Keywords: Critical theory; Employee reporting; Learning representatives; Social reporting; Stakeholders; Trade unions; United kingdom; Workplacelearning
1. Introduction
In the employee reporting and social and environmental accounting and reporting (SEAR) research fields, manywriters (Foley & Maunders, 1977; Gray, Owen, & Adams, 1996; Gray, Owen, & Maunders, 1991; Jackson-Cox, Thirkell, & McQueeney, 1984; Owen & Lloyd, 1985; Puxty, 1991; Tinker & Gray, 2003) have offeredproposals to extend accountability and fairness at work and in society more generally. However, disputes existbetween critical writers and other authors about the types of accountability and justice allowed by the underly-ing power relationships between those who do and those who do not control industry. While some proponentsof employee reporting (e.g., Foley & Maunders, 1977; Jackson-Cox et al., 1984; Owen & Lloyd, 1985) arguethat companies should report a broader range of details to trade unions to aid their negotiations with employers,critical theorists (e.g., Ogden & Bougen, 1985) suggest that provision of such information may simply involvestructuring the employment relationship to meet employers’ interests. Similarly, although SEAR supporters advo-cate that fairness and accountability may be enhanced if companies include, inter alia, employment information(e.g., Adams, Coutts, & Harte, 1995; Adams & Harte, 2000) in reports prepared in conjunction with a broaderrange of stakeholders connected to an organization (Gray, Dey, Owen, Evans, & Zadek, 1997) and dissemi-nated to a broader range of external stakeholders (Gray et al., 1996, p. 3), critical theorists (Puxty, 1991; Tinker,
B. Lee, C. Cassell / Accounting Forum 32 (2008) 276–287 277
Lehman, & Neimark, 1991) infer that such reports could perpetuate the unjust society in which any change takesplace.
Central to the above dispute is an underlying inference by some critical theorists (Puxty, 1991, p. 37; Tinker etal., 1991, p. 47) that reform of current institutions may help regenerate and perpetuate the unjust society of whichthose institutions are a part. Such an inference is present in Marx’s work from where many critical theorists draw theirinspiration. As Cohen (1983, pp. 23 et seq) points out, many of Marx’s writings present the economy as having atotalizing effect on the rest of society, so that the State and civil society simply reflect forms of capitalist dominationresiding in the economy. A logical corollary is that the calls by other writers who articulate interests emanatingfrom civil society – i.e., that multiplicity of institutions such as the media, churches, professional associations andsocial movements that function independently of the State or the economy – for companies to either reform theirreporting procedures, or for the State to revise regulation of reporting, can only strengthen prevailing forms of classdomination.
An alternative reading of the role of civil society is provided by Gramsci (1978). Gramsci was a Marxist so heaccepted that transcending forms of class domination residing in patterns of ownership of the economy was centralto the movement away from capitalism towards a more egalitarian society. However, he recognised the heterogeneityand potential autonomy of a broad range of civil society institutions through which people seek to realise some oftheir multifaceted needs. Cohen (1983, p. 211) suggests that while the multiplicity of institutions in civil societyhelp to define the pluralist and democratic nature of advanced societies, they also provide areas of domination andsubordination that are not determined by class membership. Consequently, groups other than the working class mayfind their interests denied through civil society institutions in capitalist societies. For Gramsci, in a society in whichthere is a fully developed civil society, a key part of the movement to an alternative economy is to form a broad allianceof all those who are critical of the current order. The battle to form a broad alliance between the working class and othersacross a range of civil society institutions to strengthen the force for change constitutes what Gramsci has described asa war of position. A key objective of this article is to use Gramsci’s concept of war of position to interpret employeereporting and SEAR – where they infer restrictions on capital’s power vis-a-vis progressive forces – as indicating apotential alignment of the actions of supporters of employee reporting and SEAR, with the critical theorists’ goal oftranscending the current form of society.
A second objective of this article is to illustrate what such an alliance might look like in practice by showinghow employee reporting and SEAR might be used to strengthen the UK’s trade union learning representative (ULR)initiative. The ULR initiative has been chosen for illustrative purposes for two reasons. Firstly, not only does theULR initiative have an emergent importance as a relatively new innovation that is helping to transform employmentrelationships in the UK (Alexandrou, Davies, & Lee, 2005; Cassell & Lee, 2007; Moore & Wood, 2005; Wallis,Stuart, & Greenwood, 2005), but similar schemes have been developed in other countries – for examples, learningrepresentatives in New Zealand (Farr, 2006; Lee & Cassell, 2005), competence pilots in Finland (Kolkka & Wesanko,2006) and learning ambassadors and guidance corners in Denmark (Plant & Turner, 2005) – as trade union-led initiativesthat seek to extend employees’ right to learning at work. Secondly, the ULR initiative has the potential to appeal tosupporters of employee reporting and SEAR as well as to critical theorists. That is to say, supporters of employeereporting and SEAR aim to extend managers’ accountability to broader groups than simply shareholders (e.g., Grayet al., 1996) and have articulated their concerns as extending social justice (e.g., Ball & Seal, 2005, p. 455; seealso, Tinker & Gray, 2003, p. 729). The ULR initiative promises to both extend social justice by increasing learningopportunities for ordinary working people and improve accountability by promoting means by which trade unions mayseek explanations of managers about their support for learning. Since Marx, critical theorists (e.g., Arnold & Cooper,1999) have recognised the important role played by trade unions in defending working people’s interests vis-a-vis theowners of capital. The ULR initiative promises to help strengthen trade unions by widening their appeal (Unionlearn,2006).
The discussion is organized into two main sections. The first reviews the debates between critical theorists andother authors around employee reporting and SEAR and proposes Gramsci’s concept of war of position as a wayof understanding the potential for the different authors to act in complementary ways in pursuing their differentobjectives. The second outlines the ULR initiative and uses an empirical study of trade union (TU) officials to illustratehow critical theorists and other writers’ approaches to employee reporting and SEAR could work in complementaryways in practice to support the ULR initiative. The paper concludes by suggesting other policy areas that could beadvanced by complementary actions of the different writers.
