Final report for Fik Restocking · 2020. 4. 23. · targeting drought affected pastoral households...

Ethiopia

TERMINAL EVALUATION OF THE RESTOCKING/REHABILITATION PROGRAMME FOR THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

(IDPs) IN FIK ZONE OF THE SOMALI REGION OF ETHIOPIA

JUNE 2005 Prepared and submitted to Save the Children (UK) Ethiopia by: Acacia Consultants Ltd. P.O. Box 340 Sarit Centre 00606 Nairobi, Kenya Tel/Fax: 254-2 3742855 / 376655 Mobile: 0733 780900/0722 203 444 Email: [email protected]

Evaluation of the SCUK IDP Restocking Project in Fik Zone of the Somali Region of Ethiopia June 2005

Acacia Consultants Ltd.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ..............................................................................................................2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................................................3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..................................................................................................................................................4 MAP SHOWING FIK ZONE OF THE SOMALI REGION OF ETHIOPIA............................ Error! Bookmark not defined. CHAPTER 1- BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT.........................................................................................................0 1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................0 1.2 Save the Children (UK) in Ethiopia .............................................................................................................................0 1.3 Objectives of the project .............................................................................................................................................1 1.4 This evaluation............................................................................................................................................................2 1.5 Methodology ...............................................................................................................................................................3 1.6 Itinerary .......................................................................................................................................................................3 1.7Constraints...................................................................................................................................................................3 CHAPTER 2- FINDINGS OF THE EVALUATION ...........................................................................................................4 2.1 The operating context .................................................................................................................................................4 2.2 Project Summary ........................................................................................................................................................5 2.3 Implementation of Activities ........................................................................................................................................5 CHAPTER 3- DATA ANALYIS AND DISCUSSION ........................................................................................................9 3.1 Number of households claiming to have re-settled ....................................................................................................9 3.2 Household food sources of restocked families ...........................................................................................................9 3.4 Household expenditure of restocked families...........................................................................................................13 3.5 Comparison between women-headed households and men-headed ones. ............................................................14 3.6 Livestock mortality and losses ..................................................................................................................................14 3.7 Training of Community-based Animal Health Workers.............................................................................................15 3.8 Labor allocation and decision-making by restocked households .............................................................................15 3.9 Gender relations, access and control of livestock and livestock products ...............................................................15 3.10 Suggestions from the community about viable herd size .......................................................................................16 3.11 Summary.................................................................................................................................................................16 CHAPTER 4- IMPACT OF THE PROJECT ...................................................................................................................18 4.1 Production of expected outputs and results .............................................................................................................18 4.2 Impacts of the project................................................................................................................................................19 4.3 Unanticipated effects of the project ..........................................................................................................................20 4.5 Sustainability of project outputs in the long term ......................................................................................................22 CHAPTER 5 – KEY ISSUES & LESSONS LEARNED .................................................................................................25 CHAPTER 6 – RECOMMENDATIONS..........................................................................................................................27 Annexes ANNEX 1 - TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION...................................................................................30 ANNEX 2 – ITINERARY FOR THE EVALUATION MISSION ........................................................................................35 ANNEX 3 – PEOPLE MET AND CONSULTED DURING THIS MISSION.....................................................................36 ANNEX 4- STATUS OF FLOCK GROWTH RATES AMONG RESTOCKED IDP HOUSEHOLDS INTERVIEWED.....37



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAHWs Community Animal Health Workers CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CRDA Christian Relief Development Agency CSO Civil Society Organizations Deyr Rainy season between October and December DPPB Disaster Prevention & Preparedness Bureau (Somali Region) DPPC Disaster Prevention & Preparedness Commission (National) FEZ Food Economy Zone GoE Government of Ethiopia Gu Rainy season between early April and June Hagaa Dry season between July and September HH Household IDPs Internally Displaced Persons Jilaal Hot dry season between late December and March NGO Non Government Organization OWS Ogaden Welfare Society PCDO Pastoral Community Development Office (Agriculture Bureau) SCUK Save the Children (United Kingdom) Ethiopia Office Shoats Sheep and Goats SNRS Somali National Regional State UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund WFP World Food Programme Xaas The family and all the animals that are left behind, after the horwein

animals leave – mostly shoats, milking animals, weak animals, etc. Definitions of some of the terms used in this report Drought-affected IDPs – Those households that lost most or all of their livestock and other means of livelihood during the 1998 –2000 drought and were forced to abandon their pastoral life to settle among settled populations, mainly around urban or market centers in Fik Zone. External factors affecting the project- Those conditions and circumstances that were beyond the control of project management during the implementation of the project e.g. drought, insecurity; timely delivery of restocking packages e.g. food, blankets etc. Resettled IDP household – This is a household that has left the IDP camp as a result of being given the complete restocking package. Re-integrated IDP household – The restocked households that have genuinely returned to a pastoral and nomadic lifestyle are those defined by the number of IDP households re-integrated into their original communities. This means those households that have a) moved out of IDP camps; b) re-started the pastoral way of life; c) returned to their original homes and d) re-established social safety networks with their kin and friends, based on livestock ownership. SCUK’s IDP restocking package for this project: 30 sheep and goats; 1 donkey; 1 blanket; 250 kg of maize; 1 plastic sheeting.



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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The consultant wishes to thank all the Save the Children UK staff that participated in this evaluation. Of special mention are following: Cassandra Chapman (manager of the evaluation); Abate Mollaw Kabede; Wendwessen Kitaw; Suleiman Mohammed; Yusuf Ahmed and Muhiadin Ismael. Members of the evaluation team: Hassan Ahmed, Muhamud Mohammed and Abdullahi Abshir are all thanked for their commitment and knowledge of the subject and of the area. While it is not possible to mention and acknowledge each person by name, the consultant wishes to convey sincere gratitude to all that made this mission a success.



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report is an output of an external evaluation of the Save the Children UK (SCUK) restocking project targeting drought affected pastoral households in Fik Zone of the Somali Region of Ethiopia. The one-year project, implemented between March 2002 and August 2003, had an immediate objective of re-integrating 500 vulnerable IDPs in Fik Zone into their home communities through improved capacity to build assets for a pastoral life. The project was funded and implemented by SCUK, in collaboration with other stakeholders, notably the Government of Ethiopia- the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC), the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau (Somali Region), the Livestock Development Bureau (Somali Region), local Government administration in Fik Zone, UNICEF, Christian Relief & Development Agency (CRDA) and local stakeholders in Fik. UNICEF contributed plastic sheets and blankets while CRDA provided maize as part of the restocking package. The package comprised of 30 small stock, 1 donkey, 1 plastic sheet, 1 blanket, 250 kg of maize and provision of animal health services through the training of 10 animal health workers. The project was implemented in 11 sites in Fik Zone, based on a detailed participatory scoping study undertaken in early 2002. A total of nearly 2.2 million Ethiopian Birr was spent by SCUK on this project to restock 500 IDP households. This excludes the value of the other components donated in kind. Acacia Consultants Ltd, a Relief and Development consultancy firm based in Nairobi, Kenya, together with SCUK and local government staff, carried out the external evaluation in June 2005. The objectives of the evaluation were: 1) to assess the extent to which the objectives of the project were achieved, and 2) to identify and document the lessons learned from implementation. The approach used in the evaluation included a review of existing project documents, field visits to meet with key informants, community meetings and detailed interviews with beneficiaries. Non-restocked families, restocking committees, local leaders, partner organizations and staff from relevant government bureaus were consulted. Detailed information from restocked families was collected using a structured questionnaire. Children were involved in the evaluation via PRA and other participatory methods. This report is divided into 6 chapters. Chapter 1 presents background information on the project and the evaluation while chapter 2 details findings on implementation performance and production of outputs and results. Chapter 3 presents data analysis and the attendant discussion while chapter 4 focuses on the restocking debate as well as on the impact of the project. Chapter 5 gives the lessons learned while chapter 6 presents the recommendations. Key sheets (2-3 page summaries of principles and lessons) and case studies have been prepared from the experience of this project. The findings of the evaluation are as follows: Implementation performance: The partnership between SCUK, DPPC, DPPB, the livestock development bureau and local government officials in Fik and with UNICEF and CRDA worked very well. This collaborative arrangement resulted in the establishment of an accountable, transparent and effective system of identifying beneficiaries and delivering the restocking package to them. At the local level, government authorities and the livestock development bureau participated in the identification of beneficiaries, in the purchase of livestock, their vaccination and distribution of the livestock to target beneficiaries. The evaluation team found that the project was implemented well and there were no major constraints. Considerable time and effort had been invested in doing the groundwork before implementation. A participatory and consultative situational analysis was carried out, a targeting methodology was developed and shared with relevant stakeholders in order to obtain consensus, liaison with government officials was done and IDPs and host communities were mobilized in readiness for the project. This preparatory work later proved to be worth the investment because of the challenging and sensitive context in which the project was implemented (See chapter 2).



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All planned activities were achieved except the provision of utensils, which was in the initial proposal, but was not implemented. The success in project implementation is owed to the participatory, consultative and process-oriented manner in which the project was implemented and managed. The restocking package was adhered to in all project sites and all the 500 beneficiary households received what was earmarked for them. The evaluation team investigated allegations leveled against the project with regard to the total restocking package not reaching some targeted beneficiaries in Garbo. These allegations were false and baseless. The local government administration in Fik and the restocking committees in the different sites informed the team that “the restocking arrangements were water tight and it would have been virtually impossible for any SCUK staff to divert resources earmarked for identified beneficiaries”. In terms of project management, the communication between SCUK offices in Addis Ababa, Jijiga and Fik was good and all the necessary management support and delivery of inputs, including financial disbursement to the field was done effectively. Project progress reports were regular and were of good quality. Of special mention is the monitoring report produced by an SCUK team headed by a consultant –Abdi Umar in May 2002. This report was instrumental in shaping the design and steering of this project. Two weaknesses of the project were identified: 1) Not adequate analysis was done to understand the motivation and skills of individual households targeted since some of them may not have been “good risks” for restocking. In addition, a market analysis on the effect of the project acquiring livestock locally and paying a premium price was not done; 2) The second weakness of the project was the lack of adequate project data, especially on the cost of items contributed by other agencies such as UNICEF and CRDA. Also, the performance of trained CAHWs and restocked households was not being monitored, despite the fact that this could easily have been done through the current SCUK FOCUS project in Fik zone. Effectiveness and appropriateness of the intervention The consultant considers that this intervention was appropriate. It was implemented at the right time (after the drought), targeted the right beneficiaries (drought-affected) and was consistent with the needs and desires of the majority of the vulnerable IDPs. A comparison of restocking with alternative rehabilitation interventions (See Section 4.6) shows that it is cost effective and if done properly can contribute significantly to reducing food insecurity of households. In fact, the intervention was already making a significant contribution to household food security and incomes of targeted households. It was relevant to the livelihoods of the beneficiaries because livestock still remains the mainstay of the pastoral economy. It was clear that livestock was contributing nearly 50% of the household food and income and a significant number of the restocked families were beginning to return to the pastoral way of life. Therefore, as a short-term drought recovery intervention, the project has been successful. Achievement of objectives The goal of the project was to strengthen the recovery from the drought of the 1998-2000 of the most vulnerable IDPs while the purpose was to re-integrate 500 vulnerable IDPs in Fik Zone into their home communities through improved capacity to build assets for a pastoral life. The purpose has not been achieved because few households have been re-integrated into their home communities. The purpose appears to have been formulated without adequate target group analysis. The assumption that all IDPs wished to return to pastoralism and to their home areas was incorrect. But another contributing factor could be the way the objectives were formulated. It appears that the goal has been achieved because the project has indeed strengthened the capacity of vulnerable IDP households to recover from the drought. But the purpose of re-integrating IDPs to original homes has not been achieved. According to the logical framework, results or outputs contribute to the achievement of the purpose and the latter contributes to the achievement of the goal.



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Project Impact The project has had significant impact on the beneficiaries. The following are some of the impacts of the project to date: • A total of 500 restocked households immediately attained increased capacity for economic standing,

with potential for a significant number of families growing out of poverty. For example, the contribution of livestock to food sources rose from 2% before restocking to 40% after restocking. At the same time food relief dropped from 50% before restocking to 7% after restocking. This means that livestock and by products had effectively replaced food relief as a source of food, signifying increased self-reliance and improved household food security. Most restocked households pointed out that “food aid is very important but it does not reproduce like livestock. Livestock is a better food source because it builds up during the good years and gives the family some dignity and respect from other community members”;

• There is a marked drop in the contribution of firewood and water selling from 25% before restocking to 5% after restocking. This may be attributed to changes in labor investments. It appears more labor was deployed in farming and herding of own livestock since these sources of income have risen considerably after restocking;

• Income sources from labor have gone down from 35% before restocking to 20% after restocking. The explanation is that more family labor is being allocated to livestock and farming activities as opposed to providing casual labor for income earning. However, the team was informed that more men were still offering casual labor as most children and women worked on their own farms or took care of the animals. The explanation given was that the men were spending more time providing labor in order to invest more in their livestock as opposed to selling the males to earn an income;

• The level of support from relatives to restocked families went up after restocking. It appears that relatives are more likely to assist households that have some capacity for viable livelihood strategies. This is consistent with the Somali adage that “Somalis provide or add something to someone who already has something.”

