PSYCHOLOGICA fr, -1 ~ I ( f(::' .-........ v

BEING

NOTES AND OBSERVATIONS

ON

Christian Wolf's Psychologia Empirica

BY

EMANUELSWEDENBORG

TRANSLATED FROM THE PHOTOLITHOGRAPHED MANUSCRIPT

BY

ALFRED ACTON, M.A., B.Th. DEAN OF THE mEOLOGICAL SCHOOL OF THE ACADEMY

OF THE NEW CHURCH

SWEDENBORG SCIENTIFIC ASSOCIATION

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

19 2 3

PREFACE

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X. XI.

XII.

XIII.

XIV.

XV.

XVI.

XVII.

XVIII.

XIX.

XX.

XXI.

XXII.

XXIII.

CONTENTS.

Nos.

BY THE TRANSLATOR.

Is GOD A SPIRIT? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 THE EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

Wolff's Rules.... . . .. .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 How TO ACQUIRE A KNOWLEDGE OF THE

SOUL............................... 3-8 THE FORMAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PER­

CEPTIONS , . 9-14 OBSERVANDA. [Diversities of Tremulations.]

How the membranes seem to be effigied.

The tremors in the tunics. The forma­

tions of the tremulations . 15-20 SENSATION . 21-41 IMAGINATION . 42-71 SLEEP AND DREAMING . 72-86 THE FACULTY OF PICTURING . 87-105 THE MEMORy . 106-132 ATTENTION AND REFLECTION . 133-142 THE INTELLECT AND COGNITION . 143-144 THE THREE OPERATIONS OF THE INTELLECT 145-150 NATURAL DISPOSITIONS AND HABITS OF THE

INTELLECT . 151-158 PLEASURE AND VVEARINESS . 159-164 SENSITIVE ApPETITE AND SENSITIVE AVER­

SION 165 AFFECTIONS 166-194 THE WILL 195-199 THE WILL AND ITS DETERMINATIONS 200-208 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOUL. THE

SOUL AFTER DEATH 209-216 THE PHILOSOPHY OF PARTICLES. . . . . . . . . . 217 THE MEMBRANES 218-226 [NATURE IS MECHANICAL]............... 227

iii

CONTENTS.

XXIV. THE MEMBRANES ......................• 22~230

XXV. [CONCERNING PHILOSOPHy]............... 231 XXVI. FAITH IN CHRIST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 ApPENDIX. EMINENT GENERATION.

SUBJECT INDEX.

iv

Preface.

Some three or four months ago, Professor E. E. IUNGERICH brought to the present writer a draft translation into English of pp. 159-206 of the third volume of the Swedenborg photo­lithographed MSS:--The writing contained in these pages had not been given any title by the author, but in the photolitho­graphed volume Dr. R. L. Tafel had supplied the title" A Comparison of the Systems of Christian Wolff and Sweden­borg "; for which, Pro£. Iungerich had substituted as being more descriptive, the title "A Psychology of Tremulations based on the Apothegms of Chr. Wolff." Neither of these titles seemed satisfactory. The first involves a systematic com­parison of the whole of Wolff's philosophy with the philosophy of Swedenborg, whereas the work itself consists merely of notes made on various points in \lIIolff's PSYCHOLOGIA EMPIRICA in­terspersed with sundry observations. The second title, while indeed descriptive, seems to involve that the work was written as a set treatise, whereas on the face of it, it is ~othing mo:.-e than notes written during the course of --!".-e~ding. We have preferred therefore the title " Psychologica" or PsychologicalNotes. .~ -- -­

-After hearing a brief description of the work from Prof. IUNGERICH, it needed but a glance at his draft translation to convince the writer of these lines, as to the importance of the work in question; and the matter of its publication was at once brought up before the Directors of the Swedenborg Scientific Association, with the result that Mr. HAROLD F. PITCAIRN gen­erously offered to defray the cost of printing.

Pro£. IUNGERICH'S translation was not in shape to be pub­lished. Indeed it became clear that considerable research would be necessary before a finished translation could be undertaken; and even with this, it was clear that in many places the trans­lator would be obliged to become more or less of an interpre­ter. As soon as this became evident, it was suggested that in

v

PREFACE.

justice both to the translator and to the reader the Latin text of the work should be published at the same time as the English translation; and we record, with great appreciation, that Mr. HAROLD F. PITCAIRN at once extended his offer to cover this additional printing.

The new translation which was then commenced by the pres­ent writer was made from the photolithographed manuscript direct, but based on Prof. IUNGERICH'S draft translation. The changes, however, have been so numerous and far-reaching, that the work is really a new translation, and for it the trans­lator alone must be held responsible. At the same time grate­ful acknowledgment is made for many suggestions supplied by Pro£. Iungerich's translation.

The PSYCHOLOGICA was evidently written by the author for his own use; consequently the language is frequently so ellipti­cal as to be obscure. The translator, therefore, had. two choices; either he could translate the work with exact literal­ness; or he could supply more or less of interpretation wherever the text does not make the author's meaning c1ear,-as for in­stance in the numerous cases where it is not clear what specifi­cally is the subject or object of the verb.

The objection to the first method is that a literal translation would be far more obscure than the original Latin; for the English language does not have genders like the Latin, and does not always show by the form of the verb whether the subject is singular or plural. It is on this plan that Pro£. Iungerich's translation was made. To our mind, the second plan is to be preferred, and this, therefore, we have adopted. Any possible objections which may be made to it are almost entirely obviated by the publication of the Latin text.

The Latin text is in places extremely difficult to read. Pro£. IUNGERICH hil made a transcript befo~~preparing his transla­tion, and in making the present translation, an independent transcript was also made. This latter Pro£. IUNGERICH very kindly compared with his own and supplied valuable suggestions. In view of this revision by so competent a scholar, the reader may be assured of the correctness, so far as possible, of the readings presented in the printed text.

vi

PREFACE.

Grateful acknowledgment is made to Pro£. C. E. DOERING who has given considerable assistance in connection with the diagram in n. 17. Swedenborg's explanation of this diagram presents some difficulty; but after considerable research, Pro£. DOERING found that by a slight alteration in the letters referring to the diagram, Swedenborg's conclusion was fully established. It seems clear, as suggested by Pro£. DOERING, that Swedenborg made a slip in writing C and E for A and A. Pro£. DOERING also informs us that the proposition based on this diagram seems to be original with Swedenborg, for no such proposition is to be found in any of the very numerous works on Mathematics which the Professor has consulted in the course of his studies.

Acknowledgment is also made to Mr. WINFRED S. HYATT, for his kindness in executing the interpretations of Sweden­borg's diagrams.

To Pro£. Iungerich's translation, which covered pp. 102-136 of the photolithographed MS., we have added pp. 137-140. These latter pages do not concern Wolff's PSYCHOLOGICA EM­PIRICA, but the same is true also of the four preceding pages. In any case, it is clear that the pages now added belong to the same series of writings.

We have also added an appendix consisting of a short piece entitled" Eminent Generation," which has been translated from the sixth volume of the photolithographed MSS., p. 311. It was written some six or seven years after the PSYCHOLOGICA, and is inserted as an appendix to the present work partly as .furnishing some indication as to Swedenborg's literary plans, and partly because it has not hitherto appeared in print. The original title supplied by the author was" Eminent Generation, or the Generation of the Spirituous Fluid." This he altered to " Eminent Generation."

The editing of the present volume has consisted in supplying an index, in adding a few explanatory footnotes and in giving references to other of Swedenborg's writings. The giving of references is somewhat unusual but seems useful in the present case as supplying means to the student to elucidate or more fully understand the author's meaning. The editor has also supplied all the paragraph numbers printed in black letter, and

vii

PREFACE.

in one or two cases he has subdivided paragraphs (though with­out numbering them) ; this seemed useful for greater ease in reading and study.

THE PSYCHOLOGICA AND, CODEX J~.8.

The manuscript here translated is contained in codex 88 of the Swedenborg MSS. preserved in-the Library of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Sweden, where it occupies pp. 159-206

/' :'\

of the codex. For the most parte codex 88)s a commonplace b29.k wherein Swedenborg entered "{rom ,!ayjoj.ay:_his j~l!~':I:al

of travels. From da¥ to day also, and thus between the entries of the journal, he wrote various draft paragraphs to be incor­porated in the first chapter of his PRINCIPIA, notes on works he was reading, and observations on various mining operations which had engaged his attention.

Pages 3-7 of the codex, which were the first pages to be written on, contain a little treatise entitled " A General Treat­ment of the Motion of the Element." * This work was written in Stockholm and probably in April 1733; for immediately fol­lowing it, on p. 8, Swedenborg commences his journal of travels, beginning with the statement thatheIeftStockholm-on May 10th. This part of the journal extends from pages 8 to 39, and contains entries from May 10th to July 15th. From it we learn that on June 7th Swedenborg arrived in Dresden, where he stayed for some time. Here, from June 14th to the 19th, he devoted himself to reading and correcting his PRINCIPIA in preparation for its publication.

The special object of his journey to the continent on this occasion, was the publication of the OPERA MINERALOGICA, of ~hich th.e PRINCIPIA ~onst}j:utes vOlumel This' ';orkhad been written in Sweden prior to the commencement of Swedenborg's journey, and, as far at any rate as the PRINCIPIA is concerned, the author specifically states that he had completed it two years before it was printed, that is to say, in 1731.t It should be

, ---.., -.:..:> ( * Translated in I Scientific and\) four volumes, or else to have been

,,-Philos?~hical Treatises, pp. 99-1QS.j divided into four "tomes," for on --rrIie 'original MS. of the p. 57 of(todex 8§,_ in a note" On PRINCIPIA appears to have filled the Orde; of the Particle" the

viii

PREFACE.

noted, however, that the first draft of the PRINCIPIA did not ~. include what is now known as Chapter 1 on "The Means Con­\ ~ucing to a True Philosophy" but that Chapter 2 of the pub­

lished work was originally Chapter 1 of the draft, and so forth. A less immediate object of Swedenborg's journey, though not

a less important, was to learn about and study the numerous learned works which were daily appearing on the Conffnentand ;1i1Cli in 'Sweden, at that time, were difficult to pr~~ure. And when we consider Swedenborg's intense thir~ for knowledge, we can well understand the eagerness with which he searched for new works, and the avidity with which he read and studied them. Indeed his journal contains many extracts from the works which he came across in the course of his travels, besides innumerable notes of works of which he had heard or read.

On July 10th he notes that at the house of a friend, he had seen, for the first time, a copy of Wolff's COSMOLOGIA GEN­ERALIS, a work in which "the author has endeavored to estab­lish elementary nature from 'purely metaphysical principles." Swedenborg evidently procured a copyof this work,* and de­voted some of his time at Dresden to studying it.. ,

The journal for July 15th, 1733, ends on p. 39 of(codex 88: On the following pages (40-46) are contained sundry draft notes for" My Preface to the Principia." After some short jou'~'nal entries dated July 21st to 23rd, at which latter date Swedenborg arrived in Prague, these ~raft notes are continued from p. 50 to p. 57. Several paragraphs of th.ese~r~ts were subsequently incorporated verbatim et literatim in Chapter 1 of

) the PRINCIPIA on "The Means Conducing to a True Philos­, ~p~y."

It appears therefore, as noted above, that at this time what is now the first chapter of the printed PRINCIPIA was either not written, or was not in complete form. It also appears that this

author states that "what has been Phil. Tr., p. 124). The printed said about vortical motion and the PRINCIPIA is divided into three first obstruction of the sun and parts.the dispersal of its crust should *The Cosmologia is entered in be adduced from the fourth tome the Auctioneer's catalog of Swe­of the Principia" (I Scient. & denborg's library.

ix

PREFACE.

chapter was originally intended as the Preface or Introduction to the work, and that what is now Chapter 2 was Chapter 1 of the draft which the aut~rcarried -with him from Swede'O. This is-further confirmed by one of the draft paragraphs in­tended for the PRINCIPIA. This paragrapllis entitled" Con­cerning the Active of indefinite Celerity arising from the Point." Here Swedenborg observes" This should be inserted at the end of the fourth particle." The words" at the end of the fourth particle" would seem to indicate at the end of the chapter which treats of the fourth particle; or it may be that the word " par­ticle " is a misprint for" article" ; for we firnCihat°tiielrlsertlOn

° r-eferred to is actually' made at the end of Chapter 5 of the , printed PRINCIPIA, whi~~ccording to our argumen~'would be

~hapter 4 of t~e first draft. -Among these PRI!'1SI~._notes, occurs a paragraph headed

"A Comparison of Wolff's Cosmologia Generalis with our Principia." A part of this note is incorporated in the" Ap­pendix to the Principia," p. 452,* and it is in this connection that Swedenborg states that his PRINCIPIA was written "two years" before he saw Wolff's Cosmologia, that is to say, two years prior to July 10th, 1733.

It should here be noted that these draft notes for the PRIN­- - .._---­CIP.!:\, and also the first chapter of that work (into which some of the notes were afterwards incorporated), deal largely with the question of the operation of th~ elements on the membr~es

of the human body,-a subject which, as shown by the present ;-ork, a~d by other contents ofGO~ex ~") largely occupied Swedenborg's attention at this time, but which is not dealt with at all in the PRINCIPIA itself. This fact is of considerable sig­nificance as indicating the connection, which was already clearly defined in Swedenborg's mind, between the theory of the e1e­

-0 ments and the doctrine concerning the soul and its operations 2 - into and in the body.---- - --­

A brief journal entry at the end of the draft notes for the PRINCIPIA, on p. 57, states that on July 29th Swedenborg went to Carlsbad. Here he makes some further notes for the PRIN­

* The page references contained in this Preface refer to Latin edi­tions.

x

--

PREFACE.

CIPIA, which are contained on p. 58 of:codexJ~8~and which were included in Chapter 1 of the printed work. He then continues his journal from pp. 59-86, describing his visits to various min­ing towns, and his return to Carlsbad on August 13th. Here he remained for five days, during which he wrote, on pp. 86-88, a paragraph comparing nature to a spider's web, which was later printed verbatim et literatim in Chapter 1 oC,theyRINcIPIA.*

Following this paragraph, pp. 89-115 of (codex 88)contain nothing but journal entries, including notes oncopp~smelting and gold mining, one of which was subsequently incorporated in the second volume (De Cupro) of the OPERA MINERALOGICA. On August 25th he returned to Dr~en, and on September 4th he arrived at Leip~ig. The last entry in the journal for 1733 is dated October 5th, on which day, as Swedenborg notes, he began the printing of his PRINCIPIA.

--. Then, commencing with p. 116, come fifteen pages of a work on "The Mechanism of the Soul and the Body," t the main subject of which is the mode whereby sensations are convey~d

,to .~he_~ul, namely by means of membranous tremulatlOns. This is followed by twenty-one pages of excerpts on the subject of Generation, and five pages of anatomical observations :j: end­ing with p. 157.

Page 158 is blank; and fro~. 152\ommences the work, the translation of which is containedin the present volume. This ends on p. 213, with the paragraph "Concerning Faith in Christ. ,,',-

Following this, on p. 214, comes an entry in the journal dated March 1st, 1734, to the effect that on that date Swedenborg journeyed to Halle.

It is evident therefore that the PSYCHOLOGICA was wri~ten_in

Leipzig, between the 5th October 1733 and the 1st March,1734. Now·on the 5th October Sw~de~bo~g c~~e~ed printingthe three folios of his OPERA MINERALOGICA; and, as indicated by the evidence adduced above, it was doubtless at this time that

* All the draft notes for the t Translated in I Scient. & Phil. PRINCIPIA referred to in this Pref· Tr., pp. 13-32. _. Ice are translated into English in I :j: Translated in I Scient. & PJiil,\ S'cient. & Phil. Tr., pp. 107-125. Tr., pp. 35-42.. .~

Xl

PREFACE.

he wrote out for the press that meEIoraple first chaplet ofJ~e

PRINCIPIA entitled "The Means conducing to a True Philos­,. - -' ophy." Allowing for the time taken while he was thus en­gaged; allowing also for the writing of the MECHANISM OF THE SOUL AND THE BODY, for the copying of the excerpts on Gen­eration, and the composing of the Anatomical Observations, it is probable .!..hat th.e..P--S:X<2.HOL<:lGICA was wr~!~en in J~.!1~!y a?~

Febr_uary of 1734. --- -­--In any event it is clear that at the end of 1733 or the begin­ning of 1734, Swedenborg came across Wolff's PSYCHOLOGIA EMPIRICA, which was published in Leipzig and Balle at the end of 1732 * and which Swedenborg had never before seen._ Being a great admirer of Wolff, Swedenborg seems to have entered into a careful study of this work; and it was in the course of

) this study, that he wrote the notes now published. These notes embody and further amplify Swedenborg's doctrine with respect to the intercourse between the soul and the body, especially as related to his PRINCIPIA theory. Be had already written on this subject in Sweden, before commencing his journey, his thoughts being set forth in the little work on "The Motion of the Elements." The theory there expounded he had further elaborated in the course of his journal, in his drafts of Chapter 1 of the PRINCIPIA, in his finished copy of the chapter itself, in the treatise on "The Mechanism of the Soul and the Body," as contained on pp. 116-130 of(fodex_?8>and in the work on the INFINITE, which was published simultaneously with the PRINCIPIA.

For the greater clearness of the reader, we present below the contents of, codex 88"in the form of a table:

"--. Pages of codex 88.

1-2 Sundry notes (written after 1740).t 3-7 The Motion of the Elements (written in Stockholm).

8-39 Journal, May 10th to July 15th, 1733. Leaves Stockholm May 10th; arrives Dresden June 7th.

* Hist. des W olffischen Phi!. by was finished on December 27th, C. G. Ludivici, Leipzig, 1738, p. 67. 1739; also some anatomical notes.

t P. 1 is the first cover page. It The page facing it (p. 1 proper) contains the statement that the contains drafts of the title page of Economy of the Animal Kingdom the Economy.

xii

PREFACE.

June 14th to 15th, prepares PRINCIPIA for press. July 10th, sees Wolff's COSMOLOGIA.

40-49 Principia notes and Journal to July 23rd. Arrives at Prague July 23rd.

49-57 Principia notes and Journal to July 30th. Arrives at Carlsbad July 29th.

58 Principia notes. 58-86 Journal, August 6th to August 13th.

Describes journeys to mining towns. Returns to Carlsbad on August 13th.

86-88 Principia notes. 88-115 Journal, August 16th to October 5th.

Arrives in Leipzig September 4th. Commences printing of PRINCIPIA October 5th.

116-130 Mechanism of Soul and Body. 131-157 Anatomical Excerpts and Observations.

158 Blank. 159-213 Notes on Wolff's PSYCHOLOGIA EMPIRICA (the present work). 214-215 Journal, March 1st to 4th, 1734.

Leaves Leipzig for Halle March 1st. 216-236 Anatomical Excerpts. 237-276 Abstract of Principia.*

The rest of the codex, to p. 713, is filled with various philosophical and anatomical excerpts.

THE PLACE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICA IN THE SERIES OF SWEDENBORG'S WORKS.

While in Leipzig, Swedenborg published also a " Prodomus, or introduction concerning the Infinite," part 2 of which deals with the intercourse between the soul and the body. Whether this work was written in Leipzig or whether it was completed, at any rate in first draft, before Swedenborg left Stockholm, is not clear.

As indicating that it was written prior to the printing of the PRINCIPIA, we note that on p. 224 t Swedenborg refers to "my Principia concerning the elementary world"; and he adds: "I wish to quote therefrom only the following words: ' !f. an~e­ment comes into existepce it must most certainly be fluid, so as t~bie tOlfow-with the utmost aptne~-; no£.. ~an iLflQ1L!n

* An English translation of this Swedenborg Scientific Association. Abstract was published by the t Latin edition, London 1886.

xiii

PREFACE.

/.

..... (

4..

this way unless each particle becomes fluid, so that each single particle contributes to the moti~';;--~w~~le,'" etc. These words appear to have been taken fromthe first dr<!ft; for though we have made the most diligent search, we can find no such words in the printed PRINCIPIA.

On the other hand, later on in the INFINITE (p. 263), the author's references to Chapters 5 and 7 of the PRINCIPIA are clearly to the printed work. Moreover, certain aspects of the work on the INFINITE appear clearly to indicate that it was written during the course of Swedenborg's travels in 1733. We refer particularly to t~ote of sadness sound~d here and there, at the contemplation of the prevalence _01 ~~heism. We find the same note in the MECHANISM OF THE SOUL AND BODY and also in the present work.* Indeed the work on the INFINITE appears to be specially addressed to the unbelieving philosopher.

Again, we have the fact that the MECHANISM OF THE SOUL ... - .- ----,...------.

ANp~ODY, the first chapter of the PRINCIPIA, and the PSYCHO­LOGICA,-undoubtedly written about the same period, namely in Leipzig between September 1733 and the end of February 1734, have a common peculiarity that distinguishes them from all others of Swedenborg's writings, except the INFINITE, namely, the use of the word " simile" as a noun and-;ith-a particular psychological meaning. However, the time when the INFINITE was written, whether prior to Swedenborg's journey com­menced in May 1733, or during the journey, cannot be decided with any degree of certainty.

It does seem clear, however, that the PSYCHOLOGICA was written after the INFINITE. It is indeed true that one or two passages in the former work are very similar to passages in the INFINITE; yet we observe that the same similarity exists in the case of the PSYCHOLOGICA and the MECHANISM BETWEEN THE SOUL AND THE BODY, which latter work was undoubtedly the earlier of the two. Moreover, several facts seem clearly to indi­cate that the PSYCHOLOGICA was written after the INFINITE, and that it constitutes a preliminary essay in preparation for that work, of which the INFINITE was the "~~Q<:1(nn..11_~~~?r

* See Psychological Transactions Preface p. xiii.

xiv

PREFACE.

!orerunner. This leads us to a consideration of the develop­ment of the psychological theory outlined in the work now published.

THE COSMOLOGICAL WORKS AND THE PHYSIOLOGICAL.

Early students of Swedenborg have doubtless observed the apparent gap between the PRINCIPIA and the physiological

1\ __ works. In the one the elements of the universe are considered; 2. - in the other, the bloods of the _b5?dy and tne operation of the

soul into the body. But the -connection between these two series, namely the operations of the elements upon th;bfo;ds, was only obscurely understood. It appeared as if Swedenborg had not written anything to fill the gap between his two series of works. Something of a connection between them i~ed

supplied by the INFINITE, where on p. 263 Swedenborg indicates that the soul consists of the first and second actives of his PRIN­CIPIA. But this rather whetted than satisfied the appetite of the student. In 1904, however, further light was thrown on this matter when the SWEDENBORG SCIENTIFIC ASSOCIATION published the little work from(codex 88\entitled "A general treatment of the Motion of the---Elements." * In this work,

'" - Swedenborg shows that the elements of the un}~erse operate 2. - upon the membranes of the body and there produce undulations

and tremulations. The con~ection between his two serie~-!?f

works was made still clearer by the publication of the " Mech­anism of the Soul and Body" t where our author enters more fully into the effects of the ele~ents upon human membranes, and where he specifically connects his PRINCIPIA theory with his doctrine of the intercourse between the soul and the body.

And now, with the appearance of the PSYCHOLOGICA, the student is offered the means of entering still more fully into ~

'" ~ ~gerstanding of the co~nection between the elements or bloous 1 ~ of_ the universe and the blQods or_ekments of the huma~~dy.

A study of Swedenborg's philosophical writings leads us to conclude that this connection was in general clearly present in ~~s mind long before the writing of the PRINCIPIA. Ind~

* In I Scient. & Phil. Tr. pp. 99 t 11 ibid. pp. 13 seq. seq.

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PREFACE.

this is specifically indicated in the INFINITE (p. 268) where in speaking of a work which he proposes to write on the subject of the soul, its motion, geometry and mechanism, he adds that in this work he will set forth" how far I have already advanced in this enquiry."

The first indication of Swedenborg's specific doctrine respect­ing the soul and its mechanism is contained in the little work on TREMuLATION, written in 1719. Here Swedenborg advances the doctrine that all sensations, whether internal or external, are nothing but the perceptions by the soul of tremulations in mem­b.ran.es. Here also he indicates, what he so often insists~-;in his PRINCIPIA and later works, that all nature, even the most occult, is mechanical and geometrical; that perception, imagina­tion, memory, sensation, all are to be explained geometrically by the tremulations of membra~es-:--By thisdoctrine as set forth in TRE;~~~TIoN"he explains sympathy and antipathy, and also what is now called thought.!ransfe~~~ce; ascribing these to mo­tions transmitted to the elements from one person and received by the subtle membranes of another. - ­- In-pr~paring the TREMULATION, Swedenborg entered into a

very thorough study of anatomy or, to quote his own words as contained in a letter written to his brother-in-law, Dr. Benze1ius, in November 1719, where he refers to the work on TREMuLA­TION as " A little anatomy of our vital forces": " For the pur­pose of writing this work I have made myself thoroughly ac­q~ted with the anatomy~the_nerves and membranes, and I have proved t.h~--futrmony which exists between that and the interesting geometry of tremulations; togethe~-~ith many other ideas, where I have found that I agree with those of Baglivi" (I Doe. c. Swed. p. 310).*

There are many evidences of Swedenborg's intense study of anatomy and of his remarkable familiarity with the most minute det~ls of. the hu~~n__body; but it is not generally kn~~~ that these studies commenced so early as prior to 1719. In addition to the TREMuLAmN, there are other evidencesof Swedenborg's early anatomical studies, studies which appear to have been

*Baglivi's work, De Fibra M0- Swedenborg and he frequently trice, was very closely studied by quotes from it in his later works.

xvi

PREFACE.

closely followed up in the years following 1719. Chapter 1 of the PRINCIPIA on "The Means conducing to a True Philos­ophy" is full of reference.:>~dicatingthe most exact anatom~<:al

k~~~!~dge; and such knowledgeis quite"'clearly indicated in the work on the INFINITE.

After writing TREMULATION, however, Swedenborg appears to have come to the conclusion that it would be vain for him to follow up this subject until he had first developed '!_the~rY.'--?-f

t~ u!1i~~!se. He therefore bent his efforts to a study of chem­istry and of the mineral kingdom; and finally these studies and researches culminated in the writing of the PRINCIPIA, pub­lished in 1734.

In the INFINITE, which was published in the same year, Swedenborg specifically states his reason for presenting the

t: doctrine of the elements before turning to the full presentation <:. of the do~tEin~-~,Cth~oul and its intercourse with the body,

of which he had treated in a preliminary way in the little work .- on TREMULATION. "Unless the theory of the elements be pre­

mised (he says) we would labo~ vain t~~t;)a knowledge - of t1~~~, ,ope,rati~ns in human.Ji.fe" (p. 235); that is to say,

unless the PRINCIPIA precede, the physiological and psychologi­cal works could never follow.

The work on the INFINITE however, although written as an exposition of psychological principles, was professedly" a fore­runner," and, as shown in the work itself, <;to forerunner to a contemplated treatise which was to show mechanically anddem­onstrate geometrically the intercourse of soul and body. The doctrines which Swedenborg proposed to demonstrate in this intended work were already present in his mirld, before he had written the PRINCIPIA, but they could not be presented until the " theory of the elem~:~ts had first been premised."

In the INFINITE, or forerunner of this proposed work, Swe­denborg several times refers to " the work itself" (p. 192).

On p. 247 he says: "Of themselves the membranes of the body are nothing but merely passive; but' they are so formed that they can receive the motion of elementary parts and be actuated into imitation thereof. Hence by means of the ele­~~nts a like modulation is spread in a moment throughout the

xvii 2

PREFACE.

-1­

z

,'1

whole body, so that th~ tremulous or undulatory motio~0n the enclosed elements are the verimost animal spirits which are said to act i~ Obedience to the willing sour Btitof these ~atters

~e shall treat b~-tter -i~-a' speaal the~ry; here I could present only a confused and general idea of this operation."

On p. 251, after speaking of the necessity of membranes be­ing harmoniously adapted by use and cultivation to p-~uce

distinct~ffects; andConsequently of there being ~t1~essioIl..Q.f

fi~._~nd finer membranes for the reception and representation ~f vib~atiOns, he continues: "but all these particulars will be fully deduced and geometrically demonstrated in a special theory. I wish here only to present a general idea, by help whereof, others, more penetrating than I, may perhaps more deeply investigate the operations of the elements upon the mem­br~~es, and of the me~branest.i:pon-the elements." -- . _...._­

On p. 266 he says: " In brutes the soul is much more gross than the human soul. It is an elementary, not consisting of actives, which latter constitute the actuality of reason; but in place of actives the soul of brutes is an elementary something. In a special exposition on this subject, I wish to confirm this proposition with a great many arguments which perhaps are not as yet well known."

On pp. 267-268 he again repeats his intention of writing on this subject. "If we suppose the actuality of .!4~-2Q...ul to con­sist in motion and in a force highly mechanical, while its surface consists in a figure highly geometrically; and if the mind will tht;n examine all things which experience can present to it for ex~ation, that i; to s~y~he anato~y of the human body, the parts of all the extern.<J:L senses and all the modes and faculties which can be knownand distinguished in the iinagination~I!!­

!!..ry, perc<:E!~n and __will, and the varieties and difference~ of them all as arising from divers affections and other causes, and ~J;ly-oth~LJhings which~re 'tcibe-;pecially scrutinized and compared, then at last something certain can be concluded con­cerning the true geometry and mechanism of this most perfect entity. As to how far I h;:tve advanced in this enquiry, it is my intention 1;;-'present this in detail, if G.od· grant me life and leisure. Here in-general, I think that nothing can be presented

xviii

PREFACE.

as affirmative and positive; for e?Cper~~ce and geometry are the only things which must affirm and establish. And when experi­ence and geometry have done this, then by consent of the soul we shall have the rationale of the subject. The principal_end of this. pre>p.9.sed wo~k is that th;immClrtality of the soul may be demonstrated before the very senses."

On p. 192 he enters into further detail as the character of his proposed work to which the INFINITE was the forerunner. After noting the objection to his doctrine concerning the soul, namely, that if it were subject to mechanical rules, it would be material and perishable, and not spiritual and imm~tal; and after showing, that such an objection could arise only from a

(" gross conception of the "purer mechanism" of the more per­fect world in which the soul lives, and the destructi~;£~hICh----------- ----- . --- -'._'~') would involve the annihilation of the whole created univ~rse, he

-,' _._--~- .' ~.~

continues: "But what need is there of words? In the work I itself, so far as possible, I desire to demonstrate this to the eye, \ namely, that the soul is perfectly and purely mechanical; that ) the soul i~L~~!,1g!1al; and that it ~~nnot per~h, unks.s_the un}­

verse be annihilated; likewise, that the soul is so created and { formed, that it co~mences to live in the'body, an4 that it knows n2,Ulyi~; ancl"ihai-it is naturally {mp9ssible fo!"_~t to4Ie; that it cannot be injured by fire, nor by air, nor by ether, nor by elements still more subtle." *

It is clear from these references that t~ proposed work to which the INFINITE was the introduction was-to e'staW:~~~,_0e

existence and immortality of the soul and its communion with the bodY~he most exact and rati~nal manner; that it was to

\ be, as it were, a demonstration of the City of God as existing ~n earth in a hum~;--it IS with'such a work in ~ind that S-wedenborg see~ to have entered upon his study orWolff's PSYCHOLOGIA EMPIRICA; and in this study to have introduced so many passages, invariably marked" Nota Bene," wheielnhe outlines hrs doctri~e~oncerning-the ;~~l, especially ~s to-its beinggeometricarand mechanicaL----­

As he reaches the end of Wolff's work, 4~ set [or!h hls~~

ideas at greater length, writing in some detail concerning the -- -.----, -_... ._'------ --­

*Compare with this passage Psy- chologica, 209. xix

PREFACE.

will and the action of the soul in the will. Turning from this t-;-~ consideration of the soul's state after the death of the body, he addresses himself to the fascinating theme of the theologian, the communion of souls. After this, under the heading " Con­cerning Philosophy" he gives a draft table of the contents of the proposed work,-which was to consist of seventeen chap­ters ; to which table he adds a note to the effect that all the points to be treated of are to be demonstrated from geometry, anatomy, and experience in the elements. He then proceeds (n. 223 seq.) to set down some anatomical observations, evidently with a view to using them in the development of his proposed work; and finally concludes with a second and alternative list of chapter headings for his propos~d work, follo~~d by ·~k-;bf~ para­graph on Faith in Christ, where is shown the profound sim­

( plicity and reverent adoration of the author as opposed to the atheism of materialistic learning.

It seems clear therefore that the PSYCHOLOGICA was written after the INFINITE and with a general idea of preparing for " the work itself" referred to and promised in the INFINITE,­a work which perhaps was to be entitled "Philosophy" or "The Philosophy of the Particles." *-- . ­

Swedenborg, however, whether at this time or later, con­cluded .that before his doctrines could be comprehended, it would be necessary for him to enter into a detailed exposition of the human body and its parts, and especially of the brains. Therefore, laying aside for the time, the pro.Qosed work which was to demonstrate the existence, the i~m~t~lity·and-··the

blessedness of the soul-he turned to those work; wherein he was to···set f~~th--the results of his intense studies and deep reflection in the field of physiology.

The years that followed the publication of the PRINCIPIA were therefore devoted to the writing of works on physiology. In 1737 or 1738, he wrote on the Brain; and in December 1739 he completed the ECONOMY OF THE ANIMAL KINGDOM. In the following year he wrote furiheronthe ·Brain·~~(lT;terhe com­posed a long series of anatomical works, culminating in the

* The reading" particularum" in tirely satisfactory. the heading of n. 217, is not en-

xx

PREFACE.

ANIMAL KINGDOM. But in all these writings he seems ever to ~~~-k~pt-ht-~ew the end which he had outlined in the TREMU­LATION, and which he more fully sets forth in the work on the INFINITE.

In one of his manuscripts containing notes on the brain, we see a plain indication of this intention in a little paragraph en­titled" Eminent Generation,* by which is meant the Generation of the Spirituous Fluid, or the descent of the soul into. the body. " Emi~e.l:lt ge~eration (he says) cannot be understoode~.~ept_by

mea1]-s of refl.ection_and similitude, and unless we know how every active force can be represented if!... th~ aura, just as every image is represented iJ:!. t~e ether. But there is required re­flection and concentration, and this upon the cortical substance. We are not permitted to go further without a mathematical philosophy of series and degrees." Therefore he proposed to himself a long course before he could finally reach the goal, here adumbrated in the PSYCHOLOGICA.

As to the nature of the work itself which is now presented to the public, this we shall leave to the judgment of the reader. Suffice it to say that it marks one more step on the path that will lead the student to a clearer understanding of that doct:!i!!.e of the soul which was present in Swedenborg's mind- ev"ffi"when he wrote the PRINCIPIA; which so deeply influenced the-;l~le

of lis subseque.t.!.t writings ; w~ic~_it was the goal of his ambition to set forth in clearer lig~t, that men might be led to venerate, worship and adore the wisdom of God; and which, finally, firmly established in his own mind, was to become the means whereby he might rationaliy receive and fitly present to the world, the heavenly doctrine of the New Jerusalem.

ALFRED ACTON. BRYN ATHYN, PA.,�

June 14, 1923.�

*See Appendix.

xxi

","'" 1

PSYCHOLOGICA Being

Notes and Observations

on

Christian Wolff's Psychologia Empirica

[1. ]

1. Is GOD A SPIRIT. \iVolff says that in his NATURAL THE­OLOGY, he wishes to demonstrate that God is a Spirit [Preface, n. 7]. But let us first define what a spirit is. 1. Men say that angels or genii are spirits. 2. They say that the soul is a spirit. 3. They say that the devil is a spirit. 4. We say that all things that are active per se, even though in material things, are spirits.* But all these spirits were created and made by the Infinite, and consequently are finite and not infinite. God alone is infinite. Whatever was created by the Infinite must be finite. There is no middle term, unless it be something similar to the finite which has not yet been so finited as to have the attributes of the finite, though in potency, that is, in its at­tributes, it is similar to the finite. Therefore since spirits are created, they are finite; and if finite, they are mechanical and geometrical, ~th an acti~e added thereto. Therefore there can be no created spirits unless they are finite; nor finite unless they are endowed with geometrical attributes, and consequently, un­less they are subject to mechanical rules. As to the Infinite, on the other hand, this can have nothing geometrical in it, and nothing mechanical; for it is the cause of every mechanical principle. Hence there is no mechanical or geometrical nexus between the Infinite and the finite. The Infinite is the cause, and the effect is immediate.t Hence there would be no nexus with God if not through Christ; nor through Christ except by

* CL n. 75. t Cf. n. 230.

t -2

1

PSYCHOLOGICA.

[In]

[Chr. Wolffii]

[Psychologiam Empiricam]

MS., p. 159. 3 Ph. MS., p. 102.

Num Deus sit spiritus. Deum esse Spiritum demonstrare velle ait Claris. Wollfius in sua Theologia Naturalis. Sed primum definiamus quid sit spiritus: I. Angelos seu genios esse dicunt spiritus. 2. Animam dicunt esse spiritum. 3. Diabolum dicunt esse spiritum. 4. Omnia quae per se activa sunt quamvis in rebus materialibus dicimus esse spiritum. Sed on::mes hi spiritus sunt creati et ab infinito facti, et consequenter sunt finiti, non vero infiniti; solus Deus est infinitum; quicquid creatum est ab infinito, hoc erit fini­tum; medium non datur, nisi aliquid simile finito, quod ita nondum finitum est, ut finiti attributa habeat, sed in potentia, hoc est, in suis attributis simile finito. Ergo si creati, sunt finiti, si finiti, accedente activo, sunt mechanici et geometrici. Ideoque non dari possunt spiritus creati, nisi finiti, nee finiti nisi geometricis attributis polleant, et consequenter nisi normis mechanicis subjecti. Quod vera infinitum attinet, nihil geometrice, nihil mechanice potest in se habere, quia est causa omnis principii mechanici; unde nullus est nexus mechanicus nee geometricus infiniti et finiti; est causa et effectus est immediatus. Unde cum Deo nullus foret nexus nisi per Christum, nee per Christum nisi quatenus corpus

3

2

f 1..

PSYCHOLOGICA.

reason of His having assumed a body. But there is a nexus of Christ and the Holy Spirit with the Infinite, though to us, the nature of this nexus is unknown.* Finite spirits, therefore, are mechanical and geometrical, and so cannot be called spirits, except it be finite spirits who are actuated by their own rules. But God or the Infinite is not a spirit in any degree as compared with'" finit~ spirits"; nor can He be called a spirit, unless you would say Infinite Spirit,---=-~erm which can be predicated of the..!.I0ly"Spi!"it, not oCthe Infinite Father. - ­

[11. ]

[THE EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN SOUL.t]

2. WOLFF'S RULES. 1. We experience every moment, that we are conscious of ourselves and of other thinqs stationed about us [n. 11] ; to wit, by means of the eleme!)ts and of tile ?-~gans that shall conspire therewith. That this is a material and mechanical characteristic, we see from the fact that the like exists in brutes, in that their organs are mechanical and are adapted to the motions of !he elem~Ets.

2. That we are conscious of ourselves, is confirmed by our very doubting [no 12] ; for we cannot doubt except with regard to something which exists.

3.(He'---Who is"actually conscious', of himself and of other thingsAalso actually is, or f!.-xists. It follows therefore that we exist. The knowledge of our existence is confirmed by our very doubting,' or, From the fact that we doubt as to whether we exist or not, comes theinfere1;cethat we do exist [no 13, 14, "is] .. ­

4. Geometrical truths are learned by the same evidence as that by which our own existence becomes known to us [n. 18].

S. That entity in us which is conscious of itself and of other things outside uZ is' Ter~d th;-soul~ It is called the human ~, like'uJise the hu--:;,wn mind. Th"'erefore th"; h~;;"a~ so~Tex­ists [no 20, iij.·---­

* Cf. Mechanism of Soul and t The titles of Chapters II to Body, n. 25; I Infinite xiv. XIX are taken from Wolff.

