Stalin’s Pen: the Correspondences of the Soviet Leader and their Implications

Henry Smith

Towson University

HIST 486.001 Senior History Seminar

Professor Zajicek

May 9, 2016

Henry Smith-1

Stalin’s Pen:

The Correspondences of the Soviet Leader and their Implications

Henry Smith, May 2016

Introduction

One of the most useful, and most dangerous, ways of approaching history is through the

personal correspondences of historical figures. The letters, journals, transcripts, and words left by

historical figures illuminate a perspective to events as they happened. This can be a very

informative and enlightening tool. Joseph Stalin’s letters, however, are more complex. The

Soviet tyrant was not a mere worker keeping a journal, or a housewife writing a letter to her

husband on the front. He was in power, and this required him to take on different roles as a

leader. Whether he is giving a speech at the Politburo, discussing trade agreements with the

President of the United States, or sitting at a beach in Sochi, he was always the leader of the

Soviet Union. What is interesting is that it is not always the same kind of leader. The letters he

wrote show different kinds of leaders, ones that changed depending on the recipient. His position

on a subject, his style of writing, his cordiality, and his manner of leadership all change between

letters. When he is writing as the General Secretary leading the industrialization drive and

collectivization reforms, he is different than the World Leader working with the United States

Henry Smith-2

and Great Britain to stop the Nazis. The differences can partly be explained by the natural

differences in our speech to different people, as well as to differing times and circumstances, but

this gives us only a fraction of the full picture. The differences intentionally paint Stalin in

various images in order to meet expectations as leader and to get the most out of the recipient.

Stalin’s correspondences to Molotov, Kaganovich, Roosevelt, and Churchill are empirical

evidence of the different sides to Joseph Stalin as a leader.

The main sources are the collections of letters that Stalin sent to Vyacheslav Molotov,

Lazar Kaganovich, and Franklin Roosevelt.1 They provide not only Stalin’s personal

perspectives on the different issues surrounding the building and defense of Stalinism but a

glimpse of how he communicated with those around him. His letters lose some of the fire that

accompanied his speech, but it is still easy to see the violent emotions that he could unleash. A

letter sent to Molotov reads, “The letter from Manuilskii is cowardly and conniving. I stand

entirely by my declaration on the swindling and dirty tricks, despite the dissatisfaction of some

comrades.”2 The name-calling and thinly veiled threats are staples of Stalin’s prose, and even as

early as 1925 he is using it freely. But he is not all fire and insults. He can show compassion and

textbook diplomacy, like in his note to Roosevelt, “I take this moment to thank you, Mr.

President, on behalf of the Soviet Government, for the cordial hospitality offered to Mr. Molotov

and his staff during their sojourn in the United States.”3 He can also be a rational, pragmatic

ruler, analytically deciding the best decision in his view. This is seen most clearly in his

correspondences with Kaganovich, like on the importance of rail transport, of which Stalin

1Lars T. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov, and Oleg V. Khlevniuk, ed., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov 1925-1936 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); R. W. Davies, Oleg V. Khlevniuk, and E. A. Rees, ed., The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence 1931-36 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); Susan Butler, ed., My Dear Mr. Stalin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).2 Stalin to Molotov, 18 August 1925, in Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 94.3 Stalin to Roosevelt, June 12, 1942, in My Dear Mr. Stalin, 70.

Henry Smith-3

remarked, “I regard transport- above all, railroad transport- to be the most important issue in the

coming months. The principal threat to the national economy now comes from transport, and it is

transport that must be approved above all,” a sentiment to which Kaganovich agreed and set out

in motion.4 These sources shed much light on Stalin’s many leadership roles, which is the key

focus of this paper, but context to the letters is required first.

Starting in 1925 and ending in 1936, Stalin spent his summers at Sochi on the Black Sea.5

Lacking the necessary technology of the telephone, Stalin relied on pen, paper, and the postal

system to communicate with his party members. This allowed for the large corpus of letters to

exist at all, which allows for more research into the inner workings of the Soviet leadership.

From his seaside dacha, Stalin was alerted to important matters from Moscow and sent back his

input. Two of the main recipients of his letters were Molotov and Kaganovich, two of the most

powerful and influential members of the Soviet Union. The letters he sent show the different

dynamics Stalin held in power of the Politburo and Soviet governmental apparatus.

During this period, the most important aspect was the building of Stalinism. This is a

complex process that can be simplified into the policies, culture, and society created under

Stalin’s reign over the Soviet Union. Its origins are found in his crushing of Trotsky and

Zinoviev to unify the Politburo, as well as removal of Lenin’s New Economic Plan.6 From there,

Stalin began pushing his own agenda, which required a culture shift. The War Economy and

Revolutionary Fervor were running out of steam, and had to be replaced.7 The replacement was

4 Stalin to Kaganovich, 19 September 1931, in The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence 1931-36, 94-97. 5 Lih, et. al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 1. 6 Oleg V. Khlevniuk, Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 100.7 Hiroaki Kiromiya, “Stalin’s Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928-1932,” in The Stalin Revolution: Foundations of the Totalitarian Era, Robert Vincent Daniels (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1997), 70-71; Amir Weiner, “The Making of a Dominant Myth: The Second World War and the Construction of Political Identities within the Soviet Polity,” The Russian Review 55 (October 1996): 639-640.