• A significant number of households have begun to diversify their livelihood strategies such that they now own livestock and are selling the males to invest in petty trade, opportunistic farming, etc;

• Anecdotal evidence shows that nutritional and dietary status of households especially among children had improved. The children who participated in the evaluation informed the team that they were now able to have 3 meals a day, with all of the meals having milk as a component. Most children from the restocked families visited were in good health with no signs of malnutrition;

• Reduced work burden for women and children fetching water because the project provided one donkey as a pack animal, thereby reducing the drudgery of carrying water on the back or head. The time spent fetching water was less, enabling women to do other activities such as child care, etc.

• The project enabled the direct injection of more than 1.4 million Birr into the local economy through the local purchase of breeding animals. While no data exists on how those who sold the livestock have used or invested the money, restocking committee members in the different sites informed the evaluation team that most of those who sold animals invested the money in purchasing camels and cattle as well as investing in opportunistic farming as a way of diversifying food and income sources;

• Some restocked households acknowledge being able to stabilize socially and economically and therefore able to take some of their children to school. They feel that education is important;

• The regional LCNRDB restocked 30 households in Fik town based on lessons from this project. This is good project influence;

• Some restocked families were already giving support to some IDP households that were not restocked; • A negative result may be competition between herding and school attendance for children; • The setting up of a livestock market specifically for this project may have affected the local livestock

economy by artificially raising livestock prices to the disadvantage of traders and other buyers. More research is suggested in order to understand the actual impact of the project on livestock markets.



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Lessons learnt 1. The long-term success of a restocking project will largely depend on the motivation and herding skills of

target beneficiaries, the appropriateness of the restocking package and an enabling environment for sustainable livestock production e.g. improvements in access to markets, better animal health services, appropriate education and health facilities for pastoralists, range and water improvements together with improved security;

2. Investing considerable time in preparation e.g. developing targeting criteria and involving all beneficiaries and relevant stakeholders in planning is crucial for success;

3. Restocking can be both a mechanism for short-term rehabilitation and long-term development. It depends on the formulation of project objectives and the level of the restocking package;

4. Not all communities or vulnerable pastoralist households may be suitable for restocking; 5. The notion that restocked female-headed households end up performing poorer than male-headed

households as “restockees” is not backed by empirical evidence from this project; 6. Involving children in monitoring and evaluation of restocking programmes has added benefit and should

be encouraged; 7. In order to understand the possible impacts of a restocking project on the local market, on producers

and local traders, it is important to carry out a market analysis to determine the effects of injecting a lot of money into the local economy through the purchase of breeding animals at a premium price from local producers.

8. From this project, the lesson is that the restocking package should comprise of the following: At least 50-70 sheep and goats in preferred proportions and right age for immediate breeding; an adequate food ration comprising of cereals, oil, sugar and tea leaves for a period of at least six months; provision of adequate veterinary services by trained CAHWs and basic animal health knowledge and skills to be given to beneficiary households. But the most important reason to determine success will be the motivation of restocked families and their herding skills, hence the need for more rigorous screening of beneficiaries and more analysis of their needs.

Conclusion It is probably safe to conclude that by targeting appropriate recipients and applying stricter criteria for implementing restocking projects, with very clear objectives, restocking can be a successful means of rehabilitating vulnerable pastoralists. Therefore restocking is a viable intervention under specific circumstances and especially if the objectives are modified such that they aim to provide vulnerable families with increased capacity to meet their economic and social needs as opposed to necessarily re-integrating them back to their original communities. The selective implementation of sustainable restocking programmes can help support livestock production on the whole. By assisting those herders who are “good risks” - (recent dropouts from pastoralism, those with the right motivation and skills, those with adequate herding labor, etc.), recurring cycles of vulnerability can be broken.

Degahbur

GashamoAware

Degahbur

Map: Somali Region, Ethiopia: Food Economy Zones (Not To Scale)

Afder

Fik

Gode

Liban Dolobay

Barrey Hargelle

Guradamole

Erer

Shinile

Meiso

Afd

Ayshia

Shinile

Damba

Denan

Kalafo Ferfer

Mustahil

E.Imi Gode

W.Imi

Cherati

Segag Garbo

Duhun

Hamaro

Fik

Laga

hida

Sa

laha

d

Mayu

Warder

Danot

Boh

Galadin

Warder

Dolo Odo

Filtu

Moyale

Adadle

Gudis

Sheygosh

Shilabo

Kebridahar

Elkare Goro Baqaqsa

Degahmadow

Korahe

Dobowey

Ji j iga Kebribaya

Gursu

Babil Har

Jijiga

Awbarre

Gode Agropastoral FEZ (sorghum, cattle)

Shabelle Riverine (maize, sorghum)

Pastoral FEZ (Lowland pastoral, Camel shoat, and Birka dependent

Jijiga Sedentary Farming FEZ (Sorghum, Maize, wheat and cattle

Jijiga Agropastoral FEZ (Maize, Sorghum, cattle)

Shinile Agropastoral (sorghum, maize, Shinile Pastoral FEZ (cattle, shoats,

Fik pastoral (camel, shoats and cattle)

Dagahbur Agropastoral (maize, cattle)

Dolo-Filtu Pastoral FEZ (camel, shoats, cattle)

Moyale Weyamo Pastoral FEZ (camel, shoats, cattle)

Dawa/Ganale Riverine (maize, cattle)

Liban/Afder Agropastoral (maize, cattle, shoats)

Korahe Agropastoralists (cattle, sorghum)

Afder Pastoral (camels, shoats and cattle

Korahe_Gode pastoralists (camel, shoats, cattle)

CHAPTER 1- BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT This Chapter provides background information on the project and on the evaluation. It outlines the rationale behind the formulation of the project and the processes involved in its design. The chapter also presents the objectives, expected outputs and results of the project. The purpose of the evaluation, the methodology, itinerary for the evaluation mission and constraints faced are all summarized here, although detailed Terms of Reference for the evaluation are presented in Annex 1 of this report. 1.1 Introduction This report is an output of an external evaluation of a restocking project targeting drought affected pastoral households that were internally displaced in the Somali Region of Ethiopia following the severe drought of 1998-2000. The Region is one of the largest in Ethiopia and covers about one third of the country with an area of 349,200 sq. km. It has a population of approximately 4 million people. Although large, the region remains one of the least developed. It consists of 9 zones – Shinile, Jijiga, Fik, Degahbur, Korahe, Warder, Gode, Afder and Liban. Fik zone, which is the subject of this report, consists of 8 districts which are: Salahad, Lagahida, Mayamaluq, Fik, Hamaro, Duhun, Sagag and Garbo. The total area of the zone is 42,800 sq. km. The agro-ecology of the Fik Food Economy Zones (FEZs) favors goats and camels more than cattle and sheep because it is mostly browse rich with pockets of good grazing. In these pockets, more cattle are found. The pastoral FEZ constitutes 70-80% of the population while 15-25% is agro-pastoralist. A population of 0-5% can be classified as urban dwellers in Fik Zone. Due to their heavy reliance on livestock for food and income, the Fik Zone FEZs are vulnerable to those shocks that negatively affect livestock production. These include rainfall failure, shortage of pasture and water, market disruptions, currency devaluation, especially of the Somali shilling in the Sosh districts; clan conflicts and general insecurity; poor road infrastructure and crop failure in neighboring FEZs, among others. The drought episode followed 3 consecutive years of rain failure between 1998 and 2000. Apart from claiming thousands of lives, mainly those of children, the drought affected the base asset levels of the predominantly pastoral population. The drought effects were so bad that many households lost their livestock and other assets and became vulnerable, ending up in camps for the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The IDPs in Fik Zone are of two main types: 1) Those displaced by clan conflicts or wars- these have either moved into Fik Zone from other regions or zones, or those that “returned” from Djibouti and Somalia; 2) those that have been displaced by drought, especially after the 1998-2000 drought. These form the majority of IDPs in Fik Zone. It is estimated that 15,000 IDPs now reside in Fik, an average of about 2500 households. This situation called for the intervention of the International Community following the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission’s (DPPC) Appeal early 2000. Save the Children (UK) – SCUK- was among the agencies that responded to the needs of malnourished children, lactating and pregnant mothers in the zone. In the last 7 months of 2000, SCUK assisted over 14,000 children under the age of five years in several districts of Fik Zone. 1.2 Save the Children (UK) in Ethiopia Save the Children UK first delivered aid to Abyssinia (as Ethiopia was then called) in 1930. Programme work began even before the famine of 1973/4, when relief assistance was delivered to Wollo in the central highlands. At the same time, an emergency feeding and sanitation programme for those who had left their homes in search of food was mounted. This programme established systems, which could respond quickly to emergencies, allowing SC to play an important role in relief operations in the catastrophic famine of 1984/85 and more localized harvest failures in 1988, 1991, 1994, 2000 and 2003. In Ethiopia, the environment for children is extremely unfavorable: • They live in appalling poverty: an estimated 90% of rural households are food insecure; • Their access to health, education, welfare services and water is among the worst in the world;



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• Many categories of children (girls, physically challenged) are traditionally discriminated against; • They are increasingly affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic; • Their right to participate in decisions that affect their lives is almost universally denied. Therefore, Save the Children has identified three thematic areas that will have the greatest impact on the lives of the largest number of children: 1 Basic services including health, education and HIV/AIDS; 2 Livelihoods and poverty; 3 Emergency preparedness and response.

Enthusiastic children with the IDP Restocking Evaluation Team during a field visit to Fik (June 2005) In order to achieve positive changes for children and their families, SCUK works closely with the Ethiopian Government and other stakeholders and local partners on the following activities: 1. Nutrition assessment programmes; 2. Institutional support project to the DPPC in partnership with CIDA and Save the Children Canada; 3. Support for the implementation of the UN Convention of the rights of the child; 4. Improving quality and access to health services; 5. Promoting the rights of disabled children; 6. Alternative basic education; 7. Reproductive health for Somali Refugees; 8. Integrated Food Security, household food economy analysis and emergency support to displaced

people; 9. Early Warning System (Somali); livelihoods project, Relief to Development and Farmer led extension

services. Under here, integrated pest management is also undertaken.

1.3 Objectives of the project Over the past two and half decades, repeated droughts and conflicts in the Somali Region have resulted in massive internal displacements. The events of the 1998-2000 drought episode aggravated the food insecurity situation in Fik Zone. Nearly 15,000 people (2500 households) lost their pastoral livelihood assets and were subsequently displaced from their homes. The Regional Government sought outside assistance to help IDPs return to places of origin.



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Save the Children UK responded to the appeal by proposing a one-year restocking project. This project aimed to re-integrate 500 households into their home communities. The project was implemented in partnership with key stakeholders e.g. the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC)/DPPB; the Animal Health Bureau of the Somali Region; Restocking Committees comprising of religious leaders, local elders, women groups, local administration officials and other stakeholders. UNICEF donated plastic sheeting for housing and blankets while the Christian Relief Development Agency (CRDA) donated 1.45 metric tons of maize that formed part of the food ration for beneficiaries. The objectives of this restocking project can be summarized as follows: Goal: To strengthen the recovery from the drought of the 1998-2000 of the most vulnerable IDPs. Purpose: To re-integrate 500 vulnerable IDPs in Fik Zone into their home communities through improved capacity to build assets for a pastoral life. Outputs: 1. 500 vulnerable IDP households voluntarily relocated to their home communities; 2. 500 vulnerable households provided with a re-starter restocking package; 3. Targeting methodology for restocking developed, tested and documented; 4. 10 Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs) trained and equipped to strengthen delivery of animal

health services to restocked households in the different communities. Activities The activities under this project included the following: • Conduct an IDP survey in form of a participatory case study; • Undertake project preparation including developing the targeting methodology; • Select beneficiaries; • Decide on types of livestock; • Purchase and distribute required inputs; • Provide animal health care; • Provide food, utensils and transport services; • Undertake monitoring and evaluation. 1.4 This evaluation This evaluation was carried out between 7th and the 22nd of June 2005 by an external consultant (Mike Wekesa from Acacia Consultants Ltd. Nairobi, Kenya), two Somali Region government representatives and two SCUK staff. The team incorporated other resource persons from time to time as was appropriate. The main objective of this evaluation was to assess the progress made towards achieving the project objectives and to document lessons learned from this experience so that these inform and guide similar interventions in future. The specific objectives of the evaluation were as follows: • To assess the extent to which the project had achieved the planned objective, produced expected

outputs and the extent to which planned activities were implemented; • Assess the effectiveness and impact of the project on different target groups including children and

women; • Identify and document unanticipated positive and negative effects of the project; • Determine the relevance and appropriateness of the project in addressing the problem of IDPs; • Identify and document the effects and impacts of external factors on the implementation and

performance of the project; • Assess the sustainability of project outputs and systems in the long-term i.e. after 5 or more years; • Identify alternative strategies to restocking as a way of rehabilitating drought-affected IDPs.



