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F!Dr:;r, CJ\~'J'HO 1 NOVl:MBER INT1'.LWIE'1l

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Hnv:\nu ln :J1>nnloh t.o the P.mcr icas 011~5 Gl'.T 2 !'fovet:Jbe:- 1962--E

(Live 1:1t~rvlcw with Fidel ca:::tro 1n telev..i.sion studios of station CZQ; Luis Gotncz Wnucuc::::me:-t, moderate:&.·)

(~A'"t) \Juncuc~:111ert': Good evening televie·wers . 'lbe Cuban r adio and i..clevicion G tot ions h~.ve joined t~.;e nat!.ona1 !lookup this even:i.z:ig 1,° _ f' order to b1·00.(lcc.zt the statement of t he pr<:mier and c o'-Ci!Tlandcr in c::ne - ' Dr . F1<'1.cl Castr o , on the talks beld in Havana with U.N . Se~retar;r General U Thnn1, and other current subjects .

Con:::an•ler Cnctro, wbo.t cen you tell \.is about U Thant ' s visit to Ha·rana? ·'

Cas tro: Hell, the talks held ,;itll U 'lbant, the U. N. s ecretar!' general, lasted t\10 dnys , o.nd I thO\~gbt thnt 1.he best ,,.ay to inform ti:e people of this mutter wuc t o read the copi~s of the conversations .

The follo·..ilng Gho\ll.d be pair.tee O\\t and. cm:s iC:.er~d.: o~ t;ie first day taJJ~s of a general natm·e w"-re held in 1:~ !.c!:l c-~ c ou...-:t".:.7 1 s position was s e t for th . On the second clay he 'WEU~ted to d.i.s .::us s never s.J. c on-fidc:1tial matters . I tben a s:,ed bi"Tl if h::? ir .. ;_-:.•::.e:.! i~ the saortba:ld version of the flr st day ' s talits , in "::.iic~ t:ie ~~~ire :;>osi.tion of the Cuban revolution on tile reaso:1s i'c-r Cnoe. 1 s cot~uc~ i s set f orth- - :if' be minded if I moJ.e it public . He aG1·ced . \le also :;>=o:nised bi;:. t~at toe points- - t he questior.s and. the i::atte:.:s crf a c onfiJ.en.; ,;,al nature he i:-d.gbt discuss, lubel1n3 t !lem as such, not fo!'··OU.'t' ::..a.lie cut f o= h is--wocld n ot b~ published for the time bei~g . Ro~ever , ever"Jt3i ob tba~ was discussed i s r 1eht there . Theref ore , I shall read. t~e shortb3nd ve r $i Cn c f toe conversations held at t!le Presidential Pa~ce on 30 Oc'b:>bcr 1962 ~~ich began at 1510 hours .

U Tbant--I shal l read th~ neir.es of the persons s~eak1ng- -so U Toant- - tcere is one point I should like t o bring up-- (8astr o e),..-plains - - Ld. } he (U Toant--Ed. ) is speaking: In the discussions I he.cl. in ~ew York, both '\o."i.th the r epr esentatives of t he Sovie~ Union an~ W:.th the representatives of the United States, General Rikhye 'Was a:l:ways p r esent, ar.d I f eel that his presence would be usei'ul at this r:ieeti::ig ' •i t !J. the Premier.

We : He do not mind .· - Gene::-a.l. Rikbye ls lnvl~d +.o :r>a~·ti~1:pa.te in t he i nterYie w.

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CUBA 2 November 1962

U Thant: First of all , AU- . Premier, I should like to thank you and your governn:ent for your invitation to visit Cuba, not only for this mission, but also for the invitation given me earlier . As I informed you ween I accepted your i nvitat ion, I came as soon as possible . I am certain that today and tomorrow v:e shall have very f1·uitful talks to..-:ard finding a solution with regard to C~ba's sovereignty and in~ependence .

We : We can talk for as long as is necessary. We have plenty of free time to give you .

U Thant : As you well know the Cuban problem v1as presen~ed to the Security Counc L1 last week during the meetings of the 45 neutral countries , p:-incipally those which had attended the Bandung and Belgrade conferences . Tv10 meetings were held, and they sent represe~tatives to confer with me--since I also belong to a· neutral country and partic ipated i n the two meetings--to ask me to take the initiative , the initiative whi ch could contribute to the peaceful solution of this problem.

On 24 October I dec i ded to take this initiative . After I r.eard the statements by the t hree d~legations in the Security Council I came to the conclusion that the immediate problem vias to make an appeal to the three p::mers and I called upon Pre:nier Khrushchev to suspend the arms shipments to Cuba voluntarily for two or t hree weeks and upon President Kennedy to lift the quarantine voluntarily; and then I called upon Your Excellency to voluntar i l y suspend the construction of the missile baees to g~ve us an opportunity to discuss the problem calmly. I.a:;nediately a fta r cy request t he Security Council suspended its meetings to give me a chance to put my plans into effect.

On the follov1 i ng day I learned that Soviet ships are approachi ng the qua:ra:lt i ne area . I sent a second appeal to Premier Khrushchev and to President Kennedy asking them to avoid a direct confrontation on this matter , so t hat I could have the few days necessary to discuss this matter . On the sarte day I sent you a l etter to v1hich you very kindly rep~ied asking me to visit Cuba . The s ubject of this letter was the suspension of missile base construction in Cuoa.

Since then there have been communications between Premier Khrushchev and Pres ident Kennedy, between Premier Khrushchev and myself, betpeen President K~nnedy and myself. Naturally , Your Excellency also replied to my letter of 27 October . T~e contents of this letter are already kno\'m to the public .because it has been publ ished.

As I see the problem, Your Excellency, it is in two ~arts: one i!III:lediate and the other long term, For the ti.Ite being the Security Council wishes t o deal with t he solution of the immediate problem.

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- filillli 3 CUBA 2 November 1962

The object of my negotiations with the three powers I mentioned concerns only the i mmediate problem, naturally . However, t he United Nations will have to be involved in sorne way in the so~ution of the l ong term problem.

Several factors are involved in the immediate problem: The first is that Premier Khrushchev responded to my rec;.uest, giving instT\.lct i ons to the Soviet ships to keep away f'rom the quarantine area for the time being for several d~rs. President Kennedy repl ied that he was prepared to avoid a direct confrontation with the Soviet ships if' they were not carrying ru:maruents , and Premier I1lru shchev told me very explicitly that the Soviet ships a.re .not carrying armaments -at present.

If the two powers agree, no armaments will be sent to Cuba for two or three weeks , and for two or three weeks if no arms are being shipped the United States will lift the quarantine.

What the United States wants to be sure of is that the Soviet ships will not carry armatDents . What the United State wants is a raacbi nery-­a.n arrangement--through the United Nations which would assure it that during this period of two or three weeks no arms will enter Cuba ·

The Soviet Union does not agree with this proposal. Yesterday the $';.)viet Government proposed another solution, that is, that the Sov:1et ships would permit inspections by the Red Cross , verification by the Red Cross that they are not carrying weapons~

This reply by the Soviet Union was communicated to t he United States l ast evening . The Red Cross, which we contacted ;in Geneva by telephone yesterday, replied that i n the name of world peace and international cooperation it would agr ee to take charge of this matter, eith~r on the h igh seas or in the ports. or disembarkation, if th~ Cuba!) Government -agreed .

I cannot take sides at all . I am not empowered to associate myself with any of the proposals . I only informed the Red Cross, the Soviet Union, and the United States that, with due consideration to Cuba's sovereignty, I woul d request this of the Red Cross, always subject to t he consent of the Cuban Government . The three part~es were informed of' this, and it was r eported that the Cuhan r.ovcrnment would be in.formed of it .

