Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2004305

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Draft of an article forthcoming in Critical Sociology

Brazilian Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Change and Continuity under Dilma

Par Engstrom

Human Rights Consortium, University of London, UK

Abstract

This article evaluates the degree of policy change and continuity at the intersection of human

rights and foreign policy in the early period of the Dilma Rousseff administration in Brazil.

The smooth character of succession of power in Brazil that Dilma’s election represented

suggests significant policy continuity with her immediate predecessor Luis Inácio Lula da

Silva. In the area of human rights, however, there have been some early indications of policy

shifts. Four particularly salient dimensions of both change and continuity in the areas of

human rights and foreign policy are examined: (i) Brazil’s role as an advocate for global

governance reforms; (ii) its efforts to foster South-South relations; (iii) the character of

Brazil’s power projection; and (iv) its regional leadership role. The article also evaluates the

emergence of Brazil as a pivotal player in global governance and assesses the implications for

the engagement with international human rights by Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil will have

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2004305

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to manage increasing expectations that the country should play a more active and forceful

role in shaping the development of the international human rights regime.

Keywords

Brazil, Dilma, foreign policy, human rights, Lula, rising power

Introduction

That Brazil is ‘rising’ is increasingly taken for granted both in the academic literature and in

policy-circles. Brazil’s gradual emergence as a pivotal player in global governance together

with its current buoyant economic performance indicate for many a fundamental global

economic and political shift toward the ‘Global South’ and a new multi-polar global order.

During the Lula administrations (2003-2010), Brazilian foreign policy became increasingly

active. Indeed, the increasing assertiveness of Lula’s Brazil was seen by many as a

progressive force on the international arena. In order to distinguish itself from his

predecessor’s perceived acceptance of the liberalizing agenda of the 1990s, Lula pursued a

highly visible foreign policy agenda.

Yet, in the area of international human rights, Lula’s foreign policy remained uneven

and raised fundamental questions regarding the future role of Brazil in the international

human rights regime. This was due to a combination of internal and external factors,

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including: a fragile domestic social order with continuing human rights violations; a foreign

policy process that tends to privilege narrow conceptions of national interest; and continuing

uncertainty over the role of emerging states in the international human rights regime. These

uncertainties notwithstanding, the rise of Brazil in international relations has generated

increasing expectations, both domestically and in international fora, that Brazil should play a

more prominent role in the international human rights regime (Human Rights Watch, 2009).

The transition of power in Brazil through the election of Dilma Rousseff on 31

October 2010 raised further questions regarding the degree of change or continuity with

Lulismo. The smooth character of succession of power in Brazil that Dilma’s election

represented suggests significant policy continuity with Lula. We may therefore need to look

hard for any indications of change. In the area of human rights, however, many commentators

have been seized on early indications of change.

This article evaluates the degree of policy change and continuity in the early period of

the Dilma administration at the intersection of human rights and foreign policy.i It is divided

into three parts. The first part seeks to very briefly locate human rights in the broader

tradition and trends of Brazilian foreign policy and maps Brazil’s increasing engagement with

the international human rights regime since the transition to democracy in 1985. The second

and main part assesses the extent to which human rights influence Brazil’s formulation and

pursuit of foreign policy objectives. It situates human rights in the broader context of Brazil’s

foreign policy process during the Lula administrations (2003-2010) and examines the early

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period of the Dilma administration. The concluding part seeks to evaluate the importance of

human rights concerns for Brazilian foreign policy. It also provides some tentative reflections

on present and future trends in Brazilian foreign policy with regards to human rights. 2

Brazil and International Human Rights Since 1985

Since the early days of the international human rights regime Brazil’s relationship with

human rights has been characterized by a significant gap between diplomatic support in

international fora and a problematic human rights record at home. Brazil was an active

participant in the creation of the United Nations and early supporter of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights. Following the military coup in 1964 however, Brazil became

the target of international human rights pressures as, for example, Amnesty International

adopted Brazilian prisoners of conscience and brought cases of the political use of torture to

the attention of the outside world (Macaulay, 2010). Yet parallel to extensive human rights

abuses being committed in their own country Brazilian diplomats continued to engage with

the international human rights regime, contributing to the drafting of the UN Covenants on

Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights respectively. Brazil’s

military government relied on diplomacy to prevent close examination of its own human

rights record in the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, in order to avoid

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condemnatory reports such as the ones targeting the Pinochet regime in Chile in particular,

and the Argentine military juntas to a lesser extent.3

In contrast to other Southern Cone countries where human rights significantly shaped

processes of political transition to democratic government, during Brazil’s protracted

transitional period issues related to ‘transitional justice’ played a relative minor role in the

return to civilian rule (Pinheiro, 1998; Barahona de Brito, 2001). In part this can be explained

by the closed and negotiated character of Brazil’s transition to democracy. But the broadly

undisputed 1979 Amnesty Law also ensured that questions of accountability for violations

committed under the military regime remained marginalised during the democratic

transition.4

Yet, since the transition to democracy successive Brazilian governments have

gradually accepted the legitimacy of international concern for the human rights record of

individual countries. Over the course of the last three decades of democratization, Brazil has

shifted its relationship with the international human rights regime from a defensive and

sovereigntist position to a broadly multilateral one. This can most clearly be seen in the

significant increase in the number of Brazilian ratifications of international human rights

treaties, signalling an increasing Brazilian engagement with the international human rights

regime both regionally and globally. Following the transition to democracy successive