Henry Smith-4

the Stalinist policies under a new Stalinist oppression.8 Two of the most important policies,

which were often discussed with Molotov, Kaganovich, and even Churchill at times, were

industrialization and collectivization. Industrialization had kulaks deported, the NEP and the

NEPmen removed, and factories pushed beyond their limits to reach ever-increasing

expectations.9 Collectivization of the farms was done to distribute grain in a socialist method, but

it also placed a heavy burden on the peasants producing the grain, leading to their resentment.10

These two policies and events complemented each other in Stalin’s plans to push Russia into

modernity, and exemplified his first decade of power.

Many of letters Stalin wrote to Molotov and Kaganovich concern these two major

policies. While the letters do not include what Stalin and his inner circle discussed while he was

in Moscow, they do give an in-depth discussion between Stalin and his right and left hand man.

The medium of the letter required Stalin, Molotov, and Kaganovich to cover all the details

needed to get the job done, a central tenant and expectation of Soviet bureaucracy. This makes

them longer-winded than they normally would have been if they were in a meeting room in the

Kremlin. This allows for greater insight into Stalin’s opinions on crucial topics to Soviet history.

Another defining moment of Stalinist Russia was the Nazi invasion during World War 2,

known as the Great Patriotic War in Russia. This was the realization of the fears of the Soviet

leaders. An outside force was challenging Communism, and it needed to be defending. This was

what they had been preparing for since 1927, yet it still started badly.11 So badly, in fact, the

8 Khlevniuk, Stalin, 100-103.9 Kuromiya, “Stalin’s Industrial Revolution,” 67-72.10 Lynne Viola, “The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization,” in The Stalin Revolution: Foundations of the Totalitarian Era, Robert Vincent Daniels (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1997), 109-110.11 Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 120-121.

Henry Smith-5

Soviet Union, despite their sense of historic and moral superiority, had to turn to outside help.12

They had to seek aid from the United States and Great Britain. From President Roosevelt he

asked for material aid, like telephones, metals, alloys, wire, trucks, armor, machines, tools,

factory equipment, and clothing.13 It would not be until the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor

that America would provide direct military aid. The United Kingdom was already at war with

Germany by the time Operation Barbarossa was tearing through western Russia. Resigned to

defending their island nation from German air raids, Prime Minister Churchill had to be

convinced mainly by Stalin to open up a ground offensive on Nazi controlled France.14 Operation

Overlord put pressure on Hitler’s western territories, relieving pressure on the eastern front. This

would be a turning point in the Second World War and the downfall of fascism, but also one of

the last moments of diplomacy by the future Cold War adversaries.

The escalating war brought these three leaders together on several occasions. The most

famous of these meetings were the Conferences at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam. These meetings

established a common ground between the enemies of Hitler as they discussed how to defeat the

German warlord and what was to be done once peace was established. These meetings created

many informative and useful transcripts that can be applied to several subfields of history, but for

this paper’s purposes, it intensified the frequency of Stalin and Roosevelt’s letters to one another.

The leaders of the USSR and the USA struck an expectantly friendly relationship, one that has

created an invaluable corpus of writings that showcase Stalin’s international relations. While

Stalin’s relationship with Churchill was rockier, and did not create as many documents, their

interactions are important to the study of Stalin’s role as a international leader.

12 Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 202-203.13 Roosevelt to Stalin, October 31, 1941, in My Dear Mr. Stalin, 49-51.14 Geoffrey Roberts, “Stalin at the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences,” Journal of Cold War Studies 9:4 (Fall 2007): 16.

Henry Smith-6

Correspondence with Molotov and Kaganovich

Joseph Stalin has a reputation for being cruel, violent, tyrannical, and evil. Victims and

students of the Ukrainian Holodomor, the famines caused by collectivization, the misplaced

ethnic minorities, and the Great Terror will attest to these character traits. And in a final analysis,

they may be proven to be true. So while genocidal one-upmanship does not tell the full story, the

tens of millions dead cannot be ignored.

Stopping any study on Stalin with the sole conclusion than he was a mass murderer

devalues the complexities of the Soviet government and of Stalin, not to mention the many

sources that can tell us more about the builders and defenders of socialism. The letters Stalin

wrote to Molotov and Kaganovich while at Sochi can help to look deeper into Stalin as a person

and a leader. They show instances of the tyrannical aggression that has dominated the public

perception, but they also show the opposite. They show Stalin’s long friendship with Molotov

and Kaganovich, as comrades not just in politics but also in spirit. They had rose through the

Communist Party’s ranks together during and directly after the Civil War, and the Old

Bolsheviks shared a comradeship that was not yet broken by the demands of power.15 These

correspondences show how Stalin stood above in the Soviet hierarchy, but more importantly,

why he carried out his actions that had dramatic effects on the inner workings of the Kremlin but

also on the Russian people as a whole.