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

assumserit; at Christi et Spiritus Sancti est nexus cum Infinito, sed qualis sit nobis est incognitum. Ergo spiritus finiti sunt mechanici et geometrici; ergo nec spiritus appellari possunt, nisi spiritus finiti, qui regulis suis aguntur. At vero Deus vel Infinitum non est spiritus in aliquo gradu comparative cum spiritibus finitis; nec spiritus potest appellari, nisi velis spiritus infinitus, quod de Spiritu Sancto non de Patre In­finito praedicari potest.

MS., 160.

Reg. 1 Wolfii. Nos esse nostri rerumque aliarum extra nos constitutarum conscios quovis momento experimur, scilicet medi­antibus elementis et organis quae conspirabunt; hoc esse materiale et mechanicum, videmus ex eo, quod simile sit in brutis, quod organa sint mechanica, et ad motus elementorum

aptata. Ph. MS., 103.

2. Nos esse nostri conscios ipsa dubitatione confirmatur; non enim dubitare possumus quam de re aliqua quae existit.

3. Qui sui aliarumque rerum actu conscius est, ille etiam actu est sive existit. Ergo sequitur, nos existimus. Cognitio existen­tiae nostrae ipsa dubitatione confirmatur; ex eo quod dubitamus utrum existamus necne, colligitur nos existere.

4. Veritates geometricae eadem evUlentia cognoscuntur, qua existentia nostra nobis innotescit.

S. Ens illud quod in nobis sibi, sui et aliarU1n rerum extra nos conscium est, anima dicitur; vocatur anima humana, item mens humana. Ergo anima humana existit.

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

6. We learn the e.t'istence of the soul before that of the body [n. 22]. For if one thinks or if one doubts, the cause, or t~

doubting or thinking entity, is in the soul; since if it did not exist as a-cause'-( there ;~~ldb~no doubti~g or' thinking] . The doubt or the thought is concerning [the existence of] the body.

\ Hence the causing entity exists before the causate.* My opin­ion is; What need is there to deduce the fact of my own exist­

) ence, or to argue that I am? In such a question there is no room for doubt, nor any definite-termination. Who candoubt that heTsrlt is what he is that should be inquired into; whether he is rational or not; whether he possesses a soul or [not]; or whether there is a soul. Hence the deduction to be made is: I think, therefore, there is a soul. Still it is not yet clear whether this soul is a rational soul or is like the soul of brutes; for, in thei~ o~n '~ay, b-~utes also think and they possess a kind of phantasy. But [the clearer deduction is] I doubt, therefore there is a [rational] soul. F~ if I doubt, I will affirm or deny; I will Ai.ss~ss argutn~Ets. Thus in the thought, there is an analysis, and a kind of ratio or analogy. Hence it can be known that I doubt, therefore I am rational or enjoy a rational soul which-can doubt and affirm," can-weight arguments,;-nd by analogy or analytical thought, can come to some concl"tffiion; therefore I am rational; that is to say, I doubt, thereforeTam rational. '.'.--- ­

[Ill. ]

[How TO ACQUIRE A KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOUL.]

3. Wolff says: Thinking is an act of the soul whereby it is I conscious of itself and of other things outside itself [n. 23]. L Bare thought-~-also appii~bkt'Zbrui:es whiCh enjoy a kind of

imagination,-but an imagination without any analytical and rational searching into distinct arguments. In dreams there is thought, but what kind of thought? The existence of the soul is not proved by the existence of thought, but by the mode of

• Swedenborg here paraphrases Wolff's confirmation of his theorem.

6

3

PSYCHOLOGICA.

6. Animae existentiam ante cognoscimus quam corporis. Nam si cogitat vel si dubitat, causa vel ens dubitans aut cogitans est in anima, quod si non existit ut causa, dubitatio est de corpore vel cogitatio de corpore, hinc praeexistit ens causans, quam causatum. Mea sententia, quid opus existen­tiam deducere, seu argumentari quod sim, nee quisquam in hoc dubitandi locus aut terminus est; quis dubitare potest, quod sit; sed qualis sit disquirendum est, num rationalis vel non, num anima polleat, vel num sit anima. Hine dedueen­dum, eogito ergo est anima. Sed nondum liquet an sit anima rationalis vel sit similis brutorum; nam bruta etiam suo modo cogitant et phantasia quadam pollent; sed dubito ergo est anima. Nam si dubito, affirmabo vel negabo, argumenta diseutiam; ergo est analysis et quaedam ratio aut analogia in cogitatione. Hine potest seiri, dubito ergo sum rationalis seu anima rationali gaudeo, quae dubitare et affirmare, quae argumenta perpendere, et per analogiam seu eogitationem analyticam quid concludere potest; ergo sum rationalis; hoc est, dubito ergo sum rationalis.

MS., 161.

Cogitare dicit, est actus animae, quo sibi sui rerumque aliarum extra se conscia est. Cogitatio nuda applieari potest etiam ad bruta quae quadam imaginatione pollent, sed qua, sine disquisitione analytica, in argumenta distineta et rationali. In somnis est cogitatio, sed qualis; ex eogitatione non probatur anima, sed a cogitationis modo. In fatuis ubi vix operatur

7

4-5

PSYCHOLOGICA.

thought; thought exists in the foolish, in whom the soul hardly operates at all. There is corporeal thought, and th<:E~ is thought frc:>m_ th~ ~~l; and these two together give me ~--rational.

Therefore, it can be said: I think, therefore I am; but not, I think, therefore I am rational and a soul. Perhaps many thoughts have an origin other than the soul, although the first origin of such thoughts was the soul; but afterwards, the soul runs into the traces it has impressed on the organs of the-T;ody, without -any -further as~ent and, as it were, spontaneously; -for ~motion ~nce commenced is c2ntinued without any new motory, as may be seen in tremulous bodies. In the strings of a musical instrument the finger is the first mover, but the string may after­wards be moved either by itself, or by something simil~r, or by some other agency; and on such occasion, the motion cannot be said to commence in the soul, but to come from other agencies.*

4. The m{nd is said to perceive, when it reP!!.~!!!!Lto itself s2-1'J!§_o£j£!!t. Perception is therefore an act of the mind whereby it represents to itself some object; such as colors, odors, sounds [n. 24]. But to perceive colors, odors, sounds, is a property also of brute animals; to perceive distinctly, however, and not only to sensate harmony, but also-to know and perceive it, is the property of man alone.

5. Apperception is attributed to the mind, inasmuch as the latter is conscious of its own perception [n. -2S] . Apperception is also-and es"i)edally a property of -the rational soul; but it is also a property of brutes. They perceive a thing by their or­gans, they apperceive it by their soul; for with brutes there can be no perception without apperception. This indeed is not possible in any living creature, inasmuch as there is a terminus to which perception goes, and when it has arrived at this ter­minus, it becomes apperception. _ In man this terminus is in his [rational] soul; in brutes, it is in their soul. But as to the

* In a harp, the finger moves a xi; Princ. I, 3, p. 31. In the fiddle, string, and the movement is then the finger is the first mover, but extended to other strings and is the direct mover is the bow. So continued for some time as it were with the piano, zither, etc. spontaneously; coni. 11 Ini. IV,

8

4-5

PSYCHOLOGICA.

anima, est cogitatio. Cogitatio datur corporea, datur animae, quae simul dant mihi rationale. Did sic potest, cogito ergo sum, non vera, cogito ergo sum rationalis, et anima. Multae cogitationes fortassis aliud principium habent quam ab anima, quamvis primum illius cogitationis principium fuerit animae sed dein in organis corporis impressa ejus vestigia sine assen­tiente amplius anima recurrit tanquam sponte sua; nam motus semel inchoatus sine novo motore continuatur, ut in tremulis videre licet; in chordis est digitus primum movens, sed dein potest moveri vel per se, vel per aliud simile, vel per aliud quid, qui motus non sic dici potest incipere in anima ilIa vice, sed ab aliis.

Ph. MS., 104.

Mens percipere dicitur, quando sibi objectum aliquod reprae­sentat; est itaque perceptio actio mentis, qua objectum sibi reprae­sentat, ut colores, odores, sonos. Sed percipere etiam est brutorum, qua colores, odores, sonos; sed distincte percipere, harmoniam non modo sentire, sed etiam scire et percipere, hoc est hominis.

Menti tribuitur apperceptio, quatenus perceptionis suae con­scia est; est etiam apperceptio animae rationalis speciatim, sed etiam est brutorum; percipiunt per organa, appercipiunt illud per suam animam. Nam penes bruta non dari potest perceptio sine apperceptione, in nullo vivo, quatenus terminus est ad quem tendit perceptio, quum pervenit ad illum ter­minum fit apperceptio, quod in homine quidem est in anima, in brutis in illorum anima; sed qualis sit apperceptio, ex

9

6-8

PSYCHOLOGICA.

nature of the apperception,-whether or not there is in it a [rational] soul,-this may be concluded from the quality and mode of the apperception.

6. Every thought involves both perception and apperception [n. 26]. This is true, according to what was said above, namely, that no thought is possible without perception and ap­perception; nor, in living creatures, is perception possible with­out apperception. The same is also true of brutes. Therefore, to apperceive, is to be conscious. According to our author, "when I see the sun, I am conscious of its existence" [ib.]. This at once involves something more than apperception; it in­volves something more distinct, some resultant arising from the apperception that the sun exists; as for instance, what the nature of the sun is, and what its distance from the earth. This apperception involves still more; it involves also an act of the soul. Wolf! adds: We are conscious of the sun, not as it really is, but as our mind represents it to herself [ib.]. This also is a property of brutes.

7. All that is gathered by legitimate 1'easoning from the things observed to be in our mind, and all that is then inferred there­from,' is agreeable also to the mind. The sa·me holds good of every other entity [n. 27] . This agrees exactly with the defini­tion of reason which I gave in my PRINCIPIA, namely that it is something analogica1.* The only difference is, that whereas Wolff says the things observed to be in our mind, I can state it in this way: "the things which may be in the organs of the body and of the senses, or of the soul,"-for they are in organs.

8. We come to a knowledge of the mind, if we pay attention to our thoughts; and if further, we attl'ibute to the mind all that has been gathered from the thoughts by legitimate reasoning [no 28]. This also coincides with the definition in our PRIN­

CIPIA. For if we pay attention to our thoughts, there is at once something else at hand which reasons, distinguishes, collates; or, there is an analogy or rational.

* " The rational consists in know­ analogy may be obtained; and also ing how to arrange the ratios in being able to make this arrange­learned from the world, into such ment." (Prill. I, 2, fin.) order and connection, that an

10

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

qualitate et modo apperceptionis conc1udi potest, num anima sit vel non. MS., 162.

Omnis cogitatio et perceptionem et apperceptionem involvit; verum est secundum antedicta, nulla cogitatio datur sine perceptione et apperceptione; in vivis nee perceptio sine apperceptione, hoc etiam in brutis; ergo appercipere est conscius esse. Quum solem video, secundum autorem, ejus consistentiae conscius sum; hoc statim involvit aliquid plus quam apperceptionem ; involvit distinctius quid et resultatum ex apperceptione quod consistat, ut qualis sit sol, qualis distantia; haec apperceptio involvit plus et actum animae. Addit, Solis nobis conscii sumus, non qualis revera est, sed qualem sibi repraesentat mens nostra, hoc etiam brutorum est.

Quae ex iis, quae menti inesse observamus, legitimo ratiocinio colliguntur, et quae porro ex his inferuntur; eadem quoque menti conveniunt; idem valet de omni ente alio. Haec conveniunt ad amussim cum definitione rationis, quam dedi in Principiis, quod analogicum sit; ilIa tantum est differentia, quod dicat, quae menti inesse observamus, possum ita dicere, quae organis corporis et sensuum vel animae inesse possunt, nam insunt in organis.

Ad cognitionem mentis pervenitur, si ad cogitationes nostras attendimus, eidemque porro tribuimus quae legitimo ratiocinio ex iis colliguntur. Hoc etiam coincidit cum nostra definitione in Principiis; nam si attendimus ad cogitationem, fit statim aliud quid ratiocinans, distinguens, conferens, vel analogon aut rationale.'

1 The reading in the MS. is ratiocinate. 11

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

[IV.]

[THE FORMAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PERCEPTIONS.]

9. The light of the soul is the clarity of perception. The soul is said to be enlightened,. as when it is conscious that it per­ceives, and when it makes proper distinctions between the things which it perceives. On the other hand, darkness in the soul is called obscurity [n. 35, 36]. A clear perception is called dis­tinct,. and the opposite, confused [n. 38, 39]. Perception is partial and compound [n. 40].

10. If the particular perceptions have been clear, the com­pound is distinct [n. 41]. This is true merely of man and of reason, that from distinct particulars he can form a distinct com­pound; for between them there is a middle ratio. In all other cases, there are no clear particular perceptions except in form; and more especially since no clear compounds are possible unless the particulars be clear; therefore no compound is clear because no particular; for it is compounded of unknown particulars.

11. One who clearly perceives in a single perceptible entity many particulars 'which can be enunciated separately, perceives that entity more distinctly than one who clearly perceives in it fewer particulars [n. 42] . This is in accordance with my opin­ion, that there must be many similars, in order that a compound or resultant may be obtained.

12. If total perceptions are distinct, the soul is in a'state of distinct perceptions [n. 45]. In rational thought new percep­tions are always rising up, both particular perceptions and simi­lar total perceptions; and this by alternations; which is a sign that from one thing, many are suggested, one being ever the cause or conductor of another; and that similar things always come forward; or, that from one thing come a thousand other and similar things, whether they be such as have presented themselves as similar in the formation, or such as have offered themselves as equal to the simile.* If some dissimile comes

* By simile the author means a leading; while to use " similar" as state or tremor similar to some a noun is an unnecessary barbarism. other state or tremor. We have The above applies also to the word elected to use the word simile; for " dissimile." "similar thing" is apt to be mis­

12

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

Lumen animae est claritas perceptionis: IUuminari anima, ut dum sibi conscia est, quod percipit, ut ea quae percipit, probe a se invicem distinguat; obscuritas vero vocatur tene­brae. Perceptio clara dicitur distincta; e contra confusa. Per­ceptio partialis et composita.

Si perceptiones particulares fuerint clarae, composita dis­tincta est. Hoc est mere hominis et rationis, ut a distinctis particularibus formare possit, distinctum compositum, nam intercedit ratio media; alias particulares clarae non dantur 2

Ph. MS., IOS. nisi qua formam; praecipue quum composita nulla clara dari possint, nisi particularia sint clara, ergo nullum compositum est clarum, quia nullum particulare quia a particularibus ignotis componitur.

MS., 163.

Qui plura singiUatim enunciabilia in eodem perceptibili clare percipit, is magis distincte idem percipit aUero, qui pauciora in eodem clare percipit: Secundum meam opinionem quod plura similia dari debeant, ut compositum aut resultatum habeatur.

Si perceptiones totales distinctae sunt, anima est in statu perceptionum 3 distinctarum §. 4S; aliae et aliae semper subeunt, tarn particulares quam similes totales, et sic alternis in cogi­tatione rationali, quod signum est ex uno plura succurrere, et semper unum esse alterius causam vel manuductionem, et similia semper prodire, sive ex uno mille alia similia, vel quae in efformatione simile se stiterat, vel simili se par obtuler-

I datur. • perfectionum. 13

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

forward, it is a sign that, when the given notion had first reached the soul, it had come from such a dissimile, or together with it j and thus the dissimile sometimes comes forward. This, how­ever, is a blemish in cultivation and use, or in the first * method of learning.t

13. If the partial perceptions which enter into a total per­ception have been obscure, the total perception is obscure; or: If the partial perceptions are obscure, the soul is in a state of obscure perceptions [n. 46, 47]. For the first perception, which will be the cause of the other and similar perceptions, is obscure, and so consists of tones over-obtuse and not certain, or else of two dissimilar tones j and if these are to be the causes and origins of the other and similar perceptions, then the simile and the dissimile come in simultaneously; and from two dissimiles there cannot come a single simile, unless it be a discord of the many. For one perception must be the cause of many percep­tions, and these many present themselves in an instant. If then they be dissimilar, or if they cannot come forward, then the particular becomes obscure together with the compound. This can be demonstrated in tones, nerves or strings and membranes j it can be demonstrated in geometrical ratio or analysis. T~us,

if there be, not a single principle or beginning, but two, then the others cannot be disposed in order, so as to present a ratio, or give a result.t

14. The representation of a thing when considered objectively is called an idea; the representation of things or [of genera and] species in a universal, is called a notion. Notions like percep­tions are clear or obscure,. [and the clear are] distinct or con­fused. To cognize a thing is to acquire an idea or notion of that thing. Cognition is an action of the soul. The faculty of cognizing is that by which we acquire ideas and notions. The inferior [part of the] faculty of cognizing, is that by which we acquire obscure and confused ideas j the opposite is the case with the superior [part of the] faculty of cognizing [n. 48-55].

*According to the MS. this t Cf. II Inf. IV, xii. should be "the true first," etc. :\: Cf. Mechanism, 2--8.

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at; si aliquid dissimile, signum est quum notio illa ad animam primo pervenerit, a tali venisse vel una cum tali, unde dis­simile interdum provenit; quod tamen est naevus in cultu et usu, seu in vera prima methodo discendi.

Si perceptiones partiales, quae totalem ingrediuntur fuerint obscurae, perceptio totalis obscura est. Sive si perceptiones partiales obscurae sunt, anima est in statu perceptionum obscura­rum. Prima enim perceptio quae causa erit reliquarum et similium obscura est, et sic constat vel tonis nimis obtusis nec certis, vel duobus dissimilibus, qui si esse debeant causae et origines reliquarum similium, venit simile et dissimile simul, nec a binis dissimilibus unum simile pervenit, nisi sit plurium discordia; nam una perceptio esse debet causa multarum, quae multae in instanti se sistunt, quae si dissimiles sint vel non provenire possint, fit particulare cum composito obscurum; hoc in tonis, nervis et membranis demonstrari potest; hoc in ratione sive analysi geometrica; adeo ut nisi unum sit princi­pium, sed duo sint, reliqua ordine disponi nequeunt, ut sistant rationem, vel 4 dent resultatum.

Repraesentatio rei objective considerata vocatur idea; repraesentatio rerum vel specierum in universali, notio. Notiones sunt, ut perceptiones, clarae vel obscurae; [clarae notiones sunt] distinctae vel confusae. Rem cognoscere est ejus ideam vel notionem sibi acquirere. Cognitio est facultas animae. Facultas cognoscendi qua ideas et notiones nobis acquirimus. Facultatis cognoscendi [pars] inferior qua ideas obscuras et confusas comparamus; contra facultas cognoscendi superior.

4 nee. 15

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

[V.]

OBSERVANDA.

15. Granting that tremulation is the cause of our sensation in the soul; and granting that the soul is in the figure of a snail's shell or of a spiral with cones, and thus can be moved differently at every kind of tremulous motion; let us now see how many diversities are possible. 1. There is always some diversity at every distance from the center; and since the polar cones are also spiral, the distances from the center are almost infinite in number.* 2. If the case be such, moreover, that the density of the spiral is more subtle in the center and thicker toward the surface, it will also differ in the ratio of thickness at every dis­tance from the center. 3. If the tremors be greater or well­nigh undulatory, or if they be tremulatory,t that is, if they tremulate to a greater or lesser distance, there is at once an infinitude of differences in this respect. In the same way, we see that no one instrument sounds like another, even though they be so harmonious that, in respect to harmony, they differ not at all. Hence we have tones that are more or less soft, sharp, vehement. So also in human sound; no one speaks in the same tone as another. 3[a] Hence, in one and the same place in a membrane, divers sounds may be exhibited. Just as with the ear-drum; although there is but one drum, yet it can be bent in an instant and successively, in accordance with all tremors, similar and dissimilar. So also in the present case; although naturally [the membrane] has a single tone at one and the same distance from the center, yet by reason of the slowness or celerity of the tremor, it can vary this tone. 4. Therefore it can be so contorted, that at a great distance it may acquire the same tone as at a place nearer to the center. 5. In a differ­ent situation, extension, compression, dilatation of the poles, it

*Cf. II Infinite IV, x. tion of Elements 11. 8, 32• 8 ; 11 In­t For the distinction between Un­ finite IV, v fin.

dulation and Tremulation, see Mo­

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MS., 164. OBSERVANDA.

Sit quod tremulatio sit causa nostrae sensationis in anima; et sit quod animae figurae sit cochlearis seu spiralis cum conis, adeo ut sic moveri possit differenter ad quemcunque motum tremulum; videamus jam quot diversitates dari possint. I.

Semper aliqua diversitas ab omni a centra distantia; et quia coni polares sint etiam spirales, hinc distantiae fere infinitae sunt a centro. 2. Si accedat, quod etiam densitas ejus sit subtilior in centro et crassior versus superficiem ratione

Ph. MS., 106.

crassitie[i] etiam in quavis distantia differt a centra. 3. Si tremores sint majores vel fere undulatoriae, vel si sint tremula­tores, hoc est, si ad majorem vel minorem distantiam tremu­lent, statim differentiae sunt infinitae in hoc respectu; prout videmus nullum instrumentum alteri simile sonare, quamvis sint harmonici, adeo ut qua harmoniam nihil differant; unde toni molliores, acutiores, vehementiores; ut etiam in sono

humano, nullus alteri similiter qua tonum loquitur. 3. In eodem loco membranae hinc diversi soni possunt exhiberi, non aliter ac tympanum auris, licet unicum sit, tamen ad omnes tremores similes et dissimiles in instanti et successive flecti potest; sic etiam hoc, quamvis naturaliter ad unam eandemque distantiam a centra unum tonum habeat, sed ratione lenti­

tudinis vel celeritatis tremoris variare potest. 4. Unde ita torqueri potest, ut ad ampliorem distantiam eundem tonum nanciscatur cum loco prapinquiori ad centrum. S. In alio situ, extensione, compressione, dilatatione polorum, statim

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at once acquires another setting of the tone, but yet such, that all things follow in order harmoniously. 6. One tone can exist together with another; two tones can exist simultaneously; three or more can exist simultaneously. 7. An octave, and the octaves thereof can be moved simultaneously or separately.

16. That this consists in an HARMONIC PROPORTION; or, along the distances from the center, there is an harmonic proportion, so that the differences are to each other as the first number is to the last.* [1] Thus if we have 2,3,6, then as 3-2 is to 6-3, so is 2 to 6. Or according to the figure, as B is to D, or as AB is to AD, so BC is to CD. If therefore the ratio of the

A B C D I 1-11

distances between two points be the same as the ratio of the distance of each from the center, then there is a harmony. This is most highly in accordance with nature. 2. An harmonic proportion is thus similar to a geometric: AB: AD:: BC: CD. 3. If this proportion is continuous, it is still more harmonic. 4. This may be seen in the hyperbola, where, if AC, AE, AF,t

are in arithmetical proportion, then AB, CD, EG, FH, are in harmonic proportion. S. Thus an harmonic proportion par­takes at once of an arithmetic proportion also; just as it consists

*A proportion is harmo111c when two. Thus 2, 3, 6, is an harmonic the first number is to the last as proportion; for 2: 6:: 3-2: 6-3. the difference between the first two t In the MS. this is "AC, CE, to the difference between the last EF." See Preface, p. xi.

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aliam toni constellationem nanciscitur, ita tamen ut omnia ordine harmonice succedant. 6. Dnus tonus una potest esse cum altero; bini toni simul, tres et plures simul.. 7. Octavum et ejus octava possunt simul moveri, vel separatim.

MS., 165.

Quod in proportione harmonica consistat hoc; sive secundum distantias a centro, proportio harmonica est, quod differentiae se habeant ut primus numerus ad ultimum, vel sit 2. 3: 6.

"" , ~ ') Q..• , t·~ C

ibi 3-2: 6-3, sic 2 ad 6; sive b ad d, vel ab ad ad, sic bc ad cd. Si ergo distantiarum proportio inter utrumque prout est dis­tantiarum utriusque a centro, tunc fit harmonia, quod maxime naturale est. 2. Harmonica proportio sic est geometricae similis, ab. ad: bc. cd. 3. Si haec proportio continua sit, eo magis harmonica est. 4. Hoc in hyperbolis videre licet,

~ .. ­

A· ~~ it ­

ut si ac. ce. ef sint in proportione arithmetica, tunc est ab, cd, eg, fh, in proportione harmonica. 5. Adeo ut sic participat immediate etiam ex arithmetica, prout constet ex geometrica,

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of a geometric, according to the above figures. 6. The same geometric proportion is preserved wherever the lines from A, e, E, F, fall upon the hyperbola, or at whatever angle, provided only they be parallel, as ex and EY. The curvature of the hyperbola is also preserved, because it is formed from opposite points within the asymptotes to the other side.* This ratio can in no wise be changed, no matter what the sine. The spaces keep this ratio. 6 [a1 From which it follows that this spiral curvature in the soul is hyperbolic; and differently hyperbolic according to compression and dilatation.t 7. Such harmonic proportions may also exist in other curves, as in the parabola, the ellipse, etc.

17. How THE MEMBRANES SEEM TO BE EFFIGIED. They may be effigied in a thousand ways; and therefore, in these highly obscure matters, we wish to exhibit a formation such as seems to be most in harmony with our elementary particles and our actives, and which follows as a consequence from our principles as given in our philosophy of the elements.:!: An infinite num­ber of varieties may be propounded, though not very suitable ones; hence guesswork will here have room for play. What is not guesswork, is that which is a consequence of our principles, as follows:

1. The supremely subtle membrane is convoluted from center to peripheries into spirals.§ It arose from the dilatation of some finite which can be expanded only into a membrane of such form, according to the flux of its parts. With their tor­tuous situation, these spirals possess polar cavities [or cones]. Within are actives of the first finite, and the membrane itself is composed of second finites.11 l[a] On one side, these cones

* In connection with points 1-6, 11 In the MS. this is marked 2, ef. II Inf. IV, xi. and then come 3, 4, etc. We have

t Cf. Mechanism, 35. altered 2 to 1[a], 3 to 2, etc., in :j: ef. the little work A General order to make these numbers con­

Treatment Concerning the Motion form with the numbers in the ex­of the Elements, in Scientific and planation of the delineation, and Philosophical Treatises vo!. 1, p. also in n. 18. For the convenience 97 seq. of the reader, we have put I, 2, 3,

§ Cf. II Inf. IV, xi. etc., as separate paragraphs, al­

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secundum superiora. 6. Quod eadem proportio geometrica conservetur, ubicunque incidit in hyperbolam, seu ad quem­cunque angulum, modo lineae sint parallelae, ut cx, ed. Quod etiam ipsa curvatura hyperbolae quod ex oppositis spatiis inter asymptotes ad alterum latus; quod haec ratio nullo modo possit ad quemcunque sinum mutari; quod ipsa spatia con-

Ph. MS., 107.

servant hanc rationem. 6. Ex quibus sequitur spiralem hanc curvaturam esse hyperbolicam in anima; et diverse hyperbolicam secundum compressionem et dilatationem. 7. Tales proportiones harmonicae in aliis curvis etiam dari pos­sunt, ut in parabola, in ellipsi, etc.

Membranae quomodo videantur esse effigiatae. Mille modis effigiari possunt, hinc velimus in obscurissimis his talem forma­tionem exhibere, quae particulis nostris elementaribus et

MS., 166. activis convenientissima esse videtur, et tanquam consequens sequitur ex principiis nostris in elementorum philosophia; sed possunt tradi infinitae varietates, sed non convenientiores, hi[n]c divinatio hie locum habebit; quod non divinatio est, est quod secundum seriem principiorum 'ita sequatur: I. Sub­tilissima membrana est in spiras convoluta, a centra ad peri­pherias, orta ex dilatatione alicujus finiti, quod non aliter potest expandi quam in membranam talis formae, secundum fluxum partium ejus; tortuoso situ, gaudent polaribus cavi­tatibus. Intus sunt activa primi, et membrana ex finitis secundis. 2. Ab una parte sunt non ligati, sed ibi influit

though here, and also in the ex- constitute a single paragraph as in planation of the delineation, they n. 18.

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are not attached, and here the first element flows into them and is actuated into a similar motion in accordance with the tremulous motion of the membranes. Thus the soul can be actuated into motion by this element, and itself can actuate the latter into motion. In these operations consists the supremely subtle sym­pathy and communion of souls and angels, and their correspond­ence with our soul.*

2. On the other side, a substance consisting of third finites is applied to the cones, that is to say, to the polar cones of these spirals; and here also there is a helix-like tortuosity. Thus this substance consists of cells not unlike the shells of the snail and of certain kinds of testaceans. Within are actives of the first and second finite; for the enclosed actives must needs form their circumferences into spirals or continuing circles,-to which operation they flow of their own accord.

3. This part coheres with a highly delicate membrane consist­ing of fourth finites and perhaps also of third. It is a mem­brane which is here and there distended; and it holds the first element enclosed within. It is mobile in the same way as the surface of the ether [bulla]; in which latter also the first ele­ment is enclosed.

4. This whole membrane taken together contains within it cavities filled with the second element, which is like the first but grosser.

5. Attached to it is a membrane wherein is enclosed ether, which perhaps has formed for itself rivulets running from the one membrane to the other, in order that it may freely flow through them and be evacuated and replenished.

6. Then comes a tunic consisting of a kind of subtle liquor. 7. And finally a tunic consisting of arteries and veins. The arrangement is shown in the following delineation: t

... Cf. Tremulation, p. 6. with the circles RS forming the t It should be noted that in the center. EFG and HIJKL would

interpretation of this delineation, the also be continued in the peripheries three upper lines have been curved. around this center. Thus the whole If continued they would form a would represent a primitive cell. sphere, flattened at the poles, and

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elementum primum in conos, quod secundum motum tremulum membranae in similem motum agitur; sic potest anima ab elemento hoc in motum agi, et potest illud in motum agere ; in his consistit sympathia subtilissima, et communio animarum, angelorum, et illorum correspondentia cum anima nostra.

3. Ab altera parte in conis est applicata substantia finitis tertiis constans, scilicet in conis illorum polaribus, ubi helicis instar etiam tortuositas est; et sic constat cellulis non aliter ac cochleae et quaedam testarum genera. Intus sunt activa primi et secundi, nam activa inclusa non possunt aliter quam formare ambientes in spiras seu continue circulares, ad quod etiam suapte fluunt. 4. Haec pars cohaeret cum membrana tenuissima constans finitis. quartis, et fortassis simul tertiis, estque membrana quae hic et ibi distenta est et inclusum habet elementum primum; quae non aliter mobilis est ac ipsa super­ficies aetheris, cui etiam inclusum est elementum primum.

5. Tota haec membrana simul sumta, intus habet cavitates repletas elemento secundo, similis priori sed crassior. 6. Huic

vero aligata est membrana cui inclusus est aether, qui fortassis rivulos sibi formaverat ab una in alteram, ut libere possit percurrere, et evacuari et repleri. 7. Dein tunica subtili MS., 167. Ph. MS., 108.

quodam liquore constans. 8. Tandem arteriis et venis; vel

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1. RS are the spirals or helices of the supremely subtle [membrane] of the soul. ·Within them are actives of the first finite. [ la] At T where there is no attachment, is the first element.

2. QP is the tortuosity with its hollow spirals. The membrane consists of third finites. Within are enclosed actives of the first and second * finite.

3. NO is the membrane adhering to it, in which is en­closed the first element.

4. CD is the membrane in which is enclosed the second element; yet together with the former it constitutes a single membrane; [h, i, k, 1, m, are second elementary particles.]

S. ABCD is the membrane where ether is enclosed, which can flow like a rivulet [e, g, f}.

6. There is a still grosser membrane, where there is a subtle juice.

7. And another yet grosser, where is blood with its arteries. Such is the nature of the membrane found throughout the entire head, and over each individual par­ticle or minutest gland.t

8. But in a body where there is no rational soul but only a sensitive, RS are wanting.

9. The one RS is entirely similar to the other.

* The MS. has" third." tives, elements and membranes in t The reference is to the pia their psychological aspect, see Prin­

mater, or perhaps to the piissima cipia I, i, pp. 9-10, 39-40, 41; II mater; see Motion of El. 6; Brain, Inf. IV, fi'~ and xiii, fin; Mech­411. In further study of the ac- anism, 12, 16,36; Motion of El. 2,

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secundum delineationem: ut I. RS sunt spirae seu helices

subtilissimae animae in quibus sint activa primi; in Test ele­mentum primum, ubi non alligata est. 2. QP est tortuositas cum suis cavis spiralibus; membrana constat finitis tertiis;

intus sunt inc1usa activa primi et tertii. 3. NO est mem­brana ei adhaerens, cui inc1usum est elementum primum.

4. CD membrana cui inc1usum est elementum secundum; una tamen membrana cum priori. S. ABCD est membrana ubi

aether inc1usus, qui rivuli instar fluere possit. 6. Adhuc

crassiora sunt, ubi succus subtilis. 7. Adhuc crassiora ubi

sanguis cum arteriis. Talis membrana est per totum caput, et super quam[li]bet particulam vel glandulam minimam. 8. At

vero in corpore desunt RS ubi non est anima rationalis sed sensitiva. 9. Una RS est plane similis alteri. 5, 7, 30. In n. 6 of the last named A subtler membrane investing the work, mention is made of six mem- subtler parts of the pia mater. 6. branes, as follows: 1. The cranium. A still more subtle membrane which 2. The tunic investing the arteries issues from the next subtler. See and veins, usually consisting in part also n. 228 below, where seven of nervous ramifications. 3. The tunics are enumerated. dura mater. 4. The pia mater. 5.

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18. THE TREMORS IN THESE TUNICS. 1. In the first is the supremely distinct tremor of the soul. 2. Likewise in the sec­ond. 3.* In the third is the memory of brutes; but in man the memory is in the second and likewise in the third., 4. In the fourth is the organ of sight. 5. In the fifth is the organ of hearing, and likewise the other sensations according to the di­versities of the tremulations. In the 6th is implanted sensation whether evil or good.

19. THE FORMATIONS OF THE TREMULATIONS. [1] They are effected by use and cultivation, as the membrane is adapted to one tremor or another. 2. All things tremble harmonically, as for instance at the octave or some similar interval; for all the membranes differ in their octaves. 3. If something new enters in, which is being affixed to the membrane; or to whose motion the membrane is being adapted, it places itself, either at an octave with a similar thing, or else within the octave; to the end that the distances or differences may be as extremes from centers. It cannot place itself in an intermediate situation, since apperception is effected by means of a simile. Then, between these two there is also a harmony; hence when either octave is moved, this new thing also readily comes into motion; and thus from the three come those things which are still harmonically joined together; and so on. From this it follows that when men are being cultivated it is necessary, that they use such a method that similes shall come in with similes. If perchance some dissimile should harmoniously occupy a place among sim­iles, then its motion t is effected by the motion or tremor that

*We understand 3 to be identical "cannot have actives of the first with points 3 and 4 of n. 17, and and second kind, although that soul 4 to be identical with S, and so also consists of an expanse." forth. Brutes know the four quarters and

t Compare n. 17 point 8, and also "therefore something enters into M echallism, n. 14. In the latter their expanse which is of the qual­reference, the soul of brutes ap­ ity of the second or magnetic ele­pears to be identified with points 3 ment. Therefore we also can have and 4 of n. 17 of the present work; the soul of brutes; but we have for it is said that the brute soul also a soul still more subtle." See

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Tremores in his tunicis. I. In prima est ipsa animae, dis­tinctissima. 2. Pariter in altera. 3. In tertia est memoria brutorum, sed in 2

da est memoria hominum pariter in tertia. 4. In quarta est organum visus. 5. In quinta est auditus; pariter reliquae sensationes secundum diversitates tremula­

In 6tationum. satus est sensus malus vel bonus.

Formationes tremulationum. Fit ex usu et cuI tu; si aptatur

ad hunc aut iilum tremorem. 2. Omnia trement harmonice, ut ad octavum, vel simile; nam membranae omnes differunt octavis. 3. Si novum quid intrat quod affigitur vel cujus motui aptatur membrana, vel ad octavum se locat cum simili, vel inter octavum, ut distantiae vel differentiae sint ut extrema

MS., 168. a centris; intermedie non se locare potest, si per simile fiat apperceptio; dein inter haec duo etiam hamlonia, unde utroque moto octavo facile etiam hoc in motum venit; et sic a tribus veniunt illa quae adhuc sunt harmonice juncta; et sic porro. Ex his sequitur, quod cum excolantur homines, necessarium sit, ut methodo utantur, ut similia cum similibus veniunt; si dissimile occuparet forte locum inter similia harmonice, tunc a motu vel tremore impresso fit ejus mOtlls, et sic dis­

also Mechanism, n. 3, 21; II Inf. :\: That is, the motion of the mem­IV, xiii (the Soul of Brutes); brane. Prin. I, pp. 1, 2; I, i, pp. 9-11.

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has been impressed, and thus a dissimile comes forward in the simile.* Hence either the man reasons absurdly; or else, by means of much imagination, [the dissimile] is entirely lost to the memory and obliterated, and something more similar grad­ually occupies its place. This must be effected by use and culti­vation.

20. Therefore according to \Volff's rules if a compound be confused, the soul is in a state of confused perceptions; and the reverse [n. 12, 13, above].

[VL]

[SENSATION.]

21. Perceptions of material things in the visible world depend on contingent mutations in our body [no 57]. Thus in the case of touch, taste, smell, sound, sight, everything must exist from mutations or be dependent thereon. So also the understanding and the many phenomena occurring in the most subtle [senses] ; there must be something that shall do the moving; as, for in­stance, the passions of the animus, bilious ichor.t Thus the imagination itself depends on mutations; it must have an origin which shall move it; it does not exist from itself. Add to this that perception cannot be thought of as being without an origin which shall bring change or movement; so neither can it be con­ceived of as being without a terminus, in that the motion goes to a definite terminus and, as it were, to a center. Unless there be a terminus to the motion, there can be no perception. There­fore some motions are terminated in subtle organs, and some in the soul. They cannot all go to the soul itself, except by help of the imagination. Thus a tremor in a larger [medium] that is to say, a grosser tremor, moves simultaneously, and in like manner at the octave, with the differences in smaller [mediums] and thus a tremulation comes into existence.:j: How

* C/. Mechanism, 2-6; Prin. 1,4, grosser medium and tends to a p.43. more subtle medium, it sensibly be­

t C/. II In/. IV, 3. comes the same motion in things :j: We interpret this in the sense more subtle, and consequently a

indicated in II Infinite IV, v fin: more distinct motion. Tremulation "\Vhen a motion begins in a in the air may cause undulation in

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simile cum simili prodit; sic vel absurde ratiocinatur, vel ex memoria per multam imaginationem plane perit et obliteratur, et sensim quid similius locum illum occupat, quod fiet ex usu et cultu.

Ergo secundum regulas Wollfii si compositum sit confusum est anirila in statu perceptionum confusarum; et contra.

Ph. MS., 109.

Perceptiones rerum materialium in mundo aspectabili a mutationibus in corpore isto contingentibus dependent. Sic in tactu, gustu, olfactu, sono, visu, omnia existent vel dependent a mutationibus; sic etiam intellectus et plura in subtilissimis, erit aliquid quod movet, ut si passiones corporis, si aliquid bilosum icor; sic ipsa imaginatio dependet a mutationibus, habebit originem se moventem, ex se non existit. Accedit quod perceptio non considerari possit sine origine quae mutet vel moveat; sic etiam non concipi possit sine termino, quod moveatur ad certum terminum et quasi ad centrum; nisi terminus sit motus, nulla erit perceptio. Ergo quidam motus terminantur in organis subtilibus, quidam in anima; non omnia ad ipsam animam ire possunt,5 nisi adjuvante imaginatione, adeo ut tremor in majori, seu crassiusculus, moveat simul similiter ad octavum differentibus in minoribus, adeo ut

the ether, and undulation in the trcmulation of a grosser membrane ether may cause a still greater un­ may bring undulation to a more dulation in a more subtle element. subtle membrane." Compare also This can be ocularly shown by ibid. 12, 3, 32, 3.

large and small balls," etc. Sce & possint. also Mot. of Elements 43 : "The

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can we say of touch, smell, and hearing, that they depend on mutations, if we do not say the same thing of sight also, and of the passions of the body and of the animus ! * As nature oper­ates in the greater so she operates in the lesser. There is no difference. Why take refuge in the unknown just because we do not see? The things which we do not see are infinitely more than those which we see. If we do not see an insect, are we then to say it is [non] existent? that it lacks membrane? that it does not move mechanically, etc.?

