ORI GIN AL PA PER

Examining the Role of Carbon Capture and StorageThrough an Ethical Lens

Fabien Medvecky • Justine Lacey • Peta Ashworth

Received: 6 July 2013 / Accepted: 16 September 2013

� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract The risk posed by anthropogenic climate change is generally accepted,

and the challenge we face to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to a tolerable

limit cannot be underestimated. Reducing GHG emissions can be achieved either by

producing less GHG to begin with or by emitting less GHG into the atmosphere.

One carbon mitigation technology with large potential for capturing carbon dioxide

at the point source of emissions is carbon capture and storage (CCS). However, the

merits of CCS have been questioned, both on practical and ethical grounds. While

the practical concerns have already received substantial attention, the ethical con-

cerns still demand further consideration. This article aims to respond to this deficit

by reviewing the critical ethical challenges raised by CCS as a possible tool in a

climate mitigation strategy and argues that the urgency stemming from climate

change underpins many of the concerns raised by CCS.

Keywords CCS � Climate change � Ethics � Intergenerational justice �Mitigation � Responsibility � Risk

Introduction

The risk posed by climate change and the recognition of its anthropogenic causes

are generally accepted by most in society (IPCC 2007a). With the latest projections

suggesting the world’s emissions are trending towards the extreme (Peters et al.

2013), the challenge to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to limit global

F. Medvecky (&)

The University of Queensland, St Lucia, Australia

e-mail: f.medvecky@uq.edu.au

J. Lacey � P. Ashworth

Division of Earth Science and Resource Engineering, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial

Research Organisation (CSIRO), QCAT, Kenmore, Australia

123

Sci Eng Ethics

DOI 10.1007/s11948-013-9474-z

warming to 2 �C cannot be underestimated (Torvanger and Meadowcroft 2011).

Economic analysis shows that early investment in mitigation—defined as any action

taken to reduce GHG emissions or enhance sinks to minimise the effects of global

warming (IPCC 2007b)—is likely to be the cheapest option for reducing the impacts

of global warming (Stern 2007; Garnaut 2011). This can be done either through

producing less GHG to begin with or emitting less GHG into the atmosphere. Based

on current performance, neither approach comes without its challenges.

One emerging carbon mitigation technology with large potential for capturing

carbon dioxide (CO2) at the point source of emissions, either from fossil fuel based

power plants or CO2 emitting industries (e.g. cement kilns, oil refineries), is carbon

capture and storage (CCS)1 (GCCSI 2011). As a result of this potential, it features in

many national and international climate mitigation strategies (IPCC 2005; IEA

2008). With global warming gaining momentum and coordinated international

action looking increasingly unlikely, over time there have been calls for more

attention to adoption policies with regard to CCS (Haszeldine 2009; Ashworth et al.

2010). With only a handful of storage projects operating at a commercial scale, the

viability of CCS is being challenged, particularly by environmental groups who

question the merit of extending the life of fossil fuels when they are a significant

cause of rising CO2 levels across the globe (Bellona Foundation 2008; NOAH

2009). However, as Brown (2011) states, all mitigation approaches to climate

change have the potential to cause harm, but these potential harms need to be

balanced against the risks of human induced climate change. Making these value

judgements and assessments is the domain of ethics.

Following Brown (2011: 318) we take ethics to mean ‘‘the domain of inquiry that

examines claims about what is right or wrong, obligatory or non-obligatory, or the

circumstances under which responsibility attaches to human actions’’. Similarly,

Singer (1994: 3) claims that ethics pertains to the question of ‘‘how we ought to live.

What makes an action the right, rather than the wrong, thing to do?’’ Traditionally,

ethics has been divided into two broad categories, meta ethics and normative ethics.

Meta ethics is best understood as the more abstract or theoretical aspects of

morality. These are the higher level or second order queries that seek ‘‘to identify

the relevant moral criteria, the weight or significance of each criterion, and to offer

some guidance on how we can determine whether an action satisfies those criteria’’

(LaFollette 2002: 8). In this regard, meta ethics is concerned with exploring the

connection between values, reasons for action and moral motivation (Sayre-McCord

2012). In effect, meta ethics is about uncovering the nature of our moral claims.

Alongside meta ethics, normative ethics are concerned with first order moral

queries which require us to consider the key issues and questions that arise when

considering how we ought to respond in practical situations, such as with the

development and use of technologies like CCS. Normative ethics tends to be further

1 The CCS process is comprised of three key stages: separation, transport; and storage. Initially, CO2 is

separated from other exhaust gases and contaminants produced when fossil fuels are burnt for energy

generation or other industrial processes. After separation, the CO2 is then compressed and transported to a

location, such as a geologic aquifer, for storage. At this storage site, the CO2 is then injected into the

ground under rock formations to depths of 1 km or more. Once injected, sensing technologies are used to

monitor the CO2 to ensure safe and long term storage.