Stalin was the General Secretary of the Politburo, the executive policy making branch of

the Soviet Union. Policies were proposed and debated by the members of the Politburo and a

decision was democratically reached. At least, this was the system envisioned under Lenin.

Under Stalin, the system became even more centralized. Decisions were no longer reached on the

15 Sheila Fitzpatrick, “In Power,” from On Stalin’s Team: The Years of Living Dangerously in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 64-65.

Henry Smith-7

Politburo floor but in back room meetings between Stalin and several key members related to the

proposed policy.16 Stalin may not have been the leading expert on a subject, but he was virtually

always present, and his decisions were often final. He could be persuaded one way or another,

but it was clear who was in charge.

As in Moscow, so it was in Sochi. Updates on industrialization and collectivization were

required, as well as the happenings of Soviet politics. The letters to Kaganovich generally

concerned the former information, with factory updates and statistical data being the main

subjects of conversation, while the letters to Molotov generally concerned how members of the

Politburo were behaving. There was some overlap, but the distinction is not so surprising.

Kaganovich was in charge of the Orgburo, several Central Committee departments, and the

Politburo during Stalin’s absence.17 Essentially, he was in charge of the political operation of the

Soviet Union in Stalin’s stead. Molotov was less of a political organizer and more of a

bureaucrat.18 He had Stalin’s position before him, and still performed the office’s duties

whenever Stalin was away. He served as Stalin’s right hand man, working tirelessly for his best

interests, both in Moscow and abroad.19 Each served a different role in Stalin’s government, and

therefore Stalin had different correspondences with the two of them.

For instance, when Stalin wrote to Molotov about new iron and steel works, he focuses

on the personnel, specifically a Lokatskov, head of Main Ferrous Metals.20 He compares his

“ancient” methods to American and German specialists, and questions whether he and Molotov

could “shake up” Lokatskov and Kuibyshev, an economic advisor to the Politburo, into

16 J. Arch Getty, “Stalin as Prime Minister: power and the Politburo,” from Stalin: a New History, Sarah Davies and James R. Harris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 83-86.17 Davies, et. al., The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, ix.18 Lih, et. al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 2.19 Ibid.20 Stalin to Molotov, 23 August 1929, in Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 172.

Henry Smith-8

performing good enough, or if they could bring “Austin & Co.” in on contracts instead.21 At this

time, the Soviet Union was bringing in foreign construction firms to build up their industry, but

only until Russian workers and experts were capable.22 This was a topic of contention in both

Moscow and Magnitogorsk, and the right personnel was necessary in making the Soviet

industrial dream a reality.

Conversely, when Stalin wrote to Kaganovich on factories, it was more policy than

person. “Why aren’t the summaries on the Moscow and Gorky auto plants being published every

day...Why did tractor output decline at the Stalingrad Tractor Plant...What is the situation with

regard to plan fulfillment of tanks, airplanes, engines…?”23 These question were less interested

in the personnel but in the operation. Industrialization had to follow Stalin’s vision for the

advancement of socialism, and Kaganovich was the man in charge of seeing things completed.24

If viewed through the correspondence, the leadership styles Molotov and Kaganovich

saw were quite different. Stalin had to be both a judge of a person’s character with Molotov and

an adept organizer and coordinator with Kaganovich. Stalin would fit certain roles to achieve

certain tasks, creating a multi-dimensional identity as leader. He had to be numerical and direct

at times. At others, he had to be subjective and judgmental. What was important in the end was

getting the job done. Was his cruelty another means to an end? Possibly. Does this resolve him

of guilt or blame? Definitely not. But it does show that Stalin had many hats, which he used to

ensure Stalinism moved forward.

Stalin’s shifting modes of power were unified by a common command for respect and

obedience. Since the crushing of Zinoviev and Trotsky and the removal of all opposition in the

21 Ibid.22 Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, 37-45,47-48.23 Stalin to Kaganovich, 12 June, 1932, in The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 127.24 Kaganovich to Stalin, 14 June 1932, in The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 133-135.

Henry Smith-9

Politburo, Stalin ran the government through a combination of fear, devotion, and paranoia.25

Political exile was always a threat, as was murder. Even Molotov and Kaganovich lost Stalin’s

favor towards the end of his life. Overt oppression cannot last however, even for a member as

devoted as Molotov. Stalin was aggressive and demanding, but not more than he needed to be.

He remained tempered and self-aware in his writings, but the threat of his anger never was far. In

a letter to both Molotov and Bukharin, he wrote, “Damn the both of you: you misled me a little

bit by asking my opinion on the new directives (about China) and not providing me with

concrete fresh material… And not only did you mislead me a little bit, but I misled you, perhaps,

with my long and quite angry reply…”26 Stalin may have had absolute deciding power, but when

he was in Sochi, he relied heavily on the information provided to him.27 As this letter shows,

information can be withheld or altered to limit what Stalin knew. This was done to make him

make a decision that benefited whoever was giving him the abridged information. This letter also

shows the thinly veiled contempt Stalin could muster. “Damn the both of you,” when used in

governmental correspondence is a phrase that often signals the end of someone’s political career.

