ORI GIN AL PA PER
Examining the Role of Carbon Capture and StorageThrough an Ethical Lens
Fabien Medvecky • Justine Lacey • Peta Ashworth
Received: 6 July 2013 / Accepted: 16 September 2013
� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
Abstract The risk posed by anthropogenic climate change is generally accepted,
and the challenge we face to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to a tolerable
limit cannot be underestimated. Reducing GHG emissions can be achieved either by
producing less GHG to begin with or by emitting less GHG into the atmosphere.
One carbon mitigation technology with large potential for capturing carbon dioxide
at the point source of emissions is carbon capture and storage (CCS). However, the
merits of CCS have been questioned, both on practical and ethical grounds. While
the practical concerns have already received substantial attention, the ethical con-
cerns still demand further consideration. This article aims to respond to this deficit
by reviewing the critical ethical challenges raised by CCS as a possible tool in a
climate mitigation strategy and argues that the urgency stemming from climate
change underpins many of the concerns raised by CCS.
Keywords CCS � Climate change � Ethics � Intergenerational justice �Mitigation � Responsibility � Risk
Introduction
The risk posed by climate change and the recognition of its anthropogenic causes
are generally accepted by most in society (IPCC 2007a). With the latest projections
suggesting the world’s emissions are trending towards the extreme (Peters et al.
2013), the challenge to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to limit global
F. Medvecky (&)
The University of Queensland, St Lucia, Australia
e-mail: [email protected]
J. Lacey � P. Ashworth
Division of Earth Science and Resource Engineering, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial
Research Organisation (CSIRO), QCAT, Kenmore, Australia
123
Sci Eng Ethics
DOI 10.1007/s11948-013-9474-z
warming to 2 �C cannot be underestimated (Torvanger and Meadowcroft 2011).
Economic analysis shows that early investment in mitigation—defined as any action
taken to reduce GHG emissions or enhance sinks to minimise the effects of global
warming (IPCC 2007b)—is likely to be the cheapest option for reducing the impacts
of global warming (Stern 2007; Garnaut 2011). This can be done either through
producing less GHG to begin with or emitting less GHG into the atmosphere. Based
on current performance, neither approach comes without its challenges.
One emerging carbon mitigation technology with large potential for capturing
carbon dioxide (CO2) at the point source of emissions, either from fossil fuel based
power plants or CO2 emitting industries (e.g. cement kilns, oil refineries), is carbon
capture and storage (CCS)1 (GCCSI 2011). As a result of this potential, it features in
many national and international climate mitigation strategies (IPCC 2005; IEA
2008). With global warming gaining momentum and coordinated international
action looking increasingly unlikely, over time there have been calls for more
attention to adoption policies with regard to CCS (Haszeldine 2009; Ashworth et al.
2010). With only a handful of storage projects operating at a commercial scale, the
viability of CCS is being challenged, particularly by environmental groups who
question the merit of extending the life of fossil fuels when they are a significant
cause of rising CO2 levels across the globe (Bellona Foundation 2008; NOAH
2009). However, as Brown (2011) states, all mitigation approaches to climate
change have the potential to cause harm, but these potential harms need to be
balanced against the risks of human induced climate change. Making these value
judgements and assessments is the domain of ethics.
Following Brown (2011: 318) we take ethics to mean ‘‘the domain of inquiry that
examines claims about what is right or wrong, obligatory or non-obligatory, or the
circumstances under which responsibility attaches to human actions’’. Similarly,
Singer (1994: 3) claims that ethics pertains to the question of ‘‘how we ought to live.
What makes an action the right, rather than the wrong, thing to do?’’ Traditionally,
ethics has been divided into two broad categories, meta ethics and normative ethics.
Meta ethics is best understood as the more abstract or theoretical aspects of
morality. These are the higher level or second order queries that seek ‘‘to identify
the relevant moral criteria, the weight or significance of each criterion, and to offer
some guidance on how we can determine whether an action satisfies those criteria’’
(LaFollette 2002: 8). In this regard, meta ethics is concerned with exploring the
connection between values, reasons for action and moral motivation (Sayre-McCord
2012). In effect, meta ethics is about uncovering the nature of our moral claims.
Alongside meta ethics, normative ethics are concerned with first order moral
queries which require us to consider the key issues and questions that arise when
considering how we ought to respond in practical situations, such as with the
development and use of technologies like CCS. Normative ethics tends to be further
1 The CCS process is comprised of three key stages: separation, transport; and storage. Initially, CO2 is
separated from other exhaust gases and contaminants produced when fossil fuels are burnt for energy
generation or other industrial processes. After separation, the CO2 is then compressed and transported to a
location, such as a geologic aquifer, for storage. At this storage site, the CO2 is then injected into the
ground under rock formations to depths of 1 km or more. Once injected, sensing technologies are used to
monitor the CO2 to ensure safe and long term storage.
F. Medvecky et al.
123
divided between normative theories (theories for assessing and justifying right and
wrong) and applied ethics (the application of those theories to specific cases)
(Kagan 1998; Darwall 2003). Applied ethics focuses on the rightness or wrongness
of particular human actions and behaviours, with a particular focus on the reasons or
justifications that are provided for making these judgements about what constitutes
right (or wrong) action. Applied ethics is prescriptive rather than descriptive which
is to say it tells us how things ought to be (or how we would like them to be) not
necessarily how they are. Thus, questions about right actions and obligations in
relation to climate change mitigation fall into this category. However, we also
examine closely the social norms and the context in which these moral dilemmas
arise. As noted above, this is particularly important because the circumstances of
our real lives and political affairs are often ‘non ideal’ requiring us to navigate
between preferred moral ideals and an imperfect ‘real world’ (Thompson 1985).
In this paper, we take a universal point of view with regard to ethics. That is to
say, we start from the position that no ethical principle can be justified based on the
self-interest of any particular or sectional group alone. This is not to say that we are
arguing that ethical principles are universally applicable, as we recognise that
circumstances and social conditions can play a key role in determining the right
outcome. However, what we are suggesting is that adopting a universal point of
view with respect to ethics implies the importance of giving ‘‘the same weight to the
interests of others as one gives to one’s own interests’’ (Singer 1999:11).2 However,
what is most interesting in this paper is the opportunity to examine the relationship
between the more theoretical or meta ethical issues and how they relate to the more
practical or normative aspects of CCS. This is because the theoretical and practical
aspects of the way we respond to a technology like CCS are inextricably linked. One
way in which this is most apparent is by considering how the spatial and temporal
complexities of an issue such as climate change has made it especially challenging
to make a strong connection between our moral intuitions about our immediate
responsibilities with respect to mitigating climate change and also our responsi-
bilities with respect to future generations (Gardiner 2006; Markowitz and Shariff
2012). Indeed, the issue of intergenerational justice highlights the challenges of our
moral motivation to act with respect to the longer term consequences of our actions
(or failure to act as the case may be).
