N A M S A

AGENCE OTAN D'ENTRETIEN ET D'APPROVISIONNEMENT NATO MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY AGENCY

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE TRUST FUND PROJECT

FOR DESTRUCTION OF

ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINE STOCKPILES IN ALBANIA

FINAL REPORT

FINAL REPORT

ON THE PfP TRUST FUND PROJECT FOR DESTRUCTION OF ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINE STOCKPILES IN ALBANIA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. In July 2000, the Mine Action Team of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) requested NAMSA to produce a project proposal for the destruction of Albania's entire stockpile of approximately 1,6 million anti-personnel landmines (APL). The proposal for the establishment of a demilitarization process at an explosives factory in Albania was subsequently accepted by Canada. The project was planned to take 16 months at a total cost of USD 790.104.

2. The donor countries were Canada, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Norway, The Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. NAMSA was appointed by Canada in December 2000 as the executing agency. The project started on 25 January 2001 after the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between NAMSA and Albania.

3. The project was managed by NAMSA's project management, contracting and finance staff in Luxembourg assisted by an in-country team of one expatriate ordnance specialist and two Albanian employees.

4. Process lines were established at an Albanian explosives factory, ULP Mjekës, for the demilitarization of the APL by reverse assembly. Materials from the mines were recycled to the maximum extent possible. A German company won a contract for the design, installation and commissioning of machines for crushing TNT charges and shredding Bakelite mine bodies. Financial assistance was provided to the factory for the renovation of its facilities and the production of new machinery. At its height, the project provided employment for 70 people, many of them women, from an economically depressed area with a high unemployment rate.

5. The APL stockpile was located in 57 depots throughout Albania. The Logistics Department of the Ministry of Defence organized the outloading and delivery of the APL to the factory in a well-coordinated and effective programme.

6. The last APL was demilitarized on 4 April 2000. In total 1.683.860 mines were destroyed against a predicted stockpile of 1.607.420. The additional 76.440 APL were discovered by means of a self-generated internal verification programme undertaken by the Albanian Armed Forces.

7. The project was completed in 15 months, one month less than planned, and on budget. A number of lessons were learned that will be of use in the design of future PfP Trust Fund projects

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BACKGROUND

1. This was the first project undertaken under arrangements established for the NATO Partnership for Peace trust Fund. The sequence of events was as follows:

• 29 February 2000: Albania ratified the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL).

• April 2000: Canadian Ambassador for Mine Action, Mr Daniel LIVERMORE and the late Lt Gen Gordon REAY visited Albania to assess the viability of a programme to assist Albania to meet its Ottawa Convention obligations.

• July 200: Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and NAMSA signed agreement for the development of aproject proposal at a maximum cost of USD 10.000.

• July-August 2000: Project proposal developed by NAMSA.

• 21 September 2000: Project proposal presented jointly by Canada and Albania to a meeting of the Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC) of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at NATO Headquarters.

• December 2000: Canada and NAMSA signed Executing Agent Agreement.

• December 2000 – January 2001: Donors signed Financial Management Agreement with NATO Headquarters (Financial Controller)

• 24 January 2001: Albania and NAMSA signed Memorandum of Understanding.

• 25 January 2001: Project started

• 26 April 2002: Project finished.

PROJECT AIM 2. The aim of the project was to assist Albania in the destruction of its APL stockpile of 1.607.420 mine. The project also aimed to help establish the infrastructure required to undertake industrial-scale demilitarization of Albania’s huge stockpiles of surplus munitions. This was to be achieved through training and the development of procedures, facilities and equipment.

PROJECT OUTLINE

3. General. The project proposal recommended the establishment of process lines at the ULP Mjekës explosives factory for the destruction of the APL stock by reverse assembly.

4. Albanian Contribution. Albania’s contribution to the project would be the operation of the demilitarization facility at ULP Mjekës and transportation of the mines to Mjekës from the estimated 57 storage locations throughout Albania.

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5. Sponsors and Donors. The project sponsors were Canada and Albania with additional donations provided by Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Norway, The Netherlands, Switzerland and The United Kingdom. The estimated cost of the project was USD 790.104 (just under USD 0,50 per mine).

PROJECT PLANNING

6. In July 2000 the Mine Action Team of DFAIT asked NAMSA to produce a fully costed project proposal for the destruction of Albania’s APL stockpiles. To satisfy Canadian legislation it was considered necessary for DFAIT and NAMSA to sign an agreement to cover this. NAMSA undertook to deliver a project proposal and DFAIT agreed to provide up to CAD 15.000 to cover NAMSA’s costs. NAMSA’s costs consisted of consultancy fees and travel costs.

7. NAMSA engaged Mr William HUNT on a consultancy contract for 10 days to assist in the production of the project proposal. NAMSA’s principal demilitarization specialist, Mr Peter COURTNEY-GREEN, spent a week in Albania working with Mr Hunt to develop the project proposal and Mr Hunt spent the following week working with NAMSA in Luxembourg to finalize the document. After coordination by NAMSA’s finance, contracting and legal departments, the proposal was submitted to DFAIT through the Canadian Joint Delegation to NATO.

8. A copy of the project proposal is attached. The format was developed specifically for this project and it worked well, both as an information document to enable Canada to raise pledges from donors and as a planning document to guide the management of the project. The same template was used to plan subsequent PfP Trust Fund projects in Moldova and Ukraine and it is intended to retain the format for use in other projects.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PROJECT 9. EAPC/PMSC Approval. On 21 Sep 2000 the project proposal was briefed to the PMSC by the Canadian Ambassador for Mine Action and the Albanian Minister of Defence. This joint presentation later proved to have been a useful procedure, since it established Albanian ownership of the project proposal and helped to keep Albania as Joint Sponsors of the project on track.

10. Executing Agent Agreement. NAMSA and DFAIT signed the Executing Agent Agreement in December 2000. A copy is attached.

11. NAMSA-Albania Memorandum of Understanding. NAMSO is empowered by the North Atlantic Council to do business with PfP countries with which it has established memorandums of understanding (MOU). The power to sign such MOU has been delegated to NAMSA providing the text conforms to an approved standard. The standard text is a very simple enabling document which creates no obligations on either side. However it should include an annex describing the intended project. A copy of the NAMSA-Albania MOU is attached.

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12. Financial Management Agreement. This agreement between the Financial Controller (FC) at NATO Headquarters and the donors had to be complete before NAMSA could start the project. A copy is attached.

13. Project Start. The project could only start after all the agreements listed above had been finalized. The start date was 25 January 2001.

IN-COUNTRY PROJECT SUPERVISION 14. Recruitment of Project Supervision Team. A number of ammunition specialist groups sponsored by NATO had been operating in Albania since 1998 to help deal with the country’s acute ammunition problems. Some of these personnel remained in Albania working on projects sponsored by UNDP and others, so it was possible to recruit as the in-country project supervisor a suitably qualified expatriate munitions specialist with experience of working in Albania. The Project Supervisor needed the support of an interpreter/translator who could also act as his administrative assistant. There was also a need to employ a Verification Auditor whose role was to account for the mines delivered to Mjekës and maintain an accounting system to record the processing and final disposal of the materials.

15. Project Supervisor Contract. For administrative simplicity it was decided to manage the in-country team through a single contract with the chosen Project Supervisor. This contract covered the employment of the Project Supervisor himself, the employment by the Project Supervisor of the other two personnel, the leasing of a suitable vehicle (a Landrover), payment for internet services, telephones, office stationery and computer peripherals.

16. Use of Expatriate or Local Personnel. The employment of an expatriate project supervisor was an expensive option but it was considered to be justified for this project because Albania lacked the infrastructure and trained personnel to enable NAMSA to manage the project solely through locally-recruited resources. The decision to use expatriate or locally recruited resources, or a combination of both, will be an important decision in the planning of any future PfP Trust Fund projects. The decision will depend on cost, the complexity of the project, the adequacy of indigenous resources and the availability of suitably qualified locally-recruited personnel.

17. Project Supervision Team. The team consisted of:

• Project Supervisor: William HUNT, formerly a British Army ammunition technical officer who had been working for some time in Albania under a NATO Headquarters contract.

• Verification Auditor: Ismet MIFTARI, formerly a lieutenant colonel in the Albanian military engineering department with experience of anti-personnel landmines and of accounting and control systems for ammunition.

• Administration Assistant: Jula BUZI, a languages graduate who had previously been employed with the NATO PfP Ammunition and Explosive Ordnance Disposal team.

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The in-country project supervision team: Willie Hunt, Jula Buzi and Ismet Miftari

18. Office Accommodation. The Project Supervisor and his assistant were allocated an office in the Ministry of Defence, Tirana with connections for a telephone and computer. The Verification Auditor was allocated an office in the administration building at the Mjekës factory. Provision by Albania of office facilities at no cost was counted as a contribution in kind to the project.

DEMILITARIZATION CONTRACT 19. General. A contract was negotiated with the government owned explosives factory ULP Mjekës in Elbasan to undertake all aspects of the demilitarization of the anti-personnel mines, from receiving and storing them to disassembling them and recycling or disposing of the materials. The contract was based on NAMSA paying a fixed unit price for the demilitarization of the mines. Residues such as TNT and cast iron were to be reprocessed or sold on by the factory for non-military purposes. The expected revenue for these sales was taken into consideration in calculating the demilitarization price.

20. Commercial Disposal of By-products. NAMSA was not informed until very late in the project that the regulations of the Directorate of Military Industries prevented ULP Mjekës from selling the residues left over from demilitarization to civilian industry. This resulted in the stockpiling of the cast iron bodies of the fragmentation mines until a late stage in the execution of the project. Since these could have been re-used for the manufacture of anti-personnel landmines or grenades, it was essential to destroy them to complete the demilitarization process. The Directorate of Military Industries and the MOD were initially slow to respond to NAMSA’s concerns in this area and eventually it was necessary for NAMSA’s General Manager to write to the Deputy Minister of Defence. This had the desired effect and an order was signed by the Prime Minister to allow the mine bodies to be sold for reprocessing.

21. Refurbishment of Facilities. The demilitarization contract did not specifically include provisions for NAMSA making advance payments to finance the refurbishment of the facilities at ULP Mjekës. However a number of such payments were negotiated, to be repaid by deductions from invoices submitted later in the contract. This enabled the complete refurbishment of the main process building, including the air extraction system to remove TNT dust suspended in the air.

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The process building before, during and after refurbishment

TRANSPORTATION 22. General. Albania’s principal contribution in kind to the project was transporting 2.600 tonnes of APL from the 57 storage locations throughout the country. During discussions in the planning phase the MOD stated that while they could provide the vehicles and soldiers for this, they needed help with the cost of fuel. NAMSA therefore negotiated a contract with the MOD for the delivery of the mines to the factory against a payment of USD 0,05 (5 cents) per mine, a total of approximately USD 80.000.

23. Planning and Coordination.

23.1 The Director of Logistics, Colonel Kadri SULA, managed the transportation programme, with day to day organization delegated to the Engineer Representative of the Armaments and Weapons Branch of the Logistics Directorate. The MOD allocated five 4-tonne trucks and a pool of drivers for the task.

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A convoy of trucks arrives at the Mjekës factory

23.2 Logistic operations were based on a monthly outloading plan which was issued a month in advance to the various Brigade Headquarters by the Logistics Directorate. The Brigade HQs subsequently issued instructions for outloading to subordinate units under their command.

23.3 Demilitarization operations were planned to take place at least one month behind the transportation programme to ensure that sufficient feedstock existed in the event of an interruption in the transport programme.

23.4 The collection of mines from the North and South East regions of the country was programmed during the late spring and summer months to avoid seasonal access limitations. This also served to remove APL from the border regions where they were more susceptible to misappropriation.

24. Training. To mitigate risk and enhance safety standards, MOD drivers were trained in routine handling and transportation drills and emergency procedures. The training was based on NATO standard procedures and it was designed and implemented by the Canadian Ammunition Technical Officer (ATO) attached to the NATO PfP Liaison Office, Major Pierre LEMELIN. The following subjects were covered:

• Handling of ammunition.