This letter predates the Great Terror or Purge, so Molotov and Bukharin were less at risk here

than if the same utterance was made a decade later.

The letter also shows Stalin’s self-awareness to his anger. It may not be a controlled fury

that he can dispense at will, as he feels some remorse for his emotions, but it is also not an

uncontrollable characteristic. Stalin knew when his anger was necessary, and with the political

system he manipulated to keep every member on its toes, his anger held a fatal weight. His anger

was a tool to be used to keep his lieutenants in line and following his vision. It is a Stalinist

variant of the carrot and the stick. In the above letter, he felt deceived, and administered the

25 Khlevniuk, Stalin: New Biography of the Dictator, 81-89.26 Stalin to Molotov and Bukharin, 9 July 1927, in Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 139-140.27 Getty, “Stalin as Prime Minister,” 98.

Henry Smith-10

stick, but in Letter 80 to Molotov, he gives the carrot. After going over budget cuts and

rebalancing, he asks Viacheslav, not Comrade Molotov, “How’s life? Are you getting any rest?

My health is good; my friends are well also. Regards to Com. Zhemchuzhina [Molotov’s

wife].”28 This may be political and personal manipulation, but it does show Stalin’s use of

aggression is not a blind rage, but more calculated to serve his best interests.

What were these best interests? We return to the ambiguous concept of the building of

Stalinism. The policies that Stalin pushed for are the clearest definition of Stalinism, but it also

involves the political, social, and cultural changes that occurred on a systematic level.

Industrialization was the most important aspect, and acted as a symbol for the creation of a new

society. Industry moved Russia forward into modern times, and furthered the historical certainty

of global victory for socialism.29 One of most common topics in the letters to Molotov and

Kaganovich was the progress of the Five Year Plan and the construction of new factories and

industries. Kaganovich was often more detailed in his reports on various topics. Grain sales,

tractor shipments, steel production, railroads, and Politburo voting on industrialization policies

are common in Kaganovich’s letters, which are really more like numbered reports on Moscow’s

view of the Union. They are lengthy and cover multiple topics that Stalin wished to be informed

on. One letter alone mentioned the cancellation of a speech by Vyshinsky, the Central Volga

Canal construction project, grain procurement rates and measures, the People’s Commissar of

Heavy Industry’s request for “a continuous rolling mill,” phonograph editing, the appointment of

the Ukrainian secretary, the shuffling of administrators, an International Youth Day Parade, and

Ordzhonikidze and Molotov’s vacation.30 This allowed Stalin to be up to date with current affairs

as Kaganovich ran the day-to-day leadership and Stalin made decisions from the Black Sea.

28 Stalin to Molotov, 21 July 1935, in Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 23529 Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, 120.30 Kaganovich to Stalin, 2 September 1933, in The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 201-203.

Henry Smith-11

Stalin did not need to be the ever present dictator, but his close correspondence with Kaganovich

kept in him control.

The correspondence with Kaganovich was more formal than Stalin’s letters to Molotov,

but there is some evidence of familiarity between the two Old Bolsheviks. This is due to the role

Stalin was playing with Kaganovich, as opposed to Molotov. With Kaganovich, Stalin was

ensuring Stalinism kept moving forward. With Molotov, he was ensuring Stalinism stayed

together. Stalin required results and updates from Kaganovich, which led to his responses being

administrative. As long as things were progressing, he was cordial and agreeable with

Kaganovich’s reports. But he was not afraid of letting Kaganovich know when he disagrees. He

wrote he was “resolutely opposed,” to publishing Central Committee congress material, noted

that “the situation with artillery is very bad,” and that “the Baku oil situation is bad.”31 Very few

words were wasted in his analysis of what was wrong, and this reflected Stalin’s expectations in

his role of industrial supervisor. When Tomskii was “resigned” from the All Union Chemical

Association, Stalin was strait to the point in agreeing with his removal as, “he is doing nothing

for us.”32 The worst thing one could be to Stalin was being useless.

Compare this to his next letter chronologically, written to both Kaganovich and Molotov,

detailing a new campaign to influence public opinion against Japanese militarism33. Several

differences emerge in the writing. He was more verbose in the second letter, full with positive

directives, suggestions, and expectations. He is less terse than in the first letter, as he takes on a

different role of leader. The operations of industry and public opinion are not connected in

Western governments, but under Stalin’s centralized state, he had to be the leader and instigator

31 Stalin to Kaganovich, 21 October, 1933, in The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 231.32 Stalin to Molotov, 2 September 1930, in Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 210-211.33 Stalin to Kaganovich and Molotov, 21 October 1933, in The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 232-233.

