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European Security Review Page 1 of 17

.../Editcontent.asp?EditHTMLText=1&Mode=EditBlock&BlockID=10727&PagebgColor=ad9ce7 12/11/2003

Number 20 December2003

The Defence Deal in the IGC

The DefenceDeal in theIGC

The European armamentsagency: a virtual reality

Developing civilian crisismanagement capabilities

Operation Atl antia:Aficitonal test for Berlin Plus

Iran: a test case in EUnon-proliferation policy

EU/member states pledge5 Billion to tackle WMDproliferation

The revised Europeansecurity strategy

ISIS EuropeRue Archimde 51000 BrusselsBelgium

Tel: +32 2 230 7446Fax: +32 2 230 6113Website:www.isis-europe.orgEmail:[email protected]

ESR is edited byCatriona Gourlay

The Italian EU Presidency submitted a revised proposal on thefuture of European defence to the Naples conclave on 29

November.1 This new draft prepared the ground for a deal,resolving several contentious issues by the big three -- Germany,France and the UK. While the other member states and accessioncountries agree with the compromise text regarding the creation ofa double-hatted Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and permanentstructured co-operation on defence, the proposal for a mutualdefence clause has met with stiff resistance from the neutralcountries and a compromise text is still being negotiated.

Agreement has, however, been reached on other issues that donot require Treaty change, such as the development of EUoperational planning.

EU Foreign Minister

The position of a foreign minister was proposed by theConvention to promote coherence in EU foreign policy andprovide an institutional bridge between the supranationalEuropean Commission and the inter-governmental Council. TheConvention proposed that the position of EU Foreign Ministershould merge the position of Commissioner for External

Relations (1st pillar) with the functions of the Councils High

Representative of CFSP (2nd pillar).2 This was met with

widespread agreement in principle but there was disagreementover institutional details. For instance, Britain and Francewanted this minister to be more accountable to member statesand less to the Commission and this has been reflected in anumber of changes introduced to the text since October.At the Luxemburg and Brussels IGC meetings held in mid-October the principle that the Foreign Ministers CFSPresponsibilities 'cannot be subject to the same obligation ofindependence as the other members of the Commission' was

established. The Naples conclave4subsequently agreed thatArticle 25 on the European Commission would be amended tomention the exception that the Minister of Foreign Affairs ismandated by the Council in the area of CFSP.A furtherqualification was added to clarify that in the event that theEuropean Parliament exercised a vote of censure, the Ministerof Foreign Affairs would resign his duties regarding the exerciseof the Commissions external relations (only). Similarly, Article26 was amended to make it explicit that unlike otherCommissioners, the Foreign Minister would require the consentof the Council to resign, if asked to do so by the President ofthe Commission.The powers of the Foreign Minister have also been clarified.Article 27 on the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs now statesthat the Foreign Minister will chair the General Affairs and

External Relations Council5 and thathe/she will be tasked with

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ensuring coherence between CFSP and the external actions ofthe Commission (rather than simply ensuring coherencebetween the different aspects of Community externalrelations). Article III-197(3)confirms theintention that theForeign Minister be assisted by a new European External ActionService, working in co-operation with the diplomatic services ofthe Member States. The decision on the organisation of theService and how it relates to the Union's delegations has,however, been left to a later decision of the European Council

and Commission (with the European Parliament offered theopportunity to offer its opinion).

Structured co- operationThe issue of structured co-operation proved to be one of the most contentious defenceissues in the IGC. The Convention text proclaimed, those member states whose militarycapabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to oneanother shall establish structured cooperation within the Union framework.( Article 40).Subsequent discussions revealed fears on the part of a number of member states that suchco-operation would be exclusive, leading to a sub-group of member states forging aheadwith defence integration, inevitably conducting exclusive missions in the name of the EU.Recommendations introduced to the Naples conclave by the Italian Presidency sought tomake structured co-operation more inclusive and more closely aligned with the generalprovisions governing ESDP. To this end, a number of amendments to the Article governing

the implementation of ESDP (Article III-213) were introduced that established more openmechanisms for joining or leaving permanent structures. Moreover, it was clarified thatdecisions to launch EU operations would be taken unanimously in accordance with theestablished provisions for enhanced co-operation (articles III 325 and III 326) by all 25member states. An additional Protocol will be attached to the Treaty to clarify the objectivesof structured co-operation and outline under which conditions states will be able to engagein such co-operation.

Both the criteria and objectives of membership are capabilities driven where theparticipating states are required to engage more intensively in the development of defencecapabilities, including through the development of their national contributions and, whereappropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and inthe activity of the European Military Capabilities Agency. Moreover, participating states

must have the capacity to provide by 2007 at the latest, either at the national level or as

an essential part of multinational force packages, targeted combat units for the mission asplanned, structured at a tactical level as combat formations, with support elementsincluding transport and logistic, capable of carrying out the [Petersberg tasks] within aperiod of 5-30 days, particularly in response to requests from the United Nations, to besustained for an initial period of 30 days with possible extensions to at least 120 days. Fiveobjectives of structured co -operation are specified. They include: co-operation on objectivesconcerning the level of investments expenditure on defence equipment; bringing defenceapparatus into line (by increased harmonization of military needs, pooling, specializing andco-operation in the field of logistics); undertaking concrete measures to enhanceavailability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of forces; addressing capabilityshortfalls through the capability Development Mechanism; and developing, whereappropriate, major joint or European equipment programmes in the framework of theEuropean Defence Capabilities Agency.

Mutual Defence ClauseThe final Convention text contained a solidarity clausestating that member states wouldcome to each others assistance in the event that a member state suffers a terrorist attack.It did not, however, go so far as to bring into the framework of the EU any Article 5 typecollective defence commitments, previously agreed on by some member states in thecontext of an amended Brussels Treaty establishing the Western European Union (WEU).This issue has, however, been revisited in the IGC and at the Naples conclave; Britain,France and Germany agreed to the Italian proposal to incorporate Article 5 style languageinto Article 40 of the Treaty. The proposed mutual defence clause states that If a MemberState is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall havetowards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordancewith Article 51 of the UN Charter. Commitments and coo eration in this area shall be

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consistent with commitments under NATO, which, for those states which are member of it,remain the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation. Thislanguage accommodates the concerns of states such as the UK and Poland who wanted toenshrine complementarity with NATO, but met with strong resistance from the four neutralmember states, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Ireland. Such an Article would clearlycompromise their neutrality and in many cases would undermine national public support forthe Treaty. These states have demanded that the Article should constitute a voluntarycommitment only. The compromise text proposed by the Presidency takes the position ofthe neutral countries into account in so far as it adds the clause that 'this does not affectthe specific character of the defence and security policy of certain member states'. At thetime of publication, Austria and Sweden had agreed to this formulation, but it was still notcertain that this compromise would be accepted by Ireland and Finland at the Summit.Operational military planning