278 B. Lee, C. Cassell / Accounting Forum 32 (2008) 276–287
2. Employee and social reporting as a war of position
Traditional forms of financial reporting assume capitalist property laws (Brown, 2000, p. 51). Thus, a firm’s managersare seen as only accountable – i.e., required “to provide an account . . . of those actions for which one is held responsible”(Gray et al., 1996, p. 38) – to shareholders for financial performance. Proposals to extend accountability to others haveled to disputes between advocates of employee reporting and SEAR vis-a-vis critical theorists. Those proposals anddisputes will be reviewed before Gramsci’s concept of war of position is discussed.
2.1. Employee reporting
In the UK, pressures for disclosure of company information to trade unions appeared from 1960 (Jackson-Cox etal., 1984, pp. 253–254) when the State saw employers’ provision of information about TU members’ employment as ameans to a consensus between employees and employers. The 1975 Employment Protection Act contained provisionsfor a Code of Practice on disclosure of information to trade unions.1 Ogden and Bougen (1985, pp. 214 et seq) providea typology of the different perspectives – namely, the adversarial, abstract rational, co-operative and pluralist positionsand Ogden and Bougen’s own radical approach – that explain the usefulness of any information that employers discloseto trade unions.
The adversarial perspective is most sympathetic to capital and suggests that employers should only disclose infor-mation to trade unions if they obtain some tactical advantage by doing so. Others suggest a greater affinity between thegoals of employers and employees, which may be enhanced by employers’ disclosure of information. For example, theabstract rational position sees benefits arising from disclosure of the optimal amount of information to allow reductionof trade unions’ forecasting errors to forestall inappropriate claims. Similarly, the co-operative approach suggests thatdisclosure of information allows trade unions and management to arrive at shared solutions in a more professionalway. The pluralist stance recognises that there may be different interests in the workplace but believes that employersshould share some information to create an environment of mutual trust in which the different parties may pursue theirrespective goals in complementary ways.
Ogden and Bougen’s radical perspective challenges the idea of labour benefiting from information provided bycapital. They recognise an underlying conflict of interests between employers and employees and that companies’information systems are designed to produce data for management purposes. Consequently, the information is not in aformat where it will be of use to trade unions.2 In a context where managers are the original designers and owners ofcorporate information, disclosure to trade unions may be used as a part of a management strategy to obtain the consentof employees for the conditions of their own exploitation (Ogden & Bougen, 1985, pp. 219 et seq).
After the 1979 Conservative Government introduced laws designed to limit TUs’ influence, debates on employeereporting lost impetus in the UK (cf., Day & Woodward, 2004). However, SEAR came to the fore.
2.2. Social and environmental accounting and reporting
From the nineteen-sixties, a range of social movements – which may be defined as “a kind of campaign [that] . . .
demands righting of a wrong” (Tilley, 1998, p. 467) – emerged to articulate the interests of women, ethnic minorities,community groups and environmentalists (Boggs, 1986, Chapter 2; Boggs, 2001, p. 286; Byrne, 1997, pp. 131 etseq). At this time, social reporting – in the form of social audits prepared by parties outside of a company – roseto prominence (Gray, 2001, p. 9; see also, Gray, 2002, pp. 690 et seq) to convey information about companies ofconcern to social movements (Cooper, Taylor, Smith, & Catchpowle, 2005, pp. 953–954). Although SEAR lost some
1 Day and Woodward (2004, pp. 47–48) detail how the Employment Act of 1982 and Companies Act of 1985 required companies to use theDirectors Report to elaborate on how in the preceding 12 months, they had provided employees with information on matters that concern them asemployees and consulted them when decisions were made that might affect their interests. However, like more recent disclosure requirements, suchprovisions addressed employees per se rather than their trade unions.
2 Indeed, many (Brown, 2000, p. 53; Cooper and Essex, 1977, p. 210; Foley and Maunders, 1977, p. 14; see also, Owen & Lloyd, 1985) highlightthat a company’s published accounts are often inadequate for TU purposes. There is also evidence that many employers fail to honour legal obligationsto report on employee issues in any substantive way (Adams & Harte, 2000; Day and Woodward, 2004, pp. 55 et seq).
B. Lee, C. Cassell / Accounting Forum 32 (2008) 276–287 279
popularity in the UK from 1979 when the neo-liberal Conservative Government promoted free markets, it subsequentlygathered support, albeit in a transmuted form with companies increasingly disclosing social information (Gray, 2001,pp. 10–11). Thus, supporters of SEAR have called for reports on, inter alia, environmental impact (Owen, 1992) andequal employment opportunities (Adams et al., 1995; Adams & Harte, 2000), to be prepared by an organization’sexecutive managers in conjunction with additional groups (Gray et al., 1997) and articulated to a broader range ofstakeholders than simply shareholders (Gray et al., 1996).
There are many typologies (see Deegan, 2002; Gray et al., 1991, p. 15, 1996; Lehman, 2001; Mathews, 2004; Parker,2005) of ideas that seek to explain the existence of SEAR. The ideas range from the business case (Elkington, 1997)to critical theory (Cooper et al., 2005; Puxty, 1991; Tinker et al., 1991), with several forms of analysis in between,including institutional theory, organizational legitimacy and variants of stakeholder theory (Deegan, 2002; Gray et al.,1991, 1996; Mathews, 2004). Space constraints preclude a review of the nuances of the different theories. For thisdiscussion, it is sufficient to review how the different theorists’ ideas on disclosure provide a greater or lesser challengeto the current order.