• Segregation of compatibility groups.

• Safe loading and unloading.

• Security of loads.

• Convoy drills.

• Fire fighting.

• Emergency drills.

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Major Pierre Lemelin instructs Albanian Army personnel in ammunition handling

25. Resources. To ensure that each vehicle deployed had two fire extinguishers available to deal with vehicle fires, the Project Supervisor purchased 20 water gas fire extinguishers on the local market.

26. Lazarate Depot. This was located in the Gjirokaster region near the border with Greece. 5.300 APL were recovered from 5 ammunition storage tunnels that had been sealed by the AAF in 1997 to prevent looting. The tunnels remained sealed until near the end of the project due to local tensions and political issues. The MOD mounted a military operation to recover the mines in March 2002 in coordination with the Project Supervisor. In addition, 500 tonnes of conventional ammunition were removed from the site, effectively closing the depot.

Clearing the entrance to an ammunition bunker

at Lazarate

Emptying the bunker

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27. Sazan Island. In March 2002, in an operation mounted by the Albanian Navy and coordinated with the Project Supervisor, 8.100 APL held at a military offshore base on Sazan Island, off the coast of Southern Albania, were destroyed by open detonation with support from the US Navy 8th Mobile EOD Team. It had been intended to move these mines to the mainland and then on to ULP Mjekës with the assistance of an Italian Navy detachment based at Sazan Island, but in the event they were unable to provided assistance.

Sazan Island Operation

Sazan Island

Sailors of the Albanian Navy

repacking anti-personnel mines

US Navy 8th Mobile EOD Team preparing mines for demolition

Destroying the mines

28. Monitoring and Accounting. Monitoring of the outloading and transportation process was limited due to inadequate communications with the Brigade ammunition storage sites, most of which did not have telephone lines. Monitoring of outloading was conducted where practicable and no serious infringements were observed. Accounting standards proved to be high and no unresolved discrepancies occurred during the outloading process. The MOD and AAF internal verification system identified 76.440 additional APL to those originally declared.

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29. Contract Management. The MOD managed the contract well, ensuring a continuous programmed flow of feedstock to the demilitarization factory. The NAMSA Project Supervision team assisted in the preparation of the monthly invoices and certificates of transport, presenting them for corroboration and signing by the designated Contract Manager before forwarding them to NAMSA for processing and payment.

30. Summary of Transport Operations.

30.1 This project stretched the limited resources of the AAF logistics organisation. Other internal AAF and bi-lateral projects placed heavy demands on limited logistic assets. The most significant of these occurred during a harsh winter spell that saw project vehicles diverted to provide humanitarian relief to affected areas in the remote North East and South East of the country. No known accidents or incidents took place during the transportation of the APL stockpile.

30.2 The success of the project as a whole depended to a considerable extent on the efficiency of the transport operations. In the event these operations were planned meticulously and performed with great efficiency. All those involved, particularly those in the MOD Logistics Directorate and the AAF personnel who did the work, deserve great credit. These operations set a high standard by which to judge contributions in kind by Partner nations to PfP Trust Fund projects.

DEMILITARIZATION OPERATIONS 31. Selection of Mjekës Site. The government owned explosives factory at ULP Mjekës, near Elbasan in Central Albania, was chosen as the site for the demilitarization work. The only alternative would have been the government owned munitions factory at Poliçan in Southern Albania, but it was considered that ULP Mjekës offered better road connections to the 57 storage locations throughout the country.

32. Capacity Building. Although the management and workforce had extensive experience of manufacturing and processing explosives, they had no experience of industrial-scale demilitarization. It was therefore necessary for the Project Supervisor to take an active role in helping to develop processes for the demilitarization of the mines and new rules and procedures for the conduct of operations. The Project Supervisor arranged formal technical training for ULP Mjekës management and military fire fighting personnel. All staff were given a one day training package before being employed on the process lines.

33. External Training. The contract for the provision of technical assistance, which was awarded to the German company EBV, included training for the four senior members of the ULP Mjekës staff in demilitarization techniques, the commercial aspects of demilitarization contracting (including developing and submitting costed proposals) and contract management skills. The training was carried out at EBV’s factory at Torgau, Germany.

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(left to right) ULP-Mjekës chief engineer, factory manager and finance director

undergo training at EBV factory in Torgau, Germany

34. Refurbishment of Facilities. It was necessary to refurbish facilities and equipment that had been damaged during the civil unrest in 1997 or that had deteriorated due to lack of maintenance. The Project Supervisor helped ULP Mjekës compile a proposal for refurbishing the process building. NAMSA then negotiated a payment of USD 11.000 to cover the costs. Once the payment of this money had been effected, the work was carried out without delay and to a good standard.

35. Demilitarization Methods.

35.1 Mines AP Bakelite and Wood. These mines differed only in the material of the mine bodies, one type being made of Bakelite and the other of wood. They were of simple design, allowing straightforward manual disassembly of the components. The mine bodies required permanent deformation to prevent reuse. This was simple for the wooden bodies, but the Bakelite mine bodies could only be deformed by machine. The construction of a machine to shred the Bakelite bodies was included in the technical assistance contract. It came as a self-contained unit in a standard ISO container and proved to be very effective. The equipment was delivered and installed in December 2001 and the process rate was such that all bodies were processed in accordance with the project schedule.

EBV Bakelite crusher

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35.2 Mines AP Fragmentation. These could be disassembled manually.

35.3 Mines AP Fibre. The TNT explosive charge was poured into the plastic mine body during manufacture in its liquid state, after which it solidified. The standard way to remove cast TNT based explosive fillings from munitions is to heat them to the point at which TNT melts. ULP Mjekës engineers therefore designed and built heating baths (normally referred to as autoclaves) to loosen the charges by expansion of the mine body coupled with melting of the surface layer of the explosive.

Preparing PMN mines for the autoclave

ULP Mjekës chief engineer and

NAMSA personnel discuss design of prototype autoclave

Removing mines from the autoclave

35.4 Detonator Assemblies. The original plan had been to destroy the detonators in a simple ammunition incinerator. ULP Mjekës engineers subsequently designed a detonation containment chamber from a small disused earth covered explosive storehouse. The detonators were then destroyed in batches in the containment chamber.

35.5 TNT Blocks.

35.5.1 The demilitarization contract stipulated that the TNT blocks recovered from the APL should be reduced to TNT flake. The explosive would

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then be available for reprocessing as a commercial explosive by powdering and mixing with ammonium nitrate to form Ammonite, a product that ULP Mjekës had manufactured before the destruction of its TNT production plant in 1997. Explosives like Ammonite are not suitable for military use but are widely used in civil engineering projects.

35.5.2 NAMSA concluded a contract by competitive tendering with a German demilitarization company (EBV GmbH) to design, construct, install and commission purpose built equipment to reduce the TNT blocks to proportions that would enable them to be pulverised into powder form in a milling machine. NAMSA also provided financial assistance to ULP Mjekës to refurbish their existing Chinese milling machine.

Chinese TNT milling machine

New TNT crusher after installation

Loading TNT charges into feeder trays

Loading feeder tray into TNT crusher

Crushed TNT

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36. ULP Mjekës Technical Regulations. Existing Albanian technical regulations were considered inadequate, so the Project Supervisor wrote new safety and operating regulations based on NATO standards. These were generally accepted, introduced and enforced by ULP Mjekës management.

37. ULP Mjekës Demilitarization Procedures. ULP Mjekës had no experience of demilitarization and had no appropriate procedures. The Project Supervisor and his team developed appropriate procedures and instructions and assisted in the training of staff, although regular supervision and monitoring were necessary to ensure compliance. Additional safety awareness was engendered through a poster campaign which addressed all areas of safety ranging from explosive safety to manual lifting techniques.

38. Quality Assurance. A Quality Plan, endorsed by the NAMSA Quality Auditor, was developed jointly with the ULP Mjekës management team. This introduced a quality system as an effective aid to management. Technical monitoring systems were further reinforced by formal, recorded, weekly quality audits.

39. Explosive Accounting. Although Albanian accounting regulations and methods appear cumbersome and archaic by modern standards, they do work and as a consequence the accuracy of ammunition accounting, which was regularly audited by the Project Supervision team, was very high throughout the project.

40. Explosive Limit Licensing. NATO standard explosive limited licensing was introduced in storage and process buildings. Task Boards detailing explosive and man limits were displayed in all areas where explosives were stored or processed. These were monitored and enforced by the Project Supervision Team.

41. Recycling of Metals. An amendment to Albanian law was required to enable some 1.100 tonnes of mine bodies to be moved to two recycling centres. 150 tonnes were purchased by KM Poliçan and converted into manhole covers for the Tirana municipality. The remaining 950 tonnes was processed into construction material by Kurum International, Albanian’s sole civilian ferrous metal recycling organisation. As previously indicated at paragraph 19, the expected revenue for these sales had been taken into consideration in calculating the price paid for demilitarization of the mines.

Bodies of disassembled fragmentation mines at ULP Mjekës

Transferring fragmentation mine bodies…

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…to the furnace

Manhole cover made from fragmentation mine

bodies at Poliçan

42. Waste Streams. Other waste streams were dealt with as follows:

• Crushed Bakelite mine bodies were disposed of in authorized landfill sites.

• Fragmentation mine stakes and damaged packaging were dispersed locally as firewood.

• Undamaged packaging was retained for future use.

MONITORING & VERIFICATION 43. External Verification. The NAMSA Verification Auditor monitored the demilitarization processes and the accounting procedures for mines and ancillaries. He verified inloading, storage and demilitarization figures using an Integrated Ammunition Accounting and Monitoring System (IAAMS) designed and introduced by the Project Management team. This was supplemented by additional stock checks and audits of ULP Mjekës ammunition accounts by the Project Supervisor.

44. Discrepancies. A well-structured accounting and handover procedure between the AAF and ULP Mjekës ensured there were no unresolved discrepancies concerning the AAF. Many anomalies were identified. Many of these involved factory sealed boxes, so they must be attributed to poor quality control during manufacture. Other factors included:

• Detonators. 42.808 more detonators than APL were delivered for demilitarization. This was partly due the holding of surplus detonators in the inventory, which is normal practice. It may also reflect that some mines were looted in 1997 without the separately packed detonators being taken.

• TNT Blocks. 228.614 fewer TNT blocks than APL were delivered for demilitarization. Part of this discrepancy is considered to be attributable to poor quality control during manufacture. 100.000 x 75 gram blocks were removed by the AAF prior to demilitarization for use in a civil construction project. They wanted these charges in particular because their size and shape were ideal for placing in boreholes. This was agreed by NAMSA

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against an undertaking given by the AAF to supply to ULP Mjekës an equivalent weight (7.500 kg) of TNT charges extracted from anti-tank mines.

45. Accounting Accuracy. The overall accounting accuracy of the AAF and ULP Mjekës was assessed as being better than 99%.

46. Article 7 Report. Although not a requirement of the Project Proposal, the Project Supervisor assisted in the drafting of Albania’s first annual Article 7 report for submission to UNDDA

NAMSA PROJECT MANAGEMENT 47. General. The Project Manager was the Chief of the Ammunition Section of NAMSA’s Special Projects Programme. He was assisted by the staff of the Ammunition Section and, from May to November 2001, by a consultant ordnance specialist. The consultant was replaced from December 2001 until the end of the project in April 2002 by a newly recruited senior technical officer. Project management direction was provided by the Programme Manager of the Special Projects Programme, who was answerable to the Director of Logistics Programmes and Operations. Additional support was provided by NAMSA’s supporting divisions responsible for finance and contracting.

48. Project Plan and Milestones. The guide for managing the project, including the milestones and detailed budget, was provided by the project proposal that had been accepted by the Sponsors and donors. In principle, any significant deviations from this had to be approved by the NATO Sponsor. In the event there were few deviations and those that occurred arose either from the emergence of better ideas than those in the original proposal (such as the destruction of detonators in an enclosed detonation chamber) or by force of circumstances (such as the inability to transport APLs from Sazan Island to the mainland for demilitarization).