Henry Smith-12

for both. The letters show almost a form of code switching, as Stalin takes different approaches

to the different aspects of Soviet leadership.

Stalin’s vacations to Sochi created a paper trail of his interactions with Molotov and

Kaganovich. From these documents, we can see how Stalin wrote to his main lieutenants and

more importantly how it changed. Stalin’s countenance in his writings depended on the recipient

and what the recipient meant to Stalin’s larger designs for the building of Stalinism. If he was

writing to Kaganovich, it was for the daily operation and leading of the USSR, and he used the

tone of authoritative leader that expected and demanded results and updates. If he was writing to

Molotov, it was for the inner workings of the Politburo and foreign embassies, specifically its

personnel, and took on the role of chief bureaucrat, deciding who was responsible for what to

make the Stalinist policies become reality. Stalin’s letters to the Soviet politicians differentiated

based on what Stalin expected and needed from them. This made Stalin utilize different styles of

leadership to best get the job done. The letters show this, and are a valuable resource to

determining Stalin’s relationship with the rest of the Politburo. This knowledge can be used to

better understand what kind of leader in Russia and the USSR was Stalin.

Correspondence with Roosevelt and Churchill

Stalin often came off as crass or aggressive to his Russian companions. If he was in a

particularly good mood, he might appear wry and sarcastic. This was due to his superiority over

Molotov and Kaganovich. The hierarchy had to be maintained, and a clear image of Soviet

leader kept Stalin above his fellow Communists. But with President Roosevelt and Prime

Minister Churchill, this hierarchy was not engrained. With fellow heads of state, Stalin was

expected to act as an equal, not a dictator. This caused his behavior to be different around the

international leaders, and his letters followed suit.

Henry Smith-13

The Second World War brought to Russia the devastation of the Nazi war machine. The

early defense of Russia was chaotic, as the army, the Politburo, and Stalin were not ready for

war.34 It was less of a defense, in fact, than an unorganized retreat; Stalin felt as if all the work

that had gone into building the Soviet state was being destroyed.35 Despite the grim future, the

Soviet Union could not give up. Defense plans were becoming more concrete, however slowly,

and the Red Army and Stalin still needed to at least appear confident to secure Western

alliances.36 Stalin needed allies, and that required him to take on another role of leader.

The first meeting of what became the Big Three occurred in Moscow in 1941 with the

main topic being the American material assistance, later organized into the Lend Lease Act.37

Despite the tensions that emerged by the end of the Second World War and threatened

throughout the Cold War, the Soviet-American alliance started affably enough. The three states,

being the USSR, the USA, and the UK, agreed to “collaborate and cooperate” together until the

war was over.38 As for Stalin himself, he was deeply gracious to Roosevelt.39 “The Soviet

Government expresses its deep gratitude for your statement that the decisions of the conference

[Lend-Lease] will be carried out to the maximum extent…a non-interest bearing loan in the sum

of one billion dollars…substantial assistance to the Soviet Union in its great and difficult

struggle with our common enemy, blood thirsty Hitlerism.”40 These do not seem like the words

of a brash and sadistic tyrant. How then do we compartmentalize this cordiality with the reality

of Stalin? One answer would be to doubt the sincerity of Stalin’s message. It is not unlikely that

such a formal letter was written by more than just Stalin, and he does claim to write “on behalf of

34 Khlevniuk, Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator, 203.35 Ibid., 204-205.36 Ibid., 210-211.37 Ibid., 212.38 Roberts, “Stalin at the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences,” 10.39 Stalin to Roosevelt, November 4, 1941, in My Dear Mr. Stalin, 52.40 Ibid.

Henry Smith-14

the Government of the USSR,” so outside influence from that Government would also be

possible.41 But this overlooks a key point of Stalinism that Stalin had the final say. If Stalin

disagreed with the message being conveyed, it had to be revised or removed. Additionally, if the

words are not Stalin’s, they are coming from Stalin’s pen, and since Stalin agreed to keep further

correspondence with Roosevelt, more words must flow in the future. Whatever doubt to the

authenticity or sincerity of the letters, they were still sent to Roosevelt, and Stalin’s position of

friendship was made explicit.

This friendly relationship lasted until Roosevelt’s death in 1945, and Stalin’s relationship

with this successor, Harry Truman, would not be as friendly.42 Stalin and Roosevelt’s

relationship was cordial, but not as cold as the Stalin’s was with his Soviet compatriots. While it

would be difficult to call Stalin and Roosevelt true friends, there was a shared sense of interest

that never neared hostility. Stalin could be bluntly mean to Soviet and foreign politicians and

ambassadors, but this antagonism was never aimed at Roosevelt.