The business case offers no challenge to the current order. It assumes the legitimacy of capitalist patterns of ownershipand suggests that companies should use triple bottom line reporting to illustrate the social and environmental – as wellas the financial – impact of projects to shareholders. Other theories – such as institutional theory, organizationallegitimacy and stakeholder theory – suggest that a social contract exists around a common set of values betweenthe individuals, organizations and companies that comprise society. Although some of these theorists recognise thatcompanies’ interests may diverge from those residing in broader society, they contend that companies will seek toconvince others of their shared interests (see Deegan, 2002). However, any failure by a company to present its interestsas synonymous with the wellbeing of others could lead to a challenge. Thus, while the ideas of these different theoristsdo not challenge the current order directly, they infer possible challenges to the legitimacy of individual companiesthat violate common values. In short, companies may be made more accountable to a broader range of parties thanshareholders. Yet many supporters of SEAR also argue that their ideas are distinct from those of critical theoristsbecause they only seek reform of current society (e.g., Gray et al., 1996; Mathews, 2004).
Critical theorists’ desire to transcend capitalism means that their ideas offer the greatest challenge to the currentorder. They draw their inspiration from Marx’s work and see in current society an unjust system that subordinates andexploits natural resources and labour in a drive for profit that brings most benefit to those who direct multinationalcapital. Critical theorists have often presented general support for SEAR as both populist and supportive of the currentorder because engagement with current institutions either implies their acceptance (Tinker et al., 1991), or is naıve ofprevailing political forces, which leaves SEAR initiatives open to hijack by powerful corporations that engage withSEAR from utilitarian self-interest (Tinker & Gray, 2003, pp. 729–730). However, some critical theorists (e.g., Cooperet al., 2005, p. 93) have argued recently that social accounts may be effective when they are composed outside of themarket, informed by critical theory and linked to the struggles of social movements. In the context of Puxty’s (1991)longstanding call for a dialogue between critical theorists and other authors on the potential of social accounting, it isof value to ask whether the various forms of social accounts proposed by both critical theorists and other writers haveany potential to act in complementary ways.
2.3. War of position
Gramsci’s (1978) idea of pursuing a strategy of war of position to transcend capitalist hegemony in situations wherethere is a fully developed civil society will be used here to suggest one way of understanding a potential overlap of theaims and objectives of critical theorists and some other authors on employee reporting and SEAR. Gramsci drew hisinspiration from Marx. Thus, his over-riding interest was to transcend capitalist organization of modern economies.Yet in advocating a war of position, he recognised the importance of promoting alliances between all who have aninterest in limiting the power of those who control capital.
Gramsci’s concept of war of position is linked to two other concepts; hegemony and civil society. Gramsci’s workon hegemony is well established in the accounting literature—see Cooper (1995), Goddard (2002), Lehman (1995),Lehman and Tinker (1987), Richardson (1989), Spence (2007) and Tinker et al. (1991). It is, thus, sufficient to statehere that hegemony refers to the mixture of winning consent from a majority through propagation of ideas of therights of leaders and a threat of force against any deviant minority, to allow the development of an economy underthe direction of a leading class and its political and social allies (Gramsci, 1978, p. 263). Gramsci (1978, pp. 55–60)
280 B. Lee, C. Cassell / Accounting Forum 32 (2008) 276–287
argued that, at times of crisis, the type of hegemony of one class may be replaced by a different type of hegemony ofthe same class, or a subordinate class may succeed the class that was previously hegemonic.
The means of challenging the hegemony of a leading class and capturing the State for a subordinate class to transformsociety varies according to civil society’s development. Civil society3 is “the ensemble of organisms commonly called“private”” (Gramsci, 1978, p. 12). These include churches, trade unions, professional associations including those com-posed of academic accountants, community groups and other voluntary association such as social movements (Burawoy,2000, p. 162; Simon, 1982, p. 26). Gramsci (1978, p. 238) presents two general political compositions. The first iswhere the State is an omnipotent force with democratic institutions in civil society non-existent. The second is wherecivil society is fully developed. Unlike in much of Marx’s work where civil society is presented as simply reproducingforms of oppression existing in the economy (Cohen, 1983), Gramsci saw civil society institutions enjoying a degree ofautonomy. Thus, civil society institutions may provide either resistance to the State’s support for organization of indus-try in a particular way, or a buffer for the State against such resistance. In other words, civil society provides a terrainwhere support for progressive change may be won or lost (Leversha, 1977, p. 119; cf. Cohen & Arato, 1992, p. 151).
Gramsci argues that for people seeking to transcend and replace capitalist economies, there are two forms of politicalstrategy that vary in their appropriateness, depending on the extent of civil society. The first is “war of manoeuvre”,which is possible when civil society is undeveloped. It involves simply seizing control of State apparatuses and usingthem to organize the economy around alternative principles. In this way, the transformation of the economy eitherprecedes or takes place simultaneous to the democratization of broader society. Gramsci’s (1978, pp. 238–239) secondpolitical strategy is a “war of position”. Where civil society is fully developed, it is necessary to win sustained supportacross its many institutions for any envisaged fundamental change to society and it is this that constitutes a war ofposition. As Burawoy (2000, p. 162) has put it, war of position involves “a reconstitution or replacement of the existingcivil society with one favorable to the spread of socialist ideology and the consolidation of prefigurative institutions”.The existence of a fully developed civil society implies a two-staged transition (Sassoon, 1982, p. 98; Simon, 1982,p. 75). First, a fuller democratisation of the current capitalist formation takes place partly through transformation ofcivil society institutions. Second, there is a movement – that draws support from civil society institutions – towards ademocratic economy based on socialist principles.
The arguments of the advocates of employee reporting and SEAR and their proposals for reform of accounting shouldbe evaluated in this context. Obviously, some advocates of employee reporting and SEAR are wholly supportive of thecurrent order. However, others are not. Some writers on employee reporting (e.g., Owen & Harte, 1984, p. 184) expressdissatisfaction with capital’s right to define the terms of the framework for its negotiations with labour. Similarly, somesupporters of SEAR object to how traditional accounting “benignly” accepts “the dominant rights of investors andfinancial markets” and they advocate changes to investors’ exclusive rights to influence companies (Gray, Owen, &Maunders, 1988, pp. 6 and 7). They have also set up their own institutions in civil society to develop social accountingto reflect broader parties’ needs (Gray et al., 1997, p. 326). Although such institutions represent academic accountants’interests, there is the potential for these writers’ ideas and actions to add new dimensions to trade unions’ demands forreform of workplace relationships and social movements’ objections to inequality, environmental disequilibrium, etc.A potential outcome could be to limit the ability of those who control multinational capital to simply pursue their owninterests, while strengthening organizations that may be prefigurative of a socialist economy.