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divided between normative theories (theories for assessing and justifying right and

wrong) and applied ethics (the application of those theories to specific cases)

(Kagan 1998; Darwall 2003). Applied ethics focuses on the rightness or wrongness

of particular human actions and behaviours, with a particular focus on the reasons or

justifications that are provided for making these judgements about what constitutes

right (or wrong) action. Applied ethics is prescriptive rather than descriptive which

is to say it tells us how things ought to be (or how we would like them to be) not

necessarily how they are. Thus, questions about right actions and obligations in

relation to climate change mitigation fall into this category. However, we also

examine closely the social norms and the context in which these moral dilemmas

arise. As noted above, this is particularly important because the circumstances of

our real lives and political affairs are often ‘non ideal’ requiring us to navigate

between preferred moral ideals and an imperfect ‘real world’ (Thompson 1985).

In this paper, we take a universal point of view with regard to ethics. That is to

say, we start from the position that no ethical principle can be justified based on the

self-interest of any particular or sectional group alone. This is not to say that we are

arguing that ethical principles are universally applicable, as we recognise that

circumstances and social conditions can play a key role in determining the right

outcome. However, what we are suggesting is that adopting a universal point of

view with respect to ethics implies the importance of giving ‘‘the same weight to the

interests of others as one gives to one’s own interests’’ (Singer 1999:11).2 However,

what is most interesting in this paper is the opportunity to examine the relationship

between the more theoretical or meta ethical issues and how they relate to the more

practical or normative aspects of CCS. This is because the theoretical and practical

aspects of the way we respond to a technology like CCS are inextricably linked. One

way in which this is most apparent is by considering how the spatial and temporal

complexities of an issue such as climate change has made it especially challenging

to make a strong connection between our moral intuitions about our immediate

responsibilities with respect to mitigating climate change and also our responsi-

bilities with respect to future generations (Gardiner 2006; Markowitz and Shariff

2012). Indeed, the issue of intergenerational justice highlights the challenges of our

moral motivation to act with respect to the longer term consequences of our actions

(or failure to act as the case may be).

The approach in this paper is therefore not to recommend a particular moral

position to the reader but rather to highlight and review some of the most critical

applied ethical issues that are associated with the use of CCS in balancing the risks

of mitigation approaches against the risks of human induced climate change, and

2 Singer (1999) notes this universal point of view with regard to ethical judgements has been reflected in

a wide range of theories, some of which are highly incompatible. This includes such theories as the

‘Golden Rule’ in Christianity, the Stoics’ view that ethics is derived from a universal natural law, Kant’s

Principle of Universalizability along with R. M. Hare’s later development of Kant’s theory, Hume and

Smith’s appeal to an impartial spectator in eighteenth century moral philosophy, utilitarian views from

Bentham to J. J. C. Smart regarding the equal value of persons, and Rawls’ development of ethical

principles from the Original Position. In these vastly different ethical theories and approaches, the one

common element that can be drawn out is the notion that ethics implies that we look beyond our own

concerns in order to also consider concerns of others. We do, however, recognise that the fundamental

differences in these theories are extensive and subject of much ongoing debate.

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some of the challenges related to doing this. We do this by first examining the

ethical implications of our (i.e. current generation of decision makers) response to

climate change mitigation and then move to undertake a closer examination of the

role of CCS in the mitigation portfolio. After investigating some foundational issues

regarding our responsibility to mitigate, we then systematically step through some

of the most critical applied ethical challenges in relation to implementing CCS.

Namely, how we should respond to the risks associated with CCS? What our

responsibilities to future generations are, the impacts of CCS for justice, and the role

of democracy in decision making. Some of these challenges have previously been

well voiced, others less so. We close with a discussion on the ethical implications

arising from the time constraint climate change forces upon us as this is a

reoccurring theme throughout this review.

To Mitigate or Not

Climate change is a particularly vexing moral problem because of the multitude of

concurrent ethical issues it raises. In some ways, although climate change is a global

problem, it is also comprised of a multitude of causes and effects, and a range of

social actors and institutions that are spread across the globe, and which are located

and operating within their own very specific local contexts (Garvey 2008). This

represents not only the social but also the spatial complexity of climate change. And

while society is a dynamic system, characterised by a range of social interactions

between individuals and groups, all have varying social roles and concomitant

responsibilities depending on their position in society. The ethical dimensions of the

interactions between these different groups mean that the actions of present

generations will also be felt far into the future. Gardiner (2006) defines climate

change as ‘‘a perfect moral storm in which global, intergenerational and technical

issues come together’’. These themes are also picked up by Caney (2009) who adds

human rights issues into the mix.