Therefore , Your Ex~ellency, the first point, which would help my work c onslderably , would be to know the attitude of the Cuban GoveJ:nment to the i deli of the Re<i ('!rn~n ··h·wkt.n6 I.he t 1·n nF._po:i:tnt.ion of armaments 0n ~<w.lc-t oh.i.ps :for the next two or three weeks. The que.~~.ion is: What would Cuba's atti tude be ~o this proposal?

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HRHH 4· ClTBI\ 2 November 1962

Pr~sident Dorticcs:· Are :rou s:peac~.n3 of the litgh -~e:::i.s, or in ·Cuba?

U ':11ent: Of course, ! ir.fo:::-n.eci the gov-ern:.:ents of tra Sovi.et t;J.lion and the u:i::teC. States of this lY:.'O"OC'Sal u:.:ide ·by il!- c :Red Cross . 'l.he Soviet Govcrru:ent re:_:lied that this is a matter pertaining to Cuban sovere ig:lty . I have not · received a rep~' f1·o:n tile· U.S . Government on · the imtter . Would Your :.Ex-celler.cy 1il:e -to discuss tl:e ill.e.tJ.;er point by point or all togetl:er? · ·

We: I would .prefer you to continue :your statement .

U 'Ihant: 'TI:le United States tolG ~e , nnd also said so during ~he · negotiations and during the Security cour.cil meet:i.ng:;, that its main concern lies with the launching paC..s rather than tbe a~rua~ent . Its princ i:pal c oncern is the m::.ss ile l aanching pads . As is well known, last Sunday Premier IJlrushchev inst:.·uc·~ed the Soviet t e chnic i ans to distr.antle the missile launchin~ pads and t o return the miss iles t o tbe Soviet Union. He also s aid tne.t t.e ,1ould ask the United Nati.ens to ·send tea:ns t o verif':>· ·1r this has actually been done .

I re:plied to the Soviet rep:-esentati ves that before a teem c oul d be s ent to chec~t on tbis the ~ost iwpo::-tant point was to obtain the p r ior consent of the Cuban Governn:ent .. · 'Ihis rr-atter coul d not be .presented without t he kDO\·:ledge and conser.t cf the Cubar. Government and. no action could be ta:en which "10ulC. violate its sovereignty.

I al.so in!orl!"~d both the So;~et r epresentative and the U. S. Goverr..ment t !lat I would co;::e to Cuba to present this vi ewpoint t o Pr er-ier Castr o nnd to his colleagues . Of course, both the Soviet Gove::-nment a nd the U. S . Govern-:ient agree on t his point- - that if the launch~ng pads are rei:iov~d tension -will be reduced. \·lbat the United States i s s eeking through me is a t ea:po:-ary a greement pr ior to the conclusion of t h e discantl ing of t he paes .

I asked t he Sovie t r ep r esentati ves ·how l ong this would t ake . They aske d Mosccw, but this morni ng t h ey ha d not r e ce ived a rep ly.

H~at the United St ates -. is l ooking for is a t emporary a greement ·with t he ~nited Nations, s ubject, naturally, to t he authorizati on and consent of t he Cube.n Gover nn:ent . Naturall~r, no one lmows h ow ·1ong this will take- ­one or t wo ;reeks , and perh ap s mere .

Tnus , the firs t U.S . p r opos a1 is that i f .Cuba c onsents,- a team of U.N. r epr esentatives c onsisting o:f :i::ersons whose nationalities are a.cce!>tab le · to t!le Cuban Governn:e nt "\:ould be suggested. The sec ond proposoi would be a r ecor.naissance plane manned by per sons.a cceptable to t h e Cuban, .Russian, and Amer i ca n Goverra:ents. A plane with a CUb an; a Russian, and a u.s. r epr e sentative on b oard f or t he t~o or t hree weeks this may last was also suggested. I repl~ed to t he United St ates that this proposal. would also be p r ese nted t o Premi e r Fidel Cast~o .

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IniHII 5 CUBA 2 November 1962

' The United States ini'orr.ed me thc.t as soon ao t his system has been put i nto practice it would rua.ke a public statement, in the Security Council if necessary, that it would ha.rbor no aggressive intentions toward the Cuban Government and would guo.rantee the territorial integr i ty of the no.tion . I was asked to tell you this .

As I replied to the United States and to eve:!:yone, the most i mportant t hing is that all these decisions cunnot be reached without the consent of the Cuban Government . I was told t hat if this decision was r eached with egrecmlent of the Cuban Government and the United Nations , not only would t he United States make the statements i n the Security Council but tt would also l ift tte blockade .

I in:formed t he United States yest erday tho.t while I was conferring with premier Fidel Castro and the Cuba.n leaders, it would be ill advised for the blocakade to be maintained, and I o.sked that it be suspended. This morning it was announced that the blockade had been suspended for the 48 hours of my visit to the Republic of Cuba .

As Your Excellency knows , I said in t he Security Council that this blockade was highly unusual, not very common e.xcept:i.r.g in times of war . That is what I told t he Security Council . This viewpoint is shared by the 45 cot:.ntries which met and asked me to make this reque~t .

Two of t hese 45 countries, who also have seats on the Security Council at this time--the United Arab Republic and Gbana--made statements in this connection during a meeting in the Security Council. Other countries of the 45 neutrals, particularly t hose which participated in the Belgrade conference, .will m~e similar statements if given an opportunity, So much for the immediate problem.

~ Your Excellency, the Security Council did not authorize me to discuss the longterm problems, althout;b this is something which will have to ' be discussed in the Security Council later. For the purposes of this :fi~st conversation, this is all I have to say to you, Your Excellency.

We: There is one point which cor.fuses me: it concerns your proposals on inspection . They speak of two points here-~a t eam and a plane. I should like more explanation on this point. Please repeat to me the part ~eferring to the inspection proposals .

u Thant : Both proposals would c ome :from the United No.tiers and. Y.'Ould consist of two units: one on land and the other from a plane for the period o:f the dismantling of the bases, tha:t is, about two weeks.

We : I do not understand why this is asked of us . Could you expl ain a. little better? ·.,

... HllliH G CUM

2 Noveober 1962

U Tl1ont: The explanntion given by the un::.teQ States 11hy it is mo.}~ing .the req,uest is that it ·wauts to be certain that ::che l'aeis are ac"'~ually dis~tled and that the oisniles are retur:1ed to the Soviet"'Union.

We: What rigl~t ha.s the Un5.ted States to as:{ tn:!.s 'l I mean, i:f th is is based upon a re·ai right or if it is a C.emc.nd based upon force , or a position of strength .

U Thc:-.nt : Thin is m~r v:!.ewpoiut : it is not a right . Su.ch a t .!ling could only be done with t he app~oval and consent of t he Cuban Gover.ament .

lve : Wz do not exactly understa.11d why this is asked o~ us because we have not violated any right, we absolutely have not attacked anyone . All our actions have bee~ based u~on internationo.l law. We have done absolu~ely nothing outside the norms. of internati onal law .

On t he other hand, we have been t he victi~s ~irst of all of a blockede, which is an illegal e.ct , and in the seconc! place , of the attem:;>t to deteri::ine from another what we ho.ve a· right to do or not to do within our ~rontiers. It is our unc!ersta~ding t hat Cuba is a sovereign state no more nor less tho.n any member n~tion of the United ~atiol13 with all t he att~ibutes inherent i n any of these states .

Moreover, the United Stutes has repeatedly been violatin~ our airspace . wi t~Lout any right, committing an i ntolerable act of aggression against our .country which ' it has sou3ht to justify by an OAS decision , but this dGcision is not valid for us . We were even expelled from the OAS . We can accept anything that is just , thet does not imply a reduction of our sovereig~ty. The r i£hts viol cted by the United States huve not been reestablish€d1 and we do not accept any i oposition by force .