Brazilian governments have ratified all the core international human rights treaties, putting in

place a domestic infrastructure of human rights. In the process, Brazil gradually shifted from

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an obstructionist to a more cooperative relationship with international human rights

monitoring bodies. Moreover, government responses to continuing human rights violations

have evolved as well, from being defensive and reactive to a more pro-active and

institutionalised policy-making (Panizza and Barahona de Brito 1998: 21). In large part these

shifts are driven by broader foreign policy concerns of attaining international legitimacy and

recognition as a reliably democratic state and a global ‘good citizen’. But political leadership

by committed government policymakers played an important role as well. More significantly

though, Brazil’s human rights community started towards the end of the 1990s to pressure the

government with demands for more active human rights policies to ensure compliance with

the country’s international commitments. As Brazilian foreign policy has democratized –

with increasing civil society input – and as Brazil has emerged as a pivotal player in global

governance, the engagement with international human rights by Brazilian foreign policy has

increased. This shift has created the necessary policy conditions for a more active Brazilian

role in the international human rights regime on the one hand, and a more prominent role for

human rights in Brazilian foreign policy more generally, on the other.

Brazilian Foreign Policy and Human Rights: From Lula to Dilma

The installation of the first Lula government in January 2003 was met with significant

anticipation by human rights activists in Brazil and beyond. Given the Workers Party’s record

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of opposition to the military regime and its support for human rights at the local and

municipal levels throughout the 1990s these expectations were to some extent justified.

Moreover, in order to distinguish itself from the Cardoso government’s perceived acceptance

of the liberalizing agenda of the 1990s, Lula pursued an increasingly assertive foreign policy

agenda. Indeed, the Lula presidencies were seen by many as a progressive force on the

international arena in particular. Following Dilma’s election on 31 October 2010, four

particularly salient dimensions of both change and continuity in the areas of human rights and

foreign policy need to be highlighted: (i) Brazil’s role as an advocate for global governance

reforms; (ii) its efforts to foster South-South relations; (iii) the character of Brazil’s power

projection; and (iv) its regional leadership role.

Brazil and Global Governance Reforms

Under Lula Brazil sought to increase its weight and influence in international institutions

through strongly advocating for reform of global governance institutions and the revision of

global norms. This was most clearly seen in intensified efforts to gain a permanent seat on the

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), but also in Brazil’s successful efforts in joining the

core group of states negotiating the Doha round trade talks of the World Trade Organization.

Brazil has not been strongly revisionist in the positions taken, but it has been opposed to the

status quo as reflected in the policies pursued with regards to issues such as nuclear

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proliferation (regarding the sanctions regime imposed on Iran) and climate change (regarding

the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ that stresses the need for

developed countries to shoulder the greater burden of the costs of adapting to climate

change). The foreign policy discourse of the Lula administration stressed the need for a more

multi-polar world, and it continued the Brazilian foreign policy tradition of emphasising

multilateralism. It also reflected the more instrumental character of the Brazilian Foreign

Ministry’s attitude towards multilateralism, which tends to frame Brazil’s own interests in

terms of arguments for greater justice and representativeness in global governance

institutions (Hurrell, 2008: 53). These claims resonate widely in Brazil’s ongoing campaign

to reform the UNSC, which draws on the widespread sense of the unrepresentative nature of

international institutions in order to boost Brazil’s own claim for a permanent seat on the

UNSC.5

As highlighted in the negotiations around the new head of the International Monetary

Fund, the Dilma government is likely to continue to press Brazilian demands for global

institutional reforms. Although more assertive in tone, foreign policy under Lula built upon a

deep-rooted nationalist tradition in Brazil of viewing international institutions suspiciously

and the international order as entrenching the privileges of the developed world. The

divisions within Brazilian political elites as to the way to achieve a more prominent role in

the international arena are long-standing. There is a certain ambivalence among political

elites about whether Brazil is part of the ‘West’ and should seek convergence with the global

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liberal order, or whether the country is a member of the ‘Third World’ and should therefore

identify with the struggle for development and ally with the developing world in order to

push for a greater role in international affairs. Although Brazil has long shared Western ideas

about international law and society, since the 1960s the more nationalist and

developmentalist side of Brazil’s foreign policy identity has prevailed. The foreign policy of

the Cardoso administration drew more actively on the other side of Brazilian national identity

emphasising Brazil’s convergence with the liberal norms of the 1990s. Under Lula the

emphasis was on economic and political sovereignty and on seeking alliances within the

