SIR ERIC DRüMMûND, BRITAINtS AMBASSADOR TO ITALY, AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE ITALO-ABYSSINIAN CRISIS OF 1935-1936 Araceli Julia P. Gelardi B.S., Florida International University, 1982 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of His tory O Araceli Julia P. Gelardi 1998 SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY March 1998 Al1 rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other rneans, without permission of the author.
Transcript
SIR ERIC DRüMMûND, BRITAINtS AMBASSADOR
TO ITALY, AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE
ITALO-ABYSSINIAN CRISIS OF 1935-1936
Araceli Julia P. Gelardi B.S., Florida International University, 1982
THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in the Department
of
His tory
O Araceli Julia P. Gelardi 1998
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
March 1998
A l 1 r ights reserved. T h i s work may not be reproduced i n whole or i n part , by photocopy o r o the r rneans, without permission of the author.
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Abs t r a c t
This thesis examines the role Britain's Ambassador to Italy,
Sir Eric Drummond, played on the formulation of British foreign
policy during the Italo-Abyssinian crisis of 1935-6. Contrary to
some past studies which ignore Drummond's impact on government
decisions during the crisis, this thesis shows that he did play
an important role in influencing many of the British goverment's
decisions.
This assessrnent has been arrived at by examining Drummondls
tenure as ambassador during the crisis, and also by focussing on
the perspectives of British governrnent officiais involved in the
foreign policy decision-making process. These individuals
include members in the Foreign Office such as the Permanent
Under-Secretary and, in the political sphere, the Foreign
Secretary.
The thesis illustrates how Drummond played a key role during
each phase of the crisis. Because of his position as arnbassador,
Sir Eric was able to present British views and positions taken
throughout the crisis to Mussolini and his aides. But, more
importantly, Drummond was able to provide his colleagues and
superiors in Whitehall with useful observations and, at times,
convincing advice which aided the British government in
formulating its policies in response to unfolding events.
The thesis is based on an analysis of primary and secondary
sources in English, both published and unpublished. The primary
sources are comprised mainly of British documents such as those
iii
f ound in the F o r e i g n O f f i ce, G e n e r a l C o r r e s p o n d e n c e , P o l i t i c a l
F i l e s (F .O . 371) deposited in the Public Record Office at Kew,
P a p e r s f r o m the F o r e i g n Office C o n f i d e n t i a l P r i n t and R e p o r t s ,
and the D o c u m e n t s on B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y - Cabinet and Foreign
Office memoranda were also examined, as were other material found
in the published diplomatic documents of Canada, Germany, and the
United States. This emphasis on Foreign Office, Cabinet, and
other diplomatic sources is integral to the thesis because it is
in these materials that Drummondls opinions and advice can be
found, along with his governmentls responses and policies. Since
much of the crisis was played out within the League of Nations,
League publications were also used in this study, as were British
periodicals and rnemoirs.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
1 would l i k e to express my apprec ia t ion t o my supervisory
cornmittee f o r t h e i r help throughout m y graduate s tudies . Many
thanks go to D r , Martin Kitchen f o r his advice and helpful
comments. f am also very much indebted t o Dr. John Stubbs for
h i s invaluable suggestions and for h i s un fa i l i ng kindness.
Many thanks a r e a l s o due to m y husband and parents f o r t h e i r
encouragement and support- Final ly , t o my daughters, Vic tor ia
and Gabriella, f o r t h e i r unending pa t ience and good humour, 1
Chapter O n e : Introduction - Background t o the I t a l o -Abyssinian crisis
During 1935-6 Benito Mussolini embarked upon his rnost
ambitious plan for acquiring a colonial empire, the conquest of
Abyssinia. Decernber 1934 marked the official beginning of the
Italo-Abyssinian crisis with a clash between Italian and
Abyssinian troops at Walwal, sorne sixty miles inside Abyssinian
territory. The crisis ended in July 1936 when sanctions imposed
by the League of Nations were lifted. By that time, Italian
troops had entered the Abyssinian capital of Addis Ababa (in May
1936), and forced Ernperor Haile Selassie to flee into exile.
Throughout the crisis, intense negotiations were pursued (both
within and outside of the League) in order to resolve matters.
In the end, Mussolini acquired his East African empire. However,
it was a venture which had exacted a hea-vy price £rom many of the
players involved.
Mussolini's scheme to subjugate Abyssinia was in accordance
with Fascist philosophy, for success in this endeavour would
illustrate how glorious and powerful Italy and il Duce were by
providing an empire rerniniscent of ancient Rome. However, the
whole adventure was not to be a straightforward affair, for the
crisis engulfed not only Abyssinia and Italy, but also affected
Great Britain, France, and the League of Nations. By the end O£
Mussolini's adventure in July 1936, European relations had become
severely strained. The Stresa front of April 1935 consisting of
Britain, France, and Italy in opposition to Nazi Germany's
increasing belligerence, had disintegrated. Moreover, the League
of Nations1 inability to deal successfully with the crisis had
also rendered the League a fatal blow.
The Italo-Abyssinian conflict was therefore not merely a
crisis of relations between Italy and Abyssinia, but was, above
all, a grave crisis with international implications, Ample
scholarly li terature theref ore exis ts on various aspects of the
conflict, There are, for instance, studies on the devastating
impact the crisis had on the League of Nations.' For
contemporary accounts of the war itself, there are Pietro
Badogliols and Emilio de Bonols pro-Italian narrativesO2 Ange10
del Boca and Anthony Mockler have also written about the war, as
has Thomas M. Coffey/ Coffeyts work places heavy emphasis on
Abyssinia's emperor, Haile Selassie and presents a sympathetic
account of him.
Other aspects of the crisis can be found in works such as
Franklin D, Laurens1 examination of French policy. He also
analyzes the effect the crisis had on the French public as seen
See for example: Elmer Bendiner, A Time £or Ansels: the ~rasicomic Historv of the Leaque of Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975); F.S. Northedge, The Leaque of Nations: Its L i f e and ~imes (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 19 86) ; F. P. Walters, A Historv of the Leasue of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 19 52 ) -
Pietro Badoglio, The War in Abvssinia (London: Methuen Publishers, 1937) and Emilio de Bono, Anno XIIII: The Conquest of an Ern~ire (London: The Cressett Press, Ltd., 1937). These works of course are pro-Italian propaganda pieces published in English and aimed at British audiences and therefore need to be consulted with caution. They are also revealing in showing how Italy aspired to an -pire that was part of the British and French experience.
Ange10 del Boca, The Ethiopian W a r 1935-1941 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); Anthony Mockler, Haile Selassiels War (Oxford University Press, 1984); Thomas M. Co£fey, Lion bv the Tail: the Storv of the Italian-Ethiopian War (New York: The Viking Press, 1974)-
through newspapers, periodicals, and journal^.^ Brice Harris,
meanwhile, details the role played by the United States during
the crisis. He cites the great powersg lack of decisive
leadership as a major contributing factor in Italyls ~ictory.~
For an overview of directions taken in Italian foreign
policy through a seventy year period, C.J. Lowe and F. Marzari
provide a detailed accountm6 Denis Mack Smith, an established
historlan of Italy, portrays Mussolini as a driven man who sought
prestige for Fascism and Italy through the acquisition of a
colonial empire by means of a military conquesL7 Esmonde
Robertson has produced a study of Mussolinifs foreign policy,
highlighting his efforts at establishing Italian spheres of
influence in Europe and Africa.'
Several scholarly monographs have been published during the
last thirty years on the crisis itself. Two examples focussing
on the international dimension can be £ound in studies done by
George W. Baer.g Frank Hardie has also written a thorough
' Franklin D. Laurens, France and the Italo-Ethiopian C r i s i s 1935-1936 (The Hague: Mouton, 1967) .
Brice Harris, Jr,, The United States and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).
C.J. Lowe and F. Marzari, Italian Foreicm Policv 1870-1940 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1975) .
' Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981) and Mussolinils Roman Empire (New York: The Viking Press, 1976).
Esmonde M - Robertson, Mussolini as Empire Builder: Europe and Africa 1932-6 (London: The Macmillan Press, L t d . , 1977) -
George W. Baer, The Cominq of the Italian-Ethiopian War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967) and Test Case: Italv, Ethiopia, and the Leawe of Nations (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976).
account of the crisis. He interprets the actions of the European
powers as the first steps taken towards the policy of
appeasement,1° A substantial portion of Baer and Hardie's
monographs are devoted not only to the Italian and French
perspectives, but also to the British foreign policy aspects of
the crisis.''
In addition to these books, several journal articles also
highlight the dilemmas facing British foreign policy makers
during the period. R.A.C. Parker illustrates this well in his
paper entitled, "Great Britain, France and the Ethiopian Crisis,
1935-36." It focusses on the differing outlooks and responses of
the British and French governments to the conflict, whicn
eventually led to exceedinçly strained relations.12
Though a number of scholarly works on the Italo-Abyssinian
crisis and its relation to British foreign policy have been
produced, very little work has been written thus far on Sir Eric
Drummond. To date, only one book appears to have been written on
10 Frank Hardie, T h e Abvssinian C r i s i s (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1974) .
l1 Some of t h e books which have port ions devoted t o the Abyssinian quest ion a s it r e l a t e s t o B r i t i s h fore ign policy include: R . J . Q . Adams, B r i t i s h P o l i t i c s and Foreiqn Pol icy i n t h e - ~ q e of Appeaçernent 1935-9 (London: Macmillan, 1 9 9 3 ) ; Core l l i Barne t t , The Collapse of B r i t i s h Power (New York: Morros, 1972); Northedge, The Leacme of Nations; Gaines Post, J r . , Dilemmas of F o r e i m Policy i n the Aqe of Appeasement 1 9 3 4 - 7 ( I thaca : Corne11 Universi ty Press, 1 9 9 3 ) .
l2 R.A.C. Parker, "Great B r i t a i n , France and the Ethiopian C r i s i s , 1935- 36," Enqlish His to r i ca l Review, volume LXXXIX, no. 351 ( ~ p r i l 19741, pp, 293- 332.
him, It covers his tenure as the first Secretary-General of the
League of ~ations . l3
In addition, one graduate thesis has been completed on
~rummond.'~ It re£utes allegations that the Ambassador was, by
the end of his tenure, a Fascist sympathizer, On the Abyssinian
crisis itself, Donald Rotunda shows how Drummond maintained his
British loyalties. The thesis, however, does not delve into
detail regarding the role Drummond may have had on the formation
of British foreign policy in response to the crisis. His
influence is only brief ly alluded to - 1 5
Another study on Drummondrs ambassadorial role was published
in 1 9 5 3 .16 However, this article by ~elix Gilbert (which is a
comparative analysis of the British Ambassadors to Germany and
Italy) focusses on the l a te r stages of Drummond's tenure as
Ambassador. Consequently, it does not thoroughly cover the role
he played during the Italo-Abyssinian crisis. Furthermore, a
1984 review article by Anthony Adamthwaite on war origins
describes The Diplomats, 1919-1939 as "though useful and still in
print, rit] is fast approaching middle age. "17 He calls for
13 See James Barros, Office without Power: Secretary General Sir Eric Drummond 1919-1933 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).
l4 Donald T. Rotunda, "The Rome Embassy of Sir Eric Drummondu (Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1972).
'' Ibid., Chapters 4 and 5, pp. 154-309-
l6 Felix Gilbert, "Two British Ambassadors: Perth and Hendersonw in The Diplomats, 1919-1939, eds. Felix Gilbert and Gordon Craig (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19531, pp. 537-54.
l7 Anthony Adamthwaite, "War Origins Again," The Journal of Modem Historv, volume 56, no. 1 (March 1984), p. 114.
historians to produce needed works on such thernes as "the
influence of the prof essionals (rneaning the diplomats) . This is a theme echoed recently by Wesley Wark. In an
article on appeasement published in 1995, Wark notes that there
is a dearth of material on senior British Ambassadors posted to
Europe's major capitals during the 1930s. Biographies, for
instance, have yet to be written on any of them.lg
Occasional references to Drummond during the crisis can be
found in some books and journal articles. The secondary
literature which does exist on Drummondts role in relation to the
British goverrient acknowledges only a segment of his influential
role2', ref ers to it in passingzl, or disregards it.22
la Ib id .
l9 Wesley Wark, "Appeasement RevisitedI1 International Historv Review, volume XVII, no. 3 (August 1995). p. 559- A recent study by D . C - Watt seeks to provide more d e t a i l i n t h i s a r ea of diplornatic historv. See Donald Cameron watt, "Chamberlainls Ambassadors," i n ~ipiomacv and ~ o r ~ d Power: Studies i n Br i t i sh Foreiqn Policv 1890-1950, eds- Michael Dockrill and d ri an McKercher (New Y o r k : Cambridge University Press, 19961, pp. 136-170.
Baeri s two monographs, f o r example, ref e r to Drummondl s in£ luent ia l r o l e to a c e r t a i n extent. See a l s o Parker, "Ethiopian C r i s i s , " pp. 303, 312, 314, 318-19.
*' Bendiner, A Time fo r Ansels, pp. 349, 355; J.A. Cross, S i r Samuel Hoare: a P o l i t i c a l Biosraphv (London: Jonathan Cape L t c ï . , 19771, p. 203; Hardie, Abyssinian Cr is is , pp- 117, 124; A.R. Peters, Anthonv Eden a t the Foreiqn Of f i c e , 1931-1938 (Aldershot: Gower, 1986) , p. 1 2 4 ; Post, Dilemmas of Foreisr. Policy, pp. 122, 200 ; James C. Robertson, "The Hoare-Laval Plan," The Journal of Contem~orarv Historv, volume 10, no. 3 (19751, p. 437; Robertson, Mussolini as Empire Builder , p. 172-
22 Ian Colvin, None So Blind: A Bri t i sh Diplornatic V i e w of the Orisins of World War II (New York: Harcourt, Brace & world, Inc., 1965) ; F. S. Northedge, The Troubled Giant: B r i t a i n Amons the Great Powers, 1916-1939 (New York: Praeger, 1 9 6 6 ) , Northedge, i n h i s Leasue of Nations, discusses Drummondls e a r l i e r role as League Secretary-General and also has a chapter devoted to the Abyssinian question. However, no reference is made t o any sort of i n f l uen t i a l r o l e which Drummond could have had with h i s government during the Abyssinian c r i s i s . The same can be sa id f o r Walters' Historv of the Leasue of Nations. H e devotes some seventy pages to the c r i s i s and a lso goes i n t o d e t a i l about Drummond as League Secretary-General, ye t no mention i s made
Therefore, a substantial gap in the literature exists
concerning a detailed study of the role played by Sir Eric
Drummond throughout these events, This thesis is thus an attenpt
at contributing to the historical literature on the crisis by
bridging t h i s gap. It will attempt to do so by systematically
analyzing the Ambassadorlç role and illustrating how he helped
London £rame its foreign policy initiatives with respect to the
Abyssinian crisis. Before we analyze Drummondls role as
Ambassador in detail, his earlier career at the British Foreign
Office as well as his tenure as the League of Nationst f i r s t
Secretary-General will be examined-
of any possible significance Drummond could have had for the British throughout the conflict. ~endiner's A Time for Ansels also describes Drummondls early League role in detail as well as his ambassadorial role in Rome. His examination of the Italo-Abyssinian crisis however, has few references to Drummond,
C h a p t e r Two: A portrait of S i r Eric Drummond
A little over a year be£ore the Abyssinian crisis broke, the
British embassy in Rome saw a change of Ambassadors. In October
1933, after 12 years' service as Ambassador, Sir Ronald Graham
departed frorn Rome and was replaced by Sir (James) Eric
Drwnmond. l
Born in 1876 to a prominent Scottish family with connections
to the crown2, Eric Drummond was educated in Eton. Thereaf ter,
like others of his social standing and education, he sought a
career in the diplornatic service where his fluent cornmand of
French and G e r m a n could be placed to good use/ After passing
the challenging entrance examination of the Foreign Office, he
was duly accepted as a clerk in 1900.' During the next nineteen
years, Drummond showed himself to be a capable and dependable
Sir (Janes) Eric Drummond (1876-1951), became the 16th Earl of Perth in 1937, succeeding his half-brother, Upon succeeding to the earldom, Drummond also became Lord Drummond of Cargill and Stoball, 10th Viscount Strathallan, Lord Drummond of Cromfix, Hereditary Thane of Lennox, Hereditary Steward of Menteith and Stratheam, and Chief of the Clan Drummond. From Frank C. Roberts, comp., Obituaries £rom the Times 1951-1960 (Reading: Newspaper Archive Developments Ltd., 1979), p. 566.
The Drummond family czn trace their lineage to the 13th century. Ancestors include two queen consorts of Scotland. Queen Anabella (née Drummond) , consort of Robert 111 of Scotland, was the ancestor of al1 succeeding monarchs of Scotland, Great Britain, and the United Kingdom. The earldom of Perth was granted in 1605. Burke's Peerase, Baronetaqe & Kniqhtaqe (London: Burke's Peerage, 1970), pp. 2098.
' Rotunda, "Rome Embassy," p. 55. Though he could read it, his Italian was not fluent. When Drummond conversed with uss soli ni or Count Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolinils son-in-law and Foreign Minister, it was in French, Ibid., note 7.
Drummondls life between his departure from Eton and his arriva1 at the Foreign Office appears to be somewhat of a mystery. It would appear that he may have been educated further at home or travelled throughout the European continent in order to polish his linguistic skills. Rotunda, "Rome Embassy," pp. 55-6.
individual, rising through the ranks and becorning the Private
Secretary of Prime Minister Asquith (1912-1915) and Foreign
Secretaries Grey (1915 -1916) and Balfour ( 1 9 1 6 -1918) . During his
tirne at the Foreign Office, Drummond showed himself to be not
only able and cornpetent5, but also influential with such
individuals as ~ a l f our . " Drmond's abilities and dedication to his duties did not go
unnoticed. When, in 1919, the time came to select the League of
Nations1 first Secretary-General, the forty-two year old Sir Eric
Drummond was thought to fit the role admirably- His discreet
presence at Balfour's side and his own enthusiasm for the League
had caught the attention of President Wilson during the peace
negotiations in Paris, The President carne to value Drummond as a
confidante. Wilson liked Drummondfs judgment and efficiency
which he had seen firsthand, for Balfour allowed Drummond (whom
he glowingly described as "the perfect Private Secretaryw) to
handle most of the work dealing with the League.' Lord Robert
Cecil, a keen supporter of the League and member of the British
That he was competent and had proven himself at the ~oreign Office can be seen when Drummond was awarded a KCMG (Knight Commander of St- Michael and St, George) with the right to be styled as "Sir Eric Drummondu in 1916. Further evidence of Drummondts capabilities cari be seen in his name being included among a list of respected individuals, for consideration to the important post of British Ambassador to Washington in 1919. Ian Malcolm (for A . J . Balfour) to Lloyd George, 25 February 1919, Lloyd George Papers, House of Lords Record Office, London. Henceforth, Lloyd George MSS.
Barros, Office without Power, pp. 12-13, 383-384, 387; Walters, Historv of the Leaque, p - 75. Evidence of Drummondls influence with Balfour can also be found in the correspondence between Drummond and Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian), David Lloyd George's Private Secretam- See for example, Drummond to Kerr, 18 and 23 January 1919, Lord Lothian Papers, Edinburgh, Scottish Record Office. Henceforth, Lothian MSS.
' Bendiner, A Time for Anqels, pp. 133-4.
delegation at the Paris Peace tafks, was also impressed with
Drummond and had successfully persuaded ~avid Lloyd George to
support Drummondls nomination for the post of Secretary-General.'
Drummond was duly sworn in as the first Secretary-General of the
newly fonned League of Nations.
As Secretary-General, Sir Eric ~rummond held the view that
the League should develop as an international organization, open
to al1 countries, despite objectionable characteristics of some
regimesag He also understood the limitations that the League
faced, owing to the absence of political and rnilitary support
£rom the United States.'' Because he understood the coercive
limitations of the League, Drummond consistently sought to foster
international cooperation among the Leaguefs members.': One of
the ways in which he sought to prornote international cooperation
was by conducting a series of persona1 visits to various European
Lord Robert Ceci l t o Lloyd George, 2 1 April 1919 , Lloyd George MSS.
Barros, Off ice without Power, p. 27.
la Drummond t o Arthur S a l t e r , Director of the ~conomic and Financial Section of t he League Sec re t a r i a t , 23 December 1929, viscount C e c i l of Chelwood Papers, AD 51111, B r i t i s h Library, London, en ce for th, Ceci l MSS; The Earl of Per th , "San Francisco Hopes," T h e Spectator , no. 6094 (13 Apri l 19451, p. 3 3 0 .
Barros, Off ice without Power, pp. 41-2. Moreover, according t o Drummond, t he League should w o r k I1by persuasion, no t by fo rcew and as such, the League "cannot irnmediately impose i t s w i l l on a r e c a l c i t r a n t Par ty ." S i r E r i c Drummond, "The League of Nations, The Spectator , no- 5236 (3 November 19281, p. 639.
capitals. It was during one such visit, to Rome, that Drummond
first met Mussolini in 1923 . '2
During his tenure as Secretary-General, Drummond typified
the quintessential British civil servant through his modesty,
discretion, and careful approach to innovation.13 Though at
times Drummond appeared to lack charisma, he was invariably
described as being an astute and circumspect ~ecretary-~eneral."
He read al1 important documents, often late into the evening,
returning them with his amotations to the writer within twenty-
four hours.15 He also had, as James Barros describes him, " t h e
rare gift for conciliating divergent positions and in a modest
and deprecating fashion offer a suggestion which would satisfy
both sides and enable the work to be resumed. "16
After more than a dozen years at the League's helm, Drummond
decided that it was time to move on. It was a decision which he
did not take lightly.17 Not only had thirteen busy years as
12 Barros, Office without Power, pp. 268, 276; Sir Ronald Graham to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 9 November 1923, Great Britain, British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the ~oreisn Office Confidential Print, series Fr Europe 1919 -1939, volume 5, Italy & Southeasten Europe, July 1921-December 1923, doc. 316, pp. 423-5. Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt, general editors, Christopher Seton-Watson, editor, University Publications of America, 1992. Henceforth, BDFA, series FI vol. 5.
l3 Northedge, Leaque of Nations, p. 51.
l3 Barros, Office without Power, p. 26.
LS Rotunda, laRome Embassy, p - 91. l6 Barros, Office without Power, p - 25.
" D m o n d to Gilbert Murray, 1 February 1932, Gilbert Murray Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford University. Henceforth, Murray MSS. Murray, Professor of Greek at Oxford University, was a staunch supporter of the League throughout its existence and a rnoving force of the League of Nations Union.
Secretary-General taken their toll on his health, Drummond also
felt it necessary to leave for the League1s sake because he did
not want the secretariat to become too associated with one
individual.18 Accordingly, much to the regret of many, Drummond
tended his resignation and requested to return to the British
diplornatic service £rom which he had been seconded.lg Tributes
to Sir Eric's professionalism and dedication were not short in
corning. 20 There were for instance, the sentiments expressed by
Eamon de Valera, the Acting President of the Leaguels Council
concerning the Secretary-Generalls resignation, He described
Drummond as possessing
... unremitting industry, . . . loyalty and devotion to the work of the League. . . (his) decisions will remain as an example to those who carry on in the years to corne... H i s judgment, tact, impartiality and unfalling courtesy are known to al1 who corne to Geneva ... (They) must recall occasions (on) which the solution of problems of great difficulty and delicacy was made easier by the efforts of the Secretary-General to find the highest comrnon rneasure of agreement. 21
Il3 Drummond to Sir John Simon, 7 January 1932, Cecil MSS, ADD 51112.
l9 Rotunda, "Rome Embassy, ", p. 93; Barros, Office without Power, p. 381; The League of Nations, The Monthly Summarv of the Leaque of Nations, volume XII, no. 1, January 1932 (London: G. Allen and Unwin Ltd., League of Nations Department, 1932) .
20 Examples of tributes paid to Drummondls tenure as Secretary-General can be read in The League of Nations, Monthlv Summarv of the Leasue, vol. XII, nos- 8 & 9, August & September 1932, p . 245; Ibid., vol. XII, no- 11, November 1932, p. 364; Ibid., vol. XIII, no. 6, June 1933, p. 130- F.P Walters, a former Deputy Secretary-General of the League, in his Historv of the Leaque, was full of praise for Drummondis abilities as Secretary-General, pp. 558-9.
*' Acting President of the Council to the Secretary of State for External Affairs on the Resignation of the Secretary-General, 27 September 1932. Canada, Documents on Canadian Extenal Relations, volume 5 (1931-1935) - Alex 1. Inglis, ed., doc. 255, p. 275 (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1973). Henceforth, DCER.
Added to this was praise for his
smiling patience in tirnes of difficulty, his perfect calm in the adjustment of differences, and above al1 the sense of moral and intellectual integrity with which he has inspired those who corne to Geneva in search of international peace and ~ r d e r . ~ ~
Drummond l e f t the League on 30 June 1933 and took up his
post in October as head of the British embassy in Rome where he
served as the British Ambassador to I t a ly from 1933 until 1939.
2 2 League of Nations, Monthlv Summarv, vol, XIII, no. 6, June 1933, p . 153,
Chap ter Three : B r i t ish foreign policy and the decision -making process
Before beginning an ana lys i s of Drummond's r o l e during the
Abyssinian c r i s i s , i t would be appropriate t o d ig re s s and examine
the decision-making process i n government as i t r e l a t e s t o Great
ri tain i n the m i d 1930s. Though a number of government agencies
m a y have been involved i n t h e process of c r e a t i n g a v iable
fo re ign policy, i t w a s t h e Cabinet which bore t h e primary
r e spons ib i l i t y f o r the formation of f oreign po l icy . l Within the
cabinet i t s e l f , there also ex i s t ed a t tirnes, a so -ca l l ed "Inner
Cabinet. Members of t h i s select group tended t o dominate
cabinet discussions due t o t he importance of t h e i r min i s t r i e s ,
t h e i r p o l i t i c a l c lout , o r t h e i r pe rsona l i t i e s .
