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The Institute for Global Dialogue and the Federal Trust for Education and Research 1

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Reflections on Trends inKenya, Ghana

and Senegal

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2 Enhancing Institutional Effectiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa


Enhancing Institutional Effectivenessin Sub-Saharan Africa

Reflections on Trends in Kenya, Ghana and Senegal

Report Rapporteurs

Dr Francis IkomeDr Siphlomandla Zondi

Che AjuluAlexis Krachai

July 2006

The Institute for Global Dialogue, South Africaand the Federal Trust for Education and Research, UK



CONTENTS

1. Foreword .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7

2. Methodology .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9

The Working Group .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9

Case Study Countries .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 10

The Report .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 10

3. An Overview of Post-Colonial Reform .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 11

4. Observations, Findings and Trends .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15

Conceptual Reflection .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15

Separation of Power .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 16

The State of the Bureaucracy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 17

Local Government .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 18

Financial Management and Budget Control .. .. .. .. .. 18

Revenue Collection .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 19

Private Sector Development .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 20

The Role of Civil Society .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 20

Leveraging Traditional Institutions .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 20

The Impact of Regional and Continental Institutions .. .. .. 21

Cross-Cutting Issues .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 22

The International Dimension .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 23

Conclusion .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 24

contents continue >>


CONTENTS

5. Perceptions from the Case Study Countries .. .. .. .. .. 27

Key Elements of Good Governance and Institutional Effectiveness .. 27

Institutions and Branches of Government .. .. .. .. .. .. 28

Presidents, Presidential Power and the Executive .. .. .. 28

Political Parties, Parliaments and Parliamentarians .. .. .. 29

The Civil Service and State Bureaucracies .. .. .. .. .. 31

The Rule of Law, Judicial Systems and Judicial Reform .. .. 34

Fiscal Authorities, Public Finances and Revenue Generation .. 35

Influences on the Administrative and Political Systems .. .. .. 36

Brain Drain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 36

Traditional Forms of Governance and Chieftaincy .. .. .. 36

Civic Education and Citizenship .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 37

Gender .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 38

Non-State Actors .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 38

Civil Society .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 38

The Media .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 39

The Private Sector and Foreign Investment .. .. .. .. .. 40

Supra-National Considerations .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 41

Regional and Pan-African Groupings .. .. .. .. .. .. 41

Economic Autonomy and International Trade .. .. .. .. 42


Foreword

Africa continues to labour under the twin challenges of economic growth and poverty alleviation.Anaemic economic performance comes up against the paradox of rising population growth and theravages of the HIV/AIDS raptor; while downward trends in human welfare—life expectancy, adultliteracy, income, education, health and employment—are indicative of deep stagnation in Africa’sdevelopment trajectory.

Over the last two decades, a variety of policy discourses have emerged in Africa which broadlyexamine the causes of this development and growth malaise and then attempt to provide appropriatediagnostic interventions. Despite their differing ideological presumptions and intellectual currents,there is broad convergence, it would seem, around six strategic policy imperatives which focus onthe need to: consolidate achievements in macroeconomic stabilisation; enhance state capacity fordevelopment; promote an active role for the private sector; transform Africa’s agricultural base; improvethe foundations of Africa’s human capital; and diversify the continent’s economies.

This study is interested in casting greater light on the question of state capacity and buildinginstitutional effectiveness in Africa. It draws its inspiration from important recent developments aroundNEPAD and the evolving architecture of the African Union. Both provide important markers andherald a different approach to governance, with a strong normative emphasis and commitment. Indeed,NEPAD’s preconditions for development stress the need for state transparency and accountability asfoundational norms for strong and robust institutions, which in turn are seen as the essential bulwarksof ‘African solutions to African problems’.

This project is rooted in an ongoing conversation between the London-based Federal Trust andthe South Africa-based Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) which sought to design a project thatwould, on the basis of select case studies, attempt a better and deeper understanding of the institutionalnexus of state capacity in Africa. A novel approach (used by the Federal Trust in a European context)would invite the testimonies of relevant actors who have views about the factors that inhibit andpromote institutional effectiveness. Because of their instructive profiles for the project and vastlydifferent colonial progenies, Ghana, Kenya and Senegal were selected as Case Study Countries.While the Federal Trust and the Institute for Global Dialogue would share the responsibility for managingthe project, a high-level pan-African working group would provide constant project guidance andadvice, lead the testimony-gathering exercise and act as a conceptual and critical sounding board.

This study thus embodies the collective effort of those involved in the project and its findings areemblematic of the contributions made by a cross-section of interlocutors in the three case studycountries who gave generously of their time, opinions and insights. The study further highlights andinforms an important impulse for building institutional effectiveness in Africa, namely, democraticpluralism. The base of evidence here suggests that democratic pluralism is salutary for governmentaccountability. In terms of this logic, as the democratic order institutionalises itself, it will promotedevelopmental state institutions that improve social welfare and advance economic prosperity.However, let us hasten to add that state weakness in Africa is a structural phenomenon and buildingmore effective state administrations, will, as the case studies make clear, require time, resources andsacrifice, but above all, political will and discipline.


This study must be seen as a modest contribution to the ongoing discussion and debate aboutAfrica’s development challenges and prospects. We trust that it will enjoy a wide audience and thatits findings will be of interest to a wide policy and academic community.

We would like to take this opportunity to recognise the sterling effort and unwavering commitmentof all our colleagues involved in this enterprise and to thank the UK’s Department for InternationalDevelopment (DFID) for considering the project worthy of its financial support.

Brendan DonnellyDirector, The Federal Trust

Dr Garth Le PereExecutive Director, IGD


Methodology

In February 2005 the Institute for Global Dialoguein South Africa and the Federal Trust for Educationand Research in London convened a Pan-AfricanWorking Group of experts to rethink institutionaleffectiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The aims and objectives of this WorkingGroup are:

1. What lessons can be learnt from 10 years (1995-2005)of attempts by African countries and the internationalcommunity to improve institutional effectiveness andstate capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)?

2. How can future strategies designed by Africangovernments and supported by the internationalcommunity best improve institutional effectiveness andstate capacity to support poverty reduction?

3. What does the emerging Pan-African Agenda of theAU and AU-NEPAD mean for African Countries and theinternational community that is supporting Africa? Whatare the implications?

Within this overall context, the WorkingGroup’s Terms of Reference are:

1. Is there a common understanding within Sub-SaharanAfrica on what elements of institutional reform areessential to promote democracy, reduce poverty andenhance economic growth? What elements might beconsidered secondary and tertiary issues? To whatextent is this ordering applicable to Sub-Saharan Africaas a whole?

2. Is there a common understanding within Africa of thetools made available by the international communityand Pan-African initiatives to enhance institutionaleffectiveness?

3. Using the three examples of Ghana, Senegal andKenya, what lessons can be learnt from comparing andcontrasting different records of institutional reform? Inparticular, what recommendations can be made on therecent and future role of the African Union, NEPAD,APRM and relevant Poverty Reduction Strategies?

4. What is the role of the African Union in working toenhance institutional effectiveness at the national andPan-African level? What lessons can be learnt fromother supra-national bodies such as the EuropeanUnion?

5. How should future initiatives be designed andimplemented to maximise the positive effects they mighthave on institutional effectiveness at the national andPan-African level? In particular, how can policy-makers

respond effectively to national differences within Africaand the need for appropriate amounts of policy space?

6. What ought to be the future role of the followinggroupings in enhancing institutional effectiveness inSSA?

The International Community

Providers of Foreign AidInternational InvestorsMultinational Business

Domestic Stakeholders

Private SectorTrade UnionsLocal and National Media

The Working Group

The Working Group was comprised of expertsfrom around Africa, all of whom have expertiseand experience of dealing with various political,economic and social issues that impact on howinstitutions work. Members were supported by aResearch Team at the IGD. The members of thisTeam were Dr Siphlomandla Zondi, Francis Ikomeand Che Ajulu.

The following experts have contributed to theWorking Group.

1. Professor Rok Ajulu - Department of InternationalRelations, Wits University (Kenya)

2. Dr Abdul Lamin - Department of International Relations,Wits University (Sierra Leone)

3. Dr Garth Le Pere - Executive Director, Institute forGlobal Dialogue, South Africa

4. Dr Khabela Matlosa - Director for Research,Publications and Information, EISA (Lesotho)

5. Professor Dani Nabudere - Executive Director, AfricaStudies Centre (Uganda)

6. Professor Irene Odotei - Institute of African Studies,University of Ghana, Legon (Ghana)

7. Professor Eghosa Osaghae - Vice Chancellor,Igbinedion University, Okada (Nigeria) (GroupChairman)

8. Dr Alioune Sall - Regional Coordinator, African FuturesInstitute (Senegal)

9. Dr Gloria Somolokae - Advisor, WK KelloggProgramme, University of Botswana (Botswana)


10. Prof Balefi Tsie - Dean of Arts Faculty, University ofBotswana (Botswana)

11. Dr Nicholas Amponsah - Lecturer, Political ScienceDepartment, University of Ghana (Ghana)

12. Professeur Pathé Diagne - Directeur, Centre d’EtudesProspectives Alternatives et de Politologie, Senegal(Senegal)

Case Study Countries

From March 2005 the Working Group met on fourseparate occasions to consider its Terms ofReference, recent developments and the viewsof other experts and stakeholders. Three of thesemeetings took place in the Case Study Countries– Kenya, Ghana and Senegal – chosen by theIGD so that this project would reflect both politicalrealities and national characteristics.

The Working Group recently completed itswork in these three countries where they met withkey stakeholders interested in institutionaleffectiveness. The dialogue between these expertsand the Working Group took place in a series ofRoundtables that were hosted by local partners.The Working Group also used its trips asopportunities to engage with post-graduatestudents enrolled in political and economic studies.

9-11 June 2005: Kenya (hosted by the Department ofPolitics at the University of Nairobi)

27-29 July 2005: Ghana (hosted by the Tradition andModernity Project, University of Legon)

17-19 August 2005: Senegal (hosted by the Centred’Etudes Prospectives Alternatives et de Politologie,Dakar)

The Report

The report continues with a context-settingchapter that presents a historical overview of theevolution of institutional governance in post-independence Africa.

The main element of the report is a set of keyfindings presented alongside an analysis of theexpert testimony received during the Roundtablediscussions held during the Working Group’sstudy visits to the three Case Study Countries aswell as the African Union and EconomicCommission of Africa’s headquarters in Ethiopia.

The final section of the report is a summarycompilation of the notes from the Roundtablemeetings.


An Overview of Post-ColonialGovernance Reform

An analysis of the current state of governance andgovernance institutions in Africa would beincomplete without an understanding of the historicalfactors that have influenced the nature of the post-colonial African state. To begin with, the foundationsof Africa’s post-colonial state were laid during thecolonial era. Not only did the colonial administrationsshape and structure the territories that were tobecome independent African states, but they alsobequeathed a range of institutions and practices tothese states at independence – legislatures, judicialsystems, executive offices, public serviceapparatuses and public corporations. However,these institutions, which were originally tailored toserve the needs of the colonial metropolis, werehanded over to independent African states withoutadapting them to the changed realities and needsof sovereign statehood. Therefore, a majorchallenge that the immediate post-independenceAfrican governments faced was restructuring theseinherited colonial legacies to meet both thedevelopment needs of their countries and theirpersonal aspirations to consolidate their newly wonpolitical power.

This formed the basis for efforts to restructurenational institutions in Africa in the first decadeafter independence; covering areas as diverse aspolitical and military organisation, education andpublic administration. Politically, leaders of Africa’sindependence movements converted themselves(with disarming ease) into despots; stiflingopposition parties and creating one-party states,emasculating the judiciary and the legislature andcreating overbearing presidential regimes, andeven silencing the media. In a number of cases,pioneer presidents were deposed from power andreplaced by juntas and tyrants without any interestin transformation of inherited institutions andpractices. To buttress their grip on power, manyAfrican leaders devoted sizeable portions of their

national budgets to strengthening the coerciveapparatuses of state - expanding the sizes andcapabilities of their armies and police forces.African governments’ emphasis on the use of thecoercive apparatuses of state, alongside thesystematic weakening of broad-based politicalinstitutions, widened the gap between the Africanstate and civil society. This severely underminedthe prospects of a democratic political culture.

