossession of original record in its discretion, order execution of judgment or final order even before expiration of the period toappeal

W Exercise of discretion requires that it is based on goodreasons (combination of 2 or more will suffice):

1. PUBLIC INTEREST INVOLVED OR WILL OFELECTORATE

2. SHORTNESS of remaining portion of term ofcontested office

3. LENGTH OF TIME that election contest has beenPENDING

W Shortness of remaining term- not good reason for execution

of judgment pending appealRA 8524: extended term ofoffice of Brgy. officials to 5 years (negates claim of FERMO

W Upon nullification of writ of execution pending appeal,decision of FERMOs proclamation as winner was stayedstatus quo (last actual peaceful uncontested situationpreceding the controversy) restored

W LAXINA: entitled to discharge functions

19 SAQUILAYAN V. COMELEC416 SCRA 658

(DINO)

FACTS:1. SAQUILAYAN and JARO were candidates for the Office of

Municipal Mayor of Imus, Cavite.2. SAQUILAYAN was proclaimed winner.3. JARO instituted an Election Protest Case before the RTC,

contesting the results of all 453 election precincts. Healleges the ff:

a. Votes in favor of JARO were considered strayb. Ballots and votes were misappreciated (considered

null and void, or counted in favor of SAQUILAYAN)c. Votes that were void (containing stickers or

markings) were counted in favor of SAQUILAYAN,etc..

4. SAQUILAYAN filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was denied bythe RTC.

5. Questioning the denial of his Motion to Dismiss, theCOMELEC (Division) ruled in favor of SAQUILAYAN andordered the dismissal of the election protest. It ruled thatJAROs allegations failed to state a cause of action, on thebasis of Pena v. HRET.* Pena v. HRET held that the bare allegations of massivefraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism, withoutspecification and substantiation of where and how theseoccurrences took place, render the protest fatallydefective.

6. Upon reconsideration sought by JARO, the COMELEC EnBanc, SAQUILAYANs Motion to Dismiss was againdismissed, and the Election Protest Case was ordered to

proceed.

HELD:

1. The present case is similar to Miguel v. COMELEC, whichthe COMELEC En Banc used as basis in ordering theElection Protest Case to proceed.

2. IN both cases, the protestants questioned all the precinctsin their respective municipalities.

3. As Miguel v. COMELEC is more recent than Pena v. HRET (as


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used by the COMELEC Division), then the former shouldprevail in case of a conflict.

4. Furthermore, election contests involve public interest. Technicalities and procedural barriers should not be

allowed to stand if they constituted an obstacle to thedetermination of the true will of the electorate.

5. Laws governing election contests must be liberallyconstrued to the end that the will of the people in thechoice of public officials may not be defeated by meretechnical objections.

6. Allowing the election protest to proceed would be the bestway of removing any doubt as to who was the realcandidate chosen by the electorate.

7. Decision of COMELEC En Banc affirmed.

20 SANTOS V. COMELEC399 SCRA 611

(PADLAN)

FACTS:

Petitioner (SANTOS) and Respondent (PANULAYA) were bothcandidate for MAYOR of the Municipal of Balingoan, MisamisOriental in the May 14, 2001 elections.

MUNICIPAL Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed PANULAYAas Mayor.

SANTOS filed an ELECTION PROTEST in the RTC.

RTC found that SANTOS obtained 76 votes more thanPANULAYA. RTC declared SANTOS as winner. RTC voided MBCsproclamation in favor of PANULAYA.

SANTOS filed a MOTION FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEALwith the RTC.

PANULAYA APPEALED the RTC declaration in favor of SANTOSto the COMELEC.

COMELEC issued INJUNCTION against RTC to refrain fromacting on motion for execution pending appeal.

RTC APPROVED motion for execution pending appeal.

SANTOS took OATH of office and ASSUMED duties and

functions of his office.

PANULAYA filed with COMELEC a PETITION FOR STATUS QUOANTE.

COMELEC ISSUED ORDER directing parties to MAINTAINSTATUS QUO ANTE, at the same time ENJOINING SANTOS from

assuming functions of mayor.

HELD:Mere filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of itsjurisdiction over the case and to resolve pending incidents such asmotions for execution pending appeal.

The following constitute good reasons and a combination of twoor more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal:(1) public interest involved or will of the electorate; (2) theshortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contestedoffice; and (3) the length of time that the election contest has beenpending.

The trial in the RTC took more than a year, while the three-yearterm of the Office of the Mayor continued to run. The will of theelectorate, as determined by the trial court in the election protest,had to be respected and given meaning.

Between the determination by the trial court of who of thecandidates won the elections and the finding of the Board ofCanvassers as to whom to proclaim, it is the courts decision thatshould prevail.

All that was required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow

execution pending appeal was that the immediate executionshould be based "upon good reasons to be stated in a specialorder." The rationale why such execution is allowed in electioncases is to give as much recognition to the worth of a trial judgesdecision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to theproclamation by the board of canvassers.

Why should the proclamation by the board of canvassers suffice asbasis of the right to assume office, subject to future contingenciesattendant to a protest, and not the decision of a court of justice?


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Indeed, when it is considered that the board of canvassers iscomposed of persons who are less technically prepared to make anaccurate appreciation of the ballots, apart from their being moreapt to yield to extraneous considerations, and that the board must

act summarily, practically racing against time, while, on the otherhand, the judge has benefit of all the evidence the parties can offerand of admittedly better technical preparation and background,apart from his being allowed ample time for conscientious studyand mature deliberation before rendering judgment, one cannotbut perceive the wisdom of allowing the immediate execution ofdecisions in election cases adverse to the protestees,notwithstanding the perfection and pendency of appeals therefrom,as long as there are, in the sound discretion of the court, goodreasons therefor.

To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pendingappeal would bring back the ghost of the "grab-the-proclamation-

prolong the protest" techniques so often resorted to by deviouspoliticians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to anelective office. This would, as a consequence, lay to waste the willof the electorate.

ELECTION OF PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT

21 DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. RAMOS253 SCRA 559(CONCEPCION)

FACTS:This is an original action filed before the SC acting as a PresidentialElectoral Tribunal.

Miriam Defensor-Santiago (DS) ran for presidency in the 1992National Elections. She lost, but filed this present protest againstthe winner, Pres. FV Ramos.

Subsequently however, she ran for Senator in the 1995 Senatorialelections. She won and assumed office as Senator in 1995.Considering this factual milieu, the issues revolve on whether thispresent electoral protest would still be valid, even after theprotestant has already assumed office as Senator, noting that

should she win this protest, her term as president would coincidewith her term as senator, which she is now in. Now, in 1996, the SCas PET decides the case.

HELD:There was abandonment of protest.

Yes. DS filed her certificate of candidacy to run for senator withoutqualification or reservation. In doing so, she entered into a politicalcontract with the electorate, that, if elected, she would assume theoffice as senator. This is in accord with the constitutional doctrinethat a public office is a public trust. In assuming the office ofSenator, she has effectively abandoned her determination topursue this present protest. Such abandonment operates to renderthis protest moot.

Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform

the PET within 10 days if after the completion of the revision of theballots from her pilot areas, she still wishes to present evidence.Since DS has not informed the Tribunal of any such intention, suchis a manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so.

ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, LOCAL OFFICIALS,AND MEMBERS OF THE REGIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE

AUTONOMOUS REGIONS; THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM

22 VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY V. COMELEC342 SCRA 244(AGUINALDO)

FACTS:Respondent proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13parties which obtained at least 2% of the total number of votescast for the party-list system as members of the House ofRepresentatives. Upon petition for respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-listrepresentatives although they obtained less than 2% of the totalnumber of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground thatunder the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of themembers of the House of Representatives come from the party-listrepresentatives.