Besides debating the i s sues a t hand, t h e Cabinet also
r e l i e d on a number of exper t s t o guide them i n o rder t o a r r i v e a t
a dec i s ion- These exper t s could be found not only within the
Foreign Office i t s e l f bu t a l s o among the var ious i n t e r -
departmental comrnittees which w e r e created as advisory b0dies.l
' AS head of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister also bore the ultimate responsibility for the formation of foreign policy. B y m E. Carter, The Office of Prime Minister (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 296; Ivor Jemings, Cabinet Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19611, p. 218; Hardie, Abyssinian Crisis, p , 38.
As Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald had such an Inner Cabinet £rom 1932-5 known as "the Six, " which counted Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, as one of its members. Jennings, Cabinet Government, pp. 253-4, MacDonald's successor, Stanley Baldwin, often allowed discussions at Cabinet meetings to drift, providing Simon and his successor, Sir Samuel Hoare, opportunities to dominate at such meetings. John P. Mackintosh, The British Cabinet (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1968) , p. 478.
One such example was the Cornmittee of Imperia1 Defence ( C . I . D . ) , chaired by the Prime Minister. Gaines Post, Jr., IlThe Machinery of British Policy in the Ethiopian Crisis," International Historv Review, volume 1, no. 4 (October 1979 ) , pp. 522 - 3 .
Some of these Cabinet cornmittees were long-standing and permanent
while others of an ad hoc nature were created to deal with a
particular problem.
Though the Prime Minister and his Cabinet colleagues
ultirnately made the final decisions on important matters dealing
with foreign affairs, and hence, ultimately made policy, it was
another Cabinet member, the Foreign Secretary, who was entrusted
with the job of ensuring that the government's policy was
presented and de£ ended in parliament . ' Moreover, the
relationship between the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary
could have some effect on the conduct of foreign policy6, as was
the case in the Abyssinian crisis. For instance, Ramsay
MacDonald, who was ill, could defer to Sir John Simon (an
effective speaker at Cabinet meetings7), on such issues. A
sirnilar case could be made for Stanley Baldwin. Since he was
Hiram Miller Stout, British Government (New York: Oxford University Press, l953), p. 86.
Leo D. Epstein, "British Foreign Policy," in Foreiii Policv in World Politics, ed. Roy ~acridis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, I n c , ) ,
Mackintosh, pp. 296-7.
' Mackintosh,
British Cabinet, pp. 454-5; Carter, Prime Minister,
~ r i tish Cabinet, p. 479.
relatively indif f erent to matters of f oreign policy8, his Foreign
Secretaries inevitably took leading roles in this sphere. 9
Within the Foreign Office itself, the Permanent Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (PUS) assumed his duties
as the administrative head of this important government
department. As a career officer and non-political appointee
carrying the rank of an ambassador, the PUS served as the chief
official adviser of his superior, the Foreign Secretary," As
PUS from 1930 to 1938, Sir Robert Vansittart was undoubtedly the
dominant figure in the Foreign Office during the 1930s" and
cornmanded at times within the Foreign Office, a large persona1
f ollowing. l2 Vansi ttart, however, was not exempt f rom
Baer, T e s t Case, p. 48; Car te r , Prime Minister, p. 297. Anthony Eden, who succeeded Hoare a s Foreign Secre ta ry , reportedly found Baldwin of l i t t l e help when handling i s sues r e l a t e d t o foreign pol icy (Car te r , P r i m e Minister, p - 297, no te 2 ) .
Though t h e Cabinet assumed f i n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r p o l i c i e s , S i r Samuel Hoare (Simon's successor as Foreign Sec re t a ry ) , was given much leeway by Baldwin i n the c rea t ion and execution of foreign pol icy. Baer, I t a l i a n - Ethiopian War, p. 176.
' O Epstein, " B r i t i s h Foreign Pol icy ," p. 37 and W. Selby, "The Foreign Off ice ," The Nineteenth Century and A f t e r , vol. 137 (19451, p. 5; Arthur Wi l l e r t , IlThe Foreign Office Within," The Strand Maqazine, volume XC, (November 1935-April l936) , p . 400.
Thomas H, Keene, " S i r Robert V a n s i t t a r t and the B r i t i s h Foreign Off ice , 1930-1938," Proceedinss and Papers of t he Georsia Association of Histor ians (1981), p. 80; B . J . C . McKercher, "The Last Old Diplomat: S i r Robert Vans i t t a r t and the Ver i t i e s of B r i t i s h Foreign Policy, 1903-30," Diplornacy & S t a t e c r a f t , volume 6 , no. 1 (March 1995), pp, 2 , 13.
l2 Rotunda, ''Rome Embassy, p , 244, Geof f rey Thompson (an Abyssinia expert who a t one time, was ac t ing head of t h e Egyptian department a t t he Foreign Office) s a i d what a g r e a t joy it w a s t o work f o r V a n s i t t a r t . This was so because according t o Thompson, V a n s i t t a r t "never di thered, nor d i d he ever f e a r r e spons ib i l i t y , " Geoffrey Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat (London: Hutchinson of London, 1959), pp. 86, 94.
criticisms.13 Moreover, his forceful personality and strong
anti-German views also ensured that the Foreign Office was not
immune from interna1 discord.14
Throughout the Abyssinian crisis, Vansittart was a
formidable PUS who was aliowed considerable latitude on foreign
poficy decisions.15 It would thus appear that during the mid
1930s, the relationship between the Foreign Secretary and the PUS
mirrored to some extent, that of the Prime Minister and Foreign
Secretary, In other words, j u s t as the Prime Ministers -
MacDonald and Baldwin - had conceded some ground to their Foreign
Secretaries; so too, did the Foreign Secretaries - Simon, Hoare,
and Eden - concede some ground to the PUS when it came to
handling issues related to international relations.16 Simon and
Eden listened to Vansittart at times, while Hoare, in particulâr,
appears to have found the PUS persuasive in many instances."
13 Among Vansittart's detractors at the Foreign Office was Walford Selby, who later became the British ~ a s s a d o r in Lisbon (1937-40)- Norman Rose, Vansittart: Studv of a Diplomat (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 19781, pp. 69, 2 6 7 - The PUS also clashed at times with Sir Maurice Hankey (who, as Secretary to the Cabinet and the C.I.D., had a close working relationship with ~aldwin and the Cabinet), Ibid., pp, 72, 142, 147; Hardie, Abyssinian Crisis, pp. 131, 153. Though they sornetimes differed over Vansittart's running of the Foreign Office, Hankey also conceded that vansittart was a "very good" PUS and that Hankey owed him a lot. Rose, Vansittart, p. 181.
'' Post, "Machinery of British Policy," p. 527. l5 Robertson, Empire Builder, p - 118; Neil Hart, The Foreisn Secretarv
(Lavenham, Suffolk: Terence Dalton Ltd., 19871, p. 6 .
l6 Rose, Vansittart, p. 105. Some have taken the argument further, B.J.C. McKercher, for instance, contends that Simon was bypassed at times for Vansittart by MacDonald who relied on the latter for guidance in the field of foreign affairs. B . J . C . McKercher, "Old Diplomacy and New: The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919-1939," Diwlomacv and World Power, p. 104.
l7 Rose, Vansittart, pp. 164, 169; Cross, Sir Samuel Hoare, p. 263. For Eden and Vansittart, see McKercher, " O l d Diplomacy, pp. 105, 114 . Though Eden and Vansittart might have differed at times during the crisis, it
When Vansittart assumed his appointment as PUS in 1930, the
Foreign Office had by then reclaimed its ascendancy and was again
able to hold its own as the centre in the planning and execution
of British foreign policy. Though much ground had been conceded
by the Foreign Office in terms of shaping foreign policy during
David Lloyd George's premiership, aftew the Prime Minister's £al1
and thanks to the dedicated efforts of successive Foreign
Secretaries such as Lord Curzon, Ramsay MacDonald, and Austen
Chamberlain, a reversa1 in fortunes had occurred. By the tirne of
the Abyssinian crisis, the Foreign Office had been successful at
re-securing its dominant role as the central authority in the
creation and conduct of British foreign policy.'*
In order to formulate policies, the Foreign Secretary and
the Foreign Office relied on missions abroad to provide them with
information and advice on a diversity of matters. Since shifts
in policy needed to be discerned, reported, and acted upon
q~ickly'~, it became of paramount importance for ambassadors to
fulfil the two main duties of a diplomat. As head of a British
diplomatic mission abroad who was under the direct control of the
was never really serious enough to prompt either one £rom resigning his post.
l8 McKercher, "The Last Old Diplomat," pp. 16, 17, 24, 25; McKercher, " O l d Diplomacy," pp. 80, 87, 93, 98, 100, 114.
l9 William Strang, The Diplornatic Career (London: Andre Deutsch, 19621, p. 17.
Foreign office2', Drummond had t o be both a represen ta t ive of h i s
government as w e l l a s a r e p o r t e r t o h i s government. 21
I n t h i s sense, B r i t i s h ambassadors w e r e ab l e t o a f f e c t
B r i t i s h foreign pol icy. They d i d so because the information they
sought and provided on t h e coun t r i e s to which they w e r e
acc red i t ed were used by t h e Foreign Office and Cabinet t o frame
B r i t a i n ' s foreign pol icy. It w a s a foreign po l i cy which was
always d ic t a t ed by na t iona l i n t e r e s t s i n peacetirne and i n war,
regardless of the p o l i t i c a l ideologies of the government i n
power. A considerable sense of cont inui ty prevai led i n the
formation and execution O£ p o l i c i e s because it w a s necessary t o
adhere t o ce r t a in p r i nc ip l e s deemed to be i n the v i t a l i n t e r e s t s
of na t iona l and imperial s e c u r i t y . 22 Moreover, ri t i s h f oreign
po l i cy 'Iconsisted of achieving what w a s poss ib le , and was ra the r
f l e x i b l e i n i t s execution. M 2 3
2 0 William Strang, The Foreisn Office (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., l955), p. 60-
21 Donald G. Bishop, The Administration of British Foreiqn Relations (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 19611, P. 297. The main function of erbassies was to gather information. Though much of it was done formally through official meetings, much information was obtained informally as well through social functions among em'oassy staff and the local elite- See Zara Steiner, "The Diplornatic Life: Reflections on Selected British Diplornatic Memoirs Written ~efore and A f t e r the Great Warli i n Political ~emoi;: Essavs on the Politics of Mernorv, ed. George Egerton (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1994)t p. 182-
22 F . A . Voigt, "Opinion and ~olicy," The Nineteenth Centurv and After, volume CXXVIII, no- 824 (October 19451, p. 145.
23 Keith Neilson, llOnly a d.-.d Marionette? The Influence of Ambassadors on British Foreign Policy, 1904-1914,u in Diplomacv and World Power, pp. 56-7- Also, whenever the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office enjoyed close ties (as was generally the case during the Abyssinian crisis), the Foreign Office inevitably played a central role in the formation and execution of foreign policy, This was so because as political appointees, Foreign Secretaries usually sought the advice of the diplomatic experts at the Foreign Office in order to corne to a decision on matters relating to foreign
A myriad of information flowed on a daily basis between the
Rome embassy and the Foreign Office in London during the entire
Italo-Abyssinian crisis. After receiving reports from Rome, the
Foreign Office ' s resources were,
mobilized at high speed to bear on the problem (outstanding) ; the CO-ordinating activities of the Cabinet quickly employed to correlate the action of various ministries. The process (was) that of making a decision, and the best ski11 and knowledge (were) organized to make the decisions as effective as possible-.,24
Once information from abroad arrived at the Foreign Office,
the administrative machinery went into action. Information would
make its way up from the experts at the Southern Department who,
since 1934, were responsible for Italy. The volume of work at
the Foreign Office during this time had risen tremendously due to
the cri si^^^, so much so, that the Abyssinian department was
created in 1935 with X I . Campbell (and later Maurice Peterson)
as its h e ~ d . ~ ~ Accompanying the rise in workload associated with
the crisis, was a corresponding increase in expenditure at the
Foreign Office for telephone and telegraph use. Düring 1936, it
was estimated that some £70,000 was spent by the ~oreign Office
a f f a i r s , Strang, Diplornatic C a r e e r , pp. 14-5.
2C Phi l ip W. Buck and art in B. Txavis, J r . , eds. Control of Foreign Relations i n Modem Nations (New York: W.W. Norton & Co,, Inc . , 1957), pp. 274-5. This was, of course, the idea l method t o follow. Clashes d i d occur among (and within) the m i n i s t r i e s , Cabinet members, and the Foreign Off ice . Compromise was understandably the key t o securing agreements. Stout , B r i t i s h Government, pp. 83, 8 6 - 7 ; Car te r , P r i m e Minister, p. 308; Mackintosh, B r i t i s h Cabinet, p. 455.
25 Thornpson r e c a l l s how the workload fo r Allyssinian c r i s i s was so g rea t t h a t he would of ten r e t u r n home on the l a s t t r a i n a t 10:48 p.m. Thompson, Front-Line Diolomat, p. 104,
in telephone charges alone, an increase of about sixty percent
from the previous year. The increase was attributed in large
part to the crisis i t ~ e l f . ~ ~
Within the Foreign Office, group consultation became the
ob j ective, with di£ f erent grades studying and minuting their
evaluations. This ensured that senior members of the Foreign
Office hierarchy would be fully cognizant of al1 the possible
consequences that might arise with each unfolding scenarioe2*
Of ten, junior members of respective departments would make the
initial comments to despatches. From there, the despatches would
make their way up the grades. Those of major importance would be
studied and carefully commented on by heads of departments,
assistant under-secretaries, and then the PUS himself. From
here, often after consultation with the PUS, the Foreign
Secretary would arrive at a final de~ision.~'
Though reaching a consensus w a s the objective at the Foreign
O££ice, this did not always occur. Divisions did arise among the
experts as to the appropriate courses of action to take during
the crisis - mirroring to some extent, the opinions of the
27 Arthur Willert, "The King's Messengers: the Work of our Diplornatic Service AbroadrV The Strand Masazine, volume XC, May-October 1936, p . 15.
28 Ephraim Maissel, The Foreign Office and Foreiw Policy 1919-1926 (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1994), p. 31; Owen OIMalley, The Phantom Caravan (London : John Murray, 1954) , pp . 35 - 3 6 ; Willext, "Foreign Office, pp. 402-404 ; John Tilley and Stephen Gaselee, The Foreign Office (London: G.P. Putnamls Sons L t d - , 19331, p, 169.
29 Maissel, Foreiqn Office, p. 57, Also, the decision taken might or might not go to the Cabinet.
British Nevertheless, regardless of the debates among
the diplomatic experts, in the end, a decision was usually
arrived at concerning policies to pursue which were then
discussed with the Foreign Secretary.
The PUS and the Foreign Secretary o£ten worked in concert
and would decide upon what course of action to take. Their views
were sometimes heard by the Cabinet who were then at liberty to
debate the issue at hand, policies were then decided upon and
f ormally irnplemented by the governmeat . 31 Various agencies and
missions were accordingly informed of the official government
position.
Once a decision was made, London would then inforrn the
British embassy in Rome about the goverment's position on a
particular situation, thereby indicating what stand the
Ambassador should take with the Italians. With changing
scenarios occurring periodically, the ~talo-Abyssinian crisis
remained an ever fluid situation and presented a grave challenge
to the British government.
3 O Cross, Sir Samuel Hoare, pp. 187-188.
'' Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, The British Foreiqn Service (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1949), p. 50 .
Chapter Four: The b e g i n n i n g o f the crisis ( D e c 1934 - S e p t 1935)
Efforts by B r i t a i n , France and the League of Nat ions a t f i n d i n g a peaceful settlement
Most O£ Sir Eric Drummond's first year as Ambassador to
Italy was uneventful, He spent the time acquainting himself with
his new post and with the country. Reports to London covered
such diverse topics as Italian propaganda in Malta and a report
on the Congress of Asiatic studentsl meeting in Rome.' However,
by 1 October 1934, some serious concerns were already being
raised about problems concerning the Italians and Aby~sinians.~
The Abyssinian crisis dorninated Drunisnondls tenure as British
~ a s s a d o r to Italy during 1935-6, It was an era marked by
Mussolini's pursuit of an aggressive foreign policy. From
Mussolinils point of view, not only was war and an expansionist
policy necessary to divert the Italian people's attention £rom
domestic ills3 such as unemployment, but war was also needed to
carry on the idea of a dynamic Fascist statem4
' Drummond to Simon, 4 Novexber 1933 and 28 ~ecember 1433, BDFA, series F, vol. 9, doc. 288, p. 387 and Ibid,, vol. 10, doc- 1, p. 1.
Drummond to Launcelot Oliphant, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1 October 1934 in Rotunda, "Rome Embassy,It p. 154, note 2. See also Drummond to Simon, 12 October 1934, Great Britain, Public Record Office, F.O. 371/18025/~ 2438/18/1.
In 1934 Drummond sent a despatch to Simon noting the sad economic state of Italy saying, "conditions are such as to try any but the firmest confidence. The belt is drawn very tight..," Dnrmmond to Simon, 20 July 1934, BDFA, series F, vol. 10, doc. 31, p. 60. On the interna1 economic problems see also Drummond to Simon, 8 November and 7 December 1934, docs- 40, 42, pp. 76, 77 and Drummond to Simon, 30 April 1935, Ibid., vol. 11, doc- 25, p- 43.
Martin Kitchen, Europe Between the Wars: A Political Historv (London: Lonqman, 1988) , p. 155; Robertson, Mussolini as Empire Builder, p. 93.
This dynamic force, dominated by the psychology of ducismo
and the need for struggle, also required Mussolini to seek
prestige5 for his country and for himself, compelling him to
acquire a colonial empire6 which would then give Italy the status
befitting a great power. This Fascist expansionist policy
culminated in the amexation of Abyssinia in 1936,
According to the Minister for Colonies, General Emilio De
Bono, plans to conquer and annex Abyssinia were already being
made in the autumn of 1933 . 7 In his own written account, with an
introduction by Mussolini, De Bono states that,
From this m o m e n t , the Duce w a s d e f i n i tely of the opinion that the matter would have to be settled no la ter t h a n 1936,. . . . It was the autumn of 1933. The Duce had spoken to no one of the coming operations in East Africa; only he and 1 knew what was going to happen, and no indiscretion occurred by which the news could reach the public.'
With these plans in mind, a pretext was therefore needed by
the Italians to begin sending forces into Abyssinia on a massive
Kitchen, Europe Between the Wars, pp. 151, 155; Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, p. 65; Stanley G, Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), p. 233; Baer, Italian-Ethiopian War, p. 169.
Lowe and Marzari, Italian Foreiqn Policv, p. 240; Ulrich von Eassell, German Ambassador in Italy to the German Foreign Ministry, 25 July 1934, Germany, Documents on German Foreiqn Policv 1918-1945, series C ( 1 9 3 3 -19371, The Third Reich: First Phase, volume III (June 14, 1934-March 31, 19351, doc. 118, p. 295. Henceforth, DGFP.
' There were indications that Mussolini may have been preoccupied with Abyssinia since as early as 1925. Memorandum by J .H.U. Lambert, Second Secretary at the Abyssinian desk of the Foreign Office, 27 April 1936, Great Britain,-~ocuments Ôn British Foreiqn Policy,-1919-1939, second series, volume XVI (March 2 - Julv 30, 1936) , W. N. Medlico tt, Douqlas Dakin, and M. E . Lambert, eds. (London: H ~ M . ~tationer~ Office, 1976}, no: 276, p. 370. Henceforth, DBFP, 2nd series, vol, XVI.
De Bono, Anno XIIII, p. 13. Italics in the original.
scale. The opportunity came in December 1934 with a skirmish
between Italians and Abyssinians at Walwal, sixty miles inside
Abyssinian territory. The f irst phase (December 1934 to
September 1935) of the crisis had begun-
Foreign Office experts anticipated a serious crisis in the
making. After reading what Drummond had to Say, the Southern
Department head, Owen OIMalley, minuted that l'Sir Eric Drumrnond
has put his finger on a dangerous spot" and consequently "1 feel
very uncornfortable aborrt the course which things seem to be
shaping."1° Even harsher sentiments were expressed by Simon.
Geoffrey Thompson recalls a very perturbed Simon telling him
bluntly in January 1935, "you do realize, donf t you, that the
Italians intend to take ~b~ssinia?~~"
During the very early stages of the crisis, attempts at a
peaceful settlement ensued on the part of the Abyssinians through
appeals to the League of Nations. 12 At the same time, Sir Eric
Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of t ri ter national Affa i r s 1935, volume II: Abvssinia and I t a l v (London: Oxford un ive r s i ty Press, 19361, pp. 133-138; League of Nations, Monthlv S u m m a n of the Leasue, vol . X I V , no. 12 , December 1934 (Geneva: League of Nations ~ n f o m a t i o n Section, 19341, pp. 284-6.
Thornpson, Front-Line Diplomat, P - 95.
i2 League of Nations, Monthly S u m a r Y of the Leaque, v o l . X I V , no. 1 2 , December 1934, pp. 284-6. ut before the i s s u e could be discussed formally with the Leaguels Council, ~ t a l y and Abyssinia agreed to a r b i t r a t i o n under the terms of a 1928 t r e a t y between the two countr ies . Baer, ~ t a l i a n - ~ t h i o ~ i a n w, pp. 104-5.
Drummond also actively sought to effect a compromise between the
Abyssinians and ~talians . l3
Despite the protestations of Abyssinia and others,
Mussolini nevertheless echoed the argument already presented to
Drummond by other top Italian officials - that in their view, the
Abyssinians were the aggressors - l4 This exchange occurred during
a meeting between the two on 14 January 1935." After his
meeting with Mussolini, Drummond predicted that the British would
find themselves in an increasingly serious situation as a result
of the Walwal incident. He told Simon that, " f o r the first time
I feel £rom the language held to me by Signor Mussolini...that
situation is not only serious but is becorning threatening . 1116 Attempts to settle the dispute occurred amidst the backdrop
of a rapprochement between Italy and France, formally embodied in
the Franco-Italian Agreement of 7 January 1935.17 This agreement
was concluded by Mussolini and Pierre Laval, the French Foreign
Minister, during the latter's visit to Rome. The French, ever
13 Alexander K i r k (U.S. Chargé i n I t a l y ) t o Secretary of Çtate, 18 January 1935, United S ta te s , Foreiqn Relations of the U n i t e d States , Diwlomatic Papers 1935, volume 1, General: The Near East and Africa, doc, 911, p. 598. Henceforth, FRUS. Drummond a l s o v i s i t e d the Palazzo Chigi, home of the I t a l i a n fore ign ministry, almost d a i l y i n h i s quest to f ind a settlement t o the d i spu te , Rotunda, "Rome Embassy, l1 pp- 171-2.
" Drummond t o Simon, 1, 3, 4 January 1935, DBFP, 2nd ser ies , vol . XIV, nos- 76, 80, 82 , pp. 80, 83, 85-6, .
l5 Drummond t o Simon, 15 January 1935, I b i d - , no. 104, pp. 1 0 5 - 7 .
l6 I b i d , , p. 107, References to the p o s s i b i l i t y of w a r i n Abyssinia can a l s o be found i n Drummond t o Simon, 26 February 1935, BDFA, ser ies F I vol , 11,
l7 Drummond t o Simon, 10 January 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 9 0 , note 3, p. 92 and Drummond to Simon, 8 January 1935, BDFA, s e r i e s F r vol . 11, doc. 1, pp. 1 -6 .
vigilant against a resurgent Germany, sought an alliance with the
Italians to counteract what they perceived to be an increasing
German threat to their national security. The Italians, still
anti-German at this time, welcomed this alliance with the French.
Meanwhile, the British, (who knew through their own
Ambassador in France that the French were keeping a close eye on
events ) 18, wi shed to encourage a Franco - I talian rapprochemen t
while simultaneously aiming to maintain ties with the French and
with the Italians. This stemrned in large part to British
concerns over the threat posed by a revisionist Germany. Since
at hast the days of Sir Eyre ~rowe'~, the notion of a serious
threat coming from Germany held sway with many senior rnembers of
the Foreign In order to counter this threat, it thus
became essential to try and maintain close ties not only with the
French but also with the Italians. This British desire for close
cooperation with Italy was evident even before the crisis
erupted. In 1933, Sir John Simon wrote of his conviction that
Italy was the key to peace in Europe and how "everything depends
on keeping Italy on the right path.. .l12' It was a view supported
1 a S i r George Clerk ( B r i t i s h Ambassador i n Par i s ) t o Simon, 17 February 1935, DBFP, 2nd s e r i e s , vol . X I V , no. 1 5 9 , p. 153.
l9 Crowe w a s PUS from 1 9 2 0 t o 1925 and author of a famous 1 9 0 7 memorandum, "On t h e Present S t a t e of B r i t i s h Relations with France and Germany.It This w a s an a r t i c u l a t e analysis on the balance of power p r i n c i p l e - Crowe saw France a s a key to the containment of Germany and stressed the importance of t h e Royal Navy a s a cornerstone t o B r i t i s h foreign pol icy . McKercher, IlThe L a s t Old Diplomat, pp. 5 -6.