Global South against the West.6 Although Dilma may adopt a less assertive rhetoric she is

likely to follow Lula in viewing the liberal norms of the 1990s concerning democracy, human

rights, and free markets as not reflecting a universal consensus but instead narrow national

interests.7

The consequences for Brazil’s human rights foreign policy are significant. Brazilian

diplomatic discourse on human rights is likely to continue to stress internationalism and

multilateralism and support for global liberal values. And the contrast with Brazil’s

continuing pluralist and ‘Third World’ discourse on matters related to international trade

negotiations, international finance, and the environment is likely to remain unaltered. Hence,

there has been very little evidence of any ‘mainstreaming’ of human rights in Brazilian

foreign policy on the international arena. Brazil under Dilma is likely to remain a

comparatively inactive participant in terms of diplomatically supporting the international

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human rights regime, launching human rights initiatives in multilateral fora8, and funding and

staffing international agencies with rights mandates.9

Brazil and South-South Relations

The Lula administration prioritised the expansion of relations with other major developing

countries, especially China, India, and South Africa. Efforts to intensify South-South

dialogues were reflected in the increasing formalization of the IBSA forum (India, Brazil, and

South Africa) and the gradual institutionalization of the BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India,

and China), but were also seen in the more activist Brazilian diplomacy towards Africa, and

to a lesser extent the Middle East. Partly these diplomatic efforts need to be understood in the

context of Brazil’s attempts to mobilise support for its bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC,

although stronger ties with the Third World also have deep roots in Brazilian national

identity.

Yet, the ambition to build South-South strategic alliances and to gain support for a

UNSC seat has led Brazil to compromise on its commitment to human rights. Although

Brazil has traditionally refused to criticise other countries’ human rights record, for the Lula

administration pragmatic strategic interests trumped more principled concerns for human

rights. Brazil consistently supported China, gave a quick endorsement of Iran’s disputed

presidential elections in 2009, and invited Iran’s president for an official visit. Supporters of

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this pragmatic approach stress the importance of engaging rather than isolating Iran, for

example, and Brazilian diplomats may have calculated that they have very little influence to

change the domestic behaviour of states such as China and Iran in any case. But Lula’s trip to

Israel in March 2010, which was billed as a peace initiative, and to Iran in May 2010 indeed

demonstrated the difficulties for Brazil to engage with international conflicts and promote

humanitarian values.

Here there are some potentially significant indications of a shift by the Dilma

administration. In a much publicised interview with the Washington Post a few days before

taking office on 1 January 2011, Dilma sought to distance herself from Lula by criticising

Brazil’s abstention on the vote on Iran at the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) in 2010. The

Dilma administration followed up on this by changing Brazil’s historical voting pattern at the

HRC by supporting an initiative, proposed by the United States, to appoint a rapporteur to

monitor the human rights situation in Iran.10

The vote reflects, in addition to a shift in Brazil’s

relationship with Iran, an increasing government willingness to criticise individual countries

for their human rights record. It is therefore noteworthy that the Brazilian Ambassador in

Geneva justified the vote on the grounds of impartiality:

Brazil believes that all countries, no exception, have challenges to face in this field.

President Rousseff made it quite plain that she will closely monitor the human rights

situation globally, beginning with Brazil. [...] [I]t is a motive of particular concern for

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us the non observance of a moratorium on the death penalty, not only in Iran but in all

those countries that still practice such an execution as punishment . (MercoPress,

2011)

Beyond the diplomatic rhetoric, the signalling seemed to have generated domestic

political dividends. It represented for many a departure from Lula and a step for Dilma out of

the shadow of Lula, which was achieved at a relatively modest cost. For example, Senator

Cristovam Buarque, from the Democratic Labour party (PDT) and Lula’s former education

minister, concurred with the vote:

There are differences between Dilma and Lula. The vote was correct, it does not

condemn Iran; rather it accepts an investigation. The bottom line is that Brazil

believes there are certain universal policies that define human rights. (MercoPress,

2011)

Yet, to what extent does Dilma’s divergence from her predecessor’s policy on Iran

signal a substantive departure? It is true that in foreign policy terms Iran had become a high-

profile issue for Lula himself. In May 2010 Turkey, Brazil and Iran had announced a nuclear

fuel swap deal that was aimed at pre-empting further UN sanctions. The deal was also

heralded as an example of the increasing clout of emerging countries in a new multi-polar

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world, even in an area of global governance such as international peace and security

dominated by Western powers. The Brazilian government, and the then foreign minister

Celso Amorim in particular, therefore openly expressed their frustration with a US

government that quickly moved to discredit the nuclear deal. But also domestically the deal

attracted significant criticisms, despite the Lula government’s assurances that it was in

Brazil’s self-interest to cultivate closer ties with a country that has emerged as one of Brazil’s

largest trading partners in the Middle East.