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The full Terms of Reference for the evaluation are appended to this report as Annex 1. 1.5 Methodology The methodology used in carrying out the evaluation included: 1. Reviewing documents including the project proposal, agreements and project progress reports; 2. Undertaking field visits made to Fik, Dundumahad, Hamaro, Ayun, Gassangas and Yahob; 3. Consulting key informants at the regional, zonal, district and community levels; 4. Holding Focus Group Discussions and community meetings were held mainly with the beneficiaries; 5. Undertaking field observations on restocked animals to ascertain condition and numbers of animals; 6. Consulting with non-restocked families as well as other non-beneficiary stakeholders; 7. Collecting detailed information from restocked households using a questionnaire; 8. Involving children in the evaluation using PRA and other participatory methods. The children who

participated in the evaluation gave vital information. They provided the exact numbers of livestock their parents had at the time of the evaluation, they provided information on their diet and milk intake and they discussed issues to do with education because this seemed to be top on their agenda. The key issue in involving children is the methodology and approach of doing it. Participatory approaches that would allow the use of tools such as songs; drawings; role plays etc. are very important in building trust with children and allowing them to think freely about the project and its impacts. In most cases, they have a much better memory of things that happen at the household level than their parents do. Therefore, the benefits of involving children in the evaluation included:

• The children felt recognized and made to participate in an issue they felt was important in their

lives. This built their confidence and made them feel they had something to contribute; • They gave much more accurate figures on livestock numbers and could recall incidences that

happened in reference to the livestock. They would tell the story of what happened; • Their views, particularly on health, diets and education can be very useful for future planning of

projects. Many times we assume children do not really understand what goes on. We deceive ourselves.

• Children record discussion points by heart and they do this very well; • During the discussions, while team members were asking some children on milk intake, other

children probed the interviewees further. This was not requested by the evaluation team, children simply wanted to be involved.

1.6 Itinerary The evaluation took 20 days including at least 13 days in the field. Many people were met and consulted and the details of the itinerary and the people met during this mission are appended to this report as Annexes 2 and 3 respectively. 1.7 Constraints The evaluation required extensive travel within the region in a relatively short timeframe. Due to the condition of the roads and especially just after the rains, travel was slow and arduous. As such some meetings were not possible and organization of others a little rushed. For example, if time allowed, a visit to Garbo and Dehun would have been useful since these were the areas with allegations of beneficiaries not getting the full restocking package. Inter-clan fights near Gassangas interrupted fieldwork and the team did not interview as many beneficiaries in this sight as anticipated. Equally, in an area with security problems, travel arrangements had to be carefully done.



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CHAPTER 2- FINDINGS OF THE EVALUATION This Chapter presents the findings of the evaluation, with regard to the implementation of activities, as well as the operating context under which the project was implemented. It also discusses project management performance and assesses the extent to which the implementation of activities was achieved. 2.1 The operating context The Somali Regional State of Ethiopia is an area plagued by political instability and has long been a source of conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. In recent years, the Somali Region, in particular the administrative zones of Fik, Degehabur, Gode and parts of Korahe Zone, have experienced security problems. This is compounded by long-standing inter-clan conflicts over scarce resources such as communal grazing lands and watering points. Such clashes, although usually, resolved quickly have resulted in population displacement, destruction of property and high death tolls. Save the Children UK has been operating in the Somali Region against this backdrop of insecurity since 1988. Until 2000, most SCUK programmes were focused on the relatively more secure northern half of the region, in Jijiga zone. However, in 2000, SCUK decided to respond to the emergency needs in the more insecure and remote Fik Zone. Humanitarian agencies operating in Fik Zone, including SCUK, have experienced a number of security incidents. Despite this, it was felt that agencies were not particularly targeted given the degree of acceptance that existed from both the community and local administration. Therefore, with careful management and adherence to security procedures, agencies felt they could continue to operate in relative safety. With regard to livelihood strategies, it is noted that due to their overwhelming dependence on livestock for food and income, the Fik Pastoral and Agro-pastoral Food Economy Zones are vulnerable to those factors that negatively affect livestock production. These include rainfall failure, shortage of pasture; market disruptions for livestock and grain; devaluation of the Somali shilling (Sosh) in the southern districts; clan conflicts and general insecurity; poor infrastructure and crop failure in neighboring Food Economy Zones. But insecurity in Fik Zone does not necessarily mean livestock theft or cattle rustling. From the evaluation, only one household out of the 51 interviewed said they lost 1 animal through theft. This means that insecurity does not necessarily impair herd mobility. The only implication of insecurity on restocked households results from inter-clan fights, which may prevent IDP households from returning to their original homes or utilize the more insecure areas. Inter-clan fights could also interfere with services provided by humanitarian agencies such as SCUK. Risk minimizing strategies of local people include livestock migrations in search of pasture and water, increase of livestock sales to make up the household food deficit, and reduction of the household expenses. Labour migration to Jijiga, Babile, Djibouti, Bosaso (in Somalia) is also practiced. This restocking project was implemented in the context of unpredictable weather patterns. For example, although the project was supposed to be completed in February 2003, the timeframe was extended due to drought in 2002 and other factors that affected the implementation of planned activities. Poor functioning markets affected the supply of breeding animals required for restocking. Limited animal health services and veterinary drugs is a major problem that undermines livestock production in the area. Although categorized as an emerging region, the Somali Region, and particularly Fik Zone, remains one of the most difficult areas to work in.



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2.2 Project Summary The following is a summary of the IDP restocking project in Fik Zone: Project Title: Rehabilitation for the drought-affected and displaced people (Restocking Project) Project Code: SC/UK/1244/43/3664 Location: Fik Zone Country: Ethiopia Project duration: March 2002- August 2003 Implementing Agency: Save the Children UK – Jijiga Programme Funding Source: SC/UK/budget Project Expenditure

Item Budget Description Ethiopia Birr1. Staff salaries per diem 205,9122. Office support cost 110,7383. SCUK fleet cost 162,5254. Non SC UK staff (partner) 63,7755. Livestock purchase 1,468,8756. Net drug purchase 20,0007. Training of CAHWs 10,8258. Evaluation Costs 14,0759. Staff terminal benefits 53,75010. Contingency 21,250 Total 2,131,725

2.3 Implementation of Activities Conceptual framework and project design: Programming in SCUK is a bottom up process. This project was conceived and designed by the Jijiga SCUK office in consultation with the Fik Zone, but with technical and management support from the SCUK national office in Addis Ababa. The 1998-2000 crisis led to acute food insecurity in Fik Zone, prompting SCUK to intervene to save the lives of malnourished children and vulnerable mothers. It established therapeutic feeding centers in Fik and Hamaro districts and supplementary food distribution was carried out in 4 districts of Fik Zone. Once these emergency interventions were over, it was clear that those who had lost their livestock assets required rehabilitation so that they could return to the pastoral way of life. This was the rationale behind the formulation of this project. A snapshot review of the project undertaken in May 2002, (project started in March 2002) provided further input on beneficiary targeting and other aspects critical to the success of the project. A proposal was developed based on this participatory case study and funding was forthcoming from SCUK, which got the budget from DPPC’s sale of old trucks that had been operating in the country. A total of 2.2 million Birr was available for this project and management arrangements were agreed upon between the DPPC/DPPB and SCUK. A project officer based in Fik Zone managed the project. The project officer reported to the Area Coordinator in Jijiga. Community Development Workers were employed to work under the Projects Officer. The Addis Ababa office liaised with UNICEF and CRDA, especially with regard to the provision of the other items in the restocking package such as plastic sheeting and cereals. Criteria for selecting the beneficiaries: The criteria for selecting the beneficiaries included the following: • Whether the IDP family was affected by the of 1998-2000 period; • The number of animals the household had after the drought; • Female-headed households or not; • Dependence on selling firewood and/or water; • Capacity to rear animals and to return to the pastoral way of life; • Had been living with local communities in the last 2 years;



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• Willingness to go back to original home after restocking. All stakeholders agreed on the above points. Community elders, religious leaders, influential people, IDP elders and women groups were responsible for targeting the vulnerable IDPs households in 11 local communities of Fik, Hamaro, Sagag, Dhuhun and Garbo districts. With this collaboration, SCUK, the DPPFSB and the livestock bureau identified 500 IDP households in Fik Zone. There was considerable dialogue and consensus at every step of the process in order to ensure transparency and accountability in the process. Restocking committees still exist today, but rather dormant, although they could still have played a role in monitoring the restocked households. The selected beneficiaries elected the restocking committees. The responsibilities of these committees were to: ensure impartiality, purchase of good quality animals, ascertain the number of households receiving assistance and monitor the progress of restocked households. Restocking Committees: The SCUK team supported the establishment of restocking committees, in all the 11 sites of the project. Considering familiarity, capability and willingness of a person to facilitate the project activities, the targeted households selected committee members from among them; Selection and purchasing of animals: A market was set up in which those who were willing to sell livestock were given the details of the animals required. The 500 beneficiaries themselves, with support from SCUK staff, restocking committee members and the veterinary bureau staff, chose the animals they liked from the market. The veterinary staff examined the animals for good body condition and for age. All the animals required were to be 2 years of age or mature enough to breed. An SCUK staff paid for the animal once it was selected by the beneficiary and approved by the veterinary staff and other members of the purchasing committee. Each animal was bought at a price of 90-120 Birr; Viable flock size: The beneficiaries decided on the proportion and composition of animals (65% goats and 35% sheep) they would receive. This was based on the different uses households put different species of livestock and their products. The total number of 30 shoats was the minimum number of a viable flock size that traditionally would be used to restock a vulnerable family. SCUK budget constraints did not allow a higher number of shoats to be given. The demand for restocking was high; Non-livestock items of the restocking package: Apart from livestock, shelter, animal health services and drugs as well as the provision of cereals are the other most crucial components of socio-economic welfare of an IDP household. Therefore the provision of cereals (250 kg per household) by CRDA and one plastic sheet by UNICEF and a blanket had made a great contribution to the rehabilitation of restocked IDP households; Selection of CAHWs: CAHWs were selected by community members and by IDPs. The selection criteria were: age; possession of livestock; trustworthiness; background in ethno-veterinary practice; some basic education and ability to move around following livestock. A total of 10 CAHWs to take charge of 11 restocking sites were recruited and given training for 12 days. This was a hands-on training that provided both knowledge and skills in disease diagnosis and treatment. They were also equipped with a drug start- up kit. The roles of the CAHWs was to treat animals of restocked families at a fee, provide technical advice, avail veterinary drugs and act as the main contact point between private pharmacies, the government officers and the community, including the IDPs. The CAHWs treated animals of both local community members and those of the IDPs; Distribution of livestock: Once the animals had been purchased, they would immediately be vaccinated and de-wormed. They would then be distributed to the families immediately. The project did not hold onto the animals for long periods of time. Restocking Committees, together with religious and local leaders participated in this distribution.



7

Participation of other stakeholders The following table shows the different stakeholders in the project and the role they played: Stakeholder Role in the project Impact of role Comments Restocked families Recipients of the

restocking package Ultimately determine the long-term sustainability of the project outputs and results.

Both men and women-headed households were targeted for restocking.

CRDA Contributed maize as part of the restocking package.

This was critical in meeting cereal needs of the household and in preventing early sales of breeding animals by desperate restocked families.

All the 500 targeted households received 250 kg of maize.

UNICEF Donated blankets and plastic sheeting for roofing the houses

This saved households from looking for income to purchase blankets and roofing materials.

Utensils were meant to have been part of the package but this was not possible. No explanation was given.

SCUK Provided the bulk of the budget to put together the restocking package. SCUK also implemented the project.

Careful targeting, beneficiary selection, thorough involvement of all stakeholder and the transparent and accountable manner of implementing activities ensured direct benefits to targeted households and groups.

When CRDA was not able to provide transport for the cereals, SCUK picked up this cost.

DPPC/DPPB They are the government bodies charged with disaster prevention and preparedness.

Approved the project and participated in its implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Could be a major beneficiary of the lessons from this project.

There is need for the DPPB and the SNRS to be strong in influencing national policies to favor the Somali Region. Issues on animal health services, markets and infrastructure should be high on the agenda.

Local government leaders

Participated in the targeting, beneficiary selection, monitoring and evaluation.

Kept implementing agency accountable and careful about how to implement the project.

Complained that the project had fixed the prices of donkeys although the prices fluctuated with different seasons.

Livestock Bureau Identification of animals to be purchased as well as training of CAHWs

The right animals were purchased and CAHWs trained. CAHWs are providing essential services to restocked households.

There is need to train restocked families in basic animal health so that they can treat basic ailments.

Religious and other Civil Society members

Selection and targeting of beneficiaries

Women groups advocated for female-headed households to be restocked.

There was good balance between female-headed households and others in the targeting of beneficiaries.

Restocking Committees

Participated in the purchasing of the animals, distribution of restocking package and monitoring of restocked families

They encouraged restocked families to return to their original homes.