Further to this, Markowitz and Shariff (2012) argue that climate change fails to

generate strong moral intuitions and this, in turn, fails to motivate an urgent need to

act in the same way other moral imperatives do. In particular, the spatial and

temporal complexities of climate change impact on our understanding of moral

agency, causality and responsibility (Jamieson 1992; Garvey 2008). Gardiner (2006)

has described the problem as a theoretical failure that can lead to a moral failure,

and the complexity excuse has been problematically used in some cases as an

excuse to do nothing at all. However, in the scientific community, there is a general

consensus that we ought to do something about climate change (Gardiner and

Hartzell-Nichols 2012). In parallel, an ethical consensus has also formed with

regard to climate change, and the view is that we ought to take action (Broome

2008; Garvey 2008; Brown 2013).

Not only is there consensus that we ought to do something about climate change,

there is also some agreement about the direction our actions ought to take. The two

available options to deal with climate change are through mitigation and adaptation.

Adaptation has increasingly become an important component of the policy mix

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(Pielke et al. 2007). However, there is general agreement that adaptation on its own

is simply not sufficient, and that a large part of our response—arguably the largest—

ought to be in the form of mitigation (Stern 2007; Garnaut 2011). It is in this context

of mitigating emissions that CCS comes into play.

The Role of CCS in the Mitigation Portfolio

Without climate mitigation there is little argument for the development and

implementation of CCS. If we accept the broad definition of mitigation as any

action taken to reduce or offset the effects of climate change, then sequestration of

CO2 is clearly aligned with the goal of mitigation. However, some question the

legitimacy of CCS, arguing that it merely serves to provide us with a way of

justifying our ongoing use and reliance on fossil fuelled energy sources (Littlecott

2008; Rochon et al. 2008). That is, it promotes a ‘business as usual’ attitude towards

our dependence on fossil fuelled energy sources. Such a view implies that our moral

duty might be more appropriately met by ceasing to use these GHG producing

energy sources in the first place.

Further, claims have been made that our duty is in fact to adapt our lifestyles

away from the use of fossil fuelled energy so as to more effectively reduce the

production of GHG (Wuebbles and Jain 2001). We suggest this argument

oversimplifies the reality and complexity of the situation at hand. Undoubtedly,

with the passage of time and the non-renewable nature of fossil fuels, the world will

ultimately cease to use fossil fuels. However, with large numbers of the population

currently facing energy poverty, combined with projected global population growth

and the associated infrastructure and energy demands of this growth, simply

‘switching off’ our fossil fuel usage is likely to have significant and far reaching

impacts on human well-being (Hughes 2009). It moves us beyond the ethical

discussion of mitigation, to question whether our primary responsibility is to ensure

the steady continuity of well-being for humans (through ongoing energy supply) or

to redress our poor energy practices. The nature of this challenge is exacerbated

when we consider the increased fossil fuel use in developing economies such as

China, India, Brazil and others, which is helping to address widespread poverty.

Here the challenge becomes about weighing up poverty reduction through the

provision of low cost reliable energy with the application of more costly climate

change mitigation technologies.

Due to the extent of current energy infrastructure and sources around fossil fuels,

CCS provides a way of responding to climate change within the current limitations

imposed by the GHG emitting technologies on which we currently rely so heavily.

While there is an argument to be made against using CCS to mask the problems

associated with fossil fuel use, such a concern should not be perceived as a barrier to

use and implementation of CCS, but rather as reminder of our responsibility towards

mitigation. The question now becomes not whether CCS is a legitimate mitigation

option but rather what alternative options are currently available for addressing the

scale of anthropogenic GHG emissions and what the implications of each these

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options are. If we choose not to pursue CCS, then the reasons for our choices must

be made very clear.

One concern is that CCS technology incurs an energy penalty which might lead

to an increase in production of GHGs. Each stage of the CCS process (separation,

transport and storage) requires energy, and that energy must be deducted from the

output of the plants whose CO2 is being captured. Current best estimates assess the

energy penalty of CCS to amount to a ‘‘15–20 % reduction in overall electricity use

(House et al. 2009). The fact that CCS incurs an energy penalty has been a cause for

concern, particularly in developing countries such as China, due to the ensuing

reduction in available energy. However, this argument has been waning as experts

and opinion leaders gravitate towards the consensus position that CCS ought to be

considered in any energy mix aimed at combating climate change (Liang et al.