Although the issue of the development of EU operational military planning structures is notaddressed in the IGC, it has been one of the most contested transatlantic issues linked todebates on the future of Europes defence structures (see previous issue of the EuropeanSecurity Review). At the Naples conclave, a compromise agreement was reached by the 'bigthree'. While there is no publicly available text associated with the agreement, it wasreported that the deal consisted of an agreement to establish a permanent EU planning cellwithin NATOs operational headquarters, SHAPE. This cell would consist of staff secondedfrom EU member states and would be responsible for operational planning in the case ofany EU-led operation using NATO assets.In the case of autonomous operations, not usingNATO assets, operational planning would take place in national headquarters, or, as a 'lastresort', at the EU headquarters in Brussels.Member states agreed that some officials(aproximately 30) from member states would be attached to the EU Council Secretariat inthe Councils Cortenberg building in Brussels so that it could run a military operation in thisevent. The deal has not been openly criticized by the US, although it continues to assert theprimacy of the Berlin Plus framework agreement between the EU and NATO, which coversthe SHAPE and national headquarters operational planning options only.

All for nought?

Despite the fact that EU member states are close to agreement on most of the defence

issues in the IGC, the chances of the IGC being concluded by the summit on the 12 th and

13th of December remain slim given that there is still no agreement on crucial issues suchthe voting system within the Council. The WEU Assembly has already seized upon theprospect of IGC failure, proposing that the defence provisions be pursued outside the Unionframework in the context of the WEU and on the legal basis of the amended Treaty of

Brussels.6 This is, however, unlikely and all hopes are still pinned on the prospects of a lastminute deal being reached.

Cat r i on a Gou r l ay an d Joshua K leym eye r

1. See 'The Convention: Conclusions without closure'. by Catriona Gourlay , European

Security Review, Number 17, May 2003.

2. COREPER document CIG 52/03, Brussels, 25 November 2003 IGC 2003 Naples

Ministerial Conclave: Presidency Proposal

http://www.euitaly2003.it/NR/rdonlyres/D3AF1BA8-3F8C-40AA-A8DD-

DBEC7C8C0251/0/ConclaveDoc52Add1.pdf .

3. COREPER document CIG 2/03, Brussels, 2 October 2003 IGC 2003 The Union Minister

for Foreign Affairs: Main Points http://ue.eu.int/igcpdf/en/03/cg00/cg00002.en03.pdf.

4. COREPER document CIG 57/03, Brussels, 2 December 2003 IGC 2003 Defence

http://ue.eu.int/igcpdf/en/03/cg00/cg00057.en03.pdf Bulletin Quotidien Europe

9/12/2003 .

5. COREPER document CIG 60/03 ADD 1, Brussels, 9 December 2003

http://www.ueitalia2003.it/NR/rdonlyres/B6D8B2AC-707C-4FC8-AA34-

12FD3C396EC8/0/1209Cig60Add1_en.pdf.

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6. Conclusions of the WEU Assembly [IV.1(b)90] http://www.assembly-

weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2003/1841.html .

The European Armaments Agency:A Virtual Reality

At the November 17 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) in Brussels,

agreement was reached on the principle to establish, under the authority of the Council, anintergovernmental Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition

and armaments1 in the course of 2004. This decision helps maintain the momentum towardsthe creation of a European Armaments/Defence Capabilities Agencyand provides a frameworkfor further elaboration of the organisation of the Agency. However, it falls short of ItalianPresidency ambitions to reach agreement on a Joint Action establishing the agency. An interimEstablishment Team has now been tasked with addressing the outstanding technical issues,and member states aim to agree a Joint Action to create the agency during the forthcoming IrishPresidency.

An ongoing process

The present Agency discussions follow up on the Thessaloniki European Council conclusions,

which tasked the current Presidency with establishing an agency to:1) develop defence capabilities in the field of crisis-management;2) promote and enhance European armaments co-operation;3) strengthen the European industrial and technological base;4) create a competitive European defence equipment market as well as promoting, inliaison with the Communitys research activities where appropriate, research aimed atleadership in strategic technologies for future defence and security capabilities.

An Informal Advisory Group, composed of representatives of national Defence Ministries,was set up to take this work forward, and has subsequently been replaced, by a COREPER

decision dated September 4th, by an Ad Hoc Preparatory Group.2 On October 28, after fivemeetings, this Group submitted its final activities report to COREPER. The report includedguidelines on the role and the function of the Agency, but legal, institutional and financial

aspects were put to one side. The Council Working Group, Relex (Working Party of ForeignRelations Counsellors) was then tasked by COREPER to examine technical issues concerningthe composition of the agencys Steering Board, the legal status of the Agency and themodalities by which it would report to COREPER, the Political and Security Committee (PSC)and the Military Committee (EUMC).

Agreement on key issues examined by the preparatory group remained elusive, however,leading to the 17 November GAERC agreement to continue negotiations and set up the

Establishment Team in January to address outstanding technical (legal and financial)details. The Team would be composed of 12-15 experts from member states, the CouncilSecretariat and the Commission and is expected to submit its recommendations for a JointAction establishing the Agency to COREPER in the spring of 2004.

The Agency's role

The mandateThe November 17 GAERC conclusions refer to an Agency that shall be responsible for thedevelopment of European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and for thepromotion of European armaments co-operation. To achieve these objectives, the Agencyshould be tasked with: identifying future defence capability requirements, both inquantitative and qualitative terms (forces, equipments, interoperability and training);continuing to work with NATO through the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM);encouraging member states to meet their capability commitments in the ECAP process;promoting the harmonisation of military requirements; pursuing collaborative activities tomake up shortfalls, and defining financial priorities for capability development andacquisition. The Agency will also identify multilateral solutions for present and future

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requ remen s o capa es, an w promo e cos -e ec ve an e c en procurementhrough co-operation programmes to be managed by the WEAG/WEAO (Western EuropeanArmament Group/Western European Armament Organisation) and/or OCCAR (OrganisationConjointe de Coopration en matire dArmement) or by the Agency on the basis of theirexperience and the Letter of Intent (Framework Agreement) process.