22. Those bodies are present to us which have such a situation in relation to our body, that they can be perceived by us if there be no accidental obstacle [n. 60]. They are not present because they exist, but they are present in respect of a contiguum. Thus the sun is present by reason of a contiguum, a rose, by reason of its odor. A thing is present to the perception by reason of a contiguum. Otherwise no presence can be thought of.

23. A body is present in some place, if it is situated within the termini by which we define that place [n. 61]. Therefore presence cannot be thought of unless there be a terminus to which [it is referred]. If it be presence in the soul, the termi­nus must be there; if elsewhere, the terminus must be there. [The thing present] always goes off to the soul; for the things of the memory are ever in motion with all else; hence a subtle tremor arises therefrom, and thus passes on to the soul. If there were no tremors of the memory, there would be no per­ception. Through the memory the tremor is led on to the soul. In brutes the motion of the sight, hearing, etc., can be brought only to the sensitive soul; and it is brought thither only by means of more subtle tremors.

24. Sensation is a perception which can be explained in an intelligible way as a mutation effected in some organ of our body as such [no 65]. Sensation cannot come to the soul, unless there be intermediate membranes tremulous to a more subtle motion. Since these membranes are instantly moved to tremu­lous motions adapted to them,-and this, either because of some

* The MS. has "animae" (of as a slip for animi. the soul) which we have assumed

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tremulatio existat. Quid dicemus de tactu et olfactu, auditu, quod dependeant a mutationibus, nisi etiam idem dicamus de visu, de passionibus corporis et animae; qualiter operatur natura in majori sic in minori, nulla est differentia. Cur ad ignotum fugimus ideo quod non videamus; sunt infinite plura quae non videmus, quam quae videmus; si insectum non videmus, ergo dicemus illud [non] esse, carere membris, non mechani[ce] moveri, etc.

MS., 169. Corpora ista nobis praesentia sunt, quae eum ad corpus nos­

trum habent situm, ut percipi a nobis possint, nisi accidentale aUquod obstaculum adsit. Praesentia sunt non quod sint, sed respectu contigui sunt praesentia, ut sol ratione contigui, rosa ratione odoratus; perceptioni est praesens ratione con­tigui, alias nulla praesentia considerari potest.

[Corpus] praesens aliquo in loco si intra terminos consistit, quibus locum istud definimus. Ergo praesentia non potest considerari nisi sit tenninus ad quod; si sit anima, erit ibi tenninus, si alibi erit ibi tenninus. Abit semper ad animam, quia res memoriae semper moventur cum reliquis; hinc fit inde tremor subtilior sicque vadit ad animam. Nisi tremores memoriae sint, nulla perceptio foret, per illam deducitur ad animam; ipse motus visus, auditus etc non ad animam nisi sensitivam brutorum perduci potest, nisi ope tremorum subtiliorum eo deducatur.

Sensatio est perceptio per mutationem, quae fit in organo aliquo corporis nostri qua taU, intelligibili modo explicabilis. Sensatio non pervenit ad animam, nisi sint membranae ad subtiliorem motum tremulae intennediae, quae cum ad motus tremulos sibi adaequatos illico moventur, vel propter simile,

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simile, or because of a mutation-therefore the motion advances onwards to the soul, and becomes a rational perception. But that motion cannot be brought thither, unless the little mem­branes by cultivation and use ~ave been made accustomed to it, so that they may be moved in some similar way, but more subtly. From undulation comes tremulation; * hence comes rational perception.

25. A sensory organ is an organic part of the body in whose mutations are contained the reason of the perceptions of mate­rial things in the visible world en. 66]. This is true. Percep­tion does indeed come from these mutations; but it comes by means of a tremor in more subtle membranes, by whose help it is carried to the soul where is the terminus, and thus becomes perception.

26. N. B. The question arises: FOR WHAT REASON HAS NATURE FORMED IN OUR SENSES THAT WHICH IS SO DELIGHT­FUL? as for instance in our sight, so many gladsome colors; in our hearing, such great harmony; and so in the other senses; with the result that we are harmonic organs full of delight. The reason is because all the way to the soul, all things must conspire to the production of harmony; all the membranes simultaneously from the greatest to the least; all the octaves higher and higher, the grosser and the subtler, even to the soul. And because the harmony of all is so great, it reaches even to the soul. Hence come such great delights, especially if some­thing intervenes which constitutes an harmonic proportion; as for instance intermediate delights which thus come to the soul without impeding or injuring any organ by tremors which are not harmonious, etc. On the other hand, if other tremors inter­vene, the undelightful at once arises, and this presents the oppo­site effect. Hence we have undelightful colors, undelightful sounds, smell, taste, touch, etc.t

27. A stronger sensation obscures a weaker, so that presently we entirely fail to pe1'ceive the weaker [n. 76]. The tremula­tion is the same if only it be of the same celerity, whether it be more acute or more obtuse, or whether it go to a greater dis­

* Cl. Motion of Elements 12,8, t Cf. Mechanism, 2-3. 42, 3; Principia I, 1, p. 10.

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vel propter mutationem, hinc pergit motus ad animam fitque perceptio rationalis; nee illuc perveniri potest, nisi per cultum et usum, membranulae ad illum motum factae sint assuetae, ut moveantur simili quodam modo sed subtilius; ab undula­tione fiat tremulatio, hinc fit perceptio rationalis.

Organum sensorium est pars organica corporis, in cujus mutationibus continentur rationes perceptionum rerum materi-

Ph. MS., 110.

alium in mundo aspectabili. Hoc verum est; ab istis mutation­ibus pervenit quidem perceptio, sed mediante tremore in subtilioribus membranis, cujus ope 6 defertur ad animam ubi terminus, et fit sic perceptio.

N. B. Quaeritur quae ratio sit quod tarn deliciosum forma­verit natura in nostribus sensibus, ut in visu tot laetos colores, in auditu tantarn harmoniam, et sic in reliquis sensibus, adeo ut nos simus organon harmonicum et delitiosum; ratio est, quod omnia conspirent usque ad animam ad harmoniam MS., 170.

producendam; omnes membranae simul a maxima ad mini­mam; omnes octavi altiores et altiores usque ad animam, crassiores et subtiliores. Et quia tanta est harmonia omnium, usque dum ad animam pervenit, unde tantae delitiae, praeci­pue si aliquid intervenit, quod constituit proportionem har­monicam, ut intermediae quae sic ad animam perveniunt, sine impedimento et laesione alicujus organi per alios tremores quam harmonicos, etc. 7 Contra vero, si alii intercederent, illico injucundum venit, et contrarium effectum sistit; unde colores injucundi, soni injucundi, odoratus, gustus, tactus, etc.

Sensatio fortior obscurat debiliorem, ita ut subinde debiliorem prorsus non appercipiamus. Tremulatio eadem est modo sit ejusdem celeritatis, si vel sitS acutior vel obtusior, si ad majorem

6 opus. 7 et. 8 si.

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tance or to a lesser distance. Innumerable varieties are possi­ble, even though there be but a single tone. But if the tone is to be a single one, then generally there can be but one celerity.

A~O

C~D

E~F

C~H

Thus although (ab) has long tremors, yet they can be of a like tone with the short and brief tremors in (cd), and with the longer ones in (ef). This may be clearly seen in pendulums, where the oscillation or vibration may be greater or less, and yet may occur in almost the same time.* Therefore when there is a stronger tremor or a stronger sensation, as in (ef), it ab­sorbs a weaker; for it contains all the weaker, such as (cd) in itself; and if the weaker be within it, they create no sensation, since there is no variation in the tremor of the membrane. On the other hand, if there be another variation, as in (gh), where tremors swifter or slower run through the wave of one and the same tremulous membrane, a difference at once arises, inasmuch as it runs through the membrane not at the same time, but at a different time, so that when it comes to the extremities or termini, a new motion is sensated. In such case a stronger and a weaker sensation may exist, and this simultaneously. If they cohere harmoniously, the effect is at once delightful; if not, it is undelightful. It should also be borne in mind, that all the senses, sight, hearing, taste, smell, can perceive at one and the same time, inasmuch as they differ in the origin, and quality of their tremors.

28. So also in the imagination; if there be here a tremule,t and it be powerfully tremulous, not only are all other thoughts wont to be impeded, but even the operations of the senses; so that at that moment we neither see nor hear; or if we see and

* Cf. Trl!mulation, p. 49. trl!mor. The latter is used of sen­t Trl!mttlmn, the diminutive of sation, the former of imagination.

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distantiam vel minorem distantiam abeat; innumerae dantur varietates quamvis unus sit tonus; si tamen unus erit tonus,

lA...c~(

~?

J~

generaliter9 erit una celeritas; ut in (ab) quamvis sint! longi tremores, possunt esse similes coni cum curtis et brevibus (cd), cum adhuc longioribus ut in (ef), quod in pendulis videre liquet, ubi oscilatio vel vibratio major vel minor datur, tamen in eodem fere tempore; ergo cum fortior tremor seu fortior sensatio ut in (ef), absorbet debiliorem, nam in se habet omnes debiliores ut etiam (cd); et si inessent debiliores nullum sensum creant, nam nulla est variatio in tremore membranae. At vero si alia variatio sit ut in (gh), ubi tremores citiores vel lentiores pereurrunt undam ejusdem tremulae membranae, turn statim oritur differentia, quia per­currit membranam non eodem tempore, sed diverso, ut dum in extremitates seu terminos sentitur alius motus; tunc fortior et debilior sensatio dari potest, et quidem simul; quae si harmoniee eohaerent est statim delitiosum, si non est injueun­dum. Hoc etiam animadvertendum est,! quod uno tempore omnes sensus possint 2 appereipere, visus, auditus, gustus, oIfaetus, quia differunt origine, et tremorum qualitate. MS.,I7I.

Sic etiam si in imaginatione sit tremulum et fortiter tremu­lum, impediri solent non modo aliae eogitationes, sed etiam ipsorum sensuum operationes, ut eo momento nee videamus, audiamus, vel quamvis videamus, et audiamus, tamen nulla

9 generiliter. 2 possunt. I sit.

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hear, yet there is no apperception, because [the sensation]' does not come to a terminus and center, but the [tremors] stop mid­way, and therefore do not move the intellectual part. Thus we may be in a room and hear bells and yet not hear them, or at any rate, not know that we have heard them. So we may be on a street, and see and yet not see, because [the sensations] do not come to the origin [of apperception] and therefore we do not know that we have observed what we have seen. So also in many other cases. Therefore sensations are possible without perception, and such perhaps are the sensations of worms and imperfect animals.

29. A sensible object is thought of in three ways, namely, as consisting in an object,. * as bringing a mutation to a sensory organ,. and as being perceived by the soul. This is from Wolff [in Psychol. Empir. n. 77 note].

30. The soul can alter nothing in its sensations,. nor is it able to substitute one thing for another at will, so long as a sensible object acts on a sensory organ [no 78]. We see this in each of the senses, sight, hearing, etc.; when one tone strikes these organs, the soul cannot substitute another. So also in the more subtle organs, where, from mutations and tremors, comes inte­rior sensation or thought. As soon as a tremor arises in these more subtle organs,-whether from particles in the blood, or from some other and more subtle liquor, or, by similitude, from an origin arising from the organs [of the senses], or from any other source,-the soul cannot substitute another mutation at will, unless it be such as forms a harmony with the prior muta­tion, and which comes into motion from the same.

31. Yet it cannot be therefore denied that a motion in the ether, or in the second or first element, from whatsoever cause arising, can act immediately upon the organs or proximate mem­branes of the soul, and can thus affect them, and actuate them into a tremor. Thus if there should be motions in the first element, from whatsoever cause arising, then this element can affect the soul and actuate it into an answering tremor; and consequently, by means of phantasy or appetite, can produce

* So Wolff; the MS. has" organ." 36

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apperceptio est, quia non venit ad terminum et centrum, sed in media via subsistunt, unde partem intellectualem non movent. Sic in aliquo conclavi esse possumus, et campanas

Ph. MS., II I.

audire et non audire, ad minimum nescire quod audiverimus; sic in via videre et non videre, quia ad originem non perveniunt,3 adeo ut nesciamus id observasse quod vidimus; sic in multis reliquis; unde sensationes dari possunt sine pereeptione, quales fortassis sunt in ipsis vermibus, et animalibus imperfectis.

Sensibile tripliei modo eonsideratur, quatenus inest organo, quatenus mutationem infert organo sensorio, et quatenus pereipi­tur ab anima, haec Wolf.

Anima in senationibus suis nihil immutare potest, nee unum alteri pro arbitrio substituere valet, dum objeetum sensibile in organum sensorium agit. Hoc videmus in omni sensu, visu, auditu, etc.; non alium tonum potest substituere, quum unus percellit organa; sic in subtilioribus a mutationibus et tremori­bus pervenit interior sensatio vel cogitatio; quumque ortus sit tremor primum in subtilioribus, vel a particulis in sanguine vel alio liquore subtiliori, vel per similitudinem ab origine ex organis, vel aliunde, non potest aliam substituere pro arbitrio, nisi talem quae harmoniam cum priori habet, quae ex eadem mutatione venit in motum.

Nee tamen inde negari potest, quin motus in aethere, in elemento secundo vel primo, ex quacunque causa, immediate in organa vel membranas animae proximas agere possit, et sie eas afficere, inque tremorem agere; ut si darentur a quavis motus in elemento primo, tune hie 4 animam potest afficere et in tremorem eonvenienter agere, et consequenter aliquid sed pauxillum eorpori per phantasiam, vel appetitum,

8 perveniant. 4 hae<:.

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some effect, though very slight, in the body; or, when it has been increased in these,* can come again to the soul, and so enter the will,-a process which may be called fatality. Argu­ment must always be made from the great to the less, from the gross to the subtle. What happens in the gross can happen also in the subtle.

32. If a sensible object acts upon a sensory organ rightly constituted, we sensate necessarily; or, It is not in the sours power to decide whether it will sensate or not [n. 79]. This follows from the preceding proposition. Hence there is no con­trol over sensations, unless they arise from a cause [over which there is control]. And since there are grosser and subtler ele­ments, so that things can be set in motion by all the elements; and since there are always motions in these elements, arising from an infinitude of causes,-of which we shall speak else­where,-therefore if the soul is to perceive anything, a motion must occur that shall impel and shall create something sensible.t Thus what occurs in the ether, occurs also in the lesser elements.

33. If the action of a sensible object upon a sensory organ is in any way impeded, the sensation in the soul is also impeded [n. 81]. That after the fall, an impediment may arise from vitiated states of the body [and] from passions of the animus,:j: so that sensations cannot be terminated in a just manner in the soul; thus, that all vitiated states and excessive indulgence in the passions may furnish impediments, and may so fix them in the membranes that, at the presence of a similar motion, the soul cannot be moved save agreeably with the origin of the vices-this may be deduced as a remote conclusion from the proposition; and also from innumerable passages in the Sacred Scriptures. Hence results a kind of callosity or disease. The case is not unlike that of the instruments of hearing and sight; these are dulled by excessive sound and excessive light, and becoming set in that state, can no longer receive an harmonic mutation save agreeably with the structure which they have acquired by these causes, or by this excess. There are also

* That is, as we understand the t Cf. II Infillite IV, iii. author, in the phantasy and appe­ :j: The MS. has "body." tite.

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vel dum in illis auctae rursus ad animam, et sic in voluntatem, quod fatalitas audire potest. Argumentandum semper est a majori ad minus, a crassiore ad subtilius; quod accidit in crassiori, accidere potest in subtiliori.

MS., 172.

Si objectum sensibile in organum sensorium rite constitutum agit, necessario sentimus, seu in animae potestate non est, utrum velit sentire necne. Hoc sequens est prioris. Hinc nulla est potesb'ls in sensationes nisi a causa oriantur, et quia elementa dantur crassiora et subtiliora, ut ab omnibus elementis mobilia, et quia semper in illis sunt motus, ab infinitis causis oriundi, de quibus alias, hinc si aliquid percipiet, accedet motus qui impellet, et aliquid sensibile creabit, sic quod in aethere, in elementis minoribus.

Si actio objecti sensibilis in organum sensorium quocunque modo impeditur; in anima quoque sensatio impeditur. Quod a vitiis corporis post lapsum, ex passionibus corporis, oriri possit impedimentum, ut non justo modo in anima terminen­tur; sic omnia vitia et nimia in passionibus possunt impedi­menta dare, et figere in membranis, adeo ut ad similem motum non aliter possit moveri quam convenienter vitiorum origini, hoc longe deduci potest, et quidem ex innumeris scriptis sacris; fit inde tanquam callus vel morbus, non aliter ac auris et visus instrumenta a nimio lumine et nimio sono hebebantur, inque statu illo permanent, nee possunt amplius mutationem harmonicam concipere quam convenienter structurae, quam per causas vel nimium illud obtinuerint. Dari etiam aliae

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other possible causes which may produce impediments, so that a more subtle tremulation arising in the first or second element may be unable to cause a genuine motion, or to carry a genuine motion down to the grosser organs, and consequently to be extended to the will.

34. N. B. That we can make deduction from the senses to the soul, from grosser tremors to more subtle, cannot be denied; for nature is [everywhere] like herself. Hence from the senses, are we best instructed concerning the nature of the soul; or, from the organism of the senses concerning the nature of the soul's organism. It follows, therefore, according to Wolff, that, If a mutation is produced in a sensory organ by some sensible object; then, coexistent with that mutation, there is a sensation in the mind, explicable in an intelligible manner by means of it, and acknowledging in it the sufficient reason * for its own existence and for its being what it is [no 8S]. And that, If the mutation is the same and is in the same sensory organ, the sensation in the soul must also be the same [no 86]. From which it follows that if the organs of sensation have been in­jured by blemishes, or have become coherent in this way, whether by acquisition or congenitally, 'the same will be the case with the sensation in the soul.

35. N. B. All anatomists declare that nature operates in this way;t [and that] the sports of nature command our admira­tion; and in the field of anatomy nothing is more common. This is acknowledged by anatomists, and there is not one who does [not] inculcate it.

36. If it happen that the same mutation is produced in the same sensory organ by different sensible objects, these objects must seem the same [n. 87]. So also, in the understanding, similes acquire the same tenor and tremor as dissimiles; and therefore such confusion exists, that the one cannot be distin­guished from the other; hence confused ideas. Excessive ten­sions and relaxations might also confuse the ideas, and make

• So Wolff; the MS. has "sen­ that nature conveys sensations by sation." means of membranes; see II 11If.

t That is, as we understand it, IV, X.

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causae possunt, quae causentur impedimenta: adeo ut sub-Ph. MS., 112.

tilior in primo et altere elemento orta tremulatio non genuinum causari possit motum, vel genuinum deferre ad crassiora organa, et consequenter involuntatem dispandi.

N. B. Quod a sensibus ad animam, a tremoribus crassiori­bus ad subtiliores deducere possimus, non negandum est, quia natura sibi similis est. Hinc ex sensibus optime erudi­m ur, qualis anima sit; sive ab illorum organismo q ualis animae sit. Ergo sequitur secundum Wollfium, Si in organo aliquo sensorio ab objecto aliquo sensibili quaedam producitur mutatio; in mente eadem coexistit sensatio per illam intelligibili modo explicabilis, rationem3a sufficientem, cur sit et talis sit, in illa agnoscens. Dein, Si mutatio in eodem organo eadem est, sen­satio quoque in anima eadem esse debet. Unde sequitur si organa sensationurn a vitiis laesa sint, vel ita cohaerentia, facta vel nata, quod sensatio in anima eadem esse debeat.

N. B. Anatomici omnes dicunt naturam sic operari, naturae mirandi lusus, adeo ut in anatomicis nihil sit com­munius; quod agnoscunt, et nullus [non] hoc inculcat.

MS., 173. Si contingat a diversis objectis sensibilibus eandem in eodem

organo sensorio produci mutationem, eadem apparere debent. Sic etiam in intellectu, similia cum dissimilibus eundem teno­rem et tremorem nacta sunt; ergo etiam confusum existit, adeo ut unum non distingui potest ab altero, ergo ideae con­fusae. Etiam nimiae tensiones et laxationes confundere

la sensationem. 41

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those identical which are distinct. Hence is apparent what kind of methodical cultivation should be used.*

37. If the mutation in one and the same sensory organ is different, the sensation in the soul is also different [n. 88]. This is generally so, yet cases may occur, and do daily occur, when it is not so; as for instance if there be a blemish in the means. If the means be injured, there may be a diversity of things in the eye or ear, and only one and the same thing in the soul. Thus in excessive anger, in drunkenness, in idiocy, the thing in the soul may be one and the same, and yet in the organs there may be a diversity of things. In such cases the means are so fashioned that they convey the diversity to the soul only in a confused way. It may indeed be said that this result comes also from [a defect in] the organism of the sense; but in cases of melancholy and phantasy, those who labor under this disease do not sensate any defect in the organ, but in the middle path [between the organ and the soul] where the membranes are occupied with their own tremors and not with those of the organs of the senses; hence they deflect sensations to the soul in various ways.t

38. N. B. Thus from experience in sight we can argue in respect to hearing, smell, taste, touch; that is to say, experience in the one sense gives us experience in the other, provided only we keep in mind their ratio in respect to degrees and moments. Thus, from the sense we can carry our argument to the soul, the understanding, the imagination, etc.

39. If the same object produces a diffel'ent mutation in the same organ, it must also seem different [n. 89]. So also in the understanding.

40. To each possible mutation in the sensory organ, answers a certain sensation and a peculiar idea in the soul. Thus the sensation coexists in the soul [no 90). Such idea can exist only in a tremor of the most highly subtle membranes, the idea being similar to the sensation in the organs. Coming from a mutation and tremor in the organs, [the motion] must needs create a

* Cf. Prin. I, 3, p. 30; n In/. t Cf. Trcmulation, pp. 7, 45, 74; IV, xiii (The soul is the same, Prin. I, 4, p. 43; Mechan. 4. etc.)

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potuere ideas, et easdem facere, quae sunt distinctae. Unde qualis esse debeat methodicus cultus exinde apparet.

Si mutatio in organo sensorio eodem diversa est, sensatio quoque in anima diversa est. Hoc fit plerumque; accidere tamen potest, et accidit quotidie, quod non talis sit, ut si naevus sit in mediis; ut diversa sint in oculo aut aure, et eadem in anima, si media sint laesa, ut in nimia ira, ebrietate, in fatuis, eadem possunt esse in anima, quamvis diversa in organis; nam media sunt ita aptata ut diversitatem non defe­rant ad animam nisi confusam; quamvis dici possit, hoc etiam provenire ex ipso organismo sensus; sed in melancholicis et phantasiis, qui ilIo morbo laborant, nullum vitium sentiunt in organo, sed in media via, ubi occupatae sunt membranae tremoribus suis non organorum sensuum, unde deflcctunt varie sensationes ad animam.

N. B. Sic possumus ab experientia in visu argumentari ad auditum, olfactum, gustum, tactum, aut experientia in uno sensu dat nobis experientiam in alio, modo habeatur ratio graduum et momentorum; sic ex sensibus ad animam, intellectum, imaginationem, etc.

Si idem objectum diversam efficiat mutationem in eodem organo, diversum quoque apparere debet; sic etiam in intellectu.

Unicuique mutationi in organo possibili sensatio quaedam et idea peculiaris in anima respondet, adeo ut coexistat in anima,' Idea ilia non potest existere in alia re quam in tremore sub­tilissimarum membranarum, quae similis est sensationi in organis; provenit a mutatione et tremore in organis, ergo nee

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simile. It cannot create a dissimile; it cannot impress aught but what itself possesses; no other effect or mode will result, except what is in exact accordance with its own mode. Hence in most highly subtle membranes a tremor is an idea. And to the end that it may be the more an idea, it is a simile of sensa­tion both in respect to mode and in respect to existence. That [a tremor] may be an idea, it must have termini to one of which it may go, and from this to the other extreme. The extremes are the points to which the motion is permitted to go. If the motion be slight, it does not go beyond the soul; * for it cannot communicate with what is grosser, save obscurely. If it be a greater motion it can go to some [further] terminus, according to the extension of the motion. Therefore an idea must have a terminus. It arises from a greater motion; but then it with­draws, and rests within its own termini; and from these it does not communicate anything to the senses unless it be a consider­able motion, so that a phantasy arises which spreads to the senses; with the result that in wakeful moments we seem to see and hear this identical thing, exactly as in dreams. Therefore an idea may be in the soul,t as in sleep, in brutes, in noctambu­lists; but usually, as is also the case in dreams, something is wont to come from the soul, which directs ideas to a definite end, as though they were directed by one of whose origin we are ignorant,-a circumstance which often seems to us a matter of wonder.t In brutes [the tremor or idea] is terminated in the membrane or spiral which is next to our soul. But when it comes to the [human] soul, where the very modes of the idea are examined, it is not an idea, unless you wish to call it a dis­tinct idea; for the gross cannot move the subtle, unless [the subtle] comprehend its choicest part, and thus involve the many things which come simultaneously into the motion. The conse­quence is that a more distinct idea results, or a reasoning, or reason, which is merely the modification of an idea into its more distinct parts.

* Reading animam; but the word We have omitted the word" either" can equally well be read animum inasmuch as it is not followed by (the animus). any consequent.

t Idea poteS<f esse sive i,~ anima :f;CI. n. 76. (an idea may be either in the soul).

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potest, quin etiam simile creet; non potest aliquid dissimile, non aliud imprimere quam habet, non alium effecturn aut modus fiet quam prout modus est. Hinc in subtilissimis MS.,174· Ph. MS., II3. membranis tremor est idea; utque eo magis sit idea est sensa­tionis simile tarn qua modum, quam qua existentiam. Ut idea sit, habebit terminos ad quem et ab illo ad alterum ex­tremum. Extrema sunt ubi permittit motus ire; si minimus sit non ultra animam it, nam non potest communicare cum crassiore nisi obscure, si major potest ad terminum aliquem ire, secundum motus extensionem. Ergo idea habebit ter­minum; oritur a majori motu, sed dein excipit, et subsistit intra suos terminos, a quibus non communicat quid sensibus nisi major sit ut oriatur phantasia, quae se in sensus dissipat, ut videre idem et audire videamus, prout in somnis sic in vigiliis. Ergo idea potest esse sive in anima, ut in somno, in brutis, in noctambulonibus; sed plerumque turn ut in somnis aliquid venire solet ex anima, quod dirigit ideas ad certum finem, tanquam a quodam, cujus originem nescimus, quod saepe mirum nobis videtur; in brutis terminatur in membrana vel co[c]hlea proxima animae nostrae. At vero quum ad ani­mam venit non est idea, nisi velis dicere distinctam ideam, ubi ipsi modi ideae examinantur; nam crassius non movet subtilius nisi comprehendat eximiam ejus partem, et sic involvat plura, quae simul in motum veniunt, et consequenter, fit distinctior idea, seu ratiocinatio, seu ratio, quae est tantum modificatio ideae in partes distinctiores.

45

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41. N. B. There can be nothing sensible in a membrane, unless that membrane be divided into its least parts. If it stays in the dura meninx, so as to inhere in its parts,-and this is possible,-then it is subject to many mutations, and must unfold itself by winding paths. This is less the case in the pia meninx, that is to say, in the ramifications in the second, third and fourth pia meninx, and in the membranes of the liquid [meninx] of the cortical and medullary substance.* Nor can [there be any­thing sensible] in the blood vessels, since these are sometimes wide, sometimes narrow; it is indeed there, but it cannot be very sensible. But [the sensible] is in the places where the mem­brane divides into lesser membranes, and these into still lesser, to which latter it adheres. It can also rest in the liquid [mem­branes], that is to say, in a place where it is not rendered sub­ject to mutations as in the grosser membranes; and likewise in a place where the ether and the first and second elements can be enclosed, and which they can permeate, and thus be able widely to spread the incipient sensation. For every motion from one medium to another, is effected by aid of the elements; exactly as in the air, from one string [nervus t] to another; [so in the highly subtle membranes] where there are almost no veins and arteries, or where no nerves are visible.

[VI!.]

[IMAGINATION. ]

42. The mind can reproduce the ideas of absent sensible ob­jects,. or if the soul has perceived things by the senses, it can reproduce the perceptions of these things even though the ob­jects themselves be absent [no 91]. Thus when we have been in temples, we can later reproduce an idea of them. So, in matters of hearing, we can reproduce a sound and sing it. The same is not the case in smell and taste, except in an obscure way. There

* By the second, third and fourth mater. As to the membrane of the pia meninx we understand our au- liquid, see above, n. 176 ; see also thor to mean the arachnoid tunic, AIat. of Elements S. the pia mater and the piissima t Nervus = string, or nerve.

46

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N. B. Quod in membrana sensibile quid esse nequit, illSl

sit divisa in partes minimas; si haereret in dura meninge, adeo ut inhaereat ejus partibus, quod fieri potest, tunc subjecta sit multis mutationibus, et per ambages se explicabit, minus si in pia meninge; seu3b in ramificationibus in pia meninge 2

da 3ta

quarta; inque membranis ipsius liquidi, corticalis et medullaris substantiae. Nee potest in vasis sanguineis, quia illa jam latiora jam sunt ar[c]tiora, sed est quidem sed non potest ibi tarn sensibilis esse; sed in locis, ubi se membrana in minimas dividit, et haec in min[or]ibus, quibus adhaeret, ut et possit in liquidis subsistere, seu ibi ubi non obnoxia redditur muta­tionibus, ut in crass[ior]ibus; pariter ubi aether et elementum primum et secundum possint includi et intermeare, et sic sensationem inceptam latius dissipare; nam ope elementorum fit omnis motus ab uno in alterum prout in aere ab uno nervo in alterum, ubi fere nullae venae et arteriae, vel ubi nulli nervi sint conspicui.

MS., 175. Objectorum sensibilium ideas mens reproducere potest; seu si

qua sensus percipit anima, eorum perceptiones reproducere potest, objectis licet absentibus. Ut quum fuimus in templis, dein ideam ejus possumus reproducere; sic in auditu possumus reproducere sonurn et cantare, non item in olfactu et gustu,

8b sed. 47

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

are indeed some who are also unable to reproduce in the case of hearing, although they recognize a tone when sounded by others. Here we see how sight and hearing concur. By the hearing we can reproduce that which the sight has perceived, provided only some handle be furnished in the way of words. On the other hand, we cannot reproduce by the sight * what has entered in by the hearing; for a subtle motion, unless it be vehement, will not reproduce a gross, nor a gross, a subtle. But these reproductions would not be possible, were it not that by use and cultivation [the membranes] have so aptly formed their tremors that they are harmonic. Whatever is reproduced, must have a cause and origin of its reproduction, as for instance in the sight or hearing. If I should see a temple, then other temples by their likeness to it, will reproduce that temple, or if I hear it named, the hearing will reproduce it. If the same organs are moved by a simile, whether through the sight or through the hearing,t then the soul goes through a simile to a simile, and this especially if [the simile] be in continuous mo­tion. If it be in the continuous motion of its affair, a simile is moved, and consequently this particular simile. If the mo­tion of this simile has been made stronger by the voice, the sight, or other causes, so that I would wish to linger there in order that the will may extend thither, then the motion of this simile and consequently the reproduction, becomes at once stronger. But this is never effected except by means of organs, or of a simile, with the addition of the will, which leads me to stay in this simile and not to admit any others; that is to say, to shut the way to tremors leading to other similes. Then the motion of this simile becomes stronger, and so we have a reproduction.

43. The Faculty of producing the perception of sensible things that are absent is called the faculty of imagining or imagination [no 92]. As stated above, the cause arises from a simile, com­ing in through the sight or through the hearing; or from a simile which is already in the membranes; and also from a voluntary or involuntary lingering, with the addition of the stimulus of pleasure which is the cau~e of the lingering. These are the causes of imagining.

*The MS. has" hearing." t The MS. has" sight." 48

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

nisi obscure; quidam tamen sunt qui nee in auditu reproducere possunt, quamvis cognoscant ab aliis eundem tonum esse. Hie videmus quomodo visus et auditus concurrant; repro­ducere possumus illud per auditum, quod visus perceperat, modo aliqua ansa per voces detur; non vero per visum 4 repro­ducere quod per auditum intraverat, quia subtilior motus non reproducit crassiorem, nisi vehemens sit; aut crassior sub­tiliorem. Sed haec non forent nisi per usum et cultum, ut ita apte forma[ve]rint suos tremores, ut harmonices sint. Quodcunque reproducitur causam et originem reproductionis habebit; ut in visu vel aure; si videam templum vel alia templa per similitudinem reproducit hoc, si audiam illud

Ph. MS., II4. templum nominari, reproducit; si per simile per visum aut per auditum4a mota sint eadem organa, hine per simile it anima ad simile; praecipue si in continuo motu sit, si in continuo motu ejus rei, simile movetur, et consequenter hoc; si fortior motus hujus factus sit per vocem, visum vel alias causas, ut ibi morari velim, ut voluntas usque extendat, turn fit illico fortior hujus motus, et consequenter reproductio, sed nun­quam nisi per organa, aut per simile, accedente voluntate ut haeream in hoc nec admittam plura, seu occludam viam ad tremores ad reliqua, fit ejus fortior motus; sic reproducit.

Facultas producendi perceptiones rerum sensibilium ab­sentium vocatur facultas imaginandi seu imaginatio. Causa ut dictum est, oritur ex simili, vel per visum vel per auditum, vel ex simili jam in membranis, et mora voluntaria vel involun­taria, accedente stimulo voluptatis, quae est causa morae. Hae sunt causae imaginandi.

4 auditum. 4a visum. 49

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

44. N. B. It must be observed, however, that idea and imag­ination can never be said to be in the soul only; they are also in the organ proximate to the soul; for there the imagination or idea first rests, and there it becomes a confused imagination or idea. It must always be confused before it can be distinct. Then, when it has come to the soul, it becomes distinct, and we have the rational. A confused idea or confused imagination exists also in brutes; but it is found distinct only in men and in their soul. They differ in the matter of coarseness or gross­ness. Subtle tremors therefore, can be received only by the soul, which is itself subtle and can perceive distinct tremors, though at first only in a confused way. Thus, if [a membrane] should excel in subtlety in a thousand ways, then in the same measure it is the more sensible; and it conceives [tremors1 first confusedly and then distinctly. Thus if it be smaller in the ratio of dimension, it may be put as (hi) to (ab) ; but if it be a thousand times more subtle in the ratio of grossness, the ratios may be set forth either as in (de) and (kl), or as in the circles

Z

AU ':0: "V' .LJ,

c

M ( no) and (qr) ; since (the tremorI comes from a grosser mem­brane, which, in the ratio of celerity can be moved only in pro­portion to its grossness. Thus the more subtle motion, such as that of the soul, may be denoted (on), and the most subtle motion in (rq). By the help of the intermediate element or actives, this motion induces a similar motion in (on), and hence the entire membrane (on) of the soul is moved. Therefore a confused idea is produced in the soul, in like manner as it exists in (rq). But if there be a delay, so that (qr) is in perpetual motion, and (on) also in perpetual motion, then it passes over harmonically to (z), the place of its mean proportional, and thence to its middle [line] ; and so by modes ever more similar,

50

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N. B. Observandum tamen, quod neutiquam did potest in anima esse solummodo idea et imaginatio, sed etiam in organo proximo animae; ibi enim subsistit primum, et fit confusa; confusa praecedet semper distinctam,· quum jam venit ad animam fit distincta, et est rationale. Confusa idea vel imaginatio datur etiam in brutis; sed distincta non MS., 176. nisi quam in hominibus inque iUorum anima; differunt cras­si tie; ergo non subtiles tremores recipere potest nisi anima, quae subtilis est et distinctos potest percipere, quamvis pri­mum confuse; ut si subtilitate superaret mille modis, tunc eo sensibilior est, et primum confuse concipit dein distincte, ut si ratione dimensionis sit minor, sit ut (hi) ad (ab), sed ratione crassitiei millies subtilior, poni possunt ~ationes vel ut in

4 e; 4­

~V-n,

'~

~

(de) et (kl), vel ut in circulis (no) et (qr); si venit a crassiori, quae non moveri potest ratione celeritatis quam in respectu ad crassitiem suam, sic subtilior ut animae (on), subtilissimus motus in (rq) sit notus, ille inducit similem, ope intermedii elementi vei activorum, in (on), unde movetur tota (on) animae, ergo fit confusa idea in anima, pariter ac est in (rq), sed si mora sit, ut qr perpetuo moveatur, et perpetuo movetur (on), tunc harmonice transit ad z, ubi est media ejus propor­tionalis, abinde ad suam mediam, et sic per similes et similes

5 distincta. 51

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to modes ever more numerous. The delay cannot be effected simultaneously, unless a harmony be also created. Thus dis­tinction is produced, and rational imagination; for between (0) and (n) are many different tremulations which have been im­pressed by use, or to which [the membrane] has been adapted.

45. The ratio of grossness as between the membranes, is best made clear from pendulums, where the celerities are in the duplicate ratio of the length of the pendulums. Thus if the gross membrane be 9, its celerity can be given as 3; exactly as in the pendulum; for by means of different celerities there re­sults a difference of the tremors. Therefore from pendulums we can ascertain what should be the various grossnesses of membranes.*

46. ON THE PIA MENINX AND THE INTELLECT. The pia meninx invests the nerves; clings closely and firmly to the brain, except in hydropsical subjects, where it is loosely attached; and is connected with the dura mater by veins. It so abounds in blood vessels, that, according to Ruysch,t it is almost made up of them. It has no nerves. In the neighborhood of the longi­tudinal sinus, it is said to have glands.:j: From these particulars it is evident, why we sensate in the nerves, namely because the pia mater is continuous with the dura. Therefore it invests the cerebrum thus closely, in order that it may bind the interior part by membranes still more subtle. It is evident also that the pia mater consists almost entirely of blood-vessels; § therefore the affections of the body and soul come by means of the emo­tion of the blood, whose parts variously strike upon the mem­brane according as those parts are angular or round, large or small, abundant or sparse. Likewise, that in the [pia mater and] arachnoid" there are no [nerves]; but yet it is sensible where there are fibrous tendons, or ramifications of nerves. If there were not so great an abundance of vessels in the pia meninx, we would not be moved by the blood to so many emo­tions.

* Cf. TremulatioJl, p. 49. Allat., p. 169. t See Fibre 53, where the pas- § The MS. has venis (of veins).

sages from Ruysch are cited. 11 Heister, 268, 269; see also :j: These anatomical particulars Vieussens and Winslow, quoted in

are quoted from Heister, Comp. Fibre 329, 331. 52

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modos, ad plures et plures, non simul moveri potest mora, nisi etiam harmonia creetur, sic fit distinctum, et imaginatio rationalis; nam intra (0) et (n) sunt plures differentes tremula­tiones ab usu impressae vel ad quas apta reddita est.

Qualis sit ratio crassitiei membranarum, hoc aptissime ex pendulis elucescit, quod celerita'tes sint in ratione duplicata longitudinum, adeo ut si crassa membrana sit (9) celeritas

Ph. MS., lIS. dari potest 3, plane ut pendula: nam per celeritates diversas fit diversitas tremorum: ergo ex pendulis habere possumus, quales esse debeant crassities variae membranarum.