2011).

A further criticism of CCS is that investment in this technology diverts valuable

resources away from cleaner, more desirable renewable energy sources that will

have a longer term future (Rochon et al. 2008). However, this argument

oversimplifies the situation by implying that CCS technology and renewable

energy technologies exist as mutually exclusive choices in responding to climate

change. It is true that for any amount of resources that are devoted to one

technology, those very same resources cannot be allocated to other projects. But, it

does not follow that because there is an opportunity cost involved with pursuing

CCS technology, that cost automatically makes investment in other technologies

prohibitive (IEA 2013).

Most climate mitigation models demonstrate there are multiple options to be

explored in responding to anthropogenic climate change. For example, the earlier

research from Princeton University’s Carbon Mitigation Initiative (Pacala and

Socolow 2004) suggests that a ‘‘stabilisation wedge’’ approach to reducing carbon

emissions using a combination of available technologies—some of which involve

reducing emissions and some of which involve reducing production of emissions—

will be necessary to meet emissions reduction targets. The choice therefore, is not a

case of one technology or the other but rather utilising a variety of existing

technology options to take action (IEA 2009; IPCC 2011). Therefore, we can

assume that CCS should be considered one potential mitigation strategy which leads

us to examine the ethical implications of the technology itself.

The Ethical Landscape for CCS

Risk

Risk has been understood not only in terms of the technical risks posed by

technologies (Moller and Hansson 2008) but also the socio-political uncertainty

associated with these technologies (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2006). The technical

aspects of risk often relate to safety and avoiding risk through engineering

management and control systems. However, our understanding of technologies

within the broader context of society necessarily reflects the interrelated nature of

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complex technical, environmental, economic and social systems (Sotoudeh 2009).

This can also reflect a potential discrepancy between objective risk and public

perceptions of risk, which Singleton et al. (2009) have characterised as realist versus

social constructivist risk perspectives on CCS. However, one key issue that emerges

from this distinction relates to how technologies and the risks associated with them

are perceived (Fischhoff and Fischhoff 2001). In this regard, public perceptions of

risk tend to be more socially determined. For example, research has shown that trust

is an important co-determinant of the perceived risks and benefits associated with

CCS (Bradbury et al. 2009; Huijts et al. 2012). As Huijts et al. (2007: 2781) argue

‘‘trust may cause greater tolerance of uncertainties, willingness to explore

opportunities, and openness to new information. It allows people to make decisions

and enjoy the benefits of new and potentially risky technologies without having to

understand all the details’’. The literature also demonstrates that people can accept

risks if there are tangible benefits associated with them, but they assess these risks

against the perceived impacts to themselves and their friends, and how irreversible

the perceived impacts might be (Slovic 1993). Further, people are also more likely

to have a greater tolerance for unavoidable versus avoidable risks and the associated

negative consequences. In many ways, decisions about CCS reflect ethical decisions

about ‘‘the level, acceptability and distribution of risk in society beyond those in the

legislative arena (Bradbury et al. 2011: 9), particularly in relation to the more

technical risks, many of which are similar to those discussed with regard to nuclear

power and storage of radioactive waste (Spreng et al. 2007; Hansson and

Bryngelsson 2009).

In examining the nature of these ethical decisions about risk, Brown (2008, 2011)

suggests that the potential harms identified in relation to CCS can be broadly

categorised as follows: (1) risks to local populations located near CCS sites who

may be exposed to higher concentrations of CO2 because they live near injection

wells or feeder pipelines (Reiner and Nuttall 2011; West et al. 2011), and (2) risks

posed by long-term leakage or maintenance issues. According to Brown (2011) such

risks can be readily overcome by locating injection wells in unpopulated areas.

However, it does not necessarily follow that removing these risks from populated

areas automatically addresses the potential technical risks associated with leakage.

Rather, Brown’s solution merely removes this as an immediate harm for a human

population but it does not address the remaining question of how leakage might also

impact on animals, plant life and natural ecosystems, which may also have longer

term implications for humanity. This again highlights how those immediate term

considerations about siting of CCS facilities also need to be balanced against longer

term impacts that may have far reaching consequences. Alongside these technical

risks and their potential impacts, there are also questions about the role of

compensation and geographic equity associated with the siting of CCS facilities.