Meanwhile, in the administrative realm,African governments undertook to phase outexpatriate manpower through processes ofnationalisation and indigenisation of their publicservices and national corporations. In the 1960sand early 1970s, a majority of Africangovernments embarked on massive recruitmentand appointment of graduates into the publicservice. Public service workers were offered avariety of incentives – huge salaries, free housing,service cars, free telephones, water and electricity.African public services became the most lucrativesectors of the economy, and civil servants stoodout as a privileged class. As a result, by the late1970s and early 1980s, African public servantsbecame ‘public masters’ – compromisingneutrality and probity that are characteristic ofpublic services elsewhere. Corruption,absenteeism and generalised impunity becamethe hallmarks of the African public service.

The failure of African states’ institutionalreforms of the 1960s and 1970s was compoundedby the nature of Africa’s incorporation into theglobal political economy. In this regard, the globalpolitical economy into which Africa wasincorporated in the 19th century was underpinnedby an international division of labour whose logicconsigned Africa to a peripheral position. Thecontinent specialised in the production andexportation of primary products (cash crops andminerals with no value add) to the markets ofindustrialised countries of the North. In return,they were to serve as markets for manufacturedgoods from the North. Moreover, Africangovernments could neither determine the prices


nor the volumes of their exports. Their export-oriented economies were therefore bound to bevulnerable to external shocks in later years.

In the 1970s, commodity prices plummetedin global markets. This, together with successiveenergy crises, beginning with the 1973 OPEC-induced global oil crisis, nearly brought a majorityof African states to their knees. Desperate forfinances, African governments were forced toembark on borrowing sprees from bilateral andmultilateral institutions, marking the beginning ofAfrican countries’ debt overhang and debt crisis.At the same time, some African governmentsmade serious efforts to move away from export-oriented economic policies towards import-substitution industrialisation. At the political level,African leaders at the 1979 OAU Summit inMonrovia responded to the crisis with a call forself-reliance through regional integration andpromotion of agriculture. The Summit sought toreinforce the role of the state in confronting theeconomic crisis. Donors, on the other hand, sawthe crisis as an opportunity to force Africangovernments to retreat from the centre of nationaldevelopment. The donor community, especiallythe IMF and the World Bank, put pressure onAfrican states to liberalise their politics andeconomies, because, in their opinion, the lack ofpolitical and economic liberalisation in Africancountries was the major cause of Africancountries’ inability to develop. These externalpressures would constitute the incentive forexternally driven institutional reforms in thecontinent in the 1980s.

In 1981, the World Bank’s Berg Reportadvanced the argument that the problem ofdevelopment was fundamentally an institutionalone. Viewed in this light, the Bank saw theeconomic crisis as being a product of excessivestate intervention in the economy. It blamed thepublic sector for a deteriorating macro-economicenvironment, leading to persistent fiscal deficitsand hyperinflation. The report averred that anover-extended public administration overlaid with

parastatals, was responsible for economicinefficiency and resource wastage. Therefore, theBank advocated that ‘governments could do morewith less.’ The report advocated privatisation ofstate entities alongside stringent fiscal controlsas key corrective measures. But what wouldsubsequently characterise the donor responsewould be the leitmotif of downsizing the publicservice, cutting down on wage expenditure andreducing budget allocations in areas such ashealth, education and social welfare which theprivate sector was expected to take over. A leanand managerial state became a precondition formuch needed development aid. Structuraladjustment, thus, further eroded state capacity todeliver public goods and manage economicdevelopment, while paradoxically, donor fundingwent to countries with increasingly undemocraticgovernments.

In the late 1980s, the World Bank admittedthat there were weaknesses inherent in theimposed reforms; however, it only suggestedminor changes to the adjustment dogma. Chiefamong these was the propagation of capacitybuilding as a means to rescue flagging donor-driven public-sector reform initiatives. Anotherwas the mantra of political conditionality, whichmade support for institutional reform conditionalupon good governance, democracy and civilsociety development.1 These adjustmentsreinforced the agenda of rolling back the state.The private sector was given a boost, but it failedto take over the responsibility from the state forthe provision of basic services as the Bank hadanticipated. This further deepened the economiccrisis and undermined the service deliveryprocess. Donor programmes thus became widelyunpopular within African governments andamongst the African populations.2

By the end of the 1990s, the World Bankadmitted that donor intervention had exacerbated“bureaucratic dysfunction and its attendantproblems of overstaffing, distorted wageincentives and weak governance institutions.”


More than a decade of structural adjustment hadfailed to improve development capacity.3 Clearly,donor interventions sought to deal withtechnocratic symptoms of the fundamentalproblems in the nature of the post-colonial statethat only served to accentuate its predatorytendencies. Such interventions diminished thecentrality of the state in national development, andfailed to revitalize the public sector even when itsimportance was later realized. These donorpolicies further insulated government institutionsfrom deep-seated maladies by allowing them tooutsource, privatise, and decentralise ‘non-essential’ activities to the detriment of sectoralreforms and efficient service delivery.

In the final analysis, the ‘rolling back the state’agenda weakened even the very institutions itcreated as part of public sector reform anddecentralization. It diminished the administrativecapacity necessary for the functioning of newinstitutions within the public sector. The state lostvital human capital and institutional memorynecessary for sustaining even donor-initiatedreform processes. This experience is, perhaps,behind the paradigm shift exhibited by a recentWorld Report with regard to the role of the state:

The state is not merely a referee, making andenforcing the rules from the sidelines, it is also aplayer, indeed often a dominant player in theeconomic game.4

This shift in donor thinking is both opportuneand positive. It will give African governments morespace to negotiate priorities and dictate the natureof public sector reform. This coincides with theemergence of the New Partnership for Africa’sDevelopment (NEPAD), itself a result of a longprocess of debates and reflection on post-independence experiences, including devastatingconsequences of dictatorship and the dislocationof the state from the centre of nationaldevelopment. NEPAD balances self-reliance asenunciated in Monrovia in 1979 with the notion ofeffective partnership with wealthy countries to

ensure that African countries play a pro-active rolein the global economy. It is setting standards andvalues of good governance and democracyagainst which African states will be judged. It alsoprovides a common agenda in Africa’sengagement with donors and investors.

What flows from the foregoing overview ofgovernance reforms in post-colonial Africa is thatthe continent has over the years faced a seriouschallenge of building appropriate institutionalframeworks for its development. It also points tothe fact that various efforts at institutional building(both internally driven and externally inspired)have only yielded mixed results. It is within thiscontext that this study, focusing on a selectnumber of African states, reflects on trends ininstitutional effectiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa.

1 World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis toSustainable Growth Washington, 1989.

2 African Development Bank, Development PolicyManagement Forum Report, November 1999.

3 Ibid, p. 5.

4 World Bank, World Development Report, 1997, p. 31



Observations, Findings andTrends

This section provides an overview of the keyobservations, findings and trends that haveemerged from the three countries studied in theproject: Ghana, Kenya and Senegal. The analysisand findings provided here are preliminary andtentative in nature but are strongly suggestive ofthe conclusions that could be drawn on the basisof an expanded sample of countries. This reportthus has three objectives:

- to highlight general trends and critical comparativeinsights which emerge from the composite report onthe three case studies;

- to provide broad observations and findings in tenthematic areas; and

- to draw conclusions on key questions posed by thestudy and those that have emerged in the course ofthe country visits.

The thematic areas referred to are as follows:

1. Separation of power;

2. State bureaucracy

3. Local government

4. Financial management and budget control

5. Revenue collection

6. Private sector development

7. The role of civil society

8. Leveraging traditional institutions

9. The impact of regional and continental institutions

10. Cross cutting issues of gender, capacity, citizenship and literacy

Conceptual Reflection

Numerous governance initiatives in Africa, withNEPAD and the UK Commission for Africa beingthe most recent, have attempted to address theneed for a strong political and administrativeframework to advance development, democracyand stability. These initiatives are underpinned byprinciples of accountability, transparency, integrity,

respect for human rights and observance of therule of law. To realise these values and norms(which also sometimes come in the form ofprescriptions) countries have had to build,restructure and overhaul their institutions. Indeed,countries in Africa, including the three referred toin this study, have established a complex web ofinstitutions in the form of administrative andoversight structures to enhance the efficiency andeffectiveness of the state. Another set ofinstitutions emerged largely under the influenceof the Bretton Woods institutions, particularly, topromote macro-economic stability, private sectordevelopment and resource mobilisation. YetAfrican countries still labour under the burden ofevolving effective institutions as a basis foraddressing their perennial developmentalproblems and challenges.

As the study has established, the continent’sunderlying problem is not so much the absenceof institutional frameworks, but rather howefficiently and effectively existing institutionsfunction. Their frequent lack of functionalcoherence, adaptive capacity and delivery efficacyis important because of the profound impact it hason the credibility and legitimacy of the institutionsthemselves. Contrary to the often-expressedbelief that tends to see lack of capacity as theoverriding problem in the failure of Africaninstitutions to deliver, this study found that it israther the poor utilisation of existing capacity thataccounts for much of the institutional weaknessesobserved in the study. Some of this poor utilisationderives from the insufficient “domestication” ofinstitutions in order to be sensitive to local politicalcultures and differing spatial and existentialenvironments. The ‘ownership’ of institutions andgovernment programmes as well as enhancedhuman resource capacity is central in addressingproblems of institutional ineffectiveness and isessential for their legitimacy and integrity amongthe citizenry.


Separation of Power

The overbearing power of the executive,especially powers vested in the head of state,has a detrimental effect on the prudentialseparation of power required to ensure theindependence of institutions. In all three casesstudied, state power is concentrated in the officeof the president and, by extension, the executive.The executive tends to be drawn directly fromparliament, which severely compromises theability of the legislature to maintain its oversightand law-making function. In Kenya and Senegal,in particular, there is a creepingauthoritarianism that threatens theindependence of the variousorgans of state as well as theeffective functioning of theadministrative institutions, suchthat the delivery of public servicesis impeded and jeopardised.Although this tendency is lessapparent in Ghana, recentpresidential actions there haveraised concerns about the efficacyof separation of power as anobserved constitutional imperative.To address this adequately willrequire systemic and normative changes in theunderlying culture of impunity, patronage andpersonality cults which have been spawned by ahistory of political and economic crises, illiteracyand poverty.

Legislatures remain fairly weak andincapable of exercising checks and balanceswithin the state. Although enshrined in theconstitution, the independence of parliaments inour Case Study Countries is undermined by theinfluence of the executive, frequently exercisedthrough financial incentives tied to neo-patrimonialarrangements and rent-seeking activities. This isespecially evident in Kenya where the executiveprovides huge amounts of discretionaryconstituency development funds toparliamentarians to underwrite local development

projects of their choice. This in turn givesparliamentarians the means to buy votes. Thereare also instances of parliamentarians beingsubjected to and tempted by corrupt practices inGhana and Senegal. The executive typicallyapplies pressure to ensure conformity andcompliance by parliamentarians in all three cases.The fact that legislatures are the recruitinggrounds for cabinet posts reduces incentives forparliamentarians to hold the executive to account.The ability of parliamentarians to exercise rigorousoversight over policies and their implementationas well as scrutiny of legislation is constrained by

high levels of technical incompetence, pooreducation and, in Senegal, sheer illiteracy. Theimpact of this is aggravated by a lack of technicaland analytical support services within parliaments.This further undermines the work of theparliamentary committees, especially thoseoverseeing public accounts. As a result, anyappearance before parliamentary committees bythe executive and other senior officials hasbecome perfunctory and an empty formality. Thepoor state of political parties, weakened by loweducational levels especially in Senegal, a cultureof patronage in Kenya and lack of professionalstaff in Ghana has generally had a cumulativenegative effect on the quality of the work andproductivity of the legislature. To change this,governments will have to improve support

Mauritius has flexible regimes governing politicalparties

While competitive politics on the continent is hampered bydraconian rules governing registration and activities of politicalparties, Mauritius has over the past decade put in place a legalregime that allows for greater flexibility around registration andoperations of political parties. For instance, in Mauritius politicalparties are not required to register at all except for electoraladministration. Opposition parties enjoy considerable freedom,guaranteed by law and enforced by law enforcement agencies.