Dilma’s policy shift on Iran has exposed one of the main fault lines in Brazilian

diplomacy on human rights that pit principled rhetorical condemnation against pragmatic and

‘cordial’ dialogue.11

As an example of the latter, former foreign minister Celso Amorim has

strongly criticized the Iran vote at the Human Rights Council on the grounds that it

undermined any opportunities to pursue a dialogue with the Iranian leadership. In an

interview, Amorim also defended the Brazilian diplomatic tradition of impartiality, and

preference for mediation over condemnation (MercoPress, 2011). Amorim’s intervention

indicates that Dilma’s position on Iran does indeed reflect an independence of mind and a

willingness to depart from some of Lula’s preferred foreign policies. Yet, the Iran vote does

not by itself reflect a fundamental shift in Brazilian diplomacy on human rights towards a

more assertive and condemnatory rhetoric as cautioned against by Amorim.

The Character of Brazil’s Power Projection

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The Lula administration maintained Brazil’s preference for soft power over hard power

strategies. This was reflected in Brazilian positions taken in debates over coercive sanctions

(Iran) and in Brazil’s continuing reluctance to accept the legitimacy of military interventions

for humanitarian purposes. Brazil's traditional ‘allergy’ to the use of force, deeply held doubts

about the utility of force, and preference for mediation and diplomacy is likely to endure

under Dilma.

For example, Brazilian reluctance to support coercive enforcement measures was seen

in its response to the conflict in Libya. In March 2011 Brazil, as a temporary member of the

UN Security Council, joined with China, India, Russia and Germany to abstain from the vote

authorising ‘all necessary measures’ against Libya. Following the onset of NATO bombing

of Libya, Brazil’s opposition to the bombing hardened in the aftermath of the visit of US

President Barack Obama to Brazil in March 2011 with the Foreign Ministry, the Itamaraty,

issuing statements condemning the loss of civilian lives, and calling for a ceasefire and the

initiation of a dialogue.

Brazil’s opposition to the NATO bombing campaign in Libya reflects the country’s

traditional aversion to the use of force and its preferences for mediation and diplomacy.

However, the expectations on Brazil, particularly by the USA and the EU, to shoulder

increasing responsibilities for the management of international security concerns may

continue to grow. Brazil’s continuing leadership role in the UN mission in Haiti reflects an

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increasing willingness to engage in more robust UNSC-mandated missions and a shift in its

position on the legitimacy of coercive peace enforcement. And, often overlooked given the

focus on UNSC Resolution 1973 that authorised the use of force in the case of Libya is the

fact that Brazil voted in favour of a previous UNSC Resolution (1970) in February 2011 that

imposed sanctions on Libya and that referred the situation to the International Criminal

Court. This is in contrast to previous reluctance to support coercive sanctions in the case of

Iran for example. Any Brazilian policy shifts in these matters need to be understood in the

context of the ongoing campaign to secure a permanent seat on the UNSC. It is also

important to note that Brazilian aversion to the use of force even for humanitarian purposes

needs to be differentiated from its position on other (softer) human rights enforcement

measures, such as diplomatic dialogue and local capacity-building.

Brazil as an Ambivalent Regional Leader

Brazil’s multilateralism has traditionally tended to be projected beyond the region of Latin

America. But under Lula there was some recalibration of foreign policy priorities, as the

administration sought to intensify relations with the South American sub-region in particular.

This was seen in efforts to broaden Mercosur (to include Venezuela) as well as deepen it

(beyond purely economic relations and towards political cooperation, including on human

rights matters). The regionalization of Brazilian foreign policy was also reflected in the

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creation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Brazil under Lula showed

itself to be prepared to be politically more assertive in the wider Latin American region by

becoming involved in politically contested issues, such as Brazil’s leadership role in the UN

peace-keeping mission in Haiti, and (tentative) expression of willingness to mediate in the

Colombian conflict. However, these attempts have been fraught with problems, as regional

countries do not necessarily sign off on Brazilian regional leadership. 12

With regards to human rights policy more specifically the limits of Brazil’s regional

leadership are also apparent. Even if it were willing to promote human rights as part of its

regional foreign policy (Brazilian relations with Cuba indicates otherwise), Brazil’s capacity

to shape political outcomes in the region is limited, as seen, for example, in the political

negotiations following the July 2009 coup in Honduras and its ongoing political and human

rights aftermath. 13

Brazil is also a regional outlier in the Southern Cone in that political

democratization coincided in the first decade that followed the transition to democracy in

1985, with a deterioration of the domestic human rights record, at least on measures related to

citizen security (Macaulay, 2010). 14

Hence, despite the return of electoral democracy and

Brazil’s increasing engagement with international human rights, processes of democratization

in Brazil have moved at a different speed, and occasionally in different directions, than

human rights change.