N. B. De pia meninge et intellectu. Nervos investit, cere­bro arcta et firma inhaeret, laxa in hydropicis; cum dura matre per venas; copiosissima vasa sangui[ni]fera, adeo ut ex talibus quasi conflata sit, secundum Ryschium, non vero nervi. Glandulae statuuntur circa sinum longitudinalem. MS., 177. Ex his patet, quare sentimus in nervis, quia continua cum dura matre; quare tarn arcta cerebro, ut per subtiliores mem­branas adhuc liget partem interiorem; quod constet fere pure venis, unde affectus corporis et animae, per sanguinis emo­tionem, quae varie percellunt membranam secundum suas partes angulares, rotundiores, majores, minores, copi[osi]ores aut defectiores; pariter quod in arachnoidea nulli sint, sed tarnen sensibilis, ubi tendines fibrosi, seu ramificationes ner­vorum. Si non tanta vasa forent in pia meninge, nec movere­mur a sanguine in tot motus.

53

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47. A phantasm is an idea produced by the imagination [no 93].

48. If we perceive a thing by sense distinctly, we imagine that thing in ourselves more easily and more clearly than a thing which we perceive confusedly [n. 94]. We imagine it MORE

EASILY, because many similes are produced, and each one ex­cites its own simile. This occurs more strongly in one place or another according as the cultivation is stronger. Hence at the terminus of the imagination one simile assists another. That we imagine it MORE CLEARLY is self evident; for when we per­ceive it distinctly, it comes to the soul in clearer form, and for the purpose of going thither, has no need of delay or of any other origin. Hence that which at a former time * would come to the soul confusedly, is in the soul at once, or distinctly. Thus we can clearly imagine the sun, because we see its figure, etc., but not light, because it is confused.

49. Sensual ideas are ideas which come to the soul from the senses, or which are in the soul actually [n. 95].

50. Phantasms are less clear than sensual ideas [no 96]. Phantasms come from the imagination apart from the sense; sensual ideas come from the senses. The reason why the latter are clearer is because the tremulations from one medium to the other or from one membrane to the other, are so disposed, that 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or more tremors can be present simultaneously, and together can constitute a single tremor in the next mem­brane; for many tremors together present a single one, as in the case of colors, sight, symphonies, taste and smell. They come together as a unit; nor do they produce aught but a unit in the more subtle membrane. Hence, if, by use and cultiva­tion, 2, 3, or 4 tones or even 100, or 1000, though this is im­possible, have constituted a single tone, it follows that the tones come to the more subtle membrane simultaneously, and consti­tute a single tone. In a phantasm the idea commences from the imagination of 1,2, 3, or 4 things exactly as they have been impressed; and the first or second of these things together with the others are conjoined into a simile. Hence the phantasm

* P,'ius (at a former time); alias (otherwise) seems required by the sense.

54

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Phantasma est idea ab imaginatione producta.

Si quid sensu distincte percipimus, id faCilius et clarius nobis imaginamur quam quod confuse percipimus. Quod facilius inde provenit, quod plura sint similia quae produeuntur; unum excitat suum simile, quod fortius alieubi sit, ob eultum fortiorem, hine unum juvat alterum ad tenninum imagina­tionis. Quod clarius ex se patet, nam tunc clarius ad ipsam animam pervenit, nee opus habet mora, et alia origine, ut eousque eatur: hine statim in anima seu distinete est, quod prius veniret confuse: ut solem possumus, quia videmus figuram, etc., at lumen non, quia eonfusum.

Ideae sensuales quae veniunt a sensibus, vel actu insunt.

Phantasmata minus clara sunt ideis sensualibus. Phantas­mata veniunt ab imaginatione sine sensu; ideae sensuales a sensibus; causa est, quod tremulationes ab uno medio in alterum vel ab una membrana in alteram ita sint dispositae,6 ut 2, 3, 4, S, 6 vel plures simul esse possint, et haec simul eonstituere unum tremorem in altera membrana; nam piures simul dant unum, ut in coloribus in visu, in symphonicis, in gustu et olfactu; in unum coeunt, nec causantur nisi unum in membrana subtiliori. Hinc si per usum et cultum 2, 3 vel 4 toni eonstituerint unum, vel 100 vel 1000 unum, quod fieri nequit, hinc simul perveniunt ad membranam subtiliorem et constituunt unum. In phantasmate incipit idea ab imagi­natione I, 2, 3 vel 4, prout impressa, et eadem prima vel secunda cum reliquis etiam ad simile conjuncta sunt, hinc

& sit disposita.

ss

51-52

PSYCHOLOGICA.

takes only such three or four things as have been impressed, and which together excite another tone. But if the sight or hearing be present, which takes three or four objects simul­taneously, the membrane at once relinquishes the other con­junctions, and retains these. Consequently sensual ideas are clearer; for actual objects present simultaneously things which can never be presented except from simultaneous causes.

51. Acts of the imagination are equivalent to 'Weak sensations [n. 98]. This is a consequence of the preceding proposition; for in darkness we do not see so distinctly as in light.

52. N. B. IN WHAT WAY ATHEISTS FROM IGNORANCE FALL EASILY INTO DOUBT. [1] Ignorance is the shortest path to de­nial. Because we are ignorant of the soul, we doubt its exist­ence; and because we cannot arrive at anything definite by doubt, we come at once to denial; and then nothing can be con­ceived of distinctly but only confusedly, and if not confusedly, still nothing is produced which men are not most prone to deny. Hence ignorance leads us to doubt, and confused doubt to de­nial; especially if we also doubt concerning things sacred. And therefore, I believe that in the absence of God's help, human faith is hardly possible without doubt. 2. Since men know that the same thing is found in brutes as in men, they believe the souls of both will die. They think in this way, because their idea is confused and not distinct, seeing that they do not know how to distinguish between brutes and men, since, never having been brutes, they are unable to speak from experience; also and especially because in brutes there are quasi signs of intelligence. 3. Consequently men doubt concerning God, because they are ignorant of the soul and doubt its existence. 4. Moreover·if a thing is mechanical, they think that therefore it will perish. The soul is indeed mechanical, but there is a mechanical which cannot perish; * and if this were shown, I do not think so much doubt would arise. S. From preconceived opinions, men think that mechanically, a communion of souls is [not] possible, and this because they cannot suppose the soul to be mechanical; but if they know, they will think differently. 6. They say that spirits are not material or mechanical, and that therefore they

* Cf. n. 116. 56

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non sumit nisi talia 3 vel 4 quae impressa sunt, quae simul alium tonum excitant; at si oculus adsit, aut auditus, qui simul sumit 3 vel 4, statim linquit membrana alias conjunctiones, et haec retinet, unde ideae sensuales clariores sunt, quia ipsa objecta sistunt ilIa simul; quae sisti nequeunt nisi a causis simu!.

MS., 178. Actus imaginationis aequipollent sensationibus debilioribus.

Consequens prioris, quia in tenebris non tarn distincte videmus ut in luce.

N. B. Quomodo Atheistae ab ignorantia facile in dubita­tionem prolabuntur. Ignorantia est proxima via ad nega­tionem; quia ignoramus animam, dubitamus, et quia per dubitationem ad certum quid pervenire nequimus, venimus statim ad negationem: ubi nihil distincte potest concipi sed confuse, et si non confuse sed nihil fert, quod non pronissimi sunt ad negandum. 7 Hinc ignorantia ducit nos ad dubita-

Ph. MS., rr6. tionem, et dubitatio confusa ad negationem; praecipue si dubitamus etiam de sacris; ut fides humana sine auxilio Dei esse possit sine dubitatione vix credo. 2. Quum sciunt idem esse in brutis quod in hominibus, credunt emori utriusque animam, quia confusa est idea, nec distincta, quia distinguere nesciunt, quoniam nunquam fuerant bruta, et ab experientia loqui [non] possunt;8 praecipue quum quasi sint signa intel­ligentiae in brutis. 3. Quod consequenter de Deo dubitent, quia nesciunt animam, et dubitant de illa. 4. Turn etiam si mechanicum sit ideo putant periturum esse; sed licet mechanica sit tamen datur mechanicum quod non perire potest;9 quod si ostensurn sit, credo non tan tarn oriri dubitationem. S. Ani­marum communionem dari [non] posse mechanice ex prae­conceptis opinionibus putant, quia non possunt statuere illam mechanicam; at si sciant aliter sentient. 6. Spiritus dicunt esse non materiales aut mechanicos, ergo dubitare

7 negationem. 9 possit. 8 possint.

57

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. ought to doubt concerning their existence,-at which I do not wonder. For spirits are created, and consequently are finite and not infinite; and therefore, since, according to the common opinion, spirits are neither finite nor infinite; and since men know of no third possibility; therefore being unable to have any conception of them, they come to denial, the refuge and last boundary of ignorance. 7. Since they do not know that the soul can enjoy a most subtle sense,-a sense of things deeply concealed,-therefore, being ignorant, they deny; if this were to be shown of the soul, they would not deny. 8. With the opening of the mechanism of the soul, they will come to know the nature of the soul in life, its nature as formed in life by means of the body, and what its nature, thus formed, will be after death. 9. They will come to know that the soul can de­rive its origin only from the Infinite, in whom is the cause of every finite,-a fact which spirits themselves know and yet do 110t know, and which consequently they highly venerate.*

53. N. B. If the intellect and memory were not mechanical, how is it that the memory can be excited mechanically? Can be helped by medicine? Can be destroyed or diminished by diseases? Can be vivified by odors and frictions? Can be diminished or increased by the condition or health of the body? How could such infinite varieties be possible?

54. Sensations t so obscure the acts of the imagination, that presently we do not apperceive the latter at all [no 99]. This is the case, not only because sensations are stronger [than the acts of the imagination] but also because they are frequently dissimilar. Thus by their strong motion, sensations obscure all else. Moreover, sensation more powerfully acquires for itself similes, and of these similes, one part coincides with the tremors of the imagination, and the other is aberrant. Hence sensation divides, as it were, the act of the imagination, and renders it confused and consequently nul; for that which becomes con­fused becomes, as it were, nothing in the imagination.

55. Weak sensations become clearer in the absence of strong sensations; as for instance the sensation of the moon in the

* Compare with this passage n. 91 below, and 111echanism 23; II Inf. ii (from ignorance, etc.). t So Wo1ff; the MS. has" senses."

58

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debent de illis, quod non miror, quia creati sunt et conse­quenter finiti, non vero infiniti; ergo cum non sint finiti nee infiniti secundum opinionem vulgi, tertium nesciunt, ergo cum non concipiunt, in negationem pervenient, ubi est azylum et terminus ignorantiae. 7. Quum nesciunt animam posse gaudere subtilissimo sensu et rerum absconditarum, quia nesciunt negant; si ostendatur non negabunt. 8. Animae mechanismo aperto scient, qualis sit in vita, qualis formetur per corpus in vita, qualis sic formata erit post mortem. 9. Scient non aliunde originem trahere posse quam ab infinito, ubi est omnis finiti causa, quod sciunt sed nesciunt ipsi spiritus, et consequenter summe venerantur.

N. B. Si intellectus et memoria non forent mechanici, quomodo ex[c]itari potest memoria mechanice, quomodo per medicamenta juvari, quomodo per morbos perire et diminui, quomodo per odores et frictiones vivificari, quomodo per temperamentum corporis diminui et augeri, quomodo tot infinitae varietates. MS., 179.

Sensus obscurant actus imaginationis, ita ut hos prorsus non appercipiamus, quia sensationes non modo fortiores sunt, sed sunt saepe dissimiles, adeo ut sensationes per fortem motum obscurent reliqua; sed etiam fortius acquirit sibi similia, quorum pars cum tremoribus imaginationis coincidit, pars aberrat; unde quasi dividit imaginationis actum, confusum reddit, et consequenter nullum; quod enim confusum fit, fit quasi in imaginatione nullum.

Sensationes debiliores clariores fiunt, absentibus fortioribus;

59 tl

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absence of the sun [n. lOO]. Therefore the imagination be­comes stronger, when strong sensations are absent.

56. Acts of the imagination, are clearer when existing alone, than when existing together 'with sensations [no 1011. This is a consequence of the preceding proposition. It is seen in dreams; when we are alone; and when we are in ecstasy. Therefore also, Acts of the imagination are clearer in the dark, and when we shut our eyes, and in the absence of other objects which strike the other sensory organs [no 102].

57. We imagine visible objects, and likewise words, 1nore easily and more clearly than inarticulate sounds, odors, tastes, and tactile qualities, etc. [no 103]. There are two reasons for this, as will be seen if we take words as an example. 1. A number of words, though pronounced successively, form to­gether one tremulous tone. In the more subtle membrane this tone concentrates into a similar tone. Thus from being many they become two. 2. But in every vocal expression there is also something which goes deeper and even to the very soul; and this at once produces some motion in a higher membrane. For in addition to the impressed tone, there is something of the soul within it, which is of such a nature that it has occupied a seat in the soul. Thus many vocal expressions make one sen­tence.* At first they all proceed in the ear as successive and different words; then they become more and more concentrated into a one. But because there is something more within, this one goes ever more deeply; it cannot stop in the middle. There­fore, it is not the tone, whether deep or slow or sweet, that does this, but only the composition. On the other hand, I hardly think that musical tones, where there is merely tone and nothing deeper, go to the soul,-except with some persons, in the case of harmonic composition. Hence they are not apt to remain in the phantasy. As with hearing so with sight; and therefore the things that come through these senses are imagined by us more easily and more clearly.

58. If a present perception contains part of a past perception, the whole of the latter recm's [no 104]. Thus if we see a place, we at once perceive the man who was in that place; if a house,

* Sententia = sentence, opinion, judgment. 60

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ut luna absente sole. Ergo imaginatio fortior fit, si absint sensationes fortiores.

Si actus imaginationis soli sunt, clariores sunt quam sensa­tionibus coexistentes. Hoc consequens est prioris, ut in somnio, si soli sumus, si in exstasi. Ergo etiam, Actus imaginationis clariores sunt in tenebris et quando oculos claudimus, aliisque objectis absentibus, quae cetera organa sensoria feriunt.

Visibilia objecta itemque verba facilius et clarius imaginamus, quam sonos inarticulatos, odores, sapores, et qualitates tactiles, etc. Causae sunt duae, ut verba exempli gratia: I. Formant plura verba simul unum tremulum tonum, quamvis succes­sive pronuntiata; hoc in subtiliori membrana similem tonum concentrat, adeo ut ex pluribus fiant duo. 2. Sed etiam in

Ph. MS., 117.

quavis voce est aliquid quod altius [it] et usque ad animam; statim movet quid in altiori membrana; nam praeter tonum impressum, aliquid inest animae, talis, quod sedem occupaverat in animam. Sic plures voces unam sententiam, haec omnia pro­cedunt primum in aure successiva et diversa, dein magis et magis concentrata in unum, et quia aliquid inest plus, ad altius semper it, non potest in mediis subsistere. Ergo non facit tonus altior, lentior, dulcior, sed tantummodo compositio. At vero toni musici, ubi nihil est nisi tonus, nee altius quid, vix reor ire ad animam, nisi harmonica compositio apud quosdam; hinc nee haeret ita in phantasia. Ut est cum auditu sic est cum visu; ergo tarn facilius, quam clarius illa imagina­mur.

Perceptio praeterita integra recurrit, cujus praesens continet partem. Ut si locum videmus, statim hominem percipimus

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we at once perceive the owner; if an animal, we at once per­ceive its shape; if words, we at once perceive their meaning, and other things, and so forth. This comes from the soul, or, in a general way, from the membrane near the soul, which by reason of use or sense has concentrated this [sensation or phantasm]. Thus suppose we saw 10 parts simultaneously; these ten parts first go to the soul distinctly, each one having its own tremor; but by delay and cultivation, these tremors unite and concen­trate the parts into one motion or into one place. This is the case if two parts concentrate harmonically in one place; if three parts likewise concentrate harmonically; if in like manner ten parts concentrate in one place-which place can be deduced by calculation; then in that place, a tremor excited in the place by one part, will move also the other parts; for the tremor is com­pounded of these others, and the mode within the tremor is such that it moves its component parts, even though it be in one place, for, as was said above, many modes of tremulations may exist in a single place. Therefore after delay, the whole comes from the part, and the part from the whole. This is the reason why the memory can be enriched after adolescence and indeed even to old age, and why a new memory can be infused; for the many things [of the memory] always make for themselves their own place, and there produce a mixed tremor, as it were. From this it becomes apparent why the memory can be augmented, and why the whole of it can come from a part; and also that this concentration comes from the soul; for it cannot be con­centrated save harmonically; hence when one part is moved, the harmony is moved.

59. If what is perceived [at the present time] is the same in pa1·ticular or in general as what has been perceived at another time and together with other things; the imagination must pro­duce a perception of the latter also [n. 105]. Thus if I see a tree, I at once see a garden, and men and boys in the garden, and still more my own thoughts and amusements in the garden. This comes from the cause spoken of above, and likewise from the fact that a simile produces a simile. Things which entered simultaneously into the perception have formed for themselves a mixed center as it were, in that they have a mutual similitude

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qui in loco fuerat; si domum statim possessorem; si animal statim ejus formam, si voces statim sensum et plura, etc. MS., 180.

Hoc venit ab anima vel fere membrana prope animam, quae ex usu vel sensu concentraverat hoc; ut si videmus 10 partes simul, primum eunt 10 partes distincte ad animam, et quaeli­bet pars suum tremorem habet; sed mora et cultu se uniunt et con[c]entrant hae partes in unum motum seu in unum locum; ut si 2 concentrant se harmonice in loco, si 3 pariter harmonice, si 10 pariter in unum locum, quod per ca1culum licet subducere ubi, et ibi est locus,! qui tremor in loco excita­tus a parte, movet etiam reliquas partes, quia a reliquis est compositus, et modus qui inest tremori talis est ut moveat partes se componentes, quamvis in uno loco sit; nam modi tremulationum in uno loco etiam plures dantur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo venit totum a parte, et pars a toto post moram. Haec est ratio quod memoria possit locupletari ultra adolescentiam et quidem usque ad senectutem, et nova infundi; nam plura faciunt sibi semper suum locum, et ibi quasi tremorem mixtum. Ex his apparet cur memoria augeri possit et tota veniat a parte; et quod concentratio haec veniat ex anima; nam concentrari nequit nisi harmonice, unde moto uno harmonia movetur.

Si quod [ nunc] percipitur specie vel genere idem est cum eo, quod alias cum aliis perceptum juerat, imaginatio etiam horum per­ceptionem producere debet. Ut si arborem, statim hortum, et viros et juvenes in horto,2 et plus meas cogitationes et lusus in horto, quod ex eadem causa venit, pariter quod simile producat simile. Quae simul intrara[n]t in perceptionem formaverant sibi quasi centrum mixtum, quod similitudinem et affinitatem

I locus est. 2 hortis. 63

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and affinity with each other. In this way, the similes are moved. 60. Without a previous sensation no phantasm can arise in

the soul [n. 106]. This is equivocal and is not true. It is in­deed true that without sensation no phantasm can arise or have any origin so as afterwards to remain as a phantasm. But that a phantasm can arise, either in part or in whole, without sensa­tion, is evidenced by the fact that we have phantasms in dreams when the senses are asleep; that we think when the senses are, as it were, quiescent. It is seen also in affections; * for a phantasm can be aroused within the senses and in the mem­branes themselves by bilious and acid particles, arising from a superfluity or paucity of liquor; by some distention of the nerves; by a thousand causes; and in this way a phantasm may come into motion.

61. If the imagination reproduces the perception of other things, which formerly were perceived simultaneously with that which we now perceive,. then necessarily those other things have been perceived simultaneously with it, either frequently, or for some length of time [n. 107]. Provided the parts be exam­ined with a noting of the similes, so that [the sensation or tremor] goes to the seat of the soul and forms for itself a place and an agreeable tone, we have a phantasm which recurs on the excitation of any other simile; but without such a first percep­tion this will not be the case. Hence Wolff adds, Facilit.y t in reproducing the perceptions of things formerly perceived simul­taneously with those that are now perceived, is acquired, whether the things perceived simultaneously and frequently or for a long time, are perceived by the sense, or by the imagination [11. 108]. This accords with my opinion.

62. If many things are percei~'ed simultaneously, and the sight of the mind is fixed on one of them; the imagination reproduces the perception of the things pre'ZJiously perceived with this one [n. 109]. This is a consequence of the preceding propositions; for the part then becomes the whole imagination, and from many parts, the one has made for itself its own place and

*Affectibus = the modes in t So Wolff; the MS. has" fac­which we are affected; e.g., an ulty." affection of the lungs, etc.

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habent 3 inter se, quo modo moventur similia. Sine praevia sensatione nullum in anima phantasma onn

potest. Hoc vacillat nec verum est. Hoc quidem verum est, quod nullum phantasma oriri potest sive originem aliquam ducere, ut dein tanquam phantasma insedeat, sine sensatione; sed quod phantasma oriri possit sine sensatione in parte aut in toto videtur ex eo, quod in somnis phantasmata habeamus quum sensus dormiunt, quod cogitemus sensibus quasi quietis. In affectibus: nam excitari potest intra sensus in ipsis mem­branis a particulis felinis, acid is, ex superfluo vel pauco li­quore, a distentione ali[qua] nervorum, a mille causis, sicque in motum venire potest phantasma.

MS., I8!. Ph. MS., 118. Si imaginatio reproducet perceptiones aliarum rerum antea

simul perceptarum cum ea, quam nunc percipimus; res istae vel saepius vel diu percipiantur necessarium est. Modo examinen­tur partes cum similium nota, ut eat usque ad sedem animae, et formet sibi locum et tonum convenientem, habetur phan­tasma quod recurrit cum alio simili; at sine tali prima per­ceptione frustra erit; hinc addit, Acquiritur facilitas 4 reprodu­cendi, sive res saepius aut diu sensu, sive imaginatione simul percipiantur; quod est secundum meam sententiam.

Si res plures simul percipiuntur, et mentis acies in unam earum intenditur, imaginatio reproducit perceptionem rerum cum hac antea simul perceptarum. Haec praecedentium est consequens, nam pars fit tunc integra imaginatio et pars sibi fecerat a pluribus suum locum et tremorem; hinc etiam illae

a habet. 4 facultas.� 65�

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tremor; hence the many also recur. For what happens is, that this part,-itself compounded and made up of many parts,-is then joined as a part with others, and so claims this its own place, if this place [is shared] with the others; and it does this innumerable times.

63. If you fix the sight of the mind continuously on a thing which the phantasm has in C01mnon with the perception from which it is born, there follmvs a succession of phantasms of the same kind and species of entities,. but if, in the phantasm, you direct that sight to other things, the succession of phantasms continues in another kind or species of entities,* [n. 110]. This is a consequence of the former proposition that a simile seeks a simile. If one thing is composed of many, and we take a single one of these many, then this one consists of other things which had composed it; and consequently we will go according to this series. If you take one of these things, it takes to itself similes, or those things of which itself is composed, leaving all the others. Thus it changes its place, and with change of place come other similes.

64. If by force of imagination the phantasm of place is pro­duced,. from this is born a further phantasm of the actions done by us or by others in that place,. and from these again a phan­tasm of other things formerly percetved as coming after such actions [n. 111]. This is a consequence of the former proposi­tion, and the reason for it can be shown by the same considera­tions.

65. N. B. Whatever comes into the memory anew is a com­pound formed from prior things. At first, in infancy, this com­pound comes from very few centers, then from more, and so at

• If your attention is fixed say But suppose that in the first phan­on a flower pot in a window, you tasm you fix attention on the may have a phantasm of a court of· judge's seat; and then have a phan­justice with flower pots in the win­ tasm of a garden in which the dow. Again fixing attention on the judge walks; and, fixing attention flower pots the next phantasm may on the flowers, then have a phan­be of a storm blowing the pots off tasm of a florist's shop, etc. Here the window, etc. Here the pots in the succession of phantasms is of the window is the constant factor a continually different species of because there the attention is fixed. entities.

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recurrunt. Fit enim quod haec ipsa a pluribus composita et facta, cum aliis dein jungatur tanquam pars, et sic hoc locum suum vindicat, si hoc cum aliis; et sic innumerae vices.

Si mentis aciem continuo intendis in id, quod phantasma cum perceptione, ex qua nascitur, commune habet, successio phantas­matum in eodem genere vel specie entium continuatur; si vero in phantasmate ad alia illorum dirigis, successio phantasmatum in alio genere vel alia specie entium continuatur. Hoc consequens est prioris, quod simile quaerat simile. Si unum compositum sit ex pluribus, etassumumus unum ex pluribus, tunc hoc constat aliis quae composuerant, et consequenter ibimus ad illam seriem. Si unum ex his sumis similia sibi assumit, vel ilia ex quibus compositum est, rellictis reliquis: sic mutat locum, et cum loci mutatione veniunt alia.

Si vi imaginationis producitur phantasma alicujus loci, ex eo porro enascitur phantasma actionum a nobis vel ab aliis in isto loco perpetratarum; et ex his porro phantasma aliarum rerum olint post ipsas perceptarum. Est consequens prioris, ex eisdem ratio reddi potest.

N. B. Quodcunque in memoriam e novo venit, composi­turn est ex prioribus; primum in infantia a paucissimis, dein

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last from a great many. Still it is easy [to form a new com­pound] ; for many things have one center, and from such things comes a new center. Unless a new center be acquired, or a new motion in the same center, we can add nothing to our memory.

66. If there comes to the mind the phantasm of a premedi­tated action; from. this arises the phantasm of the place where you premeditated the action, together with the things there pres­ent when you were meditating about it, and even those which have been frequently seen there at other times [n. 112]. For when a phantasm takes its origin in the soul, it cannot take that origin unless at the same time other things be present to which it can join itself and which it can mingle into a one. Therefore the place together with other particulars comes into the phan­tasm. This is a confirmation of my opinion.

67. If many things are perceived simultaneously, and this frequently or for a long. time,. the perceptions of such things are interconnected [n. 113]. This is my opinion.

68. Things are not interconnected merely because the percep­tions of them in. the soul are interconnected [n. 114]. For each of the parts from which the perceptions come has its own con­nection, or its own origin; and from these comes the perception.

69. The rules of imagining [or of imagination or phantasms] are the rules by which phantasms can be explained [n. 115].

70. The law of imagination is the general principle of the rules of imagination or phantasms * [n. 117].

71. Frequently all sensations and phantasms are seen to cease simultaneously, so that we appe1'ceive nothing at all [no 118]. This is not the case. When sensations cease, as for instance sight, or hearing, phantasy does indeed often cease, but it also lives. If it seems to cease there is then a confused phantasm, so that if later, you wish to think [about it] you will come upon something alien or strange which was in the confused phantasm. And because it is a confused phantasm, it is accounted as being no phantasm at all. But since it is living, and since in the blood and liquids there are so many species of particles, and in the elements so great a motion, it cannot cease entirely, but only in

*So Wolff; the MS. has" rules of sensations." 68

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a pluribus, et sic tandem ab adhuc pluribus, scil: centris; usque tamen facile est, quia plura habent unum centrum, ex talibus novum; nisi novum centrum acquiratur, vel in eodem centra novus motus, nihil in memoria possumus addere. MS., 182.

Si in mentem venit phantasma actionis praemeditatae, ex eo oritur phantasma loci, in quo eam praemeditatus es, una cum rebus ibi praesenti.bus, quando de eodem meditatus,5 vel etiam ibidem alias saepe visis. Nam quando originem capit in anima, tunc non originem potest capere, nisi alia simul adsint, quibus­cum se jungit et in unum miscet, ergo venit locus et alia. Est confirmatio sententiae.

Si res plures vel diu simul perpiciantur, perceptiones earum inter se connectuntur. Est mea sententia.

Res ideo inter se non connectuntur, quia perceptiones earum in anima connectuntur; nam quaelibet pars suam habet connex­ionem, seu originem ex quibus.

Regulae imaginandi per quas phantasmata possunt explicari.

Lex imaginationis e[s]t principium generale regularum imaginationum. 6 Ph. MS., 119.

Saepius sensationes omnes et phantasmata omnia simul cessare videntur, ut nihil prorsus appercipiamus. Hoc nee ita se habet; cessantibus sensationibus, ut oculo, auditu, cessat quidem phantasia saepe, vel etiam vivit. Si cessare videtur, est tunc phantasma confusum; ut si velis cogitare postea, tunc incides in aliquid alienum quod in confuso fuerat; et quia confusum putatur nullum; quatenus tamen e[s]t vivens, et tot in sanguine et liquidis sunt species particularum, et tantus in elementis motus, non potest plane cessare, sed tantum ut non

6 rneditatus est. e sensation urn. 69

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the sense that it does not go to the soul. Thus the way to the soul is shut off, as it were. Hence there is not a cessation of the phantasm, merely because we remember nothing but what. comes to the soul. Moreover in the soul there is always motion, inasmuch as there is always motion in the most highly subtle elements. According to the kind of motion in the body, such also is the motion in the most highly subtle [membranes]. The soul sensates all that is in the body, even when it has not been wont to bring the sensation to the phantasm, or to the body,­as in the case of involuntary motion and motion in the cere, bellum. Hence it cannot communicate these motions * to the body, partly because they are too subtle, partly because by no wont have such motions ever reached the corporeal parts, and partly because there is no such bond between the cerebellum and the cerebrum, as exists between the cerebrum and the organs of the senses.

[VII!.]

[SLEEP AND DREAMING.] t 72. When [all] clear sensations cease and we are not con­

scious of anything present, we are said to sleep. This state of the mind is called sleep. Profound sleep is when not only clear sensations, but also clear phantasms cease, so that we apperceive nothing [n. 119]. This also is equivocal. Sleep is only a re­laxation of the nerves and consequently of their offshoots which, in the form of tendinous fibres, are visibly spread around and form tunics. In the daytime these nerves are in tension, while at night they are in relaxation; and therefore, when relaxed, nothing sensual can run through them ;-that is to say, when there is a relaxation of the nerves and tendinous fibres, as for instance in the dura meninx, and perhaps in those [membranes] which invest the nerves and muscles, and so in the pia meninx

*That is, the motions caused by· translator. vVhat follows is still the soul's sensations. cited from Wolff's chapter on the

t This sub-title is added by the Imagination.

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eat ad animam; adeo ut praeclusa sit via quasi ad animam; unde cessatio non est, quia nihil quod non pervenit ad animam, reminiscimur. In anima etiam semper est motus, quatenus in elementis subtilissimis semper est motus; qualis in corpore etiam in subtilissimis movetur; quicquid est in corpore sentit, quamvis non assuescit referre ad phantasma et ad corpus; ut motus involuntaris,7 ut motus in cerebello. Unde non potest communicare cum corpore, partim quod motus sint subtiliores, partim [quod] tales motus non per ullam assuetu­dinem pervenerant ad corporeas partes, partim quod non tale sit ligamen a cerebello ad cerebrum, ut cerebri est cum organis sensuum.

Quum sensationes dame cessant, nee ullius quod praesens est, nobis conscii sumus, dormire dicimur, status ille mentis vocatur somnus. Somnus proJundior quando simul phantas­mata clam cessant, ut nihil appercipiamus. Hoc etiam vacil­lat. Somnum est modo relaxatio nervorum et consequenter illorum prapaginum quae per fibras tendinosas visibiliter se circumspargunt, et tunicas formant. 4 Quam interdiu in ten­MS., 183. sione sunt, noctu vera in relaxatione, inde nec quicquam sen­suale per illas percurrere potest; hoc est, relaxatio nervorum et fibrarum tendinosarum, ut in dura meninge et fortassis in illis quae etiam circumvestiunt nervos, et musculos, et sic

7 involutens. 71

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which is made up of vessels and fibres. This relaxation of the nerves and fibres, therefore, makes it entirely impossible for any tremule to pervade them and move the membrane. Hence in this state there is no communication with the more subtle mem­branes which enter the cerebrum and the nerves. Moreover, the effect of the will upon the parts ceases, and with the cessa­tion of all will, the tension of a membrane of this kind also ceases. Therefore when [the body] is in its relaxation no tremula can come over these membranes; but a tremor is present in the more subtle membranes where is the seat of phantasies, and which are not relaxed. Therefore when [the body] is in its relaxation no tremule can come over these membranes; but a tremor is present in the more subtle membranes where is the seat of phantasies, and which are not relaxed. Therefore phan­tasies are awake, even though the membrane of the senses may be asleep,-that is to say, that membrane, by the medium of which, sensation travels from the organs of the senses to the membrane of the phantasy. Still phantasies are possible, and the operation and communication of such phantasies with the soul. Hence we have dreams. Hence also it follows that phan­tasies do not have their ground in the same sort of membrane as sensations; and that theirs is a more subtle membrane; for there can be no sense of imagination except in the more subtle membranes. Such sense does not exist in the tunics or lymphs of· the eye, or in the tympanum of the ear, but only a medium for mechanically conveying undulations to ever more subtle membranes; and when these undulations cease, the communica­tion also ceases. Thus they are deceived who think that sensa­tion resides in the tunics of the eye or ear. If we were to be­come deaf or blind, yet, in the dream of phantasy, [sight] and hearing, as though coming through the ordinary channels, may remain during the whole course of our life. This is not the case, however, with those who are born deaf and blind, since with them [the membranes] have not been cultivated. Sleep therefore is a relaxation of the tunics with the nerves of the grosser membranes, by whose aid sensations are transmitted; together with a tumescence of the veins and a relaxation of the whole body,-though as to the cause from which this sleep and

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pia meninge,7a quae constat vasis et fibris; sic omnino relaxatio haec facit, ut nihil tremulum potest illas pervadere , et movere membranam; unde in hoc statu nulla est ejus communicatio cum subtilioribus, intrantibus cerebrum et nervos. Cessat etiam voluntatis effectus in partes, cessante voluntate omni cessat etiam tensio talis membranae. Ergo quum est in sua relaxatione nihil tremulum super illas membranas venire potest; sed in subtilioribus adest, ubi phantasiae, quae non sunt laxatae; unde phantasiae vigilant, licet dormiat mem­brana sensuum, vel qua mediante ab organis sensuurn per­venit sensatio ad membranam phantasiae. Phantasiae tamen adesse possunt et illarum cum anima operatio, et communi­catio; unde somnia; et quod phantasiae non consistant in ejusmodi membrana, in qua sensationes; quod subtilior sit, nam nullus est sensus imaginationis nisi in subtilioribus; non in oculi tunicis aut lymphis, nee in auris tympano, sed est tantum medium ut deferat mechanice undulationes versus subtiliores et subtiliores; quibus cessantibus cessat modo communicatio, adeo ut qui putant in tunicis oculi aut auris consistere sensationem fallantur. Si surdi deveniamus, si caeci, potest tamen per totum vitae tempus in somno phan-

Ph. MS., 120.

tasiae [visus] et auditus tanquam venientes per ordinariam viam remanere; non vero in surdis et caecis natis, quia non excultae sunt. Ergo somnus est laxatio tunicarum cum nervis crassiarum, quarum ope deferuntur sensationes; tumes­centibus venis et laxato corpore per totum; sed ex qua causa

7a meninx. 73

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relaxation comes, this is a matter of another * investigation, and, moreover, is a medical and anatomical question; at the same time the ligations of the dura and pia mater are relaxed. From this cause also the veins tumesce; for the venous mem­branes likewise consist of fibres, or of ramifications of the nerves by which they are bound. Hence there enters into them a juice and liquor which, therefore, is said to be attracted by the blood, whereas it comes solely from the relaxing of the guiding reins. Other parts, such as the muscles, also tumesce; for [the nerves] are there relaxed, and the soul cannot act into them, because there is no tension; nor is there such coherence as to enable the liquor or ether to flash through its accustomed path.

73. With noctambulists, however, although a large part [of the body] is relaxed, yet another part is so tense, that there is a communication between the organs and the pia and other lesser meninges. But this communication is not effected by a path that is sure and everywhere unimpeded; for in one place there is considerable communication, while in another there is none. Hence there are no definite reasonings, nor any definite phantasies. It is a kind of apoplexy in the brain.

74. SLEEP. Whence comes the blood in a sleeper's face? t The sinuses of the cerebrum are somewhat lax, [as also are the cords] which, according to Willis, run transversely [within the sinuses] and when not relaxed, prevent them from being un­duly extended.t Repose comes, because all tensed parts finally bring pain. Unless the parts be relaxed, they remain tense; therefore lest they be always tense and thus at last unsubmissive to voluntary motions, they must be unstretched; so likewise in order that, by dilatation, refuse matters may be discharged, and may depart from corners where they have been closed up and

* The MS. has aUus (another); aware, he rarely, if ever, writes it is highly probably however that alillS investigationis. Compare this word is a slip for altius M echan. 31. (deeper). The phrase altius in- t Cf, n. 72, 1598•

vestigationis is frequently used by :j: Quoted from Heister, Comp. Swedenborg, but, as far as we are Anat. 207.

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veniat somnus et laxatio illa, alius est indaginis, est etiam medica et anatomica. Ligationes durae matris et piae laxan­MS., 184. tur simul. Unde etiam tument venae, quia membranae illarum etiam constant fibris seu ramificationibus nervorum, cum quibus ligantur; unde intrat succlls et liquor, quem sic dicitur sanguis attrahere, quum unice veniat a laxatis loris; etiam tument aliae partes ut musculi quia ibi laxantur, nee in illas potest agere anima, quia non tensa est, nec illa est cohaerentia, ut liquor aut aether suo tramite permeare potest.

Noctambulones vera, quorum multa pars est laxata, pars tensa, adeo ut communicatio sit organorum cum meninge pia et minoribus. Sed non via certa et ubivis impedita, sed hic multa, hic nulla, unde nulla certa ratiocinia, nec ullae certae phantasiae; est species apoplexiae in cerebro.

Somnus. Unde sanguis in facie dormientis? Sinus cerebri laxatiores sunt, quae alias, secundum Willisium, transversae currunt, alias nimiam sinus extensionem impedientes. Est quies, quia tensa omnia dolorem tandem pariunt, nisi remit­tantur tensa remanent, hinc ne semper tensa et sic demum motibus voluntariis inobsequiosa, retendi debent. Pariter ut per dilatationem sordes se exonerare, et ex angustis 8 clausis

8 angustris. 75

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pressed in. Therefore, in due manner they must again be tensed. Hence from [long continued] wakefulness, when, by reason of the tension, the blood can no longer pass through the extremely subtle ramifications, nor its acridity be diluted by new and adscititious lymphs, etc., fevers arise. That by exces­sive imagination and thought, the dura mater and the nerves are tensed by reason of the excessive action of the pia meninx, is plain from all the phenomena. Thus from thinking, the cranium grows warm; the eyes redden and become somewhat dry and immobile; the nerves of the neck are frequently hardened, and also the nerves [of the head] so that they may cause apoplexy and convulsions; there is a cohesion of the pia mater with the dura mater brought about by the veins that go to the sinuses.

75. N. B. CONCERNING SPIRITS. 'When they can go no fur­ther into nature's work, that is to say, when they can make no further advance to indivisible elements, our modern authors take refuge in spirits, where the ancients betook themselves to atoms. The taking refuge in spirits is the worse course; for when the mind is brought to a standstill, it should not take refuge in something unknown. In this unknown men see some­thing active, and at once they call it spirits. From this we may see to what point in occult nature our modern writers have now come; and whether they have penetrated any deeper than the ancients. They have merely clothed the unknown with a new name; and this because they see an active; not indeed an active per se but an active operating upon a finite. * Thus they call God a spirit, but infinite; they call angels spirits, but finite; they call the soul a spirit, and so also its animal spirits; they call the devil a spirit. They say these spirits are not infinite; that they are finite; that they are endowed with active force; that they can act upon the body or upon what is material; that they can be enclosed in the nerves. And yet, they say that certain spirits are not capable of extension, and cannot be considered as being in space. What is all this but mere contradictions in predicates? That which is not infinite, must be finite. If there were a medium, it would partake of something of the infinite; and yet

* ef. II Infinite ii (The animal spirits).

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et compressis jam exire, et iterum tendi debito modo; unde existunt a vigilia febres, quando sanguis non amplius potest subtilissimas ramificationes pertransire propter tensionem, nee acredo dilui lymphis novis et ascititiis, etc. A nimia imaginatione et cogitatione tendi duram meningem et nervos, ob actum nimium piae meningis, patet ab omnibus, adeo ut cogitando cranium calescat, oculi rubeant et sicciores et immobiliores evadant, nervi colli saepe [inchoent] indurari, et nervi, ut possint causari apoplexiam et convulsiones. Cohaesio est piae matris cum dura matre per venas ad sinus abeuntes.