20 I b i d . , pp. 5-6, 30; Maissel, Foreiqn o f f i c e , pp. 38-9, 4 6 , 50-3.
21 L e t t e r from Simon t o Austen Chamberlain, 7 September 1933 as quoted i n Anthony P. Adamthwaite, The Makinq of the Second World War (London: Unwin Hyman., L t d . , 1977; r ep r in t , New York: Routledge, Chapman, and H a l l , Inc. ,
by many in the British government including Sir Robert
Vari~ittart.~~ In mid-February, the Foreign Office received a
stern warning £rom Drummond of what was in store. He had gleaned
some valuable information £ r o m a long-standing friend, the
Marquis Theodoli, w h o also happened to have close connections to
uss soli ni.^^ Drummond reported that the details gathered
amounted to "the first inside information I have had as to what
is in Mussolinils m i n d . " Drummond went on to Say that Mussolini
,..also felt that Italy was entitled to her place in the Sun. We and the French had taken alrnost al1 the dish - only the crumbs were left. It would be intolerable in the Duce's view if Italy were not allowed even to consume these crumbs. I remarked that this was al1 very well, but what about the League? This led to the reply that the League rnust not stop legitimate Italian aspirations.
Drummond also added that the French "had definitely offered
Italy a free hand in Abyssi~ia.~~~~ In giving his analysis of the
situation to Simon, Drummond explained how,
The situation is hateful, but as 1 see it the best chance to-day is for the Emperor to secüre,
22 Aaron L. Goldman, "Sir Robert Vansittart's Search for Italian Cooperation Against Hitler, 1933-36," Journal of Conternporarv History, volume 9, no. 3 (July 1974), pp. 93-5, 127.
23 The Marquis ~heodoli was head of the League of Nations Mandates Commission for most of its existence and w a s also a former Italian Under- Secretary for the Colonies, Northedge, Leaque of Nations, p . 197, 220; Drummond letter to Simon, 16 February 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 160, note 3, p. 151.
Drummond to Simon, 17 Febr-cary 1935, F.O. 371/19105/J 973/1/1. According to Theodoli, this was what French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou (Laval's predecessor) to ld him personally. It is believed that the same impression was given by Laval to Mussolini during negotiations in January 1935 involving the Rome agreements, Baer, Italian-Ethiopian War, pp. 78-83; Hardie, Abvssinian Crisis, pp. 60-62.
as speedily as possible, the easiest terms he can. Otherwise 1 fear the worst and an Italy acting contrary to her League engagements and involved up to the hilt in adventures in Abyssinia is not going to be of much use to us in a critical moment of European affairs-
The letter had an impact on Simon who found it to be "a very
grave letter" and issued orders for it to be seen by the Prime
Minister at onces2' Drummond1 s report also struck a note with
Vansittart,
The PUS was fully aware of the consequences in store for
Britain and Europe should a major quarrel erupt between Britain,
France, and Italy over the Abyssinian crisis. This was
demonstrated in his response to Drummondts views. ~ansittart
wrote,
This (meaning the views expressed by Drummond) is as we always expected. From the first the Foreign Office collectively has always interpreted the first rumbling at Walwal as the prelude to Ltalian expansion at Abyssinials expense. We may take this letter (Dirummondt s) as the confirmation of our fears. We must now face the inevitable and frame our policy accordingly-
Vansi ttart continued,
(1) We should endeavour to dissuade Italy £rom going the full length firstly because-..she ought to have her bands free for graver matters in Europe; secondly because of the further and perhaps deadly blow that this must deal the League; and therefore, thirdly on account of the consequent reaction on a large section of public opinion here, just at a period when we want and need, al1 of us, the most complete confidence and collaboration.
Vansittart was also cognizant of the fact that,
25 Dnunmond to Simon, 17 February 1935, F.O. 371/19105/5 973/1/1 and Simon minute, 17 February 1935, Ibid-
(2) . this must be done in the quietest, most friendly way. We must not be manoevred into playing an isolated and futile role of opposition. Both epithets are now certain, seeing the attitude of France ... we cannot af£ord to quarrel with Italy and drive her back into German embraces ... (3) 1 think the Secretary of State should expound these views ... and lay particular stress on (2) Let us hope that (1) will have an arresting effect on the Italians."
Vansittart accordingly instructed Drummond to comunicate
the British governmentls growing anxiety in "the most friendly
terms ... and rnannerw and to use his own discretion to "convey this micable but real concern to Signor Mussolini. n27 This need to
maintain Anglo-Italian relations on an even keel (a thene about
which Drummond continually reminded his colleagues) was a view
shared by many in the Foreign Office including such senior
figures as Vansittart; Orme Sargent, the Assistant Under-
Secretary; and Sir John ~irnon.~~ Simon agreed with Vansittart
and stressed to Drummond the need to exhibit caution in bis
dealings with Rome, encouraging Drummond to, "approach the
I talian Government in the mos t f riendly way . . . u29 This notion of placating Italy was evident in the Stresa
conference held in April 1935 among the British, French, and
Italians. The main item on the agenda centred upon the
26 Vansittart minute, 25 February 1935 in response to Drulmondls despatch to Simon of 17 February 1935, Ibid.
27 Simon to Drummond, 26 February 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 178, p. 170.
*' Rotunda, IlRome Embassy,I1 pp. 189-190, 194.
29 Simon to Drummond, 21 February 1936, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 171, p. 163.
maintenance of a united front in support of Austria against
Germany in the face of conspicuous German rearmament, 30 There
was concern on the British government's part that Mussolini not
experience British intransigence during the meeting?
Otherwise, Italy might be enticed into the German camp. This
thought haunted the British at Stresa and consequently prornpted
them to keep discussions about abyssinia away £rom the
negotiating table.
The main British representatives present at Stresa were the
Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, Sir John Simon, and Sir Robert
Van~ittart.~~ Sir Eric Drummond was also present at Stresa.33
Thus far, Drummond had been following London's directives about
expressing his government's I1friendly anxietytl towards Mussolini
and the 1 talians . 3 4
By April 1935, Italyls military preparations had reached
such a level that it was obvious that they were meant for a full-
3 O On 16 March Germany had announced military conscription in violation of the Treaty of Versailles.
3' Lord Vansittart, The Mist Procession: The Autobiosraph~ of Lord Vansittart (London: Hutchinson of London, 19581, p. 513.
'* Record by Geoffrey Thompson of the Abyssinian department of the Foreign Office, of a conversation at Stresa with Signor Guarnaschelli, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 230, note 1, p. 220.
3 3 Vansittart, Mist Procession, p. 520 - '"~rummond to Simon, 1, 14, 30 March 1935, DBPP, 2nd series, vol. XIV,
no. 187, pp. 177-8; no. 203, p. 193; no. 222, pp. 211-12; Drummond to Vansittart, 12 March 1935, Ibid,, no, 201, p - 191.
scale invasion of Abyssinia . 3 s At Stresa Drummond was insistent
that Mussolini be warned in person by the British of their
displeasure with Italian actions and intentions to date. 36
However, this warning was never given.
Mussolini himself had expected the British to bring up the
topic of Abyssinia and was prepared to discuss this with thern.37
Though there was some discussion about Abyssinia at Stresa arnong
lower level of fi ci al^,^^ no mention of Abyssinia took place in
Mussolini l s preçence during the conf erence, a f act which sorne
individuals later lamented-39
3 5 Baer, Italian-Ethiopian War, p. 122. In a rnemorandum dated 26 March 1935, by the Rome embassyts Milita- Attaché (H. Stevens) , it was estimated that 600,000 men were to serve in the Italian army by April. BDFA, series F, vol. Il, doc. 21, pp. 35-7. Furthermore, it was reported to the Foreign Office that #lit now seems to be quite clear that, unless prevented by European considerations of great weight, Italy intends to exploit her military strength in Eastern Africa at the expense of Abyssinia; and that, since nothing is to be gained by delay, she will act in the autumn as soon as weather conditions permit.. . Stevens memorandum, I April 1935, Ibid., doc. 24, p. 40 - Similar fears of an invasion were expressed to the League by the Abyssinian government. See League of Nations, Monthl~ Sumrnan/, vol, XV, no. 3, March 1935, p . 62.
36 The Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs: Facins the Dictators (London: Cassel1 & Company Ltd., 19621, p. 179.
37 Ibid. , p- 118
Record by Thompson of a conversation at Stresa with Guarnaschelli, 12 April 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol, XIV, no. 230, pp. 220-2; with Guarnaschelli and Vitteti, Ibid,, no, 231, pp. 220-2; Memorandum by Thompson, 13 April 1935, Ibid., no. 232, pp. 225-8; Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat, p - 97; Robertson, Empire Builder, pp. 130-1.
39 Vansittart conceded that Drummond "... urçed sensibly that we should begin (the meeting) by warning the Duce of our wrath, should he attack Abyssinia." But this recommendation was not followed. Vansittart, Mist Procession, p. 520. According to Drummondts own recollection, he thought that on the last dav of the conference Vansittart tried to ".,.broach the subiect with ~usçolini-but he failed in his obj ect, as Mussolini speedily rode off on another tack. The Earl of Perth, letter to the editor, The Spectator, no. 5996 (28 May 1943) .
Back in February, Anthony Eden, then the British Minister
for League of Nations Affairs, expressed his satisfaction with
Drummondls observations about the possible impact the crisis
would have on Britain- Eden noted how Drummond summarized,
in an acute form the responsibility of H.M. Government as a member of the League, and more particularly of the Council, in respect of recent developments in the Italian-Ethiopian dispute .... The impression that is left on my mind by al1 this is, 1 confess, that unless some hint - and a pretty strong hint - is given to the Italians that we should not view with indifference the disrnemberment of Ethiopia, then this dismemberment will take place...40
Why then, was Drummondls appeal not listened to at this
important meeting? One reason for this can be traced to Simon1s
interpretation of British policy. This meant that the British
should avoid alienating Mussolini at almost any cost, otherwise
there might be little hope of achieving a united Stresa front
agains t ~ermany , 41
Another reason can possibly be traced to the personal
antipathy which Ramsay MacDonald felt for Drummond. He appeared
to dislike Drummond in particular due to the latter's conversion
to Roman Catholicism years earlier. MacDonald felt that
Drummondls conversion was an unforgivable act by a fellow ~cot.'~
MacDonaldls animosity toward Drummond was a factor in MacDonald's
'O Edan minute, 26 February 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol, XIV, no. 175, note 4, p. 167.
Baer, Italian-Ethiopian War, p. 123.
'* Barros, Office Without Power, p. 15; Rose, ~ansittart, p. 69; Rotunda, ''Rome Embas~y,~~ p. 98.
rejection of Sir Eric's candidature for the post of PUS in 1929-
The pos t went ins tead to vansi ttart . 4 3 Furthermore, when
Drummond resigned from his post as Secretary-General of the
League, MacDonald refused to grant him the ambassadorship to
either Washington or Paris, Drummondl s two original choices . *" Thus, it is also distinctly possible that Drummondls advice to
the two British ministers at Stresa went unheeded due to
MacDonald's intense persona1 dislike of Drummond. It must be
noted that this is but one possible scenario of what happened at
Stresa. MacDonald may have decided to remain silent for other
reasons . 4 5 Vansittart may also have been anxious to keep
Abyssinia £rom being discussed in Mussolini's presence in order
to ensure that a united anti-German front be e~tablished.~~
Whatever the reason behind the lapse, the result was, instead of
leaving Stresa with an admonishment from the British as he had
expected, Mussolini interpreted their silence as tacit approval
of his actions and future goals for ~byssinia.~~
3 3 Rose, Vans i t t a r t , p . 69; Rotunda, "Rome Embassy," p. 97,
4"o~e, Vans i t t a r t , p . 69; Rotunda, "Rome E m b a s ~ y , ~ ~ pp. 97-99. I n h i s l e t t e r to Simon reauest inq a return t o the B r i t i s h foreign service, Drummond wrote, " S i r ~uçten-chambeGlain, t o whom I had expressed iy des i re t o r e s ign (from the League), t o l d m e t h a t i n 1929 he had gone so f a r as t o submit my name t o the King f o r t h e post of Br i t i sh Ambassador i n Washington, b u t f o r various reasons t h i s appointment was not proceeded with." Drummond l e t t e r to Simon, 7 January 1 9 3 2 , Cecil MSS, ADD 51112 ,
45 David Marquand, Ramsav MacDonald (London: Jonathan Cape, 1 9 77) , pp. 7 7 3 - 4 . E d e n (who was il1 and could not go t o S t resa) a l so urged MacDonald t o bring up Abyssinia a t the conference.
" Rotunda, "Rome Embassyfn pp. 219-29, 240, 245; Marquand, MacDonald, p . 774.
47 Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat, p. 92,
It was now evident that the British goverriment was in a
precarious position, The Abyssinian crisis compelled Britain to
try and balance two seemingly irreconcilable objectives. Not
only did the British need to preserve cooperation with France and
Italy, but they also needed to (or at least appear to), support
the League of Nations and its Covenant advocating collective
securi ty. 4 8 This commi tment to the concept of collective
security obliged member states to treat "an attack upon another
(member state) as an act to be resisted, by diplornatic pressure
and disapproval, by economic sanctions or even by force.M49
Numerous warnings were being issued by the British to the
Italians about the consequences of their Abyssinian adventure.''
These warnings took on official and unofficial forms. Drummond,
for example, formally expressed his governmentls (specifically
mentioned) concerns to Italian officiais such as Mussolini and
Fulvio Suvich, the Under-Secretary O£ State for Foreign Affairs.
But since he had also been allowed to use his own discretion in
such matters, Drummond would also use his contacts with prominent
Italians such as Theodoli both to warn them of the consequences
-1 a Parker, "Ethiopian Crisis," p. 296.
" David Dilks, Retreat From Power: Studies in Britainls Foreiqn Policv of the Twentieth Centun, Volume One 1906-1939 (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 19811, p. Il.
In May 1935 Vansittart wamed the Italian Ambassador to Britain, Dino Grandi, about the potential problerns that might arise due to Italian policy towards Abyssinia - namely the negative effects this aggressive policy would bring upon the European situation and upon British public opinion. Simon to Drummond, 3 May 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol- XIV, no. 244, pp. 239-41.
of their actions and to obtain information about the Duce's plans
which the Ambassador would duly pass on to London.''
London was continually being told by their Ambassador in
Rome about the seriousness of the situation. The Ambassadorls
warnings about Italian intentions were creating serious concerns
among his superiors in London. In a detailed secret memorandum
to the Cabinet on the situation, Simon expressed his concerns
about Italian military preparations for an offensive and its
impact on the European scene." He pointedly remarked that
Vtalyrs reaction (to British support for the ~eague) in Signor
Mussolinils present mood, is in~alculable."~~ With such
unpredictable results, Germany would welcome the continued
disruption to the European situation caused by the Abyssinian
crisis,
Throughout the crisis, Drummondts superiors continued to
have confidence in Sir Eric's abilitie~.~~ His observations
5 1 Drummond to Simon, 3 May 1935, F.O. 371/19110/J 2094/1/1.
52 '*The Italo-Ethiopian Situation: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs," Great Britain, Public Record Office, Cabinet Memoranàa, Il May 1935, CAB 24/255.
53 Ibid.
5 4 From the earliest days of the crisis, the Foreign Office allowed Drummond to use his discretion in his dealings with Rome. Simon to Sir Sidney Barton, British Minister at Addis Ababa, 8 Deceinber 1934, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, note 4, p. 49. Vansittart agreed that Drummond "should have a free handw in his dealings with the Italians, Drummond to Simon (note by Vansittart), 18 January 1935, Ibid., no. 123, note 3, p. 121. In Maxch, D m o n d thanked Vansittart for expressing confidence in him and for aliowing hirn to use his own discretion in Rome as to whom he should talk about the Abyssinian crisis. Drummond to Vansittart, 12 March 1935, Ibid., no. 201, p. 191, Indications that Drummondls superiors continued to permit him some latitude in his dealings with the Italians were also evident in May and November 1935. Note by Vansittart for Simon, 13 May 1935, Ibid., no. 258, p. 257 and Hoare to Drummond, 8 November 1935, Ibid- , vol. X V , no. 197, p. 241.
about Italian actions were conveyed by Simon to the abi in et.^'
So alarmed was London about Drummond's reports on the escalating
intensity of the situation that it was deemed necessary to take
the serious step of summoning him home for consultations in order
to show Mussolini British concern at the turn of e ~ e n t s . ~ ~ Sir
Eric's views were eagerly sought by Whitehall and he was
accordingly taken directly upon his arrival, to a Cabinet meeting
on 17 May to apprise policy rnakers of his opinions on the crisis.
Dusing the Cabinet meeting, Drummond spoke at length about
various aspects of the crisis." The Ambassador advised the
Cabinet that somewhere along the line, pressure would have to be
put on Haile Selassie to acquiesce to Itafian ambitions for if
that failed, Drummond feared that the British were in for
trouble.58 He left London with instructions that Mussolini must
be warned in person that Britain might have to choose the League
over support for Italian policies. This was due to strong public
opinion in Britain which was firmly pro-Geneva?
5 5 Drummond to Simon, 15 May 1935, Ibid., vol. XIV, no. 270, note 3, p - 268; Mernorandun by Simon on the Italo-Ethiopian situation, 11 May 1935, Ibid., no. 253, p. 250; and Drummond to Simon, 8 May 1935, Ibid., no. 246, p. 242.
56 Drummond to Simon, 15 May 1935, Ibid., no. 270, note 3, p. 268. Drummondls recall did not escape the attentions of the ~ritish press who duly reported his meeting with the Cabinet. See The Times, 18 May 1935, p. 14.
'' Simon to M, Ingram in Rome, 17 May 1935, DBFP, vol, XIV, no. 273, note 2, pp- 269-270; Cabinet Conclusions, Extract, 17 May 371/19110/5 1989/1/1-
Cabinet Conclusions, 17 May
59 Rotunda, "Rome Embassy,~ p.
1935, F.O. 371/19110/J
248.
37
1935, F.O.
l989/l/l.
The British public was of a pacifist60 bent and support for
the League was considerably influenced by pressure groups such as
the League of Nations Union (LNU). This organization kept the
public informed on issues relating to foreign affairs and induced
the British government to honour its commitments to the Covenant
of the ~eague. The LNU1 s principal methods in applying
pressure on the government were through public mass meetings,
letter writing campaigns to the Foreign Office, the Cabinet, and
members of Parliament as well as producing a widely read pamphlet
entitled, "The Tragedy of Aby~sinia."~~ However, undoubtedly the
most influential campaign that was organized by the LNU was the
Peace Ballot of June 1935.
The Peace Ballot was interpreted by many to be the public's
view on what the governmentls role should be during the crisis;
namely, a continuation of efforts at conciliation through the
League- Though it had its opponents (such as Lord Beaverbrook,
proprietor of The Dailv Express, whose readers were asked to tear
up the "ballot of bloodn), many others £rom al1 over Britain and
6 0 Here, the term 'pacif istl 5s used in very broad terms to mean a general opposition to war. For a detailed study on pacifisrn in Britain during this era as well as an explanation on the difference between @pacifisml and lpacificism,l see Martin Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain 1914-1945: the Defininq of a Faith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). Ceadel defines @pacifisml as a moral creed whose adherents view any type of war as wrong and therefore must never be resorted to. @Pacificisml is also defined as opposition to war, However, unlike 'pacifists, adherents of Ipacificism1 accept that war is sometimes necessary. Ibid-, pp. 3-5.
Paul Kemedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacv: Backsround Influences on British External Policy 1865-1980 (London: Fontana Press, 1989), pp. 243- 244. For a detailed study of the LNu, see Donald S. Birn, The Leaque of Nations Union, 1918-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) -
62 Denis Waley, British Public Opinion and the Abyssinian War 1935-6 (London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., 1975), pp. 95, 101, 105.
£ r o m al1 walks of life supported it. Three national dailies for
instance - The Dailv Herald, The Manchester Guardian, and The
News Chronicle as well as three periodicals - The Economist, The
New Statesman & Nation, and The Spectator, were among its
supporters.63 Many were obviously galvanized by the Peace Ballot
and much weight was given to its outcorne. O£ the 11,500,000
people who responded, ninety-four percent said they were in
favour of using economic and non-milita- rneasures to end
aggression.
The Peace Ballotts results persuaded the new Prime Minister,
Stanley ~aldwin~', to declare the League as the "sheet-anchor of
British p~licy."~~ The Peace Ballot's effect would continue to
be felt for months afterwardse6' Its immediate effect however,
6 3 Patr ick Kyba, Covenants Without the Sword: Public Opinion and Br i t i sh Defence Policv 1931-1935 (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 19831, pp. 146-7. Headwav, the o f f i c i a l journal of the LNU, was of course, enthusias t i c about the Peace Bal lo t s r e su l t s (Headwav, vol . XVII, no, 7 , Ju ly 1935, pp. 1 3 0 - 1 ; Ib id . , no, 8 , August 1935, p. 160). Headwav a l so derided the Beaverbrook and Rothermere press f o r being anti-League and accused Lords Beaverbrook and Rothermere of cheering I t a l y to defy the League ( Ib id . , no, 6 , June 1935, p. 1 0 2 ) .
Dame Adelaide Livingstone, The Peace Ballot: The Off ic ia l Historv (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1935), pp. 49-51 . The votes cas t i n the Peace Ballot were close to f i f t y percent of the t o t a l e l i g ib l e voters i n the United Kingdom (Ibid . , p. 54) and aznounted t o more than half of those ca s t i n the general e lec t ion held i n November 1935 (Hardie, Abvssinian C r i s i s , p. 51). Most of those who voted i n the Peace Bal lo t were a lso e l i g ib l e to vote i n the general e lec t ion (Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat, p . 9 9 ) .
65 June 1935 saw changes i n the Cabinet. Besides a change of Prime Ministers, S i r Samuel Hoare replaced S i r John Simon as Foreign Secretary.
66 Toynbee, Survev of. In ternat ional A f £ a i r s , p. 53.
67 I t s influence would manifest i t s e l £ t o a cer ta in extent , l a t e r i n the year, i n S i r Samuel Hoare's Septernber speech t o the League. The Peace B a l l o t ' s e f f ec t would a lso resurface as the dominant driving force i n the Br i t i sh general elect ions of November 1935. Toynbee, Survev of In ternat ional Affa i rs , pp. 53-4-
was to prompt the British government to champion the League and
set it on a collision course with Italy.
Upon his return to Italy, Drummond met with Mussolini. At
this audience on 21 May, Drummond dutifully followed the
Cabinet ' s instructions and in£ ormed Mussolini in s trong terms of
the British publicls increasing support for the League and
collective security? ~ussoiini responded that he understood.
However, he told Drummond that if,
. . . It was necessary for him to resort to arms, in short go to war l , he would do so and he would send sufficient men to carry out his plan. This was his ~ill...~'
Drummond warned ~ussoïini of the consequences to the League,
to Europe, and to Anglo-Italian relations should he plan to carry
out his threat to wage war. Sir Eric noted, "my impression was
that he (Mussolini) was controlled by, rather than controlling
his destiny. He mentioned ' fate1 two or three times. "'O It
proved to be a very revealing interview and provided the British
with evidence of the Duce's determination to conquer Abyssinia.
Drummond emphasized this to Simon by following up his telegram
with a private letter. In it, the Ambassador revealed how
Mussolini, though outwardly calm, seemed "to be like a man driven
The Cabinet instructed Drummond to see to it that Mussolini understood that the British government needed to show more support for the League, Drummond carried out b i s instructions diligently, reporting back to Simon saying that, used every argument 1 could think of; sometimes, even 1 was a fittle frightened myself at the things 1 said, but nothing had, as far as 1 could see, any effect on him (M~ssolini).~ Drummond 1935, DBFP, vol. XIV, no. 281, p. 281, note 10.
69 Drummond to Simon, cable, 21 May 1935, Ibid., no.
'O Ibid.
40
to Simon, 21 May
281, p. 280.
by fate." Drummond was now firmly convinced that a major
offensive was definitely planned by the Duce.71 Some sort of
plan was needed if war was to be averted. This could possibiy be
achieved if Italian craving for territory were satisfied. This
craving might be assuaged if the Zeila plan, which involved
granting territorial concessions in Abyssinia to the Italians,
were pursued. The British proposed that the port of Zeila in
British Somaliland be ceded to Abyssinia in retum for
territorial exchanges by Abyssinia to Italy in the Ogaden.72
Drummond played a rneaningful role in helping the British to
formulate and proceed with the Zeila proposal. On 1 June he sent
a lengthy despatch to London suggesting the possibility of
satisfying Italy at Abyssinials expense, should Britain and
France not wish to take coercive measures against Italyls
aggre~sion.~~ This provoked a series of minutes £rom Foreign
Office personnel intimately connected with the Abyssinian
question. Geoffrey Thompson and Owen OIMalley were in general
7 1 Drummond t o Simon, l e t t e r , 2 1 May 1935, ~ b i d - , note 1 0 , pp. 281-282.
'' Parker, I1Ethiopian C r i s i s , " p. 304. The proposed ces sa t ion of p a r t s of the Ogaden was not considered a major concession on the p a r t of t he Abyssinians, nor was i t a new concept. P r i o r to t h e outbreak of the Abyssinian c r i s i s , Hai le Se la s s i e was wi l l i ng t o cede p a r t s of t he a r i d Ogaden region (thought t o have l i t t l e p o t e n t i a l f o r economic development) i n order t o obtain, i n re turn , a coveted p o r t such as Zeila . The B r i t i s h , meanwhile, f e l t t h a t the cessat ion of Ze i l a t o Abyssinia was a "very generous proposal" on t h e i r par t . Hoare t o Drummond, message from ~ a n s i t t a r t , 17 June 1935, DBFP, 2nd se r i e s , vol . X I V , no. 309, p. 318. They a l s o f e l t t h a t Abyssinia " i n al1 essent ia ls , . .would gain more than she l o s t ..." i f t h e Zei la proposal w e r e accepted. Note by V a n s i t t a r t t o Hoare, 16 June 1935, Ib id . , no. 308, p. 317.