Source: ECA Africa Governance Report, 2005


services, establish resource centres, introduceliteracy programmes and run civic educationprogrammes in order to enhance theunderstanding of oversight and legislativefunctions among members of parliaments.

Notwithstanding decades of legal reforms,the ability of the judiciary to advance the ruleof law and remain independent of theexecutive remains weak. The credibility of legalinstitutional frameworks, including thoseinstitutions that dispense justice, requires that therules, procedures and laws be effectively guardedby an independent judiciary. The study found thatin both Kenya and Senegal, the executive has astrong influence on the appointment andfunctioning of the judges, where judicial councilsare appointed by the president and staffed withloyal officers.

This, in turn, has compromised thecompetency profile and stature of the judiciary andalienated some of the best legal minds from thebench. At the same time, in Kenya, the rampantculture of corruption has penetrated the judiciary,with a growing number of judges facing courtcharges for corruption. This, again, has seriouslycompromised the credibility and effectiveness ofthe judiciary in advancing the rule of law.

While legal reforms have increased popularaccess to justice, the quality of the justice systemand its administrative ability have hardly improved,particularly in Ghana and Senegal. Legal reformmust address equity and quality issuessimultaneously so that improvements are evenlyspread. Yet, until a clear separation of power isachieved, the effectiveness of the reforms inenhancing justice and protecting the rule of lawwill remain weak. Clearly, reforms should not limitthemselves to improving the quality of judicialinstitutions, but must also address the legislativenexus from which laws emerge that the judiciaryis meant to advance and enforce.

The State of the Bureaucracy

The state bureaucracy is generally inadequatein the delivery of public services. The overallcapacity of the public sector has weakened aseconomies stagnated following the oil crisis in theearly 1970s. Decades of downsizing understructural adjustment and the failure of palliativecivil service reform initiatives (largely driven bydonors and the Bretton Woods institutions) havecontributed to the deterioration of service delivery.The public sector has lost critical skills and hasfailed to spread public services wide enough dueto chronic resource deficits. The study found thatthe public sector lacks financial incentives toattract managerial and technical expertise and,as it stands, is not geared towards delivery ofpublic services but is rather a repository ofpatronage and sinecures of office. Civil servicereforms aimed at transforming the public sectorinto a focused, decentralised and market-friendlydeliverer of services have only enjoyed modestsuccess. Assumptions that service privatisationwould make good the delivery failures of publicgoods by the state have proven to be fallacious.Worse, due to lack of local ownership and poorpolicy co-ordination, what reforms have beenundertaken have often created administrativeshells and accentuated fragmentation within thepublic administration. Corruption flourishes withinthe civil services of the Case Study Countries. InKenya, a particularly worrying trend is the easewith which the executive arbitrarily hires and firespublic sector management. There is a need forfar-reaching public sector transformation - ratherthan mere reform - in order to advance nationaldevelopment plans and to ensure local ownershipof decision-making processes by better involvingcitizens in the political process, particularly at theprovisional level.


Local Government

Local government is generally inefficient,under-resourced and neglected. In all the CaseStudy Countries there is a dominant and over-determined strong centre that undermines theeffective functioning of local government andmunicipal systems. In all three countries, localgovernment is weak and is increasingly being

replaced by parallel initiatives from the centre thateventually usurp the role of local councils andundermine their ability to interact as interlocutorswith communities. For instance, the well-resourced Constituency Development Fund inKenya, which parliamentarians use for localdevelopment projects, undercuts the role of agrossly under-resourced local governmentsystem. In Ghana, the space provided for thetraditional institutions within local governmentstructures has reduced local councils todeliberative forums. The critical need for

performance-based local government isundermined, in Kenya and Ghana especially, bythe fact that local councillors form part of elaborateand deeply entrenched patronage networks whichguarantee them re-election even in cases ofunderperformance. Serious weaknesses alsoarise from the failure of local authorities to attractpeople with the requisite levels of managerial andtechnical skills. The lack of credibility and

legitimacy of the localcouncils as key deliverynodes has had a deleteriouseffect on public perception ofthe public sector as whole.However, there have beenimprovements in Ghanainspired by the prominentrole of traditional authoritiesin leveraging localdevelopment and popularparticipation. Financialsystems and auditingpractices are beginning toimpact positively inSenegal’s local councils inparticular.

Financial Managementand Budget Control

Economic reforms havepotentially improvedfinancial management and

budget control, but these remain key areas ofconcern. Some strides have been made in thecourse of fostering macro-economic stability andpromoting improved public finance accountabilitysystems over the past decade. Appropriatepolicies and legislation exist and institutions andprocedures are in place, especially in Ghana andKenya, although their impact has beenconstrained by poor management and lack ofpolitical will. The study found glaring inefficienciesand ineptitude in the financial oversight institutionssuch the Auditors-General and Central Banks,

Community-driven service delivery in Cameroon

Cameroon has improved community participation in key areas of publicsector intervention in the economy, particularly agriculture. A nationalagricultural extension programme is a case in point. It is pilot programmecovering some 100 villages with assistance of experts from Benin,Mali and Madagascar training Cameroonian trainers. The trainers thengalvanize communities to come together to diagnose their challenges,set priorities and demand support for these from state extension officers.While the initial focus was on agricultural extension, but once organized,the community used their newfound power to prevail upon localauthorities for better schools, roads, water supply, health services andother local issues. The phenomenon convinced cabinet ministers tomake field visits. With support from both government and donors, thecommunities have managed to improve local government delivery ofbasic services and to force local elite to provide additional resourcesfor local development. Organized villages put pressure on mayors andlocal government officials to reduce diversion of funds to unbudgetedpurposes and to improve utilization of allocated resources. In 2002,the Ministry of Planning decided to make this an official governmentapproach to local development nationally with participating villagesincreasing every year to reach 13 000 villages by about 2007.

Source: World Bank Development Report 2004


especially in Kenya. The Public Accounts andBudget Committees of parliament charged withmonitoring economic management areconstrained by high technical illiteracy in Senegal

and lack of technical support more broadly. Whilebudgets are constructed in such a way that theymay become useful tools for addressingdevelopment challenges in each country, they areformulated and implemented in a climate ofsecrecy and opaqueness, with minimalparticipation even within the bureaucracy itself.Usually the time parliament has to examine thebudget is too short for meaningful scrutiny suchthat the logic behind appropriations andexpenditure patterns is not thoroughlyinvestigated. Although audit and financial laws arein place in Senegal, they are not observed, let

alone implemented. African countries such asBotswana have shown that transparent andefficient financial systems can be made to workin the continent. The three Case Study Countrieswould do well to follow Botswana’s example.

Revenue Collection

Tax collection is improving but it remainsgenerally limited in scope. While tax collectingentities have been created, they have not beenadequately resourced. Senegal has drasticallyimproved revenue collection, following thestrengthening of its tax collecting institutions onthe basis of improved resource allocation andputting in place auditing systems. A major problemin Ghana and Kenya is that a large section of theirincome-generating population is in the informalsector, which renders tax collection virtuallyimpossible. In all three Case Study Countries, theculture of paying taxes is weak at the highest level.The rules de facto exempt political elites, seniorcivil servants and, sometimes, their families. It isespecially they who tend to be the main taxdelinquents and who further entrench a culture ofevasion. As a result, the tax system is perceivedin some quarters as punishing the low-paid, thesmall entrepreneur and the poor, while beingpermissive for the wealthy. To change this, therewill need to be a multi-pronged strategy, includingin particular strengthening and increasing theresources made available to tax-collectinginstitutions. The culture of not paying taxes couldbe reversed through public education, sanctions,incentive systems and political commitment at thehighest level of government.

Botswana champions transparencyin monetary and financial systems

A key element of transparency in the monetarypolicies is the availability of timely, accurate,comprehensive and detailed information onwho makes the decisions, how they are made,the objectives pursued, the outcomes expectedand how the institutions are constructed. InBotswana, not only are systems to ensuretransparency in place, but they have helpedimprove macro-economic stability andcorporate governance. The Bank of Botswanaensures transparency through annualpublication of a monetary statement thatoutlines the objectives and targets of itsmonetary and anti-inflation policies.Adjustments to the bank rate are publiclyannounced and the reasons for them explainedand justified. The exchange rate policy is alsopublicly explained, debated and justified. Theinformation on the basket of currencies is madeavailable to the public for verification ofcalculation of the exchange rate. The Bankrequires commercial banks and creditinstitutions to provide it with - and disclose tothe public - details of all charges payable forthe operation of accounts and other servicesrendered.

Source: ECA Africa Governance Report 2005


Private Sector Development

In spite of the success of investmentincentives, the private sector remainsunderdeveloped and largely expatriate.Generally, the private sector is expanding in Africaas a result of investment incentives brought onby democratic reform, improved macro-economicstability, the easing of registration requirementsof private companies, the protection of propertyrights and the improvement of infrastructure. Yet,very little of this expanded private sector is in thehands of local entrepreneurs. No prosperingmiddle class has taken substantial root in any ofthe three studied countries. In Kenya in particularthe tradition persists whereby the state is stillregarded as the most natural vehicle for personalwealth creation. Until an environment is createdfor increased domestic ownership of capitalthrough empowerment programmes, the state willfind it difficult to promote private sectordevelopment effectively.

The Role of Civil Society

Civil society has grown remarkably active, butis not strong enough to hold government toaccount and to participate in the fight againstpoverty. The oversight role of civil society and itsimportance in raising the public’s awareness ofits rights and privileges is universally accepted.Civil society organisations have played a criticalrole in the political transition in all three CaseStudy Countries. They have compensated forweak opposition parties in holding government toaccount in Senegal and Ghana. In Kenya, civicgroups and the media have exposed corruption.In the process, civil society has incurred the wrathof governments and ruling parties. It has suffereddeliberate attempts at suppression in Kenya andSenegal. Of the multiple forms of civil society,NGOs have however become weaker as theirsources of funding have been eroded or shiftedelsewhere, following relatively smooth yetincomplete transitions to democracy. Civil societyorganisations have work to do to improve theirown credibility by addressing concerns about theiragendas, constituencies and sources of fundingas well as problems of fragmentation andduplication. Governments will need to provideformal spaces for authentic civil society formationsto engage them on key matters affecting servicedelivery and social development.

Leveraging Traditional Institutions

The involvement of traditional authorities inaddressing the development lag - in remote,rural areas especially - is growing in somecountries, albeit slowly. Traditional modes ofgovernance have been modified in many casesto conform to the demands of modern-day politicalrealities. In Ghana, traditional authorities are notjust involved, but are integrated into the state ruraldevelopment strategies. They have become keyplayers in areas as diverse as health and HIV/AIDS, education, agriculture and preservation ofrevenue-generating cultural heritage sites. Ghana

Privatising Kenya Airways – a bestpractice example for other Africancountries

Since its privatisation in 1996, Kenya Airways(KQ) has been able to realise cost savings,provide a quality service and connect to a widenetwork. To achieve this, the company has grownstrongly and managed to weather the aftermathof the September 11 pretty well. Incomes rose2% over the six months following these eventsand bombings in east Africa. The company hassubstantially cut non-essential capitalexpenditure and produced a healthy balancebook. It has successfully upgraded its ageing fleetto allow it to expand its operations connectingdifferent parts of the continent and the continentwith Europe and Americas. The airline is today akey player in Africa’s development and inter-regional trade. The result has been improvedreliability and performance by an airline namedAfrican Airline of the Year in 1999 and has beena runners-up to SAA, Africa’s biggest airline, sincethen.



is unique in that the state has invested heavily incapacity enhancement of Chiefs’ financial

management, general managerial and legal/policycompetencies. There are fears that involvingtraditional leaders in modern governance willpromote ethnicity and corruption in traditionalnorms of gift-giving. While accepted as a norm inGhana, these practices have been studiouslyavoided in Kenya and Senegal. Even though thereare problems of compatibility and complimentaritybetween modern and traditional modes ofgovernance and concerns about ethnic tensionand corruption, the traditional institutions’ authorityand influence could perhaps be used to ease theburden on over-stretched local governments inKenya and Senegal.