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HELD:It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-listseats in the House of Representatives. The Constitution vested

Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe themechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In theexercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed itnecessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain atleast 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to beentitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that onlythose parties having a sufficient number of constituents deservingof representation are actually represented in Congress.

**NOTES:determination of total number of party-list representatives=

additional representatives of first party=

additional seats forconcerned party=

23 ANG BAGONG BAYANI V. COMELEC359 SCRA 698(ENRIQUEZ)

FACTS:The Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the COMELEC is

challenged insofar as it approves the participation of 154organizations and parties in the 2001 party-list elections.Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents as theparty-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized andunderrepresented and not the mainstream political parties.

The COMELEC received several petitions for registration filed bysectoral parties, etc. for the 2001 elections. The COMELEC allegethat verifications for the qualifications of these parties take a longprocess and as a result the 2 divisions promulgated a separate

Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political partiesonly on February 10, 2001. Before the February 12, 2001 deadline,the registered parties and organizations filed their Manifestations,stating their intention to participate in the party-list elections. The

COMELEC approved the Manifestations of 154 parties andorganizations but denied those of several others.

ACAP filed before the COMELEC a petition praying that the namesof some respondents be deleted from the Certified List of PoliticalPartiesParticipating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001Elections. It also prayed that the votes cast for the saidrespondents be not counted or canvassed and that the lattersnominees not be proclaimed. Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youthalso filed a similar petition against some of the respondents.

ISSUE 1: WON political parties may participate in the party-listelections

The SC held that under the Constitution and RA 7941, privaterespondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections,merely on the ground that they are political parties. Sec. 7 and 8,Article IX-C provides that political parties may be registered underthe partylist system. In the ConCom deliberations, Com. Monsodstated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open upthe system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistentlyplace 3rd or 4th in congressional district elections to win a seat inCongress. Sec. 3 of RA 7941 provides that a party is either apolitical party or a sectoral party or a collation of parties. Sec. 11of the same Act leaves no doubt as to the participation of politicalparties in the party-list system. Indubitable, political parties eventhe major ones-may participate in the party-list elections.

ISSUE 2: WON the party-list system is exclusive to marginalizedand underrepresented sectors and organizations

For political parties to participate in the party-list elections theirrequisite character must be consistent with the purpose of theparty-list system in the Constitution and RA 7941. The purpose ofthe party-list system is to give genuine power to our people inCongress. However, the constitutional provision is not self-executory, hence RA 7941 was enacted.


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#districtrepresentatives

.80* .20

# votesofconcernedparty

# votesoffirstparty* additionalseatsforconcernedparty

#ofvotesoffirstparty

#ofvotesofpartylistsystem


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Proportional representation does not refer to the number of peoplein a particular district, because the party-list election is national inscope. It refers to the representation of the marginalized and

underrepresented as exemplified in Section 5 of the Act. The party-list organization must factually and truly represent themarginalized and underrepresented constituencies. The personsnominated to the party-list system must also belong to theunderrepresented and marginalized sectors, organizations andparties.

Lack of well-defined constituency refers to the absence of atraditionally identifiable electoral group. It points to those withdisparate interests defined with the marginalized andunderrepresented. In the end, the COMELECs role is to see to itthat only those Filipinos who are marginalized andunderrepresented become members of Congress under the party-list system. Not all sectors can be represented under the party-listsystem. The law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages ofPayatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansionowners of Forbes Park. While the mega-rich are numericallyspeaking, a minority, they are neither marginalized norunderrepresented. It is illogical to open the system to those whohave long been within it those privileged sectors that have longdominated the congressional district elections.

The SC held that it cannot allow the party-list system to be sulliedand prostituted by those who are neither marginalized norunderrepresented.

Mendoza, dissenting: The text of Art. VI, Sec. 5(1)(2) provides for a

party-list system of registered, regional and sectoral parties ororganizations, and not for sectoral representation. It provides forno basis for petitioners contention that whether it is sectoralrepresentation or party-list system the purpose is to provideexclusive representation for marginalized sectors. The Record ofthe ConCom speaks clearly against the petitioners assertion. Two proposals for additional representation in the House ofRepresentatives were submitted namely, sectoral representationand party-list system. These two are not the same. In the end, theConCom chose the party-list system. In choosing this system, the

ConCom did not intend to reserve the party-list system to themarginalized or underrepresented. In fact, the party-list systemmandates the opposite.

Furthermore, Justice Mendoza holds that the majoritymisapprehended the meaning of Section 2 of RA No. 7941. Theprovision states that the purpose of the party-list system is to promote promotional representation in the election ofrepresentatives in the House of Representatives. To this end, a full,free and open party system is guaranteed to obtain the broadestpossible representation of a party, sectoral or group interests inthe House of Representatives. While the representation of themarginalized and underrepresented sectors is a basic purpose ofthe law, it is not its only purpose.

ISSUE 3: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretionin promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785

The SC held that it is proper to remand the case to the COMELECTto determine whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed toparticipate in the party-list elections comply with the requirementsof the law. In light of this, the SC provides for guidelines to assistthe COMELEC in its work. (1) The political partymust representthe marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section5 of RA 7941, (2) Even if major political parties are allowed toparticipate in the party-list system, they must comply with thedeclared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging tomarginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected to theHouse of Representatives, (3) a party or an organization must notbe disqualified under Section 6 of the Act which enumerates thegrounds for disqualification, (4) the party or organization must not

be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded orassisted by the government, (5) party must not comply with therequirements of the law, (6) not only the candidate party ororganization must represent marginalized and underrepresentedsectors, so also must its nominees, (7) the nominee must likewisebe able to contribute to the formulation and enactment ofappropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

24 ANG BAGONG BAYANI V. COMELECGR 147589, JANUARY 29, 2002


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(ENRIQUEZ)

FACTS:The COMELEC issued a TRO against the proclamation of APEC,

CIBAC and AMIN because they failed to meet the 8-point guidelinesset forth by this Court. The COMELEC found that APEC was merelyan arm of the Philippine Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. (PHILRECA)and that it did not truly represent the marginalized sectors ofsociety, CIBAC was reported to be merely an extension of theJesusIs Lord(JIL) religious movement and did not represent the interestof the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society andthat Anak Mindanao (AMIN) was listed as having obtained only1.6865% of the total votes cast for the party-list system, notsufficient to meet the 2% required no. of votes.

ISSUE:WON APEC, CIBAC and AMIN should be proclaimed winners asidefrom those already validly proclaimed by the earlier Resolutions ofthe SC.

RULING:AMIN did not get more than two percent of the votes cast.

APEC and CIBAC have sufficiently met the 8-point guidelines of hisCourt and have sufficient votes to entitle them to seats inCongress. Issues are factual in character, Commissions findingsare adopted, absent any patent arbitrariness or abuse ornegligence in its action. No substantial proof that CIBAC is merelyan arm of JIL, or that APEC is an extension of PHILRECA. The OSGexplained the these are separate entities with separatememberships. Although APECs nominees are all professionals, its

membership is composed not only of professionals but also ofpeasants, elderly, youth and women. APEC addresses the issues ofjob creation, poverty alleviation and lack of electricity. CIBAC iscomposed of he underrepresented and marginalized and isconcerned with their welfare. CIBAC is particularly interested in theyouth and professional sectors.