The approach in this paper is therefore not to recommend a particular moral
position to the reader but rather to highlight and review some of the most critical
applied ethical issues that are associated with the use of CCS in balancing the risks
of mitigation approaches against the risks of human induced climate change, and
2 Singer (1999) notes this universal point of view with regard to ethical judgements has been reflected in
a wide range of theories, some of which are highly incompatible. This includes such theories as the
‘Golden Rule’ in Christianity, the Stoics’ view that ethics is derived from a universal natural law, Kant’s
Principle of Universalizability along with R. M. Hare’s later development of Kant’s theory, Hume and
Smith’s appeal to an impartial spectator in eighteenth century moral philosophy, utilitarian views from
Bentham to J. J. C. Smart regarding the equal value of persons, and Rawls’ development of ethical
principles from the Original Position. In these vastly different ethical theories and approaches, the one
common element that can be drawn out is the notion that ethics implies that we look beyond our own
concerns in order to also consider concerns of others. We do, however, recognise that the fundamental
differences in these theories are extensive and subject of much ongoing debate.
Examining the Role of Carbon Capture
123
some of the challenges related to doing this. We do this by first examining the
ethical implications of our (i.e. current generation of decision makers) response to
climate change mitigation and then move to undertake a closer examination of the
role of CCS in the mitigation portfolio. After investigating some foundational issues
regarding our responsibility to mitigate, we then systematically step through some
of the most critical applied ethical challenges in relation to implementing CCS.
Namely, how we should respond to the risks associated with CCS? What our
responsibilities to future generations are, the impacts of CCS for justice, and the role
of democracy in decision making. Some of these challenges have previously been
well voiced, others less so. We close with a discussion on the ethical implications
arising from the time constraint climate change forces upon us as this is a
reoccurring theme throughout this review.
To Mitigate or Not
Climate change is a particularly vexing moral problem because of the multitude of
concurrent ethical issues it raises. In some ways, although climate change is a global
problem, it is also comprised of a multitude of causes and effects, and a range of
social actors and institutions that are spread across the globe, and which are located
and operating within their own very specific local contexts (Garvey 2008). This
represents not only the social but also the spatial complexity of climate change. And
while society is a dynamic system, characterised by a range of social interactions
between individuals and groups, all have varying social roles and concomitant
responsibilities depending on their position in society. The ethical dimensions of the
interactions between these different groups mean that the actions of present
generations will also be felt far into the future. Gardiner (2006) defines climate
change as ‘‘a perfect moral storm in which global, intergenerational and technical
issues come together’’. These themes are also picked up by Caney (2009) who adds
human rights issues into the mix.
Further to this, Markowitz and Shariff (2012) argue that climate change fails to
generate strong moral intuitions and this, in turn, fails to motivate an urgent need to
act in the same way other moral imperatives do. In particular, the spatial and
temporal complexities of climate change impact on our understanding of moral
agency, causality and responsibility (Jamieson 1992; Garvey 2008). Gardiner (2006)
has described the problem as a theoretical failure that can lead to a moral failure,
and the complexity excuse has been problematically used in some cases as an
excuse to do nothing at all. However, in the scientific community, there is a general
consensus that we ought to do something about climate change (Gardiner and
Hartzell-Nichols 2012). In parallel, an ethical consensus has also formed with
regard to climate change, and the view is that we ought to take action (Broome
2008; Garvey 2008; Brown 2013).
Not only is there consensus that we ought to do something about climate change,
there is also some agreement about the direction our actions ought to take. The two
available options to deal with climate change are through mitigation and adaptation.
Adaptation has increasingly become an important component of the policy mix
F. Medvecky et al.
123
(Pielke et al. 2007). However, there is general agreement that adaptation on its own
is simply not sufficient, and that a large part of our response—arguably the largest—
ought to be in the form of mitigation (Stern 2007; Garnaut 2011). It is in this context
of mitigating emissions that CCS comes into play.
The Role of CCS in the Mitigation Portfolio
Without climate mitigation there is little argument for the development and
implementation of CCS. If we accept the broad definition of mitigation as any
action taken to reduce or offset the effects of climate change, then sequestration of
CO2 is clearly aligned with the goal of mitigation. However, some question the
legitimacy of CCS, arguing that it merely serves to provide us with a way of
justifying our ongoing use and reliance on fossil fuelled energy sources (Littlecott
2008; Rochon et al. 2008). That is, it promotes a ‘business as usual’ attitude towards
our dependence on fossil fuelled energy sources. Such a view implies that our moral
duty might be more appropriately met by ceasing to use these GHG producing
energy sources in the first place.
Further, claims have been made that our duty is in fact to adapt our lifestyles
away from the use of fossil fuelled energy so as to more effectively reduce the
production of GHG (Wuebbles and Jain 2001). We suggest this argument
oversimplifies the reality and complexity of the situation at hand. Undoubtedly,
with the passage of time and the non-renewable nature of fossil fuels, the world will
ultimately cease to use fossil fuels. However, with large numbers of the population
currently facing energy poverty, combined with projected global population growth
and the associated infrastructure and energy demands of this growth, simply
‘switching off’ our fossil fuel usage is likely to have significant and far reaching
impacts on human well-being (Hughes 2009). It moves us beyond the ethical
discussion of mitigation, to question whether our primary responsibility is to ensure
the steady continuity of well-being for humans (through ongoing energy supply) or
to redress our poor energy practices. The nature of this challenge is exacerbated
when we consider the increased fossil fuel use in developing economies such as
China, India, Brazil and others, which is helping to address widespread poverty.
Here the challenge becomes about weighing up poverty reduction through the
provision of low cost reliable energy with the application of more costly climate
change mitigation technologies.
Due to the extent of current energy infrastructure and sources around fossil fuels,
CCS provides a way of responding to climate change within the current limitations
imposed by the GHG emitting technologies on which we currently rely so heavily.
While there is an argument to be made against using CCS to mask the problems
associated with fossil fuel use, such a concern should not be perceived as a barrier to
use and implementation of CCS, but rather as reminder of our responsibility towards
mitigation. The question now becomes not whether CCS is a legitimate mitigation
option but rather what alternative options are currently available for addressing the
scale of anthropogenic GHG emissions and what the implications of each these
Examining the Role of Carbon Capture
123
options are. If we choose not to pursue CCS, then the reasons for our choices must
be made very clear.
One concern is that CCS technology incurs an energy penalty which might lead
to an increase in production of GHGs. Each stage of the CCS process (separation,
transport and storage) requires energy, and that energy must be deducted from the
output of the plants whose CO2 is being captured. Current best estimates assess the
energy penalty of CCS to amount to a ‘‘15–20 % reduction in overall electricity use
(House et al. 2009). The fact that CCS incurs an energy penalty has been a cause for
concern, particularly in developing countries such as China, due to the ensuing
reduction in available energy. However, this argument has been waning as experts
and opinion leaders gravitate towards the consensus position that CCS ought to be
considered in any energy mix aimed at combating climate change (Liang et al.