49. Coordination of Effort.

49.1 Coordination of effort was achieved by regular project management meetings and by a system of written reporting that ensured the distribution of information at all levels.

49.2 Project management meetings covering this project and other PfP Trust Fund projects under development were conducted every week by the Programme Manager of the Special Projects Programme and were attended by project management, finance and contracting personnel.

49.3 A weekly situation report was circulated to all personnel involved in the projects, including the General Manager and his Directors.

49.4 NAMSA’s project management staff maintained contact with the in-country Project Supervisor by email and telephone on a daily basis. The Project Supervisor was required by his contract to submit a written report to NAMSA every month. He also provided a weekly written situation report to the project management team.

49.5 NAMSA provided a written report to the NATO Sponsor (Canada) every two months. The reports included detailed financial summaries that showed expenditure

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and commitments against the planning figures in the project budget. These reports were also copied to the International Staff at NATO Headquarters. Canada distributed the reports to the donor countries.

49.6 NAMSA staff visited Albania to observe and monitor the project at regular intervals and for specific purposes such as negotiating contract amendments with ULP Mjekës and replacing the Project Supervisor while he was on leave.

50. Contract Management. Statements of Work for the Project Supervision, Transport and Demilitarization contracts were compiled by Ammunition Section staff and passed to the Special Projects Programme’s specialist contracting personnel for the contracts to be written. The programme's Senior Procurement Officer then used the draft contracts as the basis for negotiating the precise terms. The Equipment Support contract was awarded as the result of a competitive bidding process. A Request for Proposals was sent to potential bidders in NATO countries and also those in non-NATO donor countries (Austria and Switzerland)1.

51. Financial Management.

51.1 The financial matrix at Annex G of the project proposal was used to devise a budget for the project. It was necessary to retain a degree of flexibility in the various budget headings since it had not been possible to predict costs exactly when planning the project. However the overall budget of USD 790.104 was the absolute limit of available funding, so every variation in expenditure during the execution of the project was reviewed critically in the light of its effect on that.

51.2 The only significant cost overrun was in relation to the Equipment Support contract. This was awarded by competitive tender so it had been necessary to estimate what the lowest compliant bid would be. In the event, the expenditure on the contract exceeded the forecast by USD 28.071 (33%) but this was contained within the contingency reserve.

51.3 Budgetary control was a continuous process, but formal reviews were held by the project management team against a monthly financial statement prepared by the programme's finance staff. A financial statement was also included with the project reports sent every 2 months to the NATO sponsor for distribution to the donors.

51.4 The original estimate of NAMSA's project management costs for the 15 months of the project was USD 54.000 plus USD 12.000 for travel and subsistence. The figure of USD 54.000 was based on an estimate of 0,6 man-years of effort spread over 15 months. This proved to have been an underestimate of the effort required, particularly since this was the first Trust Fund project and it therefore required very careful management at all levels. It became necessary owing to pressure of work to supplement the project management team by hiring a suitably qualified person on a consultancy basis for the 6 months period from May to November 2001.

51.5 The routine financial work of processing and paying invoices against the various contracts was conducted in accordance with NAMSA's normal procedures. However all payments in connection with the Albania project were given a high priority and processed as quickly as possible.

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1 Companies in non-NATO countries are not normally eligible to bid for NAMSA contracts. In response to a request from the sponsor (Canada) the NAMSO Board of Directors agreed to allow companies in non-NATO donor countries to bid for contracts in support of PfP Trust Fund projects.

51.6 The Final Financial Report is at Annex A.

SUPPORT BY OTHER AGENCIES 52. The Head of the NATO PfP Mission in Albania, Mr Ray SNIDER, provided practical and moral support to the project throughout its life. He also coordinated the assistance provided by three Canadian Ammunition Technical Officers involved in Task Area 1 (Ammunition and EOD), particularly in the form of training and capacity building for the AAF in preparation for the transport of the APL to Mjekës.

53. The Counsellor at the Canadian Joint Delegation to NATO, Mr Ross GLASGOW, provided valuable liaison between NAMSA and the Sponsor and Donors.

PUBLIC RELATIONS 54. Main Events. An active approach was adopted in relation to PR to help promote the PfP Trust Fund concept. The following PR events were organized:

• An informal ceremony in which the Canadian Chargé d'Affaires, Ms Gwyn KUTZ, demilitarized the first landmine.

• A formal Inauguration Ceremony attended by representatives of the sponsor and donor nations was held to mark the opening of the refurbished ammunition process building. The principal guests were the Albanian and Canadian Ministers of Defence. The event attracted a wide audience from international organisations and also received considerable press coverage.

• 5 press releases were distributed at key points in the project. These were widely distributed to the MoD press office as well as to national and local press offices.

• The in-country Project Supervisor produced a newsletter that was distributed throughout Albania to interested organizations on paper and by email.

• The project received regular exposure on the NATO and NAMSA websites.

Canadian Chargé d'Affaires Ms Gwyn Kutz

assisted by the Mjekës factory manager demilitarizes the first box of mines

Canadian Defence Minister

Hon. Art Eggleton speaks at the opening ceremony on 10 September 2001

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Albanian and Canadian Defence Ministers open the refurbished process lines

55. Briefings.

55.1 Formal briefings were given regularly to visitors to Albania and other interested parties including the NATO Secretary General, SACEUR, Commander AFSOUTH and the US State Department.

55.2 Briefings were given by NAMSA at international gatherings including the Global Demilitarization Symposiums in Reno, Nevada in May 2001 and in Lexington, Kentucky in May 2002 and the Intercessional Meetings of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction in Geneva, Switzerland in January and May 2002.

56. Publication. NAMSA submitted an article about the project to the magazine Military Technology entitled NATO's Partnership for Peace Trust Fund Tackles Demilitarization. This was published in the June 2002 edition. 4.000 copies of the article were published as a leaflet for distribution by NATO Headquarters, NAMSA, the Sponsors and Donors. A copy is attached.

LESSONS LEARNED 57. Since this was the first project managed under the guidelines for the PfP Trust Fund, it was a learning exercise for all the individuals and agencies involved. The principal lessons learned from NAMSA's perspective were as follows:

• It is important to establish the host nation's ownership of the project proposal to ensure their compliance with the way the project is executed. This should be achieved by close liaison with the host nation during the development of the project proposal. This can be reinforced by involving the host nation in presenting the proposal to the Political Military Steering Committee of the EAPC.

• The credibility of a PfP Trust Fund project will be enhanced in the eyes of the donors and others if the host nation is seen to make a significant contribution in kind to the execution of the project.

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• It is essential that sufficient finance and time should be made available for the development of a detailed project proposal that predicts as accurately as possible the resources and time required for the execution of the project.

• The format used for this project proposal provided a sound basis for the subsequent management of the project and was also found to be suitable for planning other PfP Trust Fund projects.

• Development of an MOU between NAMSA and the host nation can be a lengthy process, so it should begin as early as possible in the development of a project.

• It is essential to devote adequate resources to the in-country management of a project, although the precise nature of those resources will vary depending on the complexity of the project.

• The decision to use expatriate or locally recruited resources, or a combination of both, will be an important decision in the planning of any future PfP Trust Fund projects. The decision will depend on cost, the complexity of the project, the adequacy of indigenous resources and the availability of suitably qualified locally-recruited personnel.

• As far as possible the provision of support (interpreters, transport, office facilities etc) for in-country personnel should be negotiated as host country contributions.

• Projects such as this which depend on the establishment and execution of commercial contracts can only be managed effectively by a professional contracting agency.

• Partner nations seldom have sufficient resources to invest in the refurbishment of facilities or the design and production of machinery, nor do they have the resources to provide bank guarantees against advance payments. The sponsor and donor nations should therefore be prepared to accept the risk that is inherent in making advance payments without guarantees.

• Albania's exemplary response to the logistic challenges of this project should provide a standard against which to judge host nations' proposed contributions to PfP Trust Fund projects.

• If circumstances dictate significant changes in the execution of a project, such as the disposal by detonation of the APLs on Sazan Island, the executing agency must consult the NATO Sponsor nation before proceeding.

• By their nature, PfP Trust Fund projects require close and careful management. The resources to do this should not be underestimated.

• In the management of a project such as this, there must be close coordination of project management, contracting and finance staffs. This can be achieved through frequent and regular project management meetings and the circulation of progress reports to all the interested parties.

• The financial management of such a project should allow adequate flexibility between budget lines while maintaining strict adherence to the overall budget.

• PR must be managed vigorously to ensure that projects attract positive publicity for NATO and the Partnership for Peace.

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FINANCIAL SUMMARY AT CONTRACT END

Operational costs USD 724.104,00Project Management cost NAMSA USD 66.000,00TOTAL ESTIMATED PROJECT COSTS USD 790.104,00

DESCRIPTION FORECAST REVISED BUDGET

COMMIT-MENTS

TOTAL PAYMENTS

Details of NAMSA Project Management Costs Travel/Subsistence NAMSA 12.000,00 7.642,43 7.642,43 7.642,43Management cost NAMSA 54.000,00 39.117,88 39.117,88 39.117,88Consultant (Hastings) 49.730,98 49.730,98 49.730,98Sub Total NAMSA 66.000,00 96.491,29 96.491,29 96.491,29DETAILS OF OPERATIONAL COSTS Consultant Contract Consultant Fees (Hunt) 144.000,00 138.249,32 138.249,32 138.249,32Adm.Asst Salary (Buzi) 12.000,00 13.790,32 13.790,32 13.790,32Subsistence 4.000,00 0,00 0,00 0,00Verification Auditor Salary (Miftari) 7.400,00 10.550,00 10.550,00 10.550,00Sub Total 167.400,00 162.589,64 162.589,64 162.589,64Vehicles Rental 35.600,00 28.453,55 28.453,55 28.453,55Factory Supplies 1.500,00 1.269,00 1.269,00 1.269,00Sub Total 37.100,00 29.722,55 29.722,55 29.722,55Resources Desktop computer system 2.500,00 4.628,30 4.628,30 4.628,30Monthly telephone charges 3.170,00 3.109,06 3.109,06 3.109,06IT consumables/Stationary 1.600,00 2.453,36 2.453,36 2.453,36Internet account 700,00 75,00 75,00 75,00DHL/Mail Costs 0,00 600,00 600,00 600,00Bank Fees 0,00 169,19 169,19 169,19Misc Fees 0,00 92,95 92,95 92,95Printing 0,00 2.927,80 2.927,80 2.927,80Sub Total 7.970,00 14.055,66 14.055,66 14.055,66Sub Total Consultant Contract 212.470,00 206.367,85 206.367,85 206.367,85OTHER OPERATIONAL CONTRACTS Mjerkasi Factory ALB 011 292.600,00 288.577,13 288.577,13 288.577,13Equipment Contract ALB 012 84.400,00 112.471,82 112.471,82 112.471,82Transportation ALB 013 80.400,00 83.788,00 83.788,00 83.788,00Contingency ALB 014 54.234,00 0,00 0,00 0,00Travel/Training 0,00 2.407,91 2.407,91 2.407,91Sub Total other Contracts 511.634,00 487.244,86 487.244,86 487.244,86GRAND TOTALS 790.104,00 790.104,00 790.104,00 790.104,00

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EXECUTING AGENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN CANADA AND THE NATO MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY AGENCY

Project Number: TF 01 Between the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, hereinafter referred to as “NAMSA” and The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade for Canada, hereinafter referred to as the “Lead Nation”. Whereas the “Lead Nation”, in conjunction with other contributing nations, is prepared to contribute to the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control, according to the Guidelines for the NATO/EAPC Trust Fund for Stockpile Destruction, for the specific project: Anti-Personnel Mine Stockpile Destruction Project in Albania. The combined contributions of all donors will total 800,000 USD. Whereas NAMSA will act as executing agent for this project as defined in NAMSA proposal to Government of Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade for Anti-Personnel Mine Stockpile Destruction in Albania and the guidelines contained in PFP/SC-N(2000)85 (Guidelines for the PFP Trust Fund for the Destruction of APM Stockpiles); Now therefore, the Lead Nation, on behalf of itself and the other contributing nations, and NAMSA agree as follows: 1. The project will be implemented over a 16-month period commencing when the required funds have been committed to NAMSA. 2. NAMSA shall be responsible for the proper implementation of the project as described in Annex A. NAMSA will make every possible effort to ensure timely and full implementation of the project. Possible changes in the project or in the implementation will only be implemented with the consent of the parties. The Lead Nation carries no responsibilities other than those outlined in this Agreement. 3. The NATO-IS Office of Financial Control will confirm to NAMSA when the contributing countries have provided written confirmation that they will provide the total of 800,000 USD, taking into account the schedule of contributions for each contributing nation and the payment obligations towards involved contractors. These monies will be used to cover the cost of the related work plus NAMSA's administrative overheads. 4. Funds due to NAMSA under this Agreement will be transferred to NAMSA by the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control upon receipt of the contributions called for by the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control and within 30 days of the request for funds issued by NAMSA. Such funds shall be placed in a NAMSA account identified for this project.