TRO partially lifted with regard to APEC and CIBAC.

25 ANG BAGONG BAYANI V. COMELEC

GR 147589, APRIL 10, 2002(ENRIQUEZang bagong bayani ng 2D!)

The COMELEC determined that the following party-list participants,

despite their having obtained at least 2% of the total votes cast,have failed to meet the 8-point guidelines set forth in ourDecision: Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), Association ofPhilippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), Veterans Federation Party(VFP), Abag Promdi (PROMDI), Nationalist Peoples Coalition (NPC),Lakas NUCD-UMDP, and Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC).

The OSG, acting on behalf of the Comelec, in its Consolidated Replydated October 15, 2001 and in a Manifestation dated December 5,2001, modified its position and recommended that APEC and CIBACbe declared as having complied with the 8-point guidelines

ELECTION OF LOCAL OFFICIALS

26 OCCEA V. COMELEC127 SCRA 404(ZUIGA)

FACTS:W Samuel Occena filed a petition for prohibition to declare as

unconstitutional the provisions in the Barangay Election Act

of 1982 (BP 222) which prohibited:

o any candidate in the 1982 barangay election from

representing himself as a member of a political

party;

o the intervention of political parties in a candidate's

nomination and filing of his certificate of

candidacy; and

o the giving of aid or support of political parties for or

against a candidate's campaign

W Occena prayed that the 1982 elections be declared null

and void, and new barangay elections held without the ban

on the involvement of political parties

W In 1982 the court considered the Comments of the Solicitor


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General as an Answer

W Note that the decision in the case was delayed because all

the Justices resigned on May 1982 (*SC trivia: over

allegations that the bar exam results of Justice Ericta's son

were changed in his favor - there was pre-decoding of his

grades before official decoding and publication)

HELD:The ban on the intervention of political parties in the election ofbarangay officials is NOT violative of the constitutional guaranteeof the right to form associations and societies for purposes notcontrary to law.

Under the Barangay Election Act of 1982, the right to organize isintact. Political parties may freely be formed although there is arestriction on their activities, i.e., their intervention in the electionof barangay officials on May 17, 1982 is prescribed. But the ban isnarrow, not total. It operates only on concerted or group action ofpolitical parties. The ban against the participation of politicalparties in the barangay election is an appropriate legislativeresponse to the unwholesome effects of partisan bias in theimpartial discharge of the duties imposed on the barangay and itsofficials as the basic unit of our political and social structure. Itwould definitely enhance the objective and impartial discharge oftheir duties for barangay officials to be shielded form political partyloyalty.

Some reasons for the restriction:- "the barangay is the basic unit not only of our social structure butalso of our political structure. It would be a more prudent policy to

insulate the barangays from the influence of partisan politics. Thebarangays, although it is true they are already considered regularunits of our government, are non-partisan; they constitute the baseof the pyramid of our social and political structure, and in orderthat base will not be subject to instability because of the influenceof political forces, it is better that we elect the officials thereofthrough a non-partisan system." (Deliberations on ParliamentaryBill 2125 which later became BP Blg. 222)- The Barangay Captain and the Barangay Council, apart from theirlegislative and consultative powers, also act as an agency for

neutral community action such as the distribution of basic foodstuffand as an instrument in conducting plebiscites and referenda.- The Barangay Captain, together with the members of the LuponTagapayapa appointed by him, exercises administrative supervision

over the barangay conciliation panels in the latter's work of settlinglocal disputes. The Barangay Captain himself settles or helps settlelocal controversies within the barangay either through mediation orarbitration.

The case of Imbong v. COMELEC also involved the restriction asthat prescribed in Sec. 4 of BP 222. In upholding theconstitutionality of what was then Sec. 8(a) of Republic Act No.6132, the court said that "While it may be true that a party'ssupport of a candidate is not wrong per se, it is equally true thatCongress in the exercise of its broad law-making authority candeclare certain acts as mala prohibita when justified by theexigencies of the times." The primary purpose of the prohibitionwas to avoid the denial of the equal protection of the laws. Thesponsors of the provision emphasized that under this provision, thepoor candidate has an even chance as against the rich candidate.Equality of chances may be better attained by banning allorganization support. The ban was to assure equal chances to acandidate with talent and imbued with patriotism as well as nobilityof purpose, so that the country can utilize their services if elected.

Fernando's Concurring Opinion:Test of the permissible limitation on freedom of association: Howshould the limitation 'for purposes not contrary to law' beinterpreted? It is submitted that it is another way of expressing theclear and present danger rule for unless an association or societycould be shown to create an imminent danger to public safety,

there is no justification for abridging the right to form associationsor societies."

Teehankee's Dissenting Opinion:The restriction denies "non-political" candidates the very freedomsof effectively appealing to the electorate through the public mediaand of being supported by organized groups that would give themat least a fighting chance to win against candidates of the politicalkingpins. The political bigwigs are meanwhile left to give their"individual" blessings to their favored candidates, which in


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actuality is taken by all as the party's blessings.

27 KANDUM V. COMELECGR 136969, JANUARY 18, 2000

(CHOTRANI)FACTS:Petitioner Amilhamja Kandum and respondent Hadji Gapur Ballahowere candidates for Punong Barangay in Barangay Look Bisaya, Tipo-Tipo, Basilan in the 1997 barangay elections. Petitionergarnered 61 votes over respondent's 59 votes. When petitionerwas proclaimed the winner by the BBC, respondent filed anelection protest in the MCTC and secured a favorable decision.

Petitioner appealed the decision to the RTC. But when the RTCdismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, petitioner filed anotice of appeal to the COMELEC through the MCTC .

The COMELEC issued a resolution dismissing the appeal for havingbeen filed out of time. (Appeal was filed 37 days after petitionerreceived copy of the decision of the MCTC)

HELD:RTC doesn't have jurisdiction over election protests involvingbarangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving electivebarangay officials decided by courts of limited jurisdiction (theMetropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and MunicipalCircuit Trial Courts) lies with the COMELEC, not the RTC.

Under paragraph (2), Section 2, subdivision C, Article IX of theConstitution,

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the followingpowers and functions:

xxx

(2) Exercise exclusive . . . appellate jurisdiction over all contestsinvolving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of

general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decidedby trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

28 BUHISAN V. COMELEC

GR 127328, JANUARY 30, 2001(PEAFLORIDA)

FACTS:Petitioner Jane Buhisan and private respondent Gordon Gorospewere candidates for the position of Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)Chairman of Barangay Poblacion, San Juan, Siquijor during the May6, 1996 elections. Buhisan garnered 35 votes against Gorospe's 34votes. Buhisan was proclaimed by the Board of Election Tellers asthe duly elected SK Chairman.

On May 13 Gorospe filed before the MCTC of Lazi, Siquijor anelection protest which seeks the annulment of the proclamation ofBuhisan and to declare the former the duly elected SK Chairman.MCTC nullified Buhisan's proclamation and declared Gorospe as theSK Chairman.

Buhisan appealed with the COMELEC. Electoral ContestsAdjudication Department of COMELEC returned the appeal. Amotion for reconsideration was filed. Also, Buhisan re-filed with theCOMELEC her appellant's brief insisting that public respondent takecognizance of her appeal.

COMELEC dismissed the appeal and informed Buhisan that theMCTC decision in the election protest may only be elevated to theCommission en banc via a petition for review and not by ordinaryappeal.

HELD:The COMELEC didn't commit any grave abuse of discretion withdismissing the appeal due a mere technicality.