A phased and progressive approachThe creation and development of the Agency will be an incremental process according to atimetable yet to be defined, whereby it will progressively manage core functions identified in

the present framework until it reaches full operationality. Once established in 2004, theAgency will act as co-ordinating focus for the existing network of bodies and agreementswith relevant competencies. It will work closely with the EU Military Committee (EUMC) thatis responsible for the management of the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM), as wellas with the member states representatives in the Headline Task Force (HTF) that work onthe ECAP process. It will also prepare the legal and operational framework for themanagement of collaborative projects through OCCAR, and the adoption, where necessary,of the Letter of Intent (Framework Agreement) procedures and WEAG/WEAO workingprinciples and practices. Once the Agency reaches its full operational potential, it shouldhave incorporated working practices and methods from all these existing arrangements andorganisations (OCCAR, LoI Framework Agreement, WEAG/WEAO), although it may still sub-contract aspects of procurement management to external bodies such as OCCAR.

Organisational structur e

The Agency shall have the legal personality to carry out its functions under the authority ofthe Council. A Steering Board, composed of representatives of participating EU member

states authorised to commit their government3 and a representative of the Commission,

will be responsible for formulating the Agencys policies and budget.4 The PSC will receivereports and provide guidelines on matters relating to CFSP and ESDP. The Steering Boardwill be chaired by the Head of the Agency, which points to the present SG/HR, Javier Solana.He/she will be assisted by a Chief Executive and supported by a permanent internationalstaff mainly selected from member states. There will also be a small number of secondedCommunity officials who will be responsible for specific projects over a fixed period.

Outstanding issues

In addition to legal and financial details to be addressed by the Establishment Team and

the final outcome of IGC in relation to the role of the EU Foreign Minister and the future ofdefence in the common market,5 key organisational issues remain unresolved. With regardto the composition of the Steering Board, traditional tensions at the national level betweenForeign and Defence Ministers were once more exposed, with internal resistance in somecountries to the proposal that member states should be represented by their DefenceMinisters. Moreover the modalities of decision-making within the Agencys Steering Board(unanimity or qualified majority voting) have yet to be decided and the relationshipbetween the Agency and existing Council bodies remains unclear. For example, the MilitaryCommittee is currently responsible for the elaboration, assessment and the review ofcapability objectives, and its future relationship with the Agency's role in this area requiresfurther negotiation. Similarly, it is not clear to what extent the Commissions developing

rolein defence R&D6 will relate to the Agencys role in generating member state defencecapabilities.

Fundamental to the on-going debate is the fact that France and Britain hold divergingvisions on the Agencys core competencies. Britain wants to maintain a focus uponcapabilities development and therefore stresses the central role of Defence Ministers in theagencys decision-making process. France prefers that the Agency focus on all four functionsincluded in the Thessaloniki mandate and insists that the final decision on the creation ofthe Agency should only be taken after all technical and legal implications have beenexplored. Moreover, France stresses that the multi-functional nature of the Agency shouldbe taken into account in the composition of the Steering Board. Unlike Britain, France wouldlike to ensure that the views of other ministries were represented where this is relevant,namely in debating industrial or research questions. Germany has supported the Frenchposition although it stressed the key importance of bringing member states DefenceMinisters and National Armaments Directors into the institutional framework of the Union.

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functional priorities of the agency.

Moving beyond virtual reality

The November 17 announcement to establish an agency in the field of defence capabilitiesdevelopment, research, acquisition and armaments in the course of 2004 has created anAgency framework but not yet an Agency, as key issues have not been resolved. Thecreation of an Establishment Team, a timeline that consciously enables key decisions in theIGC to be built-in, and the avoidance of key discussions about the end-state of the Agencyin relation to the existing bodies such as OCCAR, WEAG/WEAO and the LoI process,represent the framework within which the Agency will develop rather than a meaningfulfinal decision.

Over the coming months member states will need to reconcile their different visions abouthow the agency will relate to other existing organisations and how it will be managed.Moreover, member states also need to address the issue of how the Agency will link withthe work of the ECAP Project Groups and follow-up the Helsinki Headline Goal II process,reflecting the capability needs of the expanded Petersberg Tasks, and to be agreed by June2004. Sustained political will is required if the Agency is to be equipped with a mandate andstructure that will enable it to generate real solutions to short-term capability shortfallsand generate capabilities suitable for longer term requirements.

Danie la Manca and Ger r ard Qu i l l e

1. As yet no agreement has been reached on a name for the agency. The names mentioned

here are commonly used and are based on the original Franco-German proposal for an

Armaments Agency and the UK preference for a Defence Capabilities Agency.

2. This group met within the Council structures and was composed of senior representatives

of the Ministries of Defence of the member states and was chaired by the Italian Ltn Gen.

Gianni Botondi.

3. The question is particularly sensitive, especially for France who seeks to give the Steering

Board a multi-ministerial character. See below for more details.

4. The budget has represented another sticking point during negotiations. The original Ad

Hoc group proposal to provide the Agency with its own budget made up of nationalcontributions whilst member states would bear operational costs has been rejected. The

GAERC conclusions revert the issue to the establishment phase.

5. It is envisaged that the Joint Action establishing the Agency will be revised where

necessary according to the final outcome of the IGC.

6. The commission is opening Community research and development funding to the defence

sector for the first time with a Preparatory Action with a budget of 65 million Euros over

three years. A group of personalities has been appointed and will meet twice and report

in the spring of 2004 to advise on priority projects. See MEMO/03/192, Brussels, 7

October 2003.

Developing Civilian Crisis Management Capabilities

There is widespread acknowledgment from within the EU institutions and member states thatthe EU needs to strengthen its civilian crisis management capabilities and this is reflected in therevised European Security Strategy, which states that we need greater capacity to bring allnecessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations. A number of initiativesare currently being undertaken to address capability shortfalls. This article reflects, in particular,on recent attempts to bolster planning and mission support and develop new procedures fortraining and recruitment for EU civilian operations.

Strengthening Planning and Mission Support

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The Council recognizes that EU planning and mission support for civilian operations areclearly inadequate and need reinforcement. The EUs experience with its first ESDP mission,the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia Herzegovina, first exposed capability shortfalls in allaspects of administrative and logistical planning. These are set to become more acute nowthat the Council has agreed that operation Concordia will be followed-up with the policetraining mission Proxima in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Council is alsoactively considering a further mission to establish an integrated police unit in Kinshasa(DRC) to be carried out concurrently, and other potential operations have also beenproposed. Indeed, the short history of ESDP suggests that the EU will most frequently becalled on to conduct civilian operations rather than high-end military ones.