The risks associated with the ongoing storage of CO2 in these facilities are that

the facilities may leak or be accidentally excavated in the future (Wilson et al. 2003;

van der Zwaan and Gerlagh 2009). At a local level, the possible consequences of

leakage vary from suffocation of human and animal life to contamination of potable

water to induced seismicity (Wilson et al. 2003). However, the potential for leakage

from any given storage site has clear implications for the level of risk involved, and

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while the impacts of very small amounts of leakage over a very long time period

would seem negligible, high level leakage could potentially have adverse affects.

This view is supported by Reiner and Nuttall (2011: 302) who, based on the findings

of the British Geological Survey, suggest that CCS is a climate friendly option

because without it the leakage from fossil fuel energy generation would be 100 %.

In contrast, Shaffer (2010) suggests that in the long-run, a leakage rate of 1 % per

10 years would be enough to undermine the initial gains the technology offers with

regard to rising global temperatures. Clearly, being able to predict with accuracy

and manage the uncertainty of what will occur over long term storage time frames is

not without its challenges. Alongside these risks associated with storage, leakage

can also occur during transportation of CO2 or as a result of human error, all leading

to similar outcomes (Ha-Duong and Loisel 2011; Wallquist et al. 2012). For

example, during transportation, leakage may occur in pipelines due to component

failure or to infrastructure damage (Cole et al. 2011; Mazzoldi et al. 2011).

Although without these measures in place, it might also be argued that 100 % of

these emissions would be released into the atmosphere.

Given that there is much to gain or lose from ensuring the right storage site, Brown

(2011: 327) identifies that the ethical questions in relation to siting and storage tend to

revolve around establishing the ‘‘burden of proof’’. In particular, this relates to where

the responsibility lies for the quality of the site that is selected, its ongoing monitoring

and maintenance, and who is involved in making those decisions around the local

siting of CCS and its potential impacts. However, while these debates about the

technical aspects of the risks associated with CCS and how they could or should be

addressed have the potential to go on ad infinitum, what is critically important in terms

of addressing these technical risks comes back to the way they are perceived. In this

regard, part of that perception is about our moral duty to manage these uncertainties

given the responsibility we have to future generations. The real risk here is that in

failing to resolve our position on the technical aspects of risk, we will fail in our moral

duty to take action on mitigating climate change. This again highlights the importance

of understanding that our perception of the risk involved in acting on CCS, also needs

to incorporate the risk of not acting on CCS, and our motivations for this.

Rights and Duties Towards Future Generations

As mentioned previously, one of the reoccurring themes that drives debate over

climate change and, in turn CCS, is that of intergenerational justice. CCS raises

issues of intergenerational justice on two fronts. Firstly because by storing CO2 for

such long periods, CCS in effect displaces the risk current generations face with

regard to climate change and imposes that risk on future generations, and secondly,

because CCS is intrinsically linked to climate change, and the current generations’

decisions over climate change determines the distribution of the costs and benefits

of climate change across multiple generations. These considerations often lead us to

make decisions that challenge the common assumption regarding the ‘time

neutrality’ of moral status—the assumption that an individual should not be

morally discriminated against (count for less) simply because of when that

individual exists (Ekeli 2004).

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Intergenerational decisions raise two strands of ethical issues. One strand is

concerned with theoretical issues of the rights and duties of future generations. The

other strand is concerned with how our views concerning our duties towards, and the

rights of, future generations can be applied to intergenerational decisions. These

reflect meta ethics and applied ethics problems respectively. At the core of the meta

ethical issues are questions over whether future generations can or should have any

rights (Gosseries 2008). A core challenge to granting future generations’ rights is

that those future generations (or at least the majority of their constituents) do not yet

exist, and to attach a right to a non-existent entity seems nonsensical (Parfit 1987).

Worse still, it is not clear what harm we might do to future generations. This latter

problem arises because whichever policy we enact will generate a unique set of

future individuals. If we were to enact a mitigation policy, we would generate a

specific set of individuals, and if we were to enact an alternative policy (say,

‘business as usual’), we would generate a different set of individuals. Hence, for any

set of future individuals, they will only be alive only because we enacted the

policies we did in fact enact. If future individuals have a life worth living, then it

seems illogical for them to wish we had enacted a different policy as this would be

equivalent to wishing a different set of individuals had come to be (and hence to

wish they, themselves, were not alive) (Kavka 1982). If existence is essential for the

possibility of rights and the possibility to be harmed, then current actions do not and

cannot harm future generations, and future generations do not and cannot have any

rights (Grey 1996). Yet, the claim that we have no moral reason to take future

generations’ well-being seriously seems deeply counterintuitive

One way of taking the well-being of future generations seriously, without

committing to having duties towards future generations or to granting future

generations rights, is to claim that future generations’ interests are taken care of

because we, the current generation, have an interest in the well-being of our progeny