2011).
A further criticism of CCS is that investment in this technology diverts valuable
resources away from cleaner, more desirable renewable energy sources that will
have a longer term future (Rochon et al. 2008). However, this argument
oversimplifies the situation by implying that CCS technology and renewable
energy technologies exist as mutually exclusive choices in responding to climate
change. It is true that for any amount of resources that are devoted to one
technology, those very same resources cannot be allocated to other projects. But, it
does not follow that because there is an opportunity cost involved with pursuing
CCS technology, that cost automatically makes investment in other technologies
prohibitive (IEA 2013).
Most climate mitigation models demonstrate there are multiple options to be
explored in responding to anthropogenic climate change. For example, the earlier
research from Princeton University’s Carbon Mitigation Initiative (Pacala and
Socolow 2004) suggests that a ‘‘stabilisation wedge’’ approach to reducing carbon
emissions using a combination of available technologies—some of which involve
reducing emissions and some of which involve reducing production of emissions—
will be necessary to meet emissions reduction targets. The choice therefore, is not a
case of one technology or the other but rather utilising a variety of existing
technology options to take action (IEA 2009; IPCC 2011). Therefore, we can
assume that CCS should be considered one potential mitigation strategy which leads
us to examine the ethical implications of the technology itself.
The Ethical Landscape for CCS
Risk
Risk has been understood not only in terms of the technical risks posed by
technologies (Moller and Hansson 2008) but also the socio-political uncertainty
associated with these technologies (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2006). The technical
aspects of risk often relate to safety and avoiding risk through engineering
management and control systems. However, our understanding of technologies
within the broader context of society necessarily reflects the interrelated nature of
F. Medvecky et al.
123
complex technical, environmental, economic and social systems (Sotoudeh 2009).
This can also reflect a potential discrepancy between objective risk and public
perceptions of risk, which Singleton et al. (2009) have characterised as realist versus
social constructivist risk perspectives on CCS. However, one key issue that emerges
from this distinction relates to how technologies and the risks associated with them
are perceived (Fischhoff and Fischhoff 2001). In this regard, public perceptions of
risk tend to be more socially determined. For example, research has shown that trust
is an important co-determinant of the perceived risks and benefits associated with
CCS (Bradbury et al. 2009; Huijts et al. 2012). As Huijts et al. (2007: 2781) argue
‘‘trust may cause greater tolerance of uncertainties, willingness to explore
opportunities, and openness to new information. It allows people to make decisions
and enjoy the benefits of new and potentially risky technologies without having to
understand all the details’’. The literature also demonstrates that people can accept
risks if there are tangible benefits associated with them, but they assess these risks
against the perceived impacts to themselves and their friends, and how irreversible
the perceived impacts might be (Slovic 1993). Further, people are also more likely
to have a greater tolerance for unavoidable versus avoidable risks and the associated
negative consequences. In many ways, decisions about CCS reflect ethical decisions
about ‘‘the level, acceptability and distribution of risk in society beyond those in the
legislative arena (Bradbury et al. 2011: 9), particularly in relation to the more
technical risks, many of which are similar to those discussed with regard to nuclear
power and storage of radioactive waste (Spreng et al. 2007; Hansson and
Bryngelsson 2009).
In examining the nature of these ethical decisions about risk, Brown (2008, 2011)
suggests that the potential harms identified in relation to CCS can be broadly
categorised as follows: (1) risks to local populations located near CCS sites who
may be exposed to higher concentrations of CO2 because they live near injection
wells or feeder pipelines (Reiner and Nuttall 2011; West et al. 2011), and (2) risks
posed by long-term leakage or maintenance issues. According to Brown (2011) such
risks can be readily overcome by locating injection wells in unpopulated areas.
However, it does not necessarily follow that removing these risks from populated
areas automatically addresses the potential technical risks associated with leakage.
Rather, Brown’s solution merely removes this as an immediate harm for a human
population but it does not address the remaining question of how leakage might also
impact on animals, plant life and natural ecosystems, which may also have longer
term implications for humanity. This again highlights how those immediate term
considerations about siting of CCS facilities also need to be balanced against longer
term impacts that may have far reaching consequences. Alongside these technical
risks and their potential impacts, there are also questions about the role of
compensation and geographic equity associated with the siting of CCS facilities.
The risks associated with the ongoing storage of CO2 in these facilities are that
the facilities may leak or be accidentally excavated in the future (Wilson et al. 2003;
van der Zwaan and Gerlagh 2009). At a local level, the possible consequences of
leakage vary from suffocation of human and animal life to contamination of potable
water to induced seismicity (Wilson et al. 2003). However, the potential for leakage
from any given storage site has clear implications for the level of risk involved, and
Examining the Role of Carbon Capture
123
while the impacts of very small amounts of leakage over a very long time period
would seem negligible, high level leakage could potentially have adverse affects.
This view is supported by Reiner and Nuttall (2011: 302) who, based on the findings
of the British Geological Survey, suggest that CCS is a climate friendly option
because without it the leakage from fossil fuel energy generation would be 100 %.
In contrast, Shaffer (2010) suggests that in the long-run, a leakage rate of 1 % per
10 years would be enough to undermine the initial gains the technology offers with
regard to rising global temperatures. Clearly, being able to predict with accuracy
and manage the uncertainty of what will occur over long term storage time frames is
not without its challenges. Alongside these risks associated with storage, leakage
can also occur during transportation of CO2 or as a result of human error, all leading
to similar outcomes (Ha-Duong and Loisel 2011; Wallquist et al. 2012). For
example, during transportation, leakage may occur in pipelines due to component
failure or to infrastructure damage (Cole et al. 2011; Mazzoldi et al. 2011).
Although without these measures in place, it might also be argued that 100 % of
these emissions would be released into the atmosphere.
Given that there is much to gain or lose from ensuring the right storage site, Brown
(2011: 327) identifies that the ethical questions in relation to siting and storage tend to
revolve around establishing the ‘‘burden of proof’’. In particular, this relates to where
the responsibility lies for the quality of the site that is selected, its ongoing monitoring
and maintenance, and who is involved in making those decisions around the local
siting of CCS and its potential impacts. However, while these debates about the
technical aspects of the risks associated with CCS and how they could or should be
addressed have the potential to go on ad infinitum, what is critically important in terms
of addressing these technical risks comes back to the way they are perceived. In this
regard, part of that perception is about our moral duty to manage these uncertainties
given the responsibility we have to future generations. The real risk here is that in
failing to resolve our position on the technical aspects of risk, we will fail in our moral
duty to take action on mitigating climate change. This again highlights the importance
of understanding that our perception of the risk involved in acting on CCS, also needs
to incorporate the risk of not acting on CCS, and our motivations for this.