The potential for trade unions and social movements to constitute forces that are prefigurative of a non-capitalistorder should not be understated. It has long been argued that trade unions represent people who have an interest intranscending capitalist economies that use their labour as a source of profit for others, even if they are not alwayscognizant of that (Marx & Engels, 1969, pp. 116–117). Similarly, while social movements’ actions are simply protestsexpressing alternative values rather than being directed to redressing power relationships through political practice(Boggs, 1986, p. 76; Byrne, 1997, pp. 145 et seq), many social movements have an interest in transcending thecurrent order. As Boggs (1986, p. 51; see also, Sklair, 1995, pp. 503–504) explains, they “assert social use value overexchange value, human needs over commodities even where such transformative language is rarely employed”.
In this context, advance in a war of position may be evident in information disclosure that makes those who controlmultinational capital more accountable in the current order while strengthening forces that may be prefigurative of an
3 For interpretation of the contribution and threats of civil society for accountability from alternative frameworks, see Gray, Bebbington, andCollinson (2006) and Lehman (1999, pp. 224 et seq, 2007).
B. Lee, C. Cassell / Accounting Forum 32 (2008) 276–287 281
alternative society. Thus, there is a potential overlap between employee reporting and SEAR supporters’ pursuit ofdisclosure and the aim of critical theorists to transcend current society. A potential manifestation of this overlap willbe considered by examining how employee or social reporting might help advance the UK’s ULR initiative.
3. The trade union learning representative initiative
ULRs are a new innovation. ULRs were first proposed at the Trade Union Congress (TUC)’s 1998 annual conference(Rana, 2001, p. 29). These proposals coincided with the 1997 New Labour government’s attempts to promote lifelonglearning (Margolis, 2003). That government’s policy document, “The Learning Age”, promoted learning as a partnershipbetween “employers, employees and their trade unions” (DfEE, 1998, Paragraph 3.10). However, many employersfailed to support ULRs (Cowen, Clements, & Cutter, 2000, pp. 13 and 19; TUC, 2002; York Consulting Limited,2003), so the Government (DfES, 2001) issued the consultation paper “Providing Statutory Rights for Union LearningRepresentatives”. Despite continuing opposition from employers’ representatives including the Confederation of BritishIndustry, the British Chambers of Commerce and the Engineering Employers Federation (Clough, 2004, p. 31; Rana,2001, pp. 26–27), ULRs were granted statutory support by the 2002 amendments to the Employment Act (HMSO,2002).
The statutory provisions allow people paid time off to train as ULRs and to: (i) analyse learning or training needsof other employees, advise those employees on learning and training matters and arrange learning and training and (ii)consult with an employer about learning matters that affect employees. The ULR initiative, thus, promises to extendjustice at work by creating learning opportunities for all. These rights to consultation for ULRs could also extend anorganization’s managers’ accountability for provision of workplace learning opportunities, beyond executive managersand shareholders, to the wider workforce and trade union officials. Following the statutory provisions, the number ofULRs grew from 6500 in 2003 to around 18,000 in 2007 and is intended to reach 22,000 by 2010 (TUC, 2004a, p. 3;TUC, 2005, p. 3; Unionlearn, 2007). Consequently, the ULR initiative may strengthen the TU movement by extendingits function and appeal (Unionlearn, 2006).
The programme of research from which the empirical evidence below is drawn is unique in considering the potentialcontribution of social accounting to the ULR initiative. As the TUC had proposed the introduction of ULRs, the researchfocused on its affiliated unions. The TUC is the UK’s largest single body of workers and had an affiliated membershipof 6,690,741 members at the start of this research in 2003 (TUC, 2004b, p. 120). At that time, 36 trade unions wereactively involved in the ULR initiative (see TUC, 2004b, p. 108). Trade unions with ULRs were identified throughinformation provided on their websites. Between July 2003 and December 2004, visits were made to thirteen tradeunions, if the two strands of Amicus that had recently merged are counted separately. Semi-structured interviews, ofbetween 60 and 90 minutes each, were held with 15 full-time officials who had responsibility for learning at eithernational or regional level. The trade unions visited, their size of membership and the number of respondents interviewedare listed in Table 1. Our cross-section covered over one-third of the trade unions that had ULRs and included the
Table 1TUs included, proportion of TUC affiliated membership & number of respondents
Trade union % of TUC membership No. of respondents
Unison 19.27 1Amicus—Amalgamated Engineering & Electrical Union (AEEU)
15.872
Amicus—Manufacturing, Science & Finance (MSF) 1Transport & General workers (T&G) 12.49 1General, Municipal & Boilermakers (GMB) 10.52 1Public and Commercial Services (PCS) 4.27 2Communication Workers Union (CWU) 3.98 1Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians (UCATT) 1.72 1National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE) 0.99 1National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) 0.94 1Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematograph and Theatre Union (BECTU) Less than 0.5 1National Union of Journalists (NUJ) Less than 0.5 1Transport Salaried Staffs’ Association (TSSA) Less than 0.5 1
282 B. Lee, C. Cassell / Accounting Forum 32 (2008) 276–287
five largest and some medium and small trade unions that, together, represent around 70% of the TUC affiliatedmembership.