Section 49 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 dated February 6,1996, governing the conduct of Sangguniang Kabataan electionsprovides:

Sec.49. Finality of Proclamation.-The proclamation of the winning


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candidate shall be final. However, the Metropolitan TrialCourts/Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shallhave original jurisdiction over all election protest cases, whosedecision shall be final. The Commission en banc in meritorious

cases may entertain a petition for review of the decision of theMeTC/MTC/MCTC in accordance with the COMELEC Rules ofProcedure. An appeal bond of P2,000.00 shall be required, whichshall be refundable if the appeal is found meritorious.

Also, the COMELEC may entertain such petitions only onmeritorious gronds. By prescribing a specific mode to be adoptedin assailing the MCTC's decision, COMELEC is afforted opportunityto examine the allegations on the face jof the petition if there is aprima facie showing that the MCTC committed an error of fact orlaw or gravely abused its discretion to warrant reversal ormodification of the decision. In other words, this manner of appealis discretionary on the part of the election tribunal. It is essentialthat a prior determination be made regarding the existence ofmeritorious reasons for the petition. Unlike in ordinary appeals,acceptance of the petition is not a matter of course. Here anappeal is obviously not the proper remedy allowed by theCOMELEC Rules Accordingly, public respondent cannot be faultedfor grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners appeal

29 MONTESCLAROS V. COMELEC382 SCRA 2(VALDEZ)

FACTS:W MONTESCLAROS (petitioners), all 20 y.o. claims being in

danger of disqualification to vote and be voted for in the SK

elections should it be postponed from original date (MAY

02) to NOV 02

W RP Pres. Signed the bill into law postponing the elections

W During pendency of petition Congress enacted RA 9164-

synchronization of brgy. and SK elections on JUL 02;

provides that voters and candidates for SK elections must

be at least 15 but less than 18 on the day of election

HELD:The subject law doesn't disfranchise the petitioners. It also doesn'tdeprive them of any property right.

W SK: youth organization originally established by PD 684 asKABATAANG BARANGAY (KB)composed of all brgy.

residents less than 18 y.o.

o LGC renamed KB to SK and limited membership to

youths at least 15 but not more than 21 yo

o SK tasked to enhance social, political, economic,

cultural, devt. of youth

W No vested right to the permanence of age requirement

under LGC; every law passed is always subject of

amendment or repeal

o Court cannot restrain Congress from amending or

repealing law; power to make laws includes power

to change laws; Court cannot direct COMELEC to

allow over-aged voters to vote or be voted in an

election limited under RA 9164

o Congress has power to prescribe qualifications

W PETITIONERS: no personal and substantial interest in the

SK electionsseeking to enforce right which has been

already limited with the passage of RA 9164ceased to be

members of SK and no longer qualified to participate

o Only those who qualify can contest, based on a

statutory authority, any act disqualifying them

membership in the SK is mere statutory right

conferred by lawW No one has vested right to any public office, much less

vested right to an expectancy of holding public office

30 MONTESCLAROS V. COMELECGR 152295, AUGUST 13, 2002

FACTS:

HELD:


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ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATES AND CERTIFICATE OFCANDIDACY

31 RECABO V. COMELEC308 SCRA 793 (1999)(FLORES)

FACTS:W This is a petition for Certiorari seeking to annul the

Comelecs resolution cancelling Kaiser Recabos certificate

of candidacy for Vice-Mayor in Surigao Del Norte

W Kaiser Recabo claimed to be LAKAS NUCD-UMDPs official

candidate to the aforementioned position, substituting his

mother Candelaria Recabo

W Kaiser Recabos certificate of candidacy was only signed by

Governor Matugas, and not jointly with Robert Barbers

(space left blank) as intended by the certificate of

nomination

W On the other hand Respondent Reyes certificate of

nomination for Vice-mayor was signed by no other than

Fidel V. Ramos (National Chairman LAKAS) and Jose De

Venecia (Secretary General LAKAS)

HELD:The certificate of candidacy of petitioner and that of his motherwho he substituted as candidate for Vice Mayor DID NOTsubstantially complied with the requirements of being officialcandidates of the LAKAS party.

W To allow Recabo to run would put the election process in

mockery for we would in effect be allowing an anomalous

situation where a single political party may field in multiple

candidate for a singe election position

W Lakas designated 2 party officers to issue certificates of

nomination, petitoners nomination was signed only by

one, while respondents signed by Ramos and JDV

W Comelec declared petitioners mother as and independent

candidate on account of the invalidity of her nomination,

thus there can be no valid substitution by petitioner for an

invalid nomination

W Besides, petitioner filed his candidacy out of time for an

independent candidate (although w/n prescriptive period of

a substituted candidate, useless because already adjudged

as an invalid nomination and substitution)

W Well-settled certificate filed beyond deadline not valid

W But Reyes motion to be declared winner, garnering the

second highest number of votes to Recabo can not be

granted, wound be tantamount to substitution of judgment

for the mind of the voter

32 BAUTISTA V. COMELEC414 SCRA 299

(AQUINO, T.)

FACTS:

HELD:

DISQUALIFICATIONS

33 SOCRATES V. COMELEC391 SCRA 457(NEPOMUCENO)

FACTS:W Petitioner is mayor of Puerto Princesa, who was removed

from office thru a recall proceeding initiated by themajority of the incumbent barangay officials of the city

W Petitioner filed a motion to nullify the recall resolution but

was dismissed by the Comelec for lack of merit

W Comelec set date for conducting the recall election; former

3 term mayor Edward Hagedorn files his certificate of

candidacy

W Petitioner Adovo and Gilo files petition before Comelec to

disqualify Hagedorn claiming that he is disqualified from


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running for a 4th term; petition was dismissed

HELD:Hagedorn is qualified to run in the recall election

W Art. X Sec. 8 of 1987 Constitution: the term of office of

elective local officials, except barangay officials, which

shall be determined by law, shall be 3 years and no such

official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms.

Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time

shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity

of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

W Sec. 43 (b) RA 7160: Term of office no local official shall

serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same

position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length

of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the

continuity of service for the full term for which the elective

official was elected

W These constitutional and statutory provisions have 2 parts

W The first part provides that an elective local official cannot

serve ore than 3 consecutive terms

W The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in

determining the 3-term limit rule

W The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office

for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of

service

W The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office

for any length of time interrupts continuity of service andprevents the service before and after the interruption from

being joined together to form a continuous service or

consecutive terms

W After 3 consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot

seek immediate reelection for a fourth term

W The prohibited election refers to the next regular election

for the same office following the end of the third

consecutive term

W Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer

covered by the prohibition for two reasons

W First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no

longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive

termsW Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary

interruption in the continuity of service

W Clearly, the constitution prohibits immediate reelection for

a fourth term following three consecutive terms

W The constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent

reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not

immediately after the end of the third consecutive term

W A recall election midway in the term following the third

consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an

immediate reelection after the third term

WNeither does the constitution prohibit one barred fromseeking immediate reelection to run in any other

subsequent election involving the same term of office

W What the constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term

W The prohibited election referred to by the framers of the

constitution is the immediate reelection after the third

term, not any other subsequent election

W The framers expressly acknowledged that the prohibited

election refers only to the immediate reelection, and not to

any subsequent election, during the 6 year period following

the two term limit

W The framers of the constitution did not intend the period

of rest of an elective official who has reached his termlimit to be the full extent of the succeeding term

34 ADORMEO V. COMELEC376 SCRA 90(HOSAKA)

FACTS:Pet Raymundo Adormeo and private resp Ramon Talaga were the


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only candidates who filed the certificates of candidacy for mayor ofLucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Talaga was then theincumbent mayor.