Their correspondence concerned matters not related to the war as well. Roosevelt’s re-

election, Franco-Soviet relations, which were a matter of some contention, and even Stalin’s

birthday were all mentioned and discussed between the two heads of state.43 They asked each

other for advice in the subject of ruling a country at war, gave each other updates on Soviet and

American ambassadors in Moscow, Washington D.C., and other places of note, and discussed

geopolitical matters that affecting the Allies and the world at large. They were political allies and

confidants, and their alliance did much to save Russia from the Nazis and Germany’s eventual

defeat. Stalin expressed as much to Roosevelt, in how “ ‘If not for Lend-Lease, victory would

41 Ibid.42 Roberts, “Stalin at the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences,” 29.43 Stalin to Roosevelt, November 9, 1944, in My Dear Mr. Stalin, 266; Stalin to Roosevelt, December 2, 1944, in My Dear Mr. Stalin, 269-270; Getty, “Stalin at the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences,” 12, 21, 23, 39; Roosevelt to Stalin, December 21, 1944, in My Dear Mr. Stalin, 277.

Henry Smith-15

have been greatly hindered.”44 Stalin knew he had an important and powerful ally in Roosevelt,

and did much to maintain this friendship.

It is in this understanding of Stalin’s view that we can see why Stalin so befriended a

Western capitalist, the historic enemy of the Marxist, Leninist, and Stalinist revolutions. It also

helps us rationalize why Stalin, justifiably scrutinized by popular perception, had a close

relationship with Roosevelt, a President that had overwhelmingly popular support in America at

the time and a unique place in our current memory of him. Ideologically, this partnership should

not fit. What it comes down to is that Stalin needed Roosevelt. The Nazi plan had nearly

succeeded, reaching the gates of Moscow, and that was with American and British material

support. The direction of power is switched when compared to Stalin’s relationship with

Molotov and Kaganovich. Stalin was not the Boss to Roosevelt, and he could not pretend to be.

Stalin knew that it was neither the time nor place to flaunt Bolshevik and Socialist superiority to

the Capitalist West when Leningrad was under siege. What was important was not the spreading

of Socialism to the global stage, but defending their Stalinist society in Russia. This required the

help of the United States and the United Kingdom. The real and present dangers of fascism

outweighed the evils of capitalism to Stalin and the Soviet Union.

The advantages gained from Roosevelt and his Lend-Lease Act were what kept the

relationship alive. Without it, Stalin would see no use in Roosevelt, and the dangers of being

useless to Stalin could be mortally deadly in Russia, and politically deadly internationally. The

study of the Cold War can be seen really as a study of what happened when the United States

and the USSR no longer needed each other. But in the Great Patriotic War, Stalin needed

Roosevelt, and therefore took on the role of benevolent diplomat trying to reach international

unity against a common foe. They were unlikely bedfellows, but the correspondence shows they

44 Khlevniuk, Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator, 212.

Henry Smith-16

were both at least willing to keep up appearances in order to stop Hitler. Once the war was won,

the talks of long-term peace keeping were no longer so unified. Roosevelt’s death definitely

played a large role in the worsening of relations, but ideological differences already created

fissures in the alliance. Stalin was happy to talk of everlasting peace when he was receiving

machinery, supplies, and armaments from the United States, but once that was gone, he had no

need to keep up the cordial letters.

With Winston Churchill, we see less of the friendly talk. Even if it wasn’t completely

genuine with Roosevelt, the friendship was at least feigned for the good of international

relations. Stalin is less polite to the British Prime Minister. They would often argue animatedly

on topics important to Soviet interests. Most important of these topics were the opening of a

second front against Germany to relieve pressure from the Russian defense, the role of France as

an ally after the war, and the group’s position on the dismemberment of Germany.45 For the

conversations between Stalin and Churchill on these topics we must look away from letters and

instead towards the spoken word, or at least the transcripts of the spoken word.

Stalin and Churchill met in person during the war three times at the Conferences at

Tehran in November 1943, Yalta in February 1945, and Potsdam in July-August 1945. Tehran,

in newly British occupied Iran, will be the main focus for Stalin and Churchill’s physical

meetings. At Tehran, the Big Three concluded on the date of May 1944 for Operation Overlord,

the military venture that would retake France from Nazi control as Russia focused a counter-

offensive against the German forces in the east.46 While the Allied liberation of France seems

like a historical certainty in today’s perspective, much debate preceded it. Stalin was very

motivated to finalize the plans for Western involvement, as the Germans were moving through

45 Roberts, “Stalin at the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences,” 13-19, 22, 2446 Avalon Project at Yale Law School, “The Tehran Conference, November 28-December 1, 1943,” 1997, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/tehran.htm.