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5. Funds which the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control has placed at NAMSA's disposal and which rest after completion of the project will be returned to the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control at the conclusion of the project. 6. NAMSA shall administer and account for the funds in accordance with its financial regulations and other applicable rules and procedures and practices and keep separate records and accounts for the project. These records shall be made available to the lead nation on request. 7. NAMSA shall submit a final assessment report, which shall include a project summary and lessons learned in its implementation, as well as a financial statement showing the funds received and expended for the project, not later than 90 days following project completion. Should a financial audit of the funds expended be required, such an audit would be requested by the Lead Nation and would be performed by the International Board of Auditors for NATO. 8. NAMSA shall provide quarterly status reports to the Lead Nation in the format outlined in Annex B. 9. The Lead Nation on behalf of the contributing nations reserves the right, after prior consultation with NAMSA and with sufficient notice, to reduce or terminate prematurely the contribution to the programme. If funding is reduced or terminated, costs incurred by NAMSA for performance of the work and related termination costs will be paid by the Lead Nation. 10. The Lead Nation on behalf of the contributing nations reserves the right to claim repayment of all or part of the funds transferred if contractual obligations are not met; or if it emerges, either from the reports referred to before or from some other source that the funds are not being used or have not been used for the implementation of the programme agreed; or if alternative funding proves to have been acquired (either wholly or in part), thus giving rise to double-financing (this includes other contributions). 11. If, for any reason other than that referred to above and not through any fault of NAMSA as referred to in the previous article, only part of the work called for in this agreement can be completed, only those funds required for that portion of the work that has been completed can be expended by NAMSA. 12. NAMSA will assist in project reviews, as requested by the Lead Nation. Such reviews will include the appropriate verification and quality assurance to be carried out by a qualified authority, if requested by the Lead nation. Any related costs to be borne by the Lead Nation. 13. This Agreement, as such, does not create any rights or obligations under international law. 14. No amendments of the this Agreement nor waiver of any of the terms or conditions will be deemed valid unless effected by a written amendment.

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15. The parties agree to resolve all disputes following from this Agreement by diplomatic means. 16. The Agreement will commence on the date the last signature is affixed to it and it will terminate when all obligations relative to this project have been completed by simple exchange of letters. 17. The offices responsible for coordination of all matters related to this Agreement are: FOR CANADA (Lead Nation): FOR NAMSA The Department of Foreign Affairs The Procurement Directorate And International trade Mine Action Team In witness whereof, the undersigned have signed the present Agreement in the English language in two copies. For Canada: For the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency: Name: Ambassador Daniel Livermore Name: Michel Saudrais Position: Ambassador for Mine Action Position: Deputy Director of Procurement Date: Date: 14 December 2000

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ANNEX A

DESTRUCTION OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE STOCKPILES IN ALBANIA PROJECT DESCRIPTION

1. As Executing Agent for the project to destroy anti-personnel mine (APM) stockpiles in Albania, NAMSA will assume overall responsibility for the management of the project on behalf of the Lead Nation. 2. NAMSA will manage the project in accordance with the plan, attached as Annex C, presented by the Lead Nation to the PMSC in EAPC/PfP format. Any significant modifications to this plan must be agreed with the Lead Nation. 3. NAMSA will:

3.1 Conclude a contract with the government owned explosives factory at MJERKASI for the destruction of the APM stockpile by reverse assembly. This contract will cover the storage and processing of the APMs, including the recycling of explosive and non-explosive components for non-military purposes, and the final disposal of waste materials. The contract will include the provision by NAMSA of expert assistance in planning, establishing and operating the process lines.

3.2 Establish an independent verification system to ensure that APMs are

destroyed in accordance with the terms of the contract, and that no APMs or components are diverted for unauthorized purposes.

3.3 Conclude a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Albanian Armed

Forces (AAF) for the movement of APMs from their current storage locations throughout Albania to the demilitarization facility at MJERKASI. NAMSA will assist the AAF in the planning and coordination of these operations. NAMSA will establish an independent verification system to ensure that APMs are moved from their storage locations to MJERKASI in accordance with the terms of the MOA, and that no APMs or components are diverted for unauthorized purposes.

3.4 Award a contract by competitive tender to an established demilitarization

company for the design, production and installation of specialist machines required for the demilitarization of the APM stockpile. This contract will include training for key staff members of the MJERKASI factory.

4. NAMSA will ensure that all reasonable measures are taken to complete the

project safely and without damaging the environment.

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ANNEX B

LAY-OUT PROGRESS REPORTS …(N°) PROGRESS REPORT

Project Title : ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION

FOR ALBANIA

Period Covered : (propose 3 months) Since the reporting period covered by the … progress report, the following has taken place: I. Contracting 1. Any changes to the contract that are worth reporting 2. Main contract administration events/difficulties II. Transportation of the APMs (including specific quantities) III. Destruction of the APMs (including specific quantities) IV. Project Schedule V. Financial Situation - Situation per donor country (if required) VI. Miscellaneous

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FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN CONTRIBUTING NATIONS AND THE NATO OFFICE OF FINANCIAL CONTROL FOR

THE DESTRUCTION OF ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINES STOCKPILE PROJECT IN ALBANIA Reference: PO(99)164 and PO(2000) 1. Introduction Description of the Project Under the above mentioned references, the North Atlantic Council approved the establishment of a Partnership for Peace Trust Fund for the destruction of antipersonnel landmines (APM) stockpiles. This Trust Fund will function on a project basis with, for each project, a project lead nation, one or more contributing nations and one executing agent. The first project to be managed under the Trust Fund will be the destruction of APM stockpiles in Albania. The project lead nation will be Canada with the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) responsible for project execution. For information, the Executing Agent Agreement Between Canada and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency is attached. The NATO-IS Office of Financial Control will act as Treasurer for the project. The other contributing nations will be Austria, Belgium,theNetherlands, Norway, Switzerland and The United Kingdom. The project is to start as soon as the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control has confirmed to NAMSA that the Contributing Nations have provided written confirmation that they will provide the total of 800,000 USD required for the project. The project will include the establishment of process lines at the government owned explosives factory at Mjerkasi for the destruction of the entire APM stockpile by reverse assembly. The explosives extracted from the mines will be recycled into a blasting explosive (Ammonite) for use in civil engineering projects to assist in the reconstruction of the Albanian economy. NAMSA will conclude a negotiated contract with the explosives factory at Mjerkasi for the destruction of the APM stockpile and will award a contract by competitive tender to experienced demilitarization companies in NATO countries for the design, production and installation of specialist machines required for the demilitarization of the APM stockpile. In addition, NAMSA will conclude a Memorandum of Agreement with the Albanian Armed Forces for the loading and transportation of the mines to Mjerkasi and other contracts that may be necessary to the successful completion of the project. Cost The cost of the project has been evaluated by NAMSA at 800 000 USD. 2. Aim This document reflects the understanding of a number of nations on the destruction of APM stockpiles, discussed in the Political-Military Steering Committee for Partnership for Peace (PMSC), to share the costs of destroying APM stockpiles in Albania.

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3. Approach 3.1. The contributions for the destruction of APM stockpiles in Albania will be as follows: 3.1.1 Austria, Contributing Nation, through the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will make a contribution of 100,000 USD to the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control. 3.1.2 Belgium, Contributing Nation, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and International Cooperation, will make a contribution of 1.100.000 BEF to the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control. 3.1.3 Canada, the lead nation, through the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), will make a contribution to NATO-IS Office of Financial Control in an amount not to exceed 200,000 USD. The contribution will be provided in 2 installments: DFAIT will issue an advance payment totaling 100,000 USD to be paid to the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control after: (a) both parties have signed the Financial Management Agreement between Contributing Nations and the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control and the Executing Agent Agreement Between Canada and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency; and (b) the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control has provided DFAIT with a request for payment supported by a forecast cash flow. Upon receipt of an accounting for expenditures incurred for the period ending March 31, 2001, a final payment will be provided in an amount not exceeding 100,000 USD. Canada commits its funds for the duration of the project up to 31 March, 2003. If the project is extended with the agreement of all parties, an amendment to this contribution will need to be concluded. 3.1.4 The Netherlands, Contributing Nation, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will make a contribution to the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control not to exceed 450.000 Dutch Guilders (approximately 185.000 USD), in the years 2001 and 2002 solely. The contribution will be provided in 2 installments: The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs will issue an advance payment totaling 300,000 Dutch Guilders to be paid to the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control after: (a) the Netherlands and the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control have signed the Financial Management Agreement between Contributing Nations and the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control and the Executing Agent Agreement Between Canada and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency; and (b) The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been provided with a request for payment supported by a forecast cash flow. Upon receipt of an accounting for the expenditures for the period ending December 31, 2001 a second payment will be provided in an amount not exceeding 150,000 Dutch Guilders. This Agreement, as such, does not create any binding rights or obligations under international law.

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3.1.5 Norway, Contributing Nation, through the Department of Foreign Affairs, will make a contribution of 100,000 USD to the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control. 3.1.6 Switzerland, Contributing Nation, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will make a contribution of 100,000 USD as soon as: (a) the Financial Management Agreement between Contributing Nations and the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control is signed by Canada, the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control and Switzerland and (b) the Executing Agent Agreement Between Canada and NAMSA is signed. These funds can be utilized as soon as Canada disburses its contribution. 3.1.7 The United Kingdom, Contributing Nation, through the Department for International Development, will make a contribution of 100,000 USD to the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control. 3.1.8 All contributions will be made to the following account: - Account Number: 310 1465400 10 - Account name: NATO APM Destruction - Account Address Banque Bruxelles Lambert NATO Branch Boulevard Leopold III, 1110 Brussels 3.2. The project will be managed in USD as proposed by the Executing Agent, namely, NAMSA, in its study, commissioned by Canada, on the destruction of APM stockpiles in Albania. It is the Executing Agents’s responsibility to make payments to the contractor(s). The NATO-IS Office of Financial Control will, in its capacity as treasurer, have the authority to transfer funds to the Executing Agent. No transfers can be made unless funds are available. 3.3. The NATO-IS Office of Financial Control will make a call for funds, as requested by NAMSA, within a month and a half before the project starts and thereafter as required. The NATO-IS Office of Financial Control will confirm to NAMSA when the contributing countries have provided written confirmation that they will provide the total of 800,000 USD, taking into account the schedule of contributions for each contributing nation and the payment obligations towards involved contractors. Funds due to NAMSA under this Agreement will be transferred to NAMSA by the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control upon receipt of the contributions called for by the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control and within 30 days of the request for funds issued by NAMSA. Such funds shall be placed in a NAMSA account identified for this project. 3.4. A special account will be opened for each project and administered by the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control. 3. 5. All interest accruing to the account will be added to the capital in the account. At the end of the project, the Executing Agent will return all unused funds, if any, to the NATO-IS Office of Financial Control. Any such funds will be returned to the contributing nations in proportion to each nation’s contribution.