I believe that t his q,uestion of inspection is one .more att empt to r.W!liliate our country, therefore we do not accept it . This reQuest for i::ispection is to conf irm their attempt to viol ate our right,to act wit~~n our fro::itiers · with cor:::plete f reedcm, to decide ·wh~t we ca:i or c~nnot do within our :fr ontiers . This line of ours is not a new one; it i s a v i ewpoint we hav~ i nvariably and always reair.tai!1ed.

mnm 1 CUBA 2 November 1962

Do we not have the rights which the i nter national norms laws and principles r ecocnize for every sovereign state anywhere

1in th~ world?

We hav~ not grant~d and do n~t p~an to grant the U.S. Congress any sovereign preros ative . This viewpoint was confirmed in the United Nations by the President of the Republic of Cuba and also during reany pub~ic statements made by me as premier of the g~vernment, and this is a firm stand of the Cuban Government .

All these steps were taken for the security of the country in the face of a systematic policy of hostility and aggression. They were all taken in accordance with the la'W and we have not abandoned our determina­tion to defend these rights.

We can negotiate in all sincerity and in all honor . However, we would not be honorable if we were to consent to negotiate a sovereign right of our country . We are prepared to pay the necessary price for these rights, and this is not just so much talk, but an attitude very keenly felt by our people .

U Thant : I understand Your Excellency's sentiments perfectly. That i s why I told t he United States and others clearly: Any U. N. act i on in Cuban t erritory can be undertaken only with the consent of the people and the Governoent of Cuba. I told them that in the name of peace, which is ardenly desired by everybody and by all inhabitants of the world . I tc2.:i the ~5 countries that I agreed to come to Cuba without having any co!Ilitit~ent to either side .

Last night and this morning, before I began rrry trip, certain press r eports said I was coming to settle the details of the United Nations' presence in Cuba . That is completely erroneous. That would b e a violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba. I have come here only to present the other side ' s vie·wpoints and explore the possibilities of finding a peaceful solution. The 45 countries that asked me to come also know what position is l egal and what is not, but in the name of world peace, and for a period of only one or two weeks , perhaps three, they asked me to come to try to find a possible solution.

Your· Excellency, my conscience is clear on this point . The United Nations can only undertake an action of this sort when it has the consent of the government involved . It is not the first time this has happened . In Laos, when a situation existed there that threatened international peace, the United Nations established i tself in that territory only after obtaining the consent of the Government of Laos. In 1956, in Egypt, in the UAR, a situation arose and the United Nations established itself in Egypt , and still is in Egypt, with the consent 'o$ :the government . Similarly, in 1958, i n Lebanon, another situation threatening world p~ace arose , and the United Nations went in only af'ter i t had obtained consent of the Government of Lebanon . One condition is absolutely necessary: In order to under take an action of that nature, the consent of the government i nvolved must be obtained.

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LJ HHHH 8 CUBA

2 November 1962

We : In the case of the Congo to?? . ·.

U Thant: And in the case of Somali~;-~ ·~, :

We : In the case o:f the Congo I have understood they requested it of the Uni ted Nations .

U Thant: In the Congo the petition was presented by t~e Government of the Congo.

We : I n the Congo t{le government that r equested it is bJ.ried now. In the first place, our govern.cent has not t he slightest doubt of the fine i ntentions and the disinterestedness and honesty with which the present U.N. Secretary General is working . We have no doubts at all a~ou~ his intentions, bis good f~ith, his extraordinary interest .in finding a solution for the problem. All of us hold his mission and his person in great esteem. I say this in all sincerity. I understand the interest we all shotJld feel in peace, but the path of peace is not the path of sacrificing the rights of peoples, of violating the rights of peoples; that is precisely the path that leads to war. The path of peace is the path of guarantees for t he rights of peoples and the peopleQ' readiness to defend those rights .

In every case ment i oned by the Secretary General, Laos, EgY)?t , Lebanon, and the Congo, which I just mentioned--in all of these cases we see not hing but a series of aggressions against the rights of t he peoples . All were caused by t he same thing . The road to the past world war was the r oad marked by the annexation of Austria, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, tolerated acts of German imperia.lism--and it led to that war. And. we are keenly aware of those dangers. We know the paths aggressors like to take. We guess the path the United States. wants to take with regard to us . Therefore it is really hard to understand how it is possible to speak of imir..ediate solutions independently of future solutions, whe n the matter of greatest interest is not to pay any price for peace now, but to guarantee peace definitely, and not :. to be p aying daily the price of an ephemeral peace .

And of course Cuba is not Austria, nor the Czechoslovak Sudetenland, nor the Congo. We have the most resolute intention of defending our rights, in the face of all difficulties and risks. And it is necessary for the U.N. Secretary General to know thi.s determination of ours so · he can succeed in hi~ mission, or· at least be ab~e to work with a. J;:erfect knowledge of th:J.s cil·cumstance .

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HESH 9 CU?..A 2 November 1962

u.Than~ : I understand your sentiments p1:r~ectly, as well as the view:p~ints Your Excellency has expres~ed. As for the point of immediate solut:ons and long-term solutions , I wish to say that the Security Council has authorized me -Co seek means of obtaining peace in this area. ~ ui:derstand ti1at immedinte solutior.s and l ong- term solutions are int~ately interrel ated, and for those loDG-term solutions v;e Ghould exp.i...ore the possibilities in tb.e ligi1t of the situation as it ~)..°ists now. !he S~c\lrity Council has given me suthorization for t~at. In prcctice , it is very hard to separate the two . I believe tna·:::, if we find ~ immediat e solution for thj.s , it wiJ.J.. lead us to a perma::tent solution, not just for the United Nations b~t fo~ all interested parties .

In mentioning Laos and the other cases where the United Kations has established itself , I agree with you, but I also want to say that the United Nations , in those plac~s , has succeeded i~ removtng or averting aggression frout without . I thought, if you please, that the U. N. :p~esence in Cuba for a :period of perhaps more than three wee:rn mey likewise l essen or eliminate the danger of aggression. It is my opinio:i t hat , in c~rent and f u.ture times, the presence of the United Nat.ions in certain countries will serve especially to remove and avert eggression.

President D:>rticos: I would like to say something. I agree with what ou:.c Prc:nier has saj.d obout 0'.1!' full 'J.!ldcrs~ar.ding of the hig!l ir.ission the Sacretziry General is carrying out with such nobility. T!:l3t mission, of course, is none othe~ than to see~ means of guaranteeing peace in this critical situation.

It s-=e:ms th·~re is a qusstion to be defined: Where is the danger of war? In the ~nns of one kind or another that Cuba has, or in the aggressive U.S . c1csigns against Cuba? w~ believe eggression is what can engender war . The a:::"!l's thnt exist in CCl.bn, regardless of what they may be, wi.ll Ilev~r begin u:i aggr..=.:ssio:i. Th~refo;.:e, we ask ourselves: \.:by is inspection, and s.n acceptance of :i.r:spection, a condition for gua~anteeing peace? To gu~u;antee p~~ce it would suffice for the United States to pledge, with all necessary guarantees through the United Nations , not to a~tack Cuba. That is why we have set forth--and our Premier has repeated it here very clearly--that the questions of a long- term soluticn, if tbey can be called that, are intimately connected with the immediate solution of the crisis .

The i!I!!Ilediate solution of the crisis would come as soon as the United States offered guarantees against an ettack on Cuba, minimu:n guarantees that are contaiued in the ceclarations raade ~y our Premier on 28 October and whi. ch are surely known to t.b.e Secretary General . A U. N. stay in Cuba for purposes of inspection, which the Revolutionary Govern!lent of Cuba does not accept because of the reasons set forth by the Premier, wo~d at most wean a guarantee for two or three weeks of that peece, which

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CU.aA 2 !\ov~r:.be:r l )62

he l".cia ri?;htly called em:phcli~aral.· ~ediatei~~ afterward the ,,~n-P'~ of' war wocld b ....., ' '"""' ~ --~ ~ . resu!::le , ecause the conditions that favor North American n~gre->sion agairwc Cuba would r emain.