Rights and Duties Towards Future Generations
As mentioned previously, one of the reoccurring themes that drives debate over
climate change and, in turn CCS, is that of intergenerational justice. CCS raises
issues of intergenerational justice on two fronts. Firstly because by storing CO2 for
such long periods, CCS in effect displaces the risk current generations face with
regard to climate change and imposes that risk on future generations, and secondly,
because CCS is intrinsically linked to climate change, and the current generations’
decisions over climate change determines the distribution of the costs and benefits
of climate change across multiple generations. These considerations often lead us to
make decisions that challenge the common assumption regarding the ‘time
neutrality’ of moral status—the assumption that an individual should not be
morally discriminated against (count for less) simply because of when that
individual exists (Ekeli 2004).
F. Medvecky et al.
123
Intergenerational decisions raise two strands of ethical issues. One strand is
concerned with theoretical issues of the rights and duties of future generations. The
other strand is concerned with how our views concerning our duties towards, and the
rights of, future generations can be applied to intergenerational decisions. These
reflect meta ethics and applied ethics problems respectively. At the core of the meta
ethical issues are questions over whether future generations can or should have any
rights (Gosseries 2008). A core challenge to granting future generations’ rights is
that those future generations (or at least the majority of their constituents) do not yet
exist, and to attach a right to a non-existent entity seems nonsensical (Parfit 1987).
Worse still, it is not clear what harm we might do to future generations. This latter
problem arises because whichever policy we enact will generate a unique set of
future individuals. If we were to enact a mitigation policy, we would generate a
specific set of individuals, and if we were to enact an alternative policy (say,
‘business as usual’), we would generate a different set of individuals. Hence, for any
set of future individuals, they will only be alive only because we enacted the
policies we did in fact enact. If future individuals have a life worth living, then it
seems illogical for them to wish we had enacted a different policy as this would be
equivalent to wishing a different set of individuals had come to be (and hence to
wish they, themselves, were not alive) (Kavka 1982). If existence is essential for the
possibility of rights and the possibility to be harmed, then current actions do not and
cannot harm future generations, and future generations do not and cannot have any
rights (Grey 1996). Yet, the claim that we have no moral reason to take future
generations’ well-being seriously seems deeply counterintuitive
One way of taking the well-being of future generations seriously, without
committing to having duties towards future generations or to granting future
generations rights, is to claim that future generations’ interests are taken care of
because we, the current generation, have an interest in the well-being of our progeny
and incorporate that interest in our views (Marglin 1963). But this claim has a long
history of failing. For example, when men claimed to have ‘incorporated’ their
wives’ views and interests, thereby making universal suffrage irrelevant, or when
the well-being of slaves and servants were ‘incorporated’ in their masters’ decisions
because happy slaves work better (Goodin 1996). Indeed, it seems almost inevitable
that we do have some moral responsibility towards future generations, although it
has been recognised that there are psychological barriers to turning these
responsibilities into motivations for action. A more promising avenue that has
received increasing attention is to think of intergenerational justice in terms of
human rights. By appealing to human rights, the exact constitution of future
generations falls to the background. Instead, the environment in which these future
generations will live and the capacity for this environment to provide them with
adequate living standards in terms of health, food and so forth become the focus
(Caney 2010).
Thus, if we accept that future generations have rights, the next question becomes
‘‘what rights do future generations have and what duties do we (the current
generation) have towards them? Determining the rights of and duties towards future
generations is particularly important because future generations are strangely
vulnerable participants in intergenerational decisions. Intergenerational decisions
Examining the Role of Carbon Capture
123
have two defining features: (1) future generations which will be greatly affected by
the decision cannot take part in the decision-making process, and (2) future
generations which will be greatly affected by the decision will not be able to hold
the decision makers accountable. Consequently, the current generation has
unmitigated power over the potential well-being of future generations, while the
latter are at the mercy of current decision makers (Gardiner 2003). How we define
the rights or duties with regard to future generations will determine how we use (or
abuse) this power.
For instance, implementing CCS will place some economic burden on future
generations (and numerous iterations of them) with regard to the maintenance of
storage sites. Indeed, the economics of climate change is plagued with ethical
challenges, and CCS is no exception (Dietz et al. 2007). As with the issue of risk
where it may be argued that CCS simply displaces the risk of climate change from
the current (or near current) generation to distant future generations, from an
economic perspective, it could be argued that CCS simply displaces the cost of
dealing with climate change. There are also substantial challenges to how we assess
the present value of future costs and benefits, and what social discount rate we
should use (Quiggin 2008; Medvecky 2012). While there is a near universal
agreement that future costs and benefits should be discounted—that current
consumption ought to be valued more highly than future consumption due to
(amongst other things) economic growth, uncertainty over future prospects and
human impatience—there is no agreement what the discount rate ought to be
(Nordhaus 2007; Stern 2007; Howarth 2009).
These economic considerations also raise concerns with monetizing benefits and
estimating costs, both of which are acknowledged to be near impossible in such
long-term and complex decisions (Ackerman and Heinzerling 2001). Classically,
estimating and monetizing costs and benefits in environmental economics requires
either some existing data to extrapolate from, or the capacity to elicit values from
relevant stakeholders (Garrod and Willis 1999). In long-term intergenerational
decisions, however, we have neither reliable data of future monetary values, nor the
capacity to coherently survey all relevant stakeholders—since future generations
form a large contingent of the latter. With regard to CCS, this makes the assessment
of the future costs and benefits of the technology difficult. However, issues of
accessibility to information about the future and to future generations’ preferences
are inherent in such long-term decisions. As is the case with the ethical issues
surrounding risk, the greatest moral challenge we face is to ensure we do not fail in
our moral duty to act on climate change as a result of paralysis driven by
disagreement over such matters.
Distributive Justice
Carbon capture and storage technology also has particular ethical implications with
regard to distributive justice. Such implications apply not only to the way we
understand intergenerational justice as outlined above but also to notions of justice
as applied to our social, political and economic arrangements among others (Gough
and Boucher 2013). In this paper, distributive justice incorporates these multiple
F. Medvecky et al.
123
concerns and is defined as the just distribution of the benefits and burdens associated
with CCS technology and our capacity to ensure an outcome in which all parties are
treated fairly. We define treated fairly in terms of equality and equity. By equality,
we mean that each agent has been allocated the same amount of benefit (all things
being equal), while by equity we mean that the process of allocation was impartial
and each agent was treated equally (Klinsky and Dowlatabadi 2009). Although
justice is only one part of the broader ethical landscape, it has been described as
‘‘the first virtue of social institutions’’ (Rawls 1971) and remains a strong theme in
the climate change ethics literature (Brown 2003; Gardiner 2011).