This civilian capabilities gap is not surprising, however, given the procedures and staff ofthe Council Secretariat have not yet been adapted to meet the needs of increasing pro-active, planning and mission support functions. Whereas the Council Secretariat has beenaugmented with some 150 Military staff to enable strategic-level planning for militaryoperations, there are only 15 staff working within the Council Secretariat that can take onnew tasks with regard to civilian operations. Moreover, while military operations rely onnational level or NATO headquarters for operational planning, EU staff working on civilianoperations in Brussels are responsible for strategic and operational planning as well asmission support, and have no recourse to external planning entities. They deal with this bydelegating much of the detailed planning of missions to the head of mission and an advanceparty. Moreover, some important elements of the planning and administration of civilianmissions are shared with the Commission (which notably has responsibility for legal issues,budgetary management and procurement).

To address this gap, in November 2002 the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR)was tasked by the Council to take forward work as soon as possible on establishing anappropriate EU planning and mission support capability. This was to be based within theCouncil General Secretariat (CGS), and build on synergies with the Commission. In July 2003the SG/HRs presented concrete recommendations to strengthen the mission support within

the CGS.1 The SG/HR identified shortages of personnel in all four priority areas in civiliancrisis management (police, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection) andhorizontal mission support tasks, including operational back-up/communications, securityand safety management, and information and best practices/lessons learned. To fill thisgap, the SG/HR proposed that 27 new posts should be created within the CGS, with abalance between permanent officials and seconded experts. These proposals were fol lowedup in mid October, when the Presidency responded to the SG/HR report withrecommendations regarding staffing solutions to address the most urgent shortfalls inplanning and mission support. Given that there are no provisions for employing additionalpersonnel in the 2004 budget, the Presidencys proposals were limited and argued for thecreation of 18 new posts through the reallocation of existing resources within the CGS andthe request that member states and the Commission second additional staff to the CGS.

The Presidencys proposals for an interim solution paid little heed to the Commissionsresponse to the Councils initial report. These were presented to the Council in September.While the Commission shares the underlying objective of improving planning and missionsupport for civilian operations, it disagreed that these capabilities should be developedexclusively within the Council framework. The Commission argued that the SG/HRsproposals would effectively duplicate existing capacities within the Commission. Ithighlighted its experience in managing electoral observation missions, the civil protectionmechanism and providing personnel and support to UN, OSCE and operations of other

partners in the fields of rule of law, civilian administration and police, and pointed to thevital support that could be provided by the Commissions 129 delegations and offices acrossthe world. It argued furthermore that strengthening the Commissions mission supportcapabilities with regard ESDP operations would effectively strengthen cross-pillarintegration in this area. Moreover, the Commission argued that this solution was also moreconsistent with current budgetary arrangements (under which the Commission remainsresponsible for the budgetary management of ESDP operations), stating that theoperational support requirements are the same for EC funded election monitoring, bordermanagement and police operations as those to be conducted within the ESDP framework.Given the current institutional architecture, and the operational need to bring budgetarymanagement and mission planning within the same structure, the Commission argues thata joint service would be the most effective solution.

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The contrasting views of the Council and Commission on how planning and mission supportfor civilian missions should be strengthened is based on the fact that both institutions claimcompetence in this area. The Commission has long been engaged in post-conflict institutionbuilding and has developed mechanisms to expedite the delivery of support for crisismanagement and post-conflict peace-building activities under the rapid reaction mechanism.It does not, however, have experience in planning and supporting large-scale crisismanagement operations, involving the deployment of EU personnel. The Council arguesthat in order to develop an integrated civil-military approach to crisis management, civilian

operations must be managed from the Council, under the authority and control of memberstates and, where possible, with their direct involvement.

The question of competence is further complicated bythe fact that the term civilian crisismanagement means different things to different people.The Commission notes that whileEU civilian missions are a politically important tool, there are a whole range of tools forcivilian crisis management, the bulk of which are organised under the first pillar.While thefirst crisis management operation was launched in Bosnia, eight years after the Daytonaccords, first pillar assistance has been used to support the political stabilisation of thecountry since the end of the conflict.

Given the bureaucratic and structural obstacles to developing an integrated planning andsupport capability within the current institutional framework, both the SG/HRs report andthe Commissions response to it are relatively open to new institutional solutions. The

SG/HR cites one option as the creation of a flexible Mission Support Service, independentfrom the CGS but under the SG/HRs operational direction, while the Commission proposesthe establishment of an inter-institutional agency or service which would be compatible withthe future institutional architecture, in particular the proposed Joint External Service and theEU Foreign Minister. Such an agency or service would provide a common platform for all EUcivilian missions, irrespective of the funding source, and could be tasked by the Council orthe Commission according to their respective mandates, and, in the future by the ForeignMinister. Unlike parallel discussions on proposals to develop military operational planningstructures or an EU Armaments Agency, these proposals have received little to no pressattention and there is no formal process for their development.

Co-ordinating recruitment and training

Improving the quality and deployability of civilian personnel is evidently crucial for the

development of EU civilian crisis management capabilities. The de-centralised recruitmentprocess is currently very slow and it has proved difficult to find suitable, qualified personnelfor on-going civilian missions. Problematic features of the current system include the factthat recruitment, which is a responsibility of member states, is procedurally diverse and, inthe absence of an efficient co-ordinating mechanism to help manage inputs from memberstates, this can lead to delays and shortfalls. Moreover, while some member statesrecruitment procedures include experts outside the civil service, many national systems aregeared to internal recruitment of civil servants and therefore non-governmental experts arecurrently under-represented. More generally, the pool of potential personnel is still toolimited given the generic problems associated with extracting civilian experts from theirdomestic duties and providing sufficient incentives for them to leave on foreign missions.This also applies to selecting individuals to attend training courses. More specifically withregard to training, it is widely agreed that civilian personnel should all have common coreskills and training background to improve co-ordination between national experts in EU

operations. While this may be necessary, it is hardly sufficient, and the EU also needs toencourage member states to recognise the relevance of alternative practical experiencesand academic courses in their selection processes. Moroever, there is currently no linkbetween training courses and deployment, and mechanisms need to be introduced toensure that those trained are also willing and able to take part in EU operations.

Some of these issues are being addressed within the context of current EU traininginitiatives. Two years ago the Commission launched an initiative on training for civilianaspects of crisis management in order to improve the preparation and readiness of civilianpersonnel. The initiative has now gone through its third phase. In its first phase, anetwork of EU-wide training bodies developed proposals for a common approaches andharmonised training programmes. In the second phase, these programmes started to be

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,member states. The second phase was evaluated at a conference in Rome 20-21 October2003 and a broadly positive evaluation means that more resources will now be available fortraining courses. Other outcomes of the evaluation include the recognition that EU trainingshould be better co-ordinated with that of the UN, OSCE and other internationalorganisations and that it should also be more closely integrated with military training for EUoperations. The Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy will launch the first training course inwhich both civilian and military representatives will participate. A follow-on meeting in Berlinhas also been planned for February, at which the issue of more closely integrating civilian

and military training will be explored further.