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3.6. The NATO-IS Office of Financial Control will produce a financial report of the account (paragraph 3.1.8) which will be provided to the Lead Nation (Canada) for onward distribution to other contributing nations.. 3.7. The Agreement will commence on the date the last signature is affixed to it and it will terminate when all obligations relative to this project have been completed by simple exchange of letters. 4. Any disputes about the interpretation and/or implementation of the provisions of the present agreement will be settled by diplomatic means without recourse to any outside jurisdiction. For Austria H.E. Dr. Thomas Mayr-Harting Ambassador and Head of the Mission of Austria to NATO For Belgium S.E.M. Thierry de Gruben Ambassadeur et Représant permanent de la Délégation belge auprès d l’OTAN For Canada Daniel Livermore Ambassador for Mine Action For the Netherlands H.E. Dr. N.H. Biegman Ambassador and Permanent Representative Of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the North Atlantic Council For Norway H.E. Mr Jakken Bjorn Lian Ambassador and Permanent Representative Of Norway to NATO For Switzerland H.E. Mr Anton Thalman Ambassador and Head of Mission Of Switzerlan to NATO For the United Kingdom Susan Mary Cronin For and on behalf of Department for International Development MV Saliën Financial Controller NATO-IS

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA AND

THE NATO MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY ORGANIZATION ON LOGISTIC SUPPORT CO-OPERATION

This memorandum of understanding constitutes the legal foundation for the establishment between the Government of the Republic of Albania and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization of the logistics relations set out in the following articles.

Preamble

Whereas:

- The Republic of Albania, having accepted the invitation to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and having signed and subscribed to the Partnership for Peace Framework Document on 23th February 1994, is a partner state in the said Partnership for Peace;

- the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Albania has expressed interest in the services offered by the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization within the framework of its Programmes and Weapon System Partnerships;

- the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Albania is entering into negotiations with the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization with a view to establishing co-operation in certain areas of logistic support;

- the Board of Directors of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization has consented to furnish the Republic of Albania with logistic support services (as hereinafter specified);

- the Board of Directors of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization has recognized more especially, in the context of co-operation with this NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) state, the concern of the NATO states to minimize the costs of the programmes of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency that are common to the member states, this being one of the objectives laid down in the Charter of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization;

- the North Atlantic Council has endorsed the recommendations of the Board of Directors of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization on the conclusion of a support agreement with the Republic of Albania, on the understanding that entry into such agreement will under no circumstances confer on the Republic of Albania the status of membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or entitle the Republic of Albania to lay claim to such status;

- the Board of Directors of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization NAMSO BOD has authorized the NAMSA General Manager to sign this Memorandum of Understanding;

The Republic of Albania and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization hereinafter referred to as “the Parties”, have reached an understanding on the provision of logistic support based on the provisions set out hereunder.

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Definitions/Abbreviations

In the text of this memorandum of understanding and in that of the ensuing specific agreements:

- "NATO" signifies the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

- "NAMSO" signifies the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization;

- "NAMSA" signifies the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency;

- "PfP " signifies the Partnership for Peace instituted at the NATO summit held in Brussels on 10 - 11 January 1994;

- “technical information" means recorded or documented information of a scientific or technical nature, whatever the format, documentary characteristics or medium of presentation. This information may include, but is not limited to, any of the following: experimental and test data, specifications, designs and design processes, inventions and discoveries whether patentable or not, technical descriptions and other works of a technical nature, semiconductor topography/mask works, technical and manufacturing data packages, know-how and trade secrets and information relating to industrial techniques. It may be presented in the form of documents, pictorial reproductions, drawings and laser), computer software both programmatic and data base, and computer memory printouts or data retained in computer memory, or any other form;

- "WSP" signifies a weapon system partnership.

ARTICLE 1 Purpose

This memorandum of understanding establishes a formal framework for the provision of logistics services in well-defined areas including, but not restricted to, supply, maintenance, procurement of goods and services, transportation, configuration control and technical assistance.

ARTICLE 2 Implementation

2.1 Implementation of the memorandum of understanding will require specific written agreements to be drawn up, such as sales agreements, service provision agreements, WSP agreements or others.

2.2 It is understood that agreements such as referred to in para. 2.1 and WSP membership may require the prior approval of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Albania and will require the approval of the NAMSO Board of Directors and of the country of origin of the weapon systems or equipments involved.

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ARTICLE 3 Financial Arrangements

3.1 No financial liability will be borne by or attributed to the Parties in connection with this memorandum of understanding unless otherwise consented to subsequently by virtue of an agreement such as referred to in para. 2.1 covering a specific field of activity and tasking.

3.2 It is, however, understood that the Republic of Albania, as a customer, will bear the cost of services requested of and rendered by NAMSO after the Parties sign an agreement, including costs incurred in the event of termination, covered under Article 11.

ARTICLE 4 Liability, Warranty and Insurance 4.1 Each Party receiving materiels or services under this memorandum of understanding will waive all claims for injury (including injury resulting in death), loss or damage, when such injury, loss or damage arises from the normal use and/or operation of such materiels or services. 4.2 The Parties will afford each other mutual protection against any claim or action of whatever nature brought by any third party against one of the two Parties, and finally will indemnify the supplier organisation against claims of the same nature made by third parties. 4.3 The waiver and the indemnity referred to in paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2 will not apply in the event of wilful misconduct or gross negligence, nor in cases specifically covered in an agreement concluded between the two Parties. 4.4 Each agreement of the type referred to in para. 2.1 will detail the warranty covering the materiels or services to which it pertains, for each sector of activity and tasking involved.

4.5 Shipments arranged by NAMSO under such agreements will not normally be insured unless specifically requested by the Republic of Albania. The cost of such insurance as may be requested by the Republic of Albania will be reimbursed to NAMSO without delay.

ARTICLE 5 Management

5.1 The departments responsible for the management of this memorandum of understanding are indicated in the attached Annex 1.

5.2 For follow-on agreements referred to in para. 2.1, the Parties may designate specific points of contact.

ARTICLE 6 Security Requirements

6.1 The Parties will develop and implement a co-ordinated programme for industrial security based on C-M(55)15(Final)- Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

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6.2 The Parties will notify each other of the security classification laid down by the originating Party with respect to any information or data to be supplied to the other Party under the terms of an agreement such as referred to in para. 2.1.

6.3 Any exchange of classified information, including contracts involving such information, must comply with the provisions set out in the security agreement concluded on 26th July 1994 between NATO and the Republic of Albania, and with the security requirements set out in C-M(55)15(Final).

ARTICLE 7 Exchange of Technical Information subject to Property Rights

7.1 Data and information to be transferred, released or otherwise exchanged under an agreement such as referred to in para. 2.1 and which are clearly identified by one or other of the Parties, by means of an appropriate stamp, legend or other written indication, as being covered by property rights, will be subject to the provisions set out hereunder.

7.2 It is understood that each of the two Parties undertakes:

(a) to use information belonging to the other Party only for the purposes of the agreements referred to in para. 2.1;

(b) to fully safeguard the confidentiality of information belonging to the other

Party and to refrain from disclosing, transferring or otherwise making available such information to any third party;

(c) to treat information belonging to the other Party as classified information and to safeguard same by exercising the same care and applying the same controls with respect thereto as the recipient Party normally exercises and applies to protect its own information, in order to avoid inadvertent disclosure, publication, dissemination or transfer, and to take all necessary actions to ensure that only those employees of the recipient Party having a specific "need to know" will have access to information belonging to the other Party.

7.3 Information will not be deemed to be subject to property rights - and will give rise to no obligation on the part of the recipient Party - when that information:

(a) is within or enters the public domain due to no malicious or illicit act on the part of the recipient Party;

(b) has been supplied in a legitimate manner by a third party, without similar restrictions and without infringement of this memorandum of understanding;

(c) is approved for release or use by written authorization of the ceding Party.

7.4 Unless specifically agreed by the two Parties, nothing contained in the relevant agreements of the kind referred to in para. 2.1 will be deemed to grant any right or license in respect of any patents, inventions or data at any time owned by either of the Parties hereto.

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ARTICLE 8 Visit Procedures

8.1 Representatives of the Parties will, on request, be granted access to governmental or private facilities where work, including tests and trials, is being carried out under an agreement concluded within the framework of this memorandum of understanding subject to the “need to know” of these representatives.

8.2 The organization of visits will comply with the Security Regulations laid down in Enclosure D to CM(55)15(Final) under the heading "International Visit Procedures". All visitors will also comply with any additional security and safety regulations laid down by the host Party. Trade secrets and other technical information communicated to visitors will be treated as if they had been made available to the Party sponsoring the visitors.

ARTICLE 9 Language

The normal NATO policy of producing all official documents in English and French will be applied.

ARTICLE 10 Amendments

The provisions of this memorandum of understanding may be amended by written agreement of the Parties.

ARTICLE 11 Termination

11.1 If one of the Parties wishes to withdraw from this memorandum of understanding or from one of the follow-on agreements referred to in para. 2.1, that Party will give the other Party six months' written notice of its intention to do so.

11.2 In the event of withdrawal of one of the Parties from this memorandum of understanding or from one of the follow-on agreements referred to in para. 2.1, the Parties will consult with one other in a timely manner as to the most satisfactory withdrawal arrangements.

11.3 If required by the withdrawal notice, the Parties will negotiate, for each agreement of the kind referred to in para. 2.1, the earliest possible withdrawal date and the settlement of financial issues with respect to the ongoing tasks and services affected by the withdrawal. The Party withdrawing will meet in full its commitments up to the effective date of withdrawal.

11.4 If the Parties decide jointly to terminate the memorandum of understanding, they will jointly meet any termination costs.

11.5 The rights and responsibilities of the Parties regarding disclosure and use of technical information, security, sales and transfers to third parties, settlement of disputes, claims and liabilities and withdrawal and termination will continue, irrespective of a Party’s withdrawal from or termination of this memorandum of understanding or any follow-on agreement of the kind referred to in para. 2.1.

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ARTICLE 12 Settlement of Disputes

Any differences arising between the Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this memorandum of understanding will be settled by negotiation between them without recourse to any outside jurisdiction or third party.

ARTICLE 13 Effective Date

This memorandum of understanding will come into effect on the date of the signature by the last Party.

ARTICLE 14 Signature

The foregoing articles represent the understandings reached between the Government of the Republic of Albania and NAMSO. Two original copies, each drawn up in English and French, of this MOU are herewith signed, both language versions being deemed equally authentic. On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Albania

On behalf of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization

I. BOCKA Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to NATO

P.D. MARKEY General Manager

Date:

Date:

Addendum : The Implementing Agreement addressing the Destruction of Anti-Personnel Land Mines Stockpiles attached as Annex 2 constitutes a follow-on agreement referred to in para. 2.1 to which the Parties herewith agree.