N. B. De Spiritibus. Recentiores fugiunt ad spiritus, ubi non amplius in naturale] opusculum venire possunt, vel ad elementa indivisibilia; veteres ad atomos; pejus est ad spiritus; non ad aliquod ignotum fugiendum est, ubi mens subsistit; In· quo aliquid activum vident, hoc statim spiritus vocant. Exinde videri potest, quo in occulta natura pervenerint

MS., 185. recentiores; num altius quam veteres, tantum alio nomine investierunt, quia activum vident, et quidem non activum per se sed in finitum. Sic vacant Deum Spiritum sed in­fini turn; sic angelos spiritus sed fini tos; sic animam spiritum; sic spiritus eJus animales; sic diabolum spiritum; dicunt non esse infinitos, dicunt esse finitos, dicunt vi activa esse praedi-

Ph. MS., 12I.

tos; dicunt agere posse in corpus seu in materiale; dicunt includi posse nervis; dicunt tamen quosdam spiritus non esse extensibiles, nee considerari posse in spatio. Quid hoc, annon contradictiones merae in adjectis. Quod non infinitum est, erit finitum; si medium foret, participaret quid de infinito,

i7

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no nexus with the infinite is possible. I f the spirit is created, if it is finite, it must certainly have the attributes of the finite, such as figure, space, and in motion, moments and degrees; and therefore it must be geometrical and mechanical. If it can act upon the finite, then it must be a quality which is not infinite that acts upon the finite. What does it mean, that the spirit can be enclosed in a body as its soul, and that the animal spirits of the body can tense the nerves and act upon them? If these spirits are not mechanical and geometrical, how shall the soul act upon the material? They can change their place; they can be enclosed; they can act in a finite way slowly or quickly, weakly or strongly.

In a word, everything which we do not see with our senses, and in which nevertheless there is an active something, comes at once under the name spirit; and concerning its extension and essentials men indulge in vain disputes,-the unknowing dis­puting concerning the unknown. They both apply [it to the body] and do not apply [it]. Nay, because spirit is active in wine, and because the animal spirits are vivified by wine, there­fore wine also comes under this same name spirit,-but r am not speaking of the saner writers. If we saw a mere mass, which yet through the microscope, appears visibly as consisting of worms, and there were no microscopes at hand, we would declare that these worms also were spirits, since they are active and since we do not see the legs and bodies. So in the case of spirits; because we do not see them, therefore we call them spirits.* If we had the microscopes, we might be able to see the entire structure both of the soul and of the spirit.t

76. In sleep we s01netimes have a clear perception of things absent, one set of perceptions succeeding another for some length of time [no 120]. From this we see the operation of the imagination, in that one imagination must needs call forth another, since, by motion, things are mingled together and con­joined. They proceed in order, one alter another, succeeding each other according as there is delay. One may frequently

* Cf. n. 1. norance of state of soul, etc.). t Cf. II Infinite ii (From jg.

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cujus nullus mexus dari potest; si creatus si finitus, habebit omnino attributa finitatis, figuram, spatium, in motu momenta et gradus, ergo geometricum et mechanicum; si potest agere in finitum, quale quod non est infinitum aget in finitum, quid hoc; quod inc1udi corpori, ut anima, et animales ejus spiritus tendere nervos 9 et agere, si non essent mechanici et geometrici quid in materiale aget; possunt mutare locum, includi; pos­sunt finite agere lentius et citius, remissius et fortius. Verbo

quicquid sensibus nostris non videmus, cui tamen activum quid inest, iIlico sub nomine spiritus venit, de cujus extensione et essentialibus inutiliter disputant, ignoti de ignotis, appli­cant et non applicant. Imo quia agit spiritus in vino, etiam hoc venit eodem nomine, et quia inde spiritus animales vivifi­cantur; de sanioribus non loquor. Si videremus congeriem quandam vermium per microscopium tot visibilium, et nullas adessent microscopia, diceremus hos etiam spiritus quia agunt, nec videmus pedes, corpora. Sic etiam est cum spiritus [dicuntur]; quia non videmus, spiritus nominamus; si micro­scopium haberemus possemus videre totam structuram tarn animae 1 quam spiritus.2

MS. 186. In somno interdum res absentes clare percipimus, percep­

tionibus aliis per tractum aliquem temporis aliis succedentibus. Hinc videmus operationem imaginationis, quod una imaginatio non potest quin aliam educat, quia per motum mixta et con­juncta sunt; procedunt ordine, una post alteram, prout mora datur, sic succedunt. Saepe animadvertere licet ad certum

9tensium nervorum or tensire lanimam. nervos. 2spiritum.

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notice that they tend to some definite end,-although we do not know what that end is, except as we know it afterwards as the end of the dream,-as though all the other appearances had led to that end,-a sign that it comes thus to the soul,* which sup­plies many additional things and marvellously joins them to­gether. Thus the soul marvellously joins these others together, and so determines them to a definite end as it were.t

77. N. B. We can remember a dream if it has come to the soul, and if it has excited pleasure in the blood; or if the pleas­ure has excited the blood. vVith attention, this pleasure con­tinues in the blood, and consequently, some activity is still in the nerves when we awake. This activity, together with the pleasure remains. Consequently, since the motions arising from these causes continue, we then remember the dream.:j:

78. When we dream, we imagine the things which we· per­ceive [n. 122].

79. Every dream takes its beginning from sensation, and is continued by a succession of phantasms [n. 123]. This accords with my opinion.

80. If during the time that we are dreaming, we do not apper­ceive any new sensation, or do not direct the sight of the mind thereto, the succession of phantasms continues in the same series,. but if during this time we apperceive some sensation, and direct the sight of the mind thereto, the dream continues in differing series of phantasms [n. 124]. Hence come the simple dream and the compound dream [n. 125].

81. The sensations from which the dream takes its beginning and which sometimes are interpolated in the phantasms of the dream, are feeble [no 126].

82. In dreams things absent seem to us present [no 127]. This is also the case in the imagination, unless the things present before us, so argue the contrary, that the soul knows the differ­ence.

*The MS. has quod . .• venit, for which we read quod . .. veniat. Otherwise the translation would be ,. A sign which thus comes to the

sou1." t Cf. n. :j: See n.

40. 85.

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aliquem finem tendere, quamvis non nescimus finem nisi post ut finem somnii, tanquam reliqua duxerint ad ilium finem, indicium quod sic ad animam venit, quae adhuc plura sup­peditat, et conjungit mire, quae sic mire conjungit reliqua, et sic ad certum quasi finem determinat.

N. B. Reminisci possumus somnii si ad animam pervenerit, et si excitaverit in sanguine voluptatem, vel voluptas illum excitaverit, quae continuat cum atten tione in sanguine et consequenter in nervis remanet quid agens dum expergiscimur, et illud agens cum voluptate remanet, tunc enim inde motibus ex ilUs causis continuantibus, reminiscimur somnii.

Dum somniamus, res quas percipimus imaginamur.

Omne somnium initium capit a sensatione et per phantasma­tum successionem continuatur; secundum meam sententiam.

Si interea temporis, dum somniamus, novam quandam sensa­tionem non appercipimus, vel in eam mentis aciem [non] dirigi­mus, successio phantasmatum in eadem serie continuatur;

Ph. MS., 122.

quod si vero sensationem quandam interea appercipimus, et in eam mentis aciem dirigimus, somnium in diversis phantasma­tum seriebus continuatur. Unde somnium simplex et somnium compositum.

Sensationes in quibus somnium initium sumit, et quae phan­tasmatis 3 in eodem interdum interponuntur, debiles sunt.

In somnio res absentes nobis videntur praesentes. Sic etiam in imaginatione nisi praesentes res aliter arguunt, et anima sic noscat differentiam.

a Wolff uses this form, as if from phantasmatum-i. 81

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83. In dreams mtttations occur without a sufficient reason [no 128]. The reason exists in the causes. It comes either from parts coming from the blood and nerves, etc., which cause tremors; or from a series of tremors one succeeding the other.* If a body be at complete rest without any irritation of the liquors, coherence is the result, and this coherence arises from compounds. Hence If, in two persons, the dream takes its beginning from the same weak sensation, the two drea'Jns are nevertheless different [n. 129]. This applies equally to persons who are awake.

84. At a different time the same weak sensation will give rise to a different phantasm, provided the weakness varies [no 133]. For the phantasm then rests on the weak sensations. H enee different dreams will draw their origin from the same weak sensation, according to the different degrees of the weakness [ibid.] .

85. If the clearness of the phantasms be successively weak­ened, the dream is at last extinguished by profound sleep. So likeuJise it is extinguished if we awake,. and likeurise, if the phantasms have been obscure. Therefore we are aware of a clear dream., and not of an obscure [n. 134-137]. This makes one with our causes, to wit, if the dream penetrate to the soul, it is a clear dream. A dream penetrates to the soul if it con­tinues in the same [motion]; or if additional force come from particles of the blood and the nerve, or from some motion of the nerves. If the motion remains the same when we awake, and there be something which actuates it; and likewise if there be a nexus; then we would be aware of the dream.t

86. N. B. If the cerebellum were rightly joined with the cerebrum, and if there were a communication between their subtle membranes, then we would know all that took place in our body, and would sensate the minutest thing in our body. But the cerebellum does not now cohere with the cerebrum in this way; it coheres with the nerves, and it is the reciprocal motion of the latter that goes to the cerebellum. Hence if God

*See II Infinite IV, 9. t Cf. n. 76, 77.

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In somnio mutationes contingunt absque ratione sufficiente. Ratio datur in causis partim a partibus causantibus tremores 4

ex sanguine, nervis, etc.; vel ex serie tremorum, unus succedit alterum; si quietissimum corpus sine irritatione liquorum sit, fit cohaerentia, et cohaerentia ex compositis oritur. Dnde Si in 2 personis somnium initium capit ab eadem sensatione debili, somnia tamen diversa sunt. Pariter hoc in vigilantibus.

Phantasma diverso tempore ex eadem sensatione debili diversum oriri debet, si debilitas variat. Nam tunc in debilibus subsisti t: Unde ex eadem sensatione debili diversa somnia ortum trahere debere pro diverso debilitatis g~adu.

MS., 187. Si phantasmatum claritas successive debilitetur, somnium

tandem per somnum profundum exstinguitur; pariter si evigila­mus; pariter si obscura fuerint, ergo clarum agnoscimus, obscu­rum non. Hoc idem est cum nostris causis, scilicet si penetret ad animam, clarum est; et penetrat si continuetur in eodem; vel si vis accedat a particulis sanguinis, nervi, vel motu quodam nervorum; si idem motus remanet dum vigilamus, et quid sit quod idem agat; pariter si nexus sit, tunc illud nOVlmus.

N. B. Si cerebellum cum cerebro foret rite junctum et communicatio inter subtiles membranas, tunc sciremus quic­quid in corpore foret, et nostrum sentiremus minimum in corpore; sed jam non cum cerebro cohaeret ita, sed cum nervis, et reciprocus motus illorum it ad cerebellum. Hinc si Deus

I tremoribus. 83

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had willed so to join the cerebellum and cerebrum, we would have been instructed in all things of our anatomy almost without a master.

[IX.]

[THE FACULTY OF PICTURING.]

87. We can imagine one part of a compound without the other; so we can imagine a subject without a mode, but not without [a sensible] attribute. Thus you can imagine to your­self the parts of a tree. You can imagine a flower witllOut color, or without the color [which the eye saw] ; that is to say, without a mode. But the attribute must follow. Thus you can never imagine a mountain without a valley, or a triangle without three angles. This is because the attributes of an entity are constantly within that entity, (Wolff [n. 138]). This is a sign that phantasms arise from the senses. That which con­joins the senses, conjoins also the phantasm; that which sep­arates the senses, separates also the phantasm. A phantasm is the penetration in the finest membranes of a tremor similar to that which exists in the greatest membranes and thus in the organs. The eye and the ear can sensate parts such as sylla­bles. They can sensate compounds, such as triangles and fig­ures, and also words; and still further compounds, or the com­pounds of compounds, such as sentences from words, conclu­sions from sentences, etc. It is not the same, however, in the case of smell and taste. Here we sensate the compounds but not the parts; for in smell and taste we do not sensate the component parts.

88. The division of phantasms consists in the separating of partial perceptions from the compound perception [n. 139].

89. We are able to divide phantasms [no 140]. This follows from the preceding proposition.

90. We are able to combine partial perceptions of different entities at will; the imagination can also attribute to a subject, modes never before perceived by us in this sense, but previously perceived in other subjects, provided such nwdes are not repug­nant to the subject; there thus results a phantasm of an entity

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voluisset jungere ita cerebellum et cerebrum omnibus nostrae anatomiae fere sine magistro fuissemus docti.

Partem entis compositi unam absque altera, S subjectum item absque modo, non tamen absque attributo imaginari possumus; ut partes arboris potes tibi imaginari; florem potes sine colore, vel illo, hoc est sine modo; attributum sequitur; montem nun­quam sine valle, triangulum sine tribus angulis, constanter enim insunt. Wolf. Hoc signum est, quod phantasmata oriantur a sensibus. Quod conjungit sensus, hoc conjungit phantasII¥l; quod separat sensus hoc phantasma. Est phan­tasma penetratio similis tremoris in minimis membranis, quae 6 est in maximis, ut in organis; partes potest oculus et auris, ut syllabas; composita potest ut triangula et figuras, et voces; adhuc magis composita, ut ex compositis composita, ut ex vocibus sententiae, ex sententiis conc1usiones, etc. In olfactu et gustu non item, composita sentimus sed non partes, quia partes componentes non sentimus.

Divisio phantasmatum separare perceptiones partiales a com­positis.

Phantasmata dividere valemus. Hoc sequitur a priori.

Perceptiones partiales diversorum entium compositorum pro arbitrio combinare valemus; subjecto quoque imaginatio tribuere potest modos in eo sensu nondum a nobis perceptos, perceptos tamen antea in aliis subjectis, modo eidem non repugnant; ut

6 alteram. 6 quod. 85

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never before perceived by the sense [no 141]. We can deduce this in no other way than from the first formation [of the imagination] and its growth from infancy to the age of adoles­cence and beyond. 1. The infant sees only a confused some­thing without any species or part, without attribute, essential, or mode.. This confused something is impressed on it. 2. Later it sees parts, but in a confused way comparable to the first confused sight; thus the impression comes into the organs, but not yet to the soul. 3. It then sees the parts of these parts, and in this way come the attributes. 4. And so it sees the parts and species of these, and thus come essentials. S. Then it sees the parts of these, and so comes to their modes. In this way, modes, essentials and attributes are conjoined with the first confused vision. Thus, little by little, this vision by cultivation comes more and more to the soul. 6. When essentials [have] thus [come] into their [attributes] and modes into their modi­fications, and when by a similar coherence they all fix and form themselves in the soul, then at last by the imagination [the man] can reproduce the things that have tntered 11. bv a similitude of this kind; and at the same time can reproduce their predicates; for one thing excites another,~specially when there is such harmony. If we consider, such also is the state of the imagi­nation; from it we can see what it was in its incipiency. What has been said of sight applies also to hearing.

91. N. B. AGAINST ATHEISTS. We can see: 1. The mech­anism of the body and its organs, that is to say, that its visible organs are mechanical. 2. That there are animal spirits, and what they are. 3. That there is a soul; indeed the nature of the soul is seen; therefore we no longer doubt concerning it. 4. That the soul is immortal; therefore doubt is dispersed. S. That it is different in a vitiated body than in one not vitiated. 7. That the soul suffers its own torments; this we do not doubt, because it can be demonstrated mechanically and geometrically. 8. That there are angels who can operate upon the soul. 9. That the Sacred Scripture is marvellously consentient [with the above1; hence all doubt concerning the soul vanishes. 10. That all such things, and also nature herself, must have a cause, which neither souls nor angels can penetrate. Therefore we

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prodeat phantasma entis sensu antea nondum percepti. Hoc possumus non aliter deducere, quam a prima formatione ab infante ad adolescentem aetatem et ultra. I. Videt nihil nisi confusum quid, sine aliqua specie aut parte, sine attributo, essentiali, modo; hoc imprimitur. 2. Dein videt partes sed confuse ad similitudinem 7 cum primo confuso; sic venit in organa, necdum ad animam. 3. Turn ilIarum partes; sic veniunt attributa. 4. Sic illarum partes et species; sic veniunt MS., 188. Ph. MS., 123.

essentialia. S. Si[c] illarum partes; sic venit ad modos, unde modi, essentialia et attributa conjunguntur cum prima con­fusa visione; sic sensim sensimque ad animam magis et magis per cultum. 6. Quum sic essentialia in sua, modi in suas modificationes, et omnes per similem cohaerentiam se figunt et formant in anima, sic tandem potest per imagina­tionem reproducere ilia, et tandem praedicata quae simul s per similitudinem talem intraverant. Quum unum excitat alterum, praecipue quum talis harmonia sit, si consideremus talis etiam est imaginationis status, ex illo videre possumus qualis inceptus est: sic in auditu.

N. B. Contra Atheistas. I. Mechanismum corporis et or­ganorum videmus, scilicet quod organa visibilia sint mechan­ica. 2. Quod spiritus animales sint, et quales. 3. Quod anima sit; quidem videtur qualis sit, ergo non dubitamus amplius de ea. 4. Quod immortalis sit, ergo dubium excutitur. S. Quod alia sit in corpore vitioso quam non vitioso. 7. Quod cruciatus suos patiatur, non dubitemus quia demonstrari mechanice et geometrice potest. 8. Quod angeli sint, qui in animam operari possunt.sa 9. Quod Scriptura Sacra mire consentiat, hinc dubium de illa evanescit. 10. Quod omnia talia causam etiam ipsa natura habebunt 9 quam nee anim[ae] nee angeli penetrare

7 similationem. written above the line to be inserted 8 tandem et praedicata simul after tandem.

quae. All but the first word are 8a possint. 9 habebit. 87

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do not doubt concerning this, but venerate, worship, love, etc.* 92. We are able to compound phantasms [n. 143]. This is

a consequence of the preceding proposition. 93. The soul has the faculty of pictttring, that is to say, of

dividing, compounding, etc. [n. 145]. 94. If we compound things which are mutually repugnant to

each other, or which, by force of their nature, cannot be con­joined in one and the same subject, the phantasm represents a fictitious entity [no 146]. We cannot compound things which are absolutely repugnant to each other. This the soul cannot do, unless it is perverted. And yet [things repugnant to each

. other] are in a way not repugnant; as for instance, the head of a bull on a human body. These two are repugnant, and yet they are not; for a head is conjoined to a body, and a part can be added to a compound. In respect to mode, therefore, they are not repugnant, but only in respect to existence; as for in­stance wings on fishes. Wolff therefore adds: If by an arbi­trary compounding the imagination produces a certain phantasm, art is able to produce an object like it [no 148]. And hence he further adds: From the things which it has seen in many dif­ferent buildings, the imagination can compose the idea of a new building. The same is true of other works of art [no 149].

95. If from the things which he has seen in many different buildings, an architect composes the idea of a building, doing this by force of the principle of sufficient reason; the building constructed according to that idea will conform with the rules of architecture [n. 150]. Wolff's vis principii (force of the principle) is no other than the harmony of the motions in the elements, or harmonic proportion; the effect of which is that if [the mind] has two things, a third proportional will run to them, and between these a third; so that a continuous harmony arises. In some persons therefore, this is natural as coming from the natural motion of the elements. In others it is arti­ficial, so that they make use of rules and not of true imagina­tion. Hence with some, whose souls have not been accustomed to harmonies, a different harmonic [arrangement] results; and

* Cf. n. 52 above.

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possunt 1 ; ergo non dubitamus de ilIo; sed veneramur, colimus, amamus, etc.

Phantasmata componere possumus. Est consequens prioris. Anima habet facultatem fingendi; scilicet dividendi, compo­

nendi, etc.

Si ea componimus, quae sibi mutuo repugnant, vel naturae vi in eodem subjecto conjungi nequeunt, phantasma ens fictum repraesentat. Non componere possumus quae sibi repugnant absolute, hoc nequit anima nisi perversa. Sed aliquo modo tamen non repugnant, ut caput bovinum corpori humano; repugnant, sed non repugnant quia caput conjungitur corpori, pars addi composito; ergo qua modum non repugnant, sed qua existentiam; ut alae piscibus. Hine addit Si imaginatio per arbitrariam compositionem phantasma quoddam producit, ars objectum ei simile producere valet. Unde adhuc, Imaginatio ex iis quae in pluribus aedificiis diversis vidit, ideam novi aedi­ficii componere valet; sic in aliis operibus artis.

MS., 189. Si architectus ex iis, quae in pluribus aedificiis diversis vidit,

ideam aedificii componit, vi principii rationis sufficientis, aedi­ficium juxta eam exstructum est regulis architecturae conforme. Vis principii sui non est alia quam harmonia motuum in ele­mentis, seu proportio harmonica; ut si duo habeantur, ut tertium proportionale accurrat, et inter ea tertium, ut continua oriatur harmonia, unde est naturalis in quibusdam, quia venit a naturali elementorum motu; in quibusdam est artificialis, ut regulis non imaginatione vera utantur. Hinc quidam quorum animae non assuetae sunt harmonicis, alia harmonica

1 penetrari. 89

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to those whose souls cannot be moved and flexed in their true place, nor even well within their termini, there comes another and disjointed harmony. Moreover, dissonance also results if true termini be lacking; and also from many other causes. This then is the vis principii.

96. A hieroglyphic signification is a signification wherein one thing is transferred for the denoting of another. As for in­stance sculptured figures for the denoting of sentiments; a tri­angle for the denoting of [the trine in] God [n. 151].

97. If a phantasm is so composed that by the similitude which its constituent parts bear to the intrinsic determinations of some given thing, the latter can be inferred from the former, the phantasm has a hieroglyphic signification and is composed by force of the principle of sufficient reason [n. 152]. Because it is similar, therefore its modes, essentials, and attributes agree with the subjects as they have entered the imagination. Things which have come forth successively are compounded simul­taneously.

The ancients represented dogmas and historical matters by hieroglyphic figures. This was a familiar practice with the Egyptians, and some say the same thing of the Chinese.* Comenius exhibits the human soul hieroglyphically.t

* The authority for this statement to denote the fertility of the earth given by Wolff (whom Swedenborg when cultivated by art (loc. cit.). here paraphrases) is the Preface t Comenius Orbis Sensuatium to Tabula ChrOlwlogica Monarchiae Pktus. Of Comenius Wolff says Sinicae, Paris, 1686, where the au- that he impressed ideas on the thor, the Jesuit missionary, Phillip minds of children by means of pic-Couplet, states that Fohi the first tures. Being unable to depict the known founder of the Chinese Em- soul, he had recourse to the hiero­pire is said to have had a human glyphic art and made a phantasm head on the body of a serpent to to which he gave an hieroglyphic denote his prudence and skill; while signification. He represented the Fohi's successor is said to have had soul by dots or points arranged in a head with the countenance of an the human figure. By the points­ox, because he was zealous in en- which geometrically are without couraging agriculture, and first in- dimensions,-he denoted the sim­troduced the use of yoked oxen. plicity of the soul; and by their It is also said of him, that when arrangement into the human figure, he was contemplating this work, its substantiality (so that it can heaven rained down wheat and rice, exist without the body) and its

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prodit, quorum anima non potest moveri et flecti in vero loco, nec Cere bene in terminis, venit alia harmonia, inconcinna. Si cui deficiant termini veri, etiam dissonum prodit, exque pluribus aliis causis, hocque est vis principii.

Significatus hieroglyphicus, quo res ad denotandam aliam transfertur,-figurae ad sententias, triangulum ad Deum.

Si phantasma quoddam ita componitur, ut per similitudinem partium constitutivarum cum determinationibus rei cuidam

Ph. MS., 124.

intrinsecis, hae ex istis colligi possint, phantasma significatum hieroglyphicum habet, ac vi principii rationis sufficientis com­ponitur. Quia simile est, hinc modi, essentialia et attributa cum subjectis conveniunt, ut intrarant in imaginationem; composita simul sunt, quae successiva prodierant. Veteres dogmata et historica per figuras hieroglyphicas repraesentarant; quod Aegyptiis familiare; de Sinensibus alii. Comenius exhibet animam Hieroglyphice.

union with the body; by this ar- Schoolmen, that the whole soul is rangement he also gave expression in the whole body and also in its to the then received doctrine of the every part (ib.).

91�

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98. N. B. The Schoolmen said that the whole soul is in the whole body, and that the whole soul is in each part of the body [no 152]. They are mistaken, however, for there are many things in the body which are not of the soul; but the soul is in the whole brain, and is grosser in the body; * and the soul con­sists of many parts, though the parts are all similar.t

99. That an hieroglyphic signification prevails in the memory, is evident from the fact that the memory supplies many tremors which concur together. Therefore Wolff truly observes: If the case be such that not only do the several parts of which the phantasm is composed, denote the different intrinsic determina­tions of a thing; but that the particulars which can be distin­guished in those parts, denote the particulars which are dis­cerned in the determinations of that thing; the whole phantasm is significative and is a perfect example of the class of hiero­glyphics [n. 153] . Hence one phantasm is more perfect than another [no 154]. Therefore a kind of writing can be devised which would comprehend almost everything; and in which it would be possible to write more in a single line than can be unfolded in several pages. But to understand such writing, one must have knowledge.

100. If a hieroglyphic phantasm represents the several notes :j: which enter into the definition of a thing, it serves in place of a definition [no 155].

101. Instruction can be given by means of hieroglyphic fig­ures § [no 158], if only the parts, predicates and modes enter

* See Mechanism 13, 32-34; II method. He adds, that while it is Infinite IV, xiii. not useful to hide truths under the

t See n. 105 below, and II In- guise of hieroglyphics, yet the lat­finite IV, xiii seq. ter have their use as aids to memo­

t I.e., marks, signs, character- rizing. In illustration he instances istics; thus yellow is a "note" fhe" hieroglyphic way of writing which enters into the definition of and teaching" used by the a1chem­gold. ists; and he cites Gaspar Neumann

§ In illustrating this proposition, as attributing a hieroglyphic sig­W olff says that the Egyptians used nification to the letters of the He­this means of instruction in order brew language; and as drawing to withhold their truths from those therefrom something essential. In who were unworthy; but that we this connection he refers to his own do not yet well understand their Philosophia Rationalis or Logica n.

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N. B. Scholastici dixerunt animam esse totam in toto corpore, et totam in qualibet ejus parte, sed falluntur, quum multa sint non animae in corpore; sed est in toto cerebro, crassior in corpore, et quod anima constet pluribus partibus t sed partes omnes similes. Quod tale hieroglyphicum plus valeat in memoria, patet ex eo quod plures suppeditet tremores, qui concurrant. Ergo vere, Si non modo partes singulae, ex quibus phantasma componitur, denotent diversas determinationes rei intrinsecas, verum etiam singula, quae in istis partibus distingui possunt, denotent ea quae in determinationibus rei discernuntur; phantasma totum significativum est, et in genere hieroglyphi­carum perfectum; unde unum perfectius altero. Unde talis scriptura adinveniri potest quae exhauriat fere omnia; et plus scribere liceat in una linea, quam explicari potest per aliquot folia; sed qui intelliget, erit scius.*

Si phantasma hieroglyphicum repraesentet singulas notas, quae definitionem rei alicujus ingrediuntur, loco definitionis inservit. MS., 190.

Disciplinae per figuras hieroglyphicas tradi possunt, si modo intrent partes, praedicata, modi, ut Aegyptii. Figurae sunt

978, where he explains the state­ derstood that which in reason is ments in Scripture that .. God re­ proper to Him." pented," as meaning that God de­ t partes. tested. In this explanation he uses * In the MS. this and the preced­the rule that "by what is said of ing paragraph are written as a God in a human way, must be un- single paragraph.

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[into the figures] as was the case with the Egyptians. Figures are artificial signs. They are either primitive or derivative. The primitive are such as do not derive their origin from other and prior figures,. the derivative are such as derive their origin from other figures [no 159-161].

102. Irresolute notes * are such as cannot be resolved,. they are opposed to resolute notes [no 162].

103. The irl'esolute notes which enter into the distinct notions of things, must be represented by primitive figures. Distinct notions must be represented by derivative figures. In studi!!s, definitions and propositions must be represented by derivative figures. The resolute notes which enter into the distinct notion of a thing, must be represented in studies by derivative figures. Adequate notions must be represented by derivative figures [n.163-167].

104. If we intend to imagine some given thing, it frequently happens that a phantasm is produced which is different from the one we intended [n. 172]. A phantasm cannot be continued without pleasure as an accompanying aid. Pleasure is aroused either by the senses or by the blood.t The former pleasure we call mediate, the latter spontaneous, although this also is mediate. Thus [a phantasm cannot be continued] except pleasure results because the saliva is excited from the vessels; thus [by sight] and by hearing; thus if saliva should be excited in the absence of hearing and sight, pleasure would be aroused spontaneously, as it were, and without the senses. Hence pleasure consists in the mutation of least parts by liquid parts,-but only by such as can affect the membranes. If this pleasure is present, there is at once a delay, since such delay is created by these parts. Hence we can continue our imagination even to the end and for a long time. Otherwise, if some other origin enter in, which comes under the name of pleasure, and stimulates [the mem­branes] a different phantasm results, inasmuch as the mem­branes are actuated into another motion.

105. N. B. That the soul consists of parts which are similar to each other, is evident also from worms, in that from worms of any given kind none but worms of the same kind can be produced.:j:

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signa artificialia. Vel sunt primitivae vel derivativae; primi­tivae sunt, quae ab aliis se prioribus ortum non trahunt; deriva­tivae quae ab aliis oriuntur.

Notae irresolubiles quae non possunt resolvi; contra, resolu­biles.

Notae irresolubiles, quae notiones rerum distinctas ingrediun­tur, repraesentandae sunt per figuras primitivas. Notiones distinctae per derivativas. In disciplinis, definitiones et pro­positiones per figuras derivativas. Notae resolubiles, quae notionem rei distinctam ingrediuntur, in disciplinis per deriva­tivas. Notiones adaequatae per derivativas.

Si quid imaginari intendimus saepius phantasma prodit diversum ab eo, quod intenderamus. Sine voluptate adjutrice phantasma continuari non potest. Voluptas excitatur vel a sensibus vel a sanguine; priorem vocamus mediatam, posteri­orem spontaneam, quamvis sit mediata. Sic nisi ubi fit vo­luptas quia excitatur e vasis saliva, sic ex auditu; sic si saliva excitaretur sine auditu et visu, sine sensibus tanquam sponte excitaretur voluptas; hinc eonsistit haec in partium minimarum mutatione a partibus liquidis, at a talibus quae afficere possunt la

membranas, quae si adsit, statim fit mora, quia ereatur mora per tales partes, hine imaginari possumus usque ad finem et diu; si non, sed alia origo veniat, quae voluptatis nomine venit et stimulat, prodit phantasma diversum, quia in alium motum aguntur membranae.

N. B. Quod anima eonstet partibus similibus, patet etiam ex vermibus, quod ex uno genere non nisi ejusdem generis vermes possint prodire.

*See n. 100, note. :j: Cl. n. 98 above, and M echa­t Cl. n. 159, 160. nism, 36, 37.

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[X.]

THE MEMORY.

106. The faculty of recognizing reproduced ideas, is called memory [no 175]. Memory is only a variety of the tremor which causes sensation; and since innumerable such varieties are possible, therefore, when the same tone recurs, a sensation is produced and likewise a phantasm. Memory therefore is nothing more than the same tremor recurring. This recur­rence, together with an adequate sensation thereof,-a sensation that has been learned by cultivation,-is the memory.

107. If a reproduced idea is contained in a series of percep­tioM other than that in which it was contained when previously perceived, and we are conscious of both series; we recognize it [n. 174]. In this case there are mixed motions or tremors; there is an harmonic series; there is a situation; consequently, various series are produced simultaneously or in concentration.

108. The faculty of reproducing the ideas we have formerly had, does not pertain to the memory [no 176]. Wolff calls this faculty imagination; [for he says: " An idea may be reproduced in us and yet not be recognized as an idea previously possessed; in which case the reproduction cannot be ascribed to the mem­ory" (ib.) ].* In this way, therefore, he distinguishes between memory and imagination.

109. N. B. [1]. The soul is so furnished with its mem­branes, that it can receive motions of the utmost diversity, and this the better in the degree that the differences are more nu­merous; and by cultivation it has been so formed that not only has it received tremors, but, by virtue of the figure obtained through cultivation it is also adapted to the tremors received. This property is called the FACULTY OF IMAGINATION. Hence

*We have here substituted tended to paraphrase Wolff, it Wolff's words for our author's would seem that reproducitur is a brief paraphrase. The latter reads: slip for recognoscitur. For the .. He says it is imagination; which definition of Imagination, see n. 43 frequently is not reproduced." As­ above; and compare n. 106, 109. suming that Swedenborg here in­

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DE MEMORIA

Facultas ideas reproductas recognoscendi memoria dicitur. Memoria est tantummodo diversitas tremoris qui sensationem causatur, quae cum innumerae dari possunt, hinc cum idem tonus recurrit, fit sensatio, et idem phantasma; adeo ut me­moria sit tantummodo idem tremor recurrens, cum sensatione ejus adaequata et ex cultu edocta, est memoria.

Ph. MS., 125.

Si idea reproducta in alia perceptionum serie continetur, quam ante percepta continebatur, et utriusque seriei nobis conscii sumus, illam recognoscimus. Dantur motus vel tremores mixti, datur series harmonica, datur situs, et consequenter variae series simul vel concentrate prodeuntes.

Facultas ideas, quas antea habuimus, reproducendi, non per­tinet ad memoriam. Dicit esse imaginatio, quae saepe non rec­ognoscitur 2; ergo sic distinguit inter memoriam et imagina­tionem.

MS.,19I. N. B. Quum anima cum suis membranis ita sit instructa ut

recipere possit diversissimos motus, et quo plures differentes, eo melior; vel quod ex cultu ita sit formata ut non modo recep­erit, sed etiam ratione figurae per cultum obtentae in receptos tremores habilis sit, vocatur hoc facultas imaginationis; uncle

2 reproducitur. 97

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this faculty may be present, even though [the soul] has not yet been so formed into tremulous motions as to have received any great diversity of tones. 2. Men come to this, according as the other membranes are likewise so adapted, that they shall convey tremors to the soul; from which these tremors can rebound to the membranes, and cause different sensations according to the tone. Then, if these mediate membranes conspire together, man has the FACULTY OF REASONING. 3. When, from whatso­ever cause, [a sensation] is reproduced,-[a sensation] namely, which exists either in the organs of the senses, or in the inter­mediate membranes by reason of the incitation of liquors and the parts in the liquors,--then the same tremor arises, being mixed, compound, or harmonic according to use, and we have what is called IMAGINATION. 4. \Vhen the reproduction is from one of the senses, and continues with the sense, or in the sensa­tion, so that this can be noticed by means of the sense, it is called MEMORY. S. And because this motion cannot depart and flow off; but being imprisoned in its place,-whence it is dif­fused to its termini beyond which it cannot gO,-can spread only through the same organs [as those in which it originated], therefore memory comes from sensation as well as from imagi­nation. 6. If the intermediate membrane be injured or in any way altered so that it cannot receive the reciprocal motions, or cannot diffuse them, the result is a defect of memory. This may come in a thousand ways. It is a defect or disease- which can often be remedied by certain means; and by certain means the memory can be again aroused and vivified. 7. When the memory is a bad one, or is very slight, this has its origin in the organs; either they have not been properly prepared from in­fancy, or they were defective in the womb; or they have not been developed by cultivation, or, if developed, have been altered by some disease or other accident; or the middle part has been destroyed; or, undue tension is exercised by the blood or liquors; or, as the result of some disease, the parts have been sundered; or, are lacking; or, because, having been disturbed by much imagination, the tremors are not adapted to their proper place, the result being that the usual characteristic of the preceding tremors is turned into others which do not have the same con­

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facultas adesse potest, sed tamen nondum in tremulos motus ita formata, ut tarn diversos tonos receperit. 2. Ad hoc veni­unt, ut etiam reliquae membranae sint pariter aptatae, quae tremores illuc ducent, et aqua tremores possint resilire in illas, et causari sensationem differentem secundum tonum. Unde si conspirent mediae membranae, tunc habet facultatem ratiocinandi. 3. Quando ex causa quacunque reproducitur, quae existit vel in organis sensuum, vel in membranis inter­mediis ob incitationem liquorum, et partium in liquoribus, unde oritur idem tremor mixtus, compositus, harmonicus secundum usum, tunc vocatur imaginatio. 4. Quando re­producit ex sensu quocunque, et cum sensu continuat, sive in sensatione, ut hoc per sensum animadvertere possit, dicitur memoria. S. Et quia motus ille non abire et diffiuere potest, sed se dissipare per similia organa, quia in loco est incarceratus, unde ad terminos se diffundit, extra quos ire nequit, inde fit ex ipsa sensatione et imaginatione memoria. 6. Si membrana intermedia sit laesa, vel aliquo modo alterata, ut recipere nequeat motus reciprocos, vel diffundere nequeat, fit memoriae defectus, quod ex mille modis existere potest, estque defectus aut morbus qui per media reparari saepe potest, et per media excitari et vivificari. 7. Si memoria mala et exigua, exoritur ex organis, vel quod non ita sint ab ipso infante parata, vel in utero defectuosa, vel a cultu non efformata, vel efformata per morbum aut alium casum alterata, vel media pars destructa, vel tensio non debita per sanguinem aut liquores vel partes per morbum divulsae aut deficientes, vel a multa imaginatione turbata, adeo ut tremores aptum locum non adepti sunt, unde habitus tremorum praecedentium vertitur in alios, qui non

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nection with the rest j there are also a thousand other causes. Provided only effects and experiences be supplied, together with some of the circumstances of the case, it is possible to know the cause of defective memory, and to know how much the memory can be strengthened.

110. The notion of the memory as being a receptacle wherein ideas are laid up and whence they are drawn out when the use of things demands, is an imaginary one, and far from exact [n. 177]. This is not memory, but the faculty of imagining. Wolff adds, For memory there is required the recognition of the ideas reproduced [ib.) j and this recognition does not come without an affection and the assistance of the body.

11 L We commit to memory those things which, either fre­quently or for a considerable time are perceived simultaneously, whether this be done by help of the senses or of the imagination [n. 179]. It is done first of all by help of the senses, not of the imagination, except in the sense that the latter is furnished by the senses j and this to the end that things which we have acquired partitive1y by means of the senses, may give rise to compounds by means of the imagination. Thus their first origin is from the senses. In the same way, do we retain them in the memory [n. 180].

112. Some acquire facility in reproducing ideas and recog­nizing them when reproduced, by long contemplation of an., object or by frequent repetitions of actions; others do not need such long contemplation or so many repetitions of actions [n. 182]. This depends on the organs, either as formed in the womb or as fashioned by cultivation; they can be varied in a thousand ways. From twenty to thirty of these ways can be set down, but thousands and thousands of them are possible. In this consists the variation.

113. Some are able to recognize many reproduced ideas, oth­ers fewer [no 183]. In these cases there are innumerable dif­ferences, so that no one case can be like another. It depends on the organs.

114. Some are able to reproduce and recognize an idea com­mitted to the memory, even though they have not reproduced it for a long time,. others become unable to reproduce it, or recog­

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talem nexum cum reliquis habent; sunt mi11e aliae causae. Datis modo effectibus et experimentis cum aliquibus circum­stantiis, scire licet causam defectus memoriae, et quantum ilIa polIeat.

MS., 192.

Notio memoriae, quod sit receptaculum idearum in quo con­duntur, et unde rerum usu exigente denuo promuntur, imaginaria est, eademque minus exacta. Hoc non est memoria sed facultas imaginandi. Addit, quod ad memoriam requiratur idearum reproductarum recognitio, quod non fit sine affectu et adjuvante corpore.