The second pillarisation of civilian crisis management?

The current trend appears to be in the direction of the second pillarisation of civilian crisismanagement with the Council declaring its ambitions for greater control over thedevelopment of a co-ordinated EU Training Policy, encompassing both civilian and militarydimensions of ESDP. Member States already have control over the recruitment process andthe suggestion is that the Civilian Committee in the Council (CIVCOM) oversees bothtraining and recruitment. While the Commission continues to hold the purse strings andfund common training activities,it appears to be loosing ground regarding the control of thepreparation and support of as well as training and recruitment for civilian crisis managementoperations.

This trend risks undermining the link between short-term crisis management operations andother external relations activities including longer-term post-conflict reconstruction effortsmanaged by the Commission. The political focus on th deployment of EU civilian missionmay also risk a 'one size fits all' approach, where alternatives (such as working through aUN framework, or a regional organisation such as the OSCE) are not fully taken intoaccount. Finally, there an important efficiency and accountability argument that has notbeen addressed in the current debate: whereas the Commission has a high degree ofautonomy in making decisions about first pillar operations, second pillar operations aresubject to lengthy discussion in Council working groups with votes taken on the basis ofunanimity. How efficient is it for operational details to be discussed by 25ambassadors?Moreover, how will these member states be held to account for spending onthese activities and operations, if this is managed in the second pillar framework? Itremains to be seen, however, if the post-IGC joint external service will provide a betterinstitutional solution to the development and effecient management of civilian crisismanagement.

Ma li n Tap pe r t

1. Council of the European Union General Secretariat Planning and Mission Support

capability for Civilian Crisis Management 22 July 2003.

OperationAtlantia: A Fictional Test for Berlin P lus

From 19-29 November, the EU and NATO carried out their first joint crisis

management exercise to test EU planning procedures developed in the framework of

ESDP and the Berlin Plus arrangements with NATO. This article offers an overview of

the conduct of the exercise and reports some preliminary observations, although the

formal evaluation process has not yet been completed.1

The scenario and the players

The scenario for the CMX/CME 03 exercise was not new, but was initially elaborated by

the EU on the basis of the first CME 02 exercise, carried out in May 2002 2. The crisiswas situated in fictitious Atlantic island, named Atlantia which was experiencinggrowing friction between two ethnic groups over a contested area. Given the geo-strategic importance of the island for the EU and the risk of escalation of violence andspillover, the Union had an interest in ensuring, through its diplomatic and economicinstruments, that a cease-fire was agreed between the parties. The deployment of

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agreement and deter renewed hostility.

The exercise was carried out both in Brussels, with participants from member statesdelegations and EU/NATO relevant bodies, and in national capitals. In particular, on theEU side the Political and Security Committee (PSC) had the overall responsibility for theplanning, conduct, evaluation and reporting of CME/CMX 03, while a core planningteam, composed of officials from the Presidency, the Council General Secretariat

(including the EU Military Staff) and the Commission, co-ordinated the activities of thePSC and the working bodies (Civcom, Relex, Politico-Military Group). The Policy Unit,the Military Committee, the Satellite Centre, the Secretary General/HighRepresentative and the Commission also participated, whilst EU acceding states had an'active observers' status. On the NATO side, the exercise involved all Allies plus all 19

national delegations, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Secretary General3, theMilitary Committee (MC), the Strategic Commanders Headquarters (SHAPE), theInternational Staff (IS) and the Policy co-ordination Group (PCG).

The planning procedures for the exercise also envisaged consultations with thirdcountries, namely with non-European NATO Members, to inform them of the EUsintentions. Similarly, consultations were conducted with Canada, Russia and Ukraine aspotential contributors. Representatives from the UN and the OSCE were also invited to

observe the exercise.

Testing Berlin Plus

The CME/CMX 03 exercise was elaborated within the framework of the EU Councilsfive-year Exercise Programme. The overall aim of the exercise was to:

1) test the interaction between the EU and NATO at the highest political-militarylevel on the basis of the Berlin Plus standing arrangements for consultation and co-operation in crisis management;

2) test the EUs crisis management procedures and structures at the pre-decisional

phase of the decision-making process leading to the appointment of an OperationCommander and EU tasking for military operational planning;

3) test the ability of the EU to mobilise in a comprehensive and co-ordinatedmanner both military and civilian instruments.

Limited in its ambition and scope, CME/CMX focused on how the EU plans at thestrategic political level for an operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities,where NATO as a whole is not engaged. Therefore, no troops were deployed on theground and the overall costs were confined to incremental (personnel travel and

communication) costs4.

The exercise began when the EU Political and Security Committee tasked the MilitaryCommittee to evaluate options for a EU-led operation in Atlantia, under a UN SecurityCouncil mandate. Consultations with NATO were promptly established at differentlevels in the event of an EU operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities inthe framework of the Berlin Plus agreements. A joint meeting of the two MilitaryCommittees took place on Thursday 20 to evaluate practical modalities for the transferof NATO capabilities to the EU, and was followed by joint meetings at the political level(PSC-NAC and PMG-PCG). On Monday 24, the PSC approved the draft Joint Actionauthorising the launching of the civil-military Operation ATLANTIA. The exercise endedjust before DSACEUR was due to formulate the operational requirements and convene a'force eneratin conference' and a 'Committee of contributors' for countries that

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pledged forces.

Provisions governing the consultationswere based on a series of standingarrangements completed between December 2002 and March 2003that comprise theBerlin Plus agreements. In line with these arrangements, the Operation Headquarterswere provided by NATO and based at SHAPE, which was also involved in the conductof the exercise. Similarly, DSACEUR was appointed the Operation Commander.

Assessment

In a statement released before the exercise, the EU SG/HR, Javier Solana, stated 'The joint exercise is another important step in the close and concrete co-operation

between the EU and NATO' 5. Some EU officials similarly stressed the exercisessuccess regarding the work of the two organizations Secretariats, whose level of co-ordination contributed to the overall success of the exercise.

According to a joint pre-exercise press release, CME/CMX was also intended tocomplement the lessons learned from the actual co-operation on the EU-led OperationConcordia, conducted with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. However, theconduct of the exercise differs from that of Concordia since it concerns the fulldecision-making process previous to the launching of the mission, whilst in FYROM theEU took over a mission already begun by NATO.However, EU and NATO officials havereportedly confirmed that CME/CMX 03, along with Operation Concordia, validated theBerlin plus arrangements, at least as 'lignes directrices' for the EU-NATO interplay incrisis management. It is in the EU Presidencys and Council Secretariats responsibilityto implement them in the most appropriate way, according to contingent needs.