There were 4 men and 2 women in each restocking committee. The committees also signed the contract between SCUK and the communities on behalf of beneficiaries.

Undertake monitoring and evaluation: Monitoring continued during the time of the project and regular monitoring reports were produced. For example, a report produced in May 2002 by Abdi Umar, Hassan Ahmed and Taufiq Adan provided very clear information on how the restocking was to be done. The report outlined the following points: • Focus groups of IDPs were asked if they planned to go back to their homes. A little more than half were

emphatic about their wish to go back to their home areas, and did not see their displacement to be a permanent one. About one quarter of the respondents were more concerned with their poverty and did not see foresee their return to original homes unless they were assisted. The rest were more concerned about the resumption of food aid and for them to be given adequate quantities; (Pg 30);

• When asked what assistance they required, about three quarters of the IDPs suggested restocking with goats and sheep plus a pack animal. A total of 70-100 sheep and goats were seen to be ideal while as low as 10 shoats were still acceptable. Almost all the IDPs wished to go back to pastoralism; few wished to remain in the districts in which they found themselves (Pg 30)



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• The need to seek out IDP leadership and to work with these structures during restocking; • The fewer the number of animals offered for restocking, the longer the period that the family will need

food aid. At least six months food supply was seen to be adequate, although some IDPs thought that even with two months of food and a viable breeding herd, they would try to return to a productive pastoralist livelihood (Pg 17);

• After decades of funding restocking projects by various donor agencies, and after a plethora of academic treaties evaluating projects, it is becoming fashionable to be skeptical about restocking projects. Fortunately, most studies agree that well thought out restocking projects redistribute wealth to poorer families and provide a sustainable and meaningful livelihood for a majority of beneficiaries (Sandford and Habtu, 2000 pg. 106);

• The report concluded that the time was right for restocking, as the heavy rains of April 2002 had began. The range was recovering and the grazing pressure was low. According to the Director of Veterinary Services in the LECDB Somali Regional National State, Dr. Mohamed Abdullahi (pers. Comm to that team), who personally had worked in Fik for a long time, Fik had plenty of grazing resources even before the drought;

• The report suggested that if SCUK were to undertake restocking, beneficiaries would be 1) those who desire to voluntarily resume a pastoral lifestyle, 2) recent drop-outs from pastoralism i.e. in the last 2 years, 3) those who came with some stock to Fik Zone, 4) who have ability and capacity to herd, 5) who cannot resume an independent pastoral lifestyle on their own, 6) who will benefit children when they succeed in rebuilding their herds and 7) special consideration to be given to female-headed households.

This report heavily influenced the design and planning of this restocking project. The project also prepared other progress reports, including interim and final completion reports, both of which contain vital information on the amounts of food and non-food items distributed, number of purchased and distributed livestock, including lessons learned and recommendations for future interventions to build on the lessons learned. One of the gaps in monitoring identified by the evaluation team is in following up of restocked families and trained CAHWs in order to assess their performance. This seems to have stopped immediately when the project came to an end. Either, this monitoring would have been taken up by a subsequent project such as the FOCUS project now being implemented in the project area or resources to monitor these aspects should have been allocated for 6 – 12 months after the project. This would have generated vital information on the performance of targeted beneficiaries and on the capacity of restocking to rehabilitate vulnerable pastoralists. 2.4 Summary on implementation of activities The consultant is of the opinion that the activities were implemented and achieved to a very large extent and that the quality of implementation was high. The process of targeting beneficiaries was highly transparent and care was taken to involve all the relevant stakeholders. The project targeted both women and men and was done based on a participatory situation analysis that involved many people. Although certain items in the restocking package e.g. maize and other non-food items may have arrived late due to logistical issues such as transport, the distribution of these items was done above board. All the 500 households received the full package earmarked for them and claims against the project in this regard were found to be false. The local Government administration officials in Fik informed the evaluation team that going by the process of restocking adopted “it would have been almost impossible not to provide the full package, without raising major problems with restocking committees and beneficiaries”.



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CHAPTER 3- DATA ANALYIS AND DISCUSSION This chapter presents the findings of the evaluation especially with regard to the information obtained from restocked and non-restocked households, CAHWs and other key informants. The analysis is based on data from 51 restocked households out of 500, interviewed in 6 different project sites. A larger sample of restocked households and a visit to all the 11 sites would have yielded more statistically comprehensive results. But a 10% random sample is still considered acceptable, especially when this data is put together with that obtained from secondary sources. 3.1 Number of households claiming to have re-settled The information collected indicates that all the 500 families received the re-starter package for restocked families which was: 1) 30 sheep and goats (usually 20 goats and 10 sheep); 2) I pack animal (donkey); 250 kg of maize; 1 blanket and 1 plastic sheeting for shelter. There was consensus among all stakeholders (restocked families, non-restocked IDPs, re-stocking committees, elders, regional, zonal, district and Kobale government officials, key informants) that the system used to target beneficiaries had been fair and all targeted households received what they were entitled to. Most of the households interviewed were happy with the package although they were quick to point out that the number of animals provided was the minimum for restocking even under traditional restocking practices. They felt that this would help to improve their food and income sources in the short term but not for long-term rehabilitation and re-integration. If long-term goals were envisaged, the package would have to be different. Of those interviewed, a total of 75% (38 out of 51) of restocked IDP households claim to have re-settled i.e. moved out of IDP camps and gone back to a pastoral lifestyle, one and a half years after the end of the project. This however does not mean that they returned to their original homes. In fact, very few restocked families have so far returned to their original homes. Most are still in Fik but have moved to different sites, 15-30 km from where they were restocked. The 25% that did not move gave various reasons including: a) clan clashes in their original homes; b) inadequate environmental recovery from the drought; c) flock sizes are still too small to allow significant mobility; d) some have integrated into the husband’s original home; e) schooling of children; f) some have developed opportunistic farms; g) current flock sizes do not adequately provide for all the household food and income needs, hence the need to supplement with other livelihood strategies, etc. But this largely depended on which district it was. Those in Gassangas were more concerned with restriction to mobility resulting from inter-clan fights while those in Ayun preferred a mixture of animals and agricultural inputs and equipment for opportunistic farming. It appears that there was a general assumption at the planning and design stage that restocking would be appropriate for all targeted households. Probably stricter criteria for selecting beneficiary households should have been applied at the individual household level. In addition, it is important for purposes of planning future restocking projects to acknowledge the fact that Fik Zone comprises of different Food Economy Zones and that different rehabilitation packages should be designed for those households in the respective FEZs. 3.2 Household food sources of restocked families The following pie charts show food and income sources of restocked households before and after restocking. Before restocking, opportunistic farming provided 20% of food while relief food contributed 50%, food purchased from income from labor provision 6%, from firewood selling 10%, from water selling 10% and support from relatives 2%. After restocking, livestock contributed 40%, labor 15%, firewood selling 3%, water selling 3%, support from relatives 7% and opportunistic farming 25%. This information was analyzed from proportional piling exercises done by 51 heads of restocked households in 6 different restocking sites. Results of individual households were all added up and averages found. The sampling did not take into account the FEZs different households came from. What was important was that they were restocked with a package and the evaluation team wanted to find out how they were performing. It would have been interesting to do this exercise for the different FEZs.



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Food sources before and after restocking: This is shown in the pie charts below:

Food Sources before Restocking2%

2%

6%

10%

10%

20%

50%

Livestock RelativesLabour Water sellingFirewood sellingOpportunistic farmingFood relief

Food Sources after Restocking

15%

3% 3%

25%

7%

40%

7%

Livestock RelativesLabourWater sellingFirewood sellingOpportunistic farmingFood Relief



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There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis. These are presented in Box 3.1 below. Box 3.1 Conclusions on sources of food for restocked households - (before and after restocking). • The contribution of livestock to food and income of restocked families is 40%. This indicates that

families cannot rely on livestock alone to meet household food needs but must supplement with other sources of food, which in this case are opportunistic farming and food purchases from income earned through firewood and water selling;

• Opportunistic farming contributed 25% after restocking when compared with 20% before restocking. It appears more families wished to try out opportunistic farming as a source of food, especially with some of the maize and sorghum from relief food being used as seed;

• The level of support from relatives went up from 2% before restocking to 7% after restocking. This is consistent with the Somali saying that, “Somalis provide or add something to someone who already has something”;

• Water and firewood selling dropped in their contribution to household food sources from 10% before restocking to 3% after restocking. There are two possible reasons for this. First restocked families had moved further away from water and firewood demand areas and more time was being spent on opportunistic farming and herding of livestock. Restocking was therefore beneficial to the environment since there was a reduction in firewood collection and selling;

• Income from labor provision had gone up because relatives were more willing to help and older members of the household were much more involved in looking for food.

3.3 Household income sources of restocked families The household income sources before and after restocking are shown in the bar charts below.



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Household income sources before restocking

0%5%

10%15%20%25%30%35%40%

Selling

of m

ale sh

oats

Relativ

es

Labo

ur

Wate

r sell

ing

Firewoo

d sell

ing

Sell fa

rm pr

oduc

e

Household income sources after restocking (including by products)

0%5%

10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%

Selling

of m

ale sh

oats

Relativ

es

Labo

ur

Water se

lling

Firewoo

d sell

ing

Sell fa

rm pr

oduc

e

Loan

s/Rem

ittanc

e

With regard to household income sources, livestock (mainly from the sale of males, milk, ghee) made a contribution of 45% after restocking, sale of farm produce 12%, financial support from relatives 10%, labor provision 20%, sell of firewood 5%, sell of water 5% and loans/remittance from family members 3%. Before restocking, livestock contributed 2% to household income, opportunistic farming 3%, Provision of labor 35%, sell of firewood 25%, sell of water 25% and loans/remittance from family members 4%. Several conclusions can be made from the changes in household income before and after restocking. These are presented in Box 3.2 below Box 3.2 Conclusions on household income changes before and after restocking • The sale of male shoats and other livestock products is a very important indicator of sources of income

for restocked families;

• The provision of labor before and after restocking seems to be a very important source of household income. This means that the number of physically able members a household has is crucial to increasing household incomes. This may have implications on the ability of older children to go to school. In addition, the health status of able-bodied members of the household is important in their



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capacity to earn income for the family. The impact of malaria, HIV/AIDS or any other disease could have far reaching consequences on the income earning capacity of these families;

• There is a marked drop in the contribution of firewood and water selling from 25% before restocking to 5% after restocking. This may be attributed to changes in labor investments due to the different asset levels before and after restocking. It appears more labor was deployed in farming, provision labor and herding of livestock since these sources of income have risen considerably after restocking;

• Income sources from labor have gone down from 35% before restocking to 20% after restocking. The explanation is that more family labor is being allocated to livestock and farming activities as opposed to providing casual labor for income earning. However, it is important to note that more men were still offering casual labor (most children and mothers worked on their own farms or took care of the animals). The explanation given was that the men were spending more time providing labor in order to invest more in their livestock as opposed to selling the males to earn an income.

3.4 Household expenditure of restocked families The same households were asked to carry out proportional piling exercises on their income and expenditure patterns. They first identified the main items they spent their income on and later ranked them in order of declining importance. The items the families spent income on were cereals, clothes, essential food and non-food items (such as sugar, tea, utensils, soap etc), school fees for both formal and non-formal education and medicines for both humans and livestock. Cereals took 49.2% of the income, clothes 27.6%, food and non-food items 14.8%, medicines 13.6% and school fees 9.7%. The bar chart below shows the expenditure patterns of the restocked families.

Expenditure patterns of families before restocking

0%10%20%30%40%50%

Cereals Clothes Essentialfoods

Schoolfees

Medicines

Household expenditure of restocked families

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

Cereals Clothes Essentialfood

School Medicine

Item on which income is spent

% e

xpen

ditu

re o

n ite

ms

Box 3.3 below summarizes the conclusions on expenditure patterns of before and after restocking. Box 3.3: Conclusions from the analysis of expenditure patterns of restocked households • Cereals took 49.2% of the restocked household’s expenditure. This is because cereals now form a very

important complementary part of the diet to the milk obtained from the shoats. The implication is that restocking programmes in future should be undertaken when there is a general food distribution or the restocking package should contain a very substantial portion of cereals (or cash to buy cereals). Indeed consultations with beneficiaries indicated that the 250 kg as part of the restocking package should have been increased to a level that covers a whole year. While it is acknowledged that food aid was still



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being distributed, restocked families pointed out that this had substantially been reduced, was intermittent and was discontinued in December 2004;

• About 27% of households are not taking their children to school at all, mainly because there are no schools nearby or households do not prioritize schooling for their children. The SCUK program providing Alternative Basic Education was not known;

• Purchase of clothes from household income is an important investment in the Somali culture, especially

for specific religious festivities. However, it is important to recognize that expenditure on clothes before restocking was much less than after restocking. It may point to the fact that households had more disposable income because they now possessed more assets;

• Expenditure on non-cereal food items such as sugar and tea remained a high priority before and after

restocking. The Somali people heavily rely on tea, milk and sugar and will struggle to ensure these are available most of the time;

• The purchase of medicines for both humans and livestock appears higher before restocking. The

explanation given was that the health of animals had improved with improved availability of pastures and water and that because the animals were giving milk, children were not becoming ill often.