7 3 Drummond t o Simon, 1 June 1 9 3 5 , DBFP, 2nd series, vol . XIV, no. 296, pp. 296-302. The Ambassador suggested among o the r things, t h a t Abyssinia could be turned i n t o an I t a l i a n Egypt. Drummond a l s o discussed the p o s s i b i l i t y of some form of I t a l i a n mandate over ~ b y s s i n i a a s w e l l a s o u t r i g h t annexation by the I t a l i a n s .
agreement about not accepting Drummond's suggestiond4 Though
Vansittart disagreed with Drummond's views that Italy might
possibly be bought off by major concessions on Abyssinials part,
he nevertheless agreed with Drummond that Italy needed to be
placated somehow. If, at this stage, it was not to be at a great
expense on Abyssinia's part, then surely it rnight be at Britainls
own expense, concluded Vansittart. Therefore, on 8 June,
Vansittart responded with his farnous minute,
.-.Italy will have to be bought off - let us use and face ugly words - in some form or another, or Abyssinia will eventually perish That might in itself matter less, if it did not mean that the League would also perish (and that Italy would simultaneously perf orm another volte face into the arms of Germany, a combination of haute politique and haute cocotterie that we can il1 afford just now) .75
Anthony Eden disagreed with Vansittartls desire to buy off
Italy and wanted Britain to stick firmly to League prin~iples.~'
Had Simon stayed on as Foreign Secretary, then Eden's views might
have been followed? However, with the arriva1 of Sir Samuel
Hoare, it was Vansittart's views (somewhat shaped by ~rummond's),
which prevailed. This was but one example of the divergence in
views which grew within the Foreign Office during the course of
7 4 Thompson and OIMalley minutes, 11 June 1935 to Drummondls 1 June 1935 despaLch on the Italo-Abyssinian dispute, F.O. 371/19111/J 2205/1/1.
'' Vansittart minute, 8 June 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 301, p. 308. Italics in the original.
Ibid., note 5, p. 309.
" Eden, for example, had recently managed to convince Simon that the Italians should accept arbitration for al1 incidents related to the crisis since last December. David Dutton, Anthonv Eden: A Life and Reputation (London: Arnold, l997), p , 46.
the Abyssinian crisis, On the one hand there was Vansittart and
his supporters who were always preoccupied with the G e r m a n threat
and so sought ways to counter it, even if it meant having to
compromise at times with League principles. Then there were
those who actively espoused the League1s cause, such as Eden, As
the crisis wore on, Eden would corne to be viewed as a champion of
the ~ e a g u e ~ ~ , so much so that, when Hoare was f orced to resign
later in the year because of the Hoare-Laval pact, Baldwin and
others felt that Eden had to be chosen as Hoare's successor in
order, it was hoped, to bring some lustre back into an office
tarnished by the Hoare - Laval pact . 79 Although Eden was unenthusiastic about it, Vansittartls
views prevailed and were approved by the Cabinet. After studying
Drummondls proposals about satisfying Italy at Abyssinictls
expense, the PUS concluded :
If therefore we cannot satisfy Italy at Abyssinials expense, we are, as bef ore, conf ronted with the choice of satisfying her at our own, (plus some eventual Abyssinian frontier rectification) or letting this drift on their present disastrous course.
78 This is how Eden was viewed by the L W in Headwav. See for example, their June 1935 issue. Headwav, vol, XVII, no. 6, June 1935, p. 102; ~bid., no. 8, August 1935, p. 143; Ibid., no. 9, September 1935, p. 163; Ibid-, vol. XVIII, no. 1, January 1936, p , 6.
'' Though differences of opinion did at times, set Eden apart f r o m Vansittart, a recent study on Eden seeks to illustrate that Eden was far more in step with his governmentrs policies during the Abyssinian crisis than was commonly believed by many. See Dutton, Anthonv Eden, pp. 44-53. This view is also echoed in Parker, "Ethiopian Crisis," p. 124.
Vansittart minute to Drummondts 1 June 1935 memorandum, 11 June 1935, F.O. 371/19111/~ 2205/1/1, Italics added for emphasis.
The British accordingly decided to proceed with what became
known as the Zeila proposal of June 1935. Vansittart was anxious
to get Drummond's thoughts on this, asking him to comment on
whether or not the proposal was worth pursuing?
In a message sent on 18 June, Vansittart urged Drummond to
Ifplease let me have your views on al1 this as soon as you can, 11B2
to which Drummond irnmediately reglied that, Ifin ny view, (the)
proposition is assuredly worth trying,It estimating that its
chances of success were "about f if ty- f if ty. u83 (Moreover) , Iteven
if it does not succeed, it will show our willingness to make
concrete and serious sacrifices to help in a most difficult
situation. lf e4 Drummond was convinced that the proposa1 was worth
trying, but he was also alert to the possibility that Mussolini's
acceptance might be difficult to obtain." Accordingly, the
8 1 "1 would like to have your views upon its possibilities at the earliest possible stage, and 1 should also be glad of your advice as how best it can be put to the test ... 1 should like to know whether you think such a proposal would prove attractive to Signor Mussolini," wrote Vansittart to Drummond, on 18 June 1935, F.O. 371/19112/5 2380/1/1,
e2 Hoare to Drummond with a message frorn Vansittart, 17 June 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 309, p. 319; see also Vansittart, Mist Procession, p. 530; Avon, Facinq the Dictators, p. 221.
83 D r m o n d to Hoare, message for Vmsittart, 18 June 1935, DBFP, vol. XIv, no. 312, pp. 323-4.
8 4 Ibid. , p . 324. In addition to this, Drummond sent another report in which he advised London that the Italian goverment was ready to collaborate with the British in finding a solution if the British were willing to get in torrch with Mussolini as soon as possible. Drummond to Hoare, 18 June 1935, F.O. 371/19112/5 2402/1/1.
a' Drummond to Hoare, 19 June 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 315, p. 326,
British decided to proceed with the Zeila scheme after receiving
Drummond1 s reassurances that it was at least worth a t r ~ . ~ "
The Zeila proposal was personally presented to Mussolini by
Anthony Eden during a visit to Rome on 24-26 June. It was
rejected by Mussolini because it simply did not go far enough for
hirn. " Mussolini, as has been shown above, was by now determined
to win a war which would result in a triumphant Italy and avenge
the Italian defeat of 1896 at the hands of the Abyssinians at
Adowa. Acceptance of the Zeila scheme would deprive him of that
anticipated victory.
The schemets collapse meant that the Abyssinian crisis rnight
extend into something even more serious because should Italy
proceed with an attack against Abyssinia (a fellow member of the
League), then Article 16 would have to corne into effect. Arttcle
16 called for the use of economic and military sanctions based on
the principle of collective security to deter an attacking member
state f rom hostile actions . 8 B
Drummond was well aware, as the founding Secretary-General
of the League, that in order for Article 16 to be effective, al1
Avon, Facins the Dictators, p. 221; Baer, Italian-Ethiopian War, p. 192; Hardie, Abyssinian Crisis, p. 124; Viscount Templewood, Nine Troubled Years (London: Collins, 1954), P. 155.
87 Goldman, "Sir Robert Vansittartrn p, 116. Though he found the proposa1 unacceptable, it did not appear to upset Mussolini to any great extent, Drummond to Hoare, 24 June 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol, XIV, no. 320, p. 332.
88 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Information Department, Abyssinia and Italv (London: The Royal Institute of ~nternational Affairs, 1935), p. 42; and Alfred Z i m r n e r n , The Leaque of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918-1935 (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., l936), p. 506.
rnembers of the League should cooperate against the Covenant
breaking member." Drummond knew that once League rnembers were
required to act under Article 16 (Le., participate
unconditionally in the severance of economic relations against
the guilty state) , then they would be exposed to warlike actions
by the offending tat te-^^ Therefore, serious consequences were
in store for Britain should Article 16 be invoked, for doing so
meant that the Cabinet would also have to contemplate the
possibility of participating in a naval blockade. Such an
undertaking troubled the British Chiefs of Staff because the
burden of implernenting economic sanctions would fa11 on the Royal
NavyIg1 inflicting on the Chiefs of Staff, as the First Sea Lord,
Admiral Chatf ield put it, llimpossible responsibilities . lig2 They
8 9 His thoughts on this interpretation of Article 16 cari be found in a letter he wrote Cecil in 1925. Here, Drummond indicates his agreement with a mernorandum prepared by the Director of the League1s Legal Section, Dr. Joost van Haine1 analyzing Article 16. Drummond to Cecil, 22 January 1925, Cecil MSS, ADD 51110. Moreover, he admitted to Cecil that without American cooperation, economic and financial sanctions irnposed by the League could not work. Drummond to Cecil, 13 February 1925, Ibid. Drummondl s views on Britain and Article 16 can also be seen in a lengthy letter he wrote to Alexander Cadogan of the Foreign Office. In it, Drummond tells Cadogan that it was highly unlikely that any British government would ever make a statement asserting that she is unprepared to car- out her obligations to the League stemming from Article 16. Drummond to Cadogan, 24 April 1930, Ibid.
Ibid.
'l Arthur Marder, "The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935-36," Arnerican Historical Review, volume LXXV, (1970), no- 5, p. 1335; Report by the Joint Planning Sub-Cornmittee, "Military Implications of the Application of article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations," Committee of Imperia1 Defence, Chiefs of Staff Sub-Cornmittee, Cabinet Memoranda, CAB 24/256, 7 August 1935.
92 Sir Ernle Chatfield, It Misht Happen Aqain: the Autobiosra~hv of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield, volume II: The N a w and Defence (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1947), p. 8 7 .
feared that an anticipated conflict in the Mediterranean would
weaken def ences amids t an increasing threat f rom ~apan . 93 Chatfield warned Vansittart in August of the Servicest
unpreparedness in the event of a conflict with Italy as a result
of a policy of Treasury restraintOg" The Treasury advocated the
pursuit of a deEence policy within a balanced budget. Achieving
a balanced budget however, was attainable only at the expense of
reduced military expendit~res.~~ Chatfield also impressed upon
Vansittart the need to obtain definite assurances £ r o m the French
of their military These warnings were repeated in a
memorandum prepared by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Cornmittee of the
Cornmittee of Imperia1 ~ e f ence. '' Meanwhile, in rnid-August, at tripartite talks in Paris
involving Britain, France, and Italy, Mussolini demanded through
his representative, Baron Pompeo Aloisi, economic and political
preponderance over Abyssinia. The British and French countered
9 3 George W. Baer, ttSanctions & Security: The League of ~ations and the Italian-Ethiopian War, 1935-1936," International Orsanization, volume 27, (Spring 1973), pp. 165-179; Chatfield, The N a v - and Defence, p. 89-
9 4 Stephen Roskill, Naval Policv Between the Wars II: The Period of Reluctant Rearmament 1930-1939 (London: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., l976), p, 252,
9 5 G.C. Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasuw: 1932-9 iEdinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1979), p. 67; Kennedy, Realities Behind Diplomacv, p. 235.
96 Chatfield to Vansittart, 8 August 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol- XIV, no. 431, pp. 470-1.
97 "Italo-Abyssinian DisputeIw Cornmittee of Imperia1 Defence, Chiefs of Staff Sub-Cornmittee Memorandum, Cabinet Memoranda, 9 August 1935, CAB 24/256.
with proposais which simply did not go far eriough for Mussolini,
resulting in the talks failing to produce positive results ." With the failure of diplornatic talks and an upcoming League
Council meeting set fox 4 September, it was deerned necessary to
cal1 a Cabinet meeting for 22 August. It was agreed here that
support for the League must stand, an embargo on arms to Italy
and Abyssinia must be continued, and close cooperation with
France must be sought .'' Drummondfs reports to the Foreign Office during this period
emphasized Italian mili tary readiness for war. ' O 0 This had been
evident to London since 1934.~' It thus appeared that it would
only be a rnatter O£ time before some sort of conflict erupted
where the Italians were concerned. It increasingly appeared that
the time had corne. Again, the source of these suspicions
emanated £rom the British embassy in Rome.
98 Baer, Italian-Ethiopian War, pp. 262-267.
99 DBFP, 2nd series, vol, X I V , no, 493, note 2, pp, 5 3 4 - 5 ; The Times, 23 August 1935, p. 10. 1t was a special Cabinet meeting that was summoned, with many members hurriedly returning to London from their holiday. The meeting lasted nearly £ive hours,
' O 0 See, for instance, Drummond to Hoare, 31 August 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 513, p. 5 5 6 .
'OZ See, for instance, a despatch of 30 August 1934 where Mussolini is quoted as saying in a recent speech, "1 t is . . . today that we mus t be pre2ared for war....we are becoming and shall continue to becorne, a military nation, for we wish it to be so.. . l n John Murray, Rome embassy to Simon, 30 August 1934, enclosing translation of a speech delivered by Mussolini to Italian army officers at the conclusion of military manoeuvres on 25 August 1934, BDFA, series F I vol, 10, doc, 33, p. 64. The same observation came from the ernbassyrs Military Attache, H. Stevens. Stevens to Murray, 19 September 1934, Ibid., doc. 35, p. 69 and Drummond to Simon, 19 September 1934 Ibid., doc. 36, p. 70.
Easly in Drummondls tenure as Arnbassador, he had sent a
despatch to London summarizing Italian pronouncements on the
state of their navy. He reported that Italy "intended to build
up to full 70,000 tons of capital ships,.." and noted that "never
before have we seen such a modern and powerful assemblage of
Italian war vessels at ses." ~fficials in London also noted that
by 1934 Italy had Itbuilt up a new fleet of 13 cruisers, 15
flotilla destroyers and 44 submarines..." while 6 cruisers, 4
destroyers, 4 torpedo boats, and 16 subrnarines were being
constructed. Moreover, the Naval Academy, the fleet, and the
naval bases were fused with the Fascist spirit and it was "the
Fascist rule to assign to the most worthy the position of
Drummond reflected on al1 this and surmised that
Philosophically and historically he usso soli ni) believed in the ultimate necessity and inevitability of war. Perhaps, he said, it was the tragic destiny that weighed on man, War stood to a man as maternity to a woman .... Were war...to break out, Fascist Italy would be prepared to confront it calmly and with discipline. lo2
It was indeed understandable why the British government were
persuaded by despatches such as these from Drummond in 1934 and
especially in mid to late 1935 to fear that British interests in
the Mediterranean might suffer £rom Italian attacks. By the
sumrner of 1935, it appeared that the time for war had finally
' O 2 Drummond to Simon, 27 May 1934, BDFA, series F I vol. 10, doc. 17, p. 31.
49
arrived1O3, prompting the Foreign Office to compose a secret
memorandum on problems likely to arise should war break out.lo4
Circulation of the memorandum to al1 governrnent departments was
ordered.lo5 Hoare then ordered the rnemorandum circulated to the
Cabinet, and warned them of "the increasing urgency of the
situation. Based on Drumrnondl s reports, not only did war
between Abyssinia and Italy seem inevitable, but war between
Britain and Itaïy also seemed to be a distinct possibility.lo7
The British government acted on these warnings £ r o m Rome and
responded with somewhat confusing policies. The policies were
confusing because they were intended to protect British interests
but were perceived differently by the international community and
were thus misunderstood. The two policies pursued consisted
'O3 By 1 June, Drummond was moved to caution Simon, "... that the situation is so grave, and the threat to the League so serious, that every effort should be made to assist Signor Mussolini in the difficulties in which he now finds himself." Drummond to Simon, 1 June 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 296, p. 296.
los "1talo-Ethiopiari Disputerti Major Webb of the C - I . D . to Sir George Mounsey, 18 August 1935, Ib id -
lo6 "Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the Italo- Abyssinian Dispute" attached to the Foreign Office memorandum circulated by order of Sir Samuel Hoare, Cabinet Memoranda, 13 August 1935, CAB 24/256.
'O7 This was the main reason why the Suez Canal was never closed to Italian vessels. In June, Drummond had warned Hoare that "in the prevailing temper here, such a move would not only be bitterly resented but might have the gravest consequences; in fact, 1 am inclined to hold, however foolish it may sound, that Italy might in such an eventuality even consider seriously the possibility of war with Great Britain.It Drummond to Hoare, 18 June 1935, F.O. 371/19125/~ 2401/1/1. Concerns about an impending war can also be seen in the Mediterranean Commander-in-Chiefls request for clarification from London on his assumption that a state of w a r would exist between Britain and Italy if Malta were attacked by the latter. J.S. Barnes to Foreign Office, 22 August 1935, F.O. 371/19125/5 3964/1/1.
firstly, of the reinforcernent of the Royal Navyls Mediterranean
fleet and secondly, of an increasingly vociferous agitation on
the part of the British to have the crisis resolved within the
confines of the League.
The crisis was now entering a critical phase with the
reinforcement of the British Mediterranean Fleet between 29
August and mid-~eptember.'~~ This course of action was taken
primarily because of Sir Eric Drumondis influential reports from
Rome- It was he who was responsible for advancing the idea of
what became known as a %ad dog' attack by the Italians on
British interests in the Mediterranean.
Its origins can be traced at least to July 1935 when
Drummond sent Hoare a message on this very point and re-iterated
on 2 2 August:
1 venture to cal1 your earnest attention to my letter to Sir R. Vansittart of July 20th. 1 fear dangers set out in that letter have increased rather than diminished owing to state of mind prevailing here. los
In response to this, Geoffrey Thornpson brought up the
spectre of what could be in store if Mussolini unleashed a %ad
dog actl. ~ecailing Drummondls letter of 20 July, Thompson noted
that Drummond had I1warned us (then) of the possibility of some
'Oe Roskill, Naval Policv Between the Wars, vol. 11, p. 255.
log Drummond to Hoare, 22 August 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol, XIV, no. 486, p - 528.
%ad dogi act such as a lightning bombing of Malta." This
assessrnent was backed by R, 1. Campbell .'Io
On 13 August, Drummond told Hoare of Mussolini's plans to
stage rnilitary manoeuvres involving half a million men in
northern Italy. He went on to state:
1 need not stress again the fact, to which 1 have already called to your attention, that Signor Mussolini is determined to show the world Italy is capable of exercising great military strength in Europe, even though she m a y be engaged in colonial warfare on a big scale in East Africa .
By September the reports coming out of R o m e from Drummond
were sounding desperate. In a strongly worded telegram, he
warned Vansittart that, Ilin their present mood ... both Signor Mussolini and the Italian people are capable of committing
suicide if this seemed the only alternative to climbing
These fears were exacerbated by Drummond's continuous
briefings about Italian press reports concerning the British. On
21 September, Drummond concluded that, "for at least £ive weeks
Italian press had been conducting a violent campaign against the
United Kingdom accompanied by threats."l13 Added to this were Sir
110 Drummond t o Hoare, 22 August 1935, with Thornpson minute, 23 August 1935, Ib id . , no. 486, note 2, p. 528.
'" Drummond t o Hoare, 13 August 1935, BDFA, series F, vol. Il, doc. 41.
Drurnmond t o Vans i t t a r t , 11 September 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol . XIV, no. 551, p , 593.
Drummond t o Vans i t t a r t , I l September 1935, Ib id . , no. 3 5 0 , pp. 592-3; Drummond t o Hoare, 20 and 21 Septernber 1935, Ibid., nos, 593 and 601, pp. 652- 3, 661-3, On 17 Septernber Drummond wrote t o Hoare as w e l l about p res s a t tacks on B r i t a i n and France, quoting one paper a s saying, "If the English t e a r t h e i r h a i r a t t h e thought of I t a l y i n s t a l l i n g herself i n Ethiopia, t h i s i s a s ign t h a t we have chosen well ..." Drummond t o Hoare, 17 September 1935, BDFA, series F I vol, 11, doc, 4 9 , p. 81.
Eric's earlier disclosures of an unstable Mussolini. Drummond
revealed his concerns to London, noting that he doubted the
Duce's sanity and warning how Ilthe truth is that no one, 1
believe, knows how Signor Mussolini's mind is working and that is
the one and only factor which counts "Il4 Reports such as these
£rom Drummond helped reinforce the impression of possible 'mad
dog' acts hy the Italians on the British.
In a message to Drummond in September, his Consul in Palermo
told the Ambassador that he feared Mussolini "will commit sorne
irretrievable folly, such as attacking Malta, without a
declaration of warou He continued, "there is a striking
resemblance in all this to the Gemany of 1914 under the Kaiser
and it fills one with great rni~givings.~~ll~ These kinds of
rnisgivings haunted policy rnakers at Whitehall in the summer."6
The British government decided to respond to Dxummondls
reports. His continuous warnings throughout the summer of
possible Italian attacks on British interests found a receptive
audience within the Foreign 0ffice'17 and prompted the government
LI4 Drummond to Foreign Office, 31 July 1935, F.O. 371/19121/J 3327/1/1.
H. Dodds to Drummond, 13 September 1935, BDFA, series F, vol. 11, doc. 50, p. 82.
lL6 This fear of an impending Italian rnilitary campaign was voiced by Hoare. R. Atherton (Counsellor at U-S. embassy in London) to Secretary of State, 28 August 1935, FRUS, vol. 1, doc. 411, p. 640. According to Thompson, when tripartite talks failed in Paris in August, Vansittart and Eden knew that their next step involved the need to reinforce the Royal Navyvs Mediterranean fleet, Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat, pp. 107-8.
'17 Evidence of this c m be seen in an interview Hoare had with the U . S . Chargé in the United Kingdom. The Foreign Secretary was reported to have admitted that Mussolini "was approaching a form of madness in which he
to implement a policy which had a significant impact on how
Britain was perceived by other League mernbers and the
international community as a whole. In order to protect their
interests in the Mediterranean, the British decided to proceed
with plans to reinforce their Mediterranean fleet. In a letter
to Hoare, Vansittart warned,
.,.we shall have to take every precaution .... we now have no naval margin at all, and the loss of one or two ships even would be a very serious matter for us .... the Mediterranean fleet is probably at present too weak to look after itself vis-à-vis Italy, and if any serious trouble were possible it would undoubtedly have to be reinforced...there must always be the risk of a mad dog coup by Mussolini, and since we cannot in our present weakness afford the consequences of such a coup, we must obviously take every precaution to avoid i t .
Hoare heeded the conclusions of Vansittart, writing back "1
entirely agree with you.I1 He also told Vansittart that
"-..Chatfield should be constantly following the situation and
taking whatever precautions he personally cari..-to preverit the
possibility of a mad dog act giving the Italians any
advantage. 11119 Again, Drummond l s views were rnaking their mark
with the PUS and the Foreign Secretary. Foreign Office views on
this matter proved convincinq with the Cabinet, prompting them to
conceived he was going t o recons t ruc t the Old Roman Empire and i n f a c t ... England had l o s t i t s power and t h a t I t a l y was going t o be the new dominating force i n Europe.-." Atherton t o Secre ta ry of S t a t e , 20 August 1935, FRUS, vol . 1, doc. 384, p. 633. Also, two days l a t e r , Atherton reported t h a t l l there i s growing convict ion here ( i n London) t h a t Mussolini is not b l u f f i n g . . . I I Atherton t o Secretary of S ta t e , 22 August 1935, Ib id . , doc. 391, p. 637.
I l 8 Vans i t t a r t t o Hoare, 7 August 1935, F.O. 371/19123/~ 3614/1/1. I t a l i c s added f o r emphasis.
lf9 Hoare t o V a n s i t t a r t , 9 August 1935, Ibid.
approve plans to reinforce the Royal Navy's Mediterranean
Eleet. 120
The reinforcement O£ the Mediterranean fleet was impressive.
Tt consisted of the dispatch from various waters of the aircraft
2 cruisers, 17 minesweepers, 2 divisions of destroyers, along
with the battle cruisers Hood and The British sent
every ship they could to the Mediterranean £rom South Africa, the
West Indies, South America, and China.IZ2 The movement of ships
and men had made a strong impression on many, especially among
teague members .123 Drmond later con£ irmed a t the end of
November and early December that in his view, despite the
reinforcement of the fleet, the threat of a 'mad dogl attack from
Italy was still very real.12'
With the Royal Navyls Mediterranean fleet reinforced, it now
appeared that the ~ritish were taking the lead in trying to solve
the crisis by threatening the Italians with a show of military
120 "The Italo-Ethiopian dispute. Summary of precautionary measures taken since the Cabinet meeting of August 22nd 1935," Cabinet Memoranda, 20 Sepcember 1935, CAB 24/256.
lZ1 Ibid.; Marder, IlThe Royal N a v y , ' ' pp. 1330, 1333.
122 Chatf ield, The N a w and Defence, p. 136; Marder, "Royal Navy, p . 1 3 3 3 .
12' Thornpson, Front-~ine Diplomat, p. 109.
12' Drummond to Hoare, 29 November 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no. 279, pp, 350-1; Drummond to Hoare, 6 December 1935, Ibid., no. 320, pp. 402-3; Drummond to Foreign Office, 13 December 1935, Ibid., no. 374, pp. 476-7.
might.125 The other event which bolstered this perception of a
British lead was Sir Samuel Hoare's famous speech to the League
Assembly on 11 ~eptember.'~~ It was becoming evident to the
British that the crisis was escalating into an almost purely
Anglo-Italian conflict and something had to be done in order to
bring the conflict back within the League itself where it was
originally played out- One way of doing so was to have the
British Foreign Secretary speak to the League outlining his
governmentts policies- In a speech to the League Assernbly on 11
September, Sir Samuel Hoare did just that.
He stated the ~ritish governmentls unswerving support for
the League and for collective security. Hoare expressed
.,.the support of the League by the Government that 1 represent and the interest of the British people in collective security .... In conformity with its precise and explicit obligations, the League stands, and my country stands with it, for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety, and particularly for steady and collective resistance to al1 acts of unprovoked aggression. The attitude of the British nation in the last few weeks has clearly demonstrated the fact that this is no variable and unreliable sentiment, but a principle of international conduct to which they and their Government hold with firm, enduring and universal persistence-
The speech went on to have an even greater impact on other
League members, for not only did it serve to reaffirm British
support for the League and for collective security, it also
125 The Abyssinians, for example, were profoundly impressed by such military actions on the part of the British. Engert (U.S- Chargé in Ethiopia) to Secretary of State, 26 September 1935, FRUS, vol. 1, doc. 102, p. 659.