While there is general satisfaction that the exercise achieved its objectives, some EUofficials pointed out some outstanding obstacles revealed by the exercise that stillneed to be worked on, particularly regarding the co-ordination of the EU civil andmilitary instruments, the EU-NATO consultation and communication procedures andtheir security provisions. Some officials also made the point that the exercise, which

did not involve the operational planning phase, stopped short of testing the wholerange of consultation procedures. Moreover, the smooth conduct of the operation wasseen, in part, as due to the unrealistic fact that decision-makers were not required torespond tounforeseen events.

Next steps

The EU is conducting a comprehensive evaluation process to guide the furtherdevelopment of EU crisis management structures, procedures and arrangements, whilstthe EU-NATO aspects of the exercise will be evaluated first separately and then jointlyby the two organizations relevant bodies (PSC-NAC). The whole process may take afew months. Meanwhile, the EU has already started planning the next CME 04 exercise,scheduled for next year and based on a scenario for an EU-led operation withoutrecourse to NATO assets and capabilities (on the Operation Artemis-type, inDemocratic Republic of Congo). This will complete the EU's testing programme of thefull range of procedures available for ESDP operations.Dan ie la Man ca

1. See article by Annalisa Monaco in the forthcoming NATO Notes for analysis of the NATO

perspectiveon this operation and the lessons learned from it.

2. See ESR 13, July 2002

3. NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, was represented by a colleague, while Javier

Solana, the EU SG/HR did take partin the exercise.

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4. Costs for CME/CMX are currently estimated at no more than 50.000 Euros.

5. See Javier Solana press release, Brussels, 19 November 2003.

Iran:A test case for EU Non Proliferation Policy

In response to Irans recent disclosure of its nuclear programme, European governments havefollowed-up their renewed commitment to non-proliferation, elaborated at the Thessaloniki

European Council1

with the common, pro-active and swift engagement with Iran at the highestpolitical level. The EU stance throughout the recent crisis was consistent and builds on a policyof constructive engagement, using both negative and positive incentives to promote co-operation and compliance. Britain, France and Germany took the lead in negotiating a solutionwith Teheran and in rallying the US behind it, but it is likely that US pressure within the IAEAalso played a role in Irans climbdown.

Between September 2002 and February 2003, Iran disclosed to the International Agencyfor Atomic Energy (IAEA) details of its undeclared nuclear-enrichment program, active for thepast 18 years. This contravened Irans obligations under the Non Proliferation Treatys

(NPT) Safeguards Agreements.2 In the following months, Iran opened some of its sites toIAEAs inspections to prove the peaceful nature of the programme. However, IAEAinvestigations found evidence ofuranium enrichment activities and of plutonium generation,igniting major concerns in the international community over Irans nuclear weapons

ambitions and threatening to escalate the crisis.

The US 'hard-cop' approach

Since the Clinton Administration, the United States have consistently adopted acontainment approach towards Iran, refusing to co-operate on its civilian nuclearprogramme, even under IAEA safeguards, whilst exerting pressure on third parties to dothe same. US administration concerns about Russian technical assistance to the Bushehr

nuclear power plant program3 led Congress to pass the Iran Non-Proliferation Act in 2000,which authorised sanctions against states or private companies that provided Iran with

missile or Weapons of Mass Destruction technology.4

Although Teheran has always stressed the peaceful nature of its programme and argued

that it is necessary to meet increased energy needs, for the US, its concealment for almosttwo decades is evidence of more ominous nuclear ambitions. It therefore called for a toughresponse, arguing that the UN Security Council should address the issue and respond withsanctions.

EU conditional engagement: the 'soft-cop' approach

Since 2000, the EU has progressively distanced itself from the US policy, rather choosing topursue an active policy of engagement, involving, inter alia, new negotiations in 2002between the European Commission and Teheran on a Trade and Co-operation Agreement(TCA). The EU approach is predicated on the belief that the US-advocated hard-line positionserves to reinforce intransigent positions inside Iran with unpredictable consequences. Incontrast the EU approach, with its emphasis on conditional engagement, aims to secure co-operation and compliance through a mix of positive and negative incentives. Thus, the EU

position envisages tighter economic and commercial ties contingent on Iran achievingprogress in key areas of concern, namely terrorism, human rights, support to the MiddleEast Peace process and non-proliferation.

The three Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and United Kingdom who, since June,have beenat the forefront in pursuing a diplomatic deal with Teheran - have consistentlyreminded Teheran that trade talks and the nuclear issue are interdependent. In his visit toTeheran in August 2003, the High Representative Javier Solana was even tougher inwarning of unwelcome effects on EU-Iran relations, should Teheran fail to meet the IAEAdemands. Moreover, the European Council Conclusions of September 29 assertivelyreiterated the EU expectations that more intense [EU-Iran] economic relations can be

achieved only if progress is reached in the four areas of concern.5

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These moves are consistent with the identification, in the new European Security Strategy,that WMD proliferation is one of the principal threats facing the EU and internationalsecurity and complements new policy initiatives in the area agreed at the ThessalonikiEuropean Council in June 2003. These are described in two documents, - the BasicPrinciples for an EU strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and anAction Plan for their implementation. The EUs stated approach for tackling the threat of theproliferation of WMD, combines political and diplomatic preventive measures (includingpositive and negative security assurances) while explicitly sanctioning the ultimate recourseto coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in the case of non-compliance.

Brokering a deal w ith Iran

Despite the US pressures to immediately seize the Security Council, the September 12 IAEAGoverning Boards resolution opted for granting Teheran an October 31 deadline to dulysign, ratify and implement the Additional Protocols to the Non Proliferation Treaty and tosuspend all further uranium enrichment-related activities and any reprocessing activities, asa confidence-building measure. These Protocols would establish a short-notice highly-intrusive inspection process for IAEA experts, and Iranian conservatives responded byrejecting the proposals, stating that such conditions were extraordinary humiliating and

undermined national sovereignty.6

In late September, despite US criticism, Britain, France and Germany made a first, concertedapproach to Teheran offering, in a joint letter, technical help to Irans civilian nuclear projectin return for full co-operation and transparency with the IAEA. These three Ministerstravelled to Teheran on October 21 and successfully brokered an agreement. In the jointlyagreed statement, Iran pledged to sign, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol and tosuspend its nuclear-enrichment program in exchange for Europe providing technicalassistance to Irans civilian nuclear programme and co-operating with Iran to eliminate thecauses of its security concerns in the Middle East region (read Israel and Pakistan), ideallywith a view to establishing a nuclear weapons-free region.