Adormeo filed a with the Provincial Election Supervisor a Petition ToDeny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and orDisqualification of Talaga on the ground that the latter was electedand had served as city mayor for 3 consecutive terms as follows: 1)election of May 1992 where he served the full term; 2) election ofMay 1995, again he served a full term; and 3) in the recall electionof May 12, 2000 where he served only the unexpired term ofTagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998 election.

Adormeo contended that Talagas candidacy as Mayor was aviolation of Sec 8 Art X of the Constitution---

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, exceptbarangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be 3years and no such official shall serve for more than 3 consecutiveterms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of timeshall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of hisservice for the full term for which he was elected.

Talaga claims that he only served for 2 consecutive terms and thathis service from May 2000 was not a full term because he onlyserved Tagaraos unexpired term by virtue of the recall election. Hecites the case of Lonzanida giving 2 conditions for thedisqualification 1) that the official has been elected for 3consecutive terms in the same local govt post; and 2) that he hasfully served 3 consecutive terms.

Comelec division ruled in favor of Adormeo. Comelec en bancreversed, hence this petition.

HELD:Talaga is qualified to run for mayor.

Talaga was not elected for 3 consecutive terms having lost his 3rdbid in the May 11, 1998 elections, said defeat is an interruption inthe continuity of his service as city mayor of Lucena.

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer tothe right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the sameelective position.

Talaga was not elected for 3 consecutive terms and for nearly 2years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship wasdisrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. It was only by virtueof the recall that he served Tagaraos unexpired term. This did notamount to a third full term.

Fr. Bernas comment that if one is elected representative to servethe unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter howshort, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing thenumber of successive terms allowed only pertains to the membersof the House of Representatives and not to local govt officials.

Neither can Talagas victory in the recall election be deemed asvoluntary renunciation under the Constitution.

35 DIANGKA V. COMELEC323 SCRA 887(REYES)

FACTS:Petitioner Maimona Diangka filed a petition for certiorariquestioning the decision of COMELEC in disqualifying her ascandidate for Mayor of Ganassi, Lanao del Sur. Petitioner was thewife of the incumbent Mayor. Ali Balindong, the other mayoraltycandidate, filed a special action for disqualification against Diangkaand her husband alleging that they committed 2 acts of terrorism:

* First, that they loaded the ballot boxes into an ambulance thensubsequently, through force and threats, made the watchers ofBalindong go down from the vehicle.

* Second, that Diangkas husband went to the voting areas andcaused a commotion that prevented voters from voting.

In the results of the elections, Diangka emerged the winner.COMELEC ordered the board of canvassers to cease and desistfrom declaring Diangka as mayor, but that order came in late andstill Diangka was declared mayor. In the hearing for the


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disqualification, only Balindong and lawyer appeared, henceCOMELEC disqualified Diangka. Diangka now assails the decisionvia certiorari, meanwhile vice-mayor elect Macapodi assumed themayor position.

HELD:Diangka can be held liable for the two acts of terrorism of herhusband thus, she could be disqualified by the COMELEC.

1. COMELEC determined that Diangka was at the front seatbeside the driver in the ambulance when the watchers of Balindongwere made to go down via threats. Her excuse that she did notknow nor was she in collusion with her husband can not hold water.First, she admitted that she requested that the driver, after theythreatened the watchers, drop her off at the school. Such showsshe had control over the driver. Second, her mere presence in theambulance shows that she acquiesced to her husbands acts andhence guilty also.

2. COMELEC determined that it was actually Diangkas husbandwho caused the commotion which prevented the voters fromvoting. While it was not actually Diangka who committed the acts,she did not prove that her running was not a mere alter ego of herhusband who is in his 3 term as mayor. This together with herpresence in the ambulance makes her guilty of the acts ofterrorism in violation of the Omnibus Election Code.

Note: Grounds for Disqualification (Section 68 of OmnibusElection Code):a) Giving money or other material consideration to influence,induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performingelectoral functions;b) Committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;c) Spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of thatallowedd) Solicited, received or made any contribution which areprohibited

36 SOON-RUIZ V. COMELECGR 144323, SEPTEMBER 5, 2000

(TAN, E.)

FACTS:Petitioner (SOLLER) and respondent (SAULONG) were both

candidates for mayor of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro.

Municipal board of canvassers proclaimed SOLLER duly electedmayor.

SAULONG filed two actions:

a. COMELEC: petition for annulment of the

proclamation/exclusion of election return

b. RTC: election protest against SAULONG

SOLLER filed motion to dismissCOMELEC granted, RTC denied

The denial by RTC of SOLLERs motion to dismiss was questionedvia petition for certiorari with COMELEC. This certiorari wasdismissed by the COMELEC en banc.

HELD:1. W/N COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lackof jurisdiction in not ordering the dismissal of SAULONGs electionprotest.

YES. The decision of the COMELEC en banc is null and void. Theauthority to resolve petition for certiorari involving incidentalissues of election protest falls within the division of the COMELECand not on the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc does not

have the requisite authority to hear and decide election casesincluding pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance. Anydecision by it in the first instance is null and void. If the principalcase, once decided on the merits, is cognizable on appeal by adivision of the COMELEC, then, there is no reason why petitions forcertiorari relating to incidents of election protest should not bereferred first to a division of the COMELEC for resolution.

2. W/N RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in failing todismiss respondents election protest.


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Yes. Close scrutiny of the receipts show that respondent failed topay the filing fee of P300. Thus, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over respondents election protest. COMELEC erred in

not ordering the dismissal of respondents protest case. Errors inthe payment of filing fees in election cases is no longer excusable.

The protest should have also been dismissed for lack of properverification (tantamount to filing an unsigned pleading), and forfailure to comply with the required certification against forumshopping. This requirement is mandatory, and cannot be excusedby the fact that a party has not actually resorted to forumshopping. Good faith is not an excuse.

Moreover, respondents petition was a pre-proclamation case,which may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after thewinning candidates have been proclaimed. By resorting to thewrong remedy, respondent may be claimed to have abandoned thepre-proclamation case that he filed.

PETITION GRANTED.

37 PAPANDAYAN, JR. V. COMELEC381 SCRA 133(BAUTISTA)

FACTS:W Petitioner Papandayan and respondent Balt were

contending candidates for mayor of Tubaran, Lanao del Sur

in the May 14, 2001 elections.

W

COMELEC 2nd Division issued a resolution declaringpetitioner to be disqualified based on affidavits submitted

by respondent as evidence; ordered petitioners name to

be stricken off the list of candidates and all votes cast in

his favor not to be counted but considered as stray votes.

W On election day, petitioner was voted by the electorate as

municipal mayor. The following day, he received a

telegram from the COMELEC notifying him that the

COMELEC en banc denied his MR.

W Petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC 1st Division

seeking the issuance of an order directing the Board of

Election Inspectors to count and tally the ballots cast in his

favor during the elections pursuant to COMELEC Resolution

4116. Resolution provides that if the disqualification casehas not become final and executory on the day of the

election, BEI shall tally and count the votes of the

candidate declared disqualified.

W Respondent filed pre-proclamation case; COMELEC issued

an order suspending the proclamation of petitioner but

despite said order, Municipal Board of Canvassers still

proclaimed petitioner as winner.

W Upon motion of respondent, COMELEC 1st Division set

aside petitioners proclamation; COMELEC en banc

sustained annulment of proclamation of petitioner

HELD:

Petitioner shouldn't be disqualified.