Moreover, although Brazil’s ratification record is notable compared to many other

regional states (the USA for example) 15

, it is in many ways a regional laggard. In terms of

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recognition of regional human rights norms and mechanisms, Brazil was one of the last

Organisation of American States (OAS) member states in Latin America to recognize the

jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Brazilian perception of

having a self-contained legal system combined with a reluctance to accept international

scrutiny of the country’s domestic human rights record on sovereignty grounds has made

Brazil a relative latecomer to the international human rights regime (at least judged on

regional terms). 16

This is particularly evident in Brazil’s relationship with the Inter-American

human rights system (IAHRS). Brazil’s engagement with the regional human rights regime

has been reluctant. For example, comparatively few cases were submitted to the Inter-

American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) during the military regime. Following the

democratic transition, Brazil has had comparatively few dealings with the IAHRS, and by the

mid-1990s only a handful of the several hundred cases pending before the IACHR concerned

Brazil (Cavallaro, 2002: 483). 17

As seen in Figure 1, this pattern of recourse to the IAHRS

continued throughout the 2000s.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Moreover, up until the mid-1990s at least, Brazilian authorities put pressure on the

IACHR not to recognize cases from Brazilian petitioners. During the Cardoso government

however, the Brazilian state moved from an obstructionist to a more cooperative relationship

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with the IAHRS reaching a number of friendly settlement agreements with the IACHR. Also,

Brazil supported the candidacies of Antônio Cançado Trindade to the Inter-American Court

on Human Rights (serving as judge on the Court from 1995 to 2006) and of Hélio Bicudo, a

deputy of the Workers’ Party and former prosecutor in São Paulo, who was elected member

of the IACHR in 1997 (and served 1998-2001). 18

Yet, in terms of concrete engagement with

the IAHRS on specific cases, Brazilian state institutions have tended either to ignore

judgements by the regional system or choose not to implement substantial measures. 19

Moreover, the federal government’s increasingly responsive human rights policy has not been

matched by a parallel recognition at sub-national level. Brazil has ‘an extremely fragmented

and heterogeneous polity which limits the central state’s capacity to implement effective

strategies’ (Panizza and Barahona de Brito, 1998: 21). The character of Brazilian federalism

means that accountability for human rights violations remains dispersed – with the notorious

Brazilian military police being controlled at sub-national level – which has further limited the

capacity of the IAHRS to put pressure on Brazilian federal authorities to provide effective

remedies for violations. In part, the relative neglect of the regional human rights system is

explained by the fact that Brazilian governments’ engagement with international human

rights has tended to be projected outside the region and towards the UN, which has led to

Brazil not having a clearly defined presence within the IAHRS. 20

The absence of Brazilian regional leadership is particularly noteworthy in the area of

transitional justice. In some ways Lula built on Cardoso’s approach by extending

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compensation policy to victims of past state violence and by offering some support for the

creation of a National Truth Commission. Yet, despite widespread protests from victims’

groups, the Lula government extended the Secrecy Law to allow military files considered

sensitive to be kept from public view for 60 years. 21

Lula also resisted efforts to circumvent

the 1979 Amnesty Law and legal attempts to prosecute military and police personnel for

human rights violations committed under the military regime. Significantly, the Lula

government was openly divided over the Amnesty Law with parts of the Ministry of Justice

in favour of prosecution while Defence Minister Nelson Jobim referred to justice efforts by

victims’ groups as ‘revenge’ (Barahona de Brito, 2010).

In the early period of Dilma’s presidency there have been some indications of change,

but also of continuity, in the area of transitional justice. On the one hand, for its supporters it

is currently an exceptionally opportune moment for the creation of a Truth Commission with

a president who herself is a victim of human rights violations under the military regime. The

new Special Secretary for Human Rights, Maria do Rosário Nunes, has publicly confirmed

the president’s support of a Truth Commission, ‘despite certain voices working against the

initiative’:

Dilma Rousseff, because of her history and her commitment, is absolutely allied with

human rights [and for her the Truth Commission is a project close to her heart, which

she] clearly supports. […] The president belongs to a generation that fought for

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democracy and she is working [so that Brazil] clears its debt with the past and

recognizes history no matter how painful it may be. (ANSA, 2011)

In a political triumph for Dilma the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies approved in

September 2011 the legislative proposal to create a Truth Commission with a mandate to

investigate the whereabouts of forcibly disappeared people; to clarify the responsibilities and

structures behind torture, forced disappearances and arbitrary executions; and that

incorporates an explicit recognition of victims’ right to the truth. 22

Moreover, notwithstanding the policy preference for ‘truth’ over ‘justice’ as

demonstrated by the Dilma government, it may simply not be possible to put a full stop to

increasingly concerted legal efforts to hold individual military and police personnel to

account for their involvement in human rights violations under the military regime. Indeed,

the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recently ruled in the Gomes Lund et al.