The US welcomed the initiative, but differences in approach were again revealed in thenegotiation, at the November 20 IAEA Board meeting, of a new resolution. Washingtonpromptly rejected a first draft drawn up by Britain, France and Germany, on the groundsthat it was too loose, and reaffirmed US intentions to refer Irans non-compliance to the

Security Council, recommending sanctions. The compromise IAEA resolution agreed onNovember 26, expressed deep concern for Irans past failures and breaches in disclosing itsnuclear programme, while recognizing Irans shift towards a more co-operative and openstance. It calls on Teheran to 'undertake and complete the taking of all necessary corrective

measures on an urgent basis '7 and establishes a fast-track procedure for the Board ofGovernors to seize the Security Council, should any further serious Iranian failures come tolight.

Lessons learned

The Iran crisis has been major test for the EU nascent strategy against WMDproliferation.The EUs concerted diplomatic efforts and combined use of incentives(European assistance in Irans civil nuclear program) and disincentives (halt of TCAnegotiations and Irans isolation) appear to have affected positive policy change within Iran

and led to its agreement to the new IAEA protocols. However, the role played by the UScalls for negative sanctions in influencing Irans climbdown should not be underestimatedand it remains likely that both approaches have had a significant impact. While both the EUand the US remain convinced of the effectiveness of their respective good-cop/bad-copapproaches, it is perhaps the combination of the two that is most effective. It is, in anycase, premature to draw any conclusions. The true test of these policies is whether Iranabides by its commitment to sign the NPTs additional protocols and, in practice, suspendsall nuclear related activities.

Danie la Manca

1. See the Action Plan for the implementation of the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation

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o eapons o ass es ruc on, essa on uropean ounc , - une .

2. With the NPTs Safeguards Agreements, parties have committed to promptly declare to the agency the

starting of a nuclear program, before the conduct of nuclear-enrichment related activities, in order for the

Agency to establish procedures for the timely detection of facilities being diverted from peaceful nuclear

activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

3. In 1995, Russia had signed a contract under which it provided $ 800 millon to complete one unit of the

Bushehr project. Later, Russian co-operation to Iran nuclear program included as well the supply of

uranium enrichment centrifuge plant. On 29 October 2003, Russia and Iran agreed to sign a protocol

providing for the return of spent nuclear fuel to Russia.4. See 'Dealing with Irans nuclear program', ICG report, 27 October 2003.

5. External Relations Council Conclusions, Brussels, 29 September 2003.

6. See Dan De Luce, Europeans fail to end Iranian nuclear crisis, The Guardian, 20th September 2003

7. See 'Implementation of the NPT safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran',

Resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 26 November 2003.

EU/Member States Pledge 5 Billion Euro to Tackle WMD Proliferation

Although the issue of WMD non-proliferation and disarmament in Iraq has caused

strains within Europe and in transatlantic relations, a multilateral approach to tackling

the proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction from Russia and the

New Independent States (NIS) is proving highly effective. The G8 Global Partnershipagainst the Proliferation of Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction is illustrative

of this co-operation. In this framework, the European Commission co-hosted a G8

Inter-Parliamentary Conference with the European Parliament, in Strasbourg on

November 20-21 2003, to bring to the attention of G8 members legislators the

important work being done on threat reduction and to introduce them to the new role

of the European Union in this field.

The conference was attended by over 200 senior government officials from the EU 25and the remaining non-EU G8, their parliamentarians, members of the EuropeanParliament, representatives of twenty-one think tanks, and the media. Over two dayspresentations were given by high level government officials from the US, EuropeanCommission, the Council, the member states, and third parties such as theInternational Science and Technology Centres (ISTC), the Organisation for theProhibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the International Atomic EnergyAssociation (IAEA). Keynote speakers included US Under Secretary of State for ArmsControl John Bolton and the father of Cooperative Threat Reduction, Senator SamNunn.

The Commission's work is carried out on the basis of an EU 1999 Joint Action tosupport Co-operative WMD non-proliferation and disarmament programmes in the

Russian Federation.1 This Joint Action has recently been extended for one year to rununtil mid-2004. Presentations at the conference focussed on the work carried out onthe basis of the Joint Action, the implementation of which falls under the Commissionscompetence but is often conducted through member states, for instance:

With Germany: to destroy Lewisite in Gorny and Kambarka; With the UK: to destroy chemical weapons nerve agents at Schuschye; With France: to support the nuclear weapons plutonium disposition projects.

The Commission also funds the non-proliferation of expertise under its TACISprogramme in its support to the International Science and Technology Centres (ISTC)in Moscow and Kiev.

Current and future funding

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non-proliferation of WMD. The EU G8 member states (France, Germany, Italy and theUK) have pledged a total of 4 billion Euros (approximately 1 billion each) in the samecontext and timeframe and the European Commission has committed a further 1 billionEuros. However, confusion reigns as to how much the Commission actually spends onnon-proliferation due to the fact that relevant projects fall under diverse budget lines.Global figures for the EC contributions, including the TACIS nuclear environmentalprojects, amount 150 million euros per year between 2003-2006. This would total 450

million over three years, and if continued at the same level, would mean that theCommission exceeded its 1 billion pledge. However, a senior Commission officialhighlighted that the real figure on non-proliferation and disarmament programmes maybe far lower. Discounting nuclear environmental projects, EC spending over the period2003-2006 is made up of the EU Joint Action and TACIS contributions to the NordicDimension Environmental Plan, to bilateral projects in North West Russia, to nuclearsafeguards projects and to the ISTCs. The sum of this spending is around 140 millioneuros over the three years. If funding continues at the same levels, this would amountto less than half of the 1 billion Community commitment made to the G8 at Kananaskis.

How to make up the shortfall?

The idea of establishing a Community CFSP budget line that includes non-proliferation

and disarmament only projects was floated at the conference by a number ofparticipants. This would add stability and provide follow-on funding to the present JointAction which has only been extended for one year until mid-2004. The idea receivedvocal support from some parliamentarians, who saw such a concrete initiative as ameasure of European commitment to this important issue. One parliamentarian calledfor the idea to be incorporated into the manifestos of the European Parliamentspolitical groups in order for the issue to be taken up as a priority with the newparliament in the fall of 2004. A single CFSP budget line would help the Communitymeet its G8 commitment to the Global Partnership and serve as a measure of progresstowards achieving this objective. Practical disarmament is about more than money,however. Creating a single CFSP budget line for non-proliferation and disarmamentwould also serve to clarify and improve the transparency of project priorities, andenable the assessment of projects against stated European and G8 priorities.