W # At the time the elections were held in May 14, 2001, the

assailed resolution, had not become final and executory.

Hence, the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) was duty

bound to tally and count the votes cast in favor of

petitioner.

W # COMELEC Resolution 4116 pertains to the finality of

decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or

division, particularly on Special Actions (Disqualification

cases)

W # Sec. 13, paragraphs (b) and (c) of said resolution

provide: (b) In Special Actions and Special cases, a decision

or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final

and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation

unless restrained by the Supreme Court. (c) Unless a

motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or

resolution of a Division shall become final and executory


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after the lapse of five (5) days in Special Actions and

Special cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other actions

or proceedings, following its promulgation.

W # COMELEC Resolution 4116 further provides that: 3.

where the ground for the disqualification case is by reasonof non-residence, citizenship, violation of election laws and

other analogous cases and on the day of the election the

resolution has not become final and executory, the BEI

shall tally and count the votes of such disqualified

candidate.

W # Respondent, therefore, is in error in assuming that the

issuance of a temporary restraining order by this Court

within five (5) days after the date of the promulgation of

the assailed resolution is the operative act that prevents it

from attaining finality.

W

# With due regard for the expertise of the COMELEC, wefind the evidence to be insufficient to sustain its resolution.

Petitioner has duly proven that, although he was formerly a

resident of the Municipality of Bayang, he later transferred

residence to Tangcal in the Municipality of Tubaran as

shown by his actual and physical presence therein for 10

years prior to the May 14, 2001 elections.

W # The principle of animus revertendi has been used to

determine whether a candidate has an intention to return

to the place where he seeks to be elected. Corollary to this

is a determination whether there has been an

abandonment of his former residence which signifies an

intention to depart therefrom.W # Caasi v. Court of Appeals: respondents immigration to

the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of

his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a

green card holder was proof that he was a permanent

resident or immigrant of the United States.

W # Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives:

this Court, citing Faypon v. Quirino, applied the concept of

animus revertendi or intent to return, The fact that

respondent made periodical journeys to his home province

in Laoang revealed that he always had animus revertendi.

W # Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City: The term

residence, as used in the election law, imports not onlyan intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal

presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of

such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent

residence to which when absent for business or pleasure,

or for like reasons, one intends to return.

W # The Court explained that in order to acquire a new

domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or

bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to

remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old

domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with

animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at thedomicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time;

the change of residence must be voluntary; and the

residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be

actual.

W # The record shows that when petitioner and his wife Raida

Guina Dimaporo got married in 1990, they resided in

Tangcal, Tubaran. From then on, there was manifest

intention on the part of petitioner to reside in Tubaran,

which he deemed to be the place of his conjugal abode

with his wife. The fact that he and his wife transferred

residence from Bayang to Tubaran shows that petitioner

was relinquishing his former place of residence in Bayangand that he intended Tubaran to be his place of domicile.

Although petitioner worked as a private secretary of the

mayor of Bayang, he went home to Tubaran everyday after

work. This is proof of animus manendi.

W # It is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor in

determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the

Constitutions residency qualification requirement.


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W # When the evidence of the alleged lack of residence

qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak

or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of

the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victors

right to the office, the will of the electorate should berespected.

38 MAGNO V. COMELEC390 SCRA 495(GO)

FACTS:W Petitioner Nestor Magno ran for MAYOR of San Isidro, Nueva

Ecija in 2001.

W Private Respondent filed a petition for disqualification of

Magno because he was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of

4 counts of Direct Bribery and sentenced. Magno appliedfor probation and was discharged on March of 1998.

W COMELEC disqualified petitioner based on a provision of BP

881 (Omnibus Election Code) disqualifying a candidate

convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude until after

the lapse of 5 years from the service of sentence.

W Magno claims Sec 40 (a) RA7160 (Local Government Code)

should apply instead of BP 881: A person convicted of a

crime involving moral turpitude may run after the lapse of

2 years after the service of sentence.

W Sonia Isidro was declared Mayor while the case was

pending.

HELD:First, Direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.

Not every criminal act involves moral turpitude. Blacks LawDictionary defines it as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity inthe private duties which a man owes his fellow men or society ingeneral Direct bribery contemplates taking advantage of hisposition and is a betrayal of the trust reposed to him by the public.

Second, he is not qualified.

RA 7160 should apply. First, RA 7160 is the more recent law. It

impliedly repeals BP 881 should there be any inconsistencies.Second, RA 7160 is a special law applying specifically to localgovernment units. BP 881 applies for the election of any publicoffice. Special law prevails. Since he was discharged on March1998, Magnos disqualification ceased on March 2000.

*Court declared that it could not rule on Magnos prayer for hisproclamation as winner of the mayoralty race, it being outside itsjurisdiction.

39 CODILLA, SR. V. DE VENECIA393 SCRA 639(AGUINALDO)

FACTS:Petitioner and respondent were opposing candidates forrepresentative. A voter filed with the COMELEC a petition todisqualify petitioner on the ground that petitioner, who was then amayor, violated Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code bydistributing gravel and sand to voters to induce them to vote forhim. The COMELEC delegated the hearing to the Regional Director.On election day, no hearing has been done yet. Petitioner won.Respondent intervened in the disqualification case and prayed forthe suspension of the proclamation of petitioner. Petitioner wasnot furnished a copy of the motion. COMELEC suspended theproclamation because of the seriousness of the allegations againstpetitioner. Petitioner has not been served any summons.

Petitioner filed his answer. He alleged that the repair of the roadswas undertaken without his authority. After a hearing on themotion to suspend the proclamation of petitioner, the COMELECissued a resolution disqualifying petitioner and declaring theimmediate proclamation of the candidate who received the highestnumber of votes. The votes of petitioner were declared stray.Respondent was proclaimed elected and she assumed office.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC enbanc nullified the proclamation of respondent and ordered theproclamation of petitioner. Respondent didnt appeal from the


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decision. She argued that since she assumed office, the COMELECdoesnt have jurisdiction to annul her proclamation.

HELD:Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his disqualificationthrough the service of summons nor of the Motions to suspend hisproclamation.

The records of the case do not show that summons was served onthe petitioner. They do not contain a copy of the summonsallegedly served on the petitioner and its corresponding proof ofservice. Furthermore, private respondent never rebuttedpetitioner's repeated assertion that he was not properly notified ofthe petition for his disqualification because he never receivedsummons.71 Petitioner claims that prior to receiving a telegraphedOrder from the COMELEC Second Division on May 22, 2001,directing the District Board of Canvassers to suspend hisproclamation, he was never summoned nor furnished a copy of the

petition for his disqualification. He was able to obtain a copy of thepetition and the May 22 Order of the COMELEC Second Division bypersonally going to the COMELEC Regional Office on May 23, 2001.Thus, he was able to file his Answer to the disqualification caseonly on May 24, 2001.

More, the proclamation of the petitioner was suspended in grossviolation of section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code whichprovides:

"Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority.- TheCommission and the courts shall give priority to cases ofdisqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a

final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days beforethe election in which the disqualification is sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to bedisqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shallnot be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is notdeclared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified andhe is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in suchelection, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sectionsshall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office."

(emphases supplied)

In the instant case, petitioner has not been disqualified by finaljudgment when the elections were conducted on May 14, 2001.