Henry Smith-17

Soviet territory and the Red Army needed assistance.47 The location of the meeting was reflected

in this urgency, as Tehran allowed Stalin to have access to a direct telephone to Moscow to

coordinate with his generals.48

Stalin and Roosevelt were of the same mind of the necessity of a Western front, and both

worked to convince Churchill, who was hesitant to mount an offensive across the English

Channel.49 Churchill’s reluctance was not unnoticed by Stalin, and he spoke sharply to Churchill,

questioning his commitment to defeating Germany and allying with Russia.50 Once Churchill

agreed to the invasion however, Stalin’s demeanor towards Churchill improved.51 Stalin did not

necessarily dislike Churchill, but he would not let the British leader stand in his way of doing

what was needed for the Soviet Union. Stalin knew what was at stake. There was the threat of

complete defeat to the German armies, but Stalin did not show this fear at Tehran. He maintained

the face of a strong leader in the face of opposition, even going so far as to push other issues, like

Russia’s long time desire for access to the Mediterranean, blocked by Turkish control of the

Black Sea Straits.52 He was the leader of the Soviet Union, but that meant something different to

Churchill than it did to Roosevelt, Molotov, or Kaganovich. Stalin had to be a player in the

European geopolitical chess match, the same game Churchill was a part of. Stalin pushed

Churchill because he needed to push the Soviet position. It is a similar position to Stalin’s

motives with Roosevelt. Stalin needed something from the Western leaders, and changed his

personal style to best get it. From Churchill he needed cooperation, but the fiery English bulldog

was often characteristically uncooperative, which prompted Stalin to be more forceful. Roosevelt

47 Roberts, “Stalin at the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences,” 1048 Ibid., 1149 Ibid., 1350 Ibid., 1551 Ibid.,1652 Ibid.

Henry Smith-18

was willing to work with Stalin, which allowed for their relationship to go smoothly, but

Churchill often opposed Stalin, which created the tension.

The biggest reason that the correspondences between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill

exist is the alliance against Nazi Germany. Without the common threat, Stalin’s interactions with

the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom, and other non-socialist countries likely

would have been reserved to the odd economic agreement or international meeting. These

theoretical meetings would also be less likely since the United Nations, the leading body on

international meetings, was created as a result of World War 2 and the Yalta Conference.53 The

Second World War has reshaped our understanding of global politics that makes it seem

ideologically impossible that the two Western leaders would have so much contact with the

leader of the Socialist world. From a post-Cold War world, the alliance appears contradictory to

our understanding of the dynamics of Western-Soviet relations. But by considering Stalin as a

leader that consciously fits into needed roles for the good of the Soviet Union, the alliance seems

less peculiar. His letters to Roosevelt take on a new persona, one that is friendly, cordial, and

cooperative. As the Conferences show, this is partly due to Roosevelt and Stalin often agreeing

on many subjects. Roosevelt was not an obstacle to Stalin’s wartime leadership. Just the

opposite, in fact, as US aid and support was a monumental help to the Soviet defense of Russia.

Stalin needed Roosevelt, and made sure that the letters that were sent to him would be the most

effective at ensuring the alliance for the continued material aid. This was a major operation by

the Kremlin, and Stalin often enlisted Molotov and his subordinates to draft the letters, which

were then edited and finalized by Stalin.54

53 Ibid., 2554 Vladimir Pechatnov, “How Stalin and Molotov Wrote Messages to Churchill: Following Stalin’s Archives,” Russia in Global Affairs 7, no. 3 (July-September 2009), 162-163.

Henry Smith-19

The letters and statements made to Churchill also had immense importance, but Stalin

took a different approach with the British Prime Minister. Churchill often butted heads with

Stalin on several issues related to the war. He was hesitant to open a second front and did not

plan on being as harsh in German reconstruction. To Stalin, these were indirect threats to the

Soviet Union’s stability and interests, and therefore exerted his gruffness and aggression against

Churchill. With the assistance of Roosevelt, Stalin mostly got what he wanted. Stalin took on the

role of political manipulator and bully in his correspondence with Churchill. Churchill’s take on

Stalin is flagged with caveats. His memoirs mention several meetings he had with Stalin, but the

politician (who, it must be added, was taken to drink) made several statements that contradict

with the official Soviet and British records of the meetings.55 Regardless of Churchill’s personal

recollections, Stalin’s approaches to writing and speaking with Roosevelt and Churchill display

the Soviet leader’s ability to change his style to best fit the role he believed was necessary. This

character trait is very important in understanding Stalin as both a leader and a person.

Conclusion

Stalin’s letters give us not only a glimpse into the mind of the Soviet leader, but also an

example of how Stalin led. His leadership style fluctuated to best fit the situation he was in. And

while these differences occur with each person Stalin wrote his letters to, there is a clearer

dichotomy between the Soviet Stalin and the International Stalin. A student of international

diplomacy will see a different side of Stalin than one who studies Soviet domestic political

relations. The expectations Stalin had from Molotov and Kaganovich are very different than with

Roosevelt and Churchill. He expected results, updates, progress, and loyalty from his Soviet

comrades. With the leaders of the Western world, it is likely he wanted the same, but instead

55 Michael Ellman, “Churchill on Stalin: A Note,” Europe-Asia Studies 58, no. 6 (September 2006), 966-970

Henry Smith-20

expected coordination and cooperation. This shows that Stalin could change his form of

leadership, and this is important because it show Stalin as a dynamic leader who was self-aware

of his rule.

Stalin’s leadership of the Soviet government is so significant because of its centralized

nature. Stalin had the final say on virtually every topic, and even if he wasn’t directly involved,

the decision was made by some part of the central government. This had many adverse effects on

the operation of the country during Stalin’s rule as inefficient administration plagued the country.