The Impact of Regional and ContinentalInstitutions

Regional and continental institutions have hada mixed impact on institutional effectivenessat national level. The transition from OAU to AU,

the emergence of NEPAD and the reform ofregional economic communities have buttressed

acceptance ofprinciples ofdemocracy and goodgovernance. Theyhave also provided anormative frameworkand a common agendaat national level, whileenhancing theharmonisation ofpolicies andprogrammes amongstcountries. The impactof these institutions ine n c o u r a g i n gdiversification ofproduction and exportshas enhanced theglobal competitivenessof some products. Thepotential for regionalintegration to improve

intra- and inter-regional trade was noted in Kenya,but the persistence of protectionist tendencies inother cases undercuts this. Outside stateinstitutions, very little is known about the activitiesof regional and continental organisations, partlybecause governments have not involved enoughnational stakeholders in disseminating knowledgeand information on regional and continentalinitiatives. National populations have not beenadequately consulted on processes such as theAfrican Peer Review Mechanism in Ghana andKenya, and the negotiation of trade agreementsin Senegal, thus creating a legitimacy crisis forthese processes at national level. Nationalistsentiments have also been a constraint on thepopularisation and understanding of integrationinitiatives. There is no sense that regional andcontinental institutions are providing direct supportto development of effective institutions amongmember states generally, partly because ofinternal weaknesses within regional institutions

Leveraging traditional authorities in Ghana

Ghana sets a food example in terms of promoting integration of traditionaland modern institutions of governance. Ghana is strengthening the capacitiesof Chiefs, queenmothers and village headpersons in the Asenteman Councilareas and Akyem Abuakwa Traditional Council areas to participate in activitiesto improve health and fight HIV/AIDS in their communities. It is providingresources for rehabilitating basic primary education facilities in select ruraland deprived areas in the Asanteman Council community, thus designing apartnership between traditional authorities and government to provide qualitybasic education. Government is also improving the financial andmanagement capabilities of the two councils’ secretariats and building theircapacity in community development. It is supporting the councils in efforts topreserve and benefit from their cultural heritage by developing schoolactivities on cultural heritage, and community partnerships. Fundamental toall these programmes are the continuous efforts to revise, codify anddisseminate traditional laws and customs and to increase the accessibilityand effectiveness of traditional law courts. The latter are critical in deliveringjustice at the local level where the Chief is the first point of call for personsseeking redress.



themselves. Yet regional and Pan-Africaninstitutions are potential conduits for the exchangeof expertise, skills and resources needed toimprove institutional effectiveness across thecontinent. Conducted with strict conditions ofinclusivity and robust national debate, the APRMprocess could become a critical catalyst formeaningful institutional reform.

Cross-Cutting Issues

There are four issues which cut across the abovethematic areas: human capacity, gender, civiceducation, and literacy.

Although institutional capacity is critical,it is ultimately the quality of persons who makeup the institutions that will make themeffective. Many existing institutions have beenundermined by weak human capital, especiallyin the areas of managerial competence andtechnical skills. This shortage in turn derives frominadequate financial resources, the allure of the

private sector and more lucrative employmentabroad, corruption, political interference andinternal dysfunctionalities. Allocation of adequateresources, establishment of incentive systemsand sanitising institutions could go a long waytowards turning ‘brain drain into brain gain’.Improving education and training systems, bothon the job and through external interventions, willin the long run help improve competency levels.

Women are neglected in the running ofkey institutions. Progress has been made overthe past few decades towards enforcinginternational and national commitments to genderequity. Efforts to reverse the systemic exclusionof women in state and non-state institutions areon-going. There are gender or womencommissions to ensure state and private sectorcompliance with gender equality standards. Thisnotwithstanding, women remain marginalised incritical public debates, and progress in theupliftment of women is lethargic, falling belownational targets in most cases. Gender is yet tobe main-streamed into state and non-state

Gender-responsive budget initiatives—an increasingly popular tool

In South Africa the Women’s Budget Initiative empowers parliamentarians and others with analysis andinformation to oversee and critique government budgets. It has been a collaborative venture of theGender and Economic Policy Group (part of the parliamentary Committee on Finance) and two non-governmental organizations (NGOs) focused on policy research. By linking researchers and membersof parliament, the researchers could be assured that their work would be taken forward into advocacy,while the parliamentarians would have a solid basis for their advocacy. From the start the core membersof the initiative were also expected to draw in others as researchers and reference people. The initiativepublished a series of books and, more recently, a series of papers called Money Matters, written to beaccessible to a broad range of readers. South Africa’s government has also introduced gender budgetanalysis within the government, led by the Ministry of Finance. This and the above initiative have hadsome positive effects. For example, all sectoral budget reviews now include gender-sensitive analysis.

In Tanzania gender budgeting drew inspiration from Australia and South Africa. Initiated by theTanzanian Gender Networking Programme, an NGO, the programme’s main strengths are the alliancescreated with government, especially its gender equality activists. Teaming up an NGO researcher witha government officer, the initiative has commissioned research on four sectoral ministries (education,health, agriculture, industry and commerce), on the Ministry of Finance and Planning Commission andon the budget process. It has also done research in selected districts.

Source: UNDP HDR 2002


planning and action. This requires both theintegration of gender into development planningand deliberate efforts to increase participation ofwomen in public life and business.

There is a low sense of national belongingand responsibility among the peoples of thecountries studied. This contributes to poorgovernment accountability and a culture ofimpunity among politicians. The study foundthat high corruption, misuse of state resourcesand failure to implement plans and programmescould be ascribed, in part, to a low sense ofbelonging and a poor understanding amongpeople of their role as citizens in the advancementof their nations. This under-developed civic cultureleads to a lack of enthusiasm for holdinggovernment and companies to account for theirhandling of national resources and assets. Civiceducation integrated into the education system,but also driven publicly by various stakeholders,would in the long term reverse this growing publicdisillusionment and instil a stronger sense ofresponsibility among citizens.

Illiteracy has hampered institutional andhuman capacity. Major strides have been madein improving the standard of education over thepast decades in spite of the negative impact ofstructural adjustment programmes. Yet there arehigh educational illiteracy rates in key organs ofstate and civil society in Senegal, which impairthe effective functioning of these institutions.Large segments of national populations are leftout of public debates, economic development andopportunities for personal advancement due toilliteracy. There is also in the political world aproblem of lack of technical literacy and analyticalskills necessary to scrutinise bills and legaldocuments or to evaluate the merits of budgetaryallocations. Alongside normal educationalprogrammes, specific programmes targetingtechnical literacy in specific areas such as publicfinance as well as provision of technical supportservices are needed.

The International Dimension

Where matters of internal African governance areconcerned, governments and even non-governmental agencies find themselves in adilemma. Where they believe their ownadministrative experience and structures can actas a useful model for their African partners, theyare naturally eager to share their ideas andexperiences, all the more where they fear thatinefficiency and corruption may be harmingAfrica’s economic and social development.Africa’s recent history however, dictates extremecaution and sensitivity before those from outsideAfrica take it upon themselves to prescribe thefuture course of governance in the continent. Inparticular, Europe’s recent imperialist past muststill cast some shadow on even the mostbenevolent attempts of its representatives toshape governmental structures in Africa.

We have found, however, one aspect ofrelations between Africa and Europe, in which,without embarrassment or resentment on eitherside, Europe’s governmental structures are beingstudied and increasingly embraced by Africa. Thataspect is the conscious modelling of the nascentAfrican Union on the philosophy and institutionsof the European Union. The European Union itselfis a consciously post-imperial politicalphenomenon. Imperial rivalries outside Europewere an important vehicle in the eighteenth andnineteenth century for the jostling nationalismwhich the European Union seeks to replace. It iswholly appropriate that the African Union shouldseek to imitate, with appropriate amendment forthe African context, much about the well-established, but still evolving European Union.

We are aware that a number of the regionalgroupings within Africa already work closelytogether on economic and security issues.Equally, the African Union is poorly funded andstill lacking in personnel. Nevertheless, we learnfrom Europe’s recent history that regionaleconomic and political arrangements over time


have a definite tendency to be subsumed in aflourishing larger unit. The unceasing expansionof the European Union since 1957 bears eloquentwitness to this proposition. It was our strongimpression that the existing regional blocs of Africaare seen by national elites as a marginal aspect oftheir political culture. If the African Union undergoesover the next decade a process of development inany way similar to that of the European Union’sfirst decade, it should not regard the pre-existenceof African regional groupings as an insuperablecheck on its progress.

The European Union is rightly proud of itsposition as the world’s largest donor of aid. Muchof that aid is concentrated on practical and specificprojects. Some does concern itself withgovernance structures in individual countries,helping to train civil servants, non-governmentalorganisations and possibly disadvantaged socialgroups. We were struck, however, by the absence

of a distinct and coherent programme to help theAfrican Union, as an organisation, with trainingand administrative support in its aspiration totransfer the successes of the EU to Africa. Webelieve this should now be a high priority.

Conclusion

Our study has illuminated critical issuesassociated with strengthening institutions andenhancing governance. The importance ofcredibility and legitimacy of institutions is acommon refrain in the governance conundrum ofthe three countries. The negative effects ofpresidentialism, with its tendencies towardsauthoritarianism, are seen as having a corrosiveeffect on improving effective governance. Theimpact of adjustment programmes on socialinvestment is well known and documented, butidentifying how the high levels of illiteracy haveimpinged on the effectiveness of parliament, the

Aid for social insurance in Zambia

About half of Zambia’s population of more than 10 million people live on less than the minimum energystandard set by the food poverty line. Malnutrition threatens lives, reduces opportunities for earningincome, undermines the education of children and increases vulnerability to ill health.

Working with the Zambian Ministry of Community Development and Social Services, the GermanAgency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) developed a pilot cash transfer programme in the southernKalomo district. Covering 143 villages and 5 townships, the programme targets the 10% of householdsidentified as most destitute on the basis of criteria agreed and administered through community-basedwelfare committees. Two-thirds of beneficiary households are headed by women, most of them elderly.Two-thirds of household members are children, 71% of them orphaned by HIV/AIDS.

Transfers under the programme amount to $6 a month. The pilot programme covers 1,000 households.Initial evaluations of the programme, which started in 2004, point to some successes. School attendancehas increased and targeted households have been receiving regular monthly incomes.

Scaling up the transfer scheme to cover 200,000 destitute households would imply an annual cost of$16 million, or about 4% of total aid flows to Zambia. What this scheme demonstrates is the potential forsuch programmes to provide a conduit for poverty-focussed redistribution programmes. Very smalltransfers from rich countries can generate significant gains for poor households in countries like Zambia.However, the success of such social insurance schemes depends critically on donors and governmentsworking together over a long time horizon.

Source: UNDP HDR 2005


functioning of the civil society and economicgovernance, is an important contribution to policylearning.

While not part of the Terms of Reference,there is an instinctive sense that externalinfluences cannot be ignored, as they form partof the dialectic of forces which have shapedinstitutions in Africa. It has become clear as wellthat the subject of the study could benefit fromcoverage of other cases with different colonial andsocio-cultural heritages and post-colonialexperiences. These could include additionalFrench- and Portuguese-speaking countries, butthere is also a typology of small states in Africawhich could be instructive for further study.