The Regional Election Director has yet to conduct hearing on thepetition for his disqualification. After the elections, petitioner wasvoted in office by a wide margin of 17,903. On May 16, 2001,however, respondent Locsin filed a Most Urgent Motion for thesuspension of petitioner's proclamation. The Most Urgent Motioncontained a statement to the effect that a copy was served to thepetitioner through registered mail. The records reveal that noregistry receipt was attached to prove such service.72 This violatesCOMELEC Rules of Procedure requiring notice and service of themotion to all parties.

Respondent's Most Urgent Motion does not fall under theexceptions to notice and service of motions. First, the suspensionof proclamation of a winning candidate is not a matter which theCOMELEC Second Division can dispose of motu proprio. Second,the right of an adverse party, in this case, the petitioner, is clearlyaffected. Given the lack of service of the Most Urgent Motion to thepetitioner, said Motion is a mere scrap of paper.

Under section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can suspendproclamation only when evidence of the winning candidate's guiltis strong. In the case at bar, the COMELEC Second Division did notmake any specific finding that evidence of petitioner's guilt isstrong. Its only basis in suspending the proclamation of thepetitioner is the "seriousness of the allegations" in the petition fordisqualification. Absent any finding of evidence that the guilt isstrong, then clearly, there was grave abuse of discretion on the

part of COMELEC.

REGISTRATION OF VOTERS; PRECINCTS AND POLLINGPLACES; BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS; WATCHERS;

OFFICIAL BALLOTS AND ELECTION RETURNS; CASTING ANDCOUNTING OF VOTES

40 BAUTISTA V. COMELEC298 SCRA 480(SINGSON)


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FACTS:W Petitioner Cipriano Efren Bautista and private respondent

were duly registered candidates for the position of Mayor of

Navotas in the 1998 Elections. Aside from them, a certainEdwin Efren Bautista (Edwin Bautista) also filed a

certificate of candidacy for the same position.

W Petitioner filed a petition praying that Edwin Bautista be

declared a nuisance candidate.

W COMELEC declared Edwin Bautista as nuisance candidate

and consequently ordered the cancellation of his certificate

of candidacy for the position of Mayor.

W MR was filed by Edwin Bautista; subsequently denied.

W Before final determination of Edwin Bautistas MR, upon

request of petitioners counsel, the Regional Election

Director of NCR gave instructions to the BEI to tally

separately either in some portion of the same election

return not intended for votes for mayoralty candidates or in

a separate paper the votes Efren Bautista, Efren, E.

Bautista and Bautista, considered as stray votes.

W When the canvass of the election returns was commenced,

the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Navotas refused to

canvass as part of the valid votes of petitioner the separate

tallies of votes on which were written Efren Bautista,

Efren, E. Bautista and Bautista.

W Petitioner filed with COMELEC a Petition to Declare Illegal

the Proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers;

dismissed for lack of merit.

HELD: There was grave abuse of discretion in denying the inclusion aspart of petitioners valid votes the Bautista stray votes that wereseparately tallied by the BEI and Board of Canvassers.

W # It must be emphasized that the case at bar involves a

ground for disqualification which clearly affects the voters

will and causes confusion that frustrates the same.

W # Election Laws give effect to, rather than frustrate, the

will of the voter. Thus, extreme caution should be observed

before any ballot is invalidated.

W # In the appreciation of ballots, doubts are resolved in

favor of their validity.W # Matters tend to get complicated when technical rules are

strictly applied technicalities should not be permitted to

defeat the intention of the voter, especially so if that

intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, as in this

case.

W # Sec. 69 of the Omnibus Election Code the COMELEC

may motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an

interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a

certificate of candidacy 1) if it is shown that said certificate

has been filed to put the election process in mockery or

disrepute, 2) or to cause confusion among voters by the

similarity of the names of registered candidates; 3) or by

other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that

a candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office

for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and

thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the

electorate.

W # Fatual circumstances and logic dictate that the

Bautista and Efren votes which were mistakenly

deemed as stray votes refer only to one candidate, herein

petitioner. Such votes, which represent the voice of approx.

21,000 electors could not have been intended for Edwin

Bautista, allegedly known in Navotas as a tricycle driverand worse a drug addict, not known as Efren as stated in

his certificate of candidacy, but Boboy or Boboy Tarugo

as his known appellation or nickname, and satisfactorily

and finally shown as a candidate with no political line up,

no personal funds that could have supported his campaign,

and no accomplishments which may be noted band

considered by the public, as against a known former public


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officer who had served the people of Navotas as Brgy.

Official, councilor and vice mayor.

W # To rule otherwise will definitely result in the

disenfranchisement of the will of the electorate, which is,

as we mentioned, the situation that our election laws areenacted to prevent.

41 PUNZALAN V. COMELEC289 SCRA 702(FERNANDEZ)

FACTS:W Manalastas, Meneses and Punzalan were among of the 4

candidates for mayor of the municipality of Mexico

Pampanga

W Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Meneses

as the duly elected mayorW Manalastas and Punzalan separately siled election protests

challenging the results of the elections; Meneses filed his

answer to both with counter protests: ordered consolidated

and jointly tried by the court

W Election contests sought the nullification of the election of

Meneses allegedly due to massive fraud, irregularities and

other illegal electoral practices during the registration and

voting as well as during the counting of votes

W Because of irregularities (massive fraud, illegal electoral

practices and serious anomalies; ballots, election returns

and tally sheets disappeared under mysterious

circumstances and filled up ballots with undetached lower

stubs and groups of ballot with stubs cut out with scissors

were found inside ballot boxes) found after hearing the

protests, the trial court was constrained to examine the

contested ballots and the handwritings appearing thereon

and came up with the declaration that Punzalan was the

winner in the elections

W various notices of appeal, motions for execution, petitions

for certiorari, prohibition with prayer for issuance of

temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction

W Comelec promulgated a resolution affirming the

proclamation of Meneses

HELD:On the first issue

W While RA 7166 (An Act Providing for Synchronized National

and Local Elections and For Electoral Reforms) requires the

BEI chairman to affix his signature at the back of the ballot,

the mere failure to do so does not invalidate the same

although it may constitute an election offense imputable to

said BEI

W Failure of the BEI chairman or any of the members of the

board to comply with their mandated administrative

responsibility should not penalize the voter with

disenfranchisementW A ballot without BEI chairman's signature at the back is

valid and not spurious

W For as long as the ballot bears any one of the following

authenticating marks, it is considered valid:

o The Comelec watermark

o Signature or initials or thumbprint of the Chairman

of the BEI

o Where the watermarks are blurred or not readily

apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red or

blue fibers in the ballots

W Every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is aclear and good reason to justify its rejection

On the second issueW The appreciation of the contested ballots and election

documents involves a question of fact best left to the

determination of the Comelec

W The Comelec need not conduct an adversarial proceeding

or a hearing to determine the authenticity of ballots or the


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handwriting found thereon; neither does it need to solicit

the help of the handwriting experts in examining or

comparing the handwriting; even evidence aliunde is not

necessary to enable the Commission to determine the

authenticity of the ballots and the genuineness of thehandwriting on the ballots as an examination of the ballots

themselves is already sufficient

W Minor and insignificant variations in handwriting must be

perceived as indicia of genuineness rather than of falcity

W Carelessness, spontaneity, unpremeditation and speed in

signing are evidence of genuineness

DOCTRINE:W the laws and statues governing election contests especially

appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the

end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public

officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities

W an election protests is imbued with public interest so much

so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the

real choice of the people is imperative

ELECTORAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES

42 PILAR V. COMELEC245 SCRA 759(OBERIO)

FACTS:

Petitioner Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position ofmember of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province ofIsabela. 3 days later, he withdrew his certificate of candidacy.COMELECimposed upon petitioner a fine of P10,000 for failure tofile his statement of contributions and expenditures. Petitioner filedmotion for reconsideration which was denied by COMELEC.Petitioner went to COMELEC en banc which denied the petition inits Resolution. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

HELD:

Petitioner should be held liable for failure to file his statement ofcontributions and expenditures.

W Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to

file a statement of contribution and expenditures becausehe was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificate

of candidacy 3 days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it

is xxx clear from the law that the candidate must have

entered the political contest, and should have either won

or lost".

Petitoner's argument is without merit.

W Section 14 of RA No. 7166 states that "every candidate"

has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and

expenditures. Where the law does not distinguish, courts

should not distinguish. The term "every candidate" must be

deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his

campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.

W Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 of the COMELEC, in

implementation of the provisions of RA 7166, categorically

refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of

candidacy."

W Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall".

Such implies that the statute is mandatory, particularly if

public interest is involvedstate has an interest in seeing

that the electoral process is clean and expressive of the

true will of the electorate. One way to attain such objective

is to pass a legislation regulating contributions and

expenditures, and compelling the publication of the same.It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his

candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred

expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The

evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too

remote.

W Resolution No. 2348 also contemplates the situation where

a candidate may not have received any contribution or

made any expenditure. Such candidate is not excused from


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filing a statement.

W BP Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code provides that

"the filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not

affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities

which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner'swithdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability

for the administrative fine.

ELECTION OFFENSES

43 LAUREL V. HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE323 SCRA 779(AQUINO, P.)

FACTS:W Hon. Bernardo P. Pardo sent a verified letter-complaint to

Jose P. Balbuena charging Herman Tiu Laurel with

"Falsification of Public Documents" and violation of [Section

74] of the Omnibus Election Code.

W It alleged that both his father and mother were Chinese

citizens but when petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy

for the position of Senator he stated that his a natural-born

Filipino citizen

W An investigation was conducted by the COMELEC Law

Department and a Report was made recommending the

filing of Information.

W During en banc, COMELEC resolved to file the necessary

information against respondent and to file a criminal

complaint against respondent for falsificationW Director Balbuena filed an information for Violation of

Section 74, in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus

Election Code

W Plaintiff filed a Motion for Inhibition, seeking the inhibition

of the entire COMELEC because of its bias in rendering a

resolution.

W Plaintiff filed on 07 May 1996 a Motion to Quash alleging

lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority on the part of

Director Balbuena to file the information.

W Court denied.

W Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the

Court of Appeals.W The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court and ruled that

the proper procedure was followed by the COMELEC but

directed the trial court to remand the case to the COMELEC

for reception of petitioner's motion for reconsideration of

the COMELEC resolution dated January 25, 1996, which

approved the filing of a criminal complaint against

petitioner.

HELD:1. It was error for the Court of Appeals to hold there was no flaw inthe procedure followed by the COMELEC in the conduct of the

preliminary investigation.

-No. There are two ways through which a complaint for electionoffenses may be initiated. It may be filed by the COMELEC motuproprio, or it may be filed via written complaint by any citizen ofthe Philippines, candidate, registered political party, coalition ofpolitical parties or organizations under the partylist system or anyaccredited citizens arms of the Commission

- Motu proprio complaints may be signed by the Chairman of theCOMELEC and need not be verified.

On the other hand, complaints filed by parties other than the

COMELEC must be verified and supported by affidavits and otherevidence.

- The complaint in question in this case is one filed by Pardo in hispersonal capacity and not as chairman of the COMELEC.

- There is nothing in the rules that require that only the COMELECen banc may refer a complaint to the Law Department forinvestigation.


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- There is no rule against the COMELEC chairman directing theconduct of a preliminary investigation, even if he himself were thecomplainant in his private capacity.

2. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner's protestations on COMELEC's having acted as complainant,investigator, prosecutor, judge and executioner in the conduct ofthe preliminary investigation ring hollow.

-No. the records show that there is basis to at least find probablecause to indict the petitioner for violation of the Omnibus ElectionCode and it appears from the records that Chairman Pardo had noother participation in the proceedings which led to the filing of theInformation.

-The entire COMELEC cannot possibly be restrained frominvestigating the complaint filed against petitioner, as the latterwould like the courts to do. The COMELEC is mandated by no less

than the Constitution to investigate and prosecute, whennecessary, violations of election laws. This power is lodgedexclusively with the COMELEC. For the entire Commission to inhibititself from investigating the complaint against petitioner would benothing short of an abandonment of its mandate under theConstitution and the Omnibus Election Code.

44 FAELNAR V. PEOPLE331 SCRA 429(CRUZ)

FACTS:Eugenio Faelnar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of

barangay chairman during the 1997 barangay elections in Cebu.One day after filing such certificate (april 9), a basketballtournament was held in the sports complex dubbed as, 2nd Jing-Jing Faelnars Cup which lasted until April 30, 1997. This gave riseto a complaint for electioneering against petitioner and Gillamacfiled by Antonio Luy. It was alleged that it was actually a form ofcampaign done outside the official campaign period which shouldstart on May 1, 1997. 1. that there was a streamer bearing thename of petitioner placed at the faade of the venue. 2. petitionersname was repeatedly mentioned over the microphone. 3. it was

widely published in the local news paper. 4. a raffle sponsored byGillamac was held with home appliances as prize. It constituted anelection offense. Initially, Comelec en banc in a Resolution resolvedto dismiss the filing of the case in the RTC. Antonio Luy moved forreconsideration prompting the Comelec to proceed with the filingof the case against petitioner. Petitioner moved to quash on thebasis that the previous dismissal of the Comelec en banc, wasimmediately final and executory. And that Luys motion forreconsideration was a prohibited pleading under Commissionsrules of procedure.

HELD:A Motion for Reconsideration is allowed in election offense cases.

Section 1, Rule 13 of Comelecs Rules of Procedure states, thefollowing pleadings are not allowed, (d) motion forreconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decisionexcept in election offense cases

It was also held that the Comelec en banc is the one thatdetermines the existence of probable cause in an election offense.But it may also be delegated to the State Prosecutor or to theProvincial or City Fiscal but may still be reviewed by the Comelec.

45 COMELEC V. TAGLE397 SCRA 618(LIM)

FACTS:W Florentino Bautista ran for the position of Mayor in Kawit

Cavite

W He filed a complaint against the incumbent Mayor Poblete

and others supported by affidavits of 44 witnesses

attesting to vote- buying activities.

W The case was handled by a prosecutor of the COMELECs

law department.

W A separate complaint was filed by Rodelas and Macapagal

with the provincial prosecutor against the witnesses (vote-

selling)


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W COMELEC en banc declared the resolution of the provincial

prosecutor to institute criminal actions against the

witnesses as null and void. COMELEC cited RA 6646

otherwise known as The Electoral Reforms law of 1987

which grants immunity from criminal prosecution personswho voluntarily give information and willingly testify

against those liable for vote-buying or vote-selling.

W Law department of COMELEC filed a motion to dismiss the

case against the witnesses. This was denied by respondent

judge TAGLE.

W According to Tagle, for the witnesses to be exempt to

should have committed the overt act of divulging

information regarding the vote buying

HELD:Witnesses are exempt from criminal prosecution.

W A free, orderly, honest , peaceful, and credible election is

indispensable in a democratic society, as without it

democracy would not flourish and would be a sham.

W One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of

vote-buying and of prosecuting th

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