Let the United St::xtes give the guarantees that we der::a:i.d as e n::irrlmilin, ~ndtth~ solu~ion of t he imreediate probl er::. will have b~gun . I wocld s ay, in he l ast instance, that for the purpose of ootaii.:llr.g peace now t~ere ere no immediate ~uestions or l ons-term quc:stions to be ' d:l.:c~ssed . We believe the five points coc:taine:i in tbc decla·catior>.s m~~0 PY our Premier are ingredient3 that fo::::"Il1. part of the i1;-;raediate di~cussion intended to guarantee peace . We -uelieve that these five points are not deferred for long-ter~ discussion, but that circu..ustancea demand that they chould be part of the immediate discussio~ because , in our opinion, they are minimum conditions for g~arantceing peace.

I repeat, peace is not endanger ed by our arms; peace is in danger bec~uze of the aggressive conduct of the United States , and negotiations and discussions covering these five points are what will i mmediately · cli.mi~ate t b.e dangers of war . That is our understanding or the ?roblem.

U Thant : First, I want to thank Your Exc~llencies, the P::-esident and t~c Pr~~ier, for thejx kind words for my person and the post I occupy, and I am in full agrze~ent tTith both as to the solution we ~sy find , for short- tenn agr eements should also include negotiations for lonz-te~ ag~eements. But in terms of the United Nations, I believe the best solut,ion--and in this I believe the 110 member nations w.i.11 agree--is f'or ·th.; United Nations, through the Sec~ity Co;.mci1, to p::-ovide Uo:.r .. representatives to seek and find the long-term solution.

:Bi;.t right new, et this moment, I do not believe t.!:e U:ii ted Nations, and it~ Security Council, can arrive at a positive , accept~ole long- tei'.ill solution in the best interests of eve:rybody and world peace . I~ a lo~- ~ te:;:m solution is found, it will be in the best interests of all. and of world peace, but I be::'..ieve it is difficult to obtain at prese~t in the United Nations .

~e : I understand t~at · if that short-term solution of which the Secretary speaks were not achieved, it would be simply because the United States does not want it and would persist in demF..nding inspection as a humiliating act for Cuba , because , for J?U.""Jloses of that unilateral security which the United States demands, the Soviet Govern.~ent's decision to withdraw the arms of a strategic nature ·which had b~en brought for the defense of the Republic of Cuba should have sufficed.

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~iHH ll CUDA 2 November l962

The Cuban uOVerr..ment h 4 h" d th S . as no1.. indered the withdrawal of tho~e arms

~bli e ~viet Government's decision is in itself a decisio~ of a ' ubli~ ~~ ure . The mere fact that i t was made in this manner in the

~4 t kr~ew has had an effect on· world public opinion. The United "'

8 e; no~rs that that decis:I,on was made seri ously by the Soviet Union end t.1at, in fact , the stratee;ic weapons are beirie; withdravm .

If i·ih~t the um· t d St t e a es wants beside tho.t , . is to hura.iliate our count:::-y, it will not get it . W~ have not hesitated an instant in the de~ision to defend our rights. We cannot accept impositions that con be fc~ced c:U.y on a conquerered country . We have not desisted f-rom OUT

C.ete:::-mi!.'.l::ition to defend ourselves even to such an eJ..-tent that they vri.....l.l ~ev:r be a~:e t o i npose condition~ on us , be~ause first they will have to c~stroy us and annihilate us , and in any case they will not find any­boes- here o~ w~om to im?ose hu;:nilieting conditions . (Prolonged applause )

i U ~ha~t : O~ t~e subject of the U.S . declaration, the United States has said that it will make a public declaration or nonaggression and r espect fo:;.~ Cuoa 1 s ter-ri torial in~egri ty 0~1ce the missiles have been . C.is~ur1tl~d end l.i.t hdrcwn. In my opinion, on that there is no disagreement.

I on con::pls":ely iu a.greer.ient 'i·rith the Premier that the U.N. actions in-.:olve 8:1. invasion of' the right s of a member state, and in this case, spea~~ng of Cuba, if it is not iu agreement, w::tth accepting a U.N. action, then ny du.·;;.~r--w.b..at I must do--is to inform those who made the :proposal ot th:·_s . It is not my intention here to i mpose anything . t-r.iy duty is oc::::-eJ..~- to e:--~lain the :possibilities for finding the means , the menner , or the for:J by \thich we could find a peaceful solution, without making con.:!r(:!te 1co:posals. I shall take into accoun-t ~verything that hss bee:l s~id t~re this afternoon and I shal.l return, I shall go back, t o make tty r cpo:::-t to the :parties interested in t~s~

I ~2cl th~t this neeting has been very useful, and if the Premier is agree­abl e 1·~e can :::::~et again tomorrow, before I l eave . Meanwhile, I can be think:.'_n~ 07er carefully what the President and the Premier have said about this me~te::..~ .

tve : ~o conclude , I should like to reply on the questi.on o~ Red Cross inspection. We also oppose t!J.at inspection in our ports. I wonder, if the Soviet Union authorizes i nspection of its ships on ~he high seas, why would i t then be necessary to inspect them acain in Cuban ports? In t he seconc place, I see that the Secr~tary .cente~s his interest on c-etting the U:::lited States to make that public declaration, that pledge in the United Nation3, that i~ .will not invade Cuba •

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EHHH 12 CUBA 2 November 1962

On ~his · point , I wish to sc:,• f irst taat t !1e Un:'.:t~d States 'bas . no ris ht to i:wa~e Cuba and that it i s ii:: ;;ioss::.cle to negotiate with a ~prcmis~ not ~o commit a crime , with a mere prorr.i se no t to commit a crime , and :t!:at in the face Of that da!1ger ,.:e tr ust mo~·e to our determination to defend ourselves than to t he words c.f t}-,e U. S . Government . But moreover, if · t he United Nations attaches p eat value to a public commit ment e ntered. into in that body by t he United states , such as a cC''.:"!lit:::e:it not to invade , why not concede e c:-.na l value to t he publ~ .c con;:i.U.ment to ~l:e United Nations made by t he USSR to withdraw the s t;ra teg i c weapo:?Js l.~ sent for the defense of t he Re public of Cuba?

These \iould be two equally public com1r. i t ments. If one of them needs no acd i tional guarantee--tha t is, the U. S. commi tment not to invade Cuba - -why does the Soviet Un i on ' s commitment to withdraw its st.::-a te,zic weapons need t he additiona l guarantee of inspecting us?

We s ha ll meet with vou a ga i n with pleasure as often as you wish and at the time you choose:

U Thant : Many t hanks , Your Excel lency . .

( Cast.·o speaks for himself a t t'his poi!!t --E3. . ): And that wes the e nd of the firs t meeting. At t he second ~eetJns , he began c~,r sayins: "I want to th~nk the government .and the people for t he hospitality a nd t he facilities t hey have afforded me in this country . The motive f o r t h is new meeting i s to exchange opinions on certain confidential u.atter s I have in mind ."

Thus , at this second meeting , he started off by saying it would dea l with matters of a confidential matter . We agreed with him not to mske ' public the things he sa i d . Fundamentally, et t his second meeting we maintained our v iewpoints from t he first meeting and brought up a few things , such as the ·danger i nherent in t he violations of our airspace , t he danger of an incident, and the fact that it was indispensable for t he United States to suspend t hose flights .

At t he same time, t he U. N. Secretary Gene~:al asked us for info!'mation about the plane which the U. S . Defense Department r epo1·ted had disappeared on one of its flights to Cuba . We gave h i m t he i nfor motion he r equested , and, at the same till!e, we a greed on a cceding to his reque st to send ·~he body of t!1e pilot, who died while en an illega l flight over o ur territory--we decided for humane r easons to r eturn the body .