Perceptions from the CaseStudy Countries

The following is a summary account by topics ofthe discussions that took place during the WorkingGroup’s visits to Kenya, Ghana and Senegal. Theaccount highlights in particular the problems,strategies and characteristics that appear to bespecific to each country.

In considering this summary account it shouldbe noted that the Rapporteurs were keen to reflectthe diversity of views as expressed by the expertsand hence have limited their interventions tocorrecting grammar and ensuring that the viewsare presented along thematic lines. Accordingly,what follows may at times be regarded ascontradictory and/or inconsistent. This is inkeeping with the free-flowing nature of thediscussions had in each Case Study Country.

Key Elements of Good Governance andInstitutional Effectiveness

In Kenya, more than in the other two countries,there was lengthy discussion of what ought to beconsidered as the essential elements of goodgovernance and institutional effectiveness. Anumber of differing perspectives were offered.

One analysis was that the simple existenceof institutions was insufficient unless they workedappropriately and coherently among themselves.It was argued that this network and its constituentparts had to:

1. ensure power was exercised through co-decision;

2. be accountable to the population;

3. ensure checks and balances were in place; and

4. protect civil liberties and rights.

Another theoretical framework offered arguedthat the essentials could be described morefundamentally in that institutions simply had toguarantee the essential elements of human rights.In this instance five rights were highlighted:

1. Universal education

2. Universal healthcare

3. Shelter

4. Security (food and personal)

5. Equitable justice

Turning to the more specific question of whatpolicies and strategies could promote institutionaleffectiveness, three suggestions were offered:

1. Deepening institutional and legal reforms

2. Public sector management

3. Consistent policy-making

In Ghana the Working Group heard aparticularly well-argued description of the pre-requisite characteristics of an effective institutionalframework. Under such a framework, institutionsmust:

1. create and sustain a political space for state, civil societyand economic actors to contribute to improved livingconditions;

2. ensure all citizens partake in economic gains andshared growth;

3. guarantee that the vast majority of people can beactively involved in decision-making that affects them;

4. mobilise the requisite revenue and resources requiredfor growth and development; and

5. be internalised by the overarching political culture andsociety as a whole.

With regard to the final point, the WorkingGroup was asked on a number of occasions toconsider what came first: weak institutions or asociety unable to utilise institutions effectively andappropriately? For example, in Kenya manyexperts held the view that the country was caughtin a vicious circle characterised by the fact that‘corruption weakens institutions and the rule oflaw, which ensures that there are no harshconsequences for corruption, hence encouragingmore.’ In response to these and similar


considerations, the point was put by some thatinstitutional effectiveness was not about changinginstitutions but rather about changing political andadministrative cultures - and perhaps entiresocieties. The problem perhaps did not lie withthe institutional design, but rather with the waythe political elite used these institutions.

A recurring theme of discussion in all threecountries was the perhaps overly-abstract natureof concepts such as ‘democracy’, ‘povertyalleviation’ and ‘economic growth’. Instead, it wasoften put to us that these benefits should be seenas arising from the success of states in attainingthe more basic goals described above.

Institutions and Branches ofGovernment

Experts familiar with debates about governancein Africa will not be surprised by th e fact thata significant proportion of the Group’sdeliberations and its discussions with keystakeholders in each of the Case Study Countriesconsidered the formal branches of government:the executive, the legislature and the judiciary.The role of fiscal frameworks and public financeauthorities also played a significant part in thesediscussions.

Presidents, Presidential Power and theExecutive

In all three Case Study Countries, the role of thepresident and actions of the office of the presidentand the parliament dominated discussions. Theimportance accorded to these institutions byparticipants implicitly suggested that unless theseinstitutions operated together to the benefit of theirrespective countries, little could be achieved inother areas.

An ever-present theme during the Group’sWorking Visits in Kenya, Ghana and Senegal wasthe dominance of the president and the damage

this did to each of these countries’ political andeconomic systems. In each country, theseproblems stemmed from the simple fact that thepresidents and their officials and supporters wereperceived to have undue influence across theentire political system, impacting on both theeconomy and society. Some stakeholders arguedthat their governments had used state institutionsto extract benefits for themselves and theirsupporters. Others simply asked, ‘why is it thatmany of our presidents, who had democraticcredentials, fail to display them after taking powerand instead gravitate in the other direction,towards corruption and the abuse of power?’

These structural power imbalances withineach country were thought to have had a varietyof significant effects. In Kenya, participantsregarded the domination of the president and hisexecutive as having had a particularly cripplingeffect on the country’s political system andinfrastructure. The Office of the President wasdescribed as a ‘leviathan’ with a ‘life of its own’.Some went so far as to argue that the country wasnearly collapsing under the weight of authoritarianrule and an almost ‘predatory’ regime. Specificinstruments of presidential dominance mentionedwere the power of the president and his office toappoint judges and select an unusually largenumber of parliamentarians from all parties to jointhe executive. Significantly, the Group also heardhow important institutions with the potential toquestion presidential authority and action wereoften marginalised. The Public AccountsCommittee within the Kenyan parliament wasmentioned in particular, as it had considerablepotential to oversee and improve fiscal controls.Nevertheless, this potential meant that the Officeof the President regularly impeded the activities ofthe Committee and went out of its way to damageits credibility and effectiveness. In Ghana, theCommittee on Government Assurances, taskedwith overseeing appointments, was highlighted asone of the few Ghanaian institutional devicesthrough which Parliament could hold the


government directly to account, but again therewere concerns about its effectiveness.

With reference to Ghana, and especiallyKenya, the specific point was made that thedominance of their respective presidenciesstemmed from their relations with their ownnational parliaments. In particular, manyparticipants raised concerns about the fact thatmembers of the executive could constitute asubstantial proportion of the national parliament.For example, in Kenya the Cabinet was said tobe comprised of 77 members and the governmentof an additional 80 Ministers, the vast majority ofwhom were drawn from the Parliament. As theKenyan Parliament is comprised of only 200members, participants argued persuasively thatthis system adversely affected the Parliament’swillingness and ability to hold the Executive toaccount: parliamentarians either were, or wereanxious to become, government ministers and didnot want to jeopardise their chances byquestioning government action or policy. A similardynamic was also said to affect parliamentaryoversight in Ghana, albeit to a lesser extent. InSenegal, the situation was said to be slightlydifferent, as the president could summarily dismissthe House Speakers and other parliamentaryoffice-holders.

Presidential domination was also saidregularly to impact on the independence of thejudicial system in both Kenya and Senegal, wherethe president either also acts as the Chief Justiceor retains the sole authority to appoint judges. Inboth instances, even though judges weresomewhat protected by having tenure, manyparticipants felt that judges were unduly influencedby their ‘political masters’. The Working Groupheard how Ghana had introduced a moresophisticated and independent system, throughwhich judges were appointed.

Participants in Ghana also described howpresidents and their executive enjoyed a near-monopoly of being able to introduce legislation

and policy proposals. In particular, the Groupheard that it was practically impossible tointroduce a Private Members’ Bill in the GhanaianParliament. The situation in Kenya and Senegalwas not said to differ much; one Senegaleseparticipant concluded that their nationalparliament was no more than a rubber stamp.

Considering this extreme dominance of thepresidency, a number of conclusions were drawnduring each Roundtable seminar. Manyparticipants argued that very little could be doneto reduce overt presidential dominance unlessthere was a systematic change in countries’political and institutional cultures. It wassuggested, that unless this could be achieved,‘tinkering’ with institutional design would be futile.

Nevertheless, other participants called for theintroduction of more robust mechanisms andinstitutions that could act as counter-balances topresidential power. These could involvedesigning, equipping and supporting institutionsthat could be effective without having to rely onthe goodwill of the president.

Institutions could also be better supported intheir ability effectively to monitor governmentaction. In highlighting each of these areas forfurther deliberation, it was clear that the vastmajority of participants thought that independentand effective national parliaments, above all otherinstitutions, would go a long way to providing theappropriate checks and balances.

Political Parties, Parliaments andParliamentarians

In all three Case Study Countries, the WorkingGroup was exposed to a number of differentviewpoints on how political parties and nationalparliaments could be strengthened.

In both Kenya and Senegal, general electionsand the selection of parliamentary candidateswere presented as problem-ridden. Of particular


concern was that current electoral systemsfavoured a link of unhealthy interdependencebetween parliamentarians and their constituents.In Kenya, stakeholders commented on howcurrent arrangements reinforced the system ofpatronage, characterised by parliamentariansusing the trappings of their position to reinforcetheir personal position in their constituencies.These specific concerns are outlined below. Apotential remedy suggested by a number ofparticipants at the Roundtable in Nairobi was thatKenya could weaken the patronage system byintroducing proportional representation.

In Senegal, more concerns were raised aboutthe fact that parliamentary candidates wereselected from closed party lists rather than popularvotes. Some participants suggested thatcandidates were often elected by virtue of theirbackground and position in the party, not becauseof their expertise or knowledge.

Although electoral systems were seen bysome to be a problem, the weakness of politicalparties was seen to be a more pressing issue inall three Case Study Countries. Participantsthought that these weaknesses stemmed from thefact that very few political parties had sufficientfinancial resources or human capacity to engageactively in political debate by engaging voters andspreading their message. Another problem whichwas highlighted was that the vast majority ofparties lacked core professional staff, thus makingparty activity ad hoc and poorly co-ordinated.Although there was general agreement thatparties were weak, views diverged on whetherthese weaknesses were systemic or self-inflicted.

Primarily in Senegal, participants argued thatthe actions and attitudes of their political leadersinherently weakened political parties. Somestakeholders described how their parties tendedto be more like private associations, associatedmore with individual personalities and familiesthan with policies or ideologies.

In all three Case Study Countries,stakeholders explained how the effectiveness ofparliamentarians was weakened by the fact thattheir roles and responsibilities remainedinextricably linked to patronage. This patronagewas said to take many forms, one being whereparliamentarians were seen to be, and acted as,parts in a revenue distribution network forconstituents. Stakeholders also cited the wayspecific groups and tribes received preferentialtreatment from their political leaders and howsome politicians used the political system simplyfor their self-enrichment.

These types of problems were particularlyevident in Kenya where financial transfersappeared to impact upon every aspect of thepolitical system. The Working Group was briefedon the Kenyan system of ‘Harambee’ which hadbeen introduced to encourage individuals tosupport their local community. They heard howthis system had quickly become corrupted so thatonly the wealthy were elected to parliament asthey were seen by their constituents to be the onlyones with the capacity and money to support theirlocal community. Participants argued that,unsurprisingly, new parliamentarians did not workto represent their electors. Rather, they soughtto recoup the money they spent on first beingelected. For many this explained the Kenyanparliament’s repeated pay rises over recent years.

Other participants gave the example ofschemes such as the Community DevelopmentFunds, which arranged for parliamentarians to begiven monthly cash amounts to distribute amongsttheir constituencies to encourage development.Stakeholders explained how this scheme hadbeen suggested and supported by donorcountries, perhaps without fully understanding itsramifications. Participants argued that thisscheme had contributed significantly to corruptionas it had meant parliamentarians were either usingthe money for their personal enrichment or theyhad become ‘walking cash machines’ for their


constituents.

Patronage was also said to have lessimmediately obvious effects on the capacity ofparliamentarians to fulfil their legislative roleproperly. Of particular concern was thatparliamentarians, particularly in Kenya, werehampered by the simple fact that 90 per cent oftheir appointments were with people from theirlocal community looking for support and handouts.In short, even if parliamentarians wanted tolegislate and scrutinise the actions of theExecutive, they were too busy acting as a supportnetwork for their constituencies.