' 2 6 Parker, I8Ethiopian Crisis, p. 306.
created the i m p r e s s i o ~ tha t Br i t a in w a s now taking a leading
role , both m i l i t a r i l y and p o l i t i c a l l y , among member s t a t e s t o
xesolve the crisis. According t o Hoare:
, - . o n e thing i s ce r t a in , I f the burden is t o be borne, it must be borne col lec t ively . I f r i s k s f o r peace a re t o be run, they m u s t be run by a l l . The secur i ty of the many cannot be ensured sole ly by the e f f o r t s of a few, however powerful they may be, O n behal f of H i s M a j e s t y r s G o v e r n m e n t i n the U n i t e d Kingdom, I can S a y t h a t , i n s p i t e of these d i f f i c u l t i e s , t h a t Government w i l l be second t o none i n i t s in tent ion t o f u l f i l , wi thin the measure of i t s c a p a c i ty, the o b l i g a t i o n s which the C o v e n a n t l a y s upon i t . L27
Hoare's words had an e l ec t r i fy ing e f f ec t on the League and
w e r e misinterpreted by many. The use of the word h collective^
w a s o r ig ina l ly meant t o emphasize French par t i c ipa t ion i n
implernenting the Leaguefs Covenant, thereby exonerating Bri ta in
i f League methods f a i led t o s top I t a l i a n aggression. 12' Most,
however, understood Hoare's speech t o mean tha t Br i t a in w a s now
127 The League of Nations, Leasue of Nations Of f i c i a l Journal Special Su~plement No. 138: Records of the Sixteenth Ordinarv Session of the Assemblv Plenary Meetinqs, T e x t of the Debates (Geneva: League of Nations Information Section, 1935), pp. 4 3 - 4 , 4 6 . I t a l i c s added f o r emphasis.
Parker, I1Ethiopian Cr i s i s , II p. 306; John Connell, The l tOfficel l : the Storv of the B r i t i s h Foreiqn Office 1919-1951 (New York: S t . Mar t in ' s Press, 1958), p.-185; S e e a l s o Hoare t o Clerk, 24 August 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol . XIV, no. 4 9 3 , p , 535. Here, Hoare confides t o Clerk tha t due t o the pro- League feel ings of the B r i t i s h public, " t h e League handl1 must be played out i n September, " I f i t is then found t h a t the re i s no co l l ec t ive bas i s f o r sanctions, tha t is t o Say i n pa r t i cu la r t h a t the French a re not prepared t o give t h e i r f u l l CO-operat ion, . . the world w i l l have t o face the f a c t t h a t sanctions a r e impract icable .... It must be the League and not the B r i t i s h Government tha t dec la res t h a t sanctions a r e impracticable and the B r i t i s h Government must on no account l ay i t s e l f open to the charge t h a t w e have not done our utmost t o make them pract icable. A copy of th i s p r iva te and confident ial l e t t e r was sen t to Dxummond with Hoare's request f o r h i s "equally persona1 and conf iden t i a l comments by telegram o r urgent despatch.It Ibid., note 5, p. 537.
taking the lead in the quest to stop Ital~.'~' Not surprisingly,
the speech elicited gratitude £rom Haile ~elassie'~' and
un£ avourable cornments f rom the ~talians .131 Despite the emphasis
on collective action, the French refused to commit themselves
openly to supporting or opposing ri tain, much to the latter's
frustration.
Firm French comrnitments hoped for by the British were short
in coming despite Laval's public pronouncements on Hoare's
speech. Before the Assernbly, Laval said, "...any attack on the
League would be an attack on our security...we are a l 1 united by
bonds of solidarity which point the way to duty. Our obligations
are inscribed in the Covenant; France will not shirk them. u132
This did not, however, assuage British suspicions about half-
hearted French commi tments . '33
129 See for instance, the report of the U-S- Minister in Switzerland who reported that "no one who listened to Hoare c m escape the conclusion that Great Britain is determined that Italy shall not conquer Ethiopia and is prepared to take the initiative toward collective action when the tirne cornes.'' Wilson to Secretary of State, 14 September 1935, FRUS, vol. 1, doc. 299, p. 648.
13' Barton to Vansittart, 13 September 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 560, p. 612.
13' Drummond to Vansittart, 13 September 1935, Ibid,, no. 559, p. 611.
132 The Leaçue of Nations, Official Journal: Record of the Sixth Plenarv Meetinq (Geneva: League of Nations, 1935), 13 September 1935, p. 66. The same sentiments were expressed by Laval in a speech to the Assembly on 10 October 1935 after Italy attacked Abyssinia, Ibid., 10 October 1935, p. 106.
These suspicions haunted the British thr~ughout the crisis. British exasperation at French actions were expressed by Eden. He felt that the British were at times, working far more for the benefit of France than of Britain. Wilson (U-S, Minister in Switzerland) to Secretary of State, 4 September 1935, FRUS, vol. 1, doc. 288, p. 641, Eden was also frustrated by Laval's evasiveness when the latter was requeçted to pledge support for Britain and the League during tripartite talks in August. Bismarck (German Chargé d'affaires in London) to German Foreign Ministry, 23 August 1935, DGFP, vol. IV, doc. 270, p. 573. ~lso, Vansittart wrote to Hoare that he held out
Sir Eric Drummond periodically entreated London to rernember
that a successful outcorne to the crisis required French
parti~ipation'~~ £or, as he understood it, Mussolini was prepared
to see the war with Abyssinia go through. Drummondls suspicions
about French intransigence were not new and these views haunted
him throughout the Abyssinian crisis.
During his early years as League Secretary-General,
Drummond had seen firsthand, French ambivalence towards the
League. In a letter he wrote to Lord Robert Cecil, an advocate
of the League and the driving force behind the League of Nations
Union, Drummond vented his frustration saying, "We are going to
have trouble with the French as 1 hear on al1 sides that they are
inclined to attack the League in order to weaken its position as
far as possible.
Soon a£ ter he penned these thoughts, Sir Eric followed it
with more observations in a letter to Cecil marked "secret" where
Drummond discussed, among other things , Germanyl s proposed
admission to the League, He told Cecil in confidence that should
little hope of a positive outcome in these talks because like R. Wigram, head of the Foreign Office's Central department, and Thompson, Vansittart did not trust Laval. Vansittart to Hoare, 9 August 1935, F.O. 371/19123/J 3614/1/1- Thompson had harsh words about Laval, describing hirn in his memoirs as "a completely unsc~pulous opportunistI1 who was guilty of doublecrossing the British. Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat, pp. 100, 105.
134 Vansittart to Edmond of the British delegation to Geneva, 12 September 1935 and Drummond to Hoare, 20 September 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol, XIV, no, 556, note 3, p, 609 and Ibid., no. 594, pp. 653-4. Eaving France as a key player in Italyls future was not new in Drummondls reports to the Foreign Office. In 1934, for instance, he outlined a similar message, also reminding his colleagues of how Italyls European policies were subject to rapid changes. Rotunda, "Rome Embassy," p. 152, note 145.
D m o n d to Cecil, 22 June 1923, Cecil MSS, ADD 51099.
there be no settlement on the reparations issue between Britain,
France, and Germany, and Gemany applied for admittance, "the
French present attitude is that if she were adrnitted, France
would go out .. .of course, this rneant definitely tearing up the Treaty of Versailles. . .
A year later, Drummond still despaired of France's lack of
commitment to the League, saying how "... it seemed to me to be perfectly useless if the French Government while professing
fervent support of the League turned d o m every proposal made to
utilize the League or its organs in concrete instances.n137 Five
years later, Drummond again wrote to Cecil in confidence about
his concerns over French attitudes towards the League and its
goal of arms reduction. He told Cecil of his fears that this
time they were seriously thinking of obstructing upcorning naval
disarmament talks simply on the issue of French military
prestige.138 AS far as Drummond was concerned, his sentiments
over French ambivalence had just as much validity in 1935 as it
did in 1920s , prompting him to rernind London periodically to seek
clarification from the French on where they stood during the
Abyssinian crisis.
These concerns were definitely making their mark and were
reflected in the policy officially pursued by the British
136 Drummond t o Ceci l , 11 July 1 9 2 3 , Ibid.
Drummond t o C e c i l , 24 J u l y 1 9 2 4 , Ib id . , ADD 51110.
Drummond t o Cecil, 27 November 1929, Ib id . , AD 5lllî. I t would appear tha t France was considering arguing the point t ha t "she sees no reason w h y she should have a navy in£er ior t o tha t of G r e a t B i i i t a i n . l 1 Ibid.
government. In a meeting on 6 August, Baldwin, Hoare,
Vansittart, and Eden concluded that in forthcoming meetings with
the French, Eden, as Minister for League of Nations Affairs,
"should do his utrnostu to keep the French in line with British
attitudes on the 1talo-Abyssinian dispute- This was in keeping
with the Cabinet's approval in July of a policy advocated by
Drummond, in which discussions with the French must always be
accompanied by the realization that both the British and French
were obligated to act in concert throughout the cri si^.'^^
Drummond's periodic warnings on this matter were being
heeded by Vansittart and Hoare- The PUS was moved to advise
Hoare that the British must be careful in the way they treat
Italy, even in conjunction with the French. Hoare concurred,
wri ting back:
1 agree with you that we must be very careful how we show the big stick to the Italians. It can only be shown if both French and British hands are equally clenched upon it. Mussolini is no doubt trying his utmost to destroy the possibility of an Anglo-French cooperation. We must circumvent him and on no account let hirn find us in an isolated position.140
Drummondls influence on this matter can again be seen in the
Cabinet meeting of 22 August. The Cabinet issued instructions to
the British delegation at Geneva to ensure that they avoid any
comrnitments (particularly regarding sanctions) which the French
139 nConclusions of a meeting held between the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Minister for League of Nations Affairs, and the Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs," Cabinet Memoranda, 6 August 1935, C m 24 /256 .
14' Hoare to Vansittart, 9 August 1935, F.O. 371/19123/J 3614/1/1.
were unwilling or were unprepared to assume.'41 Further evidence
of Drummondls influence on British concerns over French
cornrnitments can be seen in a reply given by Hoare to the French
Ambassador to Britain with regards to future British attitudes in
the event of an infraction of the Covenant. Keeping in rnind what
Drummond had advocated, Hoare retorted to the French Ambassador
that his speech of Il September explained British policies and
the absolute necessity for u..steadv and collective resistance
to al1 acts of un~rovoked aaqression." Hoare emphasized further
that, "each word must have its full value. la2
Vansittart and Hoare were strong advocates of a united
Anglo-French f rontM3 as was the cabinet Yet despite the
critical need to cooperate more closely, the British and French
continued to maintain a mutual suspicion of each otherfs motives
and actions.'45 It would appear that as far as the British were
lJ 1 I1Precautionary measures since the Cabinet meeting of Augrrst 22nd 1935," Cabinet Memoranda, 20 September 1935, CAB 24/256.
14' " D r a f t note in reply to the French Ambassador," Cabinet Menoranda, 23 September 1935, CAB 24/256. Underline in the original.
''' Hoare to Vansittart, 9 August 1935, F.0- 371/19123/5 3614/1/1; Marrriner (U.S. Chargé in France) to Secretary of State, 15 August 1935, FRUS, vol. 1, doc. 691, p. 627; Atherton to Secretary of State, 22 August 1935, Ibid., doc. 391, p. 636.
u4 Atherton to Secretary of State, 23 August 1935, Ib id- , doc, 397, pp. 637-8,
14' Toynbee, Survev of International Affairs, pp- 73-74. Also, two weeks before Italy began the Abyssinian war, the U.S. Ambassador to Britain, Bingham, noted that the British were deeply concerned about the uncertainty of full French cooperation in implementing the Covenant. Bingham to Secretary of State, 21 September 1935, FRUS, vol. 1, doc. 462, p. 654.
concerned, Drummond's worries about the French were not off the
m a r k ,
Meanwhile, within the League itself, the crisis took on a
more dramatic tone. Though the dispute had been played out to
some extent within the League through Abyssinials appeals to have
the dispute examined, Italy, nevertheless, was successful in her
attempts to avoid formal discussions at the Leaguets Council
meetings through the use of defaying tacticç. These took the
form of casual replies or downright silence to Abyssinian
overtures to enter into negotiations as prescribed by the 1928
Italo-Abyssinian treaty of friendship. When the Italians finally
agreed to engage in arbitration about the Walwal incident, Italy
also deliberately delayed these talks from proceeding by
insisting that Abyssinia's participants be limited to Abyssinian
citizens. After relenting on this issue, arbitration talks
proceeded and a decision was finally announced on 3 September.'46
The next day Italy then sought to advance her case formally
within the League against Abyssinia by bringing forth cases of
alleged slave-, torture, and aggressions perpetrated against
f oreigners by the Abyssinians . The League responded by s tating
146 Baer, Italian-~thiooian War, pp., 110-16, 147-8. The arbitration commission concluded that the Walwal incldent was "due to an unfortunate chah of circurnstances~ and that there was no guilty Party. Ibid., p. 302; Toynbee, Survev of International Affairs, pp. 170-1.
14' Italy, The Italo-Ethiopian Disoute: Abstracts from the Memorandum of the Italian Government to the Leaq-ue of Nations (Rome: Società editrice de Novissima, 1935), pp. 8-11; The League of Nations, Memorandum by the Italian Government on the Situation in Ethio~ia (Geneva: League of Nations Publications, 1935), pp. 15-35; The League of Nations, The Monthlv Summarv of the Leasue of Nations - Supplement: Council Report on the Dis~ute Between Ethiopia and Italv (Geneva: League of Nations Information Section, 19351, p. 285. This was the first time Italy formally subrnitted her grievances against
that "...the Emperor has done al1 that lay in his poweru to
direct the abolition of slavery in a country that did not appear
to be as disordered as it was upon its admission as a League
member in 1923 .14' Furthermore, it would appear that Abyssinia
was by 1935 "..,better organized and the central authority ... better obeyed. "lqg
In response to the Italian memorandurn, Teclé-Hawariathe of
the Abyssinian deleqation, in an eloquent speech before the
League, f ormally requested members to inves tigate Italian
allegations. He argued that
.,.Ethiopia is obliged..,to proclaim before this Assembly that she denies these unjust alleqations and denounces these mendacious documents and al1 this literature, designed as it is to show the unworthiness of a sister nation which is guilty only of having faith in the guarant&es of treaties and in the sanctity of pacts, but which refuses to condone ambitious designs under the cloak of justice .... Ethiopia asks for the imrnediate despatch of an international comniission of enquiry to ascertain the truth of the cornplaint brought agains t her . , lS0
The charges brought against Abyssinia by Italy were overshadowed
however, by Italyfs blatant aggressive intentions and e££orts at
Abyssinia before the League.
14' Italy had sponsored Abyssinian membership in the League of Nations,
149 League of Nations, Monthlv S u m a r v of the Leaaue, vol. XV, no. 10, October 1935, p. 248.
Is0 The League of Nations, Documents and Publications 1919-1946. Official Journal, Records of the Assemblv, 1935: Records of the Fourth Plenary Meetinq, 11 September 1935 (Geneva: League of Nations Information Section, l935), p. 51.
circumventing Abyssinials appeals to the League.'" The charges
brought against Abyssinia by Italy did not elicit much attention,
unlike Hoarets speech of Il September.
On 15 September the Italians f irst public response to
Hoare1s speech appeared, Mussolini discounted it because he
viewed it as "token sentimentsu and so was received with
"greatest calmtg by the Italians. Therefore, Mussolini stated
that they were Iaproceeding with greater intensity on military
preparations in Abys~inia.~~'~~ It became increasingly evident to
the British Ambassador that the Duce's desire to fight a war was
reaching fever pitch, Warnings to London of war correspondingly
escalated, On 17 September Drummond telegraphed the following
observation to Hoare: III do not personally believe Signor
Mussolini once he has started (a) campaign will be content with
anything less than conquest of the country. . . "lS3
Hoare was prompted to send Mussolini a persona1 message
(passed on by Drummond), in which Hoare described hirnself as "an
old friend of Italy." The Foreign Secretary tried to convey a
conciliatory attitude and explained that precautionary measures
lS1 A n indignant Vansittart vented his frustration to Orme Sargent, telling him that "Italy is such a rotten and unconvinced member (of the League)." Vansittart response to Sargent memorandum on the League of Nations, 5 September 1935, F.O. 371/19687/W 8174/2304/98,
lS2 As quoted in Baer, ~talian-Ethio~ian War, p. 340.
Is3 Drummond to Hoare, 17 September 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 576, p. 633,
in the Mediterranean were taken due to violent anti-British
propaganda coming out of 1 taly. 154
But these efforts seemed to be to no avail. The Duce wanted
war. After meeting with Mussolini on 23 September, Drummond
reiterated to Hoare h us soli ni's Fascist philosophy towards war -
how the Duce
- . . believes in war as the means by which a country can be kept vigorous, Young, powerful and progressive- He believes also that ftaly is the heritor of the ancient traditions of the Roman Empire. He f inds his country lacking space, raw materials and the place in the Sun he holds to be its due. These reasons combined have rendered him oblivious of other considerations such as economic and financial facts and have produced in his mind the impression that he is acting as a predestined instrument.,..and confirms rny own constant impression of a man who is the victirn, not the master of his destiny.15'
By now the League was doing what it could to prevent the
outbreak of war. The Council had appointed a Cornittee of Five
to find a solution which would satisfy Italian dernands while
maintaining Abyssinian independence. They tried to so by
devising some large territorial concessions to Italy and by
proposing an international mandate for Aby~sinia."~ Mussolini
154 Hoare to Drummond, 23 September
lS5 Drummond to Hoare, 23 ~eptember
1935, F.O. 371/19137/5 5179/1/1.
1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no- 630, pp. 691-2. Vansittart £Lund the despatch "interesting" reading (Ibid-, note 11, p. 692). Copies of Drummondls summary of this meeting were also sent to the King, Cabinet, and Dominions. Dnimmond to Vansittart, 23 September 1935, F.O. 371/19137/5 5180/1/1 and Drummond to Foreign Office, 23 September 1935, Ibid.
156
Longman, M. Epstein, ed., The Annual Reqister for 1935, vol. 177 (London: Green, and Co., ~td., 1936), p. 165-
66
rejected it. Accepting it would have deprived him of an African
emp ireLs7 acquired through war . During this time Drummond also disagreed with Eden's
assessrnent of an Italy nearing collapse and infomed Hoare O£
this on 24 September .lSB Drummond could foresee the Fascist
regimels imminent fa11 only in the event of "...a defeat in war
or, in (the) drastic and universal (imposition of) economic
He was also concerned that it might take longer
than planned for Italy to feel the effects of sanctions if non-
League rnembers like Germany, for instance, assisted the Italians.
In a memorandum prepared by the embassyls commercial
counsellor and forwarded by Drummond to London, it was noted that
Germany might just conceivably come to Italy's aid. An
arrangement whereby Germany could act as a channel for Italian
exports and in turn supply Italy with raw materials, could
substantially curtail the effects which Italy might face should
sanctions be imposed. In the ernbassy's view, "such a scheme
would probably enable Italy to purchase at least the absolute
essentials for national life and for carrying on a war,11160
IS8 Drummond had also wri t ten a persona1 l e t t e r t o Eden where, among other things, he t o l d Eden candidly t h a t "we a r e not popular here ( i n Rome) a t present , nor a r e you." Persona1 note by Drummond t o Eden, 16 September 1935, underline i n the o r i g i n a l , F.O. 371/19687/W 8582/2304/98.
lS9 Drurnmond t o Hoare, 24 September 1935, DBFP, 2nd se r i e s , vol. X I V , no. 638, p. 699,
160 Memorandum by J. Garnett Lomax, undated, BDFA, Series F, vol. Il, doc. 52, p. 85 .
that it (the memorandum) should be attentively examined in the
event of economic sanctions being contemplated at Gene~a."'~'
With talk of economic sanctions increasing, Drummondls views
on this matter added to British hesitancy about the complete
imposition of sanctions (which would have entailed including
oil) . The British government listened to their Wassador in
Rome who warned that economic sanctions would not deter Mussolini
from pursuing his goal of a subjugated Abyssinia.16* A sense of
urgency to resolve the crisis servaded British ~entirnents?~
With the rainy season ended, Mussolini's troops were poised to
begin their attack. On 3 October 1935 Italian planes bornbarded
Addi Grat and Ad~wa.'~* The Italo-Abyssinian war had begun, j u s t
as many had feared, adding a new and alarming dimension to the
crisis.
Italyts actions now meant that sanctions needed to be
imposed by the League on the offending membes by invoking Article
16. On 7 October, the League's Council had declared Itafy guilty
of violating Article 12, a verdict endorsed by the Assembly two
- - -
161 Drummond to Hoare,
162 Drummond to Hoare, no. 464, pp. 503-4.
20 September 1935, Ibid-, doc. 51, p. 8 3 ,
18 August 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol, XIV,
16' British concerns about Italian capacity to fight a prolonged conflict can be seen in a despatch sent by Drummond in early August. Based on Italian gold reserves, Drummond concluded that Italy might possibly be able ".,.to maintain a campaign for well over two years without c~llapse.~ Drummond to Hoare, 6 August 1935, F.O. 371/19123/~ 3546/1/1. Patrick Scrivener of the Abyssinian department commented that "even allowing for necessarily incomplete data..,this is a very valuable appreciation." Scrivener minute, 12 August 1935, Ibid.
16' Toynbee, Survev of International Affairs, pp. 199-200. On details of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, see The Times, 4 October 1935, pp. 14-5.
days later?' Sanctions were inevitable and were accordingly
imposed at the end of October. The sanctions, which were
scheduled to take effect on 18 November, included an arms
embargo, a refusal of credits and loans to Italy, a refusal of
Italian imports, and an embargo on the export of key materials to
Italy (though oil was not on this list) .166 Because the
imposition of sanctions could have led to war in the
Mediterranean, efforts to resolve the conflict were intensified.
165 Article 12 prohibited m e m b e r s £ r o m resorting to war until at least three months after a decision was made by arbitrators. Also, ~lbania, Austria, and Hungary dissented from voting against Italy because of their close association with that country. Toynbee, Survev of International Affairs, pp. 206-10.
166 Secretary of State for Fzternal Affairs, Documents ~elatina to the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict ( O t t a w a : J.O. Patenaude, 19361, pp- 112-16; Epstein, Annual Resister 1935, p. 165; Toynbee, Survev of ~nternational Affairs, pp. 231-2.
Chapter Five: T h e m i d d l e of the crisis (October-December 1935)
War and more intensive efforts a t resolving the conflict
With the outbreak of hostilities, concerns about sanctions
were now in the fore£ront, What were the views of the British
Arnbassador in Rome about these measures? In Drummond's long held
opinion, the imposition of sanctions would have minimal negative
effect unless international cooperation could be attained. It
was a view he held since bis days as Secretary-General when he
questioned the wisdom of imposing sanctions and instead,
pfeferred methods of persuasion over force,' Owing to the
absence of the United States, Drummond came to see the League as
an evolutionary organization more attuned to mediation and
conciliation than coer~ion,~ Because of his intimate association
with the League and because of his position in Rome, added
attention was thus paid to views expressed by Drummond on this
subject after the Italian attack on Abyssinia began on 3 October
1935. Writing to Hoare on 10 October, Drummond surmised,
What then can economic sanctions achieve? It is, of course, conceivable that economic pressure should be brought to bear of a character to destroy cornpletely Italyls economic life and render certain an ultimate - perhaps even an imrnediate - economic collapse; but this would entai1 a degree of economic unity both inside and outside the League which may not be forth~oming.~
Rotunda, "Rome E m b a s ~ y , ~ pp. 62-3. See also p - 1 0 , no te Il earlier in t h i s thesis.
Barros, Office without Power, pp. 41, 50.
Drummond to Hoare, 10 October 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no. 65, p. 76.
Moreover, Drummond showed that he understood Fascist
mentality and k n e w that this must also be considered in his
analyses to London. Drummond added on 16 October that for
Mussolini to yield now because of economic pressure,
... would in the present circumstances be regarded as a complete humiliation .... Italian policy today is governed not by reason but by emotion and passion and the latter is ruming high against us/
A n alarming pronouncement by the Duce compounded these
concerns. He exhorted the Italian people to remember that,
Against economic sanctions we shafl set our discipline, Our frugality, our spirit of sacrifice. To rni l i tary sanctions we shall reply with rnilitary measures, To acts of war we shall reply with acts of war. Let nobody imagine that we can be overcome without a fierce ~truggle.~
Drummondïs ominous accounts were making an impact on the
Foreign Of fice and the Cabinet. In the Cabinet meeting of 16
October, orders were issued not to reduce the strength of the
British f leet in the Medi terranean owing to the continuous
attacks being perpetrated against Britain, particularly among the
Italian press.
D m o n d to Hoare, 16 October 1935, Ibid. , w a s a l s o aware s ince the e a r l y 1920s of t he value p r e s t i g e . Barros, Office without Power, pp. 1 9 0 ,
Speech by Mussolini, 2 October 1935 , BDFA,
no. 85, p. 102. Drummond Mussolini placed on 276-7.
s e r i e s F r vol . 11, doc. 55, p. 9 0 - T h i s was forwarded by Drummond t o Hoare with t h e comment, "he (Mussolini) is pledged t o the Abyssinian adventure and must a t a l 1 costs see it through-" Drummond t o Hoare, 6 October 1935, Ibid. , doc. 54, p. 89 .