3.5 Comparison between women-headed households and men-headed ones. The evaluation team looked at the performance of households headed by women and compared these with those headed by men. A total of 14 female-headed households were analyzed against 18 headed by men. The comparison was in terms of average flock size, number lost to disease, number lost to drought, number lost to theft, number slaughtered, sold or given to relatives. This was to test the notion that has been advanced in favor of restocking men-headed households because they generally perform better and have the necessary labor to employ in herding. The findings of this analysis are presented in Table 3.1 below. Table 3.1: Restocked women-headed households compared to restocked men-headed households

Household Type

Aver. flock size

Number lost to disease

Number lost to drought

Number lost to predators

Number lost through theft

Number slaughtered

Number sold

Number given to relatives

Female-headed

44 7 8 5 1 5 (But only 1 hh out of 15 slaughtered)

6 0

Male-headed

48 7 6 3 0 3 (But only 2 hh out of 36 hh interviewed slaughtered)

9 1

From the above data, there is no significant difference between female and male-headed households in terms of livestock holdings and number lost to disease. However, there is a slight difference with regard to number of livestock lost to drought, predators and theft. Female-headed households may not have equal capacity for herding and taking care of animals. This is probably a true reflection of the situation on the ground, especially noting the other responsibilities and household chores that women have. But the difference is negligible. It is recommended that in future, restocking programmes should continue to target both female and male-headed households. 3.6 Livestock mortality and losses The livestock mortality rate calculated by evaluation team based on information from the restocked families was 6.4%. The SCUK Project Completion Report prepared by the Jijiga office in September 2003 had a livestock mortality of 9%. However, local community members and beneficiaries were of the opinion that



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these rates could be lowered with better provision of animal health services i.e. increased drug supply link to private pharmacies, more CAHWs trained and beneficiaries and community members being trained in the “provision of first aid to livestock”. In addition to the 6.4%1 mortality rate, other factors that affected the number of livestock per household were: losses to predators (1.7%), to drought (3.3%) and animals sold, slaughtered or given to relatives (2%). This gives a total livestock “off-take” of 13.4%. The evaluation team consulted the Government Veterinary Officer in charge of the Somali Region in Jijiga and he confirmed that the average livestock off-take rate in Fik Zone was between 12% and 18%. Therefore, a total livestock off-take rate of 13.4% was within acceptable limits. 3.7 Training of Community-based Animal Health Workers A total of 10 community animal health workers were trained as planned. The training took 12 days and was a rigorous programme that included both theory and practical sessions. The evaluation team interviewed 2 out of the 10 (as most of them move with livestock and were not available at interview sites) and found that they were mobile and functional. However, the majority of restocked beneficiaries and other people consulted pointed out that although the quality of the CAHWs seemed fine, they were too few and diseases were therefore prevalent among the animals. The two interviewed noted that they had weak links with Government veterinary authorities but were beginning to develop good links with private pharmacies. The one CAHW consulted in Fik said that he had received drugs on loan from the private pharmacy in Fik and had used the drugs and repaid the pharmacy. It was not possible to ascertain the number of cases treated by CAHWs since this monitoring data was not available from the project, as this aspect was not being monitored. However, the CAHW met in Fik gave a figure of 100-200 shoats treated for various ailments each month. 3.8 Labor allocation and decision-making by restocked households A question asked to all restocked households interviewed was “since you were restocked, who now spends more time herding and taking care of the family flock?” What do other members of the household do? The majority of the respondents said that this was a shared responsibility, although some of the men seemed to go out more to work in order to earn income to invest in their flock, while the wife, children or a relative took care of the family flock. Ultimately, the responsibility for herding fell more on the head of the family and the bigger children (13-20 years) of age. The younger children looked after the animals near the homestead but some went to school. It is important to mention that although restocked parents and children valued education, access to basic education still remained a challenge in Fik Zone. The facilities are still inadequate and formal education is inappropriate for pastoralist children. This question was asked in order to assess the impact of restocking on the availability of children to attend school. In many instances in pastoral communities, an increase in livestock holdings will require more labor. Children are usually the first ones to provide this additional labor. In the case of this project, it appeared that the those discriminated against were girls aged between 13-20 years, who would be together with the head of the household in the grazing areas, while the mother and other children would remain with some livestock in the settlement. The SCUK’s Program on Alternative Basic Education allows pastoralist children to learn without abandoning their family duties and should be encouraged. 3.9 Gender relations, access and control of livestock and livestock products The question asked was, “Who makes the decision to sell an animal? Milk? Skin? Ghee? Give an animal to a relative?” Again the majority of the respondents said it was a joint decision between the husband and the wife to sell an animal. However, other livestock products such as milk, skins, ghee, etc. would be disposed off by any one of the family members with authority to make such a decision. With regard to women-headed households, the woman would make the decision.

1 This mortality rate is close to the one in the SCUK project completion report. The report has a mortality rate of 9% based on 61% of all the restocked households.



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3.10 Suggestions from the community about viable herd size Most beneficiaries felt that 50-70 animals would be a viable herd. The baseline information available for Fik Zone categorizes households with livestock holdings of 30-40 shoats as poor, 45-55 as being in the middle while those with 100-150 as the better off2. From the households interviewed, the average number of animals per family was found to be 44-48, one and a half years after restocking. According to the projections below, restocked families should be having an average of 56 animals after one year of restocking. Therefore the current average holdings are low and this could be attributed to the fact that not all the animals given were ready for breeding at the time of restocking. However, it is worth noting that the restocked families are no longer in the category of poor but in the middle category. Livestock Projects for restocked families

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Breeding Stock 15,000 12,750 18,488 20,907 41,352 15% Mortality Rate 2,250 1,913 2,773 3,136 6,203 Net Breading Stock 12,750 10,838 15,714 17,771 35,149 1.5 Annual Birth Rate 19,125 16,256 23,572 26,656 52,724 50% Female 9,563 8,128 11,786 13,328 26,362 50% Males 9,563 8,128 11,786 13,328 26,362 80% Survival Rate for Female 7,650 6,503 9,429 10,662 21,089 80% Survival Rate for Male 7,650 6,503 9,429 10,662 21,089 No. of Females at End of Year 20,400 26,903 25,432 36,094 57,184 No. of Males at end of Year 7,650 13,005 14,338 22,850 40,512 Total No. of Animals at end of Year 28,050 39,908 39,770 58,944 97,696 Average stock per household (500 households)

56 80 80 118 195

Assumptions 1. All the 15,000 animals were ready for breeding during first year of restocking 2. 15% Annual Mortality Rate for mature animals 3. 1.5 birth rate per year 4. Breeding starts at the age of 2 years 5. 20% annual mortality rate for males and females 6. 50% females to 50% males are born 7. 30% mortality rate at year 3 due to drought affecting both males and females 3.11 Summary The following are the main points summarizing this chapter: In a volatile environment such as Fik where conflicts are a common phenomenon and suspicion abounds between local communities, the Government and external agencies, it is extremely important to undertake thorough preparatory work for a project such as this one. The selection of beneficiaries in consultation with all relevant stakeholders is mandatory. This project did very well in this regard and the consultant wishes to commend SCUK staff and management for a job well done. When assessed in the short-term, this restocking project is a very successful rehabilitation project, with the potential to move families out of poverty in the long-term. This is because beneficiaries immediately gained with the influx of livestock and non-livestock asset transfers. Gifts of livestock acted as a mechanism for short-term rehabilitation, with the potential to multiply and make a bigger contribution to household income and food sources. It must be pointed out that traditional land use strategies are considered to be the most

2 Fik Pastoral Food Economy Zone: An HEA Baseline Study by SCUK, DPPB and Partners. October 2001.



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efficient and environmentally sound methods of utilizing arid and semi-arid lands. Restocking, by promoting mobility and the traditional way of life, is beneficial to the system and should be supported. However, it is clear from the analysis that livestock multiplication (herd growth rates) is not growing fast enough to make a bigger contribution to the socio-economic welfare of the restocked households. This is because of the number of livestock in the restocking package. If the objective is to rehabilitate drought affected pastoralist IDP households and re-integrate them into pastoralism, the restocking package must be reviewed to include a larger ration of food to last longer i.e. 6-9 months (1000 kg instead of 250 of cereals); provide 50-70 shoats and strengthen animal health delivery systems by increasing the number of trained CAHWs and provide basic animal health training (2-3 days training) for the recipients of livestock. Incidentally, the International Committee of the Red Cross in Jijiga has already developed training materials for livestock keepers and SCUK can collaborate with them instead of “re-inventing the wheel”. The Focus Programme could work together with other service providers to provide appropriate capacities for community-based animal health services in the project area.



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CHAPTER 4- IMPACT OF THE PROJECT This chapter focuses on the effects and impacts of the project. It presents conclusions from the evaluation with regard to the efficacy of the project and its usefulness in influencing policy and informing best practice in restocking programmes in future. 4.1 Production of expected outputs and results Table 4.1 below presents the production of expected outputs and results from the activities.

Output Objectively Verifiable Indicator(s)

Extent to which output was achieved

Rating Result and effects on the lives and livelihoods of the target group

Output 1: 500 vulnerable, displaced households voluntary relocated from temporary shelters in Fik Zone to their home communities.

Number of households voluntarily resettled in their home areas from the makeshift camps

500households restocked but not resettled in their home areas

4

Although 500 vulnerable, displaced households were meant to have been relocated from Fik Zone to their original communities, it is difficult to determine that this has happened because the majority of the beneficiaries are still around where they were restocked. Project reports however indicate that 110 hh –22% returned to Ayun, Garbo, Imay and Dhuhun.

Output 2: 500 vulnerable, displaced households provided with a “re-starter” package of animals – each with 30 shoats and one pack animal

Number of households that received a complete “re-starter” package

Completely achieved.

1 All targeted families received the complete restocking package.

Output 3: Targeting methodology for assisting IDPs in Somali Region developed, tested and documented to share with others

Existence of a document describing the targeting methodology

This is to be an output of this evaluation.

3 Key sheet on targeting prepared by the consultant.

Output 4: Community Animal Health Workers trained and equipped to strengthen the animal health delivery system in at least 10 communities

• The % of CAHWs trained and equipped that are functional one year after project completion;

• Number of animals lost to disease by resettled households;

• No. of treatments given by each CAHW;

• Views and opinion of beneficiaries on service quality, price etc.

All CAHWs were trained and equipped. Largely achieved. The mortality rate is low i.e. 6.4%.

2

No monitoring of the performance of the CAHWs is going on and therefore it is difficult to know how many CAHWs are still active. However, the evaluation team met and held discussions with two of the ten CAHWs trained. These were active. There is need to link CAHWs to the Focus Program. Difficult to know the number of treatments given by each CAHW because no monitoring is taking place. Focus should link the monitoring of the already trained CAHWs and the restocked families to ongoing work Many beneficiaries felt that CAHWs were technically qualified but that they were too few. Availability of drugs was still poor and the link between CAHWs and relevant government department was still weak.

Rating: 1= Completely achieved; 2=Largely achieved; 3=Partially achieved; 4=Achieved to a very limited extent; and X= Too early to judge.