In Senegal, the parliamentary situation waspresented in a different light. For example, inSenegal, absences from parliamentary sessionsand committee meetings were a particularproblem, particularly after MPs had been givencomplimentary cars for their own use. Otherparticipants also highlighted the fact thatSenegalese MPs were permitted to join anotherpolitical party (‘cross the floor’) as often as theyliked and at any time during a parliamentarysession. Again, this was seen as underminingparliament’s effectiveness and, to a certain extent,its legitimacy.

While recognising the deficiencies ofindividual parliamentarians, some stakeholdersargued that the role of national parliamentarianswas circumscribed by factors beyond their control.

First, and perhaps foremost, the Groupappreciated the arguments of stakeholders whocited the damaging effect over-dominantpresidencies and executives had on the role ofparliament. Stakeholders also argued that theeffectiveness of parliamentarians wasfundamentally weakened by the fact that manylacked the basic training to be able to scrutiniselegislation. Other groups argued that even themost intelligent and well-meaningparliamentarians were hampered by lack ofcapacity in their offices to manage the paper work

created by the legislative process. In consideringthese two points, some stakeholders argued thatparliamentarians often reverted to tribal, ethnicand ideological rhetoric during debates, ratherthan arguing on specific points of policysubstance. It was said, particularly in Ghana, thatthis resulted from a parliamentary system wherescrutinising government legislation was ofsecondary importance to participating in ritualdisplays of “legislative grandstanding.”

Faced with this wide range of problems, allof which were seen to impact on parliamentaryeffectiveness, a number of experts offeredpossible solutions. Some argued that nothingwould improve until the system of patronage couldbe broken. It was accepted this would require afundamental shift in political cultures. In contrast,other more specific and perhaps more easilyachievable recommendations were made,including the suggestion that each country shouldhave a well-regulated and reliable parliamentarylist of members’ interests. The argument was alsomade that there should be a constitutional cap tothe number of parliamentarians who could be co-opted into the executive. Other experts called formore formal training courses for new MPs andparliamentary candidates to improve their capacityto scrutinise government proposals. Suchprogrammes were being actively considered inSenegal, although, disappointingly, progress onimplementation had been blocked by a disputeover who should provide the training.

The Civil Service and State Bureaucracies

Enhancing the effectiveness of the civil serviceand state bureaucracies was of paramountconcern to the vast majority of experts heard bythe Group. But, as in the discussion on nationalparliaments, differing views were offered as towhether the general weaknesses of Africanadministrations were the consequence of actionsby the institutions themselves or of external factorsbeyond their control. This debate was at thecentre of the discussion on corruption.


At the most basic level, corruption wasdescribed to the Group as “endemic rent-seekingbehaviour.” In Ghana, such behaviour is known as‘Kalabule’, the widespread corruption that affects,according to stakeholders, almost everygovernment and public service transaction. InSenegal, one stakeholder compared corruption toan octopus with tentacles that could reach into anyadministrative crevice. Although the vast majorityof stakeholders argued that any form of corruptionwas unacceptable, a minority, particularly in Ghana,offered two subtle arguments which provided theWorking Group with insights as to why this problemwas so wide-spread.

Firstly, some stakeholders talked about therole of gift-giving in Ghanaian society: any gooddeed or service obtained by an individual or familywas usually acknowledged by the imparting of asmall gift. This was ingrained in the culture,particularly in rural areas where informal networksare particularly important. Although this failed tooffer any real excuse for corruption, the pertinentquestion was posed as to how it might be possibleto educate a population into accepting that gift-giving was an inappropriate action when dealingwith government officials. In response, somestakeholders argued that it was not a task for thegeneral population to change its cultural system.It was rather for officials to recognise howcompletely inappropriate it was to accept any giftsoffered. Some stakeholders thought that,unfortunately, this was unlikely, especiallybecause money had corrupted a system that usedto be characterised by the giving of small tokenssuch as a ‘box of matches’ or some ‘lamp oil.’

This problem was reinforced by another subtleproblem, which related to the way in which someofficials received their remuneration, particularly inGhana. In that country, officials, even of relativeseniority, received modest wages of about$350USD a month but enjoyed considerable non-salaried benefits such as free transport andhousing. Although this situation provided a good

standard of living whilst officials were employed,the structure of their remuneration package alsomeant many faced destitution when they retiredor lost their job. This was because they lost theirbenefits (housing, transport) and their low salarieshad been insufficient to allow them to save forthe future. As a result, many turned to acceptinggifts, including money, to help supplement theirincome and pension. Although few condoned anyaction that might be considered corrupt, many ofthose interviewed by the Working Groupssuggested that governments should perhaps lookat remuneration packages for their administratorsthat did not encourage pension planning throughcorruption.

In a similar way, corruption was said todamage the effectiveness of national civilservices. Concerns were raised that officialsappeared at times, particularly in Ghana, to bemore interested in their personal status than intheir roles and responsibilities. One stakeholdermade the point that many institutions appearedto have far more senior officials then those taskedwith actually implementing reforms and policies.

As described above, many stakeholdersthought that the effectiveness of their civil serviceswas reduced by overall weak political cultures andthe damage caused by overly dominantexecutives who equated decentralisation with aloss of power and control. Many thought that thistrend resulted in over-centralisation and a growinggap between the ‘people and the institutionssupposed to serve them’.

Within this context, stakeholders wereconcerned by the weakness of local government,particularly in Kenya and Senegal. Many thoughtthis situation was caused by a number ofoverlapping problems, some systemic, othersoperational. In Kenya, a large number ofstakeholders explained how many local authoritieshad been shaped largely for political purposes, insuch a way as to influence the outcome of generalelections, and not because political leaders


thought a local authority could help improve theprovision of public services. The Group heardthat in these countries local authorities were oftentreated as political tools, not as administrativebodies. Hence they had no real ability to operateeffectively, lacking as they did sufficient centralgovernment funding. This had led to a situationin Kenya where many local government bodieswere effectively bankrupt. The politicisation oflocal authorities was also said to have resulted ina situation where many councillors who wereincapable of improving their local area wereregularly re-elected by virtue of the system ofpatronage.

In Ghana, the Group was presented with asimilar account, but it heard the additional pointthat in the Ghanaian political system regionalministers often oversaw the area from which theyoriginated. Some stakeholders thought thisshould be encouraged as these ministers wouldbe more likely to understand the needs of theirown area. Others disagreed, citing their beliefthat this practice simply results in furtherpatronage and corruption.

Other reasons were mentioned for thepossible ineffectiveness of local government.Foremost, many stakeholders thought that therewere significant inconsistencies between policiesand strategies considered at the national and thelocal level. This understandably contributed toconfusion and overlapping responsibilities thatmany stakeholders thought encouragedcorruption. Many stakeholders thought that at themost basic level, there was not enough attentionpaid to local government bodies and hence theyhad particular problems attracting well trained andappropriate staff.

Although views were clearly mixed as to thecauses of these countries’ weak civil services,there was common agreement on the effect ofthis problem. The most concerning effect wasthat limited state finances were said by many tobe mis-spent, even squandered. Some

stakeholders argued that this problem wascompounded by the states’ limited capacities tocollect government revenues. Over the long termthis led to increased government borrowing anddebt, with the well-known resulting problems.Inefficiencies and weak structures were also saidto create bottlenecks and open up furtheropportunities for corruption. In Ghana theargument was made that by far the mostdamaging effect of weak administrative structureswas that they discouraged both domestic andforeign investment. This point was supported bypersuasive statistics showing that Ghana hadexperienced a fall in foreign direct investmenteven though it had recently followed a strategy ofmarket and economic liberalisation. This trendwas shown to have materialised at the same timethat business surveys had recorded increasedconcerns about the effectiveness of administrativestructures.

Although the majority of discussion about theeffectiveness of civil services was dominated bythe problems experienced by the three CaseStudy Countries, some stakeholders offered theirviews on possible solutions. Somerecommendations were specific: for example, inKenya it was suggested that ‘whistleblowers’highlighting corrupt practices should be given farmore protection and support. Other ideasconcerned more general areas where specificimprovements might be made. Within this contextthe specific recommendation was given thatformer officials should be encouraged more torecord and consider their insights. Others arguedthat the key was to look forward and instil betterleadership and management skills inbureaucracies. Considering the problemsassociated with the political and administrativecultures in each of the three countries, it wasaccepted that this had to be a long-term aim.Nevertheless, some stakeholders thought a goodstarting point would be to introduce a Code ofEthics and Performance Management.


The Rule of Law, Judicial Systems andJudicial Reform

Unsurprisingly, the rule of law, judicial systemsand judicial reform were seen by the majority ofstakeholders in each country to be critical issues.In Ghana, upholding the rule of law wasconsidered to be the greatest test of institutionalcredibility: citizens in a democracy must haveconfidence that rules, procedures and laws areknown, predictable and enforceable. Similarsentiments were expressed in Senegal andKenya. That said, concerns were raised aboutthe judicial effectiveness in all three Case StudyCountries. These problems related to how judgeswere appointed and how cases were handled.

In all three countries, participants wereconcerned that the president’s office had far toomuch control over the appointment of judges. Insome countries, the Group heard how thepresident was also the Chief Justice. This gaverise to accusations that judges were notindependent but merely ‘political tools’. Althoughthe majority of stakeholders agreed with thissentiment, some argued that judges wereaccorded a modicum of security (althoughprobably not enough) by having tenure ofemployment.

The Group also heard about the specific waysin which judges were appointed in Ghana andSenegal. In Ghana, judges are appointed by thepresident from a list of nominees drawn up byGhana’s Judiciary Council. This Council iscomposed of representatives from the police,military, bar association, employers’ associationand the organisation that publishes the LawReport. They are joined on the Council by a smallnumber of Chiefs, four individuals nominated bythe president, the Attorney General, and the ChiefJustice (Chair). Within this Council there is a sub-committee charged with screening potentialcandidates and drawing up a list of nominationsthat is then discussed amongst the full Council.

Although this process was highlighted as anexample of possible ‘best practice’, someparticipants did point out that Ghana’s judicialsystem had been damaged by recent presidentialaction. The Group heard how the GhanaianPresident had allegedly taken advantage ofconstitutional loopholes to appoint new judges tothe Supreme Court to help overturn cases thathad previously gone against the government.

In Senegal, the problem was said to beslightly different: Because the executive selectedjudges there was little opportunity for them to bepromoted on merit; hence they were said to havelittle reason to be independent. Stakeholdersargued this meant that many well-educatedSenegalese were put off from joining the judiciary.More generally, the rule of law was oftencompromised and corrupt behaviour oftentolerated, particularly in the civil service and statebureaucracies.

Aside from the legitimacy and efficacy ofjudges, stakeholders also contributed insights asto how cases were processed in each Case StudyCountry. Underpinning much of this discussionwas an implicit debate on whether increasing thecitizen’s access to justice ought to be the firstpriority or whether the credibility of the courts andthe resultant quality of the justice passed downwas more important. There was no majority view,but in Ghana and Kenya there was significantdiscussion, particularly about the role of traditionalarbitration and also how judicial systems couldbe streamlined and enhanced.

In Ghana, the role of alternative disputeresolution procedures and traditional judicialprocess was discussed. It was suggested that,due to Ghana’s lack of administrative resources,the country would be better advised to look attraditional Chiefs becoming more involved inconsidering non-criminal disputes and arbitrationrather than trying to increase the number of courtsand formal arbitration panels. Some participantsargued that using traditional methods of arbitration


would have the double advantage of reducing thecaseload of more formal courts and alsoincreasing access to justice. Similar sentimentswere expressed in Kenya, where the Group heardthe argument that it was necessary to look beyondformal judicial structures because the citizens livein traditional structures. Some stakeholdersdisagreed with these sentiments as they recalledthat Chiefs, particularly in Ghana, had previouslybeen divested of their judicial role due to theirmixed record.