To assess whether and how employee and social reporting could help improve the ULR initiative, the interviewschedule included questions on whether the ULR initiative had made employers more accountable for learning, the typesof measurements that may be useful for assessing ULR activity and whether reporting mechanisms would enhanceaccountability. Interviews were audio-taped and transcribed verbatim. Interview transcripts were interpreted usingtemplate analysis (King, 2004) by organizing the data under a set of relevant headings to identify the typical varietyof opinions in these areas. The headings were drawn initially from the interview schedule and included provisions foraccountability, measurements and any potential for employee reporting and SEAR. The other main source of evidenceused in this paper is learning agreements, as they constitute new provisions for accountability associated with the ULRinitiative. Model and actual learning agreements were collected and analysed by reading through to identify commonthemes of coverage and provisions for their operation.4
This evidence is organized below to report on TU officials’ views of (i) emergent forms of accountability arisingfrom the ULR initiative, (ii) desirable measurements and (iii) any potential of employee reports and social accounts tosupport the ULR initiative, to suggest (iv) how an alliance of different authors might manifest in actions that supportthe ULR initiative.
3.1. Emergent forms of accountability
TU officials were asked about the ways in which the ULR initiative had increased employers’ accountability aroundthe provision of learning opportunities. Learning committees featured prominently in their responses. The Amicus-MSFofficial explained the operation of learning committees:
“[W]e always advocate a steering committee specifically for learning on which . . . some of the learning reps willsit. The colleges that are involved in partnership will sit, representatives of the company will sit and that way, inthat forum there is sort of feedback.”
Learning agreements were the other new initiative involving provisions for accountability that were reported fre-quently by respondents. The substantive content of many agreements between an employer and one or more tradeunion included detail of the mechanisms for reporting to each other, which was usually through the type of com-mittee described above. In most instances, learning agreements specified the ULRs’ rights – such as time for ULRduties and access to office facilities – and responsibilities, including working within the legislation. Some agreementsspecified the responsibilities of the company and its managers. For companies these included “Approving the timenecessary to support and encourage participation in learning” and “Recognising and supporting the role of Learn-ing Representatives as advocates for learning within the organisation”. Managers’ responsibilities included: “SupportLearning Representatives in their role and responsibilities as advocates for learning within the organisation”. Someagreements also included opportunities for learners such as access to learning centres and any entitlements to time off forlearning.
While a number of respondents expressed satisfaction with the emergent forms of accountability, others reporteddifficulties in securing learning agreements. Thus:
“[M]ost managers would turn round and say, “Well, where’s your national agreement? If you haven’t got anational agreement, go away.” (CWU official.)
Although the 2002 revisions to the Employment Act made provisions for TU officials to take an employer toan industrial tribunal for obstructing the introduction of ULRs, many respondents doubted the effectiveness of suchprovisions. Some TU officials called for stronger forms of legally enforceable disputes procedures to make employersaccountable. The GMB official explained why this was required:
4 Although the data listed above are the main sources used in this paper, other evidence was also collected, including: briefing materials for ULRsand other learning materials; formal interviews with a range of other parties involved in TU learning; and informal conversations with full-timeofficials and ULRs and observations at some trade unions’ seminars for ULRs. This additional data has been used for triangulation purposes (Scapens,2004, p. 269) to check the validity of the evidence that is reported.
B. Lee, C. Cassell / Accounting Forum 32 (2008) 276–287 283
“If employers . . . fiddle about avoiding litigation . . . sometimes the impetus is lost because we’ve taken so longgetting to where we need to be to prove beyond reasonable doubt the point that we’re making. I just think a slimlined, faster track system where employers should be accountable would do a great deal of good.”
3.2. Measurements
In the light of weaknesses in existing forms of accountability, TU officials were asked what measurements wouldallow them to assess the advance of the ULR initiative at a company. Many TU officials argued for measurements oflearning outcomes such as the number of ULRs that existed, whether learning centres had been established and thenumber of people who had undertaken courses at different levels.
While some TU officials appeared to accept measurements as an objective statement, others recognised that omissionof information could mask a variety of situations, including employers’ lack of support for the ULR initiative. Thus,the respondent from Amicus MSF argued for the provision of explanations in any years when no support for learningactivity had been forthcoming. She said:
“[I]f they weren’t doing anything they’d have to say why they weren’t doing anything. You know, “What’s thereason that you can’t, you know, help your staff develop? . . . There’s a lot of companies that aren’t doing anythingand . . . they’re allowed to do nothing.”
Some respondents also suggested that simple statements of the existence of some learning provisions would not besufficient. This issue was raised frequently with particular reference to the 2002 amendments to the Employment Actthat provided ULRs with the right to “reasonable” time off to carry out their role. A number of respondents arguedthat definition of the term reasonable was a contestable terrain. Instead, they preferred detailed measurements of anysupport for ULRs including the time that ULRs were allowed for their work. For example:
“[I]f you’ve got a Learner Representative . . . they should say well it’s . . . for two, three, four, five hours a week.”(Amicus AEEU official)
3.3. Potential role for employee reporting and SEAR
TU officials were asked whether companies should prepare reports that explain arrangements for accountabilityaround learning and measure learning outcomes. Some respondents expressed views similar to the optimistic sugges-tions of some supporters of SEAR (Gray et al., 1997, p. 329) that disclosure could encourage more ethical behaviourby organizational managers. The CWU official said:
“If they [executive managers] were made accountable to do reports on that sort of thing, then, you know, youcould then sort of produce that to the middle managers and say: “Look, this is the policy of the business.””
In line with the suggestion of some advocates (Gray et al., 1997, p. 337) of SEAR, for stakeholders to define theiraccountability relationships with organizations, an Amicus AEEU official proposed the preparation of a joint report.He said:
“[Firms] could work in partnership with the learning centre or the learning facility that we’re trying to makeavailable and provide a joint report.”
Other respondents were sceptical of the merits of a company reporting on social and employment issues. The TSSAofficial said:
“[It’s] pointless putting it in just because it looks good. So only if it’s genuine and if they really, you know, careabout what they’re doing and care about learning.”