As a matter of fact , we regretted that this North American had to d ie in our country as a result of the illega l acts, in violation of our sovereignty , ordered by the U.S. Government. We hope the circumstcnces that resulted in that death will not be r~peated; that is, that t he causes that r esulted in that death will not be repeated •

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ffiIDH 13 CUEA 2 November 1962

In general t er ms "- he . . . Secret G ' ~ op1n1on of tne gover nment regar ding t he u N ary eneral · t· ... h · · • • a re 1 d i ls na !- e l.s &n honest and i moartial person who ha s a e:re es re to struggle t o f ind solutions for t hese problems . He also

PPf . d to be a competent person, and he, in reality, did inspire our con ldence That · th . . h. • ls e conclusion we drew from t he meeting we had wi.th

im, from the way he expressed himself, from the respect he showed at all times toward the ideas of our country and toward the rights of our country .

1:1°reover , we understand t hat at this moment the U.N. Secretary General ls carrying out a very important mission, which enhances the post he holds, and, at the same time, if he a chieves success in that effort , it Will undoubtedly increase the prestige of the United Notions . It is possible that that institut ion will deve lop and carry out its work. It is at present carrying out a very i mportant task.

Undoubtedly, it is of interest that t he United Nations constitutes an institution guaranteeing the rights of countries, and particularly the rights of t he little countries . At this moment , it appears to us that trie United Nat:.ons ·is carrJing out··that .role t1el1. In t hat sense, we give t he Unit ed Nations ell our s uppor t; t ha t is, in the efforts end activities it is carrying out in favo~ of peace and to find a solution. This is a part from our having been i ntransigeant wit h regard to t he problem of :lnspection, because we consider that we cannot accept any inspection.

We cannot accept inspection for several r easons . First, because we have no desire to sacrifice a sovereign princi ple of our country. A series of rights has been violated . Freedom of the seas has been violated by the United States . The United States is trying to meddle in. things which we have a right to do or not do within our borders . The United States, "in an open manner , has been violating the airspace of our country.

How, in the face of all those facts of aggression and violation, in the face of those acts of force , are we going to accept inspection of our country, en inspection which actually validates tte pretensions of the United States to decide what kind of weapons we have or do not have the right to possess?

We have not renounced the right to possess the kinds of weapons we may consider convenient in the exercise of the sovereign power of our country. We have not renounced that right . He consider it one of our r ights. How are we to authorize an inspec.:tion to va1:idnta n p.1:etens:l.on of a foreign country? Therefure, we do not ecc.:ept it .

In the second place , this constitutes a demand from a position of force, a position of force of the United States , and we do not yield to tha t position of force . We will never yield t o positions of force. (Applause)

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CU-.t'.A 2 !:ovember 1962

KJ:i.at Cuba defends · _ . .... _ . . d f . ln ma Ul ~c: '" n.,. . t

e enas the severe· . . - ·--· 0 1 s pcs:.tion is not inco:-isiderable. It be ca use 0 . . ign r ig:Ct c f .~ou~tr i - s · · by th ur pos1t1on againsi: tr.~ · -= • ••.oreover , it c1efends peace

ese th1· n · -~ positi ons of force which is reouired' t h • gs , our f i-..1:111es.- • ose wh l"k - w aga inst t he demands of the a

0r. .... .,.essors and 0 1 ·e to practice h o-

encoura th s ue a policy, is a position that will not ge e aGG!'essors .

Tbe aggressors .b are aggres can e agbreseors; t~at is, the world may find . that . t~ere The a~,.,.,. sors, but the aggressors will find resistance in our countryr

oc. .. essors Will f" · . + . physi~ 1 ina resis.ance to all kinds of aggression, be it bei ~at or moral aggression such as this type of aggression·which is be ng a tempted , or· an aggression against a right . And they will not

d encouraged by the -position of Cuba ! we are absolutely in the right an we ·are absolutely .determined to d~fend that right •

.

Above all, as is clear in the f!..'<planation we gave the U. N. Secretary General , more than anything else this is an attempt to humiliate us . · Therefore , the position of Cuba was and is that we do not accept inspection.

He have noted the conditions that are needed , and we repeated to the U. N. Secretary General in the second meeting that the Cuban view is that, if a real solution is desired for the existing tensions and problems in the Caribbean end on the continent, which also affect the entire world, it is necessary that the guarantees that Cu~a demands be granted . Those guarantees have the virtue of being absolutely just demands ,· and all are based on the indisputable rights of our country--the ending of the economic blockade and all the measures of economic end commercial press ure which the United States exerts against our country all over the world and which it has been exercising against our COlllltry, aggressive acts that were part of the i ngred ients that aggravated the situation to the point it reached this time, aggressive acts they cont i nue to commit at this moment .

We are constantly receiving reports of vessels which were coming to Cuba end whose goods were left in Mediterranean, European, or Lat in American ports , goods that were destined for Cuba . Just ye.sterday a report came of one or two ships , loaded with jute for our sugar production, which left their cargoes in a Mediterranean por t because of pressure by the United States .

Moreover , we demand the cessation of all subversive activi ties and the launching and landing of weapons and explos i ves by air ar.d sea , the organization of mercenary invasio~s, and the infiltration of spies and saboteurs--all actions which are carried out from U. S. territory and some accomplice cowitries . to not a people have a right to demand guarantees against those actions? The cessation of the pirate attacks

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C:1jBA 2 r:ovewbe:r 1962

that are carried out f b~~~ . . ..• the cessa .... io o ~oo ,'":"~ s i n ti1e Cn::i;e:.. States and Pue::-to Rico ,

t ~- n f all v1ola~io~s of OU!' a~rs~a ce and territor~al wa ers by u s l - • - -t"h .._ . 0 ~ P anes ar:d wa-r:- sl1i~s --tll~t is to sav, our country ;requests

_,a., e;r:i.u;e not be .commi·tted a ··~L1st ~ ..... .,...,. ..... : ~-~ ... i·ons a-~ 1·1iegal acts n .... bo • • <> ...... ' .. ~... J..v .;.<..<... ~

8.._ G o ... t ~ com:n1ttea agai:ist it, a nd, fin3:U.y , "!:1::a"!; the naval base ". ~ana anamo be ~ithd~awn a ~d the Cu~nn territory occupied 1:;y the

United States ce returned .

It is absurd that the wi th~rawal of fr ::.endly i·.'ea ?Oi.1S be requezted end · · that an enemy base be left in OQ~ country. T~t has absolutely no f o undation! · That is aosol1.::tely absurd! No o::i.e : in any place in the world woul0. dispute the right of ou!' country to request tbe return of the territory en -which this ca se is situated , a base wl"le~·e , in these days of crisis, troops ~ere ecc~~uloting to attack our country . Bow ere we going to be asked to ilit~:iraw friencly weepor.s, while enemy '~ea pons ::ema in -within the heart of our country?

T'ne United States says that it possesses thet base by virtue of a · treaty, a!'l e,6ree:nent between t f'.e Uni.tee S'~ates and a Cuban government-­of cou::se, a C-..:.oan govern:tent t:-"at eme1· ge\J. during tee inte:.-vention. It was not th::c.u:;h acy treat:; ; it '·1as t h::ougn a unilateral ao:eement in the U.So Cong::ess, throug:-t an a;ne~Jme!'li: they imposed on our cons-tituticn a:id i::iposcJ. 1:::y t~e -:J~it.::o.i $~ates, by the United States in a lew of i'cs Cong!'ess, Cu ca ;.ias wa::ned t h:=:t they ~oul1 not depart the country i f that at!lenci;nent t..:ere net accepted, an amendr.ient 'W:Oich contained tbe question of t hz r~val base !