Memoriae mandamus ea, quae saepius vel diu simul percipi­untur, sive id fiat sensuum sive imaginationis ope. Hoc fit

Ph. MS., 126.

omnium primo sensuum, nee imaginationis ope, nisi quatenus a sensibus sit 3 instructa, ut composita oriantur per imagina­tionem, quae habuimus partita per sensus; adeo ut prima origo sit a sensibus. Eadem modo retinemus illa.

Alii diuturniore objecti contemplatione, vel pluribus actibus reiteratis, facilitatem ideas reproducendi et reproductas recognos­cendi sibi comparant,. alii minus diu [ tu] rna contemplatione et paucioribus actibus iteratis ad id opus habent. Hoc secundum organa vel ab utero formata vel ex cultu efficta; quae milIe modis variari potest, quorum 20 ad 30 modo apponi possunt, sed milIe et rnilIe dari. Variatur hoc.

Alii plures ideas reproductas recognoscere valent, alii pauciores. Datur in his diversitas innumera, adeo ut unus non dari possit sirnilis alteri, secundum organa.

Alii ideam memoriae demandatam reproducere et reco[!.noscere valent etsi multo tempore eandem non reproduxerint; alii eam non amplius reproducere, nec reproductam recognoscere valent,

3 sunt. 101

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nize it when reproduced, if they have not reproduced it for some time [no 185]. It may be gradually obliterated, and fail to make for itself fit tremors, or to make the middle organs obedi­ent, unless it does this repeatedly. A thousand cases are pos­sible.

115. Goodness of memory admits of- divers degrees both as regards the committing of a thing to memory quickly and doing this with ease, and also as regards its long retention in the mem­ory [no 190]. Here we have "quickly" "with ease" and "long." As regards committing to memory QUICKLY or WITH

EASE, in such case the membrane of the soul must be well fig­ured with an exact center, and with its periphery having exact elasticity and tension. The things contained in this membrane are harmonically disposed, that is to say, they have entered it by harmony. Its connection with the intermediate membranes is apt and just, and is brought about by the aid of the blood and of the nervous liquor, and consequently of the nerves. It is not overwhelmed by various non-harmonic phantasies or mo­tions; and thus it knows how to allot to each mingling [of motions] its own proper place. Otherwise a man cannot be­come either facile or quick in memory.

If the memory is to be LONG ENDURING, [the membrane of the soul] must be always of the same figure and-of like expan­sion; it must not be overwhelmed by other phantasies; there must be an unvarying connection between it and the membrane of the phantasy. The latter is a somewhat grosser membrane; for it does not at once admit a motion, but when the motion is admitted, it retains it, becoming versatile to that motion, and admitting none but similar motions.

116. N. B., N. B.* If it is shown in this way that the soul and its operations are a mechanism, not only is the doubt re­moved which we entertain concerning the soul and its existence and immortality, but we shall then be able to make further progress and to learn the nature of the memory, the intellect, the imagination, and the passions of the animus and body, all

>I> In the MS. one N. B. is writ- in the right. ten in the left margin and the other

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si aliquo tempore eandem non reproduxerint. Sensim ea oblit­[er]ari potest, nec tremores aptos sibi facere, sive organa media obedientia, nisi iterum hoc fiat; mille casus dari possunt.

Bonitas memoriae diversos admittit gradus, tum quatenus quid memoriae cito, tum quatenus facile mandatur, tum quatenus diu retinetur. Est cito, facile, diu; quod cito attinet vel facile, tunc erit animae membrana bene figurata cum exacto centro et sua peripheria, exactae elasticitatis et tensionis, quae inibi sunt harmonice disposita sive per harmoniam ingressa; nexus cum mediis membranis aptus et justus, quod fit ope sanguinis, nervosi liquoris, et consequenter nervorum; non obruta variis non harmonicis phantasiis aut motibus, ut sciat quodlibet mixtum suum locum sortiri; alias non fit facilis aut citus, Si

diu, erit semper ej usdem figurae; expansionis similis; non obruendi aliis phantasiis; nexus similis illius et membranae phantasiae; aliqualis crassior, nam non statim admittit, sed admissum tenet, volubilis ad motum illum, non admittens plures nisi similes.

MS., 193. N. B. Si sic mechanismum ostenditur anima et ejus opera­

tiones, non modo N. B. tollitur dubium quod habemus de anima, ejus existentia et immortalitate, sed sic etiam possumus uIterius progredi et scire qualis sit memoria, intellectus, imagi­natio, et passiones animi et corporis, quae nobis ignotissimae

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which are most utterly unknown to us because we do not know the mechanism [of the soul and its operations].

N. B. Therefore we doubt concerning the existence of the soul and its immortality; for we reason so grossly as to suppose that everything which is mechanical will perish; that everything of this nature will rot away; that everything of this nature is subject to· change ;-as though there were not a mechanical which can never perish, and which is immortal. For how long a time have not the supremely subtle elements and the sun en­dured which were created simultaneously! But if God wills them to perish, then all things will return to the prime and there will be nothing, and angels and worlds and souls will perish.*

117. The degrees of the goodness of the memory are esti­mated from the time spent in committing a thing to memory; from the number of acts whereby the reproduced ideas are com­mitted to memory; and finally from the number of acts whereby the infixed ideas are retained [no 191]. If more time must be

. spent this arises from various causes. It may arise because the mediate membranes are not well tremulous; or because there are many things which occupy them; because the going and returning [of the tremors] is impeded; because the soul itself is not of the duly exact figure and tension. But of these mat­ters we have spoken above; t for a thousand varieties are possible.

118. Memory and imagination admit of degrees, inasmuch as we are able to reproduce the ideas of many things and to recog­nize them when reproduced [no 193]. This is according to [our] hypothesis, for [the imagination1 cannot [reproduce] more than one mixed idea at a time; from this come similar ideas, or ideas that are still further mingled; and so the process needs time and graduation.

119. The size of the memory is estimated from the number of things, the ideas whereof we are able to reproduce, and to recognize when reproduced; including things perceived sepa­rately at different times, and things perceived simultaneously in

• Cf. n. 52, and 11 Infinite 11, iv, 9. t N. 115.

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sunt, quia nescimus mechanismurn. N. B. Ideo dubitamus de animae existentia et ejus immortalitate quia tarn crasse ratio­cinamur, quod putemus omne quod mechanicum est perire, omne tale putrescere, omne tale mutationi obnoxium, quasi non mechanicum detur quod nusquam perire possit, et im­mortale esse; quantum manent elementa subtilissima et sol; quae simul creata sunt; sed si Deus velit ut ilIa pereunt, redeunt omnia in primum, et fit nihil, et angeli cum mundis et animis perirent.

Gradus bonitatis memoriae aestimantur ex tempore impen­dendo, ut quid memoriae mandatur, ex numero actuum quibus ideae reproductae memoriae demandantur, ex numero denique actuum quibus infixae retinentur. Quod plus temporis impen-

Ph. MS., 127.

dendum sit oritur ex variis causis, sive quod mediae membranae non ita tremulae sunt, sive quod plura sint quae ilIa occupent; quod itum reditumque impediat, quod ipsa anima sit non tarn exactae figurae, tensionis; sed de his prius, nam mille varietates possunt dari.

Memoria et imaginatio admittunt gradus, quatenus rerum multarum ideas reproducere, et reproductas recognoscere valemus. Hoc secundum hypothesin, nam non potest simul nisi unam ideam mixtam, ex hac proveniunt vel similes, vel plus mixtae, et sic tempore et gradu opus est.

Magnitudo memoriae aestimatur ex numero rerum, quarum ideas reproducere et reproductas recognoscere valemus, tum diverso tempore singillatim perceptarum, tum eodem tempore continua

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a continued series at one and the same time [n. 194]. The ability to reproduce a number of things, originates in their har­monic situation and influx. [The soul] can recognize them when reproduced, if the mediate membranes are in apt condi­tion; for the most part however, one membrane disposes the other. So likewise, as regards the circumstance that they can be perceived at the same time, provided there be figure and harmony.

120. N. B. One membrane disposes the other, because there is a connection between them. If either one were to become flaccid the other would also become flaccid; the one cannot be changed without the other being also changed in some way.

121. Repetition is called exercise,. and this admits of degrees, in proportion to the number of the acts which are repeated, in part at the same time, and in part at different times [n. 195].

122. Exercise is needed if a thing is to be committed to mem­ory and retained therein [no 196]. Nothing comes into the memory without cultivation and exercise. But even with these, • some memories retain the things once committed to them, while others retain things only when they have been committed to them several times.

123. N. B. Without cultivation and exercise, there is noth­ing in the imagination or memory beyond what exists in brutes. The reason why men need to be developed and not brutes, is because man possesses a soul which, by reason of its subtlety, cannot be opened and be connected [with the body] except by exercise. Men are not so gifted as brutes, because men have a soul which confuses; the path [to the soul] is longer, and does not terminate in proximate things; hence comes confusion. Some men however are naturally very apt; they are better con­nected up, and their conducting membranes are more fit and more like to the paternal [membranes]. Hence we have the reason why men are not so greatly gifted with natural instinct as are brutes; why they have need of cultivation; and why some are naturally quicker and better.

124. The result of exercise is, that the imagination reproduces a greater number of ideas simultaneously, and preserves them unchanged for a longer space of time [n. 197]. For exercise

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serie simul perceptarum. Numerus rerum oritur ab harmonico situ et influxu, quos recognoscere potest si membranae mediae sint aptae; ut plerumque tamen una membrana disponit alteram. Pariter quod eodem tempore, modo figura et har­moma.

MS., 194. N. B. Una membrana disponit alteram, quia nexus est; si

flaccior foret fieret altera etiam flaccior vel alia; non mutari potest una, nisi aliquo modo mutetur altera.

Exercitium dicitur iteratio; quod admittit gradus pro numero actuum partim eodem, partim diverso tempore repetitorum.

Exercitio opus est ut quid memoriae mandetur et eadem retin­eatur. Sine cultu et exercitio nihil venit in memoriam; sed datur dein memoria, quae detineat semel mandata, et quae teneat non nisi aliquoties mandata.

N. B. Sine cultu et exercitio nihil datur in imaginatione aut memoria, nisi quale in brutis. Quod homines excoli debeant et bruta non, est ratio quod anima polleat, quae aperiri et connecti non potest, propter subtilitatem, nisi per exercitium; nec tantum habent ut bruta, quia est aliqua anima, quae confundit, itur longius nec terminatur in proxima, hinc con­fusum fit. Quidam tamen ex natura aptiores, melius ligantur, et membranae ducentes aptiores et similes paternis. Hinc ratio dari potest, cur homines a naturali instinctu non tantum habeant quantum bruta; cur cultu opus habeant; cur aliqui proniores et meliores ex natura sint.

Exercitio obtinetur, ut imaginatio ideas plures simul repro­ducat, et per longius temporis spatium immutatas conservet;

107 9

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forms the connection [with the soul], and the connection, figure and tension of the membranes; and it applies many [tremors] to their own proper places and accustoms [the membranes] to the sensations thereof.

125. The imagination is said to be extended if it can produce many ideas simultaneously, and when produced can hold them for a long space of time [n. 198].

126. If one wishes to extend his imagination and memory, he must progress continuously from a lesser degree of extension to a gl'cater [no 199]. In this way the connection is formed, and the extension and ngure of the membranes and organs. Unless this be done little by little and by degrees, nothing is effected. This is true both of the visible and of the invisible.

127. Things perceived distinctly are more easily committed to memory and longer retained than things perceived confusedly [n. 200]. This is because they are in their proper places and are harmoniously joined together and mingled; hence [it be­comes] natural [to remember them].

128. An acquired, and in particular an artificial memory is obtained by mnemonic art [n. 206]. This is easy because of the harmony and similitude.

129. That the 111,emory can fail, is manifest [n. 209]. This is the fault of nature or of exercise, or of phantasy.*

130. If we are not able to recognize an idea reproduced by aid of the senses, neither will we be able to reproduce it by force of the imagination [n. 212]. This is true, but not always; for a man may remember a thing at one time, which at another time he does not remember. The membranes may be so affected that they are entirely unable to receive a certain tone,-a condition which may arise owing to some fluid or dryness, or other cause-and yet later that tone may be attained. Thus in sleep I cart frequently remember a thing, which when awake I have completely forgotten; as for instance Greek and Hebrew words, which I would never have known although I had read them. A man has heard in his brain the singing of melodies, which otherwise he would have been entirely unaware of knowing.

* Cf. n. 1096• 7•

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quia exercitium format nexum et membranarum nexum, figuram, tensionem, et applicat plures suis locis, adsuescit sensationibus eorum.

Imaginationem extendere si plures ideas simul producere, et per longum temporis spatium productas servare possit.

Si quis imaginationem et memoriam extendere velit; a gradu minori extensionis continuo progrediendum est ad majorem. Sic nexus formatur, extensio et figura membranarum et organorum; nisi sensim et per gradus, nihil fit, tarn in visibili quam in invisibili.

Quae distincte percipiuntur, memoriae facilius mandantur, diutiusque retinentur, quam quae confuse percipiuntur. In suis locis sunt,4 et harmonice juncta et mixta: hinc naturale.

Memoria acquisita, [ac] in specie artificiosa, arte mnemonica obtinetur. Ob harmoniam et similitudinem facile.

Memoriam labi posse manifestum est. Est vitium naturae vel exercitii; vel phantasiae.

MS.,195. Ph., MS. 128. Si ideam ope sensuum reproductam non recognoscere valemus,

nec eam vi imaginationis reproducere possumus. Hoc verum est, sed non semper; nam potest uno tempore reminisci ejus, cujus non alio tempore. Possunt membranae ita affectae esse, ut ad ilIum tonum recipiendum nequaquam possint, quod ope alicujus fluidi, siccitatis, aut alius causae oriri potest, dein potest tonum ilIum adipisci; ut in somno possum recordari saepe quod vigilans plane oblitus sim, Graecas et Hebraeas voces, quas nequaquam scirem, quamvis legerim. Quidam in cerebra audivit cantantes cantilenas, quas alioquin nesciret

4 est. 109

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Memory comes and goes, and has its alternations. Ordinarily, however, Wolff's proposition is true.

131. If we do not reproduce ideas for a long time, we become forgetful of the things represented by them [n. 217]. The reasons are: because other tremors have occupied the place [of the tremors belonging to these ideas], or [the latter tremors] have joined themselves to others so that they can no longer be conjoined to these; because the membrane has become so dif­ferently formed that it is unable to give out the same tone,-the connection being different, and also from other causes; because lapse of time makes us for!!et, in that other and stronger tones have occupied the same place. From these causes also it comes about that we hesitate,-we know as it were, and do not know; for when [an idea] is conjoined with others, it acquires almost the same tone, and then something else suddenly comes up, which has occupied the place. Therefore, Wo1ff continues, If the idea of a thing, clearly perceived at some former time, has become obscure when reproduced by force of the imagination, the soul has forgotten some of the things, which it had for­merly clearly perceived i1t that idea [n. 220]. Thus one part [of the things contained in an idea] may be lost and another remain,-the latter being conjoined with some other [tone or tremor].

132. When we remember a thing, we seem to ourselves to recognize that which we had forgotten [no 232] ; because [the thing] is mixed, and composed of parts, modes, time, and place. If we remember any part of it, we come also into this by aid of the parts of which it consists.

[XI.]

ATTENTION AND REFLECTION.

133. We can bring it about, that in a compound perception we apperceive one partial perception more than the others [no 234] . This indeed is hard to explain until we have first seen the nature of the will, and of the effect produced by the passions of the body. Our ability to bring about the apperception re­ferred to, depends on the will. For we can move this foot or

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se calluisse; redit et abit memoria, habetque suas vices. Sed ordinarie verum est.

Si quas ideas longo tempore non reproducimus, rerum per illas repraesentatarum obliviscimur. Causae sunt quod alii tremores occupaverint locum, vel cum aliis se junxerint, ut cum illis amplius non conjungi possint; quod aliter formata sit membrana, quam ut similem tonum edat, alius nexus et plures causae, quod tempus faciat ut obliviscamur; quod alii toni validiores locum eundum occupaverint. Hinc datur etiam quod haereamus, sciamus quasi et non sciamus, quia cum aliis conjuncta fere eundem tonum nacta est, tunc statim subit aliud quod locum occuparat. Unde etiam, Si rei antea clare perceptae idea vi imaginationis reproducta fuerit obscura., anima nonnullorum oblita est, quae in eadem clare perceperat. Sic pars perire potest, pars remanet cum alio juncta.

Dum rei reminiscimur, eam recognoscere nobis videmur, quam obliti fueramus. Quia est mixta, composita ex partibus, modis, tempore, loco, si alicujus partis reminiscimur, venimus etiam in illam ope partium ex quibus constat.

ATTENTIO ET REFLEXIO.

Efficere possumus ut in perceptione composita, partialem unam magis appercipiamus, quam eeteras. Hoc difficile quidem explicatu est, antequam viderimus qualis sit voluntas, et qualis effectus passionum corporis. Quod efficimus, id depen­det a voluntate, quum possumus hunc vel illum pedem, hunc

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that, this finger or that; we can move our eyes and look at a thing more or less sharply and exactly, or more or less ob­scurely. All these actions belong to the will; and therefore it is the will that must be investigated.

THE WILL * originates either mediately from the senses; or from the subtle fluids which move the second and third mem­branes; t or from both together. If the body have been af­fected throughout its parts by certain tremors and by no others; if the liquids continually dispose the meninx to this motion rather than to any other; then it follows that the meninx is more prone to this special tremor than to any other. If some other motive cause be added which arises from the senses, then straightway, on account of the similitude, the parts [of the body] are also moved together with their vessels; and consequently, by reason of the tremor, the latter throw off their liquor. For by the tremor of a membrane, only the similar parts of its liquor are moved; which latter is more adapted to one kind of tremor than to another. Corporeal things are adapted to a single tremor only; glass vessels are moved by the sound of their own note, the pews in a church by theirs, a string by its; thus like by like. Since such liquors are contained in their vessels and glands, which are everywhere occupied by liquors of divers kind, therefore when a motion is impressed on a membrane, then at once the liquors:j: contained in glands or vessels which are of a like motion, are also moved. Consequently they are urged into motion, and carried off, and thus are also themselves the cause of a like motion in the membrane. Hence, when the [membrane] is concordant with these [motions] the immediate result is a delay; and finally, pleasure is experienced or a more delightful [delay], in that the membrane is moved, with the liquors assisting in the motion. From these causes there at once arises a delay in that part where the desire is. Therefore [a partial perception] can be separated from a compound. In these matters there are infinite degrees. Thus if a delay is due, it must have its cause in the similitude of the liquid which is the cause of the delay. Pleasure of this kind precedes will;

*Cf. n. 100. :t The MS. has membranae (the t See n. 17. membranes).

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vel ilium digitum movere, possumus oculos movere, et acutius et exactius videre, obscurius; omnia voluntatis sunt. Hinc indaganda est voluntas. Ortus ejus est vel ex sensibus mediate,

dam 3tiamvel ex fluidis subtilibus quae movent 2 et mem­branam, vel ex utroque simul. Si corpus affectum sit per suas partes his tremoribus non aliis; si liquida continuo ad hunc motum quam alium disponant meningem; inde sequitur quod pronior ad hunc tremorem sit, quam ad alium. Si accedat causa alia, quae moveat, a sensibus, ilIico moventur etiam partes propter similitudinem, et illorum vasa, et consequenter ex tremore excutiunt suum liquorem; ex tremore enim mem­branae moventur, modo partes similes liquoris ejus qui aptior

MS., 196. est in hunc quam in alium tremorem; corporea non nisi ad unum tremorem apta sunt; vitra ex suo sono moventur; scamna ex suo in ecclesia; nervus a suo; sic simile a simili. Quum tales liquores in suis vasis et glandulis sint, quae ubique sunt liquoribus obsita diversi generis, a motu impresso mem­branae, illico membranae etiam in glandulis vel vasis moventur quae similis motus sunt, et consequenter in motum ciuntur, et excernuntur, et sic causantur etiam per se similem in mem­branam motum, unde statim fit mora, ubi concordat cum illis, et fit tandem voluptas aut jucundior, quia movetur mem­brana etiam illis auxiliantibus, ex his fit statim mora in ilia parte, ubi desiderium est. Ergo a composito separari potest. Dantur in his gradus infiniti; aut ut si mora esse debeat, debet causam habere in similitudine liquidi, quod causa est morae, voluntatem praecedit talis voluptas, adeo ut quae volunta­

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and so the things which rule the will * are merely pleasures and the degrees thereof. This is effected in the third meninx; t the soul remaining ever the same, and likewise the second membrane. Thus, because [the pleasure] comes from the third membrane, there is therefore an immediate emmeshing and separation [of the partial perception]. Frequently we do not sensate such pleasures; frequently they hide themselves under other causes which will come out long afterwards. Nevertheless the pleasure is there. It becomes sensible if the fourth meninx also be moved, and if there be a copious outflow [of liquor]. This is the cause of attention and reflexion.

As to the senses being attentive, this comes partly from the above causes, and partly from the fact that the senses have been thus disposed by continual use. But when [sensation] no longer reaches to the pia mater, and the dura, [the senses] sleep.

134. That a partial perception becomes clearer if we give our attention to it [no 235, 237], is quite evident from the preceding consideration; and also that In a compound perception we can so bring it about that one partial perceprion nas greater clarity than the others [n. 236].

135. [When directed to phantasms] this attention is fre­quently impeded by the senses,. and [when directed to feeble sensations], by stronger sensations [n. 238].

136. If we wish to give our attention to phantasms, we must hinder external objects from acting upon the sensory organs:j: [no 239]. This is done spontaneously; for the motions or tremors of the membrane are too strong to allow of dissimilar tremors striking the membrane at one and the same time. In these matters there are a thousand varieties.

137. Some are able to keep their attention on one and the same object for a long time,. with others, the attention dies out at once [n. 244]. This comes from differences of tempera­ments, ac~ording as one has a large or a small quantity of such

*The MS. has voluptatem t See n. 17. (pleasure), but we have assumed :j: As for instance, we close the that this is a slip for voluntatem eyes when we wish to hold our at­(the will). tention to some imagination (ib.).

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tern 6 regant, sint mere voluptates et illarum gradus; hoc in tertia meninge; anima manet semper eadem, et pariter altera

Ph. MS., 129.

membrana; sic quia venit a membrana 3tia hinc statim irretitio et separatio. Saepe tales voluptates non sentimus, saepe se condunt sub aliis causis longe post derivandis, usque tamen adest; sensibilis fit, si 6 ipsa 4ta meninx etiam moveatur, et copiosum effluvium sit. Hoc est causa attentionis et reflex­ionis. Quod vera sensus attendant, venit partim ab iisdem causis, partim quod ex continuo usu sic dispositi sint; at vera quum non amplius pertingit ad piam matrem et duram, tunc dormiunt.

Quod partialis clarior fiat si attendamus ad illam, ex superi­oribus satis notum est. Et, Efficere possumus ut una partialis majorem claritatem caeteris habeat.

Impeditur haec attentio saepe a sensibus et a fortioribus.

Si ad phantasmata attenti esse velimus, ne objecta externa in organa sensoria agant, impedimus. Hoc sponte fit, nam motus vel tremores membranae fortiores sunt, quam ut simul tre­mores dissimiles possint incutere. Dantur in his mille varie­tates.

Alii attentionem ad idem objectum diu conservare possunt; o'ziorum attentio statim expirat. Hoc venit a temperamentis, quod'talium liquorum multam vel exiguam copiam habeat,

voluptatem. I sit. 115

I

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

liquors; or has more of some other liquor; or as contrary mo­tions exist. [The attention] goes to that [motionJ which is stimulated by these liquid parts. We can experience this on a larger scale when we are affected by something; for then we can give our attention to it alone, and to nothing else; and cer­tainly, we must make conclusions from the greater to the lesser.

138. Some can give attention to many things simultaneously; others to fewer [n. 245] . This is according as the passions are mingled, and the membranes fashioned.

139. Degrees of attention are acquired by exercise [n. 248J. The reason is, because in process of time a stimulating liquor of this kind, whether bilious or some other subtle liquor, can be formed by exercise; and so also the excretory vessels which shall continually afford assistance, and thus produce delay in the imagination. For in time all things of this kind can be formed and adapted. Hence, In one way or another a person may be so prepared that at last he can remain attentive in the midst of loud noises [n. 249J. One can acquire this ability in various ways, according as he commences, continues, and stimu­lates his appetite gradually and little by little.

140. By long intermission in its use, each degree of attention is again lost [n. 254]. The cause is the same.

141. We can give our attention to any of the different parts of a total perception, one after the other, exactly as we please [n. 256]. This is the result of delay, and of our appetite for the whole.

142. The faculty of reflecting is the faculty of directing one's attention at will to the things contained within the thing per­ceived [no 257]. This results from our appetite for the whole, and from the organs and the soul, in which latter the mingled motion is concentrated.

[XII.]

CONCERNING THE INTELLECT AND COGNITION.

143. In discriminating the genera and species of things one from the other, it is our wont to indicate them by certain articu­late sounds [n.269J.

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quod plus alius, quod contrarii motus existant, aufert ad quem stimulant partes illae liquidae. Hoc experiri possumus in majori si veniat affectus quod ei tantum non alio possimus attenti; a majori ad minus omnino concludendum est.

Alii ad plura simul possunt esse attenti, alii ad pauciora. Si passiones mixtae sint; et membranae efformatae. MS., 197.

Gradus attentionis exercitatione comparantur. Quia temporis tractu potest talis liquor vel felinus vel alius subtilis stimulans per exercitium formari; ita vasa excretoria, ut talem liquorem abundanter recipiant, et illum copia effundant, et semper adjuvent, et moram faciant imaginationis. Omnia enim talia formari et aptari possunt tempore. Hi[n]c quocunque modo praeparari potest,ut tandem inter strepitus attendat. Variis modis sic potest acquirere, prout successive et sensim incipit, continuat, et appetitum stimulat.

Gradus quilibet attentionis diu intermisso ejus usu iterum amittitur. Eadem causa.

Attentionem nostram successive ad alias aliasque partes per­ceptionis totalis promovere valemus, prouti visum nobis fuerit. Quod fit ex mora, et appetitu totius.

Facultas reflectendi est attentionem suam ad ea quae in re percepta insunt, pro arbitrio dirigendi. Fit ex appetitu totius, et ex organis, et anima, in qua est motus mixtus con[c]entratus.

DE INTELLECTU ET COGNITIONE.

Rerum genera et species a se invicem discreturi, per sonos quosdam articulatos ea indicare solemus.

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144. The greater the number of the things one can represent [to himself] distinctly,. or can distinguish in one and the same subject,. the greater is the intellect [n. 276-71.

[XII!.]

[THE THREE OPERATIONS OF THE INTELLECT.]

145. There are three operations of the intellect, namely, N 0­

tion with simple apprehension, Judgment, and Discourse [no 325].

146. The first operation of the intellect is the representation of many things; one by one, in a single thing [n. 330]. In such case the similes are concurrent. Therefore according as one excels another in being able to distinguish more things in an object, so he is more acute [no 332].

147. N. B. That we may know the connection and the non­connection which constitutes JUDGMENT, [we must consider that] judgment comes from use and exercise in joining many things together. Thus, as soon as we have joined 2 and 3 to­gether, with the result 5 as a single tone, or as a mixed tone; and also 3 and 6 with the result 9; we then go higher in our progressive exercise, and this in the same way, namely by join­ing 5 and 9 so as to obtain 14. We then go on obtaining other results of the same kind, using wholes or a part, so that a new result arises which is a mixed tone; and so on ascending higher and higher. The cause of the one operation, is the same as that of the next; but the intellect is higher in proportion as the number of the things which it can compound and then divide is greater. Thus as soon as it joins the letters (a) and (d), it then knows what (ad) is; then (ad) must be added to another compound (cum); later it must form sentences, and then the connections of sentences. Thus results connection and judg­ment. It is the same in music.

148. Therefore the intellect is represented more by words than by the eye, for in words is contained this art [of connecting and judging]: If art can represent a sentence by a single hiero­glyphic sign or compound character, what cannot the soul do by a single mixed tone, where parts are as it were confused, but compounds become clear!

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Quo plum quis distincte repraesentare [potest], vel in eadem subjecto distinguere, eo major est intellectus.

Tres sunt inteUectus operationes, notio cum simplici appre­hensione, judicium, et discursus.

I. Prima inteUectus operatio est plurium in re una sigiUatim facta repraesentatio. Ibi similia concurrunt. Quo erga plum in objecto aliquo distinguere valet, eo acutior est altero.

N. B. Ut scire possimus nexum et non nexum, quod est judicium, venit ex usu et exercitio conjungendi plura, ut quum primum conjunxerimus 2 et 3, adeo ut sit 5 unus tonus, vel tonus mixtus; quoque 3 et 6 quod sit 9, demum altius progredi-

Ph. MS., 130.

mur exercitio ex eodem modo, scilicet jungendo 5 et 9 ut fiat 14, dein alia talia cum totis vel cum parte, ut sit aliud, est tonus mixtus, sic altius et altius, estque eadem causa, unius et alterius; sed altior intellectus est quo plura componere potest et dein dividere. Ut primum literas a et d, dein quid sit (ad), dein addendum (ad) ad aliud (cum) dein sententias, dein sententiarum nexus, sic sit nexus et judicium. Sic in musicis.

MS., 198. Ergo intellectus major repraesentatur per verba quam per

oculum, quia in verbis est ilia ars. Si ars potest per unum signum hieroglyphicum aut characterem compositum reprae­sentare unam sententiam, quid non anima per unum tonum mixtum; ubi partes tanquam confusae sunt sed composita fiunt c1ara.

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149. In demonstrations * thoughts proceed in the same way as that in which series of notions and perceptions generally run; and in the most natural order [n. 395-6].

150. N. B. These compounds also have their harmony. [A demonstration] proceeds from a syllogism and ends in a con­clusion, and this harmonically. This is represented by syllo­gisms; and it may also be represented by letters and by num­bers. There is a similarity in all these cases. Hence comes harmony of tone or non-harmony. Moreover, in this way one can attain to the unknown. Here may be applied the whole of logic and of rational philosophy.

[XIV.]

[NATURAL DISPOSITIONS AND HABITS OF THE INTELLECT.]

151. Habit is acquired only by exercise; and by means of exercise disposition is turned to habit [n. 430]. In this way the organs are formed; and in this way a habit in tone or tremor, is acquired.

152. A habit acquired by constant use is both preserved and perfected. A habit may also be lost and an opposite habit take its place [no 431, 433].

153. One is more solid,t in the degree that, in proving prin­ciples, he draws nearer to irresolute notions [n. 442].

154. Heuristic *artifices [are rttles] whereby the mind is fitted to elicit an unknown truth by means of principles per­spicuous to it [n.469].

155. One who is endowed with a good genius, has also a good memory. Discoverers have need of genius [no 480-1].

156. One who sees the connection between many universal truths, has more of reason than one who sees the connection between few [no 488].

'" Wolff illustrates the proposi­ distinctly, and of concatenating rea­tion by examples of syllogistic sons" (n. 440). demonstrations, :j: From the Greek (~pt(TKW to find,

t Wolff defines solidity of the discover. intellect as "the habit of reasoning

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In demonstrationibus cogitationes eodem modo procedunt, quo series notionum ac perceptionum communiter continuantur, et ordine maxime naturali.

N. B. Composita haec harmoniam suam etiam habent. Desinit ex syllogismo in conc1usum, et hoc harmonice, quod repraesentatur per syllogismos; potest etiam per litcras, per numerOSj est similitudo omnium; hine fit harmonia toni vel non. Perveniri sic etiam potest ad non cognitum. Hie appli­cari potest tota logica et philosophia rationalis. .

Habitus non nisi exercitio acquiritur, et dispositio mediante exercitio in habitum convertitur. Sic formantur organa, sic acquiritur habitus in tono et tremore.

Habitus acquisitus continuo usu et conservatur et perficitur. Habitus etiam potest amitti et contrarius succedere.

Tanto quis solidior est, quo in probandis principiis propius accedit ad notiones irresolubiles.

Artificia heuristica sunt quibus mens apta eificitur per princi­pia ipsi perspecta veritatem incognitam eruendi.

Qui ingenio idem et memoria pollet; inventores ingenio opus habent.

Ratio major ei est, qui plurium veritatum universalium nexum perspicit, quam illi qui pauciorum nexum perspicit.

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157. All that is learned by aid of the reason is gathered from other propositions) or from judgments and definitions previously familiar to us [n. 494].

158. N. B. The sense of touch begins in the nerves and their membranes but is sensated in the soul; and this more acutely in man than in any other animal, inasmuch as man's soul is more subtle. Pain or grief is a sensation in the soul; by its aid the connection is sundered and an entire part of the soul's membrane is so moved from its situation by distraction or alter­nation that it is unable to admit tremors. The opposite of pain is sweet and gladsome.

[XV.]

CONCERNING PLEASURE AND WEARINESS.

159. N. B. THE ORIGIN OF PLEASURE ex posteriori: * 1. Pleasure originates from the eye, the ear, the taste; in short from the senses, subtle and gross. 2. From the phantasy or imagination. This is the same thing as from the senses; for the senses are the origin of the imagination. Therefore pleasure may be created by the imagination without the aid of the senses. 3. From highly subtle particles coming in contact with mem­branes. Wherever there are membranes, whether in the brain or elsewhere, there pleasure is seen to arise. Therefore it arises from saline or diversely angular particles whether these be con­tained in liquids or not. This is well known from experience. That such particles excite pleasure is seen from their effects, in that humors are secreted in the saliva, in the eyes, in the blood, as a result of gladness. That [gladness operates] in this way, may be seen in the face, as a result of the blood. 4. Such pleas­ure is either connate,-when it is regarded as part of the tem­perament; or adscititious,-when it is acquired by practice or exercise. Hence an index of pleasure stands out in the face.t S. Since the membranes are moved in a similar way, and observe a harmony with the motion excited by the particles, therefore phantasy and the particles, constitute a single or similar motion.

* Cf. n. 104. t Cf. n. 74. 122

157-159�

PSYCHOLOGICA.

Quicquid beneficio rationis cognoscitur, id ex aliis proposition­ibus sive judiciis atque definitionibus, quae antea nobis innotuere, colligitur.

N. B. Sensus tactus incipit in nervis illorumque membranis, sed sentitur in anima, et eo acutius in homine quam in alio animali, quia anima est subtilior; dolor est sensus in anima, cujus ope nexus divellitur, et tota membranae animae pars movetur e situ suo per distractionem vel alterationem ut non admittere possit tremores; contra est dulce et laetum.

MS., 199. DE VOLUPTATE ET TAEDIO.

N. B. Origo voluptatis ex posteriori: 1 Ex oculo, ex aure, ex gustu, verba ex sensibus subtilioribus et crassioribus. 2.

Ex phantasia vel imaginatione, quod idem est, quia sensus sunt origines imaginationis; ergo imaginatio sola sine sensuum ope creare potest voluptatem. 3. Ex particulis subtilissimis tangentibus membranas, ubicunque sint membranae in cere­bro, alibi, videmus inde oriri voluptatem; ergo a particulis salinis aut diverse angularibus in liquidis vel sine liquidis; quod ab experientia satis notum, quod tales excitent volup­tatem, ab effectis quod humores secernantur, in saliva, in

Ph. MS., 13I.

oculis ex laetitia, in sanguine, quod tal iter videatur in facie ex sanguine. 4. Talis est vel connata, et audit ut pars sub temperamentis, vel adscititia per usum vel exercitium, unde voluptatis index est exstasis in facie. S. Quod membranae similiter moveantur, et harmoniam habeant cum motu excitato a particulis, ergo phantasia et particulae unum motum vel

123 10

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

6. When there are juices in their vessels, glands, etc., the mem­branes themselves are moved in the same way; therefore they are excited in this way when a similar tremor comes to them from other origins. 7. Thus pleasure originates from phan­tasy; or from sense; or from parts [in contact with membranes). Because of a like motion and its reception in the vessels, one kind of liquor is excerned and no other. Thus the pleasure increases and is diffused throughout the whole body.

160. If the perfection is a true perfection,· and if he who is conscious of it can demonstrate that the thing is perfect; the pleasure is constant [no 513]. There exists a second cause of pleasure if the thing perceived be harmonious, and if it flows to the senses or the soul in this way, and not by what is inhar­mo,nious or dissonant. This is true of all the senses; it is true of the imagination; it is true of simples, of compounds, of modes, of logic, of everything; for it is capable of the widest possible extension. Hence it comes, that harmonies pleasingly dispose all the nerves of the senses; as may be seen in the sight, the hearing, the phantasy, etc. This, therefore, admits of de­grees; the pleasure is greater or less in proportion as the thing perceived is more or less harmonious.

161. N. B. The opposite of pleasure is weariness, in that in the phantasy there is a departure from harmony. In the grosser [membranes) the result is dissonance, undelight, pain, bitter­ness, etc. The cause is the same as with pleasure. Thus weari­ness, being opposite to pleasure, admits of the same degrees.

162. If pleasures be so mingled that they are many in num­ber, and if the many be not alike, they come together in a single pleasure. If there be many wearinesses, and these be great and little and of divers kinds, they come together in a single weari­ness. If pleasure and weariness exist together, both are per­ceived; but each according to its own degree; hence the one may overcome the other. Therefore pleasure may vary according

*Wolff defines Perfection as Pleasure he defines as "the intu­"Consensus in variety, or the con- itive knowledge of the perfection sensus in one, of many things mu- of a thing" (Psy. Emp. 511). tually different from each other." "Thus we perceive pleasure from He illustrates this by the eye, a a watch in that we are conscious of watch, etc. (Ontologia, 503). its perfection" (ib. 512).

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similem constituunt. 6. Ipsae membranae ubi sunt succi in vasis, glandulis, etc., eodem modo moventur, ergo sic excitantur, quum similis tremor occurrit ab aliis originibus. 7. Sic ortus ex phantasia, vel sensu, vel partibus; propter motum similem et receptum in vasculis excernitur ille non alius liquor; sicque crescit voluptas, seque per totum corpus diffundit.

Si perfectio fuerit vera et qui ejusdem sibi conscius est, rem esse perfectam demonstrare possit, voluptas constans est. Altera voluptatis causa est si harmonicum sit et sic fluat ad sensus vel animam, non per dishannonicum et dissonum; hoc in omnibus sensibus, hoc in imaginatione, in simplicibus, in compositis, in modis, in logicis, in omni re, quod extendi potest, quam amplissime. Hinc fit quod hannoniae disponant bene omnes sensuum nervos; quod videre licet in visu, auditu, phantasia, etc. Ergo gradus hie admittit; major vel minor voluptas, quo m[a]gis et minus est hannonicum.

N. B. Contrarium est taedium quatenus in phantasia ab hannonia recedit; in crassioribus fit dissonum, injucundum, dolorificum, amarum, etc. Eadem causa. Admittit sic hos gradus, quia oppositum est priori. MS., 200.

Si voluptates misceantur ut plures sint, si plures nee similes, coeunt in unam. Si taedia plura, si majora minorave, et diversa, coeunt in unum. Si voluptas et taedium simul, utrumque percipitur, sed secundum gradum cujusvis. Hinc unum potest superare alterum. Hinc variare potest voluptas

125

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to the [receptive] organs, according to the differences in cultiva­tion, and so forth.

163. Pain is a species of weariness [no 541]. 164. If a thing is good we receive pleasure from it * [n. 558].

This is true because good involves the element of harmony. The opposite is the case with evil [n. 569].

[XV!.]

[SENSITIVE ApPETITE AND SENSITIVE AVERSION.]

165. N. B. Appetite comes after pleasure. If pleasure pre­cedes, appetite follows; and it arises from the lingering of pleas­ure. Pleasure and appetite are given different names according to the modes of the sensations; as for instance, in the various senses, in the imagination, in the reason. The opposite of appe­tite is aversion and hatred. In every appetite there are degrees, mixtures and varieties, just as in pleasure.t

[XVII.]