3.4. A potential alliance around reporting on ULRs
The evidence above indicates that the TU officials expressed a range of views on forms of accountability emergingfrom the ULR initiative, the merits of measurements of learning outcomes and the potential for companies to expressthese activities meaningfully in company reports. Variations in the trade union officials’ views are based in part on their
284 B. Lee, C. Cassell / Accounting Forum 32 (2008) 276–287
experiences of negotiating with employers when some employers accept a union-led initiative while others oppose it.Variations in trade unions’ success in winning the right for ULRs to organize learning for their members at differentcompanies and in trade unions’ scepticism about companies’ reports suggest that the type of social report that may beuseful in helping to advance the ULR initiative may vary according to the prevailing circumstances.
Where companies recognised ULRs, information about learning issues in annual reports and social reports mayallow trade unions to negotiate further advances in learning at those companies. Thus, such information may helpextend the accountability of employers over learning to the trade union movement while enhancing social justice atwork by extending learning opportunities. Where TU officials were sceptical of the extent to which company reportsare representing learning opportunities accurately, or were aware of companies where rights to learning were denied,the type of social report produced outside of a company, as advocated by critical theorists, could help trade unions tohighlight those companies’ failings. Promotion of learning in existing reports and assistance in helping trade unionsproduce their own social accounts on learning could help strengthen trade unions by providing the means to advancetheir campaign around workplace learning. The actions of any advocates of employee reporting and SEAR and criticaltheorists in promoting learning in different types of reports would work in complementary ways to simultaneouslypromote justice at work, enhance accountability and strengthen trade unions that are potentially prefigurative of analternative economy.
4. Concluding discussion
This discussion has acknowledged the theoretical differences between critical theorists and others in the areas ofemployee reporting and SEAR. In effect, many supporters of employee reporting and SEAR have sought to promotecompanies’ development of social accounting – by advocating reports on non-financial, social issues, prepared bybroader groups of stakeholders than simply executive managers and addressed to the interests of wider groups thanshareholders – as a means to improving accountability. By contrast, critical theorists have warned that unless any socialaccounts are composed outside of the market, informed by a theoretical paradigm that recognises the potential forchange and are linked to the struggles of social movements, their production could strengthen capitalist economies.
One contribution of this article has been to use Gramsci’s concept of war of position in a novel way to the accountingliterature, to escape this divide. Gramsci recognised the multiplicity of civil society institutions as potential arenas ofconflict – of both a class and non-class nature – through which people may seek to realise many of their multifacetedneeds. Gramsci’s war of position concept implies strengthening forces that are prefigurative of socialism within capitalisteconomies, before a transition to an economy along non-capitalist lines. It has been suggested that collectives ofacademic accountants advocating either employee reporting or SEAR constitute forces in civil society that may helpto make employers more accountable within capitalism, either to trade unions that represent workers, or to socialmovements in civil society. As trade unions and social movements may be prefigurative of a new social order, theactions of supporters of employee reporting and SEAR may complement critical theorists’ pursuit of fundamentalchange.
A second contribution of the article has been to illustrate this framework with a single policy initiative, namelythe UK’s ULR scheme. An empirical study has been conducted to allow TU officials to articulate whether new formsof accountability arising from the ULR initiative are successful, the types of measurements that would be usefulfor monitoring progress of learning and whether company reports could usefully support the ULR initiative, beforeconsideration has been given to how the different types of social reports advocated by critical theorists and otherwriters on employee reporting and SEAR may act in complementary ways to support the ULR initiative. It has beenargued that supporters of employee reporting and SEAR could promote measurements that indicate support of learningand the ULR initiative in companies’ social reports. Critical theorists could help trade unions to articulate socialaccounts at those workplaces where the ULR initiative is not taken seriously. The longer term implications could be tomake companies more accountable in the current period, while strengthening trade unions whose articulation of socialobjectives in preference to goals of profit highlights their potential to be prefigurative of an alternative economy.
As noted at the outset, the UK scheme is one of a number of comparable international schemes that express tradeunions’ desire to further their members’ rights to learning in the workplace. There are both similarities and differencesbetween these initiatives and the UK scheme in their operation, statutory support and socio-political context. Furtheruseful research could be conducted into the views of trade union officials in those countries to identify what types ofmeasurements and forms of accountability could help extend those initiatives. Identification of such views could be
B. Lee, C. Cassell / Accounting Forum 32 (2008) 276–287 285
used to articulate a potential alliance between supporters of employee reporting and SEAR – who could help companiesdevelop the means to report on how they are contributing to learning – and critical theorists who could help trade unionsexpose companies that obstruct learning. In time, research across a number of countries may inform the developmentof generally accepted social accounting principles and standards. These standards could help strengthen trade unionsand extend the right to learning at work to other countries where it is currently limited.
Although this discussion has focused on the ULR initiative, there are a range of policies that could advance socialjustice simultaneous to strengthening trade unions and social movements. Interviews with representatives of thosemovements could be used to identify the measurements that those movements would find useful, to feed into campaignsfor social reporting and to help identify corporations that are hostile to the demands of those movements. Supportersof SEAR could promote these measurements to different parties involved with companies while critical theorists couldhelp social movements expose companies who were not supporting the initiatives in what would be an effective alliancebetween these different theorists. Over time, different theorists could help strengthen alliances between the differentmovements. For example, in the UK, an alliance exists between trade unions and the environmental movement in theform of the Trade Union Sustainable Development Advisory Committee. There is the potential for supporters of SEARto help trade unions to monitor the environmental impact of companies’ policies and for critical theorists to help tradeunions to campaign against corporations that ignore environmental concerns.