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4.2 Impacts of the project The following section details the impact of the project: • Livestock redistribution: The restocking project has resulted in some livestock re-distribution from

wealthier households to poorer ones. This is because it was the wealthier households that had animals to sell;

• Improved economic standing: The immediate impact of the project is that of 500 restocked households immediately attaining increased capacity for economic standing. Herd projections show that if external circumstances such as drought or disease do not affect the animals, their reproductive rates indicate potential for sustainable herds 3-5 years after restocking. There seems to be potential for a significant number of families to grow out of poverty and have sustainable and profitable flocks in the longer term;

• Livelihood diversification: A significant number of households have begun to diversify their livelihood strategies. For example, many families had invested income from the sale of male shoats in opportunistic agriculture and petty trade. This is a very important development as families would like to spread the risks by investing in different sources of livelihood;

Goats given to drought-affected IDPs in Fik Zone by Children from restocked families around Fik town the SCUK-funded restocking project. • Impact on children: Anecdotal evidence shows that nutritional and dietary status of households

especially among children has improved. All the 51 households interviewed in 6 different sites claimed that the restocking had had a positive impact on the health of their children due to increased availability and accessibility to milk, meat and income to purchase cereals and medicine. Milk was provided to children at least 3 times a day; in the morning; at lunchtime and in the evening. The milk was served along with other foodstuffs, mainly maize or sorghum meal. It is noted that the evaluation took place just after the rainy season in April-May and there is therefore plenty of milk in the zone. The quantities and regularity of milk provision to children may thus change if environmental conditions change ;

• Potential for IDP re-integration: The project has provided a basis for potential re-establishment of social

networks between former IDP households and their relatives. These kinship ties seem to be extremely important in the social-economic lives of the Somali people in the region because they serve as safety nets during crisis periods;

• Enabled poor households to own donkeys: The project enabled poor IDP households to own a donkey,

a very important means of transport. This reduced the work burden of women and children who are responsible for collecting water on the backs and walking long distances;



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• Injection of money into the local economy: The project enabled the direct injection of more than 1.4 million Birr into the local economy through the local purchase of breeding animals. But there was no data to show how those who sold the livestock had used or invested the money. Neither was a market analysis done at appraisal stage to determine the impact of such a large amount of money being injected into the local economy. (See Chapter 6 for recommendations). However, anecdotal evidence from some traders and local administration officials in the districts indicated that many of those who sold the animals to the project purchased camels and invested in trade commodities as well as in opportunistic farming. The motive is to diversify the income and food sources;

• Improved community animal health services: Fik Zone is remote and very poorly serviced. The training

of CAHWs has contributed to improved animal health services. The CAHWs were moving together with pastoralists and were accessing drugs from the private pharmacies in order to replenish their stocks;

• Social-economic stability: Some restocked households acknowledge being able to stabilize socially and

economically, at least in the short-term to be able to take some of their children to school; • Improved social standing: Nearly all households said they now lived with dignity and were respected in

the community. As a result of being restocked, these families were receiving more assistance from relatives because relatives felt it was a worthwhile investment;

• Community empowerment: The project contributed to community empowerment through the

development of leadership skills. In an area where the community is marginalized, involving community members, particularly women and local leaders in the planning, implementation and monitoring of the project did boost the morale of the community. Most members of the restocking committees interviewed felt that their confidence had been built and recognized they had capacity to target beneficiaries properly and monitor their progress;

• Replication: The regional LCNRDB targeted 30 households in Fik town for restocking with 30 shoats

and 1 cow based on the experience and approach of the SCUK restocking project. The project was thus influencing best practice. It is however noted that cattle were not the preferred livestock species for restocking by the communities in Fik (Refer to Abdi Umar’s report pg 17);

• Impact on policy issues: This project provides a very good example of how to undertake restocking

programmes in future. The key sheets3 and case studies4 prepared based on this report should be disseminated as widely as possible in order to influence policy and best practice.

4.3 Unanticipated effects of the project The project had unanticipated effects: • Some restocked families were already giving support to some IDP households not restocked. This was

mainly milk and 1-2 offsprings;

• A negative unanticipated result may be the fact that taking care of shoats requires a lot of care. Large numbers of shoats for a household may mean engaging children’s labor in herding, with the potential of children not being able to go to school. However, designing and scaling up programs such as the Alternative Basic Education Programme supported by SCUK can minimize any such negative impacts.

3 Implementing Restocking Programmes for Drought Recovery & Children Participation in Relief and Development Programmes. 4 Combining restocking with other rehabilitation strategies for vulnerable pastoralist houses; Restocking can be an effective way of helping pastoralist households recover from droughts; The impact of restocking on pastoralist children; Combining restocking with petty trade.



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• The setting up of a livestock market specifically for this project may have had negative effects on the local market economy because it may have created artificially high prices and disadvantaged local livestock traders and other pastoralists who wanted to restock themselves at the time.

4.4 Appropriateness, relevance and effectiveness of the project The consultant considers that this intervention was appropriate. This is based on the fact that it was implemented at the right time (after the drought), targeted the right beneficiaries (drought-affected) and was already making a significant contribution to the food and income sources of targeted households. The intervention is relevant to the livelihoods of the beneficiaries because livestock still remains the mainstay of the pastoral economy and is the best means through which vulnerable pastoralist households could return to the pastoral way of life. The package used i.e. use of small stock for restocking was the preferred community choice, provision of cereals, training of community animal health workers and the provision of a pack animal was ideal, in the light of the environment in Fik Zone. However, the provision of plastic sheeting for roofing and a blanket was probably in anticipation of the restocked families moving back to their original homes immediately after restocking. This however, has only happened to a very limited extent. The effectiveness of this project is exemplified by the contribution livestock is making to household food and income needs. It is clear that livestock is now contributing to nearly 50% of the household food and incomes sources. There are many cases (75%) of households that have returned to the pastoral way of life, with others diversifying their assets to include farming, trade, etc. The consultant recommends that any intervention to help pastoral communities in Fik should be based on a thorough livelihood analysis and an appreciation of the different FEZs in Fik Zone. In addition, a clear understanding of the target group is very important. In terms of current livelihood patterns vis-à-vis diversification, SCUK needs to support both. The key is in understanding target groups better. The overall performance of the project was summarized through an exercise facilitated by the consultant and undertaken by the evaluation team. This was in form of an analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. The table below summarizes this SWOT Analysis.



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SWOT Analysis of the SCUK Restocking Project in Fik Zone Strengths 1. Targeting of beneficiaries was excellent;

considerable consultation; screening; fairness and all were given opportunity to voice concerns;

2. Each of the 500 households targeted got a full restocking package;

3. Participation of beneficiaries and all relevant stakeholders and groups;

4. Training of Animal Health Workers; 5. Good collaboration with partners; 6. Beneficiaries being able to receive animals of their

own choice; 7. Extent to which planned activities were implemented

and achieved; 8. Potential and proven rehabilitation strategy for a

significant number of IDP households.

Weaknesses 1. Inadequate data on project costs and on the performance of

CAHWs and livestock flock growth rates, probably due to poor linkage to other programs or lack of sufficient resources set aside to provide and analyze the data.

2. One year is too short to implement a project of this magnitude i.e. for acquisition of 15,000; although it lasted longer, this was due to fluctuating weather patterns and the subsequent influence on availability of shoats in local markets;

3. Some of the animals given were less than two years old, hence took a longer time to start reproducing;

4. Sustainability of restocked flocks dependent on other food and income strategies.

Opportunities 1. Future restocking to consider giving more than

minimum viable flock i.e. 50-70 shoats; 2. A good example that can inform future restocking

programmes targeting drought-affected pastoral IDPs;

3. Project has recognized that not all pastoralists necessarily wish to be restocked; some would prefer farming (Ayun restockees). In this case, their package may be different. It is important that HEA baselines be used in livelihood analysis and subsequent targeting of beneficiaries;

4. The realization that restocking cannot be done in isolation. Other interventions e.g. in the water sector, animal health, education of children, infrastructure and access to markets need to be implemented for maximum impact. A livelihoods approach needs to be embraced;

5. Potential for spin-off benefit with restocked families already beginning to support relatives by giving them some offsprings.

6. A large number of legible IDP households still remain in the IDP camps and there is great opportunity for other agencies to come in and intervene based on lessons learned from this project.

Threats 1. Droughts and clan conflicts could limit the growth of flocks

and therefore affect the sustainability of project outputs; 2. Potential increased demand for labor if animals increase and

therefore pressure on children not to go to school. How the Regional Education Bureau has adopted the Alternative Basic Approach Model piloted by SCUK.

3. Potential dependence on external agencies for restocking and for restocked families not to be as careful with herding strategies and responsibilities as before.

4. Conflict over natural resources, i.e. grazing and water, especially when animals increase

4.5 Sustainability of project outputs in the long term There are two main aspects to consider with regard to sustainability in the long term. The first is the sustainability of the flock of shoats. The key question to ask is, “Will the numbers of livestock provided enable households to rely on these livestock more in the longer term or will households still need to complement their livestock strategies with other coping mechanisms such as selling of firewood, which in the longer term will be detrimental to the environment anyway?” Two important considerations here are the motivation of beneficiaries and livestock keeping skills. Motivation because if households do not necessarily think they need to return to a pastoralist lifestyle, they will dispose of the animals. But even if they are motivated to return but they have no herding skills, they will also lose the animals. So, new selection criteria will be required to determine the “best risks” for restocking, based on thorough livelihoods analyses. The second factor to be considered for sustainability would be the reduction of livestock mortality resulting from disease. Effective disease control is thus a critical factor. The sustainability of the Community-based Animal Health Delivery System is an important investment in fostering viable livestock production in the region. Firstly, there has to be an economically viable number of CAHWs operational in Fik Zone.



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Secondly, these CAHWs need to be strongly linked to qualified veterinarians that will supervise them and provide them with refresher training in order to update their skills. Thirdly, CAHWs must be facilitated to be able to replenish their drug supplies and veterinary equipment. Their link to private veterinarians and pharmacies is therefore critical. It is important to note that SCUK, through its Focus project, is already addressing this issue. But increasing numbers of livestock by minimizing risks without creating access to markets by livestock producers is a recipe for environmental degradation. Therefore market outlets for livestock, including infrastructure are important investments to be considered. 4.6 Comparing restocking with other common rehabilitation strategies The following simple comparison between restocking and other rehabilitation strategies will shed light on the cost effectiveness of restocking.

Intervention/Aspect Restocking Cash Relief Irrigation Food Aid Cost of undertaking intervention satisfactorily per household (E Birr)

5,200

2,640

8,122

9,840

Total cost of intervention for 500 households (Ethiopian Birr)

2,600,000

1,320,000

4,061,000

4,920,000

Friendly to the environment

Average

Good

Average

Good

Builds on skills of pastoral communities

Good

Good

Bad Bad

Is not subject to vagaries of weather

Bad

Good Average

Bad

Strengthens local markets and local production

Average

Average Good Bad

Is a flexible resource transfer

Average

Good Bad Average

Administration and logistical requirements are not overwhelming

Average

Good Good Bad

Potential to be self-sustaining

Average Bad Average Bad

Assumptions: Base Assumption: Assistance is given to households only for one year (drought recovery year). 1. Costs of restocking associated with provision of plastic sheeting, blankets and 500 kg of maize per household (assuming CRDA maize plus

some food relief received during that year) is worked out to be 400,000 Birr for 500 households; 2. Cost of restocking associated with purchase of 15,000 shoats and 500 donkeys including distribution is assumed to be about 2,200,000 Birr

for 500 households; 3. Purchasing one ton of food relief maize is approximately 1560 Birr; 4. Distributing one ton of food relief maize 40 Birr 5. Transporting 1 ton of food relief is approximately 5 Birr per km. Assuming 500 km it will be 2500 Birr per ton. Each of the households requires

2.4 tons of cereals per year (a family of 6); 6. To distribute cash relief, each family will require about 200 Birr per month to survive. Another 20 Birr will be distribution costs per family per

month. 7. To resettle one family on one acre of irrigated land and to help them start growing crops (assuming land is available and is not purchased)

costs approximately 50,000 Birr 8. The families resettled on irrigated land will require food relief for at least 6 months, amounting to 1.2 tons per family.



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Cash distribution: Based on the above figures and analysis, it appears that distributing cash as a drought rehabilitation intervention would be the ideal. It is cost effective and it may be less demanding administratively, with no direct negative impacts on the environment. It is also highly flexible. However, in insecure zones such as Fik, it would be a dangerous resource transfer. In addition, injecting a lot of money into the market may cause local inflation resulting in an escalation of prices of food and other commodities, thereby hurting poor people. But a much more important consideration would be the functioning of the markets and especially the availability of food and other essential commodities and services. While cash would guarantee access to food, commodities and services, it will be useless if food is not available in the markets. With regard to Fik Zone, the main issue in food security is availability and not access. Therefore, cash relief would not have been a good intervention in helping pastoralists recover from the drought. Restocking: Restocking builds on the skills of pastoralists. But it is more expensive than cash distribution. Restocking with small stock will enable the flocks to multiply quickly and grow in value. In this way sustainability can be possible. Livestock is also a flexible resource transfer because it can be sold and the money invested in other assets. However, restocking can only be successful under specific conditions as learned from this restocking project. Therefore, if done well, restocking would be a good intervention for rehabilitating vulnerable pastoralist households. Irrigation: Irrigation is the second most expensive intervention. It is not flexible because land is fixed and may not be easily transformed into other assets unless produce from the farm is sold. Irrigation would guarantee adequate food production and bolster household food security but its maintenance costs are very high and pastoralists would have to learn new skills in farming. It also may have direct negative impacts on the environment, unless very thorough environmental impact assessments are undertaken and environmental soundness determined. Therefore, irrigation is a possible intervention but requires considerable care and investment. Very few pastoralist communities have succeeded in translating themselves into irrigation farmers in the Greater Horn of Africa Region. In addition, it may only largely succeed with agro-pastoral communities. Food Aid: Food aid is expensive and undermines local markets and farmers. It is not sustainable because it depends on external assistance. However, in areas where food availability is a problem, food aid can be a very useful resource transfer. Again, depending on how the intervention is implemented, e.g. as food for work, school feeding programmes or distributed through local markets, etc., it can spur growth in the local economy and have more socio-economic benefits than it is normally used. But food can also be a very powerful political weapon. Conclusion: None of these interventions is better than the other. Probably the best intervention is one that combines all possible rehabilitation strategies with implementation based on a very sound analysis of livelihood systems, beneficiaries, markets, the environment and local politics and institutional capacities to implement them. Programme managers, with the participation of the communities in question, must work through this to develop an appropriate intervention for a specific target group. 4.7 Summary of this chapter The project has had a positive impact on lives and livelihoods of the beneficiaries and other stakeholders. However, the environment in Fik Zone (particularly high livestock disease incidences and the vagaries of weather such as drought) is still “volatile”, making restocked families still vulnerable to food insecurity and erosion of their assets. But by targeting appropriate recipients and applying stricter criteria for implementing restocking projects, restocking can be a successful means of rehabilitating vulnerable pastoralists. It can and is a viable intervention under specific circumstances and especially if the objectives aim to provide vulnerable families with increased capacity to meet their economic and social needs as opposed to necessarily returning them to nomadic pastoral lifestyles. Thus, the selective implementation of sustainable restocking programmes can help support livestock production on the whole. By assisting those herders who are “good risks” recurring cycles of food insecurity could be broken.