Carbon capture and storage technology creates specific justice issues with regard
to the management and storage of CO2. Instead of dispersing CO2 directly into the
atmosphere where it has a lifespan of approximately 100 years, CCS stores CO2 for
periods of 1,000 years or more (Brown 2011). While this certainly creates a need to
manage stored CO2 over a longer time period, the choice to continue emitting CO2
into the atmosphere has the long term impact of contributing to climate change
which will also be felt for hundreds of years (Garvey 2008). This again highlights
the temporal complexities associated with assessing how the responsibilities
associated with the moral decisions and actions that are taken now will be
distributed across current and future generations. Further, widespread deployment of
CCS has significant implications for the temporal and spatial dimensions of the life
cycle of fossil-fuelled energy generation. This is because, like nuclear technology, it
creates significant long term liabilities, not all of which are yet well understood. The
long term nature of these sites means that the potential sale and transfer of
responsibilities does present an ongoing concern beyond those of risk and
intergenerational justice discussed above. Specifically, there are concerns over
whether those ongoing responsibilities will rest with the private or public sector.
While the management of storage sites is likely to be the responsibility of
governments (as is the case with nuclear waste management), who should carry the
cost of such management is yet to be determined (Fentiman 2013). In terms of
justice, this highlights a tension in the role of the state as it needs to both ensure a
just outcome for all participants and rectify any perceived injustices, while at the
same time being itself a potential victim or perpetrator of injustice.
A further key consideration in relation to justice is around the dynamics
between the local burdens imposed on a community by a CCS project versus the
global benefits it brings about in terms of reduced emissions (Ashworth et al.
2012). There is no doubt that a proposition for a CCS project raises a number of
local concerns including the potential for leakage of CO2, associated health and
safety issues, not to mention the potential for a drop in housing values. This again
raises questions of the role of compensation and geographic equity and highlights
just how siting and storage decisions can challenge the fundamentals of justice in
relation to CCS. Some of these issues can be addressed by engaging the
community in the decision making process and ensuring that the compensation is
perceived as adequate (ter Mors et al. 2012). However, as with the previous
concern, there remains an issue as to who should be responsible for funding such
compensation arrangements.
Examining the Role of Carbon Capture
123
Further to this, questions related to who is investing in the technology and what
rights this affords them, also have a bearing on achieving just outcomes. In relation
to new technologies, such questions are often framed around intellectual property
and the rights to exploit research and development through technology transfer
(Warshofsky 1994; Lamont and Lacey 2006). While this concern is not specific to
CCS, the idea that climate change mitigation technologies might be sold for profit to
developing nations to meet global GHG reduction targets creates particular
inequities in terms of international justice (Rimmer 2012; Sethi 2012). Moreover,
the stance taken in relation to intellectual property also relates to the preceding
concerns. The permission to benefit through the exploitation of a given technology
seems to come hand-in-hand with the responsibility to shoulder the costs associated
with the use of the technology.
An associated issue is the international distribution of the benefits and burdens of
CCS technology. Globally, nations have contributed in different ways to the current
level of GHG atmospheric concentrations and it has been argued that wealthier
nations have benefitted by establishing the current situation where they can now
afford to reduce their emissions (Brown et al. 2009). By contrast, a lack of resources
and an absence of funding support for implementing these technologies in poorer
nations means the latter will likely be placed in a position where they need to emit
more GHG than current levels just to meet basic human needs for food, shelter and
security (Shue 1993, 1999; de Coninck 2008). Not only would this be counterpro-
ductive to the essence of CCS as a climate change mitigation policy, but this also
raises issues of justice over past actions, the distribution of past benefits and the
ensuing responsibilities of these past benefits (Bell 2010). However, inaction or
delayed action on climate change is also likely to place additional economic burden
on poorer countries, and any decisions to delay the implementation of CCS and
other mitigation policies must consider the implications for such nations.
It is clear that decisions about CCS are embedded within, and impact upon, a
range of social, political, economic and institutional arrangements. Ensuring just
outcomes from those decisions means having a clear understanding of the nature of
those linkages and how costs and benefits will be distributed based on the course of
action chosen. In any case, where our actions depart from providing just and
equitable outcomes for all concerned, we need to be able to clearly demonstrate why
such a course of action (which may in fact create inequalities) can be justified.
Democracy and Decision Making
Extending the focus on justice, the role of democracy and decision making with
respect to CCS technology also emphasises the importance of procedural justice.
Procedural justice describes the extent to which mechanisms of decision making are
considered fair (Lind and Tyler 1988). It focuses on who is engaged in decision
making processes and on questions of power and representation in these processes
(Jasanoff 2003) which is especially relevant when competing interests are at play.
For CCS technology, a clear understanding of the relative roles and power of
national governments, research agencies and universities, international agencies and
networks, industry, non-government organisations and the public to inform and
F. Medvecky et al.
123
make these decisions is critically important to matters of procedural justice. For the
CCS industry and project developers, the focus has tended to be on the technical and
geological specifications of CCS development, however there are a range of social
and political issues that must also be considered in engaging with the priorities of
multiple stakeholders (Brunsting et al. 2011; de Coninck and Backstrand 2011;
Ashworth et al. 2012). The adoption of more participatory and deliberative
democratic processes can provide the necessary scope for assessing the social values
and tradeoffs involved in decisions about technology (Durant 1999; Schot 2001;
Genus 2006).
One area of CCS research that has received significant attention has been in
relation to the social acceptance of the technology in an effort to address ethical
concerns that have arisen and much of the associated literature has focused on the
importance of stakeholder collaboration in this regard (Ashworth et al. 2010, 2012;
Brunsting et al. 2011). While recent research on social acceptance of CCS
technology has found that public acceptance is often driven by perceptions of how
technical risks will be managed, what is also important in this context is whether the
development and implementation of CCS projects will incorporate processes that
are regarded as fair and transparent by those affected and whether or not there will
be mechanisms in place for the public to voice their concerns (Bradbury et al. 2009;
Terwel et al. 2010; Ashworth et al. 2012). While participatory activities such as
town hall meetings raise their own strands of ethical concerns (Who should be
invited? Are these activities democratic engagement or social marketing?), the
numerous studies available that document processes around stakeholder engagement
with CCS projects suggest these are more likely to simply be implementation issues
(Upham and Roberts 2011; Einsiedel et al. 2013; Pisarski and Ashworth 2013).
However, the implications of achieving ‘right’ process for the current generation,
will inevitably have implications and consequences for many years to come. Again,
the effectiveness of how we realise procedural justice now impacts on the
experience of future generations.
Concluding Remarks
Carbon capture and storage stands apart from the other energy policy responses to
anthropogenic climate change because it only has merit as a form of emission
reduction. The alternatives, such as wind, solar, nuclear or tidal energy, can all be
argued for on grounds other than climate change mitigation, such as increasing or
diversifying our energy supply system. CCS, on the other hand, is intimately linked
to emission reductions, and this link comes with urgency. It is widely accepted that
if we are to avoid the worst of the effects of climate change, substantial headway
must be made in CO2 emissions reduction policy by 2020 (Hansen et al. 2008;
Meinshausen et al. 2009). If CCS is to be a useful mitigation strategy, some fully
functional large-scale sites must be in place and operational no later than 2030, and
the technology will need to be fully rolled out by 2050 (Haszeldine 2009).