Aside from such concerns, the Group heardabout encouraging developments in legal reformin the Case Study Countries. Ghana washighlighted as taking some particularly interestingsteps forward. The rationale for Ghanaian reformefforts was that Ghana should not seek to increaseits number of courts or its network of judicialbodies. Instead, reform efforts should seek torationalise and streamline current procedures andlessen the caseload of the national judiciary.Among the reforms mentioned were:

1. The legal system now required legal arguments to bepresented in writing prior to a case being heard. Thisreduced the time needed to hear oral presentations andmeant judges could look to give judgement earlier onin proceedings.

2. The legal system was adopting practices whereby theappeals court was given the original files and findingsupon which they could base their decision. Currently,the delay in hearing appeals in Ghana is largely due tothe amount of time it takes to produce a record of theinitial case proceedings. It was said that by removingthe need to produce a court record the entire processcould be sped up without impacting on the quality ofthe justice passed down.

3. A Land Court and Commercial Court had recently beenset up to help Ghana create a more attractiveenvironment for private investment. The Group heardhow the Commercial Court was being designed toemphasise the role of pre-trial conferences andalternative dispute resolution. It was said that, already,70 per cent of cases brought before the court had beendealt with at the pre-trial stage.

Although reform efforts were ongoing, someparticipants argued that little could be done unlesshuman capacity could be increased, particularly

in Ghana and Kenya’s legal systems. The Groupheard how many problems stemmed from the factthat legal training in Ghana was extremelyexpensive. In Kenya, the problem was said toresult from inadequate training of lawyers andlegal professionals and from a lack of professionalacademic lawyers. This meant that few peoplewere embarking on legal careers which, in turn,had resulted in a situation where there were notenough qualified officials to manage cases orenough lawyers to appear before the bench.

Fiscal Authorities, Public Finances andRevenue Generation

In all three countries, there was lengthy discussionon the role of fiscal authorities and the importanceof managing public finances and governmentrevenue effectively. In each case, conversationwas dominated by concerns about a lack ofoversight and transparency in governmentfinances.

Particularly in Kenya and Senegal, there wasconcern that, although audit systems and lawshad been designed and introduced, they were notbeing used or supported. In Kenya, the point wasmade that reports from the Public AccountsCommittee of the parliament were routinelyignored, either through the absence ofadministrative capacity for reform or a lack ofpolitical will to deal with corruption.

Other participants thought that problems weremore complex, with a lack of transparency in theway public monies are spent less of an issue thanthe fact that the sources of public finances werelargely unclear to the general public. As a result,some stakeholders suggested a step change wasnecessary: government revenue needed to beunderstood not as government money but aspublic money. Some went so far as to suggestthat if this could be achieved then perhaps thenotion of ‘no taxation without representation’ couldbe introduced into African political cultures.


In Senegal the outlook seemed more positive.The Group heard from a number of stakeholdershow fiscal and tax reform had yielded significantreturns and how revenue collection had improveddrastically in recent years. This had contributedto reduced corruption and fraud. Other reformefforts such as the 50 per cent devaluation of theCFA franc and the relaxation of government pricecontrols were also seen positively. These policies,combined with the reform efforts described above,had contributed to a stronger fiscal position andeconomic growth of approximately 5 per cent perannum since 1993.

Influences on the Administrative andPolitical Systems

Against the background of the debate ongovernment institutions, stakeholders in all threeCase Study Countries highlighted a number ofmore general issues that they considered to berelated to institutional effectiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa. These issues were related to the‘brain drain’, traditional methods of governance,civic education and gender.

Brain Drain

In both Kenya and Ghana there was extensivediscussion about the ‘brain drain’, the often-discussed issue of African nationals travelling todeveloped countries to find employment.Unsurprisingly, the Group heard on a number ofdifferent occasions that African countries werebeing damaged by the loss of well-educatedworkers to developed countries. In Kenya, theseviews were particularly heart-felt as somestakeholders thought “our best people [were]being attracted to developed countries to work intheir public services”. In light of this perceptionthe Group heard calls for African countries toreceive compensation from developed countriesand for well-qualified workers to be barred fromtravelling overseas to obtain work, perhaps

especially when they are newly qualified.

However, some participants made theobservation that quite often the ‘brain drain’ fromAfrican public services was not to developedcountries but to the private sector, both domesticand multinational. Accordingly, any new policieshad to reflect the fact that developed countrieswere not the only destination for African workerslooking to find jobs.

Some stakeholders also had grave concernsabout trying to stop workers from travelling todeveloped countries. Firstly, the argument wasmade that expatriate Africans working indeveloped countries repatriated a proportion oftheir salaries to their families. The Group werereminded that in some sub-Saharan Africancountries these income streams were criticallyimportant to families, communities and the countryas a whole.

Other stakeholders had more fundamentalconcerns about looking to stop workers fromtravelling overseas, as, in their view, this wouldimpinge on the fundamental right to freemovement. Many suggested that instead oflooking at how to stop workers from movingoverseas, African governments should considerways to encourage and motivate them to stay.

Traditional Forms of Governance andChieftaincy

Traditional governance and the role of Chiefs inmodern day African states were discussed atlength, particularly in Kenya and Ghana. Viewswere mixed as to whether these structures andinstitutions could help or hinder efforts to promoteinstitutional effectiveness.

A general point was made that many Africansfound it difficult, understandably, to differentiatebetween traditional and ‘modern’ governmentsystems and structures. In both Kenya andGhana, the Working Group heard how the primaryrole of the Chief was to improve their local


community. In nearly every circumstance, thisinvolved Chiefs helping their communities byoffering gifts and other forms of support. In returnChiefs relied on goods and gifts from theirconstituents. It was argued that this system hadoperated in equilibrium for a considerable amountof time and had underpinned community growth.By contrast, some stakeholders were concernedabout recent trends which had damaged thisprocess. The introduction of hard currencies intoAfrican societies had meant that money ratherthan simpler gifts were now regularly exchanged.This was said to encourage corruption withintraditional systems.

Other stakeholders were concerned about theimpact gift-giving in traditional systems had onformal government. The point was made that if itwas, and still is, considered acceptable for Chiefsto receive and exchange gifts, then why was itwrong for parliamentarians to do so as well? Inthe minds of many stakeholders this question wasrelevant, as many politicians were perceived bytheir electorate to be the equivalent of Chiefs. Inresponse to this point some stakeholders arguedthat it was no longer appropriate for even Chiefsto exchange gifts or encourage gift-giving. Othershad a different standpoint, supporting thetraditional system but placing more emphasis oneducating the electorate to differentiate betweenformal and traditional governance structures.

This general point about gift-giving regularlyled to further discussions about other perceivedstrengths and weaknesses of traditional methodsof governance.

In Ghana there was an extremely positiveperception of the role that Chiefs can play withintraditional systems. However, there was a generalconcern that over the last few decades Chiefs hadseen their role decrease and their influence wane.Some stakeholders thought this trend could andshould be reversed and that Chiefs ought to takeon a more prominent role in Ghana’s politicalsystem. Others argued that this process was

already underway, largely due to the fact that anew class of well-educated, activist Chiefs wasemerging. This was welcomed by manyGhanaians that the Group spoke to, as Chiefswere regarded as the first ‘port of call’ for the vastmajority of Ghanaians who required help, supportor advice.

Many Kenyan stakeholders had less positiveviews, arguing that traditional tribal allegianceshad infiltrated the political system and had led toincreased conflict between different regions andethnicities. This was both the cause and effect ofthe electorate voting not on policy issues, butrather on the basis of patronage and tribalaffiliation. Others argued that the traditionalpractices of ‘Harambee’ had also infected Kenyanpolitical culture, as it encouraged a belief thatwealth equated to leadership. These twoprocesses combined had, in the view of oneKenyan stakeholder, resulted in a vicious circlewhereby traditional practices supported orreinforced opaque and corrupt political practices.Politicians now lobbied to get their preferredcandidate crowned as Chief, because they sawbenefits for themselves in taking advantage oftraditional forms of governance. This had led toan even more complex and difficult system ofappointment of Chiefs.

Civic Education and Citizenship

In each of the three Case Study Countries asignificant number of stakeholders firmly statedthat more civic education was the key to improvinginstitutional effectiveness.

Based on the views heard by the Group atits meetings, the situation in Senegal and Kenyawas in this regard significantly more negative thanthat in Ghana. Some participants argued that atthe most basic level there was no culture of goodgovernance in Africa, particularly in Kenya, andthis had a direct and adverse affect on theeffectiveness of governmental institutions. InSenegal, the Group heard how high levels of


illiteracy and low levels of civic education hadmeant that large numbers of people living in thecountryside had not benefited from economicdevelopment and the economic success of thelast decade. Social and economic exclusion waspresented to the Group as the “most damning”fact of life in Senegal, with inevitable implicationsfor the governance of the country.

It was argued that this situation gave rise inSenegal to a vicious circle in which large numbersof people were left out of the public debates onpolitics and economics which, in turn, meant thatthey could not make governments address theirproblems.

Aside from this troublesome picture the Groupalso heard about possible solutions to thiswidespread and systemic problem.

In both Ghana and Kenya, the argument wasmade that it was particularly important to focusyoung people’s attention on attitudes, publicmorals and societal expectations in order to instila sense of citizenship and encourage them torecognise the benefits of good governance. Atthe same time, Kenyan stakeholders argued thatit was also important to ensure people wereinvolved in the political process from a young age.One participant suggested that without theseefforts, successive generations would continue tobe influenced by the negative aspects of tribalismand, at an older age, by corrupt practices.

Gender

In each Case Study Country, representatives froma number of civil society groupings commentedon gender imbalances in national policy debates,political parties and the government.

A general point made was that women,particularly in Kenya, were not only likely to bemarginalised and manipulated by political andadministrative systems, but also by traditionalcustoms and practices. Some stakeholders

thought this situation reflected the fact that genderissues were not seriously considered whengovernment programmes were being designed.It was argued that this disregard for gender-orientated policies had had an adverse affect onfemale poverty levels. For example, in Ghanathe Group heard how women were an auxiliaryworkforce in rural areas, taking on manual jobsafter the men had left to work in the cities. Someparticipants also argued that women were paidless for taking on the same roles andresponsibilities.

It was suggested that increased femaleparticipation in the political process andinvolvement in administrative structures wouldwork to reduce poverty. The Group heard thatsome women’s groups were seeking to push inthis direction, but in Kenya, for example, womenfilled only 17 per cent of government positions,even though the Kenyan constitution mandatedthat the level ought to be 30 per cent.

Non-State Actors

In each Case Study Country there was equallylengthy discussion about non-government actorsand their role in national political andadministrative systems.

Civil Society

The vast majority of stakeholders thought that civilsociety in each country was essential forpromoting institutional effectiveness and goodgovernance. Its role was seen as varied, but manyparticipants thought the primary aim of non-governmental groups ought to be to placepressure on institutions to operate effectively andcredibly. In Kenya and Ghana in particular, therewas the view that an active and independent civilsociety was important as it could highlight publiccorruption and help to strengthen politicalopposition. Stakeholders in Ghana expressedsimilar views, although some did emphasise that


civil society groups should, and were,concentrating their efforts on shedding light onthe budgetary process. They also thought thatcivil society groups had a responsibility to relaythe views of the people to the government.

At the same time, other participants thoughtcivil society groupings had a more important roleto play in policy-making and legislative processes.In Ghana, for example, one stakeholder arguedthat ‘the participation of civil society within Ghanawas essential if national goals [were] to beachieved, especially poverty eradication’. Othersagreed and added that perhaps this process wasalready underway, as civil society groups in Ghanahad slowly matured and were playing anincreasingly important role in Ghanaian politicallife. In Senegal, suggestions about the role ofcivil society groupings were more specific to thenational context. For example, one participantthe Group spoke to thought that ‘NGOs could helpact as a counter-balance to the rise of religion inSenegalese politics’ and also contribute tocombating gender imbalances.