If they call t:ia·~ aG::eement legiti::inte, even r:::i·.:.re legitim3te are the agreements between the .. Soviet Gove::nmc~t and. t:ie roost f::ee goverru:ient of Cuba, by virtue of 1t1hich -chose strat~gic oissil.es ,.;ere situated in ou~ country and for our defens~o A~d i~ t~a United S~ates has placed the ;;o::ld on the b::ir:.:;: of wa::- to der.iar.ci the \·1it!-:c::et..;al of those cissiles, then \1hat ri€-ht a~d ji.:st:.fication "haa i t to refuse to abandon the territory it occupies i:i ou:: cou:i'.:ry?

we are not an obstacle -to a solution of peace , a real solution of peace . We a:::e not a -warl'io::- o•: a warlike people . We are a peaceful people , and be i ng peaceful does not mean ?ermitti~g oneGelf to be trampled upon. Not in t~e least ! W~en the tra~pli~g co~es, then we are as warlike as we mi.:st be to defend ourselves. Facts have deoonstrated this .

we sl:.all never obs"truct a t ::·ue E:o:!.ution of peace , and t~e conditions for a true solution of peac~ are t~z guarantees of t~e five points established by the Govern~ent cf Cuba . ~e Un~ted States should begin by deconstrati~g its good faith , not with a procise--deeds and not wo:::-dso

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IIliliif 16 CUB-\ 2 !{oven:ber 1962

A really conVincing ·deed would b"' "" -the territory it occupies 1 ti ~ ior the united States to return to us be a wucli more conVincinB d n d.1e, naval base of Guantanamo . That would U:ii ted States could give. ee t.lan any word, than any promise the

If Cuba t s guarantees are t . . . o:f neace and .... 11 no corr.plied w1 tn t!iere will be no true solution at~~sphe~·e ~f ~e en. we ~ball. a:i-1 i1av:: to continue living in this sen:c solutions of nsi.on in whic~ we have been living up to now. He want . uld b peace' but zolut ions of peace with dignity. Moreover, there

"\:O e no peace wi thout dignity, because the nations without dignity are not respected . He have a ri,...tt to neace to one kind of .,...,.ace or enot~e~ t th · ~ ~ ' r-

.. ' 0 e peace 'mich is neither peace nor war simply because we were able to resist and were able to have dignity. {;e 1:.ave the risbt to ~ peace, to a real solution of peace, and sooner or later we shall obtain it because we have earned that right due to the spirit of our people, due to their resistance and their dignity.

Our cause, and our rig!lt to :pec.ce, will conti:iue to gain g:-ound throughout t he world. Everyone also kno'\ls \1ho is t o }:>lame for these :;>roblens, who is to blone :for all tl:ese tensio:ls . A:J.d the ueonle of the world will go on gi...-int; support to our five points \rhicil ar~ L;dis:pensa':>le conditio:is 1'or peace . Our people have won ancl. will kee:g on '1inning even more the right to a ':orthy and to a just peace .

1:c :.T..:st be allowed to work in peace . More than weapons we prefer to use im:J.;::1.::::cnts of work . Mo::::-e ti1an to kill and destroy, we prefer to c1·eate . OUl" ::::eoi)le are not :permitted to create. 'Tney arc constantly being forced to ::!ebilize, to put themselves on a war footinc , to defend themselves , to ~:-cpare theoselves because t hey are forced to do so, not because we desire t his policy.

I t is a policy iI:Iposed upon us by the aggressors against our country. u:iat oi..;.r country wants is to work . Hbat it "\?ants .i s ·to raevelop its r esources, to devel op t!le people, and to progress with its peaceful "\~Ork .

Sot:e things are a.nusing . A few days before the crisis , barel y t wo days ea::lier, we inaugurated t he institute for basic sciences . Some 1 , 000 .u younG people were to enter it to be3in studying nedicine . Within three days tbe institute for basic sciences was converted into an anti- aircraf't e::-tilleI""J school, and t:ius went everytning else . Compare one thing with the other: peaceful work and the desires and efforts of a nation to in:rorove its "\Tell being a'"'ld l::.ealth, to train all the doctors our peasant s nc~d, end to train all the ~octors our peopl e need to raise t heir average l ife span and t o improve their health.

~~:-e "\·ie~e cOO young people "\-lho had ent er ed and within thr ee days 800, l ,OCO, or 2 , 000 yout~s had to enter to be taught to k il.J., to be t aught to handl.e not surgical instrumer:ts but c annon •

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ffiffiR 17 CUM 2 Hove!:ber 1962

Ot~ read , the des ire of ..... _ ..... . +. t om i:~on ' e . t vr.e 1ns .. l. Ute Of b"'si,... S . ., .1:- ' ::.s no the a~til1e't'· ceen i.·nposed on us-by-th~laence;; ; tlle rest are hitter-tu~~c!;:~1~ ~ut "'i ,.. ld ' - /3gl'eC:..or~ S •JJ.Cu l:a.Ve .., /!:::l.., cou be seen eveMn h ... . oi:e days be-~ore ... his .. '· a - -., .. , e:i:·e how ... h 1 ... v ci·isis , ac ;.ranee " Supplies were il .· ..... e worl( of the revolution had ac:;:ricultural and -;...,d . . mproving consice-:-ably- .. ,._rcduction ·oo+h

_,,. · ~ us1;r:i.al a · t' .... J;' - , • •

0.1. the :revolution--w:.··e ad,·a' ~a ne plans-- i-he entire creative work " "'""e de + d ....... nc1nr.r at a hie'h ,.at A d ~- vo ... c to c,...ea.J..in tl:: · v o - e. n the O!'getnis:::is ·with the hope of ;ch~ev~ : w~r~;: cor.Q.~t~ons, for next yc::i.r, .:..963 , production. g leap aheaa in tne econo::zy, a. leap in the

But the crisis ca~e , and the threat . the abandonmon... f 11 t Mobiliza.t::.on was necessary, tasks in d v

0 a he projects , t he abandonm:::nt of all the task ' whi ~r . er .... to ~s_:ui:::e under those circumstances the most sacred fa.:.h' C l.S vC".:! ae.:ense Of the country. And WC defend the

v erland because we want a count!'y in 'W!lich to work, not a country of ~ar:sites but a country of 'Workers, a country of creators . And ~~e want 1,,ha" count:-y in order to work, to create!

?cat is '~by -we must defe:r:d it l:efore e.11 eise. Ar.d tbe e.::-dor wi~h ·wMch tt.e J;)eople pre~ared to fight and to do whatever else '\1:"1 s necessary C:_..•?nstro.tes the love t:ie :people feel, n:m·e every day, for creative '~ork. '·1ca-r. wo::i:e they C:.efencing in the trencoes? Hhat they are doing in the rural areas , what they arc doing in the univer:;ities , what they a.re dobg in the factories , what they are doing in the schools--tha.t is what tbu peopl~ a::::-e going to defend in the trenches ! And the more av1areness they r.ave of what they are doi=g, the n:o:::-e they love wbat they are doing, the more loeical it is tbat they go to tte trenches with more love and more courage.

\·;e will not be an obstacle to any real soluti0n of peace. We gladly o:Cfe::- our t"fforts toward tr.at solution, to the effort b.eing made by the Uni.ted Nat:lons to find that rec.l solution of peace , to t=:e effort being rr.ade by different neutralist cou..~tries to find tr.at solution of real ~~ace , a pe~ce with dii;nity and 'With absolately no lessening of a.n_.v of t:.e sove:i:eign :::-ights of our count:::-y. B\:.t i:' there is t~ be a l Gssen:ing, '~e shall continue as 'We are . We shall not accept it. How long? As long as necessary.

We shall have :patience, all the patience necessary, so that as the clmax of e.ll this struggle we s!'>..all soz::e G.ay at~in that peace wi th all the attributes of a state tr.at is totally and absolutely sovereign, l·Jhich h~s al'\!::i:,•s been the aspiratio.a of our people. We must have patience.

We shell not accept just any little formula . We shall accept any fo:::nu.lA of peace that is truly wortby. And I th5.nk tba.t , with s\.!ch e. formula., t>..'Jt only we would J?rofit , everyone wculd profit, the world '\lloulc1 profit , America ,.,ould prfit , the United States would profi t; tha-;; is to say, the very ones to bla!:ie for this s i tuati on Vlould also profit t'rom a "'solutio:n of peace that is acceptable to our country.