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ANNEX 1 The points of contact for all matters concerning the provisions of this memorandum of understanding are as follows:

- for the Government of the Republic of Albania:

The Albanian Delegation to NATO B-1110 Brussels

Tel.: 0032 2 707 2780 Fax : 0032 2 707 2783

- for NAMSO:

The Legal Advisor L-8302 Capellen,

Luxembourg Tel.: 00352-3063 6554

Fax: 00352-30 87 21

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ANNEX 2

IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT DESTRUCTION OF ANTI-PERSONNEL LAND MINE

STOCKPILES IN THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA This Annex 2 shall be considered as the Implementing Agreement under Article 2.1 of the Albania/NAMSO Memorandum of Understanding. 1. On 29 February 2000, the Republic of Albania ratified the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, and in doing so accepted an obligation under Article 4 of the Convention to destroy its stockpiles of Anti-Personnel Mines (APM) within four years. 2. The Political Military Steering Committee (PMSC) of the Euro Atlantic Partnership Committee met on 17 July 2000 and approved guidelines for the PFP Trust Fund for the Destruction of Anti-Personnel (APM) Stockpiles (Ref. PFP/SC-N(2000)63, 6 July 2000). 3. The first project to be managed under the Trust Fund will be the destruction of APM stockpiles in the Republic of Albania. The project sponsor will be Canada with the NATO Maintenance & Supply Agency (NAMSA) responsible for project execution. 4. The project will include the establishment of process lines at the government owned explosives factory at Mjerkasi for the destruction of the entire APM stockpile by reverse assembly. The explosives extracted from the mines will be recycled into a blasting explosive (Ammonite) for use in civil engineering projects to assist in the reconstruction of the Albanian economy. The process lines at Mjerkasi will provide a foundation for the development of a munitions demilitarization industry for the urgently required destruction of other munitions stockpiles in the Republic of Albania. 5. NAMSA will conclude a negotiated contract with the explosives factory at Mjerkasi for the destruction of the APM stockpile. NAMSA will award a contract by competitive tender to experienced demilitarization companies in NATO countries for the design, production and installation of specialist machines required for the demilitarization of the APM stockpile. In addition, NAMSA will conclude a Memorandum of Agreement with the Albanian Armed Forces for the loading and transportation of the mines to Mjerkasi. 6. Albania’s contribution to the project will be to ensure the continued operation of the demilitarization facility at Mjerkasi and the transportation of the mines to Mjerkasi from an estimated 110-storage locations throughout the Republic of Albania.

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7. the Republic of Albania further agrees to extend, where appropriate, the provisions of the Status Of Forces Agreement (SOFA), signed in June 1999 between the NATO Secretary General and Ambassador KUKO, to all military, civilian and contractor personnel who may be present in the Republic of Albania as a direct result of this project. On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Albania :

On behalf of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization :

I. BOCKA Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to NATO

P.D. MARKEY General Manager

Date : Date :

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N A M S A

AGENCE OTAN D'ENTRETIEN ET D'APPROVISIONNEMENT NATO MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY AGENCY

PROPOSAL TO GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

FOR

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE STOCKPILE

DESTRUCTION IN ALBANIA

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. On 29 February 2000, the Republic of Albania ratified the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, and in doing so accepted an obligation under Article 4 of the Convention to destroy its stockpiles of anti-personnel mines (APM) within four years.

2. This proposal recommends the establishment of process lines at the government owned explosives factory at MJERKASI for the destruction of the entire APM stockpile by reverse assembly. The explosives extracted from the mines will be recycled into a blasting explosive (Ammonite) for use in civil engineering projects to assist in the reconstruction of the Albanian economy. The process lines at MJERKASI will provide a foundation for the development of a munitions demilitarization industry for the urgently required destruction of other munitions stockpiles in Albania.

3. Albania’s contribution to the project will be the operation of the demilitarization facility at MJERKASI, and transportation of the mines to MJERKASI from the estimated 110 storage locations throughout Albania.

4. The project sponsor will be Canada. It will be necessary for the Government of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to conclude an agreement with the executing agency.

5. The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) will be the executing agency. NAMSA´s governing body, the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization (NAMSO) will establish a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Defence of Albania to cover NAMSA´s involvement, and a Memorandum of Agreement with the Albanian Armed Forces for the loading and transportation of the mines to MJERKASI.

6. NAMSA will conclude a negotiated contract with the explosives factory at MJERKASI for the destruction of the APM stockpile. NAMSA will award a contract by competitive tender to experienced demilitarization companies in NATO countries for the design, production and installation of specialist machines required for the demilitarization of the APM stockpile.

7. The project can start after the conclusion of the agreements mentioned at paras 4-5, providing sufficient funds are available in the Trust Fund. It is estimated that the project will be completed within 16 months of the start date. Efforts will be made to reduce this by creating multiple process lines and introducing shift working.

9. This proposal is dependent on the political situation in Albania remaining conducive to operations by NATO and its agencies.

8. The estimated cost of the project is USD 790,000.

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CONTENTS

Subject Para Page

Executive Summary i

Contents ii

Introduction 1 1

Aim 2

Outline of Proposal 3

Stockpile Status 4

Transportation 5 2

Establishment of Demilitarization Factory 6 3

Project Management 7 5

Cost Estimate 8 6

Project Schedule 9 6

Media Plan 10

7

Annexes

General Situation A

Summary of Stockpiled AP Mines B

Geographical Dispersion of Mines C

Technical Specifications of AP Mines D

Detonator Incinerator Description E

Job Descriptions F

Financial Breakdown G

Project Schedule H

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1. Introduction.

1.1 The Republic of Albania signed the Ottawa Convention on 8 September 1998 and deposited its Ratification Documents with the United Nations on 29 February 2000. Albania is thus obliged to destroy its stockpiles of anti-personnel mines (APM) by 28 February 2004.

1.2 Albania faces unique problems in dealing with its surplus munitions stockpiles, of which the APM stockpile represents only a small proportion. NATO has been assisting the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) to deal with its munitions problems since September 1998. This effort will continue concurrently with the present project.

1.3 A summary of the general situation in Albania, with particular reference to the munitions stockpile problems, is at Annex A.

2. Aim. The aim of this proposal is to present a plan for the destruction of Albania´s entire stockpile of APM in accordance with Article 4 of the Ottawa Convention.

3. Outline of Proposal.

3.1 It is proposed that this project should be funded by the Trust Fund for APM Stockpile Destruction established by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) at its meeting in September 2000. The project sponsor will be Canada. The executing agency will be the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA).

3.2 Process lines for the destruction of the APMs will be established at the government owned explosives factory at MJERKASI. The AAF will deliver APM stocks to MJERKASI in accordance with a pre-determined schedule. The APMs will be demilitarized by reverse assembly. TNT recovered from the mines will be recycled into Ammonite blasting explosives using currently existing processes at MJERKASI. The value of this product will help to offset the costs of destroying the APM stockpiles. The blasting explosives will have no military uses, but will be used in civil engineering projects in the reconstruction of the Albanian economy.

3.3 Special machines required for the demilitarization of the mines will be designed, manufactured and installed under an equipment development contract. This contract will include training for three members of staff of the MJERKASI explosives factory in demilitarization technology.

4. Stockpile Status.

4.1 Reliability of Stockpile Figures. Details of the stockpile were established by a census carried out in 1999-2000 by the AAF under the guidance of the NATO Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Ammunition Storage Training Team (EODASTT). This was a thorough and well-organized survey, but it must be accepted that actual quantities may vary from those shown in this report by up to 10%.

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4.2 Stockpile Figures. The APM stockpile consists of 3 types of mine as follows:

• Mine AP Fragmentation 930,050

• Mine AP Wooden/Bakelite 545,270

• Mine AP Fibre 132,100

Total 1,607,420

4.3 Location of Stockpiles. The mines are stored in approximately 110

locations throughout Albania. A summary by regions is at Annex B. A map showing the geographical dispersion of the mines is at Annex C.

4.4 Technical Descriptions. Technical descriptions of the mines are at Annex D.

4.5 Condition of Stockpiles.

4.5.1 Ammunition storage conditions vary greatly from poor to excellent. However it is assessed that there are no safety constraints on movement or handling of the mines. The mines are of simple construction, with main charges of TNT. Detonators are invariably packed separately in watertight containers.

4.5.2 Most ammunition is block stacked, so accurate assessment of the degree of any packaging problem is impossible. It may be assumed, therefore, that an unknown proportion of the stockpile will require re-packing prior to movement. This will be an AAF responsibility using packages recycled from the destruction programme. For planning purposes, it is assumed that 5% of APMs will need repacking.

4.6 Hazard Classification Codes (HCC). There is currently no authority responsible for allocating HCC in Albania, so these mines are unclassified. However, for transportation and storage purposes it will be safe to treat them as if they were all classified as HCC 1.1D.

5. Transportation. 5.1 General. NAMSA will conclude a Memorandum of Agreement with the AAF for the movement of the mines to MJERKASI. The AAF will perform the transportation of the APM stockpiles using their own transport and manpower resources. NAMSA will reimburse the AAF to cover their fuel and incidental expenses at a proposed rate of USD 0.05 for each mine delivered to MJERKASI.

5.2 Schedule. APM stocks will be moved to storage sites at MJERKASI in accordance with a schedule produced by NAMSA.

5.3 Training. The AAF has not been trained in the handling and movement of ammunition to internationally accepted standards. It will be necessary for the NATO sponsored Ammunition Management and Ordnance Disposal Advisory and Training Team (AMODATT) that will be established from 1 October 2000 to conduct appropriate training for the AAF in preparation for this task.

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5.4 Special Equipment. NAMSA will arrange for the purchase of 30 fire extinguishers to equip the vehicles used to transport the mines at an estimated total cost of USD1,500.

5.5 Accessibility of Stocks. Many of the APM stocks are located in sites with very difficult access, and may only be reached with rough terrain vehicles in favourable weather conditions. For this reason it will be essential to move sufficient stocks before the onset of winter to enable production to continue without interruption.

5.6 APM Stored at LAZARATE. 80 tonnes of APM are stored in 7 tunnels located in the centre of the village, which is in the GJIROKASTER region near the border with Greece. The AAF sealed the tunnels during the 1997 period of unrest to prevent looting. Armed civilian gangs control access to the village, which is not under the control of the Albanian authorities. In April 2000 the EODASTT negotiated access to the tunnels to conduct the ammunition census. If the situation does not change, it will be necessary to negotiate the release of the mines. NAMSA's Project Supervisor will attempt to do this, but responsibility for the release of the mines rests with the Government of Albania.

6. Establishment of Demilitarization Factory.

6.1 General. It is proposed that the MJERKASI explosives factory should demilitarize the entire stockpile by reverse assembly for the following reasons:

• Suitable conditions exist at the MJERKASI explosives factory for the establishment of a demilitarization facility.

• There is a large pool in the area of currently unemployed skilled and semi-skilled labour formerly employed in the explosives factory.

• MJERKASI was recommended in a recent study conducted by the UK Department of International Development as the site of the future Albanian Demilitarization Facility.

• The site has a large ammunition storage capacity and is secure (fenced and guarded).

• The MJERKASI explosives factory can incorporate the recovered TNT into their Ammonite production, for which there is a continuing market.

• Recovered steel from the Fragmentation Mines can be recycled at the nearby steel works in ELBASAN.

• More than a third of the APM stockpile is located within 40 km of MJERKASI.

• Destruction of the APM stockpile by reverse assembly with the recycling of explosive and metal parts will be quicker, safer, cheaper and environmentally benign compared to destruction by open detonation.

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6.2 TNT Recycling. Part of the MJERKASI factory’s TNT production plant was destroyed during the unrest of 1997. The factory has been using stockpiled reserves of TNT for Ammonite production, but these reserves are now nearly exhausted. TNT that can be recovered from the APM stockpile will represent approximately 10 months production requirements for the factory (see Figure 1).

Mine Type Qty Charge Weight (kg)

Total Weight (kg)

Mine AP Wood/Bakelite 545,270 0.200 109,054

Mine AP Fragmentation 930,050 0.075 69,753

Mine AP Fibre 132,100 0.310 40,951

Total Weight of TNT Recoverable from APM Stockpile 219,758

Figure 1

6.3 Special Machinery.

6.3.1 TNT Crusher. The MJERKASI explosives factory has machines of Chinese manufacture for milling TNT biscuit to powder. However there will be a need for a non-ferrous hydraulic crusher to reduce TNT blocks from the mines to TNT biscuit suitable for milling.

6.3.2 Hydraulic Press. A hydraulic press will be required to crush the bakelite mine casings to prevent their re-use and to reduce the volume of the residue for landfill.