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CHAPTER 5 – KEY ISSUES & LESSONS LEARNED Following are key issues and lessons learned from implementing this project. These are important points that could inform implementation of future restocking projects. SCUK could also use these lessons to lobby for more support to restock the remaining drought-affected IDPs in Fik. 1 The long-term success of a restocking project will largely depend on the motivation and herding skills

of target beneficiaries, the appropriateness of the restocking package and an enabling environment for sustainable livestock production e.g. improvements in access to markets, better animal health services, appropriate education and health facilities for pastoralists, range and water improvements together with improved security;

2 For best results in restocking, especially in the context of Fik Zone, investing considerable time in

preparation e.g. developing and refining targeting criteria; consulting with a wider range of stakeholders and involving beneficiaries and the community as a whole in the whole process before, during and after implementation of a restocking project is highly recommended. Obtaining consensus among all stakeholders, on the targeting methodology, and documenting such a methodology have proved to be a key area of success for this project;

3 Not all communities or vulnerable individuals may be suitable for restocking. While livestock will always remain a central component of the pastoral economy, pastoral society is changing and the values of pastoralists are rapidly changing as well. A better target group and livelihood analysis to understand their long-term plans is necessary to ensure achievement of desired objectives;

4 The notion that restocked female-headed households end up performing poorer than male-headed households in terms of herd growth rates, economic standing, food and income improvements, at least in the short-term is not backed by empirical evidence. This project has demonstrated that women-headed households have performed equally well and should continue to be supported with restocking packages in future;

5 Save the Children as an organization has a focus on children. The evaluation team had specific interest

in interacting with children during this evaluation. It found that involving children in monitoring and evaluation of restocking programmes has added benefit and should be encouraged. The children the evaluation team interacted with provided very vital information on livestock numbers, dietary changes after restocking; herding responsibilities etc. Probably an approach for involving children (which includes the use of PRA tools already in place as well as others such as role plays; songs; mimicry; drawing; story telling; simple arithmetic; proportional piling; use of pictures etc. –these fascinate children) in the project cycle needs to be developed within SCUK Somali Regional Programme to improve children participation. Training of staff on involving children in project cycle management could result in improved project performance.

6 In order to understand the possible impacts of a restocking project on the local market, on producers and local traders, it is important to carry out a market analysis to determine the effects of injecting a lot of money into the local economy through the purchase of breeding animals at a premium price from local producers.

7 This intervention was planned and implemented with the Government of Ethiopia – the DPPC and other

partners such as CRDA, UNICEF and other local partners in the Somali Region. Partnership with government guaranteed success, especially in the planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project. The role of the livestock bureau in purchasing of livestock, vaccinating them and distributing them to target beneficiaries would not have been done better by any other agency. The lesson here is that good relationships with government can provide the necessary synergy necessary to implement a challenging project such as this one.



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8 From this project, the lesson is that the restocking package should comprise of the following: At least

50-70 sheep and goats in preferred proportions and right age for immediate breeding; an adequate food ration comprising of cereals, oil, sugar and tea leaves for a period of at least six months; provision of adequate veterinary services by trained CAHWs and basic animal health knowledge and skills to be given to beneficiary households. But the most important reason to determine success will be the motivation of restocked families and their herding skills, hence the need for more rigorous screening of beneficiaries and more analysis of their needs.



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CHAPTER 6 – RECOMMENDATIONS This chapter outlines the recommendations made by the evaluation team. If most of these are implemented, it is likely that this project could contribute considerably to learning not only for SCUK and the Somali Regional State, but also the wider drought response community in the whole of Ethiopia and the Greater Horn of Africa Region. 1. For this project to contribute to organizational learning and to influence policy and best practice, there is

need for impact monitoring, especially of the performance of CAHWs and of restocked households, to continue beyond the life of the project. The obvious way this could happen is for these aspects to be linked to other on-going initiatives such as the SCUK Focus project being implemented in the target area. Or alternatively, as DFID did in the restocking project in Shinille, where additional funds for impact monitoring were required and were requested for and approved, SCUK could allocate some additional funds for impact monitoring to continue;

2. While an attempt has been made in this evaluation to compare restocking with other rehabilitation interventions such as irrigation, cash relief and food aid, there was inadequate data in the project to allow for a comprehensive cost benefit analysis. For example, no figures were available for the costs of the food donated by CRDA, the plastic sheets and blankets from UNICEF, costs of DPPC and other government departments involved in the project. It is important for projects, such as this one, to develop detailed cost outlays, which take all restocking costs into account, to enable more accurate cost/benefit analysis. This should be taken up in future projects;

3. Evidence of the long-term impact of this restocking project was not readily demonstrated by the data

collected and analyzed. This is probably because methods to analyze restocking programmes are still poorly developed. It is recommended that SCUK, together with other interested stakeholders, contribute to the development of decision-support tools to guide restocking for specific pastoralist groups. For example tools are needed to assess the environmental, economic and cultural effects of restocking. These decision-support tools could range from simple conceptual models of livestock herd or flock growth rates to more complex models that can make predictions of social-economic impact over time.

4. Post-drought rehabilitation programmes need to take care of the dynamic nature and changing needs

of different livelihoods – predominately agro-pastoral and pastoral groups. Even where restocking is proposed, there should be flexibility in terms of the package offered. For example, in Ayun, pastoralists would have benefited more from this restocking if opportunistic farming had been catered for;

5. In future restocking programmes, consideration should be given to purchasing the small stock during

the drought and providing supplementary feeds, water and veterinary care to enable the animals to survive the drought. Experience in northern Kenya shows that this is a much more cost effective way of acquiring animals for post-drought restocking than acquiring them after the drought, when the prices of breeding animals will have escalated. But this will depend on the length of the drought and the availability of supplementary feeds. Concentrate feeds could be formulated locally;

6. A critical issue, which needs attention, now and in the future (the focus project is already doing

something) is the provision of community-based animal health services. In all the sites visited, those interviewed cited inadequate animal health services (Community Animal Health Workers and Drug Supply) as a major constraint and challenge to restocked families. There are too few CAHWs and pharmacies to cater for the large number of livestock in the zone. Training on animal health should include restocked families themselves;

7. SCUK should consider a “One-Programme-Approach” to programming in the Somali Region. This

means that there is only one management structure for both the development and humanitarian



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programmes. During drought or disaster years, the development programme would “expand” by recruiting additional staff and would “contract” back to a sustainable structure during normal years. In this manner, there is only one line of management and supervision and the activities of all staff would easily be monitored and appraised. Staff involved in the development programme may be much more conversant with the security situation on the ground as opposed to newer staff coming into the area for only a short time;

8. Fik zone lags far behind in terms of long-term structural development. It is not going to be beneficial to

have a piecemeal approach to development in the area. For example, having a major restocking programme in the area would immediately call for more water and natural resource management, livestock development, improved veterinary services and the need to ensure that the demand for increased labor from improved livestock production levels does not undermine the right of school-going children to access and obtain basic education. It has to be a holistic approach. It is therefore recommended that SCUK, together with other key stakeholders e.g. Government, UNDP, ICRC, WFP etc. formulate a comprehensive development plan for the Zone, say for next 10 years. This would form the “road map” for the development of the zone. A coordinated approach to the implementation of such a plan could realize positive results. Main areas of immediate investment that would spur long-term development include: • Improving veterinary services throughout the zone; • Developing basic education facilities; • Improving livestock production through better husbandry; • Natural resource management e.g. water development and range management; • Access to national and international markets for livestock; • Other areas are: development of social infrastructure e.g. human health, roads to improve

accessibility (especially roads that would connect other parts of Fik Zone with Selahad, Lagahida and Mayumuluqa), public education, human rights, including the rights of children, and good governance.

• The need to find innovative and long-term solutions to the IDP problem in the Zone.

9. SCUK should carry out a study to understand the impact of injecting 1.4 million Ethiopian Birr into the local economy and setting up a livestock market specifically to meet the project demand for breeding animals after the drought. This is very important for future restocking projects.

10. SCUK should also undertake a comprehensive study into how children can be much more involved in

project cycle management. Once this study is undertaken, training materials for SCUK and other staff should be developed and staff trained on how to improve children’s participation in development that affects their lives. If funds are not available to do this, other partners and collaborators could take this up for the benefit of the entire relief and development community in the region.



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ANNEXES



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ANNEX 1 - TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION I. BACKGROUND Over the past two and a half decades, repeated droughts and conflicts in the Somali National Regional State of Ethiopia have resulted in massive internal displacement and large inflows and outflows of refugees, significantly affecting livelihoods and necessitating changes in pastoralists’ coping strategies. This general decline accelerated markedly between 1998 and 2000, the result of three successive years of very poor rainfall (50-75 percent of average) and a middle-east trade ban on livestock from the horn of Africa. The impact on pastoral livelihoods has been large-scale asset erosion. Rough estimates suggest catastrophic livestock losses of 70 per cent (Sandford and Habtu, 2000). The events of 1998-2000 have aggravated the already precarious food security situation in Fik zone and caused the displacement of vulnerable groups who are now in temporary shelters in Fik, Hamero, and Segage and Duhun districts of the zone. According to the DPPB, there are 2,454 internally displaced families in Fik zone (14,540 people), 20 per cent of the total internally displaced people (IDPs) in the region. Although strong support systems exist in Somali societies, traditional restocking and resource-sharing mechanisms have been overwhelmed by recent events. The Regional Government therefore sought outside assistance to help IDPs to go back to their places of origin, particularly those IDPs who have lost their livestock and have no means to restart a normal life. The number of IDPs in this category was estimated to be 7,000–9,000 or 50-60 per cent of the total IDPs in the five makeshift camps of Fik zone. Save the Children UK responded to the crisis of IDPs by proposing a one year restocking project to re-integrate 500 of the most vulnerable, displaced households (3,000 people) in Fik zone into their home communities through: 1. Providing 30 shoats and one pack animal to an IDP household who has lost all or most of their

livestock 2. Providing transport, food rations and utensils 3. Strengthening basic animal health in the zone 4. Developing and testing a targeting methodology for assisting IDPs in Somali Region The project initially planned to start implementation during the 'Gu' season of 2002. But the 'jillaal' dry season of the year 2002 was prolonged and the main rainy season 'Gu' which usually starts at the end of March and ends at the end of June virtually failed. As a result, it was decided to postpone the project implementation to the next 'Gu’ season in 2003. The project was implemented in partnership with the key stakeholders. The key stakeholders were: the Regional Disaster Prevention Preparedness and Food Security Bureau (RDPPFSB), Regional Livestock Crop and Natural Resource Development Bureau (LCNRDB) and the communities. All of them participated in needs assessment, purchase and distribution of 15,000 shoats and 500 donkeys to 500 vulnerable and displaced households. A total of 10 AHWs received a 12 days training and a package of drug and equipment to strength the provision of animal health services In addition, the project facilitated the provision of food, plastic sheets and blankets to the targeted households. A total of 25000 members of the restocked households received 1450 quintals of food obtained from CRDA to cover their 5 months ration. UNICIF also distributed 500 pieces of plastic sheets and 500 pieces of blankets to the restocked households



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II. PROJECT DESCRIPTION Overall goal The overall goal of the project is to strengthen the recovery from the drought of 1998-2000 of the most vulnerable displaced households in Fik zone. Purpose The purpose of the project is to re-integrate 500 of the most vulnerable, displaced households in Fik zone into their home communities through improving their capacity to build asset and voluntarily return to their places of origin to start a pastoral life. Outputs 1. Five hundred vulnerable and displaced households voluntarily relocated from temporary shelters in

Fik zone to their home communities. 2. Five hundred vulnerable, displaced households provided with a “re-starter” package of animals -

each with 30 shoats and one pack animal. 3. Targeting methodology for assisting IDPs in Somali Region developed, tested and documented to

share with others 4. 10 CAHWs are trained and equipped to strength the animal health delivery system in at least 10

communities – to be those communities identified as the home communities of the targeted displaced households.

Activities 1. Conduct IDP survey 2. Develop targeting methodology, and select beneficiaries 3. Decide on types of livestock for restocking and numbers required 4. Inputs purchase and distribution 5. Provision of animal health care 6. Provide food, utensils and transport services 7. Monitoring and evaluation III-EVALUATION OBJECTIVES The evaluation has been planned to assess the progress made towards achieving the project objectives. Another main objective is to document lessons that will be used to inform and guide similar interventions in the future. The evaluation should address the following core issues: i) To critically assess to what extent the project has achieved the planned objective, expected out put

and activities ii) To assess the effectiveness and impact of the project on different target groups including children

and women iii) To assess unanticipated effects: was the project having any anticipated/ unexpected effect, either

negative or positive? iv) To assess whether the project's objective, scope, approaches (partnership, targeting, viable herd

size, etc.) and activities were relevant and appropriate to address the problem. v) To assess changes in context of external factors influencing the work or what factors affected the

project vi) To assess sustainability of the project activities and systems after the withdrawal of the external

support.