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.il}!}Jf 13 CUBA 2 I\'overn!:lc-r 1962

J.nd we exprecs "'~he viev1 of f . l t OU,.. pe- .

to l.G l and to coo-nerate f - , v.l).J.e w:1cn we say t!:!at we !=:aid it · · ~ or t.r.a t pc::ac are ready - 1.ll aJ.l our proposals . .. e . We have propoced it, we have shook the viorld for • I,e~ us see if now after

. seve:ral aa t . . ' this crisis which are achieved in order t t+ _.ys ' he cocdi ti.ens or the c frcumstances

0 a .. a1n that :peace.

~ still r.ave son:e questions t .• l.t must be said t hat d , 1 ° deal wita. In t l:e com·se of this c.!'isis , scne &iff erences b t ui- ng the develop~ent of the criais tnere arose

e •,1een ... he c • ... But I vant to sa " vovie.., Gove:::-nment and the Cuban Gov~ ·re:ent. d · Y something .1. 0 all c b -

iscuss those rob,e ~· . . " u ans . It is not hare teat we should llseful or t :Pt - m .... , it is not here , where our enemi es might find it

ry o p··of"'t ""ro t' d "With the S . t .. .1.. .. m .iose isc-;issions . We ~st discu~s this them to di~Vl.e s at t:n: level of government and party, sit down with re~son a d~cu~s :verything t~t might be necessa~y in the light of

n principles.

It must be said that, above all , we are ~-arxist-Teninists . (Prolonced e:nn, . ) J'. · - 0

- - .!2.use Between t he Soviet Union and Cu~a tcere shall be no breaches!

We. "Wai:i-t to say another thing , tl::.at r1e haxe con:'idence 1n the policy of pr:u:.ciple ct the Soviet Union ar.d 11e eave confidence in the leadership of the Soviet Union; teat i s to say, 1n the govermi:ent ar.d tl:e leading IJarty of the Soviet Union. (A:ppla.use) _

If my co::npatriots were to asJ: n:e at this n:oment for an opinion, wt.at should I tell them, wr.at advice a mid con.fused situations , things trat r..ave not been understocd or are not well understood, what to do? I 'Would say that what must be done is to cave confidence, tr.at wl::at must ce done is to unde=stand that these internatioral problems are ext :;.:emely complex and extremely delicate, and that our people, who P.ave given evidence of great zraturity, of e>..-traordinary n:atu.rity, should demonstrate it in thi:; way--taking care to analyze things, to zr.ake no prerr.ature judgments, to be disciplined, and, above all, to ha~e confidence; moreover, to have complete faith in t:i::le revolutionary govern­ment , in the leadership of t he revolutionary goverr..ment; to have complete coni"idence that everything--all the problems , a:J. the questions--r111J. be discussed opportunely; to keep in mind that elements of judgment needed to understand certain things could even be mi~ -ing; and to keep 1n mind that the dramatic and urgent circumstances i:.. which events took place must not be forgotten.

Now there is time in -which to discuss all that completely 1 and ·we shall discuss it . We must prevent the enemy from profiting from our impatience, from our judgments , because an honest revolutionary rr.ay rr.ake j udgments ; he I'.as the right to form his opinions. But if the opinions he f'ormed at a given .noment about certain things t~t he does not understand well are voiced, t cere might also be someone around who is not a revolutionary, someone interested in creating distrust, division, and resentment . That is why the advice we must give is: Eave confidence, be firm, and have faith; be guided by 'What "We have said here today--that is "Wbat•'ml.lst be iiol'.le in these c:iJ:cumstances and it is that which 'We !ml.:>t do.

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A b,')ve ail , and I say i '· , _. +t.. ... t " :i ..... .-i a1,:,c>'.:1..-~e . . ~ ·an... o say in these ;. :.__('~:..·~-t:i- - ~re:i.·e a~e -:n~gs I ~ =ncn:cnt:; i:1 :.·:lie :1 a oee:-. c::eated be-.:e.use v"' ·'-h . .· • {;( ·'.:ein o::.!::.;;::ee?:.e!lt =::.y l:..ave gocd to reme?Jibe:c ab ,J. "~ o..,e_ ... '.!:> ,t".1 1-c:r:::.-~.•-·.:~ .. q:~ or diffe1eril:e5 --it ic I . . , ,oi, e a 1 vl n"'- - ·.. ,. . ... . ~ 1~ r·ocd + - , • . v J! .. C ..,o··- e U1-, 0"' , .. , s CO' '~ .:-or us

~ u vO re!'!"1enite- ato .. ~ .. - . '. ~ .v ··:- - ._,_ -- ... • or~e of the diffic lt ... ' ve "'-:- ; W•.:::t :..t ,:as c.a_e :'or vs ir. ev~r~· Soviet Unj on b ~ ~L m~lllPn"ts '1~ r~ \ c.> i:ad, how ".:;~e f:r le~CtJ.y J:a._'!i:l of the . .a... ocen 'tbcY.e . , . . e.t;cs::.:e<-"ion .... - ;v:._.;n .ii; :::.:·\.3r ee.c:i. Yatlee blo:i - - eccncl!.l.C

_.., , vlle su ..... press ' on ~ ..... . . ,. t• e shi'rJn::ents of : · ... CI •.:J~ s...:ca.:c (!uota , tne su?::,uessi.on o.... i.

l:av~ endur d :petro..1..eUU1 to ow- cc:.t,1~:ry. -a±'te:- er..ch of t!::e e.::;t-:re~Eion.s w~ e ' and 'We a:re g:r~tefi...J. . We ml.:.st say teat here .lcu.:lly J

Mc:::eove.,.. t' · . - ' c.ere is anotner e:ve::i r:ore n;ovir.·r t:!.l~~, at least i t i.11·)'' e ,,, .. es in _, · ..:1 ..., •

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" e exc:;racrdina:•ily--·che So-1ie ~ n:er., tr.e Sov~.e-c x er.. we r.e. ve n:e ... here the +ect.. .. ·c · , . . · · ur ...,u·al area ' · " uuJ. iens wno nave cot::e to i-.'Or~= w:.-cb. us in a . ... ·

5 ' the t eachers , nrofesso-s e --g; •1e~·s ple.nners tech:::lician:; of' a, , k" d · - ... ' - - ' ' - · · · t· ~ :.n s, the 1nte1·est t:1e de-vot:!.on t!.!e :.:'o:lC.~ess wj.t.u w.u.cu .;.ey r.av ::- hel11ed us . , ,

~:~rec..ver , there a~e t;.;e milihry ~ec(l.r.ic ~.an~, r:en ,~:10 :C.P.va 1Jee.u re:aciy to a.ie l:e::-e '' i to us, wn-:> !:ave i:cl1;ed -.:s :'...:::l t!:e i!l:"t;r.ic-:.::.cn , t~:ai.::!i!ls, and p:::-e::p::i.ra tio~1 o:::- o·.u- fighting :::"orcef:; ,.; ~10 b.Ei::e wor::ed wi·::h us :"er months and :rea:::-s, teaching ou:::- me:i to figh~;; ~1hc l:a're 'Wrl~ac with u::; fo:· mcnths , ~·ears, teach:'..ng our men to :::"ic;:-:.t; o.nd o:i:i:;az:::.zi:lr~ tn2t forni i .:iable ar:ny \-le eave at this mcment; a ll t.ie ,.;ea.yens ".;~ey r.E-ve £ent us , the basic wea t'ons of our arir.ed fo::ces whica are a.:u ~·:e~:wns t:1B.t tt.~ Soviet Union b s sent us anO. ~or \1ti.ch tl':e Soviet un::.011 b::is not c hargeci us ! (Applause)

I should like to say that seve~al mo~th~ aeo ~he So,iet ~nio~ eecided to can.:: al ;i.J.:!.. tte C.eb'ts of otrr- count:~v for ar;rarr.el!ts . Scme of the3e rr.::i.tta!'s ara of a milita::;,,· nat~.ire, llhi~h must o e tree.";ed with Gl'eE'-t c::..re . Neve:::-tbeless , I will e;_,!>lain scmethiz;s; for e:<a1'!!:9le , ~:1e st~·atcgi~ vieapons fo:· our defe!1se~ 'Il:ose wea.:!_'.)O:lS, the str&.tegic we=..pons , -we:::-e ::iot t he pro!)erty of Cuba . ~r-:·at is not t he case with the tanl(s and an e:ii.U-e series of -weapons , whl.c!l a :·e our property. T.qe st_·ateg ic 'W"!apor.s were not ou.r property.