and incorporate that interest in our views (Marglin 1963). But this claim has a long

history of failing. For example, when men claimed to have ‘incorporated’ their

wives’ views and interests, thereby making universal suffrage irrelevant, or when

the well-being of slaves and servants were ‘incorporated’ in their masters’ decisions

because happy slaves work better (Goodin 1996). Indeed, it seems almost inevitable

that we do have some moral responsibility towards future generations, although it

has been recognised that there are psychological barriers to turning these

responsibilities into motivations for action. A more promising avenue that has

received increasing attention is to think of intergenerational justice in terms of

human rights. By appealing to human rights, the exact constitution of future

generations falls to the background. Instead, the environment in which these future

generations will live and the capacity for this environment to provide them with

adequate living standards in terms of health, food and so forth become the focus

(Caney 2010).

Thus, if we accept that future generations have rights, the next question becomes

‘‘what rights do future generations have and what duties do we (the current

generation) have towards them? Determining the rights of and duties towards future

generations is particularly important because future generations are strangely

vulnerable participants in intergenerational decisions. Intergenerational decisions

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have two defining features: (1) future generations which will be greatly affected by

the decision cannot take part in the decision-making process, and (2) future

generations which will be greatly affected by the decision will not be able to hold

the decision makers accountable. Consequently, the current generation has

unmitigated power over the potential well-being of future generations, while the

latter are at the mercy of current decision makers (Gardiner 2003). How we define

the rights or duties with regard to future generations will determine how we use (or

abuse) this power.

For instance, implementing CCS will place some economic burden on future

generations (and numerous iterations of them) with regard to the maintenance of

storage sites. Indeed, the economics of climate change is plagued with ethical

challenges, and CCS is no exception (Dietz et al. 2007). As with the issue of risk

where it may be argued that CCS simply displaces the risk of climate change from

the current (or near current) generation to distant future generations, from an

economic perspective, it could be argued that CCS simply displaces the cost of

dealing with climate change. There are also substantial challenges to how we assess

the present value of future costs and benefits, and what social discount rate we

should use (Quiggin 2008; Medvecky 2012). While there is a near universal

agreement that future costs and benefits should be discounted—that current

consumption ought to be valued more highly than future consumption due to

(amongst other things) economic growth, uncertainty over future prospects and

human impatience—there is no agreement what the discount rate ought to be

(Nordhaus 2007; Stern 2007; Howarth 2009).

These economic considerations also raise concerns with monetizing benefits and

estimating costs, both of which are acknowledged to be near impossible in such

long-term and complex decisions (Ackerman and Heinzerling 2001). Classically,

estimating and monetizing costs and benefits in environmental economics requires

either some existing data to extrapolate from, or the capacity to elicit values from

relevant stakeholders (Garrod and Willis 1999). In long-term intergenerational

decisions, however, we have neither reliable data of future monetary values, nor the

capacity to coherently survey all relevant stakeholders—since future generations

form a large contingent of the latter. With regard to CCS, this makes the assessment

of the future costs and benefits of the technology difficult. However, issues of

accessibility to information about the future and to future generations’ preferences

are inherent in such long-term decisions. As is the case with the ethical issues

surrounding risk, the greatest moral challenge we face is to ensure we do not fail in

our moral duty to act on climate change as a result of paralysis driven by

disagreement over such matters.

Distributive Justice

Carbon capture and storage technology also has particular ethical implications with

regard to distributive justice. Such implications apply not only to the way we

understand intergenerational justice as outlined above but also to notions of justice

as applied to our social, political and economic arrangements among others (Gough

and Boucher 2013). In this paper, distributive justice incorporates these multiple

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concerns and is defined as the just distribution of the benefits and burdens associated

with CCS technology and our capacity to ensure an outcome in which all parties are

treated fairly. We define treated fairly in terms of equality and equity. By equality,

we mean that each agent has been allocated the same amount of benefit (all things

being equal), while by equity we mean that the process of allocation was impartial

and each agent was treated equally (Klinsky and Dowlatabadi 2009). Although

justice is only one part of the broader ethical landscape, it has been described as

‘‘the first virtue of social institutions’’ (Rawls 1971) and remains a strong theme in

the climate change ethics literature (Brown 2003; Gardiner 2011).