(Guerrilha do Araguaia) case that Brazil’s Amnesty Law violated the country’s international

obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights to investigate and prosecute

human rights crimes committed by the military regime. 23

The Dilma government has thus far

been able to resist growing pressures to implement this ruling, but, as Alexandra Barahona de

Brito points out, other countries in the region have learned from experience that both

domestic and international pressures to implement such rulings have a corrosive effect on

impunity for past human rights violations (Barahona de Brito, 2010). For example, Viviana

21

Krsticevic, the executive director of CEJIL, one of the organisations that brought the Gomes

Lund case to the Inter-American human rights system, makes an explicit link between the

Brazilian government’s lack of progress on transitional justice and its potential for regional

leadership:

Latin America has advanced significantly in the resolution of crimes against humanity

committed by dictatorial governments. Brazil, however, is still in debt with family

members [of victims] and society when it comes to the establishment of truth and

justice in relation to this topic. [The ruling by the Inter-American Court in the case of

Gomes Lund] represents a unique opportunity for Brazil to show that it is capable of

leadership both internationally as well as nationally with regards to human rights and

democracy. For this reason, Brazil must overturn [dejar sin efecto] the aspects of the

amnesty law that prevent justice to be done when confronted by crimes against

humanity. (CEJIL, 2010)

There are clearly strong political incentives for the Dilma government to resist such

pressures, particularly out of concern of not jeopardizing the relatively friction-free

relationship that the Worker’s Party has developed with the military during its time in

government. 24

Yet, such appeasement of the security forces will also indicate the limits of

22

civilian control over the military establishment as well as the limits of human rights

accountability in Brazil more broadly (Barahona de Brito, 2010).

Conclusion: ‘Rising Brazil’- What Role for Human Rights?

Brazil is important for the future development of the international human rights regime. The

distinctiveness of the country, both in terms of its domestic human rights record and in terms

of its relationship with international human rights, means that Brazil is likely to impact on

debates on the meaning and nature of democratic rule and human rights in the decades to

come. Together with India and South Africa (and China), Brazil is not likely to develop

understandings of human rights governance in line with Western ideals. 25

Brazil has

traditionally emphasised the importance of universalist multilateral institutions, including

with regards to the international human rights regime. But Brazil has also continued to stress

the importance of the protections from external interference as enshrined in the principle

national sovereignty and voiced opposition to the idea and practice of humanitarian

intervention. It has also resisted the inherent selectivity of Western criticisms of certain

countries’ human rights records (with, for example, Iran singled out as a human rights and

security pariah, whereas Saudi Arabia is afforded the status of a key Western ally).

What then are the prospects for a more assertive and consistent set of human rights

policies by the Dilma government? True, Dilma has generated significant domestic support as

23

a result of the policy shift on Iran, and to a certain extent with her support for a truth

commission with a mandate to investigate human rights abuses committed by the Brazilian

military regime. Yet, the extent and significance of these policy changes, albeit important,

should not be overstated.

In relation to the global democratization agenda, Brazil will continue to stress the

importance of ‘democratizing’ global governance. As a consequence, Brazil will continue to

favour dialogue over confrontation. Hence, although there is a case to be made for labelling

Brazil ‘Western’, ‘democratic’, and even ‘liberal’, Brazil’s foreign policy objectives will

continue to diverge from what is commonly associated with these labels by dominant strands

of academic theorizing. This has significant implications for the international human rights

regime, as one cannot assume that emerging powers will simply be absorbed within the

current global liberal order.

There are of course significant domestic challenges in terms of Brazil’s own deeply

problematic human rights record. Yet, it is important to acknowledge the very significant

developments in Brazilian human rights policies over the course of the last few decades. And,

domestic experiences of human rights challenges can provide important opportunities to

pursue informed and effective policies abroad (e.g. the struggle against poverty as can be

seen in Lula’s initiative on combating hunger, 26

and Brazil’s constructive role in the follow-

up to the Durban conference on racial discrimination). And, of course dominant countries

have had their own internal human rights challenges (US and racial segregation, UK and

24

colonial rule, and France in Algeria), while simultaneously supporting the development of the

international human rights regime, even before the more contemporary rights violating

policies and practices by powerful states in the ‘war on terror’.

It is also important to note some of the structural features that will continue to shape

Brazilian policies when it comes to international human rights both during the Dilma

administration(s), as well as beyond. In particular, there are two key dimensions to the future

direction of Brazilian human rights policies, both connected to increasing expectations and

normative pressures facing Brazilian policy-makers.

First, on the domestic side, the increasing pluralisation of Brazilian society has also

had its impact on foreign policy making. The formal embedding of Brazil in the international

human rights regime has created important political and legal opportunities for human rights

activism. There has been an increasing professionalization of Brazil’s human rights

organization over the course of the last decade. This is partly the result of increased interest

by major international donors such as the Ford Foundation. There has also been increased

interaction between local NGOs and transnational networks as evidenced in the creation of

Justiça Global in 1999 by human rights professionals who previously worked at HRW and

CEJIL. As a consequence, Brazilian human rights NGOs, and even social movements, have

increasingly plugged into international human rights networks. Also, domestic human rights

groups, such as Conectas, have increasingly sought to influence Brazilian foreign policy in

human rights matters. Conectas, for example, played an active role in NGO lobbying efforts

25

shaping the creation of the UN Human Rights Council. It has also worked with ‘key

countries’ to produce international norms (e.g. in relation to framing of norms around issues

concerning discrimination based on sexual orientation). Conectas has also been active in

lobbying the Congressional Committee on human rights and foreign policy. In short,

Brazilian foreign policy is no longer merely what the Itamaraty says it is (Cason and Power,

2009). This has also led to an increasing politicisation of the foreign policy process, a trend

that has intensified in recent years with the Workers’ Party increasingly putting its stamp on

Brazilian foreign policy priorities under Lula.