The Times, 17 October 1935, p. 1 4 . The Cabinet a l s o agreed Ifthat g r e a t caut ion must be exerc ised i n the appl icat ion of s anc t ions , and t h a t i t would be w e l l t o postpone t h e app l i ca t ion of any new sanc t ions u n t i l the p o s i t i o n with the French g o v e r n e n t had been cleared u p . , . " Hoare to Edmond, 16 October 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol . XV, no. 86, n o t e 2 , p. 103.
On 31 October, the Ambassador passed on Italian press
reports about how organized the Fascist state was for purchasing
basic goods such as metals, cotton, coal, and wool.' Drummond
followed up this report with another one the next day. Here he
told London of how Mussolinils demeanour had changed during a
speech, When Mussolini made allusions to Geneva, reported
Drummond, "bis whole attitude altered. He had hitherto been calm
and even jocular. He then became dernoniac in appearance and spat
out his ~ o r d s , ~ ~ ~
These warnings £rom Drummond, along with ever evasive French
attitudes towards their comrnitments to Britain and the League
(despite Laval's continued public professions of fulfilling
French obligations) ', prompted the Cabinet to advise Eden in Geneva to exercise great caution in the application of
sanctions.
Drummond t o Foreign Off ice , 31 October 1935, F.0, 371/19157/J 7190/1/1. The Foreign Of f i ce and Drummond w e r e a l s o always aware of the propaganda element prevalent Li1 mos t I t a l i a n press r epor t s , s ee f o r exaxple, Drummond to Hoare, 30 J u l y 1935, F.O. 371/19121/J 3322/1/1 on the I t a l i a n p res s .
Drummond t o Foreign Off ice , 31 October 1935, F.O. 371/19157/ J 7191/1/1. Launcelot Oliphant of the Foreign Off ice remarked t h a t this sentence gave a decidedly ugly p i c t u r e of t h e Duce (Vans i t t a r t concurred), Oliphant minute, 1 November 1935, Ib id .
The League of Nations, The Leasue of Nations Off ic i a1 Journal, Spec ia l Supplement, no. 138: Records of the Sixteenth Ordinarv Session of the Assemblv, the F i f t een th P l e n a n Meetinq (Geneva: League of Nations Information Section, 1935), 1 0 October 1935, p. 106. Kere Laval is quoted as pledging, " F r a n c e w i l l m e e t her obligations, . .my country w i l l observe the Covenant .
Hoare t o Edmond, 16 October 1935 , DBFP, 2nd s e r i e s , vo l , XV, no. 86, no te 2 , p. 103,
There are further examples of the British governmentls
confidence in DrummondJs opinions based on his observations £rom
Rome. The British, for example, followed through on Dsummondls
reports that rumours were circulating in Rome about a British
desire to go to war with Italy. He added that this view was held
even in the highest circles and was fostered to a large degree by
reports coming £rom France." Upon learning of this £rom
Drummond, the British government set about implementing some f o m
of damage control. The British did not wish to encourage this
type of thinking in Itaiy, for they were still preoccupied with
trying to maintain ties with Itaiy, lest she side with Germany.
Consequently, Vansittart immediately replied to Drummond,
authorizing him to give Mussolini "complete ... refutations of the dangerous libels that are being propagated in regard to Our views
and intentions." Vansittart then elaborated on the steps the
government planned to take based on the Ambassador's
observations :
. . .I am arranging that notice shall be taken in the press here of what you rightly cal1 the dangerous and dirty game being played by the French press in this crisis. 1 am seeing to it that some sharp criticism appears in the course of these next days, beginning tomorrow, of these despicable tactics which apparently aim at increasing tension between England and Italy and are based on sheer and pe-merse mendacity. It m a y be useful to you to know this when you see Signor Mussolini. These misrepresentations are causing wide indignation here. The press here have behaved with very marked moderation in this respect so f ar, but they w i l l react very shortly
Il Drummond to Hoare, 2 letters, 17 October 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, nos. 93-4, pp. 113-4.
and very sharply against these unscrupulous tactics unless they cease. . ,12
After the outbreak of hostilities in October, Drummond's
interviews with Mussolini increased.13 The British Ambassador
continued to press his goverment's views on the Italians. He
was increasingly employed by London as a conduit for their
appeals to Mussolini to desist from further aggression. This was
exemplif ied by a meeting the two had on 18 October. Here,
Drummond's aim was to reassure Mussolini that ri tain had no
desire to humiliate Italy or go to war (a view Drummond repeated
to Mussolini on 29 October) and to report that some of the
inaccurate statements of British intentions came £rom the French
press . l4 In this same meeting, Mussolini also told Drummond that
If Italy were faced with the choice of being forced to yield or go to war, he would definitely
l2 Vansittart to Drummond, 17 October 1935, Ibid-, no. 99, pp. 118-9.
I3 Drummondrs interviews with Mussolini since the outbreak of the crisis were generally held at six to eight week intervals, sometimes longer. After 3 October, Drummond met more freqiiently with Mussolini - on 18, 30 October; and on 5, 12, 23 November. His meetings with Italian officials such as G. Guarnaschelli (Head of the African Department at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) early on in the crisis or with F. Suvich (Italian Under- Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) in particular, throughout the crisis, were generally held often - averaging approximately every two weeks, depending upon the gravity of the situation at hand (information from DBFP, 2nd series, vols. XIV, XV). His occasional meetings with Suvich before speaking with Mussolini also appeared to pay dividends (Rome chance- to the Abyssinian department in the Foreign Office, 31 October 1935, F.O. 371/19157/J 7246). Mussolini appeared to have been accessible while he acted as Foreign Minister. Upon the appointment of Ciano to that post in June 1936, Drummond told London of his concern that heads of missions in Rome m a y lose regular contact with the Duce because when Mussolini was his own Foreign Minister, it was always possible to see hirn even during times of major crises (Drummond to Eden, 12 June 1936, BDFA, series Fr vol 12, doc, 41, p. 60). Moreover, Drummond appears to have been able to see Mussolini more frequently than most of his colleagues in Rome's diplornatic corps because the two were also able to talk informally during intervals at the opera (Rotunda, "Rome Embassy," p. 17, note 26).
l4 Sir George Clerk (~ritish Ambassador to France) to Hoare, 23 October 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no. 131, p. 158.
choose war even if it meant that the whole of Europe went up in a blaze?
According to Drummond, Mussolini was capable of carrying out
his threats, especially when Fascist Italy's prestige was on the
line. This was the impression he came away with based on his own
first meeting with the Duce and with senior Italian officiais
back in 1923. Then, Drummond concluded that "everything depended
on his (Mussolini's) attitude, and if he said that he would do
anything, he always carried it out. ln''
The meeting Drummond had with Mussolini on 29 October 1935
was revealing. The Ambassador wrote a lengthy despatch to London
of his impressions. He came away from the meeting convinced of
Mussolini's wrath which appeared to be aimed increasingly at
Britain, prompting Drummond to remark, "indeed, sometimes 1
wondered whether it was Abyssinia or Great Britain which was
Italyls chief enemy. "17 Drummond went on to Say that for the
Duce, economic sanctions meant that war could not be avoided
between the two countries- Vansittart commented: "this is indeed
strong talk particularly by the head of state ..."18 In response,
Thompson at the Foreign Office concluded that Mussolinils threats
1s Drummond to Hoare, 30 October 1935, Ibid., no. 161, p. 197. When they met four weeks later, Mussolini specifically asked Drvmmond to remernber this particular remark he had made to him in October and to take note of it again. Drummond to Hoare, 26 November 1935, F.O. 371/19165/J 8568/1/1.
l6 Drummond to Cecil, 7 November 1923, Cecil MSS, ZiDD 51110. He also told Cecil that "everything as regards Italian foreign policy seems now to be judged from the standpoint of prestige ..." Ibid., 12 November 1923.
l7 Drummond to Hoare, 30 October 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, doc. 160, p. 193.
l8 Vansittart minute, 30 October 1935, Ibid., doc. 161, note 8, p , 197.
(particularly the one where he said he preferred a general war to
yielding in Abyssinia) were not to be taken lightly because
"events of recent months have shown that Mussolini can live up to
his words."lg Lambert of the Foreign Office, meamhile, noted
that Drummond's despatch "makes for singular reading and gives
the impression that we are dealing with a man who is becoming
completely imbalanced mentally."20
Throughout the meeting D m m o n d tried to persuade Mussolini
that economic sanctions did not have to lead to war, though it
seemed to be to no availe2' Meanwhile, in meetings he had with
the Duce on 5, 12, and 22 November, Drummond continued to press
Mussolini. The British knew £rom their Ambassadorls reports £rom
Rome that Mussolinils Abyssinian adventure meant that grave
consequences were in store for the League and Europe.
By 5 November Drummond reported how, unlike the past, the
Italian people now stood solidly behind their leader. "The
threat of sanctions," said Drummond, "has unified the Italian
people to a degree which has astonished many observer^."'^
19 Thompson minute, 4 November 1935 on Drurnmondls despatch of 30 October 1935, F.O. 371/19157/~ 7245/1/1. Initialled by Oliphant and Vansittart on the same day.
Lambert minute, 4 November 1935, Ibid.
21 Drummond to Hoare, 5 November 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, dot. 161, p. 198.
22 Drummond to Hoare, 5 November 1935, F.O. 371/19159/5 7493/1/1- Drummond also included reports by Naval and Air Attachés on the state of Italian military preparations. Twenty days later, Drummond made a similar report to London, noting that "£rom a13 the information which reaches me, unanimity of people in responding to appeals of the government (to combat sanctions) is remarkable." Drummond to Foreign Office, 25 November 1935, F.0- 371/19163/J 8350/1/1.
Within the Foreign Office, Drummondts reports were certainly of
real concern as the following minute indicates:
.--the despatch gives us a profoundly depressing picture - that of a whole people organised militarily, economically, and financially for war,.-the despatch seems-.. to illustrate the extraordinary dangers of the present situation £rom the European point of view. Mussolini has created and set to work a Frankenstein which, if it were unique, might only lead to disaster. But Hitler is busily constructing a similar monster which in time he will want to set to work - and when that time comes the bombs will not fa11 in Adowa, but much nearer home. Economic sanctions will not avail then. 23
Sir Robert Vansittart was moved to order that Hoare be shown
a copy of Drummondts despatch and 'the accompanying minutes.24
Vansittart added that it should then be seen by Baldwin. Upon
seeing the despatch, Hoare responded simply, "1 agree.~~~~ Anglo-
Italian relations were clearly headed for disaster if something
was not done soon.
In a confidential despatch of 12 November, Drummond told the
Foreign Secretary of Mussolini's views on Anglo-Italian
relations. Here, the Duce is quoted as saying, "1 am not so much
afraid of the material effect of sanctions as of the moral
effects - of the damage that sanctions will do to Our relations
2 3 Thompson minute , 8 November 1935 t o Drummondls d e s p a t c h of 5 Novenber 1935, Ibid. , F.0- 371/19159/5 7493/1 /1 .
24 ~ansittart minute, 11 November 1935, Ibid.
25 Hoare minu te , 1 4 N o v e m b e r 1935, I b i d .
with en gland.'^^^ Drummond went on to Say that the Italian leader
also brought up the spectre of an ever threatening Germany and
the impact damaged Anglo-Italian relations would bring to the
European situation. uss soli ni, he said, was concerned
. . that this factor (Germany) increased his difficulties in understanding British policy- The Stresa front had been based on the comrnon recognition of a German danger, but now England had cracked the Stresa front through and through. He (the Duce) felt the necessity of opposing a check to German plans, but how was it possible to bring Italy into line with France and England in view of what was happening?27
It was therefore imperative for the British try to achieve
some form of détente with Italy. So much was now clearly at
stake - the future of Anglo-Italian relations, the Stresa front,
the League, Abyssinia, and European peace in general. Drummondls
reports were being lis tened to Vansittart acknowledged to
Drummond that, ",,.every effort should be made to restore Anglo-
1 talian relations their old But B r i t i s h
of a deténte was to no a~ail.~' The Duce was content in his
26 Drummond to Hoare, 12 November 1935, BDFA, series F, vol. 11, doc. 59, p . 102. In another despatch the week before, Drummond emphasized to Hoare that Mussolini "would like to see Anglo-Italian relations revert to n~rmal.,.~ and to this end Mussolini "wouid be ready to start conversation^,..^ Drummond to Hoare, 6 November 1935, DBFP, vol. XV, doc. 188, p. 229.
27 Drummond to Hoare, 12 November 1935, BDFA, series F, vol. 11, doc. 59, p . 102.
28 Hoare to Drummond, despatch from Vansittart, 10 November 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, doc. 206, p. 250.
29 During early November, attempts were made by the British to reach a Mediterranean détente. Drummond to Hoare, 5 November 1935, F.O. 371/19159/ J 7494/1/1. An order was issued that copies of this despatch (which also contained Drummondls summary of his audience with Mussolini), be circulated to the King, Cabinet, and Dominions. Also, Drummond to Hoare, 6 November 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, doc. 188, pp. 228-30 and Hoare to D m o n d ,
policies, and confident in their outcome as a result of
information gathered £rom the British ernbassy by his intelligence
service.
Serious breaches in security such as the opening O£ the
Ambassadorls safe (the contents of which had been photographed)
were occurring at the Rome embassy. Successful Italian
penetration of the embassy enabled Italians to gain access to
important information and provided Mussolini with valuable
intelligence material which he used to his advantage. Copies of
British diplomatic documents were earnestly studied by the Duce.
Thus, he was able to conclude, for example, £rom reading
Britain's Maffey Report, that the annexation of Abyssinia would
not seriously conflict with British interests in the regi~n.~'
Mussolini ' s access to British diplomatic documents31 was a major
factor in helping h i m pursue his expansionist policies.
The available evidence suggests that the Ainbassador did not
suspect at this time that ernbassy security had been cornpromised.
8 November 1935, Ibid,, nos. 197, 198, PP. 241-4-
'O The Maffey Report was drafted by a committee set up to examine whether British interests would be affected by the Italian amexation of Abyssinia, The committee consisted of members from the Colonial, ~orninions, Foreign, and War Offices as well as the Admiralty and Air Ministry. The Maffey Report, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, Appendix II, pp. 743-777. The cornmittee concluded in June 1935 that British interests in Abyssinia were almost non-existent. The main points of the report were published in Italy in February 1936. Baer, Test Case, p, 210.
3' Christopher Andrews, Secret Service: the Makins of the British Intellisence Comunity (London: Heinemann, 1985), pp- 403-5; Bendiner, Time for Ansels, p. 347; Colvin, None So Blind, p- 59; DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no. 539, note 6, p. 693; Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, pp. 156-7; and Mario Toscano, Desiqns in Diplomacv trans. George A. Carbone (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp, 412-14; Rotunda, "Rome Embas~y,~ p. 202, note 100; Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat, pp. 104 -5.
Drummond could not offer any explanation to London as to how the
Maffey Report was leaked.32 It would appear that the Foreign
Office was also unaware at this time of security problerns at the
Rome embassy. This was not exposed until after Rome was occupied
by Allied forces in 1944. It was then discovered that the
Italians apparently obtained information between 1935-1940 £rom a
Signor Constantini, a long tirne chancery servant at the British
embassy. When he was ernployed by the British legation to the
Holy See from 1940-1944, Constantini engaged in similar
activities and was dismissed in 1944 when he was exposed. The
British embassy and legation in Rome were not the only ones who
experienced security leaks. Other embassies and consulates had
also been successfully penetrated by the Italians?
Oblivious to these serious breaches in security at the Rome
embassy, the British continued to have confidence in their
Ambassadorrs abilities and allowed him to continue in his
sensitive role as a representative of and a reporter to his
governrnent. During the Abyssinian crisis, there was never any
evidence of mistrust show by successive Foreign Secretaries or
3 2 Drummond to Eden, 22 February 1936, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no. 539, note 6, p. 693.
33 Ibid., note 6, p. 693; Thompson, Front-Line Di~lomat, p. 104. The Italians reputedly had the best secret service in a l 1 Europe. They were able to penetrate every embassy in Rome (except the Soviet one), tapping into soae eighty codes and intercepting 16,000 messages a year. Baer, Test Case, p . 10.
Prime Ministers in Drummond's abilities as a negotiator or
advisor. 3 4
Absent, for example, were the surreptitious manoeuvres
practiced by Neville Chamberlain later in the decade. His
distrust of the Foreign Office, coupled with a strong belief in
his own abilities and judgrnent, led him to bypass the Rome
embassy in his approaches to Mussolini. Instead, Chamberlain
preferred to use other channels such as Lady Chamberlain, the
widow of his brother Austen, or the legal adviser to the Italian
embassy in London, Adrian Dingli as well as Sir Joseph Ball, the
head of the Conservative Party's Research Department who also
worked for MIS (the British Security Service) in the 1920~.'~ No
such dealings occurred duxing the Abyssinian crisis under Ramsay
MacDonald (despite his own persona1 antipathy towards Drummond)
or Stanley Baldwin, Both Prime Ministers and al1 three Foreign
3 .: For example, besides seeking their Ambassadorls advice, Simon and Hoare had allowed Drummond much discretion in his dealings with Mussolini. For Simon, see Simon to Drummond, 26 February 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 178, p. 170. For Hoare, see Hoare to Drummond, 23 September 1935, F.O. 371/19137/~ 5179/1/1 and 6 December 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no. 317, p. 401- Eden too, came to value Drummondls advice. See Foreign Office minute, 19 February 1936, F.O. 371/20190/J 1580/1000/1. Satisfaction with Drummondts conduct and abilities were not confined to these individuals. Vansittart sent Drummond a telegram in November wcongratulating and thanking" him on his "conduct of the con~ersation~~ held with Mussolini on 29 October. Vansittart ta Drummond, 1 November 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no. 170, p. 208- In terms of exhibiting confidence in Drummondls judgments, evidence of this among senior Foreign Office personnel can also be seen in September 1935, A memorandum by Orme Sargent discussing the League1s future, elicited a response from Drummond in the form of a rnemorandum. This rnemorandum in turn, triggered a series of minutes £rom senior members of the Foreign Office who al1 expressed interest in Drummondls comments. See memorandum by Sargent on the future of the League of Nations, 5 September 1935, F.0- 371/~ 8174/2304/98 and the series of minutes attached to the memorandum by D m o n d to Eden on the League1s future, 16 September 1935, F.O. 371/W 8582/2304/98. Vansittart was particularly anxious to get the former Secretary-Generalls views, saying, "by ail means, get Sir E. Dnimmondls full suggestions ..." Vansittart minute of 4 October 1935 to Drummondls memorandum of 16 September, Ibid-
3S Watt, uChamberlainls Amba~sadors,~ pp. 140, 145.
Secretaries - Simon, Hoare, and Eden, continually relied on
Drummond both as their prirnary source of information regarding
Mussolini and as their main negotiator and voice with the Duce?
In Britain, a general election was called in November.
Public opinion, so evident in the Peace Ballotls results,
continued to play a role in shaping the governmentts policy.
Victory in these elections was based to some extent on a platform
supporting the League and collective se~urity.'~ Baldwin
reiterated that the League of Nations would Vernain ... the keystone to British foreign policy....there will be no wavering
in the policy we have hitherto pursued ...u38
The British government was clearly worried about the impact
economic sanctions would bring to British interests, particularly
since their implementation began on 18 N~vember.'~ Sir Eric
Drummond had continually informed his superiors about the
implications involved in such a move - how war was the likely
scenario on the horizon. These warnings were reaching the
highest levels of government. In a meeting of the sub-cornmittee
of the Cornmittee of Imperia1 Defence on defence policy and
3 6 In a memorandum to the Cabinet entitled "The Italo-Ethiopian SituationIU Simon had among other things, acknowledged how Drummond exerted every effort at trying to convince the Italians of the dangers involved in their expansionist policies, Cabinet Memoranda, 11 May 1935, CA3 24/255.
37 The timing of the election was also due in part to other factors of an economic and political nature. For a detailed study, see Tom Stannage, Baldwin Thwarts the Opposition: the British General Election of 1935 (London: Cxoom Helm, 1980) .
38 As quoted in Charles Loch Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, 1918-1940 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 553.
39 League of Nations, The Monthly Summarv, vol. XV, no. 11, November 1935, p. 296.
requirements, the minutes of which Baldwin orderêd circulated to
the Cabinet, Drummondls concerns were reflected in a substantial
portion of the meeting. Mernbers O£ the sub-cornmittee included
senior members of the governrnent such as Baldwin, Ramsay
MacDonald, Eden, and Neville Chamberlain, the Service Chiefs,
Vansittart, and the Treasury Secretary, Sir Warren Fisher. They
despaired of the dangers facing Britain. Fears of Italian
attacks were particularly worrying. So obsessed had the sub-
cornmittee become on this particular issue, that Ramsay MacDonald
felt compelled to tell his colleagues not to dwell excessively on
such rnatters,
Drummondls warning on French ambivalence was also in
evidence at the meeting. A concerned Baldwin confessed how "he
had always felt that France would not corne in with us i£ real
trouble occurred," The First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Bolton
Eyres Monsell was in agreement, despairing how, "firstly there
was a strong possibility of an Italian aggression, and secondly
no possibility of French CO-operation in such an event." The
sub-cornmittee concluded that collaboration between the French and
British governments must be sought and secured4', echoing the
Foreign Office line that some concrete assurances of support
should be obtained from aval ,41
4 0 Record of the 14th Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Defence Policy and Requirements, held on 26 November 1935, F - O . 371/19165/J 8655/1/1.
41 "Memorandum by the Foreign Office, 27 November 1935," Cabinet Memoranda, CAB 24/257.
Meanwhile, within the League, a cornmittee was appointed to
Graft a sanctions programme while another one was cxeated to
promote conciliation between Italy and Abyssinia. The
incompatibility of these two functions was only fully realized
soon after the Hoare-Laval debacle of D e c e r n b e r 1 9 3 % ~ ~
Some of the main points of the Hoare-Laval pact were not
new. Shades of it had already emerged some months before within
the League, through proposals made by its Committee of Five-
Moreover, there had been some preliminary talks during the last
week of October between Peterson of the Foreign office and his
French counterpart, St. Quentin of the Quai d'Orsay to see how
far they could go with changing Abyssinia's b~undaries.'~ ~ h e
Peterson-St. Quentin talks continued into November amidst
Drummondts periodic warnings about ~ussolini~s adventure and the
danger this pcsed for Britain and E~rope.~'
These warnings were definitely taken seriously by the
Foreign Office. For example, in response to the W a r Office's
appreciation of the situation, Thompson, the Abyssinia expert at
the Foreign Office, was moved to comment:
4 2 Norton Medlicott, IlThe Hoare-Laval Pact Reconsidered," in Retreat £rom Power: Volume One, ed. ~avid Dilks, p. 130. The sanctions committee came to be known as the Committee of 18, while the conciliation committee was referred to as the Cornmittee of 13.
4 3 Clerk to Hoare, 24 and 26 October 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, nos, 139, 150, 151, pp. 166, 178-82; Peterson to Scrivener, 25 October 1935, Ibid., no, 147, pp, 173-5; Clerk to Hoare, enclosing message £rom Peterson, Ibid,., no. 254, pp. 314-16; au ri ce Peterson, Both Sides of the Curtain: an Autobiocrraphv (London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1950), pp, 115-16.
44 Drummond to Hoare, 9 and 23 November 1935, Ibid,, nos, 203, 245, pp. 249, 305-6.
There is another point - and to my m i n d one of g r e a t importance - which the general staff in referring to the attitude of Mussolini do not mention. It is that if fortune does not srnile upon him, if sanctions should be extended and prove really effective, the Duce, may quite well resort to some desperate act. It w i l l be remembered t h a t he has in fact s a i d as m u c h t o S i r E . Drummond, who reported as follows in his telegram of no, 671 of October 29th (here Thornpson quotes Drummondts despatch in which Mussolini threatens to wage war even if Europe went up in a blaze) . . . , when read in conjunction with the reports we are receiving of Italian preparations in the Dodecanese, the 1200% increase achieved in the production of military aircraf t etc. etc. this t h r e a t is perhaps not without ~ignificance.~~
Drummond also provided some incentive back in October for
the Peterson-St. Quentin talks to continue into November. The
Ambassador had detected a change in Italian attitudes which
seemed to point towards some sort of possible settlement. During
his 29 October audience with Mussolini, Drummond made the
observation that sorne sort of accommodation with the Duce might
be possible, perhaps at Abyssiniats expense. The Ambassador had
reported that,
.,.certain inconsistencies exist between Mussolini's strong belief that war is inevitable and his statement that if he can reach a general agreement with us Europe will breathe more f reely. 46
as Thompson minute to War Office memorandum on the Italo-Abyssinian situation, 19 November 1935, F.O. 371/19163/5 8294/1/1. 1tal ics added for emphasis ,
46 Drru~ll~c~ond to Hoare, 30 October 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, doc. 161, p. 198. In another report sent the same day, Drummond told London that Mussolini appeared amenable to possible modifications in his position towards Abyssinia as long as Italy retained currently occupied territories. Ibid., note 14,
Furthemore, Drummond also made a similar observation
towards the end of November. 47 But just how amenable Mussolini
would be to any new proposals was anybodyrs guess-
Since Drummond had direct access to uss soli ni, it was he who
was able to gauge the Duce's receptiveness to any proposals the
French and British might corne up with to resolve the crisis. On
6 November, for example, Drummond warned his goverment yet again
that Mussolini was adamant that full economic sanctions meant war
with Britain, However, Drurnmond could also detect some room for
diplomatic rnanoeuvring, reporting that
Signor Mussolini was today in far better spirits; he looked healthy and appeared more hopeful. He clearly desires an improvement in Anglo- Italian relations but one of a lasting and not transitory character . He envisaged n e g o t i a t i o n s of s e v e r a l weeks ' l e n g t h ; b u t if c e r t a i n genera l principles were agreed I b e l i e v e he m i g h t r'avour early and c o n c r e t e a c t i o n on b o t h si de^.^'
To this, Vansittart sent his congratulations to Drummond on his
conduct with the Duce.49 The Ambassadorts reports were making
their msrk on the Foreign Of£ice and helped to keep the Peterson-
St. Quentin talks afloat.