Carbon capture and storage technology creates specific justice issues with regard

to the management and storage of CO2. Instead of dispersing CO2 directly into the

atmosphere where it has a lifespan of approximately 100 years, CCS stores CO2 for

periods of 1,000 years or more (Brown 2011). While this certainly creates a need to

manage stored CO2 over a longer time period, the choice to continue emitting CO2

into the atmosphere has the long term impact of contributing to climate change

which will also be felt for hundreds of years (Garvey 2008). This again highlights

the temporal complexities associated with assessing how the responsibilities

associated with the moral decisions and actions that are taken now will be

distributed across current and future generations. Further, widespread deployment of

CCS has significant implications for the temporal and spatial dimensions of the life

cycle of fossil-fuelled energy generation. This is because, like nuclear technology, it

creates significant long term liabilities, not all of which are yet well understood. The

long term nature of these sites means that the potential sale and transfer of

responsibilities does present an ongoing concern beyond those of risk and

intergenerational justice discussed above. Specifically, there are concerns over

whether those ongoing responsibilities will rest with the private or public sector.

While the management of storage sites is likely to be the responsibility of

governments (as is the case with nuclear waste management), who should carry the

cost of such management is yet to be determined (Fentiman 2013). In terms of

justice, this highlights a tension in the role of the state as it needs to both ensure a

just outcome for all participants and rectify any perceived injustices, while at the

same time being itself a potential victim or perpetrator of injustice.

A further key consideration in relation to justice is around the dynamics

between the local burdens imposed on a community by a CCS project versus the

global benefits it brings about in terms of reduced emissions (Ashworth et al.

2012). There is no doubt that a proposition for a CCS project raises a number of

local concerns including the potential for leakage of CO2, associated health and

safety issues, not to mention the potential for a drop in housing values. This again

raises questions of the role of compensation and geographic equity and highlights

just how siting and storage decisions can challenge the fundamentals of justice in

relation to CCS. Some of these issues can be addressed by engaging the

community in the decision making process and ensuring that the compensation is

perceived as adequate (ter Mors et al. 2012). However, as with the previous

concern, there remains an issue as to who should be responsible for funding such

compensation arrangements.

Examining the Role of Carbon Capture

123

Further to this, questions related to who is investing in the technology and what

rights this affords them, also have a bearing on achieving just outcomes. In relation

to new technologies, such questions are often framed around intellectual property

and the rights to exploit research and development through technology transfer

(Warshofsky 1994; Lamont and Lacey 2006). While this concern is not specific to

CCS, the idea that climate change mitigation technologies might be sold for profit to

developing nations to meet global GHG reduction targets creates particular

inequities in terms of international justice (Rimmer 2012; Sethi 2012). Moreover,

the stance taken in relation to intellectual property also relates to the preceding

concerns. The permission to benefit through the exploitation of a given technology

seems to come hand-in-hand with the responsibility to shoulder the costs associated

with the use of the technology.

An associated issue is the international distribution of the benefits and burdens of

CCS technology. Globally, nations have contributed in different ways to the current

level of GHG atmospheric concentrations and it has been argued that wealthier

nations have benefitted by establishing the current situation where they can now

afford to reduce their emissions (Brown et al. 2009). By contrast, a lack of resources

and an absence of funding support for implementing these technologies in poorer

nations means the latter will likely be placed in a position where they need to emit

more GHG than current levels just to meet basic human needs for food, shelter and

security (Shue 1993, 1999; de Coninck 2008). Not only would this be counterpro-

ductive to the essence of CCS as a climate change mitigation policy, but this also

raises issues of justice over past actions, the distribution of past benefits and the

ensuing responsibilities of these past benefits (Bell 2010). However, inaction or

delayed action on climate change is also likely to place additional economic burden

on poorer countries, and any decisions to delay the implementation of CCS and

other mitigation policies must consider the implications for such nations.

It is clear that decisions about CCS are embedded within, and impact upon, a

range of social, political, economic and institutional arrangements. Ensuring just

outcomes from those decisions means having a clear understanding of the nature of

those linkages and how costs and benefits will be distributed based on the course of

action chosen. In any case, where our actions depart from providing just and

equitable outcomes for all concerned, we need to be able to clearly demonstrate why

such a course of action (which may in fact create inequalities) can be justified.

Democracy and Decision Making

Extending the focus on justice, the role of democracy and decision making with

respect to CCS technology also emphasises the importance of procedural justice.

Procedural justice describes the extent to which mechanisms of decision making are

considered fair (Lind and Tyler 1988). It focuses on who is engaged in decision

making processes and on questions of power and representation in these processes

(Jasanoff 2003) which is especially relevant when competing interests are at play.