Currently, there are 16 plants in operation or under construction, still a far cry from
the suggested 100 plus plants that need to be in operation by 2020 based on earlier
Examining the Role of Carbon Capture
123
road mapping activities (GCCSI 2012). In reviewing the ethical challenges raised by
CCS, a reoccurring theme has been that a failure to act on climate change also raises
ethical issues, be it with regard to risk or to future generations. Inaction on climate
change places future generations at risk, it is likely to place additional economic and
social burdens on them, as it is on some of the poorer nations in the world. This
raises a unique set of ethical issues with regard to timeliness in the implementation
of CCS. Because the usefulness of the technology is predicated on it being well
established by 2030 (de Coninck et al. 2009), we have a constrained time frame for
undertaking research into CCS, whether it be research into the scientific, economic
or societal aspects. This is ethically challenging because if we implement the
technology and there are unanticipated consequences, we may be placing both
current and future generations at unnecessary risk, while if we delay implementation
too long, we risk failing in our responsibility to combat climate change.
The issue of timeliness of implementation is not new and has been well rehearsed
in health care, where the cost/benefits of gathering better information is always
balanced against the costs and benefits of premature adoption (Chalkidou et al.
2008; Holland and Hope 2012). Health care research has developed sound strategies
for balancing the timely implementation of innovations with the need for further
research (Rogowski 2010). Indeed, formalised decision making rules for exactly
such kinds of scenarios have been proposed (Forster and Pertile 2012). A key
element of these decisions is their reliance on a clear strategy for implementation. A
strategy that defines the required research before implementation can be considered,
the timeline under which such research must be carried out, and, if the research
returns supportive findings, the timeline for adopting the technology. It is worth
noting that increasingly, some of the later research, is often recommended to be
undertaken concurrently with implementation (Chalkidou et al. 2008; Longworth
et al. 2013). A similar parallel approach could also be taken in the case of CCS
whereby we develop and commit to a strategy for implementation that takes into
account the inherent urgency of the situation the world is facing with climate
change. Indeed, one might argue if we are to have any hope at mitigating climate
change we have a moral responsibility, as a global community, to do so.
References
Ackerman, F., & Heinzerling, L. (2001). Pricing the priceless: Cost-benefit analysis of environmental
protection. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 150, 1553.
Ashworth, P., Boughen, N., Mayhew, M., & Millar, F. (2010). From research to action: Now we have to
move on CCS communication. International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control, 4(2), 426–433.
Ashworth, P., Bradbury, J., Wade, S., Ynke Feenstra, C. F. J., Greenberg, S., Hund, G., et al. (2012).
What’s in store: Lessons from implementing CCS. International Journal of Greenhouse Gas
Control, 9, 402–409.
Bell, D. (2010). Justice and the politics of climate change. In C. Lever-Tracy (Ed.), Routledge handbook
of climate change and society (pp. 423–441). New York: Routledge.
Bellona Foundation. (2008). How to combat global warming. http://www.bellona.org/filearchive/fil_
Bellona_CC8_Report_-_Final_version_-_30_mai.pdf. Accessed 30 March 2013.
Bradbury, J., Greenberg, S., & Wade, S. (2011). Communicating the risks of CCS. Washington DC: Wade
LLC.
F. Medvecky et al.
123
Bradbury, J., Ray, I., Peterson, T., Wade, S., Wong-Parodi, G., & Feldpausch, A. (2009). The role of
social factors in shaping public perceptions of CCS: Results of multi-state focus group interviews in
the US. Energy Procedia, 1(1), 4665–4672.
Broome, J. (2008). The ethics of climate change. Scientific American, 298(6), 96–102.
Brown, D. A. (2003). The importance of expressly examining global warming policy issues through an
ethical prism. Global Environmental Change, 13, 229–234.
Brown, D.A. (2008). The ethics of allocating public research funds for carbon capture and storage. http://
blogs.law.widener.edu/climate/2008/10/16/the-ethics-of-allocating-public-research-funds-for-carbon-
capture-and-storage/. Accessed 30 March 2013.
Brown, D. A. (2011). Comparative ethical issues entailed in the geological disposal of radioactive waste
and carbon dioxide in the light of climate change. In F. L. Toth (Ed.), Geological disposal of carbon
dioxide and radioactive waste: A comparative assessment (pp. 317–337). Dordrecht: Springer.
Brown, D. A. (2013). Climate change ethics: Navigating the perfect moral storm. London: Routledge.
Brown, D. A., Tuana, N., Averill, M., Baer, P., Born, R., Lessa Brandao, C. E., et al. (2009). White paper
on the ethical dimensions of climate change. Pennsylvania: Rock Ethics Institute, Penn State
University.
Brunsting, S., Upham, P., Duetschke, E., De Best Waldhober, M., Oltra, C., Desbarats, J., et al. (2011).
Communicating CCS: Applying communications theory to public perceptions of carbon capture and
storage. International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control, 5(6), 1651–1662.
Caney, S. (2009). Climate change and the future: Discounting for time, wealth, and risk. Journal of Social
Philosophy, 40(2), 163–186.
Caney, S. (2010). Climate change, human rights, and moral thresholds. In S. Gardiner, S. Caney, D.
Jamieson, & H. Shue (Eds.), Climate ethics: Essential readings (pp. 163–177). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Chalkidou, K., Lord, J., Fischer, A., & Littlejohns, P. (2008). Evidence-based decision making: when
should we wait for more information? Health Affairs, 27(6), 1642–1653.
Cole, I. S., Corrigan, P., Sim, S., & Birbilis, N. (2011). Corrosion of pipelines used for CO2 transport in
CCS: Is it a real problem? International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control, 5(4), 749–756.
Darwall, S. L. (2003). Theories of Ethics. In R. G. Frey & C. H. Wellman (Eds.), A companion to applied
ethics (pp. 17–37). Oxford: Blackwell.
de Coninck, H. (2008). Trojan horse or horn of plenty? Reflections on allowing CCS in the CDM. Energy
Policy, 36(3), 929–936.
de Coninck, H., & Backstrand, K. (2011). An international relations perspective on the global politics of
carbon dioxide capture and storage. Global Environmental Change, 21(2), 368–378.
de Coninck, H., Stephens, J. C., & Metz, B. (2009). Global learning on carbon capture and storage: A call
for strong international cooperation on CCS demonstration. Energy Policy, 37(6), 2161–2165.
Dietz, S., Hepburn, C. & Stern, N. (2007). Economics, ethics and climate change. http://dx.doi.org/10.
2139/ssrn.1090572. Accessed 13 Aug 2012.
Durant, J. (1999). Participatory technology assessment and the democratic model of the public
understanding of science. Science and Public Policy, 26(5), 313–319.