Reports such as these £rom Drummond, coupled with worries of
attacks on British interests bot to mention the fate of the
League and European peace), prompted the British goverment to
4 7 Drummond to Hoare, 23 November 1335, Ibid-, no. 244, p. 304; Clerk to Hoare, enclosing message from Peterson, 25 November 1935, Ibid-, no. 254, pp. 314-15,
48 Drummond to Hoare, 6 November 1935, Ibid., no. 189, p. 232. Italics added for emphasis.
" Hoare to Drummond, enclosing message from Vansittart, 8 November 1935, Ibid-, no. 197, p, 201.
seek an agreement with the Italians as quickly as possible.
Though Article 16 had been invoked by the League, Whitehall knew
this might not deter Mussolini £rom pursuing his goal of a
subjugated Abyssinia. Reports £rom Rome drove this point home.
The former Secretary-General made his concerns on this issue
known. Drummond told the Foreign Office that in his nind,
"Article 16 with its automatic sanctions ...p laces an intolerable
burden on the (League) members - a burden which they assuredly
cannot fully carry out.lrS0 It was increasingly obvious that if
an agreement was not reached, serious consequences were in store.
Vansittart knew this and just the day before Drummond sent this
message, adniitted that, "1 am al1 for grasping nettle~..."~~
Two weeks later Sir Eric Drummond sent two important
despatches which would have a significant impact on the execution
of British foreign policy. It is worth quoting sornewhat
extensively £rom them for they reveal much about the state of
anxiety which was prevalent in ~ritish circles. If shades of the
Hoare-Laval plan could already be detected at this stage, then
Drummondts two despatches of 26 and 28 November provided a major
irnpetus for the British to seek, along with their French
colleagues, some sort of compromise solution involving major
territorial concessions by the Abyssinians to the Italians. The
first despatch of 26 November reports on embassy conversations
5 O Drummond to Mounsey, II November 1935, F.O. 371/19688/~ 9917/2304/98.
Hoare to Drummond, telegram £rom ~ansittart, 10 November 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no, 206, p. 252,
with the Soviet Ambassador and the Marquis Theodoli. The Soviet
Ambassador recounted his conversation with Baron Aloisi (the
Italian representative to the League) who warned him that the
Italian people felt humiliated by sanctions. Furthemore, should
oil be added to the list, the consequences would be catastrophic.
The same theme was echoed by Theodoli. He added an equally
ominous warning, Theodoli disclosed how the whole Fascist Grand
Council, including those considered moderate, had preferred
desperate action to being strangled, and that "the extremists
would have their way." Therefore, I1unless there was a real
advance towards a settlement" by the next scheduled meeting of
the Fascist Grand Council on 18 December, warned Theodoli, then
Britain was headed for war. Even though Mussolini knew that
Italy could not annihilate British naval power, serious damage
would nevertheless be inflicted before I ta ly was brought to her
knees. The warnings were so serious and so full of invective
that Drummond was cautious enough to confirn them from other
reliable sources before passing on the information to London.
Sir Eric Drummond added his own views and analysis to the
above observations. He told London that the Italians had
instituted a large number of counter measures in order to deal
with sanctions. He also elaborated on the
... degree of unanimity in this country behind the resistance to sanctions .... Indeed, the propaganda machine is so successful here that, in their present frarne of mind the Italian people could, 1 believe, be worked up to (commit) ..-.almost any act of folly.
The Ambassador then advised his colleagues at Whitehall yet
again, to seek an Anglo - French unders tanding right away because,
... there is the fact, .... of the belief held widely in this country, that should Italy attack England the latter could not rely upon the French to support her in the rnilitary sphere.
If concrete French quarantees were not forthcoming Drummond
warned, then "we must treat seriously the threat of an attack
upon Our naval forces and bases iri, the Mediterranean." For,
... in the absence of a clear understanding by Italy that France's co-operation is assured, we cannot, exclude the possibility of some suicidal gesture on the part of the ~talian nation, and this irrespective of the question of an oil embargo. For it would, of course, be suicidal and this may even be realised by Signor Mussolini and his advisers themselves. It rnay be difficult for rational minds in London to admit the possi- bility of an act so foolhardy. But the rnentality of Italians to-day is irrational. They do not reason as we do and it would therefore be a mistake to attempt to estimate the future actions of Italy by our own yard-measure O£ sober judgment. It would equally be a mistake, in the circumstances 1 have postulated, to base the policy of His Majestyt s Government upon the assumption that such a suicidal act can be de£ ini tely excluded. 52
Drummond's despatch made a significant impact on his
government, The message in it was again deemed to be serious
enough to have copies of it circulated to the King, Cabinet, and
Dominions. To follow up on the despatch, steps were taken to get
the French government to explain to the Italians that an attack
on British interests by Italy would translate into war with al1
League menbers, including France,
--
'' Dnimmond to Hoare, 26 November 1935, F.O. 371/19165/J 8568/1/1.
89
Despite heeding Drumrnondls cal1 to try and get the French to
commit themselves, the British were realistic enough to know that
solid French quarantees might still be difficult to obtain.
Evidence of this is seen in the minutes composed by senior
members of the Foreign Office in response to Drummondgs despatch.
Geoffrey Thompson noted that
...the state of French public opinion should not be lef t out of account (for) - . . - it would be a brave goverment that attempted to dragoon the French people into an unpopular war in the waging of which al1 too many would regard themselves as British cannon-fodder.
After carefully studying Drummondls report, there was now no
doubt, continued Thompson, that "if anything should happen, the
znsuing struggle will be more Anglo-Italian than Italo-Leag~e.~~~~
A plan had to be devised very soon if al1 out war was to be
averted. Something in Drummondgs despatch of 26 November had
caught the attention of the Foreign Office.
In recounting Theodolirs tirade to London, Drummond revealed
that the Italians appeared to be awaiting some sort of
settlement- Theodoli also insisted that the proposed amount of
territory io be ceded to Italy as a result of the Peterson-St.
Quentin talks "was totally insufficient to satisfy Italian
w a n t ~ . ~ ~ ~ Drummond followed up his despatch with another one
three days later. In it he reported some hopeful signs £rom
sources such as Fulvio Suvich and Baron Aloisi that the Italians
53 Thompson minute, undated, on Drummond8s despatch of 26 November 1935, Ibid. Underline in the original.
5C Drurnmond to Hoare, 26 November 1935, Ibid.
were now I1very anxious for a moderate settlement of (the)
Abys sinian question. llS5 Furthermore, the Italian government
would be today ready to acceptn proposals involving Abyssinian
territorial concessions. The Italians thought that the French
were considering western boundary rectifications of longitude 40°
(or Abyssinia ' s Ogaden region) . Drumrnond then reported that
Suvich asked whether the western boundary could not be extended
further to longitude 37*. '= The Foreign Office decided to act on
these observations by Drummond. Thompson proposed that
* . A t follows that we rnay have to recornrnend to the League - lest worse befall - the basis of a settlement which, while not giving Italy nearly al1 she sought, may yet be more favourable than anything she could have secured purely by negotiation. While unfriendly critics rnight suggest that the exchange of Tigre as partial payment for an Ethiopian outlet to the sea would necessarily involve some compromising with the spirit of the Covenant, a slight sacrifice of principle would be a small price to pay to preclude al1 possibility of the Ethiopian war spreading to the Mediterranean - and perhaps beyond?
After studying Drummond's report and the minutes to it
composed by senior Foreign Office personnel, Sir Robert
Vansittart gave his assent- Having failed to obtain what
55 Drummond to Foreign Office, 29 November 1935, F .O . 371/19165/ J 8614/1/1.
56 Ibid.
57 Thompson minute, undated, on Dnimmondvs despatch of 29 November 1935, Ibid.
Drummond had always advocated, namely the ever elusive French
guaranteesS8, the PUS concluded that
1 m u t agree with Mr, Thompson- And 1 also agree with Sir E r i c Drummond and his advisers that the risk is a real one. . .an Italian attack on us cannot be excluded i n S i r E , Drummondts opinion as in mine, if sanctions go on any way, even without the addition of 0i1.'~
Vansittartls opinions were dated 2 Decernber, Sir Samuel
Hoare concurred with his PUSfs opinions the next day, just £ive
days before negotiations opened in Paris on what came to be known
as the Hoare-Laval plan.
The Hoare-Laval plan was an echo of a compromise solution
involving exchanges of territory approved by the League in
September and accepted by Abyssinia s emperor, Haile ~elassie. 60
The plan involved territorial changes in which Abyssinia was to
cede to Italy occupied territory in Tigre; as we17 as a large
zone in the south and southwest where Italy would have a monopoly
on econornic development; plus a frontier rectification in the
58 Vansittart began his minute to Drummondls despatch with negative news on this front. The Foreign Office had just been told " tha t al1 the French really contemplate doinq is to defend themselves if thev are attacked. That of course is no earthly use to us," exclaimed an exasperated Vansittart. Vansittart minute, 2 December 1935, Ibid., underline in the original.
59 Ibid, Italics added for emphasis.
60 Goldman, "Sir Robert Vansittart,I1 p. 121; Hardie, Abyssinian Crisis, p. 168. The difficulty of having to chose between partitioning Abyssinia arrd an "honourable and peaceful settlement of the dispute" was evident to the Cabinet at least as early as August 1935. "The Italo-Ethiopian Dispute: Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Cabinet," Cabinet Memoranda, 16 August 1935, CAB 24/256.
eastern and southeastern parts. In exchange for this, Abyssinia
was to receive an outlet to the ses?
The desire to get Abyssinia to agree to Italian demands was
not a concept new to the British. It had certainly been an
approach advocated by Drummond since February and March and one
which was personally presented by Drummond to the Cabinet in May-
Back in March, after concluding an interview with the Duce,
Drummond wrote to Vansittart, telling him how Mussolini was
"playing for high stakesu and that,
the best way we can help ... 1 believe Abyssinia and Europe, is to t ry to persuade the Emperor to accept the Italian demands as quickly as may be- I know it is most difficult and probably not fair to the nbyssinians, but there it is . 6 2
Drummond's views had supporters within the Foreign Office.
Geoffrey Thompson minuted that he personally agreed
--.entirely with Sir Eric Drummond's considered view that the Ernperor could be well advised to seek the best settlement be can as soon as he can ...Aby ssinia-...is doomed, for no other country, when it comes to the point, will risk the life of one soldier in defending it...63
In June, when Drummond advocated that Italy be placated at
Abyssinia's expense, he toLd London that
. . .it may be objected, (that) it is wholly impossible for His Majestyls Government (or the French Government) to give way to what will
6 1 I1Dispute between Italy and Abyssinia. Note by Sir Samuel Hoare for the Cabinet," 8 December 1935, CAB 24/257. The froniier rectifications were extended farther than what Drummond said the-Italians wanted- Instead of extending the western boundary to 37' longitude as Suvich had suggested, the Hoare-Laval plan extended the boundary to 35' longitude.
62 Drurmond to Vansittart, 1 March 1935, F.O. 371/19105/5 923/1/1.
63 Thornpson minute, 3 March 1935, Ibid.
be represented as blackmail pure and simple and to assist Italy, or at least to put no spokes in her wheel, in attempting to wrest by threat of force £rom a small, defenceless country rights which she could not obtain by free negotiation. Undoubtedly the idea is highly repugnant. There are however, some situations in which one is only offered a choice of two evils, one greater and one less.
"Quite true and this is such a case," wrote an equally realistic
Vansittart in the margin of this de~patch.~~ As it turned out,
by the end of the year, neither he nor Drummond deviated £rom
this view. The British Ambassadorts reports £rom Rome were
proving in£luential a year into the crisis.
By DecPmber, when Vansittart and Hoare devised an offer with
Laval that might appeal to Mussolini, these types of sentiments
had clearly made their mark and pervaded British thinking. To
exacerbate matters, the British again became increasingly alarmeci
that Mussolini might launch attacks on their Mediterranean
inter est^.^^ As has been shown, even in early December, concerns
about Italian 'mad-dog' attacks did not abate, owing to
Drummond's continuous warnings. During the Hoare-Laval talks in
Paris, the British Foreign Secretary made it a point to get
6 4 Drummond to Simon, 1 June 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 256, p . 297. Marginal comment by Vansittart, Ibid-, note 6-
This was certainly the conclusion arrived at by the pro-League paper, The New Statesrnan & Nation, 11 January 1936, p , 36, These fears were originating from Rome. On 13 December, for instance, Drummond related a story circulating in Rome that the Italian government "had 300 men who had taken solemn oaths to sacrifice themselves in case of necessity. They intended to make a surprise attack on the British fleet; they realised that many of these (Italian) aeroplanes would be destroyed, but they also expected to destroy half the British Mediterranean fleet." Drummond to Hoare, 13 December 1935, F.O. 371/19165/~ 9532/1/1,
French support in the event of such a scenario happening?
Because such f ears were acutely felt by the British, senior
officiais like Vansittart and Hoare £avoured a plan such as the
Hoare-Laval one, as a last desperate attempt at appeasing
~ussoiini so that the Italians would remain aligned with the
British and French against Hitler.67 Nevertheless, when details
of the plan were leaked6*, the public and political outcry was so
great that it prompted the Cabinet to disavow the plan.69 The
Hoare-Laval plan was perceived by the public to have been devised
secretly, to the detriment of Abyssinia, especially after Hoare
had announced the month before that "nothing is further £rom our
66 Hoare reported t o t h e Cabinet t h a t , " 1 thought i t b e s t . . . t o r a i s e with him (Laval) a t once the main i s sue of French m i l i t a r y support i n the event of an I t a l i a n 'mad-dogf a c t . " "Dispute between I t a l y and Abyssinia. Note by S i r Samuel Hoare for the Cabinet," Cabinet Memoranda, 8 December 1935, CAB 24/257; See a l s o Dominions Secretary t o Secretary of S t a t e f o r External Affa i r s , 10 December 1935, DCER, vol. 5 , doc. 472, p - 424. Laval responded by agreeing t o m i l i t a r y t a l k s between the two count r ies . "Note by S i r Samuel Hoare on h i s Conversation i n Par i s , " 8 December 1935, DBFP, 2nd s e r i e s , vol . XV, no. 337, p. 428.
67 Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat, p, 109; Cross, S i r Sâmuel Hoare, pp. 256-8.
According t o Thompson, who was i n Pa r i s at the t i m e and pr ivy t o the negot ia t ions, the source of t he leaks was t h e French (Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat, p. 1 1 0 ) . The U.S. Ambassador t o France a l s o r epor t ed t h a t t he source of t he leaks was t h e French. U.S. Ambassador t o France t o Secretary of S t a t e , 29Janua ry1936 , FRUS, vol. III, doc. 2499, pp. 101-2, Peterson, ~ o t h Sides, p . 120-
69 L e t t e r from M r . Low to Sargent, 12 and 16 December 1935, DBFP, 2nd s e r i e s , vo l , XV, nos. 365 and 386, pp. 467-8, 496-8; Waley, B r i t i s h Public Opinion, pp. 68-9. See a l s o The Times, 16 December 1935, p. 8; Ib id . , 17 D e c e m b e r 1935, pp. 14, 18; Ibid-, 18 December 1935, p. 13; Headwav, vo l . XVIII, no. 1, January 1936, pp. 4-5, 7, 10, 11; The New Statesman & Nation, 14 December 1935, pp- 924-5; Ib id . , 2 1 December 1935, pp. 968-9; I b i d - , 2 8 December 1935, pp, 1004-5 denouncing the Hoare-Laval plan. Geoffrey Dawson of The Times had dekided i t i n an e d i t o r i a l infamously e n t i t l e d a s a "corr idor f o r Camels-" The T i m e s , 16 December 1935, p. 15.
minds than to make and conclude an agreement behind the back of
the League . 70 Mussolini, who at first favoured the plan, eventually
rejected it after the press leaks and hostile public reaction to
itO7' The outcry £rom the British public was so great that it
prompted the Cabinet not only to disavow the plan but to
repudiate Hoare as well, Hoare resigned and was replaced as
Foreign Secretary by Anthony Eden. Pierre Etienne Flacdin
succeeded Laval (also a casualty of the plan) as Eden's French
equivalent in Janua-rv 1936, With the arriva1 of the new year,
efforts at settling the dispute once and for al1 were
intensified, particularly after events in the spring would prove
that the German problem was looming even more ominously in the
horizon,
7 0 League of Nations, Monthlv Summarv, vol. XV, no. 11, November 1 9 3 5 , p. 209. It would appear that the British believed that the Hoare-Laval talks were not deliberate acts of deception, made behind the backs of the League and Abyssinia. This belief was based on a decision made by the Leaguels Coordination committee on 2 November. This committee had apparently approved and encouraged the League to entrust to Britain and France, the mission of seeking a solution acceptable to al1 three parties. The Hoare-Laval negotiations, it was thought, were in keeping with this spirit. Note by Thompson for Hoare, 2 December 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no. 291, pp. 366-7; Edmond to Vansittart, 3 November 1935, Ibid., 110. 178, pp. 218-19. Peterson, Both Sides, p. 116.
71 Rotunda, "Rome Embassy," pp. 293-4.
Chapter S i x : T h e end of the crisis (January-July 1936)
Efforts to end h o s t i l i t i e s and discussions on the lifting of sanctions
The early months of 1936 were marked by continued
discussions of an oil embargo on Italy. Recent reports from Rome
of possible Italian attacks on British interests contributed to
London's lukewarm pursuit of a policy entailing the inclusion of
oil to the list of sanctions,'
Two principles guided British policies wnen it came to
deciding whether or not to go ahead and advocate the addition of
oil to the list of sanctions. The first was the extent to whlch
oil sanctions could become effective. On this, Drummond was
clearly giving his government details on Italy's ability and
determination to survive the imposition of sanction^.^ The
' I n February 1936, Drummond repor t ed t h a t I t a l i a n press c r i t i c i s m s of B r i t a i n ll., -has of late become even h ighe r i n temperature." Drummond t o Eden, 13 February 1936, BDFA, s e r i e s F I vol . 1 2 , doc. 9 , p. 13. Drummond had a l so wamed the Foreign Office i n Decernber about the consequences i f an o i l embargo ma te r i a l i zed (Drummond t o Hoare, 6 December 1935 , DBFP, 2nd s e r i e s , vo l XV, no. 316, p - 4 0 0 ) . H i s r epor t t h a t I t a l y would go t o war i f o i l sanct ions were imposed provoked Vans i t t a r t t o t e l l Hoare t h a t I1this (Drummond's despatch) confirms m e f u l l y i n what 1 have f e l t and t r i e d t o express f o r some time pas t , t h a t i t would be su ic ida1 f o r us t o proceed with the o i l embargo u n t i l and unless w e have corne t o a f u l l and concre te arrangement not only wi th the French b u t wi th o the r Powers r n i l i t a r i l y concerned." Vans i t t a r t minute f o r Hoare, 6 December 1935, I b i d - , no. 323 , p . 406-
I n December, Drummond admitted t o London t h a t there were d i f f i c u l t i e s i n obta in ing information on I t a l y l s c a p a c i t y t o face an o i l embargo. He d id emphasize however, t h a t suppl ies could s t i l l be obtained £rom B r a z i l and other non-sanct ionis t s t a t e s . H e a l so s t a t e d t h a t , "... other mernbers of my s t a f f have repor ted t o m e conversations with t h e i r I t a l i a n f r iends suggest ing tha t the coun t ry ' s v i s i b l e and assured s u p p l i e s are adequate f o r a l 1 reasonable requirements, and t h i s was the impression 1 myself received by Signor Mussol ini ' s behaviour i n the course of my conversation with him on the 7th." Drummond t o Hoare, 11 December 1935, BDFA, s e r i e s F I vol . 11, doc. 62 , p - 109. See a l s o Drummond t o Eden, DBFP, 2nd series, vol . XV, no. 328, pp. 413-14. Drummond followed t h i s up by saying, "making al1 due allowance f o r na tu ra l I t a l i a n d e s i r e a t t h i s moment to d iscount t h e e f f e c t of an o i l embargo, 1 myself th ink t h a t provided always t h a t means of payment can be found, I t a l y be l i eves t h a t she w i l l have l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y i n f inding the o i l she needs a t l e a s t f o r t h e next 6 months, perhaps even f o r the whole ensuing year ."
second principle guiding British policy makers was the extent to
which League members could be counted upon in their rnilitary
support should Italy attack a member for participating in
economic sanction^.^ On this, Drummond had again, been
consistent in his warnings to London that obtaining whole-hearted
French support was necessary for sanctions to work.
Drummondls cautious views on sanckions had stemmed in large
part from his days as League Secretary-General. He held the
opinion that sanctions were a show of meagre strength by a League
constrained in its abilities to utilize them ef f ectively,"
Drummondts opinions on these matters counted in the Foreign
Office and were valued by many.5
When Eden asked Drummond in confidence about the probable
effects of a League resolution to impose an oil embargo on
1taly6, Sir Eric responded that
... neither imposition of oil embargo nor resolution affirming readiness to impose it will affect Italian determination to continue war. Fresh attacks on sanctionist countries would follow which would be used to whip up interna1 morale .... Italian opinion will continue to follow Mussolini blindl~.~
Drummond tc Eden, 10 December 1935, Ibid., no. 345, p. 4 4 2 -
' "Dispute between Italy znd Abyssinia, note by Sir Anthony Eden," Cabinet Memoranda, 9 January 1936, CAB 24/259,
Rotunda, "Rome Embassy," pp. 62-3, 285.
Ibid,,
Eden to Drummond, 19 February 1936, F.O. 371/20190/3 1580/1000/1.
Drummond to Foreign Office, 21 February 1936, F.O. 371/20190/ J l63S6/lOOO/l.
The Cabinet took notice and in their meeting of 26 February,
adopted a policy in keeping with what Drummond had said. It was
decided that the Foreign Secretary would avoid taking the lead in
seeking to impose an oil embargo at the meeting of the Leaguets
Cornmittee of Eighteenm8 British policy continued on its cautious
path. The British government had to tread carefully during the
crisis because an adventurous foreign policy could not be pursued
until its rearmament programme was ~ornpleted.~ A rearmament
programme was essential to counter the increasing menace posed by
Germany's aggressive actions, One such action, the
remilitarization O£ the Elhineland, was a blatant violation of the
Versailles Treaty.
The German remilitarization of the Rhineland in March played
a dominant role in European affairs. This event intensified the
British governrnent's conviction that relations with Italy must
not be strained any further. It was more vital than ever to have
Italy as a counterweight against Germany," especially since
reports £rom Rome had shown that the Fascist regime was still
a Great Britain, Cabinet Office, Records of the Cabinet Meetinss, 26 February 1936, CAB 23/83. Henceforth, Cabinet Minutes. In early March the subject was broached in a meeting between Eden and Flandin, but the oil embargo never materialized. Edmond to Foreign Office, 3 March 1936, DBE'P, 2nd series, vol. XVI, no. 6, p. 15.
DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XVI, p. vii. - Golàman, "Sir Robert Vansittart," p . 127; In November 1935 grave
warnings had been sent by the British Ambassador to Germany, Sir Eric Phipps, about what was in store, saying that "the present Ethiopian imbroglio is mere child's play compared with the German problem that will, in some not very distant future, confrcnt His Majestyls G~vernment.~ Eden quoted this to the Cabinet, noting that dilemma is acute . " Eden memorandum, "Germany, " Cabinet Memorandum, 3 February 1936, CAB 24/260.
firmly entrenched in power.ll The main objective of the British
governmentls policy was now clearly to avoid any chance of
risking a war with Germany while being comrnitted militarily in
the Mediterranean.I2 One way of achieving this desired harmony
with Italy might be through the elirnination of sanctions.
Because of this, Drummond's reports concerning the effectiveness
of sanctions were closely studied by the British government. In
April, he told his superiors that Italy was still coping with the
hardships brought on by sanctions:
...the economic situation of the country, though in many ways deplorable, shows no sign as yet of breaking up under the pressure of sanctions. Measures imposed internally to counter the effect of sanctions have on the whole been effective, and the gaps in the League scheme filled by the non-sanctionist Powers have been made very full use of. Italians as a whole are now convinced that in the race between the efficacy of sanctions and the Italian amies in Abyssinia the latter cannot lose.13
It was increasingly clear to the British government that
sanctions were not bringing the desired effect upon Italy soon
enough. Furthemore, French support for the Italian position
11 Drummond to Eden, 13 February 1936, BDFA, series F, vol. 12, doc. 9, p. 13 and memorandum by R.L. Nosworthy, Commercial Counsellor at the Rome embassy, 11 Febmary 1936, Ibid., doc. 10, p - 14 . This remained the case in the end of June with the regime still holding on to power easily- See Drummond to Eden, 28 June 1936, Ibid., doc- 42, p. 64.
l2 "C.I.D. memorandum by the Chiefs-of-Staff Sub-Cornmittee," Cabinet Memoranda, 16 March 1936, CAB 24/261- The Royal Navy's forces in the Mediterranean at this time, consisted of 1 battleship, 2 battle cruisers, 2 8- inch cruisers, I 6-inch cruiser, 28 destroyers, 4 subrnarines, and 1 netlayer, Ibid.
l3 Drummond to Eden, 10 April 1936, BDFA, series F, vol. 12, doc. 25, p. 34. Added to this was a nation united in its determination to w i n . As Drummond reported, Is,..the chests of the ~talian people are puffed out as they have not been in the last eighteen months-l1 Ibid., p. 33.
appeared to strengthen, especially after the Rhineland crisis-l4
The European situation was deteriorating to such an extent that
it became absolutely essential to bring the on-going Abyssinian
crisis to an end, especially after Abyssinia's capitulation on 3
May 1936.