[AFFECTIONS. ]

166. Affections are acts of the soul whereby the soul shows· vehement appetite for a thing, or vehement aversion [no 603]. In what respect this is of the soul, is a matter we shall demon­strate.

167. Pleasure and weariness are not affections [n. 607]. 168. N. B. Pleasure exists from perfection even in touch;

for it exists from the harmonic undulation of an element; as for instance the pleasure of the body in its grosser particles; for the [undulations of the elements and the membranes of the body] unite together, by reason of their similitude.

169. Joy [is the predomination of pleasures (n. 614)]. It arises from pleasure and [is shared] with the body. Sorro'w is the opposite of joy [n. 619].

170. Love is the disposition of the soul to perceive pleasure [in the happiness of another (n. 633)]. Not so. Love is the

*Wolff's words are: If we are t Cf. Wolff, Psychol. Emp., n. cognizant of good, we perceive 599. pleasure from it.

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secundum organa, secundum diversitatem cultu[s], etc.

Dolor taedii species est. Si bonum est, voluptatem ex 7 eo concipimus. Quia bonum

involvit harmonicum. Contra est malum.

N. B. Appetitussequiturvoluptatem. Sivoluptaspraecedit, sequitur appetitus, oriturque ex mora voluptatis. Voluptas et appetitus varia nomina sortitur secundum sensationurn modos, ut in variis sensibus, in imaginatione, in ratione. Contrarium est aversatio et odium. Dantur gradus, mixtiones et varie­tates in quovis appetitu prout in voluptate.

Affectus sunt actus animae quibus quid vehementer appeti vel aversatur. Quatenus animae sit demonstrabimus.

Voluptas et taedium non sunt affectus. N. B. Voluptas ex perfectione consistit etiam in tactu, nam

in undulatione elementi harmonica, ut voluptas corporis in particulis crassioribus, sed se uniunt, ob similitudinem.

Gaudiumoritur a voluptate et cum corpore. Tristitia vera contra.

Amor est dispositio animae ad percipiendum voluptatem.

7 id. 127

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

effect of pleasure, or its inseparable companion. Like all other affections, it differs in degrees and in names. It arises from pleasure, thus from harmony.

171. H atrcd is the opposite of love [n. 661]. 172. Pity (commiseratio) [is sorrow m'ising from the per­

ception of another's unhappiness (n. 687)]. 173. Envy [is sorrow arising from the perception of another's

happiness (n. 70S)]. What is envied is the happiness of a person whom one hates.

174. Derision [is joy perceived from what one thinks can be ttwned to another's injury (n. 730)] . What laughter is [namely, it arises from things which in our opinion are absurd (n. 743)].

175. Acquiescence [in onesclf,* is joy on account of the good which we have done (n. 749)].

176. Repentance [is sorrow arising from the thought that we have done ill (n. 755)].

177. Glory [is jO)1 perceived from the kindly judgment by others concerning us and ours (n. 765)].

178. Shame [is sorrow perceived from the sinister judgment by others concerning us and ours (n. 774)].

179. A grateful mi1td [or gratitude, is love of a benefactor because of his benefits (n. 784)].

180. Favor [is love of another because of a good which we consider as peculiar to him (n. 791)].

181. Hope [is pleasure perceived from a good to be obtained. If this hope predominates, it becomes] Joy. [Joy arising from the good to be obtained is called] Trust [no 796].

182. Cupidity [is the foretaste of pleasure from an absent good, which we would prefer to be present (n. 80S)].

183. Flight [or flight from evil, is a foretaste of the sorrow perceived as coming from an absent evil if it were present (n. 813)] .

184. Dread [is the weariness perceived from an evil which is about to come upon us. If this evil is perceived as intolerable, we have] Despair [no 820].

* I.e., Self-satisfaction.

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Ph., MS. 132.

Non, sed est effectus voluptatis seu comes individuus. Dif­fert ut omnia, gradibus et nominibus. Oritur a voluptate sic ab harmonia.

Odium est contra. Commiseratio. Pusillanimitas. A nimositas. Invidia, felicitas ejus Desiderium. Hilaritas. Fasti­

quem odit. dium. Pudor, ira. Vin­Irrisio. Risus quid. dicta. Indignatio. A cquiescentia. Paenitentia.

Gloria. Pudor. Animus gratus. Favor. Spes, gaudium, fiducia. Cupiditas. Fuga. Metus, desperatio. Fluctuatio animi. Terror, horror.

129

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

185. Fluctuation [or vacillation] of mind (animus) [is an alternation of pleasure and weariness in regard to some good, the possibility of securing which, is uncertain (n. 831)].

186. Terror [arises from the coming of an unforeseen evil;] Horror [from a conception of its immensity (n. 839)].

187. Pusillanimity [is sorrow arising from the difficulty of obtaining a desired good (n. 841)].

188. Courage (aniwwsitas) [is the predominance of a cupidity and hope, that overcome the dread arising from the difficulty of obtaining a good (n. 847)].

189. Desire [is weariness arising from the delay of a coming good which is hoped for (n. 852) ].

190. Hilarity [is joy because an evil is past (n. 855)]. 191. Fastidiousness [is weariness arising from that in which

formerly we had perceived pleasure (n. 858)]. 192. Shame [is mingled with] Anger [when an injury done

to us hurts, or when we think it hurts our reputation (n. 863)]. 193. [The desire of] revenge [is the desiring evil to another

whom we consider the cause of a present evil to ourselves (n. 871)] .

194.* Indignation [arises when we perceive weariness because of an injury done to us, but with a mind alien to the desire of revenge (n. 873)].

[XVII!.]

CONCERNING THE WILL.

195. The will is defined as be.ing rational aPPetite [n.880]. V olition is the act of willing [n. 882].

196. Without 11wti'lJes there can be no volition in the soul, nor any nolition [no 889].

197. Whenever we will anything, tve represent it as good; and the reverse [n. 892].

198. If one would learn distinctly how appetite or aversion 1S

born, he must give his attention to those cases where we appetize or are averse to a thing for the first time [n. 924].

*The words in nos. 187-194 are margin of the MS. written at a later time in the right

130

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

[Pusillanimitas. A nimositas. Desiderium. Hilaritas. Fasti­

dium. Pudor, ira. Vin­dicta. Indignatio.]

MS., 201.

De Voluntate.

Definitur voluntas quod sit appetitus rationalis. VoUtio actus.

Sine motivis nulla datur in anima volitio aut nolitio.

Quoties quid volumus, repraesentamus tanquam bonum; et contra.

Distincte cogniturus quo modo appetitus vel aversatio nascatur, ad eos casus attendere debet, ubi aliquid prima vice appetimus vel aversamur.

131

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199. W olff illustrates appetite and aversion by a balance or scale [n.92S].

[XIX.]

[THE WILL AND ITS DETERMINATIONS.]

200. N. B. THE WILL. As regards its origin,* it is known: 1. That there is a certain natural something; that there is a certain natural aptitude; a certain self in all natural acts. In brutes, such as horses, fowl, serpents, we have the natural act of walking immediately after their exclusion from the womb; and consequently it is connate with brutes to move their legs, eyes, ears, neck, tail, and with some to move also their wings and skin; that is to say, to move all the membranes that have become solid. Thus brutes grow not only into an ,aptitude for these acts but also into the acts themselves. In man there are not many such acts. Man can hardly draw breath except by the force of the air; he can hardly move his eyes; and he moves his feet, arms and fingers only after some time. That which is moved first, is the first to grow hard; but even while it is grow­ing, the aptitude is within it. This aptitude is natural. Thus in the case of man, as he grows, he grows in accordance with the aptitude within. In some features he grows to solidity in order that the aptitude may come into act, which happens within a few days. In others this happens within a few years, in some, within eight years, and in others within twenty, thirty, forty and fifty years. Thus some persons, when they have arrived at a certain age, develop a likeness to some ancestor when he had come to the same age five generations back.

2. [Will arises] from custom and habit, and therefore things must be formed by habit; as for instance, in man, by the habit of walking, or moving himself this way or that, of applying his fingers to musical instruments and strings, of speaking articu­lately, of putting things together, of reasoning, etc. By custom an action passes into habit, so that the parts flow into such action as it were involuntarily,-as we see in the turning of the eyes,

* Cf. n. 133.

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Illustrat appetitum et aversationem ex libra.

N. B. Voluntas. Quaortumnotum est, I. Quod quiddamsit naturale, quiddam sit aptitudo naturalis, quiddam est ipse in actu naturali, ut sit naturale ut in brutis statim eundi post primam exclusionem ex alvo, ut in equis, in pullis, in serpenti­bus, et consequenter sit conp-atum pedes, oculos, aures, collum, caudam, aliqui etiam alas, cutem, hoc est, omnes membranas solidas factas, adeo ut creverint non modo in aptitudinem sed etiam in ipsum actum, in homine non multa, vix auram trahit, nisi vi aeris, vix oculos, post multum temporis pedes, brachia, digitos; quodcumque primo movetur, hoc primum indurescit; sed tamen inest aptitudo dum crescat. Aptitudo naturalis est ut in homine, ubi dum crescit secundum aptitudinem cres­cit, in quibusdam rebus ad soliditatem ut in actum venire possit, fit intra aliquot dies, in quibusdam rebus intra annos, in quibusdam intra 8 annos, et intra 20, 30, 40 et S0, adeo ut in quibusdam oriantur similes parentibus quinquogenariis, quum illi ad eandem aetatem pervenerint. 2. Ex consuetu­dine et habitu, adeo ut formanda sint per habitum, ut in homine eundi, se sic et sic movendi, digitos applicandi ad

MS., 202.�

instrumenta et nervos, loquendi articulate, componendi,� ratiocinandi, etc. Ex consuetudine transit in [h]abitum, adeo� ut sic quasi involuntarie fluant; quod videmus in oculorum�

133

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in the movements of the fingers over strings, in the motions of the tongue and throat in the utterance of words, [of the hands] in the acts of writing, [of the brain] in the forming of judg­ments, and so on, from the grossest region to the finest,-and then the action flows spontaneously.*

3. [Will arises] from appetite which directs the will; thus appetite or pleasure precedes will.

We observe these three points in respect to the will. Thus we may now see the causes of actions in the will.

201. The question arises, WHAT IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE? This also is known and is indubitable, namely, that it lies in the motion of the parts; for without a primitive motion as a cause, there can be no derivative. That there is motion in the muscles and motion in their tendons; and that this motion is a kind of traction, and relaxation, is manifest to the sight. And so also it cannot be denied that there is motion in the tendinous and membranous fibres, and that this motion is a compression and a loosening of the parts.

202. The question now arises: WHAT IS THE Nf>.TURE OF THE MOTION IN THESE FIBRES? I say that it is an undulation in most highly subtle parts, such as membranes; a motion which when once begun will continue to the extreme terminus. And since this motion proceeds, not at first through the fibres, but through their membranes, or perhaps through most highly subtle [fibres] from one extremity to the other, the result is compres­sion and relaxation. That larger and smaller wavelets (un­dttlae) can be formed and maintained, has been shown clearly enough; t but they are too gross for the soul to sensate them. It can be seen from undulating threads that an entire thread has an aptitude to the same kind of undulation; and that this undulation can proceed only to a definite terminus, and cannot stop even there. That a greater or lesser motion of this kind can exist, may be seen ocularly; and that it contracts and loosens. Like an undulating or waving rope, it has its maxi­mum force in its extremity. Hence small threads are moved

* Cf. Principia I, 4, p. 41. tN.27.

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Ph. MS., 133. conversione, in digitorum in nervis, in linguae et gutturis, in verbis, in scribendis, in judicandis et sic a crassissimo ad minimum, ut dein sponte fluat. 3. Ex appetitu, qui dirigit voluntatem, adeo ut voluntatem praecedet appetitus vel volup­tas. Haec tria observamus circa voluntatem. Sic videmus causas actorum in voluntate.

Quaeritur causa proxima; hoc etiam notum et indubium est, quod sit motus partium; sine mote primitivo, derivativum non oritur; esse motum in musculis, esse in illorum tendinibus, esse quasi tractionem et relaxationem, hoc oculariter patet, esse in fibris tendineis, et membranaceis, hoc nee negari potest; sit compressio et laxatio partium.

Quaeritur jam qualis sit motus in illis fibris. Dico esse undu­lationem in subtilissimis, ut membranis, qui inceptus con­tinuabit ad extremum, quod cum fit non primum per fibras sed earum membranas vel fortassis subtilissimas, ab uno extremo ad alterum, hinc fit compressio et relaxatio. Quod undulae majores et minores formari possunt et dari satis est ostensum, sed crassiores sunt,S ut illas non sentiat anima; ex filis undulantibus videri potest aptitudo totius fili in eandem undulationem, nee nisi ad certum terminum pergit, nee desi­nere potest in illo, quod major et minor hie motus existere possit, oculariter videmus, quod contrahatur, laxetur, ut funis undulans in extremitate maximum vim habet. Hinc

8 est. 135

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

[by this undulatory motion] more rapidly than large; short muscles than long, and so forth. Stout muscles are moved more powerfully than thin.

203. And now the question is: How CAN THE SOUL DETER­MINE SUCH MOTION INTO ACT? That this is done from desire, and imagination, and habit is well known. Since every motion in the soul itself must recognize such desire, therefore the tremor will proceed in the most highly subtle membrane, and with the spreading of thi~ tremor, there will come at last an undulation in the grosser membranes.* If this undulation be other than natural, the result is pain. All pain consists in the fact that the most highly subtle membranes cannot be moved like the grosser. It also follows that larger motions are merely larger wavelets (undulae) , inasmuch as they are reciprocations. Take for instance the leg or arm; when the leg or arm is moved, and until it comes into its natural state, [the motion] describes an equal amount of space and often of the same figure, until it withdraws or yields. So likewise in the eyes, the neck, etc.

204. But it is asked: How CAN IT BE TERMINATED INTO ONE PART AND NOT INTO ANOTHER? IF IT ARISE IN A HIGHLY SUBTLE TUNIC, AND THUS TREMBLES FROM ITS FIRST ORIGIN, WHY DOES IT NOT SPREAD MORE WIDELY THROUGH SIMILAR MEM­BRANES AND INDEED TO A GREATER MOTION? No muscle or none of the fibres in the different muscles has the like tone with any other muscle or fibre. There are as many variations as there are muscles, and as many are possible as there are fibres. I f you took a hundred or ten thousand nerves, you would never find them alike. There is not a single thing in them that is alike. They differ in length, in thickness, in composition; and if there is the least difference in these, then a minute discrimi­nation will arise in the motion. Thus there is a different tremor in the subtle [membrane] of the cerebrum, when one membrane trembles, than when another. If there is a tremor in the subtle membrane, nothing but what is similar thereto can be moved in the grosser membranes, in that the tremor flows harmonically. And since membranes are spread throughout the whole body,

• Cf. Mat. of Elements, 4.

136

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parvi citius moventur quam magni, et musculi breviores quam longiores, etc. Crassiores validius quam tenuiores.

Quaeritur jam quomodo anima talem in actum determinare potest. Quod ex desiderio et imaginatione et habitu sit notum est. Quum omnis motus in ipsa anima agnoscet tale, praecedet tremor in membrana subtilissima, quae se dissipans tandem in crassioribus existit undulatio; si alia undulatio quam natu­ralis fit dolor. Omnis dolor in eo consistit, quod subtilissi­MS., 203.

mae non moveri possint ut crassiores 9 sequitur etiam quod ipsi motus majores sint tantum undulae majores, quia sunt reciprocationes, ut in pede, in brachio, dum movetur et usque dum venit in statum naturalem tantum spatii et saepe similis figurae facit, usque dum redit, sic in oculis, collo, etc.

Sed quaeritur quomodo terminari possit in hanc non in illam partem, cur non per similes membranas se dissipet, si oriatur in tunica subtilissima et sic tremit ex prima origine major; et quidem ad majorem motum: Nullus musculus vel nullae fibrae in diversis musculis similem tonum cum altero habet; variationes sunt quot musculi, dari possunt,lO quot fibrae. Si centum et myriades nervos haberes, nunquam similes adin­venies; nusquam datur in his similare; differunt tarn longitu­dine, crassitie, compositione; si minima differentia, minimum oritur in motu discrimen , sic alius tremor in subtili cerebri,

Ph. MS., 134. si haec membrana, quam si ilIa; si hujus tremor, non aliud moveri potest quam simile in crassioribus, quod harmonice fluit; et quia membranae per totum corpus se distendunt,

8 crassiorem. 10 potest.

137

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therefore we have a determination of the will from the tremors of the imagination, and from the tremors of the soul itself. If in addition there be habit, then the tremor will go off to its simile so much the more easily.

205. When considering the muscles we are not to think of the tremor or undulation as being in those fibres which we see,-in them is only tension and remission; but as being in those membranes which we do not see,-membranes by which the proximate [fibres of the muscles] are covered, and with which they are combined, far beyond our sight. It is the undu­lation of these membranes that gives rise to the contraction or remission of the parts contained within them. For that which is to undulate must be tense; that which is remiss is either tensed by this undulation, or remitted. It would take too long to demonstrate all these points; moreover, in the cares of a for­eign journey, no aids are at hand, there is no time or oppor­tunity, nor [do] other cares and pleasures [permit]. The tremor also comes to the muscles,-where many fibres are gath­ered together,-according to their thickness. Thus a thick and short nerve cannot tremulate like a nerve which is less thick,* etc. All [the tremors] together make one body, if not [in the body itself] at least in the head as a terminus; and [the tremor] will fall at least as a mean proportional between the thicknesses.

206. A TREMOR FROM A TREMOR IN DIFFERENT MEMBRANES.

If there be wavelets in a more subtle membrane, so that the hypothenuse is halved, there is at once a contraction in the en­closed [fibre]; and that to which [the membrane] adheres is made shorter and briefer by half, and this, consequently, in proportion [to the wavelet]. If (ab) or the enclosed [fibre]

A )00000000 B

be either many or a single one, and if it have its termini on each side, then if the wavelets are very short the result of all these minute wavelets is a wave in the larger [fibre1 (ab). If [the termini] are connected as in the figure, a larger wave then arises. Thus if these waves have their ligaments or fibres bound to­

* Cf. n. 202. 138

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

ergo habemus determinationem voluntatis a tremoribus imaginationis, et ipsius animae. Si jam habitus a[c]cedit, eo facilius abit in simile.

Dum circa musculos versemur, non putandum est quod tremor vel undulatio sit in ipsis fibris quas videmus, in illis tantum est tensio et remissio, sed in il1is membranis quas non videmus, quibus induuntur proximae, quibus combinantur, maxime ultra visum. Ex illarum undulatione sequitur partium contentarum contractio vel remissio, nam tensum erit quod undulabit, quod remissum est, ab illa undulatione vel tenditur vel remittitur. Prolixum foret omnia demonstrare, nee in curis his peregrinis subsidia adsunt, nee tempus, nee locus, nee aliae curae et voluptates. Etiam pervenit ex crassitie musculorum, si plures simul sint, ut nervus crassus neque longus non potest tremulare ut minus crassus, etc. Omnes simul faciunt unum corpus, si non ad minimum in termino capitis etiam cadeat ad minimum media proportionalis inter crassit[ies].

MS., 204.

Tremor a tremore in diversis membranis. Si in subtiliori undulae sint, ut hypothenusa re[d]datur dimidia, fit statim contractio in inclusa et cui adhaeret dimidio curtior et brevior et sic consequenter. in proportione. Si (ab) vel inclusa sint

A~

plura vel unum et suos terminos habeat utrinque si breviores, tunc fit ex omnibus his minimis undulis unde unda in (ab) majori, si sic connexi sint, fit sic major unda sic hae undae si sua ligamenta vel fibras habeant ligatas dant majores undas.

139

II

207-209

PSYCHOLOGICA.

gether, they produce larger waves; and so from a primitive and tiny beginning results a great undulation or attraction. Thus there is a resemblance to muscles in all the lesser [muscles], albeit they are not fully formed as such. From a larger [or compound] an undulation results in the lesser [parts] only by means of the enclosed elements and of the similitude [between them]. For lesser [wavelets] cannot be formed by grosser except by the aid of elements; since there must be an element enclosed between the little membrane and the fibre.* In this way therefore we obtain the ratio of the senses towards the imagination and the soul.

207. In the most subtle elements and membranes, large and small wavelets may be present and in motion simultaneously, because they differ in celerity; and over them can come other wavelets, and so on,-the wavelets being smaller according as the elements are more subtle. If however wavelets come with the same celerity, they run together and finally unite. Thus there will be a dissimilarity, and yet mixed motions are possible which in part run together, and in part do not.t

208. In the human soul are actives of the first and second finite,-the finites namely, which are contained within the sec­ond element. In brutes the soul is the first element contained within the ether.t

[XX.]

209. N. B. CONCERNING TIlE VARIED CONSTITUTION OF THE

SOUL, AND CONCERNING THE SOUL AFTER DEATH. If the soul .be configured in this way, the question arises, How can it live after death? The answer is, 1. That it cannot be dissolved, not even by any element; whether we consider the first, second, third, or fourth element, all their undulatory motions can do nothing in the way of dissolving it. 2. That it lives ~~fter

death, is clear from our whole philosophy and-nrechanical [theory] . It has a center; if has peripheries; and at every tone there is a difference [of distances] from the center.§ That

* Cf. Motion of Elemen4s 32• 8, :t: Cf. Mechanism 21; II Infinite 7; M (!chat~ism, 1. IV (How the actuality, etc.).

t Cf. n. 156• § Cf. n. 15. 140

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

Sic a primo et exiguo principio fit maxima undulatio vel attrac­tio; adeo ut similitudo sit musculorum in omnibus minoribus, sed non ita formati plane. A majore fit undulatio in minoribus tan turn per elemen ta inclusa et similitudinem; nam minores non possunt aliter a crassioribus formari quam per elemento­rum ope[mJ, nam elementum erit inclusum inter membranulam et fibram. Ergo sic habetur ratio sensuum versus imagina­tionem et animam.

In subtilissimis elementis et membranis possunt undulae majores et minores simul esse et moveri, quia differunt celeri­tate, et super his aliae; et sic quo subtiliora elementa eo minora; at vero si eadem celeritas veniat, tunc se confundunt, et tandem coeunt; adeo ut dissimilitas erit usque tamen dari possunt mixti qui partim confundunt,l partim vero non.

In anima sunt activa primi et secundi, finita quae in secundo elemento, in brutis est primum elementum ut in aethere.

N. B. De animae varia constitutione et post mortem. Si anima sit ita figurata quaeritur: I. Quomodo vivere possit

Ph. MS., 135. post mortem. Respondetur, quod non dissolvi possit nec ab ullo elemento, eatur ad primum, alterum, 3tium et quartum elementum, omnes motus undulatorii nihil possunt efficere, ut dissolvatur. 2. Quod vivat post mortem patet ex tota MS., 205.

nostra philosophia et mechanica, habet centrum, habet peri­pherias, et in quovis tono differentia a centro, quod habet

1 confundit. 141

210

PSYCHOLOGICA.

which has these termini, and in which consequently there are different termini at every distance from the center, must needs be living. It variously receives all the tremulations of the ele­ments, and holds them within its termini,*-reciprocates them, if you please; therefore it is living. In like manner as, in the body, it depends on life alone that the soul can receive various motions and convey them to its own center, and [produce] ever varying tones, so that all differences in the elements can be sen· sated from terminus to terminus,-whence comes its life; so also in the soul after death. It has the same property, but, after death, it receives the impressions of the elements in a different way than in the body. Of its quality we shall speak elsewhere. 3. There is a difference in a vitiated body; for vices have occu­pied only the body, and [tremors] have not gone to the soul and cultivated it; therefore the soul has not been made sensible of different and more subtle tremors. 4. Thus it is small and gross; or of an even thickness from periphery to center; or globular in the center and thus small. Such a soul has not received many impressions, and is not developed. Therefore the first element-the element of angels and the like,-makes no impression upon it; an impression is made upon it by the second ele~ent, but only in a gross way; and also by & ethereal and aerial elements, likewise in a gross way. It is not flexible to-;'lfmanner-of tones. It is not finely elastic, but is somewhat hard. Hence it suffers ineffable torments. But the subtle soul, because it receives tones from all the elements, and is elastic, [receives also] the larger tones or those of fire and air; this torments the vicious soul, inasmuch as it is not elastic; and it suffers in this way every moment to eternity.t

210. N. B. The soul of brutes is similar; but brutes are endowed interiorly, not with actives but with the first element.t Hence also their soul consists in the fact that they know the quarters, the south and the north; for it is the magnetic element that is their most subtle endowment. - This-ls'-perish;:ble, b~t

~tiii--it-lives-for -;;: long ti;-;­* Cf. Principia I, 4, p. 40; II :j: Cf. the figure in n. 17 point 3;

111fi/lite IV, xi. also n. 208 and II Infinite ad fin. t Cf. Mechanism 16-20, 48-51.

142

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

terminos illos, et consequenter diversi termini in quavis dis­tantia a centro, non potest quin vivum sit, recipit varie omnes elementorum tremulationes, et intra terminos habet, reciprocat si velis, ergo vivum est, ut in corpore, dependet nude vita quod recipere possit motus varios et ad centrum suum deferre, et semper varios tonos, ut omnes differentiae in elementis sentiri possint a termino ad terminum, hinc est vita; sic etiam in anima habet idem, sed aliter recipit elementorum impres­siones, post mortem, quam in corpore, de qualitate alias. 3. Quod differentia in vitioso corpore sit, quod vitia tantum corpus occupaverint n~c iverint et coluerint animam, ergo nec sensibilis reddita ad diversos et subtiliores tremores. 4. Est itaque vel minor et crassior, vel aequalis crassitiei a peripheria ad centrum, vel globulus in centro, et sic minor; haec nec receperat multas impressiones et exculta est, ergo nec I

mum elementum ullam habet in illam impressionem, ange­lorum et talium, elementum secundum crasse, et elementum aethereum, et aereum, etiam crasse, non flexilis ad quemvis tonum; nec elastica bene sed durior, unde tormina ineffabilia patitur; at subtilis quia tonos accipit ab omni elemento, et elastica est, majores tonos seu ignis et aeris, torquet illam, quia nec elastica est, et hoc patitur quovis momento in aeternum.

MS., 206.

N. B. Quod brutorum anima sit similis, et gaudeat intus non activis sed elemento primo, unde etiam anima illorum consistit in eo ut sciant plagas, austrum et boream, quum est elementum magneticum, hoc est illorum subtilissimum; hoc perire potest sed tamen diu vivit.

143

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

211. N. B. Angels still more subtle may exist, who, inte­riorly, have only actives of the first finite with their surface occupied by the second finite,-like the first element. These finites are more subtle and therefore all the motions they observe are supremely subtle.

212. N. B. There are still grosser beings who consist of fifth finites and of the first and second elements. Such are the spirits of the devil, who continually suffer from fire and the motion of the aerial element. They receive no sensation from the more subtle motions.

C 213. N. B. THE COMMUNION OF SOULS. It cannot be other­~~ than that one soul sensates another, inasmuch as there is an undulation between them. Since there is an undulation we must needs sensate it. What is it that the body sees when ether is present and recipient organs? The motion in one body is sensated in another, even though the distance between them be as from star to star. And if we are able to sensate in this way, why not the soul, when a like motion moves two souls? For the similitude causes the two to be carried simultaneously into one and the same motion. Therefore there is a harmony be­tween them by means of the element.

214. DELAY. WILL. If the cause of will be a tremulation of the ether or other element, there can be no other [will] ; the motion is terminated which may be called will, but a will which comes not from many and extremely diverse causes, but from causes supremely pure; hence it can be no other than pure will.

215. Other affections and their nature. 216. N. B. That [the will] is not in the elements because

there is no center there, but the motion spreads itself around.

[XX!.]

CONCERNING THE PHILOSOPHY OF PARTICLES.

217. 1. Concerning God. 2. That we are finite and mechanical,-various argu­

ments; also angels. 3. That men become atheists from having a different

notion. They should be refuted. g4.

2

211-217

PSYCHOLOGICA.

N. B. Angeli dari possunt adhuc subtiliores, qui intus modo habent activa primi, et iIlorum superficiem teneatla finitum

dum ut elementum primum; subtiliora, et sic motus omnes subtilissimos tenent.

Ph. MS., 136. N. B. Crassiores adhuc quae constant ex finitis stis et

elemento primo et secundo; quales sunt spiritus diaboli; qui continuo patiuntur ab igne, et motu elementi aerei, a subtili­oribus nullum habent sensum.

N. B. Communio animarum. Non dari potestquin una anima sentiat alteram, quum undulatio intercedat, non potest quin sentimus earn, quum undulatio est, quid videat corpus quum aether sit et organa ; motus in uno sentietur in altero, quamvis distantia sit a stella ad stellam, quum nos sentire possumus quid non anima, si similis motus movet binas, quia similitudo facit ut binae simul in eundem motum ferantur ergo est harmonia per elementa.

}.flora Voluntas. Si causa sit voluntatis aetheris tremulatio aut alius elementi alia dari nequit, terminatur motus, qui vocari potest voluntas, sed voluntas quae non a pluribus et diversissimis causis sed purissimis, hinc alia non dari potest, quam voluntas pura.

Alii affectus quales. N. B. Quod in elementis non sit quia nullum centrum, sed

motus dissipat se in circum. MS., 207.

DE PHILOSOPHIA PARTICULARUM.*

I. De Deo. 2. Quod simus finiti et mechanici varia argumenta; etiam

angeli. 3. Quod atheistae fiant ex alia notione; refutantur. la teneant. * or per articulos; preface, p. xx.

145

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

4. That the soul, angels, the body, immortality, life after death can all be demonstrated geometrically.

5. Generally concerning tremor and musical harmony. That all bodies tend to such motion.

6. Generally concerning the elements; the opinions of certain authors, and our own opinion.

7. That tremulation thus goes from the grosser to the more subtle by contiguity.

8. That life rests in the termini of such tremors. 9. The nature of the soul. It is said that it is similar,

not as an opinion that this is so, but because in this way all things can be explained; that thus tremulation goes from the'top to the bottom. So likewise the other membranes, as to how they are pictured; also the regula falsi.

10. What is the nature of the various senses [explained] mechanically by tremulations, and so again to the senses.

11. The nature of imagination, memory, judgment, per­ception.

12. The nature of affections of the utmost diversity. 13. The nature of will. 14. What the state of the soul is in the body. 15. What its state after death. It is immortal. 16. What its state in respect to its previously enacted

life; its blessedness and its torments. 17. Again concerning God, Christ and the Holy Spirit.*

[XXII.]

218. N. B. In the MEMBRANES over the fibres there must be: 1. The membrane. 2. Between the membrane and the tendon there must be an element which is in motion. 3. In some places the membrane must be attached to the tendon at equal distances,

*NOTE BY THE AUTHOR: All the motions and tremors. 3. From these points must be deduced: 1. anatomy. 4. From experience in From reason. 2. From geometry, the elements. as for instance the mechanism of

146

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

4. Quod anima, angeli, corpus, immortalitas, vita post mor­tern geometrice possit demonstrari.

S. Generaliter de tremore et harmonia musica. -quod omnia corpora in talem motum velint.

6. Generaliter de elementis; et quorundam opiniones et nostra.

7. Quod sic a crassiore in subtilius eat tremulatio per conti­guum.

8. Quod vita consistat in terminis talium tremorum. 9. Qualis sit anima. Dicitur quod simiJis sit, nec opinio ut

sic sit, sed quod omnia sic explicari possint; quod sic eatur tremulatio a summo ad imum.

-Pariter reliquae membranae quales fingantur; et regula falsi.

10. Quales sint varii sensus, mechanice per tremulationes sic iterum ad sensus.

Ph., MS. 137. 11. Qualis sit imaginatio, memoria, judicium, perceptio. 12. Quales sint affectus diversis­

oslmL ....r :>'. S S.o.~

13. Qualis voluntas. c ~.~ ::l <t:: 'i:: ~ . @ .... ..,i- Cl)

14. Qualis status animae in corpore. ('l...c: 0 S cd U S Cl)

Cl)IS. Qualis status post mortem, im- "C:l Cl) . ­

5 Q) S .b.~ Cl)

mortalis. ~ c.... S.5 ... 0 ::l .... 0

16. Qualis in respectu ad vitam ante­ "C:l .- Cl) .... cd Cl) .... cd cd . ­

"C:l ~.~ S c 'i::actam beatitudo et tormenta. cd t::l cd.~

17. Item de Deo, Christo, et Spiritu .- :>'. S ::l :>'. .... c~Ob~g,

Sancto. S . Cl) ~ • ><: O .... b.C~""Cl)

MS., 208.

N. B. In membranis super fibras erit: 1. Membrana. 2.

Inter membranam et tendinem erit elementum quod movetur. 3. Membrana erit aliquibus locis alligata tendini, aequis dis­

147

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PSYCHOLOGICA.

as at (b, c). 4. There must be a communication of the ele­ment between the membrane and the tendon.* 5. From which

f'./'\. A D-I"\/\ /\..c\ A

A~ B t 1)

considerations it follows that the membrane can tremulate me­chanically, and that the tendon must follow the tremulation by contracting and dilating.

219. N. B. The [membranes] do not tremulate the whole brain; but since the same membrane has various lengths. thick­nesses and spaces, therefore that membrane tremulates which is apt thereto; still, by reason of mere similitude a membrane of a different length may tremulate. As for instance the [mem­brane of the] sight,t hearing, taste, smell.

220. N. B. Philosophers see that [sensation] consists in tremors,t and they smile with favor upon those who assert this, hoping that it may be demonstrated; which is a sign that herein lies the truth. Therefore if the tremor be fittingly deduced, the world will at once smile assent.§

221. N. B. That there is no necessity of having a tremor in the least [membranes], it needs only that they have a nisus to tremor, from which results a tremor in the larger membrane. Consequently a nisus in the larger makes a tremor in the lesser. Thus it is not necessary that they shall all tremble continuously, but only that one which produces the effect. The nisus to tremor produces the same result.

222. N. B. Nerves or strings can tremble only to one tone and can run out only at one celerity. But membranes, being of different lengths, can tremble to various tones and can run out at various celerities; and especially if there be an angular or other figure the effect of which is that the membrane is bound along various termini. Hence it is able to run out at [various celerities and to tremble to] various tones, according to the appellant air,-provided only there be termini. If there be various termini, then also the membrane runs out in various

* Cf. n. 206. med. t The MS. has auris (the ear). § ef. 11 I1tfmite IV, xi 2 •

. :j: Cf. 11 Infinite IV, xi, circa 148

219-222

PSYCHOLOGICA.

tantiis, ut Cb, c). 4. Erit communicatio elementi ab uno ad alterum. 5. Ex his sequitur quod possit mechanice tremulare,

~/r""LiJ et quod tendo sequi debeat tremulationem se contrahendo et dilatando.

N. B. Non totum cerebrum tremulant, sed quia eadem membrana habet varias longitudines, crassities, et spatia, hinc illa tremulat quae apta est; quamvis eadem tremulare potest, quae diversae est longitudinis a pura similitudine; ut visus,2a auditus, gustus, olfactus.

N. B. Vident philosophi quod consistat in tremoribus, et arrident iis qui dicunt, optantes ut demonstrari possit; quod signum est, veritatem inesse; adeo ut si apte tremor deducatur, inde statim arridebit orbis.

N. B. Quod non opus sit ut tremor sit in minimis,2 modo nisus ad tremorem, inde sequitur tremor majoris; et conse­quenter nisus in majori facit tremorem in minore, ut non opus sit ut continuo trement omnes, sed modo ille qui effectum edit; nisus ad tremorem facit idem.

N. B. Nervi non modo ad unum tonum tremulare possunt, nee nisi in unam celeritatem excurrere; at membranae in varios, utramvis, quia diversae sunt longitudines, praecipue si figura sit angularis vel alia unde secundum varios terminos ligata, hinc excurrere potest in varios tonos, secundum appellentem aerem, modo termini sint, si varii sint, etiam varie excurrit,

2 minimus. 2. auris.

149

223-225

PSYCHOLOGICA.

ways; but yet it is the termini, or the line of the termini that gives the tone.

From Anatomy.

223. In man the common coverings or integuments are three in number; but they are more in brutes in order that the latter may be covered against the winter; these coverings being their clothing. In man we have: 1. The cuticle or epidermis which invests and encloses the whole man. It is easily separated from the cutis * and according to microscopical observations, consists of minute lamellae and little scales as it were, which are like­wise elastic, as is evident from the fact that they contain pores.t [2. The cutis containing miliary glands and papillae. 3. The adipose membrane.]

224. N. B. The glands are for the most part hard and not hollow; no liquid is apparent in them nor can be expressed from them; nor anything of a tendinous character. As to the glands that have been seen distended, no liquid could be forced from them by pressure, though on cutting them considerable liquid appeared. These glands therefore seem to consist of almost the same sort of matter as the nerves with their membranes inserted between them or investing them, and consequently distended by a liquid, which has a communication, like the enclosed elemen­tary; which can have an exit; and which has free passage. Hence they can narrow up and compress. Thus they are fibres and so there is a secretion of humors.t

225. N. B. That nerves consist of an infinitude of little membranes, becomes apparent when they are divided length­wise. If the division is made lengthwise there will be found threads, gross and subtle, running lengthwise, and· all invested along the path of their duct. 2. If we stretch them, or separate them by stretching them lengthwise, the extended membranes come to view. 3. In their ramifications they all cohere with their membranes,-which could not be done unless they drew

*The MS. has cuticula. mind the subcutaneous glands as t Cl. Heister Comp. Anat. 195, the origins of the corporeal fibre.

196. See Fibre 123, 183-4; Anim. King. :I: The author seems to have in 500.

150

223-225

PSYCHOLOGICA.

sed tamen tennini vel linea tenninorum dat tonum. MS., 209.

Ex ANATOM1A.

Tegumenta communia sunt in homine tria, in brutis vero plura, ut tegantur contra hyemem quia investita; penes homi­nem est, I. cuticula seu epidennis totum hominem investiens et includens; separabilis facile a cute 3 ; ex minutissimis

Ph. MS., 138. lamellis et quasi squamulis secundum microscopia, quae pariter elasticae; quod apparet ex eo quod in illis pori sint.

N. B. Glandulae sunt plerumque durae nec cavae, nec liquidum apparet aut exprimi potest, aut tendinosum, in glandulis distentis inventis nihil per pressionem liquidi exivit, sed per sectionem plus liquidi; hinc videntur constare eadem fere materia qua nervi, intersertis vel involutis membranis, et consequenter liquido distentis, quod communicationem habet, prout elementum inclusum, quod exire potest et liberum habet meatum, unde se coarctare et comprimere possunt, adeo ut sint fibrae, et sic fit secretio humorum.

N. B. Quod nervi constent infinitis membranulis, ex divi­sione illorum secundum longitudinem apparet, si fiat secundum longitudinem erunt crassiora et subtiliora fila secundum longi­tudinem et investita secundum eorum ductum. 2. Si traha­mus illos vel partiamur trahendo in longitudinem videntur membranae extensae.t 3. In ramificationibus omnes suis membranis cohaerere, quod fieri non potest nisi trahant inde

3 cuticula. t a doubtful reading. •151

226-227

PSYCHOLOGICA.

their origin therefrom. 4. When a number of nerves come to­gether to form a single nerve, they are likewise invested with a common little membrane. From the most subtle [nerves] and from their extremities, one can see that there are little lamellae. So also in the veins.

226. The papillae are what originate from the nerves [in their extremities]; as in the tongue; see p. 149.*

[XXII!.]

[NATURE IS MECHANICAL.]

227. N. B. We are just like the simple men of pnmltlve times, who thought that the boundary of the earth was the boundary of their sight, or the furthest bound to which our knowledge extends; and that at this boundary was a falling off place. Their posterity declared that here was not yet the last boundary, for they saw beyond. And when, with the still fur­ther extension of their sight, men yet found no end, then they saw that the earth is round. And then at once came a rush of other experiments or observations to which previously men could not have been turned. They saw that the earth goes round the sun, and additional observations confirmed this position.