In the ac;reements by vi:::-tue n~ which ti1ey -were se::.t to ou.r cot:n t::::-y to ST.'!'encthi::n our de!'enses a:;a.in.:;t t'.'.:e threats of' atta~k, it ,.1s.s decided teat those strategic weap ons , whic h c.re ve:·y complex and re«;"J.ire very -specialized per~omv~l, 1t1ould c<>nt-. ~ nuc unde:· toe direction of Sovi et pe:·sonnel and cont in11e bei."1g ti1e r,rol'~rty of the Soviet state. That is 1rl by, when the Soviet Governrr.errr. Ciccided to ':ithdrc.w those weapons , which belonged to it, we r espected t hat decision.

I explai:l this so tb.'.lt the reasons ,.,3y the withd::awal was deciced on by tb..:? Soviet Covern:.ient ca;~ oe u:idc::-stood . Ttat is why I 'Was so.yi ng that , f.ver: t houch we '!!Ay have SO'ffie wcll- fountled rea::>on for discontent ovc-:..· son:e f ::.ct , some detail, more tban ever, '~e must remember how good , ge::'le:::-ous , r.c..ble , and friendly the Soviets bava been tm~a:::-d us, and I was :pi·e~isely sp0ak:Lr'lg of th8":.. t.:ch:lic :i.ans , i·1ho:n i·ie ta ve see:i at cur side, ready to die , to sacrifice the~ live s in the defe.~se of rrur country. They are

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Castro Ruz, premier

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2 Ilc·;e:.JJe:r 1?62 nctr!'l::.::-icen~ 1 - r.en . 'JT'"".... • l·•o t .. u ..... v is w~v a . , .. r.1en more than e ,,, . ..,, !':o~::er th~JI" t· .· tm1a.,..d th V1.::r i s e.ppri:c ·:., ... io ·- ..., r..ac we must feel at this

- o::;e men I ' , . t• -'-'v . n , arfection, reGpect aud oatitudc :follow at this • oe..Ll(Aepvela;;at)tcat i s the condu.'.!t -whi~h we mu:::t moment . p u::. e

That is '~hat we . better than ever musi;. show! and, above all, ·,1e oust conduct o-.rrsclve!: With inore great ~uring tnese morce!lt s, "With higher morale t:r;:n ever and

ne..,s than ever .

Let it not be tho ,h... . .... . d isal.'ms us . Th. u~ v tr.a~ the \l~vhdrawal or ~he strateaic we~pons thc.t "1e have f l.S. aoes not mean tl:at we are disarmed. I can e s sure you extr" d. ormidable n:eans of defe!"lse , powerful means of defc11se ,

o.Or inary resources with which to de:'..'end ourselves.

Ttheh strategic weapons are leav.:.nci-, but all the other '~eapons--a.ll the o er wea u -... pen~ are staying in our country, and t hey are very powerfu l me ..... ns o~ defense, with '~hich ·we can face any siJ~u.ation . There i::; no reason Ior coni'usion; there is no reason for confusion. The confUsion \·1ill :pass little by little .

There is one rr.atter I ,.:::.~1t to str ess , o:~e observation I want to n:ake , e.nd i t i::wol ves tne :people, tee co?:duct_ of the people du:rin~ these days . I ,.,ant to say th<at the ac'tion of the people has su=passed everythine; even the most opt i;nistic could ever hn.ve imagined i n ddtcrmination, • valor , and discipline . I 't mi.let be said that thousands of men who ·were not militiamen, who did not become militiamen during these f our yenrs of revolution, becane militiamen during this crisis . I t must be said tba"'.; thousands of persons who did not belong to n;ass orgo.ni::a'.;ions or conmittees for the def ens e of the revolution went to regi:;ter i."1 the r.:ass organizations during these days .

I t must be said that the eneny was unable , inside our co1.1ntr~r , to count on allies of any kind . It must be said tr.at durL"lg t hese days of extreme crisis it was not necessary to arrest anybody . Even men and '1omen •1ho criticiz.ed tee revolution-- i n this decis ive hour tne ~atriotic, revolutionary core beca;ne ap~arent in them a;-:d they , ,ent to enlist, and they wen·t to enlist for a battle tl~t according to ever y prospect Vias a serious battle, a terrifyinb battle; a battle that c ould b e f ought ~ith conventional weapons or ·with a tomic weapon~ .

'l'he President of the United States tried to inti.midate our people , these people '~horn he called a captive :people, when he spoke of how we might be a target for atomic attacli:s , and the :result -was that thE::re ,.1ere more t)ili tia:::en than ever , more revolut).onary rnil)tants tl'l.an ever . It must 'be told how the women went to wo::-k, a nd how the pensioners went to Vlork t o replace the I?;en in t he t!'encbes .

It mu.st be noted tra.t , alt.hough this was the greatest mo~ilizo.tion of all, .. ... v?.s t,he one tl'Jat affected p:..·cduction tr.e least. Never during a ; .. .1)::~ .. l~ation r.ad production sone as it did . T.'le people 1 s di~c.:l?line v:a.::; "tl"'1..:.~r :::ipre$':hve, the people 1 s ardor, the people 1 s valor.

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.. -Castro Ruz, p retl.i.er

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mnra 21 CU3.I\ 2 Novc::iber 1962

Ir:iprcssive also wa ... ,~ . b s ~~corr.~ ~ --~.... . Y oui· revolutiona-..y a"' dc.:··--.... ~-0.'.1 e.:q_ · :.:.-cJ cy c ·.ir people a·.::ove all

- me o ·ces d . . , commands operated It- - ~ , ar. -cne ei'f ic:'..ency with which the creating discipli . h was cc~cr.3trated how tte revolution p~s been

ne as been · ~ · . enemy has made us d~ . 1

. sn~p!.~1~ a pe0ple . By harassi!lg us , "the battle - harccnea' TllClp inec , tas ~aae us or68nized, has ~ade us

• ne .... 0 sult - ... l made a heroic e • - or 1. 1cse foU? years of harassment has 1~ Snarta the p ople , 8 people more than S~artan, for it is said that shield ~others sent their sons o-:f with tl:e ,1ords, "With your yo ' or on l t •" -And here , an c:itire peoole men women, and children ,

unl.g and) old , told themselves "with our shield o; on it . " (Prolonged app ause ' ,

~ people like t hat are an invincible -p;ople . A people li!':e that , who ~ tha~ man!ler so calmly , so admiraoly, confront such difficult

situations , are a people who have a right to win what they aspire to, which is peace , respect , to keep inviolate the ir dignity end their prestige , because we have l ong- ra!'lge moral missiles that ca:mot be disr:iar.tled and will never be dismantled ! (Prolonged applause) And that is our most powerful strategic wea~n, of strategic defense and strategic offense!

And so here I want to bear witness today ~ore than ever to our aci:niration for our people . Ar.C. ell tie rcvolut ioneries sho~ld feel doubly obliged , after this experience , to fight for our people , to work tirelessly for our people. I want to say here toC.ay from the very bottom of rrry heart , in conclusion I wa!lt to say, that today more than ever I feel proud of being a son of tr.is people .

Fatherland or death, we viill viin ! (Applause)

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Castro Ruz 1 premier

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