Though the European powers £ailed to prevent the end of
Abyssinia's independence, relations with Italy might still be
salvageable. Something had to be done and done quickly if Anglo-
Italian relations were to be revived in order to combat an
increasingly menacing Germany. The opportune moment appeared to
present itself after Abyssinials capitulation in May, The Duce
had not only fulfilled his promise of avenging Adowa, but had in
the process, also created an empire in East Africa by proclaiming
the Italian king, Victor Emmanuel III, Emperor of Abyssinia.
With the Italian annexation of Abyssinia now a fait accompli, it
became increasingly urgent to rebuild Anglo-Italian relations.
Sir Eric Drummond gave his views about the future state of
Anglo-Italian relations to Eden in a despatch on 9 May.
At the bes t, the reconstruction of Anglo - 1 ta1 ian friendship rnust take a considerable time, and 1 realise that there may be as many difficulties in England as there are here. So far as Italy is concerned, a very great deal must depend upon events of the next few weeks, or even of the next few days. A genuine détente would develop quickly, though not perhaps at once, if His Majesty's Govexnment were now to decide upon recognising the ltaccomplished
13 Baron Aloisi bluntly told Flandin that France could expect nothing from Italy unless Paris gave Rome its support in the Abyssinian affair. Flandin answered that as long as he was minister, there would be no sanctions against Italy. Gilbert (U.S. Consul at Geneva) to Secretary of State, 11 April 1936, FRUS, vol. III, doc. 114, p. 119.
facttl that will be proclaimed this evening (i. e. the proclamation of an Italian empire in East A f r i c a ) . A r e l u c t a n c e to do s o , o r a d e c i s i o n by the League t o p e r s i s t w i t h s a n c t i o n s , or t o u s e them a s a means of a t t e m p t i n g a n y t h i n g that would be regarded here a s a compromise s o l u t i o n , would c e r t a i n l y l e a d t o a strong recrudescence o f a n t i - British f e e l i n g , and possibly t o m o r e s e r i o u s consequences . I n any event, it would long delay the revival of those friendly sentiments which are necessary to useful c~llaboration.'~
It became increasingly evident to the British government
that the lifting of sanctions by the League might have to be
seriously contemplated in order to help normalize Anglo-Italian
relations.16 The Ambassadorls observations £rom Rome regarding
Italyls ability to cope with the difficulties caused by sanctions
made their impact on the Foreign Office. This i s evident in a
memorandum issued by them in early June analyzing the probable
effects on Italy if sanctions were maintained. Italy would
eventually face increasing difficulties if sanctions were
maintained. Yet, the Foreign Office noted that
.. .during the summer and autumn of last year Italy was laying in heavy stocks of metallic and textile raw rnaterials; the exhaustion of these stocks could hardly corne to be f elt, Sir E. Drummond considers, before June or July of this year at the earliest."
15 Drummond to Eden, 9 May 1936, BDFA, series F I vol. 12, doc. 30, p. 41- Italics added for emphasis. Drummond also passed on the observation of one of his consuls who notice? that in southern Italy "... there have been hints that the way is open to a rapprochement between Italy and Great Britain .... (and also how m a n y Italians) wouid welcome a resumption of friendly relations (between the two countries)." G.A. Fisher to Dnunmond, 2 June 1936, Ibid., doc. 39, p. 55 .
L6 The idea of conciliation over sanctions was discussed in Cabinet in April. Cabinet Minutes, 5 April 1936, CAB 23/83.
" Foreign Office: ltMernorandum on Probable Effects of Existing Sanctions on Italy if maintained after June 15 next," 3 June 1936, BDFA, series F I vol. 12, doc. 37, p. 52.
Taking into account Drummondls ctssessments, the Foreign Office
concluded among other things, that, if existing sanctions were
maintained, Italy's situation would not become substantially
worse until at the very least, near the end of the year?
Moreover, Drummond continued to notify London of
unmistakable signs that Italy might be receptive to improving her
relations with Britain. He told Eden on 12 June of "a welcome
modification in the attitude of the Italian press towards Great
Bri tain. l9 He reported at length on the views of newspapers,
both sympathetic and unsympathetic to the Fascist cause. Sir
Eric repeated the message of the value in renewed Anglo-Italian
relations, paraphrasing one writer by saying:
It was surely to the interest of both countries not only that there should be a détente, but that when the moral question of sanctions had been removed the two nations should corne to a positive agreement and not merely a negative accord, so as to collaborate in facing the numerous problems facing Europe. This meant a change, indeed, a reversal, of Great Britainls present policy . 20
la Ibid., p. 55 . More evidence of the Foreign Office's faith in Drummondls reports can also be seen in another aspect of the crisis, namely the ever-present British concerns over Italian 'mad doge attacks- In May, Vansittart replied to Chatfield's request about alleviating the Mediterranean fleet which had been on a state of alert for sometime, Vansittart replied that it was out of the question at this stage because, as he pointed out, in Drummond's view, Mussolini could still unleash such an attack. Vansittart to Chatfield, Il May 1936, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. X V I , no. 317, and note 1, pp. 421-2.
l9 Drummond to Eden, 12 June 1936, BDFA, series F, vol. 12, doc. 40, p. 59. According to Drummond, there were signs in March as well that Mussolini was amenable to reconstructing the Stresa front provided the British cease in their support of sanctions, Drummond to Eden, 28 March 1936, DBFP, 2nd sexies, vol. XVI, no. 176, p. 237.
20 Drummond to Eden, 12 June 1936, BDFA, series F I vol. 12, doc. 40, p. 59.
The Cabinet debated the issue of sanctions in May and June
and decided that Britainls main objective was "... to prevent the European dictators £rom coming t~gether."~~ London took notice
of Drummondls assessrnent regarding the impact of sanctions on
Italy. In his despatch of 30 May, Drummond agreed with his
Consul's view regarding Italy and sanctions, saying that:
... 1 share M r . Leach's view when he remarks, with reference to the Italian capacity to withstand the strain of sanctions, that her future resistance Iseems to be conditioned by the willingness of the Italian people to face a falling standard of living, which, in turn, is dependent on the political factor of the internal regime.' My view ( L e . , Drummondfs) is t h a t the internal prestige cou ld w i t h s t a n d a very c o n s i d e r a b l e f u r t h e r d e p r e s s i o n i n the e x i s t i n g s tandard o f l i v i n g , 2 2
More significantly, Sir Eric informed his superiors that it
would take another eight months to a year before sanctions became
truly effective in I t a l ~ . ~ ~ This was too long, for Britain could
il1 afford to wait that length of time to pressure Mussolini.
The Cabinet decided that, l1 the time factor was vital in
Europe ... there was no time to loseM2"if prevented £rom drifting i n to the German
Italy was to be
sphere of influence. It
21 Cabinet Minutes, 27 May 1936, CAB 23/84.
22 D m o n d t o Eden, 30 May 1936, BDFA, series F, vol. 12, doc- 35, p. 4 7 . I t a l i c s added f o r emphasis.
23 Cabinet Minutes, 27 May 1936, CAB 39(36) . Drummond a l s o n o t i f i e d Eden t h a t there had been an in tens i ty within I t a l y i n the l a s t months t o achieve economic autarky through the production of t h e i r own food, i n d u s t r i a l raw mater ia ls and t h e i r subs t i tu t e s as well as ireducinq imports of coa l and petroleurn products. Drummond t o Eden, 16 May 1936, BDFA, s e r i e s F I vol , 12, doc. 32, p. 4 3
24 Cabinet Minutes, 29 May 1936, CAB 23/84.
104
was also noted by the Cabinet that Drummond was in favour of
lifting sanctions* It was not an unexpected view since the
Ambassador saw firsthand the kind of impact they were having not
only on Italy but also on the European scene in general-
Within the Foreign Office meanwhile, divergent views had
emerged among those who could be termed the 'pro-sanctionistsl
and those who were the anti-sanctionists or the lrealists.l The
lrealistsl were influenced by Drummondls views on the sanctions
debate. Moreover, since many of the 'realists' were composed of
senior Foreign Office personnel such as Sir Robert Vansittart,
their views prevailed in the end.25 Drummondls assessment thus
carried weight within the Foreign Office which, in turn, found
its way to the Cabinet, This can be seen in the special Cabinet
meeting of 29 May. Here, many members were in agreement with the
views Drummond had been expressing and which had been supported
by Vansittart and Eden.
At this meeting, Eden argued the Foreign Office view (based
in large part on Drummondls observations) that "sanctions would
produce some effect but not decisive results for some time.H26
The Cabinet was persuaded and agreed with the views expressed by
Drummond through Eden, The Cabinet was unanimous in the desire
to remove sanctions since it now appeared that keeping them in
place would only have the effect of antagonizing Mussolini
2 5 Rotunda, "Rome E3nbassy," pp, 300, 306-7.
26 Cabinet Minutes, 29 May 1936, CAB 2 3 / 8 4 .
105
further in the near future.27 This was followed by Neville
Chamberlain's public speech (he was then a prominent Cabinet
member by virtue of his position as Chancellor of the Exchequer)
on 10 June in which he called the maintenance of sanctions the
Wery midsummer of madness . " 2 8
On 11 June, Eden gave the Cabinet his mernorandum on
sanctions. In it, Eden States that continuing sanctions "will
not exercise, Save as a slowly debilitating irritant, any great
political influence on ~talian p01icy.l~'~ Should sanctions be
maintained continued Eden, then "...the likelihood must be faced
that Mussolini would go to war with this country. On this point,
H i s Majestyts Ambassador at Rome has warned us.u30 Eden then
concluded that "His Majestyts Government should recomrnend the
raising of sanctions, this being the course which in existing
circumstances 1 favour.~~'
After studying the issue at hand and discussing the Eden
mernorandum, the Cabinet decided to recommend the lifting of
sanctions on 17 June 1 9 3 6 ~ ~ , realizing that the maintenance of
*' Ibid.
2a Drummond t o Eden , 1 2 June 1 9 3 6 , DBFP, 2 n d series, v o l . XVI, no . 3 6 2 , n o t e 1, p - 501.
29 "The I t a l o - E t h i o p i a n D i s p u t e , S a n c t i o n s M e r n o r a n d ~ m ~ ~ by Eden, 11 June 1 9 3 6 , C a b i n e t Memoranda, CAB 24/262.
30 I b i d .
31 Ibid.
'' C a b i n e t M i n u t e s , 1 7 J u n e 1 9 3 6 , CAB 23 /84 ; Memorandum by Eden o n the m a i n t e n a n c e o f s a n c t i o n s i n the Z t a l o - E t h i o p i a n d i s p u t e , 11 J u n e 1936 and the C a b i n e t d e c i s i o n of 17 J u n e 1936 , DBFP, 2 n d series, vol . XVI, n o . 360 , n o t e 7 , p. 491 .
European peace far outweighed the damage which such a decision
would bring upon the British governmentrs prestige and upon the
fate of the League itself. In a speech to the League Assembly on
2 July, Eden explained how, "the realities have to be
recognized .... that in existing conditions the continuation of sanctions at present in force can serve no useful purpose. n 3 3
Two days later, on 4 July 1936, the Assembly of the League of
Nations followed suit and recommended a discontinuation of the
sanctions imposed on Italy, marking an end to the Italo-
Abyssinian crisis. 3 4
33 The Times, 2 July 1936, p . 1 3 .
3J The League of The League of Nations
Nations, The Leasue from Y e a r to Year, 1936 (Geneva: Information Section, 1936), pp. 61-62.
Chap ter Seven : Concl usion
This thesis examines and analyzes the influence Sir Eric
Grummond had in helping his government formulate foreign policy
during the Italo-Abyssinian crisis of 1935-6. In so doing, it
provides a detailed study of the British Ambassadorls important
role during this critical period, which has been an aspect
frequently dismissed or overlooked in the existing historical
literature.
Since the source of the cxisis emanated £rom Rome with
Mussolini's plans and actions, it was essential for the British
government to try to acquire information and advice concerning
his thoughts and strategies. The information and advice received
by London £rom the British embassy in Rome was of great interest
to those responsible for shaping British foreign policy- Thus,
the role of Britaints Ambassador to Italy, Sir Eric Drummond, was
of significant importance to the British government, particularly
as the gravity of the situation increased in intensity.
Mussolini's Abyssinian adventure proved to have a profound
effect on many, £or the Italo-Abyssinian crisis was not merely a
dispute between the Italians and Abyssinians. It was a crisis
which eventually put the relationships of Britain, France, and
Italy to the test and also proved to be a disastrous blow to the
League of Nations, Moreover, the Abyssinian crisis also had a
significant impact on how foreign policy was conducted by
Britain. By the time the crisis had entered its nineth month in
September 1935, there was little doubt among the international
comrnunity about who was taking a leading role within the League
to resolve the situation. For various reasons Great Britain was
perceived to have taken on this task. Given this perception and,
to some degree, reality, decision makers in Whitehall were faced
with seemingly insurmountable dlfficulties throughout the crisis.
The British government was thus con£ ronted during this period
with complex challenges which, after careful assessment, dernanded
cautious policies and actions. It was a difficult position for
Britain to be in, requiring her to consider and balance many,
of ten incompatible, factors . Decisions made by the British
government in response to events unfolding needed to be taken
with great care. The role played by Drummond, during the crisis
was theref ore of great signif icance.
Sir Eric Drummond had been an active and supportive
Secretary-General of the League of Nations during i ts formative
years. His years at the League conditioned hin to seek
international coogeration among nations whenever possible. It
was a principle that he tried to apply when he was Ambassador to
Italy during the Italo-Abyssinian crisis. Consequently,
Drummondts response to the crisis rnust also be seen to stem in
part f rom his experiences at the League- As an organization
created with the hope of settling disputes among member states
through peaceful means, but constrained in its coercive
capabilities since its beginning by the political and military
absence of the United States, disputes settled by conciliation
wi thout resorting to economic and mili tary sanctions became
absolutely essential. This realistic view was reflected to some
extent in the advice Drummond gave to Whitehall during the
crisis, Since he was hesitant about the effectiveness of
sanctions and intent on maintaining good relations with I t a l y (in
order to prevent her drifting into the German sphere of
influence), Drummond advocated the pursuit of conciliatory
methods towards rtaly, Drummond did so because he was of the
opinion that settling disputes between allies was best achieved
through dialogue and conciliation. However, Drummond also gave
advice of this nature because he was fully cognizant of Britainls
predicament and of the limited room she had for diplornatic
manoeuvring . There was, however, more to this, Not only was a grasp of
the Leaguets coercive limitations along with an understanding of
his governrnent s position vis -à -v i s the League and Europe
necessary in any analysis of the crisis, Drummond as has been
seen, also factored in Fascist mentality (along with Mussolinils
volatile behaviour) when submitting his analyses to London. Al1
these views then, served to shape the kind of advice Drummond
gave as Amba~sador.~~
As the British Ambassador to Rome, Drummond proved himself
to be an active and conscientious transmitter of his governmentls
views to the Italians while also dutifully reporting back to
London his thoughts and observations , It was at times, a
35 Since his days at the Foreign Office before becoming Secretary- General, Drummond was already aware of the influence his advice and opinions could have on his superiors. Barros, Office without Power, p. 384.
thankless task which was e~ough to test the patience of rnost.
Sir Robert Vansittart, the PUS at the ~oreign Office knew this
and acknowledged it to Drummond, telling him how "1 often think
of your difficulties and do sincerely sympathise with y o u - . . ~ ~ ~ ~
The same sentiments were expressed by Anthony Eden when he told
Drummo~d in a letter that "we al1 think of you so much in the
very uncornfortable position in which you must be placed.
As the chie£ representative of the British government,
Drummond had the task of having to deal with Mussolini and his
Fascist state. By adopting a conciliatory attitude towards
Mussolini, Drummond was also following directives £rom the
highest authorities in the Foreign O£ f ice. 38 In so doing,
Britain hoped merely to apply enough pressure on an otherwise
useful ally. The British goverment's adoption of a conciliatory
attitude towards Fascist Italy was also in keeping with the
principal long standing aim of British foreign policy, namely
" t h e establishment O£ peace on a permanent footingtt chiefly
through methods such as
security as embodied by
support for the concept of collective
the League of Nations and adherence to
36 Vansi ttart ko Drummond, 26 July 1935, F.O. 371/19121/5 3332/1/1.
37 Eden letter to Drummond, 27 September 1935, F.0- 371/~ 8582/2304/98- Eden also acknowledged Drummondls difficult task in Facins the Dictators, p - 229. Evidence that the British were finding the Abyssinian crisis an ordeal can be found in a confidential letter sent by Hoare to Cferk, the British Ambassador in Paris. Here, Hoare expresses his sympathy with Clerkls situation but also adds, "al1 that 1 can Say is that it is equally tiresorne for Eric Drummond in Rome and for my poor self here." Hoare letter to Clerk, 24 August 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no, 493, p. 537.
38 Geoffrey Thompson acknowledged that "instruction after instruction was written or telephoned to Sir Eric Drummond and acted upon by the latter." Quoted in Rotunda, IlRome Embas~y,~ p. 253.
treaties such as the Locarno and Kellogg-Briand ~acts . 3g It was
a principle which Sir Eric Drummond was keenly aware of and kept
in mind when tendering his advice throughout the crisis." In
the early stages of the Abyssinian crisis in March 1935,
MacDonald told Parliament that it was the National governmentls
intention to ".. . pursue without intermission the national policy of peace by every practicable means and to take advantage of
every opportunity, and to make opportunities to make peace more
secure.lt4' This is precisely what the British government did.
The pursuit of peace, particularly within Europe was of paramount
importance during the Abyssinian crisis for Great Britain.
As the crisis unfolded, Britainls emergence as the leading
power in efforts to resolve it became a burdensome task, for
Britain was constrained in her efforts to resolve the crisis. A
legacy of Treasury restraint on military expenditure, for
instance, had limited British responses. In addition to the need
to rearm, the British also had to heed public opinion which was
Ig "Imperia1 Defence. Statement of Policy of His Majestyls Government in the United Kingdom." Presented by the Prime Minister to Parliament on 4 March 1935. Cabinet Memoranda. CAB 24/253. See also German Military Attaché in Britain to the Reich w a r ministry, 16 Seprember 1935, DGFP, vol. IV, doc. 299, p. 637; and Circular of the German Foreign Ministry. 30 September 1935, Ibid., doc. 313, p. 670
4 0 DLZimrnond~s understanding that British policy must be governed by the desire to maintain peace and by the need to pursue some sort of balance of power in Europe can be seen at least as early as 1921 when he was League Secretary-General. See Drunanond letter to Balfour, 29 June 1921. Lloyd George MSS .
"Imperia1 Defence, I l Cabinet Memoranda, 4 March 1935, CAB 24/253.
overwhelmingly pacifist and pro-Leag~e.'~ There were also
concerns about protecting imperial interests amidst attempts to
recover £rom the econornic crisis caused by the Great Depression.
Moreover, Britain had to factor in as well ~rnerican isolationism
and French ambiguity - al1 in the ever growing shadow of German
expansionism, It became essential, more than ever, to ensure
that the balance of power in Europe remained the raison dlstre of
British foreign p o l i ~ y ~ ~ and central to this was an Italy
strongly allied with Britain and France. This show of solidarity
dominated British, French, and Italian thinking at the Stresa
conference,
Fears of a stronger, revisionist Germany haunted the British
at Stresa during the initial phase of the Abyssinian crisis. It
did so to such an extent that Drummondls sensible advice about
warning Mussolini of the consequences to his African adventure
was not followed." However, during the rest of the crisis, a
" See for example, Hoare's letter to Sir George Clerk, 24 August 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. X I V , no. 493, p. 535. Here, Hoare tells Clerk of the public's determination "... to stick to the Covenant and of anxiety to keep out of war- You will Say that these feelings are self-contradictory. At present at least the country believes that they can be reconciled. Most people are s t i l l convinced that i f w e st ick t o the Covenant and apply collective sanctions, Italy must give i n and there will be no war, You and I know that the position is not a s simple a s th i s and that the presumptions that, f irstly, there will be collective action including full collective action by the French, and secondly, that economic sanctions will be effective are, to Say the least, very bold and sanguine," Italics added for emphasis-
4 3 B.J.C. McKercher, "Shield of M e m o r y : The Memoirs of the ~ritish Foreign-Policy Making Elite 1919-193911 in Political Memoir, pp. 199, 203, 204.
44 Some public figures in Britain regretted the omission of a warning to the Duce- Lloyd George, for example, called the omission uunforgivable." Bismarck to German Foreign Ministry, 23 August 1935, DGFP, vol. IV, doc. 270, p. 576,
number of Drummondls views did, in fact, make their impact on
British foreign policy-
Though some of Drummondfs advice may have helped his
government decide to pursue policies which rnay have proven to be
detrimental to the League and to Abyssinia, Drummond himself, was
never a supporter of Mussolini's Abyssinian adventure, The
Ambassador dismayed of the . . boas ting, the pos turing, the rampant nationalisrn, the gross misrepresentations of the British
attitude, the absurd egotism and concei t ( that) have been enough
to turn the least Anglo-saxon st~machs.~" As Ambassador,
Drummondts overriding concern had always been, and never ceased
to be centred mainly on ensuring that Anglo-Italian relations
were not des troyed. 06
Throughout the crisis Drummond was keenly aware of the
dilemma in which Britain found herself and periodically reminded
his government of the need for French military and political
support, His other views were also heeded during the crisis, as
exemplified by the Zeila proposal and the influence Drummond had
in convincinq his government of Italian threats of 'mad dog'
attacks which led to the reinforcement of the Royal Navy's
Mediterranean Fleet. Drummondrs warnings later in the year, of
impending war with Italy, as well as signs of possible Italian
acceptance of some sort of settlement, had some bearing on the
- - -
4 5 Quoted i n Rotunda, l 'Rome Embassy,I1 p. 193 , note 85.
46 Evidence of this can be seen in a message frorn Drummond to Simon, 1 June 1935, DBFP, 2 n d series, vol. X I V , no, 296, p. 297.
direction taken by his governrnent to proceed with the Hoare-Laval
plan. H i s views about getting Abyssinia to concede to Italian
demands (unpalatable as they were to him but advocated only
because they were "the lesser of two evilsU), were evident since
the early days of the crisis. They were discussed within the
Foreign Office and were to some extent, also reflected in the
Hoare-Laval proposals. More significantly, there is evidence to
suggest that Drummond's views on the effectiveness of sanctions
appear to have been heeded by London. His calculations of a
weaker but nevertheless determined Italy bent on surviving
hardships, aided the British government in deciding to recornrnend
the lifting of sanctions which led to the end of the crisis.
Sir Eric Drummondls observations throughout the Abyssinian
crisis undoubtedly made their mark on such dominant senior
Foreign Office officiais such as Sir Robert Vansittart. His
ability (as well as those of Foreign Secretaries such as Sir
Samuel Hoare), to defend successfully at crucial moments, Foreign
Office views in Cabinet, illustrate to some extent, the primacy
of the Foreign Office in the execution of British foreign policy.
Because of this, they also illustrate the influential role of
Britainls Ambassador to Italy whose advice and warnings were not
merely acknowledged, but were also acted upon in certain
instances. Because Drummondls was a voice heard and listened to
by the policy making elite, his opinions made an impact on the
pursuit and execution of British foreign policy. Therefore, not
only did Sir Eric Drummond's despatches £ r o m Rome prove to be
informative, they were, at certain critical junctures, also
influential in the formation of British foreign policy during the
Italo-Abyssinian crisis of 1935-1936.
ILLUSTRATION
Source: Royal Institute of ~nternational Affa ir s . Documents on International Af f a i r s 1 9 3 5 , volume II. Stephen Heald, ed., London: Oxford University P r e s s , 1937.
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JOURNAL ARTICLES
Baer, George W. Yanc t ions & Secur i ty : The League of ~ a t i o n s and the Italian-Ethiopian War, 1935-1936If, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Orsanizat ion. V o l . 27 (Spring 1 9 7 3 ) pp. 165-179-
Goldman, Aaron L. I l s i r Robert V a n s i t t a r t l s Search f o r I t a l i a n Cooperation Against H i t l e r , 1933 - l936It, The Journal of Contem~orarv Historv. Vol. 9 ( J u l y 1974) pp. 9 3 - 1 3 0 .
Keene, Thomas H, "Sir Robert Vansittart and the British Foreign Office, 1930-1938", Proceedincrs and Papers of the ~eorsia Association of Historians. (1981) pp, 80-90,
Marder, Arthur. "The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935-36", Arnerican Historical Review- Vol. LXXV (1970) pp, 1327-1355,
McKercher, B.J.C. "The Last Old Diplomat: Sir Robert Vansittart and the Verities of British Foreign Policy, 1903 -30a1, Di~lornacy & Statecraft. Vol. 6 (March 1995) pp. 1-38.
Parker, R.A.C. "Great Britain, France and the Ethiopian Crisis, 1935 -36", Enslish Historical Review. Vol, LXXXIX (April 1974) pp. 293-332,
Perth, The Earl of, "San Francisco HopesIl, T h e Spectator. (13 April 1945).
Robertson, James C. "The Hoare-Laval Planw, The Journal of Contemporarv Histow. Vol- 10 ( J u l y 1975) pp. 433-464.
Selby, W. IlThe Foreign Officeu, The Nineteenth Centurv and After. Vol. 137 (1945) pp. 3-12.
Voigt, F . A . I1Opinion and Policym , The Nineteenth Centurv and After. Vol. 138 (October 1945) pp. 145-155.
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