Some critical theorists may suggest that civil society institutions highlighting information needs that may be accom-modated within capitalism could infer that there is no need for capitalism to be superseded. That problem may exist ifthe battle for information was the end point. However, the analysis offered here presents some branches of employeereporting and SEAR as accountants demanding information that reflects popular demands for change, either fromemployees’ challenges to employers at the point of production, or from social movements in civil society that haveobjected to capital’s exploitation of various resources. Demands for – and the provision of – information is seen asa means to constraining and potentially isolating owners of capital while strengthening those movements. As tradeunions and social movements are strengthened, the interests of those wanting to extend reporting simply to improveaccountability and those who seek to transcend the current unequal society may diverge. However, a potential alterna-tive scenario is that if stronger accountability improves people’s conditions, the desire to constrain those who controlmultinational capital may increase and the potential of an alternative type of economy could become apparent to agreater number of people.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to the editorial team and reviewers of Accounting Forum, particularly Glen Lehman, and to RonHodges, Stuart Ogden and David Owen for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
References
Adams, C. A., Coutts, A., & Harte, G. (1995). Corporate equal opportunities (non-) disclosure. British Accounting Review, 27(1), 87–108.Adams, C. A., Hill, W.-Y., & Roberts, C. B. (1998). Corporate social reporting practices in Western Europe: Legitimating corporate behaviour?
British Accounting Review, 30(1), 1–21.Adams, C., & Harte, G. (2000). Making discrimination visible: The potential for social accounting. Accounting Forum, 24(1), 56–79.Alexandrou, A., Davies, J. D., & Lee, J. (2005). Union learning representatives: A case study of the Public and Commercial Services Union. Journal
of In-service Education, 31(1), 9–26.Arnold, P. J., & Cooper, C. (1999). A tale of two classes: The privitization of Medway Ports. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 10(2), 127–152.Ball, A., & Seal, W. (2005). Social justice in a cold climate: Could social accounting make a difference? Accounting Forum, 29(4), 455–473.Boggs, C. (1986). Social movements and political power: Emerging forms of radicalism in the West. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.Boggs, C. (2001). Social capital and political fantasy: Robert Putnam’s bowling alone. Theory and Society, 30(2), 281–297.Brown, J. A. (2000). Competing ideologies in the accounting and industrial relations environment. British Accounting Review, 32(1), 43–75.Burawoy, M. (2000). Marxism after communism. Theory and Society, 29(2), 151–174.Byrne, P. (1997). Social movements in Britain. London: Routledge.Cassell, C., & Lee, B. (2007). Re-vitalising learning and development? Exploring the role of the trade union learning representative. Personnel
Review, 36(5), 781–799.Clough, B. (2004). The emerging role of unions in the UK learning and skills system: From spearholders to stakeholders. London: TUC.Cohen, J. L. (1983). Class and civil society: The limits of Marxian critical theory. Oxford: Martin Robinson.Cohen, J. L., & Arato, A. (1992). Civil society and political theory. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.Cooper, C. (1995). Ideology, hegemony and accounting discourse. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 6(3), 175–208.
286 B. Lee, C. Cassell / Accounting Forum 32 (2008) 276–287
Cooper, C., Taylor, P., Smith, N., & Catchpowle, L. (2005). A discussion of the political potential of Social Accounting. Critical Perspectives onAccounting, 16(7), 951–974.
Cooper, D., & Essex, S. (1977). Accounting information and employee decision making. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 2(3),201–217.
Cowen, G., Clements, M., & Cutter, J. (2000). TUC Union Learning Representatives Survey, June 2000. York: York Consulting.Day, R., & Woodward, T. (2004). Disclosure of information about employees in the Directors report of UK published financial statements: Substantive
or symbolic? Accounting Forum, 28(1), 43–59.Deegan, C. (2002). The legitimising effect of social and environmental disclosures—a theoretical foundation. Accounting, Auditing and Account-
ability Journal, 15(3), 282–311.DfEE. (1998). The Learning Age: A renaissance for a New Britain, Green Paper. Sheffield: DfEE.DfES. (2001). Providing Statutory Rights for Union Learning Representatives. Last viewed April 2, 2008. http://www.dfes.gov.uk/consultations/
conResults.cfm?consultationId=1131.Elkington, J. (1997). Cannibals with forks: The triple bottom line of 21st century business. London: Capstone.Farr, D. (2006). Tales from the Learning Reps Project, Presentation to Wellington IPTNZ e-fest, September 2006.Foley, B. J., & Maunders, K. T. (1977). Accounting information disclosure and collective bargaining. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.Goddard, A. (2002). Development of the accounting profession and practices in the public sector—a hegemonic analysis. Accounting, Auditing &
Accountability Journal, 15(5), 655–688.Gramsci, A. (1978). Selections from the Prison Notebooks. London: Lawrence & Wishart.Gray, R. (2001). Thirty years of social accounting, reporting and auditing: What (if anything) have we learnt? Business Ethics: A European Review,
10(1), 9–15.Gray, R. (2002). The social accounting project and Accounting Organizations and Society Privileging engagement, imaginings, new accountings
and pragmatism over critique? Accounting, Organizations and Society, 27(7), 687–708.Gray, R., Bebbington, J., & Collinson, D. (2006). NGOs, civil society and accountability: Making the people accountable to capital. Accounting,
Auditing and Accountability Journal, 19(3), 319–348.Gray, R., Dey, C., Owen, D., Evans, R., & Zadek, S. (1997). Struggling with the praxis of social accounting: Stakeholders, accountability, audits
and procedures. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 10(3), 325–364.Gray, R., Owen, D., & Adams, C. (1996). Accounting and accountability: Changes and challenges in corporate social and environmental reporting.