For CCS technology, a clear understanding of the relative roles and power of

national governments, research agencies and universities, international agencies and

networks, industry, non-government organisations and the public to inform and

F. Medvecky et al.

123

make these decisions is critically important to matters of procedural justice. For the

CCS industry and project developers, the focus has tended to be on the technical and

geological specifications of CCS development, however there are a range of social

and political issues that must also be considered in engaging with the priorities of

multiple stakeholders (Brunsting et al. 2011; de Coninck and Backstrand 2011;

Ashworth et al. 2012). The adoption of more participatory and deliberative

democratic processes can provide the necessary scope for assessing the social values

and tradeoffs involved in decisions about technology (Durant 1999; Schot 2001;

Genus 2006).

One area of CCS research that has received significant attention has been in

relation to the social acceptance of the technology in an effort to address ethical

concerns that have arisen and much of the associated literature has focused on the

importance of stakeholder collaboration in this regard (Ashworth et al. 2010, 2012;

Brunsting et al. 2011). While recent research on social acceptance of CCS

technology has found that public acceptance is often driven by perceptions of how

technical risks will be managed, what is also important in this context is whether the

development and implementation of CCS projects will incorporate processes that

are regarded as fair and transparent by those affected and whether or not there will

be mechanisms in place for the public to voice their concerns (Bradbury et al. 2009;

Terwel et al. 2010; Ashworth et al. 2012). While participatory activities such as

town hall meetings raise their own strands of ethical concerns (Who should be

invited? Are these activities democratic engagement or social marketing?), the

numerous studies available that document processes around stakeholder engagement

with CCS projects suggest these are more likely to simply be implementation issues

(Upham and Roberts 2011; Einsiedel et al. 2013; Pisarski and Ashworth 2013).

However, the implications of achieving ‘right’ process for the current generation,

will inevitably have implications and consequences for many years to come. Again,

the effectiveness of how we realise procedural justice now impacts on the

experience of future generations.

Concluding Remarks

Carbon capture and storage stands apart from the other energy policy responses to

anthropogenic climate change because it only has merit as a form of emission

reduction. The alternatives, such as wind, solar, nuclear or tidal energy, can all be

argued for on grounds other than climate change mitigation, such as increasing or

diversifying our energy supply system. CCS, on the other hand, is intimately linked

to emission reductions, and this link comes with urgency. It is widely accepted that

if we are to avoid the worst of the effects of climate change, substantial headway

must be made in CO2 emissions reduction policy by 2020 (Hansen et al. 2008;

Meinshausen et al. 2009). If CCS is to be a useful mitigation strategy, some fully

functional large-scale sites must be in place and operational no later than 2030, and

the technology will need to be fully rolled out by 2050 (Haszeldine 2009).

Currently, there are 16 plants in operation or under construction, still a far cry from

the suggested 100 plus plants that need to be in operation by 2020 based on earlier

Examining the Role of Carbon Capture

123

road mapping activities (GCCSI 2012). In reviewing the ethical challenges raised by

CCS, a reoccurring theme has been that a failure to act on climate change also raises

ethical issues, be it with regard to risk or to future generations. Inaction on climate

change places future generations at risk, it is likely to place additional economic and

social burdens on them, as it is on some of the poorer nations in the world. This

raises a unique set of ethical issues with regard to timeliness in the implementation

of CCS. Because the usefulness of the technology is predicated on it being well

established by 2030 (de Coninck et al. 2009), we have a constrained time frame for

undertaking research into CCS, whether it be research into the scientific, economic

or societal aspects. This is ethically challenging because if we implement the

technology and there are unanticipated consequences, we may be placing both

current and future generations at unnecessary risk, while if we delay implementation

too long, we risk failing in our responsibility to combat climate change.

The issue of timeliness of implementation is not new and has been well rehearsed

in health care, where the cost/benefits of gathering better information is always

balanced against the costs and benefits of premature adoption (Chalkidou et al.

2008; Holland and Hope 2012). Health care research has developed sound strategies

for balancing the timely implementation of innovations with the need for further

research (Rogowski 2010). Indeed, formalised decision making rules for exactly

such kinds of scenarios have been proposed (Forster and Pertile 2012). A key

element of these decisions is their reliance on a clear strategy for implementation. A

strategy that defines the required research before implementation can be considered,

the timeline under which such research must be carried out, and, if the research

returns supportive findings, the timeline for adopting the technology. It is worth

noting that increasingly, some of the later research, is often recommended to be

undertaken concurrently with implementation (Chalkidou et al. 2008; Longworth

et al. 2013). A similar parallel approach could also be taken in the case of CCS

whereby we develop and commit to a strategy for implementation that takes into

account the inherent urgency of the situation the world is facing with climate

change. Indeed, one might argue if we are to have any hope at mitigating climate

change we have a moral responsibility, as a global community, to do so.

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