Although the above points highlight theimportance accorded to civil society groupings bythe stakeholders, there was equally lengthydiscussion about the weaknesses of the non-governmental sector. By far the most importantconcern highlighted was the apparentpoliticisation of civil society groupings. This wassaid to be a particular problem in Kenya and inGhana where it was argued that some NGOsappeared more like political parties than civilsociety groups. Many stakeholders thought thatthis caused the influence of these groupings towane, in particular if their leader was co-optedinto the political system, or more significantly, intothe executive. Many stakeholders accepted thispoint but suggested that this trend wasunsurprising as politicians were known to gravitatetowards centres of power and NGOs wereincreasingly seen as powerful players in thepolitical system.

Aside from politicisation, other stakeholdersoffered further suggestions as to why civil societygroups were not as strong as they could be.Firstly, particularly in Kenya, there was the viewthat there were too many NGOs trying to do thesame thing. This was said to lead to duplication,opaque practices and also corruption. In Ghanathe view was different, as the Group heard thatcivil society appeared to be excessivelyconcentrated at the centre, thus creating avacuum in the rest of the country. It was said thatthis problem was compounded by the fact that‘community-based organisations’ (CBOs) did notreceive enough attention, particularly by donor-country organisations who felt more comfortabledealing with larger NGOs. Some stakeholdersapproached this problem with a differentperspective and said that the CBOs were not thereto create a link between local communities andthe state, but rather to help bridge the dividebetween people and NGOs.

Faced with these concerns it was clear thatmaintaining a strong civil society in each CaseStudy Country was of utmost importance. Thisobviously required political reforms, but civilsociety groupings themselves also had to workhard to grow stronger and become more effective.In Senegal it was suggested that this was aparticularly urgent task, as, since 2000 and theelection of President Wade, many SenegaleseNGOs had become complacent, believing the newregime would automatically allow them to growstronger.

The Media

The role of the media was considered at the sametime as that of civil society groups. Like civilsociety groups in each country, the media wereseen as critical for sustaining democracy,particularly by holding political actors to accountand articulating public interests. In this regard,FM Radio Stations were seen as the mosteffective medium in informing people and getting


them involved in public life. That said, the Groupdid hear about concerns, particularly in Kenya,that FM stations were prone to encouragingdivisive political debates and, on occasion, tostirring up tribal tensions. At the same timeconcerns were also raised about the weaknessesof the print media and television reporting.

In Senegal there was particular concern abouttelevision stations. A number of stakeholdersargued that the national stations were seen aspropaganda tools of the government. At the sametime there was also concern that many stationswere being bought by a very limited number ofmedia organisations, many of which were closeto the government.

There was also concern about someSenegalese newspapers, particularly thoseregarded as being part of the ‘Blue Press’, whichwas universally regarded as a group ofpublications entirely concentrated ondisseminating the government’s messages andpromoting its political agenda.

In Ghana the situation was slightly different.The Group heard how there the Ghanaiangovernment had introduced laws which had giventhe media more opportunity to operateindependently. There was however concern thatthe media had not taken advantage of the newopportunities and that some outlets, particularlyamongst the press, were sometimes self-censoring so as not to embarrass the government.

The Private Sector and Foreign Investment

The problems experienced by the private sectorand its own inherent weaknesses were discussedat length in each Case Study Country, butparticularly in Ghana and Kenya.

In Kenya there was the perception that theprivate sector was damaged by internationalfactors and exploitation by the global system. Theproduction of coffee was given as an example,

as Kenyan coffee growers were seen as trappedby an international trading system which meantthat they were unable to move into roasting andprocessing beans, where the greatest addedvalue is found. However, other participantsdisagreed, arguing that weaknesses were internal.They said that even if Kenya was given theopportunity to export processed coffee, it did nothave the institutional capacity or infrastructure tosupport the necessary manufacturing base.Faced with this reality, they suggested Kenyanshad to spend more money on research anddevelopment to help enhance their ownproduction methods and manufacturingprocesses.

In Ghana the view was equally pessimistic.The Working Group heard a particularly strongpresentation on foreign investment thathighlighted the need to match liberalisation withessential legislative and administrative reforms.Although Ghana had liberalised over the last threedecades, its antiquated administrative and legalstructure had not been equipped to encouragedomestic and foreign investment. A specificexample was that successive Ghanaiangovernments had spent a considerable amountof time and effort travelling the globe seeking toattract foreign investment. These efforts had failedparticularly in the mid-1990s, when investmentlevels dropped significantly even while Ghanapursued a liberalising economic agenda.

As a result, it was the view of manystakeholders that Ghana had not created apositive economic environment for businessbecause, unlike Asia, they were not organisedenough to take advantage of new economicopportunities presented to them. Others had amore nuanced view. They thought Ghana hadbenefited from services liberalisation but thatGhana’s manufacturing sector had been damagedthrough market opening and increasedcompetition from foreign companies.

Ghanaian business was also said to be


hampered by two significant issues. Firstly therewas concern that business was over-politicised,so much so that it was suggested that whether acompany prospered or not was dependent not onits competence but rather on its politicalconnections. The Group also heard how a surveyof businesses recently completed in Ghana hadshown that a significant proportion of respondents‘still perceive the illiberal, neo-patrimonial andpredatory tendency of the state’. Faced with theseresults it was suggested that even if the state didnot openly and aggressively impinge on businessactivity it still employed covert and subtle meansto interfere unfairly with private enterprise.

Antiquated legal systems were alsohighlighted. Of paramount concern was that therewas no credible institutional framework in Ghanato develop and manage land policy. It wasstrongly argued by stakeholders that this was asignificant problem as land ‘constitutes the mostfundamental prerequisite for productive industrialinvestment and development’. In particular, theGroup heard how Ghanaian land was oftenclaimed to be owned by a number of individuals.Hence it was very difficult simply and legitimatelyto purchase land. Stakeholders also argued thatthere was an additional problem of landlords whomade arbitrary financial claims during the courseof a lease. It was suggested that these issueswere behind Ghana’s difficulties in attractingforeign investment or encouraging domesticinvestment.

The effect of weak private sectors and poorinvestment climates were obviously recognisedby both the Working Group and the participantsat the Roundtables. Nevertheless, in Senegal andKenya a particularly strong point was made thatperhaps the most important effect of systemicprivate sector weakness was that the statebecame the sole means of accumulating individualand group wealth. This was because with accessto political power came the power to distributeresources. Hence it was suggested that many

political leaders are put in power by privateinterests who then recoup their investmentthrough benefits deriving from political patronage.

Faced with these fundamental and systemicweaknesses there was little opportunity toconsider specific proposals that might strengthenthe private sector. Nevertheless somestakeholders, particularly in Ghana, did suggestthat African countries should perhaps look to moveaway from market orthodoxy and look to protecttheir domestic markets more rigorously. It wastheir view that this course of action would createa more conducive environment for business tooperate in. At the same time, other participantscalled for more specific legislative items to beintroduced that would first make it easier toregister new businesses and overhaul the landregistry system and the way land is bought andsold.

Supra-National Considerations

Regional and Pan-African Groupings

The Working Group encouraged discussion onthe supranational and regional aspects of goodgovernance and institutional effectiveness. Evenso, there was little discussion of these issues inKenya and Ghana, perhaps becausesupranational considerations had not yet impactedon political discourse in these countries.

Nevertheless, particularly in Kenya, the fewcomments that were made about regionalism andPan-African groupings were, on the whole,positive. Some stakeholders argued that regionalgroupings were critical to the overall success ofAfrican countries, as ‘small African countries canbenefit from these groupings to increase theircollective global influence’. Others thought thatregional blocs could also help to reduce thedomination of the nation-state and thus some ofthe unfortunate characteristics of overtnationalism.


The point was also made that these regionalblocs benefited countries economically in that theyencouraged countries to specialise and worktowards enhancing their national competitiveness.One stakeholder suggested that over time thismight enhance the global competitiveness ofAfrican industries.

Although these benefits were recognised,there were concerns about the ongoingdevelopment of these blocs. Some stakeholders,particularly in Kenya, argued that, contrary to theearlier argument, these regional blocs wereovertly liberal and hence exposed nationalindustries to dangerous economic shocks.

There was also concern that there was a needto rationalise and harmonise the number and typeof regional and pan-African groups, particularlyas it was perceived that they could lead to a strainon state resources and to unnecessary duplicationand complexity. This complexity was also said tobe contributing to an ever-increasing gap betweenthe people and these organisations. It wassuggested that, if this trend was to continue, thenAfrican regional organisations might experiencesimilar problems to the European Union and its‘democratic deficit’.

Economic Autonomy and InternationalTrade

When regional integration was discussed inSenegal, views were often hostile. It was the viewof many stakeholders that the West AfricanEconomic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) hadcurtailed Senegal’s ability to manage its economyeffectively. Many agreed but added that theythought these problems were compounded byongoing undue influence on Senegalese policiesby other countries, particularly France.

At the most fundamental level, Senegal wassaid to have very little control over its economic,monetary, industrial and fiscal policies. It wasargued that this was demonstrated by the fact that

tariffs and other customs duties/taxes had beenharmonised in WAEMU and the Frenchgovernment was said to still influence thevaluation of the Francophone currency, the CFA.The Bretton Woods institutions were also criticisedfor their policies and conditionality that were saidto dominate the Senegalese macro-economicframework.

Those points aside, it was also argued thatperhaps the biggest problem facing Senegal wasthat WAEMU negotiated trade agreements onbehalf of its members. This had been a particularproblem as the Senegalese cotton industry hadbeen decimated by the effects of regionalagreements signed with Morocco under theauspices of the WTO. Senegalese cottonproducers had to compete with heavily-subsidisedfarmers from the United States and EuropeanUnion. These agreements also had the knock-on effect of closing second-hand clothing units,which had meant increased job losses andclothing shortages.

In light of these criticisms it was suggestedby a number of stakeholders that Senegal had tofight for its political independence from WAEMU,much as it had done during colonial times. In thisinstance, WAEMU was seen as the latestmanifestation of colonialism, and it was said thatwithout seeking greater political independence,Senegal would not obtain economicindependence and enjoy stronger economicgrowth.

Not all the Group’s contributors shared thisanalysis of the situation in Senegal. Somestakeholders thought that Senegal’s problemsstemmed from poor domestic policy decisions anda lack of reforms.

The Group heard how much had been doneto reverse the policies of President Senghor, whohad advocated state intervention in the economy.Nevertheless a number of stakeholders felt thatthis process had been overly dominated by the


executive and donor countries at the expense ofother important stakeholders. In their view thishad greatly damaged the credibility of reformefforts, particularly those related to theprivatisation of utilities companies.

At the same time, there was the view that theSenegalese government was not sufficientlyprepared to contribute effectively to WAEMUpolicies or negotiating positions. It was arguedthat very few, if any, impact assessments werecarried out before negotiations began and thatthere was little research into alternative scenarios.The Group also heard how the governmentignored various stakeholders when formulating itstrade policies. It was suggested by one participantin Dakar that these failings meant that, as amember of WAEMU, Senegal accepted policiesthat it would normally unilaterally reject at thenational level.

Other stakeholders thought the problem wasmore fundamental, as Senegal’s political systemstifled debate on different policy alternatives andneither the public nor political parties seriouslydebated political choices.

Again, as an example of this problem, theimpact of WTO and regional trade agreementson Senegalese cotton producers was raised. Itwas argued that these producers had not beenconsidered by the main political parties becausethe agricultural sector did not receive the attentionit deserved from the political system.

When these suggestions and concerns werebrought together, many stakeholders in Senegalconcluded that regional blocs may not be the bestway forward, both for structural and systemicreasons, and also because their members werenot equipped to realise the benefits of integration.With this in mind, one stakeholder succinctlyposed the question, ‘if we can’t be organised atthe national level, how can we be organised atthe regional level?’


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The Institute for Global DialogueThe Institute for Global DialogueThe Institute for Global DialogueThe Institute for Global DialogueThe Institute for Global DialogueIGD House, Thornhill Office Park, Bekker Street

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ENHANCING INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTIVENESSIN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Reflections on Trends in Kenya, Ghana and Senegal

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