Second, internationally Brazil will have to manage increasing expectations that the

country should play a more active and forceful role in shaping the development of the

international human rights regime. Attempts in recent years on the part of the most powerful

states in the international system to shift the normative balance between human rights and

security in the name of the ‘war on terrorism’ have showed, according to some, the inherent

power-based logic underpinning the global human rights regime (Dunne, 2007). For others,

however, the resilience and normative strength of the human rights system is demonstrated by

the ways in which the human rights discourse has re-asserted itself at various levels (Foot,

2007). Beyond the more immediate human rights concerns, however, the international human

rights regime is facing a more uncertain future as highlighted in the debates surrounding the

meaning and wider implications of the rise of non-Western states, shifting global power

balances, and what some predict could be the beginning of the end of the period of US

26

hegemony. In many ways the rise of Brazil is seen as distinct from authoritarian China, and

other ‘middle-powers’ such as Iran (and for some, to use a more regionally relevant example,

Venezuela). Yet, one cannot simply assume Brazil to converge to global liberal norms and

values, including human rights (although such expectations in Brazil’s quest for international

status and prestige may assert some influence on foreign policy behaviour). Confronted with

increasing expectations and demands to assume greater international responsibilities,

Brazilian foreign policy-makers need to balance and assess often conflicting policy

objectives. Dilma’s government will therefore face some of the long-standing tensions in

strategy and national identity of whether Brazil’s future lies as the leader of the South, as the

mediator between North and South, or as a rising power drawing on universal standards of

legitimacy for its own instrumental purposes (Hurrell, 2008: 57).

27

-Figure 1. Number of Petitions Submitted to the Inter-American Commission on

Human Rights, by Country

Source: Author’s own based on data from Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

Annual Reports, 1999-2009.

28

Notes

1 This discussion of Brazilian human rights policies cannot aim to be exhaustive of course. A

number of key human rights concerns are dealt with in other articles in this special issue. See,

particularly, Macaulay (forthcoming).

2 This article draws, with permission, on materials previously published as Engstrom (2011).

The author is grateful for the constructive comments of two anonymous reviewers on an

earlier version of this article.

3 For an account of Brazil’s role in limiting the scope of the mandate of the United Nation’s

Human Rights Commission with regards to the question of disappeared persons during this

period see Kramer and Weissbrodt (1981).

4 The unofficial truth report sponsored by the Archdiocese of São Paulo with support from

the World Council of Churches, provided an important account, however, of the systematic

human rights violations committed by the military regime, including use of torture,

disappearances, and extra-judicial executions (Archdiocese of São Paulo, 1985). For external

opposition to the Brazilian military regime, see Green (2010).

29

5 Brazil has been a non-permanent member of the Security Council during the following

years: 1946–1947; 1951–1952; 1954–1955; 1963–1964; 1967–1968; 1988–1989; 1993–1994;

1998–1999; 2004–2005; and 2010– 2011.

6 Lula’s foreign policy managed overall to tread a delicate balance between strengthening

diplomatic and economic ties with the ‘developing world’ and securing access to the

exclusive gatherings of the ‘developed world’ such as the G8.

7 These fissures are long standing as highlighted by Pinheiro (2000: 32): ‘The military, the

right, and traditional sectors of Brazilian diplomacy refused transparency and dialogue with

NGOs because this was regarded as interference in domestic affairs by subversive elements

intent on mobilising a campaign against the values of the dictatorship. On the other hand,

sectors of the left (including elements within Brazilian diplomacy) considered that most

human rights initiatives as tools implemented by the industrialised nations (it didn’t matter

that those nations were democratic) against the interests of the Third World.’

8 One important exception to this tendency is Brazil’s leading role over the last decade in

support of a United Nations resolution on sexual orientation and gender identity. Together

with South Africa, Brazil led the UN Human Rights Council, against significant opposition

30

(mainly from member states from the non-Latin American Global South), in the adoption of

the resolution in June 2011.

9 It is noteworthy that arguably the most prominent Brazilian on the global ‘humanitarian

scene’, the late Sergio Vieira de Mello, received practically no official or diplomatic support

from his country of birth (Power, 2008). And, the absence of any voluntary Brazilian

financial support of the UN office that Vieira de Mello was heading at the time of his death,

the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, is all the more glaring in light of

modest, yet diplomatically significant, funding given by countries such as Argentina, Chile,

and Mexico.

10 The decision follows a highly publicised move in July 2010 when Lula offered asylum to

an Iranian woman, Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, who had been sentenced to death by

stoning for alleged adultery in Iran.