Harlow: Prentice Hall.Gray, R., Owen, D., & Maunders, K. (1988). Corporate social reporting: Emerging trends in accountability and the social contract. Accounting,
Auditing & Accountability Journal, 1(1), 6–20.Gray, R., Owen, D. L., & Maunders, K. (1991). Accountability, Corporate Social Reporting and the External Social Audits. Advances in Public
Interest Accounting, 4, 1–21.HMSO. (2002). Employment Act 2002. Last viewed on April 2, 2008. http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/20020022.htm.Jackson-Cox, J., Thirkell, J. E. M., & McQueeney, J. (1984). The disclosure of company information to trade unions: The relevance of the ACAS
Code of Practice on Disclosure. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 9(3/4), 253–273.King, N. (2004). Using templates in the thematic analysis of text. In C. Cassell & G. Symon (Eds.), Essential guide to qualitative methods in
organizational research (pp. 256–270). London: Sage.Kolkka, M., & Wesanko, S. (2006). ‘Workplace Guidance’ Online Training Course in Finland: Final Tutors Report. Diaconia: Diakonia-
Ammattikorkeakoulu.Lee, B., & Cassell, C. (2005). Comparing the learning representative schemes of New Zealand and the UK: A research report. Sheffield: Learning
Representatives Research Group.Lehman, C. (1995). Accounting’s changing role in social conflict. London: Paul Chapman Publishing.Lehman, C., & Tinker, T. (1987). The ‘real’ significance of accounts. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 12(5), 503–522.Lehman, G. (1999). Disclosing new worlds: A role for social and environmental accounting and auditing. Accounting, Organizations and Society,
24(3), 217–241.Lehman, G. (2001). Reclaiming the public sphere: Problems and prospects for corporate social and environmental accounting. Critical Perspectives
on Accounting, 12(6), 713–733.Lehman, G. (2007). The accountability of NGOs in civil society and its public spheres. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 18(6), 645–669.Leversha, G. (1977). Beyond spontaneity. In J. Bloomfield (Ed.), Class, Hegemony and Party (pp. 109–125). London: Lawrence & Wishart.Margolis, A. (2003). Licensed to Skill. People Management, June 26, pp. 46–48.Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1969). Manifesto of the Communist Party. In K. Marx & F. Engels (Eds.), Selected works in three volumes: Volume one (pp.
98–137). Moscow: Progress Publishers.Mathews, R. (2004). Developing a matrix approach to categorise the social and environmental accounting research literature. Qualitative Research
in Accounting & Management, 1(1), 30–45.Moore, S., & Wood, H. (2005). The Union Learning Experience: National Surveys of Union Officers and ULRs. London: London Metropolitan
University Working Lives Research Institute.Ogden, S., & Bougen, P. (1985). A radical perspective on the disclosure of accounting information to trade unions. Accounting, Organizations and
Society, 10(2), 211–224.Owen, D. (Ed.). (1992). Green reporting: Accountancy and the challenge of the nineties. London: Chapman & Hall.Owen, D. L., & Harte, G. F. (1984). Reporting on corporate accountability to the workforce. Accountant’s Magazine, 88(935), 184–187.Owen, D. L., & Lloyd, A. J. (1985). The use of financial information by trade union negotiators in plant level collective bargaining. Accounting,
B. Lee, C. Cassell / Accounting Forum 32 (2008) 276–287 287
Parker, L. D. (2005). Social and environmental accountability research: A view from the commentary box. Accounting, Auditing & AccountabilityJournal, 18(6), 842–860.
Plant, P., & Turner, B. (2005). Getting closer: Workplace guidance for lifelong learning. International Journal of Lifelong Education, 24(2), 123–135.Puxty, A. G. (1991). Social Accountability and Universal Pragmatics. Advances in Public Interest Accounting, 4, 35–45.Rana, E. (2001). Low skills, low interest. People Management, September 13, pp. 24–30.Richardson, A. (1989). Corporatism and intra-professional hegemony: A study of regulation and internal social order. Accounting, Organizations
and Society, 14(5–6), 415–431.Sassoon, A. S. (1982). Hegemony, war of position and political intervention. In A. S. Sassoon (Ed.), Approaches to Gramsci (pp. 94–115). London:
Writers & Readers.Scapens, R. W. (2004). Doing case study research. In C. Humphrey & B. Lee (Eds.), The real life guide to accounting research: A behind-the-scenes
view of using qualitative research methods (pp. 257–279). Oxford: Elsevier Ltd.Simon, R. (1982). Gramsci’s political thought. London: Lawrence & Wishart.Sklair, L. (1995). Social movements and global capitalism. Sociology, 29(3), 495–512.Spence, C. (2007). Social Accounting’s Emancipatory Potential: A Gramscian Critique. Critical Perspectives on Accounting,
doi:10.1016/j.cpa.2007.06.003.Tilley, C. (1998). Social movements and (all sorts of) other political interactions – local, national, and international – including identities. Theory
and Society, 27(4), 453–480.Tinker, T., & Gray, R. (2003). Beyond a critique of pure reason: From policy to politics to praxis in environmental and social research. Accounting,
Auditing & Accountability Journal, 16(5), 727–761.Tinker, T., Lehman, C., & Neimark, M. (1991). Falling down the Hole in the Middle of the Road: Political Quietism in Corporate Social Reporting.
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 4(2), 28–54.TUC. (2002). The quiet revolution: The rise of the union learning representative. London: TUC.TUC. (2004). New faces: The changing profile of union learning reps. London: TUC.TUC. (2004b). Congress 2004: General Council Report. London: TUC.TUC. (2005). Skills white paper: TUC response to skills white paper—Skills: Getting on in business, getting on at work. London: TUC.Unionlearn. (2006). Making a real difference. Union Learning Reps a survey. London: Unionlearn.Unionlearn. (2007). TUC’s unionlearn celebrates first birthday with a 50% increase in union learners. Last viewed on April 2, 2008.
http://www.unionlearn.org.uk/about/learn-1533-f0.cfm.Wallis, E., Stuart, M., & Greenwood, I. (2005). ‘Learners of the workplace unite!’: An empirical examination of the UK trade union learning
representative initiative. Work, Employment and Society, 19(2), 283–304.York Consulting Limited. (2003). TUC Learning Services Union Learning Rep Survey. York: York Consulting Limited.
Bill Lee is a senior lecturer in Accounting and Financial Management at the University of Sheffield’s Management School. He has a long standingresearch interest in the area of vocational education as well as in accounting.
Catherine Cassell is Professor of Occupational Psychology at Manchester Business School. Her research interests focus upon the use of qualitativeresearch in the business and management field, and learning and change in the workplace.