6.3.3 Autoclave. TNT charges from the Mines AP Fibre can be removed by heating the mine bodies in water or steam at 90oC. Trials conducted by the NATO EODASTT demonstrated that the charges are easily removed manually after heating the mine bodies for up to 11 minutes. It will be necessary to design and install autoclave equipment for this operation.

6.3.4 Incinerator. An incinerator is required for the destruction of the mine detonators. Ideally this should be a rotary kiln designed for the destruction of explosive components (such as an APE 1236). The installation and commissioning of such a kiln would delay the implementation of this project by at least a year, so it is considered to be impracticable. The design attached at Annex E, which was developed by the NATO EODASTT, is for a simple, manually operated incinerator for explosive components and small arms ammunition. It can be constructed and installed at minimal cost using local engineering resources. It is estimated that two incinerators of this design will be required for the destruction of the mine detonators.

6.4 Equipment Development Contract.

6.4.1 The MJERKASI explosives factory does not have adequate resources to finance the research, design, manufacture and installation of the machines and equipment required to set up the process lines.

6.4.2 NAMSA will award a contract by a competitive bidding process to a specialist demilitarization company for the design, production and installation of the

45

necessary machines (TNT crusher, hydraulic press and autoclave). This will be a concurrent activity with establishing the process lines at MJERKASI, which can begin operations before the installation of the machines.

6.5 Training. The management and staff of the MJERKASI explosives factory are experienced in the manufacture of explosives, and thus they possess the basic skills required for munitions demilitarization. However they have no knowledge or experience of the demilitarization industry. To address this deficiency, the equipment development contract will include familiarization training at the contractor’s demilitarization facilities for three members of staff of the MJERKASI explosives factory.

7. Project Management.

7.1 General. The project will be managed in accordance with the Guidelines for the PFP Trust Fund for the Destruction of APM Stockpiles.2

7.2 Sponsor. The project sponsor is Canada and the PFP partner is Albania. Canada will be responsible for ensuring that the project is implemented in accordance with the plan approved by the EAPC. Canada is also responsible for arranging sufficient donations to the Trust Fund to cover the cost of the project.

7.3 Executing Agent.

7.3.1 General. The executing agent will be NAMSA. NAMSA will be responsible for all aspects of the management of the project until its completion in accordance with the Guidelines for the PFP Trust Fund for the Destruction of APM Stockpiles. The project will be managed by the Ammunition Section of the Special Projects Programme, which has extensive experience of managing munitions demilitarization projects.

7.3.2 Project Supervisor.

7.3.2.1 NAMSA will employ an expatriate consultant (the Project Supervisor) to supervise the project in Albania. He will be supported by two locally employed personnel:

• Interpreter/administrative assistant.

• Verification auditor with good spoken and written proficiency in English, who will work at the MJERKASI explosives factory (see para 7.4).

7.3.2.2 Job descriptions are at Annex F.

7.3.2.3 It will be necessary to provide the Project Supervisor with a 4 wheel drive vehicle by purchase or leasing.

7.3.3 Demilitarization Contract.

7.3.3.1 NAMSA will negotiate a fixed price contract with the MJERKASI explosives factory (the Contractor) for the destruction of the mines. The contract will cover receipt, storage, internal movement, demilitarization of the mines, the processing of by-products such as TNT and steel, and the disposal of scrap materials.

7.3.3.2 NAMSA's Project Supervisor will assist the Contractor in planning the design and installation of the process lines. This may include assistance in the purchase of minor equipment, hand tools and disposable materials. NAMSA will make 2 EAPC/PFP(PMSC)N(2000)62 dated 9 June 2000.

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limited funds available to the Project Supervisor to enable him to purchase such items locally. Any expenditure of this kind will be recovered by deductions from the Contractor´s invoices throughout the life of the project.

7.3.3.3 In preparing this plan, the work involved in demilitarizing the mines has been assessed in detail and has been costed using official rates of pay for government employees in Albania, costs of consumable equipment and utilities, value of recyclable by-products such as TNT and scrap metal etc. The total cost of this part of the operation, including 20% tax (which is reclaimable) is estimated at USD 292,600.

7.3.4 Administration Costs. NAMSA´s costs for project management, administration, contracting, finance, accounting and overheads will be charged at an all-inclusive rate based on the time spent on the project by personnel employed in NAMSA´s Special Projects Programme. The rate will be based on the actual administrative costs incurred in support of the Ammunition Support Weapon System Partnership in 1999, i.e., USD 440 per person per day.

7.3.5 Travel Costs. Travel in connection with the project by NAMSA personnel and those employed by NAMSA will be by the cheapest available means. Subsistence allowances will be paid at the appropriate NATO rates.

7.4 Verification. Verification of the destruction of the mines will be achieved as follows:

NAMSA will engage a locally employed accountant with good spoken and written proficiency in English, who will work at the MJERKASI explosives factory as the verification auditor. He will maintain detailed records, as stipulated by NAMSA, providing a complete, auditable trail of mines, components, by-products and waste streams. The NATO PFP Cell in TIRANA will assist in the selection of a suitable individual for this post.

The Project Supervisor or his assistant will check the records and physical stocks every week. Particular attention will be paid to the weight of recycled TNT.

NAMSA´s contracting officer based in Kosovo may make unscheduled visits to the Contractor´s premises.

8. Cost Estimate. The total cost of the project is estimated at USD 790,000. A breakdown of the costs is at Annex G.

9. Project Schedule.

9.1 The Government of Albania, the Albanian Armed Forces and the international community all wish to see this project started as soon as possible. However, the following formalities must be completed before the project can start:

• Agreement by EAPC for the establishment of the PFP Trust Fund.

• Approval by EAPC for this project.

• Formal agreement between Canada (the sponsor) and NAMSA (the executing agent).

• Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Albania and NAMSO.

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• Establishment of sufficient funds in the Trust Fund to enable the project to proceed.

9.2 Once these formalities have been completed, it will be possible to start the project by concluding a Memorandum of Agreement between the Albanian Armed Forces and NAMSA for the movement of the mines, the provision of office facilities and the guarantee of free movement for NAMSA staff. It is estimated that the project will be completed within 16 months of the start date. Efforts will be made to reduce this by progressively increasing the efficiency of the operation at MJERKASI. These measures may include the development of multiple process lines, and the introduction of shift working. The detailed project schedule is at Annex H.

10. Media Plan. Guidelines for the Trust Fund require that a Media Plan should be submitted as part of the project proposal. In general, the approach to media relations for this project should be pro-active and open. As far as practicable, media activities should be coordinated with all the interested parties: the Government of Albania (Ministry of Defence), the Government of Canada (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), NATO Headquarters (Office of Information and Press) and NAMSA.

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ANNEX A BACKGROUND 1. During 50 years of communist rule, Albania developed a regional defence policy that included stockpiling and storing thousands of tonnes of weapons and ammunition at more than 160 strategic locations throughout the country. 2. Until recently, Albania had a substantial weapons and ammunition manufacturing capability which also exported products to generate revenue. In early 1997, Albania entered a period of severe civil unrest leading to the financial breakdown of the country including the armed forces, which virtually ceased to exist by mid 1997. 3. During the unrest, the civil population looted weapons and ammunition depots resulting in two serious consequences:

• At least 600,000 weapons, ranging from small arms to field guns and related ammunition, were released into the hands of the civilian population. Most of this has not been recovered.

• Tampering with ammunition to obtain scrap metals caused major explosions in 15

ammunition depots, killing 64 people and injuring an unknown number. The majority of the partially exploded ammunition depots are still contaminated with Unexploded Explosive Ordnance (UXO) and remain a hazard to the population.

4. During the Kosovo conflict, Serb forces crossed the northern border of Albania and laid extensive patterns of anti-personnel mines. These minefields were not documented and therefore no detailed plans exist to assist in their rapid clearance. There have been 18 fatalities to date and these mines continue to be a serious hazard for the local population. The Albanian Mines Action Executive (AMAE), a government body, is coordinating the international demining effort to resolve this problem. 5. The following problems remain:

• 143,000 tonnes of ammunition remain in storage in Albania, of which approximately 100,000 tonnes are surplus to requirements.

• An unknown proportion of the ammunition stocks are in a dangerous condition, including ammunition in which propellant stabiliser levels are low.

• Most facilities are insecure and do not conform to appropriate international standards.

• The Albanian Armed Forces have insufficient resources to resolve these problems. NATO ASSISTANCE TO THE ALBANIAN MOD 6. NATO has provided technical assistance to the Albanian MOD to address various elements of this crisis. The latest NATO initiative, the Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Ammunition Training Team (EODASTT) mission was funded for an 18 month period from January 1999 to June 2000. The EODASTT consisted of a core of international technical consultants augmented by short-term assistance from NATO military personnel. The

49

consultancy team created and maintained a core knowledge base regarding the status of the Albanian ammunition stockpile, introduced NATO-standard technical procedures, methodologies and techniques and won the trust and cooperation of the Albanian Armed Forces. 7. In October 2000, a NATO Ammunition Management and Ordnance Disposal Training Team (AMODATT) will be established. This project will use a smaller team of 3 military personnel who will rotate at 4 to 6 month intervals. UK GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE 8. From November 1999 to April 2000, the United Kingdom Government’s Department for International Development (DfID) sponsored a study of the ammunition situation and identified the need for an indigenous Ammunition Demilitarization Facility.

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ANNEX B

DISTRIBUTION OF ALBANIAN APM STOCKPILE BY REGIONS

Skodra Kukës Burrell Korca Gjirokaster Fier Shijak Tirana(1) Tirana(2) Elbasan Berat Rreshen Total Total

Code Designation Mines Tonnes 2506 Mine AP Wood 12000 13300 6000 31800 22990 28100 19390 11600 8700 48000 33100 0 234,980 117.49 2507 Mine AP Fibre 4400 4200 1600 7600 4200 8500 25000 - 30200 30600 15800 - 132,100 66.05 2508 Mine AP Frag 42000 48300 35300 31800 60400 46900 49200 24400 130900 116700 197900 76300 860,100 1,720.20 2509 Mine AP Frag 1800 3400 3200 41100 5000 2000 1600 950 10900 0 0 0 69,950 139.90 2510 Mine AP Bakelite 22900 17900 35200 25600 26500 26590 37500 13800 12600 70500 15400 5800 310,290 186.17

Total Qty 83100 87100 81300 137900 119090 112090 132690 50750 193300 265800 262200 82100 1,607,420 2,229.81 Distribution % 5.2 5.4 5.1 8.6 7.4 7.0 8.3 3.2 12.0 16.5 16.3 5.1

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ANNEX C

GENERAL DISPERSION OF AP MINES STOCKPILE

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ANNEX D TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS – ALBANIAN AP MINES. The following Appendices form basic technical descriptions of the make-up and operation of the mines. The data was collected from the Albanian Mines handbook and supplemented from Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance where information was lacking. Appendixes: 1. Mine AP Fragmentation 2. Mine AP Wood/Bakelite. 3. Mine AP Fibre.

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APPENDIX 1

TO ANNEX D

MINE AP FRAGMENTATION TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION 1. Introduction 1.1 The Mine Anti-Personnel Fragmentation is a simple design that has been copied by many countries. The mine an approximate copy of the CIS POMZ-2 and was manufactured in large quantities in Albania as well as being imported from both China and the former Soviet Union. 1.2 There are two variations of the mine; one has a screw–fit striker and the other a push-fit. Within the context of this proposal these differences are irrelevant 2. Manufacture(s) 2.1 Manufactured at the Polican factory and filled at Mjerksi. 3. Components

Components of the mine3 1. Mine body 2. Explosive charge 3. Striker mechanism 4. Release pin 5. Tensioner 6. Trip wire 7. Anchor stake 8. Mine stake

4. Method of operation 4.1 The fuze is fitted with either a push-fir or screwed detonator as appropriate and fitted in the fuze-well. The anchored trip-wire is attached to the release pin and the safety pin can then be removed from the mine. When the trip-wire is pulled, the pin is extracted allowing the pre-cocked striker to impinge on the detonator. 5. Safety arrangements 5.1 The striker mechanisms and detonators are both stored unassembled, but within the same package. 6. Containers 3 AAF Publication “Manual per Perdorimin E Minave Dhe Te Explozivava Ne luften Populorre”

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6.1 The mines are invariably packed 10 to a wooden package, will all necessary components. Table 1 - Technical Specifications Local designations Mina MKK-TH

Local catalogue numbers(s)

2508 Mine AP Frag w/screw thread 2509 Mine AP Frag w/o screw thread

Operating pressure 1 to 3 kg Dimensions 130mm x 60mm Colour Green Body material Cast iron Weight of mine 2.3Kg Explosive type TNT, wax paper wrapped, unmarked. Explosive weight 75 g Table 2 – General Information

Emplacement By hand only Depth laid4 Laid above surface

Detectability Easily visibly detectable. Anti-handling None Blast resistance5 Difficult to counter-charge because of thickness of mine wall. Cross reference Chinese type 58, Czech PP-Mi-Sk, FRY MPR-1.