11 The idea of ‘cordiality’ plays a defining role in Brazil’s national self-image. In terms of its

conduct and normative preferences in international affairs, this idea is reflected in Brazil’s

traditional preference for negotiation and mediation over direct confrontation in the pursuit of

national interests.

31

12 Although the intensity of Argentina-Brazil rivalry has dramatically diminished following

Argentina’s relative economic decline in recent decades, Argentina does not support Brazil’s

campaign for a permanent seat on the UNSC. Beyond South America, Mexico’s foreign

policy reorientation towards the US since the 1990s has not been favourably received by the

Itamaraty. And, Chavez’ Venezuela has its own ideas about regional integration that do not

necessarily align with those of Brazil.

13 There are multiple reasons for Brazil’s active involvement in Honduras following the coup

including its concern over the repression of demonstrators and political supports of the

deposed president, Manuel Zelaya, who took refuge in the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa.

Yet, the overriding concern of Brazil, together with the majority of Latin American states,

was the violation of the regional norm for the respect of democratically elected government

enshrined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter of the Organization of American States.

14 For the current citizen security situation, and the responses of Brazilian authorities to

rising public fear of crime, see Fiona Macaulay’s contribution to this special issue.

15 The USA’s human rights ratification record stands in marked contrast to most other

democratic countries in that it has not ratified a range of widely supported international

human rights treaties including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

32

Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. At

a regional level, the USA distinguishes itself, together with Canada and most of the English-

speaking Caribbean countries for example, by not having ratified the American Convention

on Human Rights.

16 For example, in a general comparison with other Latin American states, Brazil has been

slow to accept the competence, where available, of UN human rights mechanisms to receive

and consider inter-state and individual complaints. It took Brazil, for instance, until 2006 to

accept Article 22 under the Torture Convention and until 2009 to ratify the first optional

protocol under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which give

the respective monitoring committees the competence to review individual complaints.

17 As an illustration, in terms of the number of petitions received by the IACHR in 2008, 151

cases involved Argentina, while 76 involved Chile and 64 cases were submitted against

Brazil. Clearly this pattern of recourse to the IAHRS by individual petitioners and groups in

these countries cannot primarily be explained in terms of sheer numbers of human rights

violations in the respective countries. Rather, this evidence suggests that the reasons for the

differentiated relationship with the IAHRS are found in patterns of human rights mobilization

by civil society actors primarily, but also in terms of engagement with international human

33

rights institutions by domestic judiciaries and state officials. See further: Engstrom and

Hurrell (2010).

18 Very few Brazilians have been elected to the IACHR: Carlos A. Dunshee de Abranches,

1964-1983; Gilda Maciel Correa Russomano, 1984-1991; and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, 2004-

2011. Cançado Trindade is the only Brazilian who has served as Judge on the Inter-American

Court.

19 This is seen, for example, in the piecemeal reactions to the provisional measures adopted

by the IACtHR in relation to the case of Urso Branco prison. IACtHR, Provisional measures

in Urso Branco (Brazil), 25 November 2009.

20 Moreover, the reaction of the Dilma government to the April 2011 decision of the Inter-

American Commission on Human Rights to grant interim measures to suspend the

construction of the Belo Monte dam in the Amazon basin reflects Brazil’s reluctance to

submit to the authority of the regional human rights system. In response to the Commission’s

decision Dilma reportedly ordered the suspension of Brazil’s annual contribution of

approximately US$ 800,000 to the Inter-American system.

34

21 As president Dilma initially supported a legislative proposal to revise the Secrecy Law

through the adoption of a freedom of information law. Yet after strong criticisms from

opposition politicians Dilma toned down her support for the proposal, which has led to the

proposal being stalled in the Senate.

22 At the time of writing (October 2011), the legislative proposal has moved to the Brazilian

Senate for approval.

23 The case refers to the arrest, torture, extra-judicial killings, and disappearances by the

Brazilian military of members of a guerrilla group that was active in the early 1970s in the

Araguaia River region.

24 See further the article by Juliana Bertazzo in this special issue.

25However, Brazil’s understanding of the concept of human rights does not significantly

diverge from that of the West, at least when compared to other emerging powers in the

international system, such as China and perhaps even India. Moreover, it must be noted that

there is much divergence even within the ‘West’ in this regard. Consider, for example,

Northern European conceptions of social welfare, and of the appropriate balance between

individual freedoms and collective responsibilities, with Anglo-American conceptions.

35

26 Lula sought to build foreign policy on domestic policy achievements. This could most

clearly be seen in Lula’s social commitment at home (‘Zero Hunger’ programme) being

projected abroad through policy initiatives such as ‘Action against Hunger and Poverty’. This

initiative was launched by Brazil at the United Nations in 2004 and seeks to use ‘innovative

financing mechanisms’ to raise funds for hunger and poverty alleviation programmes

globally.

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For correspondence: Par Engstrom, Human Rights Consortium, School of Advanced Study,

University of London, Malet Street, London, WC1E 7HU. United Kingdom. Email:

par.engstrom@sas.ac.uk