Einsiedel, E. F., Boyd, A. D., Medlock, J., & Ashworth, P. (2013). Assessing socio-technical mindsets:
Public deliberations on carbon capture and storage in the context of energy sources and climate
change. Energy Policy, 53, 149–158.
Ekeli, K. S. (2004). Environmental risks, uncertainty and intergenerational ethics. Environmental Values,
13(4), 421–448.
Fentiman, A. (2013). Radioactive waste management: Storage, transport, disposal. In N. Tsoulfanidis
(Ed.), Nuclear energy (pp. 269–282). New York: Springer.
Fischhoff, B., & Fischhoff, I. (2001). Public opinions about biotechnologies. AgBioForum, 4(3&4),
155–162.
Forster, M., & Pertile, P. (2012). Optimal decision rules for HTA under uncertainty: A wider, dynamic
perspective. Health Economics,. doi:10.1002/hec.2893.
Gardiner, S. (2003). The pure intergenerational problem. Monist: An International Quarterly Journal of
General Philosophical Inquiry, 86(3), 481–500.
Gardiner, S. (2006). A perfect moral storm: Climate change, intergenerational ethics and the problem of
moral corruption. Environmental Values, 15(3), 397–413.
Gardiner, S. M. (2011). Climate justice. In D. Schlosberg, R. B. Norgaard, & J. S. Dryzek (Eds.), The
Oxford handbook of climate change and society (pp. 309–322). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Examining the Role of Carbon Capture
123
Gardiner, S. & Hartzell-Nichols, L. (2012). Ethics and global climate change. Nature Education
Knowledge, 3(10), 5.
Garnaut, R. (2011). The Garnaut review 2011: Australia in the global response to climate change.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Garrod, G., & Willis, K. G. (1999). Economic valuation of the environment: Methods and case studies.
London: Edward Elgar.
Garvey, J. (2008). The ethics of climate change: Right and wrong in a warming world. London:
Continuum.
GCCSI. (2011). The global status of CCS: 2011. Canberra: Global CCS Institute.
GCCSI. (2012). The global status of CCS: 2012. Canberra: Global CCS Institute.
Genus, A. (2006). Rethinking constructive technology assessment as democratic, reflective, discourse.
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 73(1), 13–26.
Goodin, R. E. (1996). Enfranchising the earth, and its alternatives. Political Studies, 44(5), 835–849.
Gosseries, A. (2008). On future generations’ future rights. Journal of Political Philosophy, 16(4),
446–474.
Gough, C., & Boucher, P. (2013). Ethical attitudes to underground CO2 storage: Points of convergence
and potential faultlines. International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control, 13, 156–167.
Grey, W. (1996). Possible persons and the problems of posterity. Environmental Values, 5(2), 161–179.
Ha-Duong, M., & Loisel, R. (2011). Actuarial risk assessment of expected fatalities attributable to carbon
capture and storage in 2050. International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control, 5, 1346–1358.
Hansen, J., Sato, M., Kharecha, P., Beerling, D., Masson-Delmotte, V., Pagani, M., et al. (2008). Target
atmospheric CO2: Where should humanity aim? The Open Atmospheric Science Journal, 2, 217–231.
Hansson, A., & Bryngelsson, M. (2009). Expert opinions on carbon dioxide capture and storage—a
framing of uncertainties and possibilities. Energy Policy, 37(6), 2273–2282.
Haszeldine, R. S. (2009). Carbon capture and storage: How green can black be? Science, 325(5948),
1647–1652.
Holland, S., & Hope, T. (2012). The ethics of attaching research conditions to access to new health
technologies. Journal of Medical Ethics, 38(6), 366–371.
House, K. Z., Harvey, C. F., Aziz, M. J., & Schrag, D. P. (2009). The energy penalty of post-combustion
CO2 capture & storage and its implications for retrofitting the US installed base. Energy &
Environmental Science, 2(2), 193–205.
Howarth, R. B. (2009). Discounting, uncertainty, and revealed time preference. Land Economics, 85(1), 24.
Hughes, L. (2009). The four ‘R’s of energy security. Energy Policy, 37(6), 2459–2461.
Huijts, N. M. A., Midden, C. J. H., & Meijnders, A. L. (2007). Social acceptance of carbon dioxide
storage. Energy Policy, 35(5), 2780–2789.
Huijts, N. M. A., Molin, E. J. E., & Steg, L. (2012). Psychological factors influencing sustainable energy
technology acceptance: A review-based comprehensive framework. Renewable and Sustainable
Energy Reviews, 16(1), 525–531.
IEA. (2008). Energy technology perspectives 2008: Scenarios & strategies to 2050. Paris: OECD/IEA.
IEA. (2009). Technology roadmap: Carbon capture and storage. Paris: OECD/IEA.
IEA. (2013). Tracking clean energy progress 2013. Paris: OECD/IEA.
IPCC. (2005). In B. Metz, O. R. Davidson, H. C. de Coninck, M. Loos, & L. A. Meyer (Eds.), IPCC
special report on carbon dioxide capture and storage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
IPCC. (2007a). Climate change: The physical science basis. In S. Soloman, D. Qin, & M. Manning (Eds.),
Contribution of Working Group 1 to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (p. 703). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
IPCC. (2007b). Glossary. In B. Metz, O. R. Davidson, P. R. Bosch, R. Dave, & L. A. Meyer (Eds.),
Fourth Assessment Report Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change, IPCC Working
Group 3 (p. 818). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
IPCC. (2011). Renewable energy sources and climate change mitigation. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Jamieson, D. (1992). Ethics, public policy and global warming. Science, Technology and Human Values,
17(2), 139–153.
Jasanoff, S. (2003). Technologies of humility: Citizen participation in governing science. Minerva, 41,
223–244.
Kagan, S. (1998). Normative ethics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Kavka, G. S. (1982). The paradox of future individuals. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 11(2), 93–112.
F. Medvecky et al.
123
Klinsky, S., & Dowlatabadi, H. (2009). Conceptualizations of justice in climate policy. Climate Policy,
9(1), 88–108.
LaFollette, H. (Ed.). (2002). Ethics in practice (2nd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Lamont, J., & Lacey, J. (2006). The ethics of patents on genetically modified organisms. Australian
Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics, 8(2), 1–11.
Liang, X., Reiner, D., & Li, J. (2011). Perceptions of opinion leaders towards CCS demonstration projects
in China. Applied Energy, 88(5), 1873–1885.
Lind, E. A., & Tyler, T. R. (1988). The social psychology of procedural justice. New York: Plenum.
Littlecott, C. (Ed.). (2008). A last chance for coal: Making carbon capture and storage a reality. London:
Green Alliance.
Longworth, L., Youn, J., Bojke, L., Palmer, S., Griffin, S., Spackman, E., et al. (2013). When does NICE
recommend the use of health technologies within a programme of evidence development?: A
systematic review of NICE guidance. Pharmacoeconomics, 31(2), 137.