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vii) Alternative strategies: is there, or would there have been a more effective or efficient way to approach the problem?

Partners Involvement ♦ Which organisation was involved in the Fik IDPS rehabilitation project (Restocking project)? ♦ In which stages of the project cycle they were involved? ♦ What are the strengths and weaknesses of the project they have noticed and what is their

recommendation? IV- SUGGESTED EVALUATION INDICATORS Impact indicators For Purpose • Number of resettled households claming to have returned to a ‘normal’ lives and reintegrated into the

communities • Percentage of resettled households which have achieved a 20 per cent increase in herd size (as

measured a year after project completion) • Percentage of resettled families providing milk to children 2-3 times regularly • What happened to the non-assisted displaced IDPs For Output 1 • Number of households voluntarily resettled in their home areas from the makeshift camps For Output 2 • Number of resettled households that received a complete “re-starter” package For Output 3 • Degree of consensus amongst clan and family leaders within the makeshift camps that the most

vulnerable households did, indeed, receive assistance by the project • Existence of a document describing the targeting methodology used by the project For Output 4 • The percentage of CAHWs trained and equipped that are functional one year after project completion • Number of animals lost to disease by resettled households • Number of treatments/services given by each CAHW • Views and opinion of beneficiaries on service quality, price etc. Activities indicators • IDP committees established • 3000 IDPs identified from the existing makeshift camps and targeted • 15000 sheep and goats and 500 pack animals purchased and distributed • 10 CAHWs trained and equipped with the necessary equipment and drugs • All purchased livestock received appropriate animal health services before distribution • 500 IDPs transported to their home places



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V- KEY QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED The following are some of the key questions to be raised during the discussions that will be held with various stakeholders at various levels. The consultant who lead the evaluation is expected to draw more key questions based the above impact and process indicators ♦ What were the criteria for selection of the beneficiaries? Who were responsible? Who were the

selected beneficiaries? How many households were selected? ♦ Do the established committees exist? How were they established? What were their roles and

responsibilities? ♦ Who were involved in the process of selection and purchasing of animals? The number of animals

distributed, shoats and donkeys and the veterinary services given to them? ♦ Was the number and the composition of livestock provided to the beneficiaries in line with the minimum

'viable herd size ' ♦ How was the procedure of the animal purchase? ♦ What did the project contribute to the livelihoods of the advantaged groups, particularly for the children

and women groups? ♦ Are there any problems during the project implementation, monitoring and supervision? ♦ What were the criteria for selection of CAHW? ♦ How many CAHWs were trained and equipped? What are their roles ad responsibilities? What are the

changes made? Problems faced to provide vet service to the communities? ♦ How many IDP households returned to their original places and when? What are the others plan for

returning to their original places? Are there any problems to return to their home? ♦ What did the distributed food and non-food items contribute to the rehabilitation package? ♦ How many IDP households claiming to have returned to a ' normal ' lives ♦ What are the lessons learnt and recommendations for future intervention of the same type of

intervention? VI. Process/tasks

1. Reviewing documents including project proposal, agreements, field reports will be undertaken at office level

2. At community level, the evaluation team will visit Ayun, Garbo, Imay and Dhuhun which are the

original places of 110 restocked households who returned to their home in the rain time of April-July 2003. During the visit individual interview, focus group discussions and community meetings will be held with different groups to raise and discuss key questions as outlined in the TOR. The discussions will however focus on issues such as the impact of the project on the livelihood of the targeted households and the targeting issues and the approaches and system followed. The team will also make a field observation on the animals of the restocked household. The evaluation team will also visit to makeshift camps in Fik town to discuss with those beneficiaries who have not returned to their original places on the program.

3. Discussion with the project staff to understand how the project was conceived, the modality of

implementation, major achievements, challenges, and lessons learnt from the process 4. Discussion with stakeholders at different levels to gain understanding of how the project is viewed

and how successful it has been in fulfilling its objectives

5. There will be a feedback workshop in Jijiga with SCUK staff and other stakeholders to share the findings and receive input from the meeting. The relevant inputs will be incorporated in the final report;



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6. There will be a final feedback workshop with SCUK staff in Addis Ababa to share the findings and

receive input from the meeting. The relevant inputs will be incorporated into the final report. VII Expected outputs

1. Formal evaluation report, outlining the major findings of the evaluation (outputs impacts, strength, areas for improvement, lessons, conclusion and recommendations;

2. At least 4 Case Studies and 2 Key Sheets prepared as dissemination materials.

VIII. Management The consultant will report to Cassandra Chapman, the Policy, Planning & Programme Development Manager, who will be the manager of this assignment. IX.Timeframe Twenty days will be allocated to undertake the evaluation. This includes the time required for preparation, fieldwork and the write up.



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ANNEX 2 – ITINERARY FOR THE EVALUATION MISSION Date Activities to be carried out

Place

07 June 2005 Travel to Addis Ababa from Nairobi

Addis Ababa

08 June 2005 Hold briefing meetings with SCUK staff

Addis Ababa

09 June 2005 Travel to Jijiga by air and meet the evaluation team

Jijiga

10 June 2005 Preparation of the survey materials like questionnaires, survey methodology, modalities, etc. reviewing project documents

Jijiga

11 June 2005 Meeting with stakeholders/regional partner institutions

Line department Bureaus

12 June 2005 Depart from Jijiga to Fik and alert people at the Dundumo’ad restocking site about the visit of the Evaluation Team.

Restocking site

13 June 2005 Working in Ndundumo’ad, Fik and meeting with the Fik zonal and district authorities

Fik and Dundumo’ad

14 June 2005 Working in Yahob and finalising meeting with the local authorities

Yahob and Fik town

15 June 2005 Travel from Fik to Hamaro work in Labadare and Hamaro and held discussions with local authorities

Labadare and Hamaro town

16 June 2005 Working n Gasangas and Ayun sites and spend overnight in Hamaro

Restocking project sites

17 June 2005 Depart from Fik to Jujiga 18-19 June 2005 Data analysis and compiling the reports

Jijiga

20 June 2005 Briefing/feedback meeting and travel back to Addis Ababa

Jijiga

21 June 2005 Briefing/feedback meeting in Addis Ababa

Addis Ababa

22 June 2005 Travel back to Nairobi

Nairobi

30 June 2005 Preparation of draft report, Case Studies and Key Sheets

Nairobi



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ANNEX 3 – PEOPLE MET AND CONSULTED DURING THIS MISSION Name Organization Position Station

1. Cassandra Chapman Save the Children (Ethiopia) Policy, Planning & Programme Development Manager

Addis Ababa

2. Wendwessen Kitaw Save the Children (Ethiopia) Deputy Operations Manager Addis Ababa 3. Abate Mollaw Kabede Save the Children (Ethiopia) Support Services Manager As Above 4. Suleiman Mohammed Save the Children (Ethiopia) Food Security & EWS Advisor Jijiga 5. Muhiadin H. Ismael Save the Children (Ethiopia) Nutrition Project Coordinator Fik 6. Hassan Ahmed Save the Children (Ethiopia) Operational Manager Fik 7. Yusuf Ahmed Save the Children (Ethiopia) Area Operational Manager, SNRS Jijiga 8. Tawfiq Adan Save the Children (Ethiopia) Water Project Officer Fik Zone 9. Mohamud Mohammed Local NGOs Coordinator, DPPB Somali Region Jijiga 10. Abdullahi Abshir Regional Livestock Bureau Animal Health Technician Jijiga Government officials met and consulted Name Organization Station

1. Abdulahi Mahdi Aden Head for Somali Region, RDPPB Jijiga 2. Dr Gatahun Bekele RLCNRDB Veterinary Department Jijiga 3. Abdullahi Shaqlane

Hassen Chairman of Fik Zone Fik

4. Ahmed Aydid Omer Vice Chairman of Fik district Fik 5. Muqadin Gas Traditional elder (zonal advisor) Fik 6. Abdulahi Traditional elder (district advisor) Fik 7. Dek Abdisalam Chairman, Fik Kebbele Fik 8. Ma’alin Hassen Acting Hamaro District Chairman Fik 9. Mahdi Aydid Chairman, Hamaro Kebbelle Fik People Consulted from Restocking Committees in Dundumo’ad Restocking Site

Name 1. Sarur Hassen Ibrahim 2. Abdi Hashim Mohamed 3. Muhumed Hussein 4. Mohamed Lashir 5. Abdi Omer Hassen 6. Mohamed Odowa Children who participated in the evaluation from Fik Station Name Status

1. Mohamed Dahir Ibrahim From restocked household 2. Mustafe Dahir Ibrahim From restocked household 3. Ahmed Mohamed Ali From restocked household 4. Anab Mohamed Ali From restocked household 5. Muktar Yussuf From non-restocked household 6. Ayan Ma’alin From non-restocked household



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ANNEX 4- STATUS OF FLOCK GROWTH RATES AMONG RESTOCKED IDP HOUSEHOLDS INTERVIEWED S/no. Name of the Restockee Sex District Project site #s given Current #s Remark1 Sarur Hassen Ibrahim M Fik Dundumo’ad 30 60 2 Dayib Mohamed Hirsi M Fik Fik 30 60 3 Barre Ahmed Mohumed M Fik Dundumo’ad 30 46 4 Hali Ahmed F Fik Dundumo’ad 30 20 (FH) 5 Samsam Musse F Fik Fik 30 50 6 Kasali Abdukadir M Fik Fik 30 52 7 Halimo Korane F Fik Fik 30 42 8 Sahra Malin Mahdi F Fik Fik 30 70 9 Dahir Ibrahim Hasen M Fik Fik 30 84 10 Sainaba Ma’alin Adem F Fik Fik 30 60 11 Halimo Muktar F Fik Fik 30 36 12 Mohamed Ali Hirsi M Fik Fik 30 55 13 Fadumo Mohamud F Fik Fik 30 40 14 Fadumo Gohd Adem F Fik Fik 30 43 15 Sharif Farah Mahad M Fik Fik 30 60 16 Abdurahman M Fik Fik 30 62 17 Halimo Ibrahim F Fik Dundumo’ad 30 35 18 Sharis Abdualahi F Fik Dundumo’ad 30 15 (FH) 19 Kalsumo Hasen Haj F Fik Fik 30 55 (FH) 20 Tamra Sh. Mohamed F Hamaro Hamaro 30 55 (FH) 21 Arfi Ahmed Hassen F Hamaro Hamaro 30 46 (FH) 22 Lul Abdulrahman F Hamaro Hamaro 30 45 (FH) 23 Dulmar Abdulahi F Hamaro Gasangas 30 40 (FH) 24 Halimo Abdulahi Ismail F Hamaro Hamaro 30 41 (FH) 25 Shahid Mohamed Abdi F Hamaro Hamaro 30 46 (FH) 26 Said Odawa M Hamaro Hamaro 30 60 27 Mohamed Wali Ma’alin M Hamaro Hamaro 30 48 28 Fadumo Sheik Abdi F Hamaro Hamaro 30 45 29 Ruqiya Shukri Korane F Hamaro Gasangas 30 36 (FH) 30 Abdulahi Arab Arre M Hamaro Hamaro 30 35 31 Ahmed Nur Mohamed M Hamaro Gasangas 30 70 32 Sahra Mohamed F Hamaro Hamaro 30 45 33 Muss Abdi F Hamaro Hamaro 30 38 34 Ma’alim Abdi Mohamud M Hamaro Hamaro 30 60 35 Dalbilla Mohamed F Hamaro Hamaro 30 66 36 Ruqia yussuf F Duhun Ayun 30 35 (FH) 37 Fadumo Sharif Hassen F D Ayun 30 55 (FH) 38 Dahab Mohamed Yarre F D Ayun 30 24 (FH) 39 Abdukadir Abdulahi M D Ayun 30 50 40 Ahmed Mohamud M D ayun 30 15 41 Kamil Hehab M D Ayun 30 38 42 Dahir Omer Yussuf M D Ayun 30 40 43 Fadumo Mohamed F Segeg Yahob 30 60 44 Halimo Sheik Ahmed F Segeg Yahob 30 40 (FH) 45 Halimo Abdukadir F Segeg Yahob 30 40 46 Asha Sharif F Segeg Yahob 30 95 (FH) 47 Kadija Mohamed F Segeg Yahob 30 29 48 Dayib Shukri M Segge Yahob 30 50 49 Fadumo Abdi Ganey F Fik Fik 30 46 50 Jawhar Mohamed F Hamaro Gasangas 30 46 51 Mohamud aden M Duhun Ayun 30 46 Total 1530 (Key: FH – Female Headed)

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