Making EU commitments concrete

Making progress in the area of non-proliferation and disarmament is clearly a priority forthe member states and the EU institutions as expressed in the newly emerging EUStrategy on WMD defined in the EU Security Strategy and the two documentsmentioned in the Thessaloniki conclusions: the Basic Principles and the Action Plan toimplement the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against the proliferation of weaponsof mass destruction. Achieving a single CFSP budget line on non-proliferation anddisarmament would be an important measure of this commitment and serve to build onthe achievements of the Community in this area. As one senior Commission stated atthe conference, we can not afford to stall in our political commitment because what

is at stake is the credibility and the visibility of the EU and, in particular the EuropeanCommunity, in a field which, after the dramatic events of the 11 September 2001, hasbecome central to the security of our people.

Gerrard Qui l le

1. See previous articles in issues 16 and 18 of the European Security Review,at www.isis-europe.org.

The Revised European Security Strategy

he Euro ean Council on 12-13 is set to a rove the second draft of the Euro ean Securit Strate

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document 'A secure Europe in a Better World' drafted by the High Representative/Secretary General,Javier Solana. The first draft was presented to the Thessaloniki European Council on 19-20 June2004 (and was reviewed inissue 18 of this publication) and the revised draft, draws on inputs from

member and acceding states as well as independent experts provided in the intervening months. Theprincipal changes from the first draft aredescribed below.

The security environment: global challenges and key threats

he first section of the paper sets out the global challenges and key threats in the security

environment. Additions to the description of todays global challenges include the observation that

'internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked', that some 'have perceived

globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice' and that 'in much of the developing world,

poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns.' The

subsection on 'new threats' has been renamed key threats. As before, these include 'terrorism' and

the 'proliferation of weapons of mass destruction', which is now 'potentially' the greatest threat to our

security rather than 'the single most important threat'. The dangers of attacks using biological,

chemical and radiological materials are also spelled out further. Whereas in the first draft the third

threat was 'failed states and organised crime', the new version deal elaborates on these issues and

deals with them separately, identifyingkey threats as 'regional conflicts', 'state failure' and 'organised

crime'. Nevertheless, the links between these threats are explained in more detail, with new mention

made of how criminal activities can 'fuel the weakening of state structures' and how 'revenues fromtrade in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world'. Moreover,

regional conflicts and new threats are linked with sentences such as 'The most practical way to tackle

the often elusive new threats wil sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict.'

Strategic Objectives

he second section on strategic objectives, begins (rather than ends) withthe objective of

addressing the threats. It elaborates on the relevance of the EU's current work and, in the case of

non-proliferation, includes the statement that 'the EU is committed to achieving universal adherence

to multilateral treaty regimes, as well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification

provisions'. The second objective of building security in our neighbourhood, includes the

statement that 'Europeanisation [of the Balkans] is both a strategic objective and an incentive for

reform'. With regard to the Arab/Israeli conflict, it reaffirms its commitment to 'remain engaged andready to the problem until it is solved [by] the two state solution'. The third strategic, objective, an

international order based on effective multlateralism, remains unchanged in substance with

the exception that the sentence 'We are committed to upholding and developing International Law'

has been inserted, and the controversial sentence of the first draft 'Pre-emptive engagement can

avoid more serious problems in the future' has been taken out.

Policy Implications for Europe

he third and final section on policy implications for Europe, additional language is introduced in the

section describing how the EU should become more active. It is made explicit that being more active

'applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our

disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities'.

Moreover, the preventive dimension of such engagement is given greater prominance. The sub-section concludes 'We need to be able to act before countries around us deterioriate, when signs of

proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can

avoid more serious problems in the future. A European Union which takes greater responsibility and

which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight.' When describing ways in

which the Union can become more capable , mention is made of the fact that the establishment of a

defence agency 'takes us in the right direction'. The EU-NATO permanent (Berlin Plus) arrangements

are also mentioned as enhancing the EU's operational capability and providing 'the framework for the

strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management.' In regard to identifying

how the Union should become more coherent , the revised draft mentions that this also has a

re ional dimension. It states that 'coherent olicies are also needed re ionall es eciall in dealin

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with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in

different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa has shown'. Finally, the paper explores

the policy implications ofworking w ith partners. With regard to the transatlantic relationship, the

new draft states that 'our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA [and] for

this reason as well, the EU must further build up capabilities and increase coherence'. It is

acknowledged that 'Russia is a major factor in our security and prosperity' and that 'respect for

common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership.' For those regions that were

not specifically mentioned in the first draft, the second draft has something for everybody in the

recognition that 'our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the world:

our neighbours in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, Latin America and in Asia. These

relationships are an important asset to build on'.

In conclusion

Unlike the first draft, the new version has a brief conclusion which ends by stating that 'an active and

capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to

an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.' This positive tone

reflects a slight change in emphasis between the first and second drafts of the strategy. The revised

version leans slightly more towards the traditional EU (and UN) approaches to tackling global security

challenges, with more emphasis on preventive engagement to address old and new challenges and

threats using the entire spectrum of the EU's external instruments.While little new text has beenadded, muchhas been rearranged, and the overrall impression is of a more coherent document, with

something for everyone, and which the European Council is bound to endorse. The real challenge,

however, willbeits follow-up. While the strategy contains noble aspirations which all willsubscribe

to, it is unclear whether the IGC will equip the EU, operating in pursuit of 25 national interests, with

the institutional means and the political will to realise these objectives through concrete, coherent

and common actions.

Catriona Gourlay

News in Brief

Euro-Mediterranean countries take partnership forw ard

The VI Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers took place in Napleson 2-3 December. Three major initiativesresulted from the meeting: the creation of aEuro-Med Foundation for Dialogue and Culture; the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean bank;and the setting up of a Euro-Med Inter-Parliamentary Assembly,to meet at least once a year as a consultative body in the framework of the Barcelonaprocess. This followed recommendations from the Euro-Mediterranean ParliamentaryForum to increase visibility and transparencyof the Barcelona Process. The needtoratify all the Association Agreements by the next EU enlargement (May 2004) was alsostressed as a further step towards regional integration and the creation of a free-tradearea.

In the Political and Security pillar of the Euro-Med Partnership, Ministers underlined the

need to tackle the new security challenges through a concerted approach. Beyond theexisting political and security dialogues, Ministers agreed further complementarymeasures in the fields of maritime safety, environment, civilian crisis managementtraining, and co-operation among civil protection authorities. Senior officialswerecharged with taking this work forward.

Annual report on Arms Exports agreed

The Council approved the fifth annual report on the implementation of the EU Code ofConduct on Arms Exports on 8 December 2003.

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