Despite the shortcomings, this system was maintained because it allowed Stalin’s vision for the

Soviet Union to advance unimpeded. Keeping this system running required extreme measures of

loyalty and devotion, some forced and some freely given, by both the population and government

workers.56 This explains Stalin’s attitude towards Molotov and Kaganovich. He required their

loyalty and obedience in order to keep Stalinism moving forward. To ensure that the Soviet

statesmen stayed in line, Stalin used the harsh and demanding words of his letters. Stalin’s

centralist government required regular results and updates, and his letters to Molotov and

Kaganovich were written in such a way to keep Stalinism propelled forward.

Stalin had to contain the harsh rhetoric in his correspondence with Roosevelt and

Churchill. While Marxist ideology may preach that the workers of America and Britain will one

day rise up and seize the means of production in these places, Stalin could not press a theoretical

communist revolution when there was the very real Nazi threat on its way to Moscow. He

needed the support and alliance of the United States and the United Kingdom, and had to play

nice in order to keep the USSR alive. He was friendliest with Roosevelt, partly because of

genuine mutual admiration, but also because losing American material aid would be a death

knell for the Russian war effort. The rational for agitating Churchill requires a separate

56 Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, 201

Henry Smith-21

explanation. British involvement on the Western front was extremely important, but Churchill

required continued pressure to force his involvement. The letters and meetings Stalin had with

these international leaders show his motives for the cooperation, which were to remove direct

enemies of the Soviet Union and to ensure future progress could be made. The end goal of the

letters, and of the rest of Stalin’s wartime international policy, was to defend Stalinism. It was a

fight for survival for both the people of the Soviet Union and for Stalinist socialism.

Joseph Stalin’s letters to Molotov, Kaganovich, and Roosevelt, and his correspondences

with Churchill display the many sides of the Soviet dictator. Although public perception has

portrayed him as a one-dimensional monster, the letters show there is more to the story. Of

course he was a monster, and the blood on his hands can and should never be washed away, but

it is important to understand that the monstrous leader is just one of several roles Stalin took on.

The framework of centralized Stalinism and the international demands of a world at war allowed

for many roles to be taken, as be the leaders around him. Stalin had different expectations from

Molotov, Kaganovich, Roosevelt, and Churchill, and had to be a different leader to each. The

differences are fewer between the domestic and international figures, but there is a clear

distinction between them all. These distinctions show themselves most clearly in the letters

written to the figures, and the letters are a remarkable tool for the study of Stalin’s personal

interactions with the various Soviet and international leaders. The letters show us the dynamic

nature of Stalin’s rule. He had to change how he ruled depending on the person or group he was

addressing, and this is very well showcased in the letters. This is important to understanding

Stalin as both a person and a leader.

Henry Smith-22

Bibliography

The Avalon Project. “The Tehran Conference, November 28-December 1, 1943.” 1997.

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/tehran.htm

Butler, Susan, ed. My Dear Mr. Stalin. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.

Davies, R. W., Khlevniuk, Oleg V., and Rees, E. A., ed. The Stalin-Kaganovich

Correspondence 1931-36. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.

Ellman, Michael. “Churchill on Stalin: A Note.” Europe-Asia Studies 58, no. 6 (September

2006): 965-971.

Fitzpatrick, Sheila. The Russian Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Fitzpatrick, Sheila. “In Power.” In On Stalin’s Team: The Years of Living Dangerously in

Soviet Politics, Sheila Fitzpatrick, 64-88. Princeton: Princeton University Press,

2015.

Getty, J. Arch. “Stalin as Prime Minister: power and the Politburo.” In Stalin: A New History,

edited by Sarah Davies and James Harris, 83-107. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2005.

Khlevniuk, Oleg V. Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator. Translated by Nora Seligmann

Favorov. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015.

Kiromiya, Hiroaki. “Stalin’s Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928-1932.” In The

Stalin Revolution: Foundations of the Totalitarian Era, Robert Vincent Daniels,

67-80. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1997.

Kotkin, Stephen. Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization. Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1995.

Henry Smith-23

Lih, Lars T., Naumov, Oleg V. and Khlevniuk, Oleg V., ed. Stalin’s Letters to Molotov 1925-

1936. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.

Pechatnov, Vladimir. “How Stalin and Molotov Wrote Messages to Churchill: Following

Stalin’s Archives.” Russian Global Affairs 7, no. 3 (July-September 2009): 162-

173.

Roberts, Geoffrey. “Stalin at the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences.” Journal of Cold

War Studies 9, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 6-40.

Viola, Lynne. “The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet

Collectivization.” In The Stalin Revolution: Foundations of the Totalitarian Era,

Robert Vincent Daniels, 108-126. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1997.

Weiner, Amir. “The Making of a Dominant Myth: The Second World War and the

Construction of Political Identities within the Soviet Polity.” The Russian Review

55 (October 1996): 638-660.