So is it with nature. In the mineral kingdom we see that the earth is round in shape; that its parts are of divers forms, such as valleys, mountains, plains; that there are stony parts; that there is sand, dust; that in the earth is contained sulphur, metals, and all that can be smelted therefrom. We declare this king­dom to be geometrical, because we see it as such. So in the vegetable kingdom. There we find trees, branches, leaves, fibres, excretory ducts through the fibres, etc. In the elemen­tary kingdom we find rain, snow, heat [&c.] which in large part we recognize as arising from natural causes and from the sacred throng itself. In the animal kingdom we acknowledge that

*The reference is presumably to manuscript and these do not in­p. 149 of the MS. (Codex 88). clude p. 149, which seems 'to con­Only portions of this MS. are in­ tain extracts from Schurig on the cluded in the photolithographed subject of generation.

152

226-227�

PSYCHOLOGICA.

ongmem. 4. Cum plures in unum coeunt pariter membranula communi investiuntur. Ex subtilissimis et ipsis extremitati­bus videre licet esse lamellulas. Sic etiam in venis.

Papillaesunt quae enervis oriuntur, ut in lingua. Vide p. 149. Jl1S.,210.

N. B. Nos sumus prout primi simplices, qui putarunt ter­minum terrae esse ubi visus, vel ubi nos novimus, et ibi prae­cipitium; posteriores dixerunt nondum esse terminum quia plus viderunt; sic magis et magis dum finem 4 nullum inveni­rent; statim viderunt illam rotundam esse; accesserunt statim turn cohortim alia experimenta vel observationes ad quae in­flecti nequierant, solem circumambire, dein plus et plus idem confirmans. Sic est cum natura; in minerali videmus tellurem esse formae rotundae, dad partes diversae formae, valles montes, planit[i]es; dad partes saxeas 5, dad arenas, dari pollinem, dad inibi sulphur, metalla, quod inde conflari potest; hoc dicimus esse geometricum quia videmus. Sic in vegetabili, dari arbores, ramos, folia, fibras, ductus excretorios per fibras, etc.; in elementari dari pluvias, dad nevem, dari calorem; mul­tarn partem agnoscimus oriri a causis naturalibus, ipsaque

, finum. 6 saxa. 153

228

PSYCHOLOGICA.

sensation is mechanical,* etc., etc. But because we do not call that mechanical and natural of which we are ignorant,-and this because we do not see it to be such,-therefore we are not unlike that stranger who did not see the land.t

But the literary world is daily taking increase and ever ad­vancing onwards. How great has been its advance in the com­mencement of the present century! And in the century that is past! So that now, from reasons and experiments we seem at last on the point of coming to causes t~~es, and of seeing that all things are done mechanically. Seeing this, why should we not anticipate them! Why should we not reach forward, and establish that which surely our posterity will establish!­the truth namely, that this body of ours is mechanical! that its organs are mechanical! that its senses are mechanical! the intel­lect, the reason, and the soul itself ! Yet in course of time the learned world will come to this position. If the great body is mechanical, why not the small? There is no new reason, no new nature; in a word, two natures are impossible.:j:

[XXIV.]

228. N. B. The MEMBRANES are: 1. The membrane of the soul; 2, of the imagination and memory; 3, of the senses; 4, of the touch. 5. The pia mater. 6. The dura mater. 7. The [membrane of] the tunic § and thus the cranium. 1. Within the membrane of the soul are the first and second actives as a particle of the second elementary, and in fact in the medullary part. 2. The membrane of the imagination is principally in the cortical part, consisting of the same substance as ether. 3. The membrane of the senses is under the pia mater, being interiorly

* The idea here summarized is t There seems to be 'here an al­set forth more fully in the IN­ lusion to some story or tradition; FINITE, to the effect that while our it is possible however that the au­ancestors thought that the ear thor is referring to the "simple heard and the eye saw in some un­ men" spoken of in the beginning known way, investigation has now of n. 227. shown that sensation is mechanical. t Cf· II 1nl. II (Mechanical See II Infinite II (Mechanical laws, etc.). laws, etc.). § See n. 171 note.

154

228

PSYCHOLOGICA.

turba sacra: In animali, sensum mechanicum, etc., etc. Sed quia hoc quod nescimus non dicimus nechanicum et naturale, ideo quod non videmus, non alius est ac peregrinus ille qui

Ph. MS., 139. terram non vidit. At orbis literatus quotidie incrementa capit; ulterius et ulterius it. Quantum non in initio hujus saeculi, in priori; adeo ut videmus ex ratiociniis et experimentis tandem venturum esse ad ipsas causas, et visurum quod omnia me­chanice fiant. Quum hoc videmus, cur non illos praevertamus, cur non eousque nos eamus, et statuamus quod statuent MS,,21I.

posteri, scilicet corpus nostrum mechanicum esse, organa esse mechanica, sensus esse mechanicos, intellectum, rationem et ipsam animam, eo usque tamen temporis tractu venit orbis eruditus. Si majus quid non minus; non alia ratio, non alia natura, vel binae naturae nequaquam.

N. B. Membranae. I. Animae. 2. Imaginationisetmemo­riae. 3. Sensuum. 4. Tactus. S. Pia mater. 6. Dura mater.

dum7. Tunicae et sic cranium. I. Animae intus 1 et 2 activum ut particula elementi secundi, et quidem in medullari parte'. 2. Imaginationis in corticali, praecipue ex substantia qua aether. 3. Sensuum, sub pia meninge ei adhaerens intus.

155 12

229-231

PSYCHOLOGICA.

adherent thereto. 4. The membrane of touch is the other and more subtle part of the pia meninx, and so forth. *

229. N. B. Membranes are always attached;-not at all points, but at some; as for instance the dura mater is attached to the bone in the sutures, etc.; to the pia mater by tendons. Thus all membranes are attached not only to each other, but also separately. Hence sensation is not lost if a part lof the membrane] is destroyed; and the whole membrane is not at once torn when a part is torn.t

230. N. B. We -must penetrate to that which is finally reso­lute, than which there can be nothing but the Infinite-irre­solvable by angels and to eternity; for we are finite. There is no connection between the infinite and the finite, except by reason of existence, like the connection between a primitive cause and its effect; and not even so,' because the [finite] is a different and immediate effect.t There is no ratio between the infinite and the finite; and where there is no ratio, there is no nexus. There is no nexus by any intermediate except by such as partakes of both the infinite and the finite. This cannot be said of the simple, but only of His Son. Time must not be considered in the infinite. If the infinite is an ens the finite becomes a non-ens; and the reverse.

[XXV.] [CONCERNING PHILOSOPHY.]

231. 1. Concerning the infinite a~d God. 2. Concerning nature and created things, that they are

all geometrical and mechanical. Concerning cor­puscular philosophy.

3. That the soul, angels, and man with his senses both internal and external, are mechanical and natural.

4. That any other cognition leads directly to atheism. 5. A refutation of the arguments of atheists. 6. That the essence of the soul can be demonstrated,

and all its acts, the communion of souls, the im­

* Cf. n. 17 and figure, and M ech- Elements, 10; II Inf. IV, x fin. allism 24. :j: Cf. n. 1.

t Cf. Mechanism, 30; Mot. of 156

229-231

PSYCHOLOGICA.

4. Tactus pars alia subtilior piae meningis, etc.

N. B. Membranae sunt semper ligatae non in locis omnibus sed in quibusdam, ut dura mater cum osse in suturis, etc., cum pia meninge, cum tendinibus. Sic omnes membranae non modo invicem sed separatim sunt ligatae; unde non perit sen­sus si pereat pars, nee laceratur illico tota membrana quum laceratur pars.

N. B. Eundum ad tantum resolubile, nee datur aliud quam infinitum, irresolubile ab angelis et in aeternum, quia sumus finiti. Nulla est connexio finiti et infiniti nisi ratione exis­tentia[e], ut causa primitiva et effeetus, nee sic quia effeetus aiius, immediatus, non est ratio infiniti et finiti, cujus nulla est ratio, nullus est nexus; nee per intermedium nisi quod partieiparet de utroque; de simplice non, sed de filio ejus; non tempus considerari in Infinito. Si infinitum est ens, fit finitum non ens, et contra.

MS., 212.

1. De infinito et Deo. 2. De Natura et rebus creatis quod omnes geometricae et

mechanieae sint. De philosophia corpusculari. 3. Quod anima, angeli, homo cum sensibus suis internis et

externis sit mechanicus et naturalis. Ph. MS., 140.

4. Quod alia cognitio directe ducit ad Atheismum. S. Argumenta atheistarum refelluntur. 6. Quod demonstrari possit ejus essentia, et omnes actus,

157

232

PSYCHOLOGICA.

mortality of the soul, its state after death accord­ing to its previously enacted life, its state when defiled by vices. That the Scripture is in full agreement with these [positions].

7. Generally concerning the elements and their motion; concerning tremulation or undulation; concerning the membranes and the tremulation therein, run­ning from what is grosser to what is more subtle. Concerning life in general.

8. And then the senses and the other subjects in their order.

[XXV!.]

FAITH IN CHRIST.

232. 1. It is clear that no one can be saved except by faith in God. 2. That no one can be saved except through Christ. 3. The question is asked, whether we are saved solely by faith in Christ. 4. The answer is, that a distinction must be made between those who know of Christ, and those who do not know of Him. Those who know of Christ, or who are Christians, can­not make any distinction between Christ and God or the Father; hence they cannot be saved except by f3.ith in Christ, since this faith is the same as fa~th in th~_~~E:~~e~--S()'"trueis this, that they who do not have faith in Christ, or, what is the same thing, who deny Christ, cannot be saved; for faith cannot be separated and be faith in God and not at the same time in Christ. But they who do not know that Christ came into the world, can still believe i~God or in the I~te, and hence not deny Christ. Hence also they can be saved; for their faith is faith both in God and in Christ, since they do not deny, because they do not know. But their salvation cannot be effected save through Christ; for He suffered for the whole world,-both for those who know Him not, and for those who know Him. Therefore salvation is wrought through Christ alone. S. B...!fore ~J1rist,

not one thousandth part of the Jews believed that such a Mes­siah w~s ~t~ come,-a Messiah who would'h~;~e- solely for so~ls; but (they expected a Messiah] bY iYF6ri1,=-they -;"C;uTd

158

232

PSYCHOLOGICA.

communio, immortalitas, status post mortem ex vita anteacta, ejus status vitiis inquinatus; quod Scriptura cum illis plane coincidat.

7. Generaliter de elementis illorumque motu, de tremula­tione aut undulatione, de membranis et tremulatione in illis a crassiore ad subtilius; de vita in communi.

8. Sic sensus et reliqua ordine.

MS., 213.

De Fide in Christum. I. Clarum est quod nullus nisi per fidem in Deum possit salvari. 2. Quod nullus salvari possit nisi per Christum. 3. Quaeritur an unice per fidem in Chris­turn salvemur. 4. Respondetur, quod distinguendum sit inter i1los qui sciunt Christum et qui non sciunt; qui sciunt Christum vel qui sunt Christiani, non possunt distinguere Christum a Deo vel Patre; hinc non possunt salvari nisi per fidem in Christum, quia fides illa eadem est cum fide in infi­nitum; adeo ut qui non fidem habeant in Christum, sive, quod idem est, qui negant Christum, illi non possunt salvari; quia fides non potest separari et esse in Deum et non simul in Chris­turn. At qui non sciunt Christum in mundum venisse, possunt nihilominus credere in Deum sive in infinitum, nee inde negare Christum; unde etiam salvari possunt, quia fides est in utrum­que, quia non negant quia non seiunt; sed salvatio illorum non potest esse nisi per Christum, nam passus est pro toto orbi, tarn iBis qui nesciunt illum quam qui seiunt ilium, adeo ut salvatio unica sit per Christum. 5. Ante Christum non milles­ima pars Judaeorum crediderunt talem Messiam venturum qui unice animarum curam haberet, 6 sed per quem toti orbis

6 haberent. 159

APPENDIX.

obtain empire over t~e whole world. Therefore, they could not be saved; for salvation is not wrought save through Christ. 6. Had Christ been born in some corner of the world, and been known to none, men could nevertheless have been saved by faith in God; but there is no salvation save through Christ. 7. It pleased Him to show Himself, that He might tell and declare that He' c'ame for the sake of souls and not-for 'the'sake-of ~ldly enlpire;' ~~d tEat in~Jlim_we. n:ighL~~e~n imag~...9f. ~e

wor?hip and life we mu~t.. ~obse!.ve, if we are to come to the reception of faith, and to be rendered fit therefor.

[APPENDIX.]

EMINENT GENERATION.*

Eminent generation cannot be understood except by means of reflection and similitude; and unless also we know how every active force can be represented in the aura, just as every image is represented in the ether according to the image impressed. And since this aura is capable of implanting all unities, hence from the representation of one aura, there is actually formed, as in a mirror, a second and similar aura; it at once takes the same form which is most exactly similar to the aura which effects the representation. But there is required reflection and concentration and this upon the cortical substance. We are not permitted to go further without a mathematical philosophy of series and degrees.

This also is the reason why all that enters by means of the external senses will remain as though formed, and, as it were, born in the memory; and if it were possible for the organ of sight to reflect its own image, and if when reflected this image could be taken up by some susceptible matter, then would arise the same image as that which had been the cause of the image in the eye; but this latter is taken up in the internal organs.

Thus from one given individual of the spirituous fluid, or from as many as are necessary to furnish the origin, comes the first composition, cortical spherule and little cerebrum. From this is born all else that is similar to it. The first thing, there­fore, could never exist without creation by'theSupreme De"fty, after whose image it 'is' prod~ced; and from it then-~;-me' all other things in the universe.

* The original title was "Emi- was altered by the author to " Emi­nent Generation, or the Generation nent Generation." of the Spirituous Fluid," but this

160

APPENDIX.

imperararent, ideo non potuerunt salvari; sed salvatio non fit nisi per Christum. 6. Si natus fuisset Christus in angulo mundi ut a nullo sciretur, tamen usque per fidem in Deum potuerant salvari, sed nulla salus nisi per Christum. 6[a). Quod placuit ei se monstrare ut indicaret et ostenderet ilium propter animas venisse et non propter imperium mundi, ut videremus ilia imaginem cultus et vitae quam duceremus, ut perveniri et apti reddi possimus ad recipiendum fidem.

[ApPE:r-,TDIX]

[Codex 57, p. 24a.] [VI Ph. MS., p. 3II.]

Generatio eminens*

Generatio eminens non intelligitur nisi per reflexionem et similitudinem, nec nisi sciamus quomodo omnis vis activa repraesentari possit in aura, ut in aethere omnis imago secun­dum impressam: et quia aura ista est omnium unitatum inden­dorum potens, hinc ex repraesentatione unius similis altera actualiter formatur, ut in specula, illico sumit eandem formam et repraesentanti simillimam: sed reflexio et concentratio requiritur; idque in substantiis corticalibus: ulterius non licet exire, sine philosophia mathematica serierum et graduum.

Haec etiam est ratio quod quicquid per sensus externos intrat remanebit tanquam formatum in memoria, et quasi natum. Sique organum visus potuisset suam imaginem reflectere et reflexem excipi a susceptibili materia, eadem imago nasceretur, quae causa ejus fuit in oculo: sed haec suscipitur in organis internis.

Sic ex dato uno individuo fluidi spirituosi, aut ex totidem ut inde enasci queat prima compositio, sphaerula corticea et cerebellulum, inde enascatur reliquum simile: primum itaque nequaquam existere potuit, sine creatione summi numinis cujus ad imaginem sit productum; ex quo dein reliqua in universo.

* The date of this writing is Jan., 1740.

161

SUBJECT-INDEX.

NOTE: Words are arranged under general subjects; thus under DIS­EASES are put Apoplexy, Coml'lllsiolf.s, &c.; under MIND, memory, imagi­nation, thOltglzt, &c. Cross references are indicated by italics.

The following abbreviations are used:

c. Cause. d. Defined. dist. Distinguished. ill. Illustrated.

ACTIVES. Elements. AFFECTIONS. Mind. ANATOMY, 217 n. Anatomists, 35. ANCIENTS, 75, 97. ANGELS. Spirits. ANIMAL KINGDOM is mechanical,

227. ANIMAL SPIRITS, 91. ANIMALS. Brutes. ARCHITECT, 95. ATHEISM, c. of, 2178, 2314• Re­

futed, 52, 91, 2315•

ATOMS, 75. ATTENTION. Mind (Will).

BILIOUS ICHOR, 21. BLIND,72. BLOOD. Liquors. Affected by

gladness, 1593• Why B. in face of sleeper, 74. Parts in. Are orig. of tremors and sensations, 3D, 33; are causes of affections, 46; of imagination, 71; of pleas­ure, 1593• Effect of, on memory, 77, 1097 , 115, 130; on dreams, 85; on will, 133. B-Vessels. Noth­ing sensible in, 41. Veins tu­mesce when body relaxes, why, 72. Sinuses, 74. Why so many B. V. in pia mater, 46.

BODY. All B's tend to tremulate, 2175• Human B. Effect of health on attention, 137; on in­tellect, 53; effect of vitiated

imago Imagination. n. Note. orig. Origin. W. Wolff.

states, 33. Relaxation of, descr., 72; Sleep.

BRAIN. Soul in, 98. Cerebrum and cerebellum, bond between, 71 ; effect, if rightly joined, 86. Membranes do not tremulate whole B., 219. Pia and Dura Maters, 228; attachments of, 229; relaxed in sleep, 72; effect of excessive imago on d. m., 74; sinuses of d. m., 74. Arachnoid, no nerves in, yet sensible, why, 46. Pia Mater and intellect, 46; blood. Effect of excessive action of p. m., 74; 2nd, 3rd and 4th p. m., 41. Piisima Mater, 177•

BRUTES. Lack supreme membrane of soul, 178, 18 n; s. of is first element, 210. Inmost of is mag­netic element, 210. Tremors go to sensitive soul, how, 23; and terminate there, 40. B. soul lives for a long time, 210. Orig. of will in B's, ZOO. Have confused ideas and imag., 40, 44; thought and imagination in, 3. Know quarters, why, 210. Have imper­fect sensation, 28. B. and Men compared as to soul, 5, 123, 158; consciousness, 6, 123; seat of memory, 18; perception and ap­perception, 4--<i; instinct, 123, 200; touch, 158; skin, 223. Simi­

162

INDEX.

larities between, 2, lead men to denial, 52.

CARES, 205. CHINESE, 97. CHRIST. God. COGNITION d. W., 14. COMENIUS, 97. CONSCIOUSNESS. Mind. CORPUSCULAR philosophy, 2312. CRANIUM, 228. CULTIVATION. Learning, Why

needed, 122-3. True method of, 19; effect on membranes, 36. Blemish in, 12; effect, 33. C. and tremulation, 19. C. and simile and dissimile, 19. C. is of membranes, 24, 1092 • Effect on imag., 42; and memory, 122-3; on pleasure, 162; on attention, 138-9. C. of imagination. Ex­ercises, d. W., 121; e. and judg­ment, ill., 147; habit and e., effect of, 151, 204; may be lost, 152; h. is an origin of will, 200.

DEAF, 72. DEFINITIONS, 100. DELAY. Mind (Will, imagination). DELIGHT and undelight, orig., 26. DEMONSTRATIONS, W., 149; d., 150. DEVIL, 75, 212. DISCOVERERS, 155. DISEASES, 33, 1096• Effect on

memory, 1097• Apoplexy, con­vulsions, fever, c. of, 74. Melan­cholia, sensation in, 37.

DISSONANCE, 161; c., 95. DOUBT. Not possible of things that

exist, 2. Men D. existence of soul, why, 116; which proves its existence, 26 ; W., 2. Atheism.

DREAMS, 60; W. '72 s. Simple and compound, 80; c. of, 72. Come to soul, 76. End in, 40, 76. Imag. in, 56; imago and D. dist.,

82. Thought in, 2. Succession of perceptions in, 76. Effect of pleasure in, 77. When clear, 85. When remembered, 77. When forgotten, 85. Begin from weak sensations, 77, 81. Why different D's from same sensations, 83. Similarity of state in D's and wakefulness, when and why, 40. Mutations in, why, 83; C. of, 85.

DRUNKENNESS, 37.

ECSTASY, 56.� EGYPTIANS, 97, 101.� ELEMENTS. Experience in, neces­�

sary to philosophy, 217n. Opin­ions concerning, 2176• Are me­chanical, 116; and natural, 95. Motion of, 2317; always m. in, 32; effect, 31; e. on soul, 32, 95. Are necessary for undulations, 206; for communication of mo­tions, 41, 44; for sensation, 32. E's in membranes; harmonic un­dulations unite with rn's and cause pleasure, 168. Actives and E's in soul and mind, and in angels and spirits. 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th E. cannot dissolve soul, 209. 1st E. is E. of angels and spirits, 209; makes no impress on vitiated soul, 209; 2nd E., 208; makes i. on v. s., 209. Magnetic E. soul of brutes, 210. 1st and 2nd K, and ether, 41. Ether 31­2; mind (imagination); e. and air impress vitiated soul, 209; liquor or e., 72; e. bulla, 174,:;;

effect of motion in e., 31. Ap­pellant air, 222.

EXERCISE. Cultivation.� EVIL, 164.�

FACE. Index of pleasure, 1594 •

163

INDEX.

Blood in, c. of, 1593 ; b. in F. of sleeper, 74.

FACULTY. Mind. FAITH. Not possible without God's

help, 52. Faith in God. FALL, THE, 33. FATALITY, 31. FIBRES. Motion in, 202. F. and

muscle have different tone, 204. Corporeal F., 224n. Membranes, Nerves.

FIGURES. Primitive and derivative, 101, 103.

FINITE AND INFINITE. God, me­chanical.

FOREIGN JOURNEY, 205.

GENIUS, 155. GENTILES, 232. GEOMETRICAL Mechanical. GLASS, 133. GOD, 2171,11; the Infinite, 2311; no

time, or resolution in Infinite, 230; nor anything geometrical, 1 ; not a Spirit, 1. Salvation by faith in G., and in Christ, 232. His Son, 230; Christ, 21711 ; the only nexus between finite and in­finite, 21717, 230; no n. between finite and infinite, 1, 75; the sim­ple not an., 230; the finite a non-entity, 230. Why Christ in­carnated, 232.

GOOD, 164, 197. GREEK, 130.

HABIT. Natural H. of intellect, W. 151s. Cultivation.

HARMONY. All things in man con­spire to, 26. H. of tone in mem­branes, orig. of, 150. Effect of H. on nerves, ill., 160. H. is natural with some, effect, 95. Harmonic Proportion, 26; is the

vis principii, 95. H. P. in soul, ill., 16.

HEBREW, lOIn, 130. HEISTER, 46, 223. HELL FIRE, 209, 212,21716• Spirits. HEREDITY, 200. HEURISTIC ARTIFICES, d. W., 154. HIEROGLYPHIC SIGNIFICATION, lOIn;

d., 96; in phantasy, 97; prevails in memory, 99. H. writing, ill., 99; advantage of, 148; Soul. H. phantasm, 100.

HOLY SPIRIT, 1, 21711• God. IDEA. Mind. IDIOCY. Sensation in, 37; thought

in, 3.

IGNORANCE. Leads to denial, 52. INFINITE. God. INSECTS,21. Worms. INSTINCT. Brutes. INSTRUCTION. Learning. IRRESOLUTE NOTES, 153.

JEWS AND MESSIAH, 232.

LAUGHTER d. W., 174. LEARNING. W. 157; by hiero­

glyphic figures, 101. Learned world has not penetrated deeply into occult nature, 75. Advance of, 227; Cultivation. Will assent to doctrine of tremors, 220.

LIFE, 2317. Rests in termini of tremors, 2176• L. after death, Spirits. L. of soul.

LIQUORS. Blood. Excitation of, a c. of pleasure, 159. Abundance of, effect on attention, 137, 139; variety of, e. on will, 133.

LOGIC, 150. LOVE, 170.

MAN. Growth of, 200. Natural aptness in some, 123. M. com­pared with brutes.

164

INDEX.

MECHANICAL AND GEOMETRICAL. Men believe the invisible cannot be M. 227; and that the M. will perish; refuted, 52, 116. All cre­ation M. and G., 227, 231 2 ; also spirits, 1, 75; souls, &c., 227, 2318 ; the senses, 21710 ; but not the infinite, 1.

MEMBRANES IN MAN. Enumerated, 17, 177n, 218, 228. How pictured, 2179 • 2nd M., 133. M. of liquid, 17, 41. The 3rd M. the seat of pleasure, 133, 1598 ; which is sen­sible in 4th M., 133. Must be element between M. and fibre, 206, or tendon, 218. M. of sen­sation, 219, 228. Sensitive M. must be subtle, 44, and distinct, 41; highly s. M's have no blood vessels, 41; have no tremor, but only continuous motions, 221. Tremor of M's and nerves com­pared, 222. Varieties in M's, 219; ratios in, iIIo, 44--5. Must be attached, 218, 222; why, 229. Tremulation of. Effect of ten­sion and relaxation of, 36; of injury of, on memory, 1096, 130­1; on will, 133; e. of grief or pain on, 158. M. of touch, 228; of phantasy, 115; of soul; of memory and imagination, mind.

MIND. Figure of, 117. Growth of, 200. Consciousness, d. 6; c. 107. Reflection. Actives and element in, 17. Is mechanical, 53. Mem­ory, d., 106, 109. orig. of, 1095,

111. Ever in subtle motion, 23, 99, 123. Hieroglyphic significa­tion prevails in, 99. Can grow, how, 58. Centers and compounds in, 65. Degrees of, d. 117-8. Size of, Co, 119. Length of, c., 115. Quick Memo, c. of, 115. Facility in, c. of, 112-5. Some

naturally retentive, 122. Effect of parts of blood on Mem., 1097 ,

115, 130; and recollection, 77; e. of health on, 53. Distinct per­ceptions more easily remembered, why, 127. Mem. in sleep. Com­mitting to Mem., how, 111. In­jured by disease, 1096,1, 130-1; and cured by medicine, 53. Loss of Memo, Co, 19, 71. Bad Mem., c., 1096 , 1. Failing Memo, c., 129. C. of remembrance, 130; of for­getfulness, 131; Mem., remem­brance and recognition, 119, 130, 132. Mem. can be restored and cultivated, 1096, 122-3. Genius and Mem., 155. Artificial Mem., 128. Mem. of men and brutes. Mem. and Imagination, disto, 108; orig. in senses, 1095, 111; have degrees, 118; terminus of, 48; seat and membrane of, 72, 228; m. of, is of same substance as ether, 228; Mem., 1. judg­ment, perception, 21711• 1., Wo, 42ss.; d. 109; c. of, 42, 43-4, 159. Rational 1., orig. 44. Faculty of 1., d. and c. 43, 109. Rules of 1., W. 69; law of, W. 70; c's of, 43; effects of parts of blood on, 71. Origin of 1. in soul, 66; in proxi­mate organs, 43-4; in senses, 87, 159. No 1. without sensation, 60; how aroused, 60, 71; not in the same ground as s., 72; is stronger in absence of So, why, 54--6; acts of 1. are weak s's, 51; 1. may create pleasure without s., 1592•

1. reproduces words and sights more easily than other sensations, 42; why, 57; cf. 148. Depends on mutations, 21. Never ceases, 71. Formation of, 90. Needs cultivation, 42, 48, 90. How pro­cured, Wo 126, and extended, Wo

165

INDEX.

125. One thing in, excites an­other, 90. Delay in 1., 139; no need of d. in clear 1., 48; see be­low (Will). When 1. prevails and why, 28. When possible to continue 1. 104. ;Effect of exces­sive 1., 74, 1097• 1. comprehends a part without its compound, 87. 1. and similes, 42, 48. C. of re­production in 1. 62-4, 66. When 1. more quick and clear, 46, 61. Confused 1. 71; must be confused before clear, 44. 1. with blind and deaf, 72. 1. and Phantasm dist., 43, 47. P. d. W. 47; d. and ill., 87; orig. 40, 61. Why one more perfect than another, 99. Why P. sometimes differs from what was intended, 104. P. re­quires pleasure for its continu­ance, 104. P. and particles, 159G•

Sensations in P. 37. P. and sen­sual ideas, dist., 50. Division, 88­9, and combination of P's, 90. Can be compounded, 92; ill., 94. Intellect is mechanical, 53, 227. Injured by disease and healed by medicine, 53. When greater, W. 144. Orig. of confusion in, 36. 1. and cognition, W. 143-4. Op­erations of 1., W. 145s. 1. repre­sented better by words than by visions, 148; cf. 42, 57. Natural disposition of, W. 151ss. 1. and sensory organs, 39. The rational, orig. 44; how formed, 3. Fac­ulty of reasoning, d. 109. Thought, d. and orig., 30, brutes; proves existence of soul, 8 ; spontaneous t's, 3; effect of t. on body, 74. Judgment, orig., ill., 147. Reason, d., 7, 40, W. 156; orig. of bad reasoning, 19. Rea­son and Idea, dist., 40, 46. 1., 14; d., 46; c. of, in soul, 40; and

166

proximate organ, 43-4; 1. from s. 118; s. recognizes I's, when, 119. 1. in sleep, &c., 40; in brutes, 40, 44. Must have terminus, 40. I's communicated to senses, when, 40. Sensual I's, 49, SO. Confused I's, 44. Will, 33, 21713 ; d., 195; orig., 200; proximate c., 201. Pure W., 43, 214. W. is not in element, 216. W. and volition, dist., 195; v. and nolition, 196. Effect of liquors of body on, 133. What man wills is to him good, 197. W. causes tension, 72. Ef­fect of injured membrane on, 133. W. and Delay, 42-3, 58. Use of D. 44. (See above Imag.) D. d., 214; c. of, 133. D. and Pleas­ure precede will, 133. P. a stim­ulus, 43; and c. of D., 104. P. d., 104; orig., 104, 159, 168; 2nd c. of, 160; varied according to or­gan, &c., 162. Why ~ood ~ives

P., 164. Seat of P. membrane. P. not always sensated, 133. Orig. of P. from phantasy, or sense, 1597• Connate and adsciti­tious P. 1594 • P. is constant, W. 160. Effect of P. is love, 170; e. on blood, in dream, 77; mingled e's of, 162. P. and Weariness, W. 15, 90; are not affections, W. 167; effect of when together, 162. Delay of P. a c. of appetite, 165; a. an orig. of will, 200. Attention, c. of, 137-8; degrees of, 139; c. of loss of, 140; c. of election in, 141; c. of a. and reflection, 133; a. and perception, 134. Attention is impeded by senses, why, 135-6; a. and aversion, 99, 108. Aver­sion, 165. Weariness, c. and ef­fect, 161; orig. 46; e. of mingled w's, 162. Perception, motion nec­essary to, 21. Classes of P's, 10.

INDEX.

Present P's contain past, why, 58. Have mixed center, 59. Law of increase of, 12; ill., 13. Con­nected P's of things unconnected, 67-8. Similes in, 59. P. of ma­terial things, law of, 21. Rational P's, orig., 24. P. and appercep­tion inseparable,S, 6; terminus necessary to, 21, 25, 28. A. is elective, why, 13. Affections, 215, 21712 ; d. 166. Passions of Animus, 21, 33. Anger, 192; sensation in, 37. Courage, 188. Cupidity, 182. Desire, 189. De­spair, 184. Derision, 174. Dread, 184. Envy, 173. Fastidiousness, 191. Favor, 180. Flight from evil, 183. Gladness, 1593• Glory, 177. Gratitude, 179. Grief, 158. Hatred, 165, 171. Hesitation, c. of 131. Hilarity, 190. Hope, 181. Horror, 186. Indignation, 194. Joy, 181; orig., 169. Pity, 172. Pusilanimity, 187. Revenge, 193. Shame, 178, 192. Self sat­isfaction, 175. Sorrow, d. 169. Terror, 186. Trust, 181. Unde­light, 161. Vacillation, 185.

MINERAL KINGDOM, 227. MOTION, Tremulation of lVfuscles. MUSCLES. Motion of, descr., 201­

2. Orig. of tremors in, 205, Fibre,. c. of contraction, 205. Tumesce when body relaxed, why, 72.

MUSIC, 41, 50, 133. Tremors in strings, 3, 13, 15, 222. Octaves, 19, 21, 26. Harmonies in, 147. M. without words, effect, 57. Tremors and M. harmony, 217°. Tone, 42, 204, 222; and har­monies, 15. TI'emulation. Tone.

NATURE. Is geometrical and Me­chollical, 227, 2312• The same in

greatests and leasts, 21, 31, 34, 227. Forms delights in senses, why, 26. Law of operation, 34.

NERVES. Consist of membranes, 225; are lamellas, 225. Tremor in N's and membranes compared, 222, Fibre. N. liquid, effect on memory, 115 (mind). Sensation in, why, 46.

NOCTAMBULIST. Sleep. NOTES, d. lOOn. Irresolute N. 102­

3. NOTION d., W. 14.

OCTAVE. Music. ODORS, use of, 53.

PAIN, 161; d., 163, 203; effect of, 158. C. of, 74, 203.

PARTICLES. Saline, 1598 • Blood. Philosophy of, 217.

PENDULUMS, 27, 45. PERFECTION d., W. 160n. PEWS, 133. PHILOSOPHY, 231. Lea r n i H g.

Anatomy needed in, 217n. Cor­puscular P. 2312. P. of particles, 217. Rational P., 150.

PLEASURE. Mind. PRESENCE, d., 22-3. PRINCIPIA, 7, 8, 17.

REFLECTION. Faculty of, d. and c., 142.

REPENTANCE, 176. REPETITION, 121. RUYSCH,46.

SACRED SCRIPTURE, 33, 91, 231 G.

Wolff on, lOIn. SALINE PARTS, 1593• Blood. SALIVA, 104, 1593•

SALVATION. God. SCHOOLMEN, 98. SENSATION. W., 21ss.; d., 220; c.

167

INDEX.

of, 15. Is mechanical, 227. Seat of, 72. Attachment of membranes necessary for, 229. Why in nerves, 46. S. in soul, 52, 158. Comes to soul, how, 24; coexists in s. 40; how impeded, 33; and deflected, 37. Membrane of S. without perception, when, 28. Weak and strong S's, 27, 55. S. in anger, 37; in sleep and wake­fulness, 83. Sensitive appetite and aversion, 165. S. in brutes. S's, similes and imagination, 54 (Mind). S. in soul, not always same as mutations in Sensory or­gans, ill., 37. S.O.'s, d., 25; ef­fect of injury to, on will, 133; understanding and, 39. Senses, 231 8 ; from s's can argue to soul, 38; to be explained mechanically, 21710 ; c. of attention in, 133. How all senses can perceive si­multaneously, 27; s's not inter­changeable in imagination, 42. Hearing, tremors in, 15; h. and sight, excite saliva, 104, 1593 ;

how h. and s. dulled, 33. Experi­ence in sight, a guide to other senses, 38. Pleasure excites humors in eyes, 1593• Parts not sensated in smell and taste, 87. Touch, membrane of, 228; where t. begins, 158; brutes,. t. and pleasure, 168.

SENSIBLE OBJECT, 29. SENSUAL IDEAS, 49. Mind. SENTENCES, 57, 147. SIMILE, 24, 43, 61, 204. S's, how

moved, 59. S. seeks S., 63; pro­duces S., 59. Concurrent S's, effect, 146. S., sensation and imagination, 54; S. and imag., 42, 48. S. and dissimile, 36, c. of, 40; effect, 12, 13; cultivation and, 19.

SIMPLE. The S. not a nexus of finite and infinite, 230. S. men, 227.

SKIN, 23355. In men and brutes. Miliary glands, 224. Papillae, 226.

SLEEP, d., 72; c. 83. Is c. of re­pose, why, 74. Why blood in face, in S., 74. Memory in S., 130, dreams. S. and wakefulness compared, 72; difference of sen­sation in, 83; fever from w., why, 74. Noctambulism, 40; c., 73; a kind of apoplexy, 73.

SOLID, 153. SOUL, d., W. 2. Exists, 91. Is

from infinite alone, 52. Why liv­ing, 209. Can be demonstrated geometrically, 2174 ; also its es­sence, 231 6• Rules for proving existence of, 26, W. 2; not proved, 3, but only indicated by mere fact of thought, 8. Organ­ism to be learned from senses, 34. Immortal, 91, 209, 21715 ; geo­metrically demonstrable, 2174•

Has faculty of picturing, 148. S. and hieroglyphic writing, 148. Constitution of, 208-9. Parts of, similar, 179, 98, 21719, ill., 105. Is a mechanism. Might be visi­ble, 75. Figure of, 14, 117, 209; f. of vitiated S., 209. Spiral curvature in, 15, 16, ill. 17. When well figured has good memory, 115. Furnished with membranes, 115; why, 109; rn's of, include 1st and 2nd actives, 208, 228, and element, 17. Can act and be acted on, 17; acted on by 1st element, 31, 209. How S. determines its motions, 203-4. Place in body, 98; different in vitiated body, 91; effect, 209. Ideas from, 118; recognizes i's

168

INDEX.

reproduced, when, 119. Is orig. of imag., 66 (Mind). Light and darkness of, 9. Confuses, 123; confused perception of, c. 20; confused ideas in, why, 44. En­joys subtle sensation, 52; even when not sensible to body, 71; cannot alter s., 30-1. S. and 2nd membrane remains the same in pleasure, 133. S. of men and brutes. State after death, 21714­ 15•

Receives impress of elements dif­ferently, 209, 212, according to life in body, 21716• Vitiated S's tormented, 91, 209. Communion of S's, how effected, 17, 213. Deemed impossible, 52. Can be demonstrated, 231 6•

SPIRITS. Notions, 1,75, and doubts concerning, 52. Must be mechan­ical and geometrical, 1, 75; can be demonstrated, 2174 ; might even be visible, 75. Angels, 75, 2172, 4; have more subtle consti­tution, descr., 211; a's and S's cannot penetrate to causes of soul, 52, 91; nor resolve the in­finite, 230; a's operate on S's, 91. Evil S's have no sensation from subtle motions, 212. S's of devil, 75; constitution of, descr., 212; Hell fire.

STRANGER, 227. STUDIES, W. 103. Cultivation. TENDON. How contracted, 218.

Muscle.

TERMINUS, 27, 205, 209; ill. 206. Termini necessary to confine mo­tions, 1095 ; to give perception, mind,. to give tone, 222; to pro­duce presence, 23. Effect of vari­ous T., 222; result, if lacking, 95. Life rests in T. of tremors, 2178 ;

T. of t's necessary for existence

of idea, 40. Terminus of imag., 48.

TREMULATION. Orig., 21. Forma­tion of T's in man, 19; are from top to bottom, 2179• Varieties of, 15; ill. 27. Are c's of sensation, 15. T's of soul, ill. in strings, 3, music. T's go from gross to subtle membranes, 2177, 2317; g. cannot move s., 40; and vice versa, 42, 203. Subtle T. from memory, 23, 99. All bodies tend to T., 2175• T. and undulation, dist., 21n, 2317; u. is orig., of T., 24; u. causes contraction, 205; u's may be simultaneous and min­gled, 207. Membranes undulate mechanically, 218. Undulating threads, 202. A tremor is an idea, 46. Tremors in membranes, 18; not necessary in subtlest m's, 221; t. produces contraction, ill., 206; muscle,' t. in membrane, from at., 206; t. and music,. t's in glass, etc., 133.

TRINITY, 97.

UNIVERSE. Is mechanical and will not perish, 116.

UNKNOWN, 75. No refuge in, 21. USE. Cultivation.

VEGETABLE KINGDOM, 227. VENERATION, 52. VIS PRINCIPII, d., 95. VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE, 26.

WINE, 75. WEARINESS. Mind (Pleasure). WORDs. Use of, W. 143. \V's and

music. New W's for the un­known, 75.

WORLD. Learning, universe. WORMS, 75, 105. Insects, 21.

169