Boxed mines Mine body and charge

Detonator Striker mechanism

4 As taught by the Albanian Armed Forces 5 Blast resistance to counter-charging.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX D

MINE AP WOOD TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION 1. Introduction 1.1 The Mine Anti-Personnel Wood is an approximate copy of the CIS PMD-6 and was manufactured in large quantities in Albania and there exits an identical counterpart which has a body made of bakelite. The majority of these mines were manufactured in Albania but a quantity of 150,000 were imported from the former Soviet Union between 1953 and 1959. 1.2 Mine Anti-Personnel Wood is a simple box design the origins of which can be traced back to the second work war.

2. Manufacture(s) 2.1 Mines were manufactured in the Polican factory and assembled at the Mjerksi factory. 3. Components

Components of the mine6

1. Arming rod. 2. Mine body 3. Fuze SHT 4. TNT charge

6 AAF Publication “Manual per Perdorimin E Minave Dhe Te Explozivava Ne luften Populorre”

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Components of the Fuze SHT 1. Striker body 2. Striker 3. Striker spring 4. Safety pin 5. Detonator

4. Method of operation 4.1 Mine Anti-Personnel Wood may be operated by pressure or tripwire. The fuze assembly is inserted into mine and the detonator is pressed home into the TNT explosive charge. In the pressure the winged striker-retaining pin is turned through 90 degrees to align the flattened end of the pin with the elliptical striker retaining pin hole. The lid of the mine then rests on the wings. Once armed, pressure applied on the lid simply pushes the pin out of the fuze assembly allowing the striker to impinge on the detonator. 5. Safety arrangements 5.1 The striker mechanisms and detonators are store unassembled but in the same package. 6. Containers 6.1 The mines, both Bakelite and wood variants are packed in various configurations

in wooden packaging. Table 1 - Technical Specifications Local designations Mina KK- Druri

Local catalogue numbers(s)

2505 (Wooden body) 2510 (Bakelite body)

Operating pressure 1 to 12 kg Dimensions 200mm x 90mm x 45 Colour Unfinished softwoods Body material Softwoods or Bakelite Weight of mine 460 g Explosive type TNT, wax paper wrapped, unmarked. Explosive weight 200 g

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Table 2 – General Information

Emplacement By hand only Depth laid7 1-2 cm below the ground, covered.

Detectability Easily detectable Anti-handling None know Blast resistance8 Very susceptible to counter-charging. Cross reference Chinese type 59, FRY PMD-1, Czech PP Mi-D

Mine AP Bakelite boxed Mine AP Bakelite, open.

Mine AP Wood boxed Mine AP Wood, open.

7 As taught by the Albanian Armed Forces 8 Blast resistance to counter-charging.

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX D

MINE AP FIBRE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION 1. Introduction 1.1 The Mine AP Fibre is a pressure operated AP mine that was introduced into service in the early 1960s The Mine Anti-Personnel Fibre is an approximate copy of the CIS PMN and was manufactured in large quantities in Albania as well as imports from China over the period 1969-70.

2. Manufacture(s) 2.1 Manufactured at the Polican factory and filled at Mjekase filling plant. 3. Components

Components of the mine and fuze 1. Fibre mine body 2. Rubber lid 3. Fuze assembly 4. Detonator 5. Explosive charge. 6. Safety pin 7. Lid securing ring.

4. Method of operation 4.1 The Mine Anti-Personnel Fibre is operated by pressure. The fuze assembly is inserted into the mine traversely and the detonator and striker are kept out of line by the plunger. When the safety pin is removed it starts a lead shear-wire decay mechanism, which provides a safe-to-arm period of up to 20 minutes. When armed and sufficient pressure is exerted on the mine the plunger moves down allowing the striker to impinge on the detonator. 5. Safety arrangements 5.1 Fuzes are not stored in the mines. Packages of fuzes are stored in the same outer container for operational convenience. 6. Containers 6.1 All containers are wooden in construction and contain 15 mines.

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Table 1 - Technical Specifications Local designations Mina KK- Fibre

Local catalogue numbers(s)

2507

Operating pressure 6 to 20 kg Dimensions 110 mm diameter, 53 mm deep. Colour Black Body material Bakelite Weight of mine 550 g Explosive type TNT cast. Explosive weight 240 g Table 2 – General Information

Emplacement By hand only. Depth laid9 Cover with soil or camouflage or 5 cm snow.

Detectability Fairly easily detectable Anti-handling None known Blast resistance10 None. The mine is very susceptible to counter-charging. Cross reference CIS: PMN, Hungarian GYATA-64, Chinese Type 58, FRY

PMA-3.

Mines Boxed Mine Opened

Side view Bottom view

9 As taught by the Albanian Armed Forces 10 Blast resistance to counter-charging.

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ANNEX E DETONATOR INCINERATOR

Figure 1 - General View

Figure 2 - Cutaway View

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ANNEX F JOB DESCRIPTIONS FOR PROJECT SUPERVISION STAFF

A. PROJECT SUPERVISOR 1. General. The Project Supervisor will be employed by NAMSA as a consultant for the duration of the project. He/she will be responsible to NAMSA for management of the project in Albania.

2. Reporting. The Project Supervisor will report to the Programme Manager, Special Projects Programme through the Chief, Ammunition and Missiles Section.

3. Support. The Project Supervisor will be supported by a locally-employed Administrative Assistant who will also act as an interpreter and translator. He/she will supervise the work of the Verification Auditor working at the MJERKASI explosives factory. He/she will be provided with appropriate transport (short wheelbase 4WD vehicle) and a lockable office with computer, internet, telephone and fax facilities in the Albanian Ministry of Defence (MOD).

4. Freedom of Movement and Access. Under the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between NAMSA and the Albanian MOD the Project Supervisor, the Administrative Assistant and the Verification Auditor will have unrestricted access to ammunition storage sites and the MJERKASI explosives factory to conduct verification activities.

5. General Duties. The duties of the Project Supervisor will cover the following principal areas:

• Supervision of all aspects of the project in Albania.

• Liaison and advice to the AAF Ammunition & Logistics organisation.

• Liaison and advice to the MJERKASI explosives factory.

• Liaison and advice to the equipment development contractor.

6. Project Supervision. The Project Supervisor will have overall local responsibility for planning, execution and verification aspects of the mines stockpile destruction programme. This will include:

6.1 Safety Compliance. The Project Supervisor will monitor compliance with all safety issues in connection with the project.

6.2 Verification.

6.2.1 The Project Supervisor will design and develop a Mine Verification Account (MVA), including software tools, that will provide validation and corroboration of claimed demilitarization figures. The MVA will use data from the AAF out-loading programme, the MJERKASI operational areas and the MJERKASI factory auditor.

6.2.2 The Project Supervisor will conduct random checks on out-loading from depots and in-loading to MJERKASI.

6.3 Budget Monitoring. The Project Supervisor will conduct checks as directed by NAMSA to monitor actual expenditure and costs against the approved project budget to ensure the project is operating within budget.

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7. Advice to the AAF Ammunition & Logistics Organisation.

7.1 The Project Supervisor will assist the Logistics Branch of the MoD in the design and implementation of a logistics programme to move the AP mine stock to a central storage facility at MJERKASI.

7.2 The Project Supervisor will, in conjunction with the NATO AMODATT, design and execute a course for AAF ammunition technical staff concerning the safe movement of ammunition by road.

8. Advice to the MJERKASI Explosives Factory.

8.1 The Project Supervisor will assist the MJERKASI contractor in the design and documentation of plans and procedures for the technical aspects of the project. He/she will draft Explosive Limit Licences (ELL) to NATO standards for all buildings and facilities used for the project and submit them to the appropriate authority for approval.

8.2 The Project Supervisor will ensure that the best possible technical standards are maintained commensurate with local capabilities and resources. He/she will validate and approve any changes proposed by the MJERKASI contractor to the destruction plan.

9. Coordination with Equipment Development Contractor.

9.1 The Project Supervisor will assist NAMSA with the development of a Statement of Work for the equipment development contract.

9.2 The Project Supervisor will coordinate arrangements as necessary with Albanian government departments for the importation and installation of special machines at the MJERKASI explosives factory.

9.3 The Project Supervisor will assist as necessary with the coordination of arrangements for MJERKASI explosives factory personnel to visit the Equipment Development Contractor for training and familiarization.

SECONDARY DUTIES 10. Advice to AMAC and AMAE. The Project Supervisor will provide ad-hoc technical advice to the Albanian Mine Action Committee and the Albanian Mine Action Executive. This will include drafting Albania's submission under Article 7 of the Ottawa Convention.

11. NATO PFP Trust Fund Projects. As directed by NAMSA, the Project Supervisor will assist in the development of other projects under the NATO PFP Trust Fund for APM Stockpile Destruction.

12. Liaison with NATO AMODATT. The Project Supervisor will liaise as necessary with the NATO AMODATT.

B. ADMINISTRATION ASSISTANT 1 . General. The Administration Assistant is responsible to the Project Supervisor for assisting in the administration of the project and acting as interpreter and translator as required.

2. Reporting. The Administration Assistant will report to the Project Supervisor.

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3. Duties.

3.1 Administration.

3.1.1 Develop and maintain a system of files and record keeping. Act as System Administrator for the in-house computer system. Maintain the stationery system.

3.1.2 Prepare documentation paying and recovering local taxes (TVSH).

3.1.3 Prepare and submit customs and importation documentation.

3.1.4 Maintain a budget monitoring system. Prepare budgetary reports as necessary.

3.2 Interpreter/Translator.

3.2.1 Act as an English/Albanian interpreter to the Project Supervisor and official visitors. These duties include travel to all locations where project activity is being conducted.

3.2.2 Translate documents from English to Albanian (and reverse).

C. VERIFICATION AUDITOR 1. The Verification Auditor will be based permanently at the MJERKASI explosives factory.

2. He/she will be responsible to the Project Supervisor for monitoring and recording all logistic aspects of the demilitarization of the APM stockpile. He/she will help to maintain a computer-based Mine Verification Account (MVA) that will provide validation and corroboration of demilitarization figures. The MVA will use data from the AAF out-loading programme and the MJERKASI operational areas.

3. The Verification Auditor will maintain records that provide a complete, auditable trail of mines, components, by-products and waste streams. In particular, he/she will:

• Check and record mine in-loading to the facility.

• Continuously audit mine and mine component data at the MJERKASI facility.

• Provide daily input to the Mines Verification Account (MVA) held by the Project Supervisor.

• Monitor the use of supplies and other consumable resources by the MJERKASI factory to ensure they are being used efficiently.

• Conduct local research and and assist with procurement as required on behalf of the MJERKASI management.

• Liaise with MJERKASI management on behalf of the Project Supervisor.

• Monitor mine stock levels to ensure:

Explosive limit licences are not exceeded in storage or operational areas.

Buffer stock levels are maintained.

4. The Verification Auditor must speak and write English and Albanian. He/she must have adequate end-user skills to operate the computer-based Mine Verification Account.

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