Marglin, S. A. (1963). The social rate of discount and the optimal rate of investment. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 77(1), 95–111.
Markowitz, E. M., & Shariff, A. F. (2012). Climate change and moral judgement. Nature Climate
Change, 2(4), 243–247.
Mazzoldi, A., Hill, T., & Colls, J. J. (2011). Assessing the risk for CO2 transportation within CCS
projects, CFD modelling. International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control, 5(4), 816–825.
Medvecky, F. (2012). Valuing environmental costs and benefits in an uncertain future: Risk aversion and
discounting. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 5(1), 1–23.
Meinshausen, M., Meinshausen, N., Hare, W., Raper, S. C. B., Frieler, K., Knutti, R., et al. (2009).
Greenhouse-gas emission targets for limiting global warming to 2�C. Nature, 458(7242), 1158–1162.
Moller, N., & Hansson, S. O. (2008). Principles of engineering safety: Risk and uncertainty reduction.
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 93, 776–783.
NOAH. (2009). NOAH’s position on CCS as a climate change tool (long version). Friends of the Earth,
Denmark. http://ccs-info.org/pos_long.pdf. Accessed 30 March 2013.
Nordhaus, W. D. (2007). A review of the Stern review on the economics of climate change. Journal of
Economic Literature, 45(3), 686–702.
Pacala, S., & Socolow, R. (2004). Stabilisation wedges: Solving the climate problem for the next 50 years
with current technologies. Science, 305, 968–972.
Parfit, D. (1987). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Peters, G. P., Andrew, R. M., Boden, T., Canadell, J. G., Ciais, P., Le Quere, C., et al. (2013). The
challenge to keep global warming below 2�C. Nature Climate Change, 3, 4–6.
Pielke, R., Prins, G., Rayner, S., & Sarewitz, D. (2007). Lifting the taboo on adaptation. Nature, 445, 8.
Pisarski, A., & Ashworth, P. (2013). The citizen’s round table process: Canvassing public opinion on
energy technologies to mitigate climate change. Journal of Climatic Change, 119(2), 533–546.
Quiggin, J. (2008). Stern and his critics on discounting and climate change: An editorial essay. Climatic
Change, 89(3), 195–205.
Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Reiner, D. M., & Nuttall, W. J. (2011). Public acceptance of geological disposal of carbon dioxide and
radioactive waste: Similarities and differences. In F. L. Toth (Ed.), Geological disposal of carbon
dioxide and radioactive waste: A comparative assessment (pp. 295–315). Dordrecht: Springer.
Rimmer, M. (2012). The Doha deadlock: Intellectual property and climate change. The Conversation, 11
December. http://theconversation.com/the-doha-deadlockintellectual-property-and-climate-change-
11244. Accessed 15 Feb 2013.
Rochon, E., Kuper, J., Bjureby, E., Johnston, P., Oakley, R., Santillo, D., et al. (2008). False hope: Why
carbon capture and storage won’t save the climate. Amsterdam: Greenpeace International.
Rogowski, W. H. (2010). What should public health research focus on? Comments from a decision
analytic perspective. The European Journal of Public Health, 20(5), 484–485.
Sayre-McCord, G. (2012). Metaethics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Spring 2012 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/metaethics/. Accessed 7
Sept 2013.
Schot, J. (2001). Towards new forms of participatory technology development. Technology Analysis &
Strategic Management, 13(1), 39–52.
Sethi, N. (2012). Doha climate talks: Rich nations reject India’s offer on intellectual property concerns. The
Times of India, 6 December. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-12-06/developmentalissues/
35646306_1_climate-talks-climatenegotiations-iprs. Accessed 18 Feb 2013.
Examining the Role of Carbon Capture
123
Shaffer, G. (2010). Long-term effectiveness and consequences of carbon dioxide sequestration. Nature
Geoscience, 3(7), 464–467.
Shue, H. (1993). Subsistence emissions and luxury emissions. Law and Policy, 15, 39–59.
Shue, H. (1999). Global environment and international inequality. International Affairs, 75, 531–545.
Singer, P. (Ed.). (1994). Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Singer, P. (1999). Practical ethics (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Singleton, G., Herzog, H., & Ansolabehere, S. (2009). Public risk perspectives on the geologic storage of
carbon dioxide. International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control, 3(1), 100–107.
Slovic, P. (1993). Perceived risk, trust and democracy. Risk Analysis, 13(6), 675–682.
Sotoudeh, M. (2009). Technical education for sustainability. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
Spreng, D., Marland, G., & Weinberg, A. M. (2007). CO2 capture and storage: Another Faustian Bargain?
Energy Policy, 35(2), 850–854.
Stern, N. (2007). The economics of climate change: The Stern review. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Taylor-Gooby, P., & Zinn, J. O. (2006). Risk in social science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
ter Mors, E., Terwel, B. W., & Daamen, D. D. L. (2012). The potential of host community compensation
in facility siting. International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control, 11, S130–S138.
Terwel, B. W., Harinck, F., Ellemers, N., & Daamen, D. D. L. (2010). Voice in political decision-making:
The effect of group voice on perceived trustworthiness of decision makers and subsequent
acceptance of decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 16, 173–186.
Thompson, D. (1985). Philosophy and policy. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 14(2), 205–218.
Torvanger, A., & Meadowcroft, J. (2011). The political economy of technology support: Making decisions
about carbon capture and storage and low carbon energy technologies. Global Environmental Change,
21(2), 303–312.
Upham, P., & Roberts, T. (2011). Public perceptions of CCS: Emergent themes in pan-European focus
groups and implications for communications. International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control,
5(5), 1359–1367.
van der Zwaan, B., & Gerlagh, R. (2009). Economics of geological CO2; storage and leakage. Climatic
Change, 93(3), 285–309.
Wallquist, L., Seigo, S. L., Visschers, V. H. M., & Siegrist, M. (2012). Public acceptance of CCS system
elements: A conjoint measurement. International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control, 6, 77–83.
Warshofsky, F. (1994). The patent wars: The battle to own the world’s technology. New York: Wiley.
West, J. M., Shaw, R. P., & Pearce, J. M. (2011). Environmental issues in the geological disposal of
carbon dioxide and radioactive waste. In F. L. Toth (Ed.), Geological disposal of carbon dioxide and
radioactive waste: A comparative assessment (pp. 81–102). Dordrecht: Springer.
Wilson, E. J., Johnson, T. L., & Keith, D. W. (2003). Regulating the ultimate sink: Managing the risks of
geologic CO2 storage. Environmental Science and Technology, 37(16), 3476–3483.
Wuebbles, D. J., & Jain, A. K. (2001). Concerns about climate change and the role of fossil fuel use. Fuel
Processing Technology, 71(1–3), 99–119.
F. Medvecky et al.
123